! Given By U. S. SUPT. OFLOCUAIENTS t 3^ THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY if Tachikawa Aircraft Company (Tachikawa Hikoki K K) CORPORATION REPORT NO. X (Airframes) AIRCRAFT DIVISION February 1947 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Tachikawa Aircraft Company ( Tachikawa Hikoki K K ) CORPORATION REPORT NO. X (Airframes) AIRCRAFT DIVISION Dates of Survey 20-24 November 1945 Date of Publication February 1947 ~'~J i*r3^ ( . U 1^ tfi I. WPERtNTENDEKT OF'OOC APR. 8 1947 This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. u : FOREWORD The United States Strategic Bombing Sur- civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enli-sted men. The vey was established by the Secretary of War on military segment of the organization was drawn 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both conduct an impartial and expert study of the the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos- effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, used in connection with air attacks on Japan transport, and infoi-mation. The Survey oper- and to establish a basis for evaluating the im- ated from headquarters established in Tokyo portance and potentialities of air power as an early in September 1945, with subheadquarters instrument of military strategy for planning in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, the future development of the United States and with mobile teams operating in other parts armed forces and for determining future eco- of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the nomic policies with respect to the national Asiatic mainland. defense. A summary report and some 200 sup- It was possible to reconstruct much of war- porting reports containing the findings of the time Japanese military planning and execution, Survey in Germany have been published. engagement by engagement, and campaign by In 15 August 1945. President Truman re- campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate quested that the Survey conduct a similar study statistics on Japan's economy and war produc- tion, of the effects of all types of air attack in the plant by plant, and industry by industry. In war against Japan, submitting reports in dupli- addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all cate to the Secretary of War and to the Secre- strategic plans and the background of her tary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey entry into the war, the internal discussions during its Japanese phase were and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. and morale among the civilian population, the Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense or- Chairmen. ganization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Harry L. Bowman, Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of J. Kenneth Galbraith, the study. Rensis Likert, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa- nese Frank A. McNamee, Jr., military, government, and industrial offi- cials. It Fred Searls, Jr., also recovered and translated many doc- Monroe E. Spaght, uments which not only have been useful to the Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for Theodore P. Wright, Directors. other studies. Arrangements have been made to Walter Wilds, Secretary. turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelli- gence Group, through which they will be avail- The Survey's complement provided for 300 able for further examination and distribution. m TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry The Air Attacks : 7 Production Statistics 12 Evaluation of Preattack Intelligence 20 Appendices : A—Tachikawa Plant Layout Facing page 22 B—Okayama Plant Layout 23 C—Kofu Plant Layout Facing page 24 D—Production 1929-40 25 E—Bomb Plot of Attack 17 February 1945 1. Facing page 26 F—Bomb Plot of Attack 4 April 1945 2. Facing page 26 G—Bomb Plot of Attack 24 April 1945 3. Facing page 26 H—Damage Plot of IB Attack 2 August 1945 4. Facing page 26 I—Air Attack Defense Map 5. Facing page 26 J—Production 1941-45 .__ 27 THE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY Introduction The Tachikawa Aircraft Co., Ltd. (Tachi- kawa Hikoki K K), which in 1944 produced approximately nine percent of Japanese air- craft, owned and operated three plants located at Tachikawa, Okayama and Kofu (Figure 1). (See insert on following page.) There was a total of about 3,600,000 sq. ft. of fioor space under roof, most of which was at Tachikawa, the third largest airframe plant in Japan. The company was founded in 1924. The first recorded production was one reconnaissance 88 in January 1929 in a small building on the southwest side of Tachikawa airfield. The rate of production on this plane varied from one to ten planes per month until mid-1932 when fighter 91 was added to bring total produc- tion in 1933 to 115. The relatively small size of the plant was shown by a total floor area in 1935 of 131,475 sq. ft. During 1940, production had grown to 1,000 planes a year (Appendix D) . This was after the great expansion program of that year, which added 1,650,280 sq. ft, to the plant area. Fur- ther additions brought the total area up to 3,131,800 sq. ft. (Table 1). Table 1 —Tachikawa Plan! Expansions Year Tachikawa Aircraft Co., Ltd. There was close contact with the MiUtary l-ij^ure 2.—Organization Chart, President .— Saburo Ando Division and later with the Air- Aeronautical Managing Director Masago Asakawa craft Division of the Munitions Ministry. There Tachikawa Plant is no record of direct financial aid having been Director Takashi Fujimoto - Moriyuki Nakagwa given to the corporation, but Director Fujimoto Assistant General Aflfairs Sigeo Kuriowa of the Tachikawa plant stated that the govern- Financial „ - Toshio Kawasaki Masaki ment directed banks to make loans for purposes Labor - Nobuyoshi - - Kikuo Tsuchiya of expansion. Material — Subcontractors -— Takeshi Hashida Control .....MinoruChiba Okayama Plant Organization and Operation Director...- .— - - .Kazuo Tsutsumi Subdirector Ryokichi Saburo Ando was the president of the Tachi- Production Hitoshi Nakamura kawa Aircraft Co., Ltd. ; Masago Asakwa was Kofu Plant Shiro Yoshiwara the managing director. The company had three Director Production.. Shoji Nomura divisions ; Tachikawa, directed by Takashi Assistant.— ..Motosuke Yoshiwada Fujimoto; Okayama, directed by Kazuo Tsut- The Sunagawa, or northern, section of Tachi- sumi, and Kofu, directed by Shiro Koshiwara kawa was the assembly part of the plant. Here (Figure 2). In the main, the Tachikawa plant were set up the Oscar and Hickory produc- furnished the engineering and technical staffs tion lines, and tooling up for Patsy was in for the corporation. process when the war ended (Figure 3). Oscar EIHAUST PIPES SOB *SS£Mai.T TflWIS PUIMBWO SHOP FVS£L*5E tSSEIiaLr S OCPE SHOP SUB assEMSL' SHEtHCTaL SHOP sscMBL. swy FiycwcsHOP Soe aSSEwBH MJC" SHOP-STpTu MOUSE FWttL ASSEMBLY FLfcrwg su ^TJTpnw S SXETIJETAt 5^ FWai. flSSe>WL' CONSTRUCTION LEGEND W WOOD CONSTRUCTDN S-CTECL FUME C ffEWOOCED CONCRETE ; ST;;jlTtGiC SO* TACMKAWA AIRCRAFT CO 704696—47—2 final assembly had four lines with 25 machines The Tachikawa plant went on a two-shift shifts work- on each line. Ideal assembly time was 10 days basis 1 March 1944. The were ten plant but actual time was 10 to 14 days. Hickory ing hours with one rest hour each. The inoperative from 0530 to 0730 each day. had two lines with 10 machines on each line. was That procedure affected 76 percent of the direct Ideal assembly time was 10 days and actual employees. At Kofu and Okayama, and at time was 10 to 12 days. Two-line production for Tachikawa prior to 1 March 1944, the single Patsy was planned with tooling undertaken, shift 0800 to 1800, with a noon rest hour, was but never was put into effect. Okayama and used. Kofu were not developed beyond the "job shop" At Tachikawa students and soldiers were stage. used from April 1944 until August 1945. Their Total number of employees expanded rapidly peak employment was in January and February from 9,000 in January 1941 to the peak of 31,- 1945 when 2,600 students and 150 soldiers 1944. At that time 30,500 were at 000 in May were employed. the newly opened Oka- Tachikawa and 500 at The number of man-hours worked by direct of those at yama plant. Approximately 5,000 laborers at Tachikawa reached a maximum of Tachikawa were being trained for Okayama 5,100,000 in April 1944 when men were being and Kofu production. At the close of produc- trained for employment at Okayama and Kofu 1945, Tachikawa employed 13,750 tion, August (Figure 7) . Okayama actually was in operation (Figure 4); Okayama 3,280 (Figure 5), and at that time but only 120,000 man hours were Kofu 2,170 (Figure 6). The big drop at Tachi- worked that month. As man-hours decreased at kawa was due to the transfer of 10,000 work- Tachikawa they increased at Okayama, reach- men to subcontractors. ing a maximum of 607,000 in June 1945 (Fig- 32 30 28 2S r" .