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The Search for a Unique Australian Counterinsurgency

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The Search for a Unique Australian Counterinsurgency “Contact – Wait Out”: The Search for a Unique Australian Counterinsurgency. Nathan Sng Student No. - A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Liberal Arts and Science (Honours) in History. The University of Sydney 2020 1 Abstract: Between 1962 and 1972 Australia was involved in a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam. Counterinsurgencies emerged as the definitive style of warfare during the Cold War. Many prominent nations employed their own unique counterinsurgency doctrines. This thesis examined whether a unique Australian counterinsurgency developed during the Vietnam War. Review of a variety of primary resources indicated that although Australia did not appear to develop a unique counterinsurgency doctrine in the Vietnam War, there is evidence to suggest that distinctive Australian qualities were present, some of which were drawn from British and French examples of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Indochina. 2 Contents Introduction 4 Chapter One: Historiography of Counterinsurgency 10 Chapter Two: The Combat Corps 28 Chapter Three: The Support Corps 57 Conclusion 70 Bibliography 75 3 Introduction For the past two decades Australia has been involved in counterinsurgency operations around the world, the two biggest engagements being in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to these, the nation’s largest contribution to a counterinsurgency was during the Vietnam War. Before that Australia’s military involvement from 1955 to 1972 was perfused with counterinsurgencies in South East Asia.1 This period in Australian military history placed heavy demands on all three armed services, in particular the Army, with an almost constant 20 years of military campaigning in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam.2 Counterinsurgency has, in many senses, been Australia’s preferred choice of warfare since the end of World War Two. As such the Australian Army has defined a counterinsurgency as “the political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency”.3 The Australian military commitment to Vietnam lasted from 1962 to 1972. Its first contribution was a thirty-man training and advisory team. The initial group that arrived in Vietnam consisted of a mixture of officers and non-commissioned officers from the infantry. Before Australian soldiers were even committed to Vietnam in any capacity, it was noted by Garfield Barwick, the Australian Minister for Defence in 1962, that the opinion held by American officials in Saigon ‘were rather unenthusiastic’ about the possibility of Australian military contribution to Vietnam, as they believed that they had sufficient troops already.4 The advisory team arrived in August 1962, officially marking the beginning of Australia’s 1 Jeffrey Grey, A military history of Australia, Rev. ed. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 214. 2 Grey, A military history of Australia, 214. 3 “Counterinsurgency” LWD 3-0-1, Land Warfare Doctrine, Australian Army (2009), 26-27. 4 Bruce Davies, Vietnam : the complete story of the Australian war, ed. Gary McKay (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 64. 4 military commitment to Vietnam.5 Later In 1965, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was deployed to Vietnam and was attached to an American infantry unit, marking the first intentional combat troop commitment to South Vietnam.6 Eventually Australia would rotate over 60,000 military personnel to Vietnam, with around 40% of them being national service conscripts.7 While Australia would demonstrate their warfighting prowess in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam, they were most certainly not the only nation to conduct counterinsurgencies. Most counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century emerged as a result of colonial revolts, though many styles of counterinsurgency and insurgency have come to the fore. The British alone have fought counterinsurgencies in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen and Northern Ireland.8 Each of these presented the British with a differing set of challenges and considerations where tactics and strategy used in one country did not work in another.9 During this time, the British demonstrated that they could succeed in counterinsurgency when other nations could not. Examples of this include the French failures in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the Soviets in Afghanistan. During the mid-twentieth century tactics and strategies of waging war and revolution devised by communist regimes and ideological leaders such as Mao Ze Dong, Che Guevara, Ngo Nguyen Giap and to an extent Vladimir Lenin flourished. British Army Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck refers to two patterns of communist revolution in his 1966 publication on counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. The two patterns Clutterbuck refer to are the 5 Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, Australia and the Vietnam War : the essential history., (Coogee, N.S.W: NewSouth Publishing, 2014), 77. 6 Paul Ham, Vietnam : the Australian war (Pymble, N.S.W: HarperCollins, 2007), 118. 7 Jane Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," in Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War, ed. Peter King (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 72-75. 8 John Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 1. 9 Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland, 1-2. 5 Russian model and the Chinese model.10 The Russian pattern relies heavily on focusing the seizure of power in urban centres through a coup d’état combining political manoeuvring, organised rioting and the capture of key points. In parallel with this, control of the army and police is also paramount. Any attempts to win public support would only be attempted after power has been seized.11 The Russian pattern is the preferred option as it is often the quicker one. However in reality, the Russian Communists of the time, crucially, had very little understanding of guerrilla warfare or organising popular support for guerrillas, as is evidenced during World War Two when their nation was under German occupation.12 By comparison, the Chinese pattern differs greatly from the Russian, with an ethos based on a grass roots movement focused on the rural side of the nation as well as its population. However, Clutterbuck claims the Chinese pattern is a result of the Russian model failing to work in those circumstances.13. For a clearer, more concise, and a frankly less British perspective and understanding of revolutionary warfare, it is best to refer to the writings of the theorists themselves.14 Vietnam was a watershed moment of sorts for Australian society and the nation’s perception of soldiers. The history of the war is rife with controversies ranging from strategic, diplomatic, military, political and social failure, and ineptitude.15 Similarly Australian involvement in Vietnam has been subject to a wide array of historical interpretation. 10 Richard L. Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 5-6. 11 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 6. 12 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 5-6. 13 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 6. 14 See Zedong Mao, Selected military writings of Mao Tse-tung, 1st ed. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). And Nguyên Giáp Võ, Selected writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1977). While not as evident in the Asian guerrilla conflicts Che Guevara’s guerrilla warfare is also interesting Che Guevara, Guerrilla warfare, ed. Thomas M. Davies and Brian Loveman, 3rd ed. ed. (Wilmington, Del. ;: SR Books, 1997). 15 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, xii. 6 While much historical literature has been written on the Australian involvement in Vietnam, little attention has been placed on situating the Australian counterinsurgency in Vietnam and where it stands by comparison to attempts by other nations. Peter Edwards addresses this when he forecasted the avenues of historical inquiry during the early 80s. Edwards lists potential for further critical analysis in strategic policy, American-British- Australian relations, changing military traditions and perceptions of the Australian soldier, as well as opportunities for inquiry into Australian social history.16 There is an abundance of literature authored by veterans of The Vietnam War, many of them detailing their personal experiences while others have attempted to provide a more analytical reflection on the war and how it was fought. Interestingly, very few of these works make specific reference to counterinsurgency, instead they focus on the innerworkings of their platoon, company dynamics or provide overall unit history of their deployment with some anecdotal commentary. Therefore, there is a gap in the literature that discusses the unique properties of Australian counterinsurgency, or how Australians managed to shape their own identity in counterinsurgency operations. Researching the possibility of a unique Australian counterinsurgency could shed a great deal of light on how and where Australia fits globally regarding the conceptualisation of warfighting. Increasingly so, as counterinsurgency style wars are likely to remain at the forefront of most military engagements for the foreseeable future, looking at the lessons of the past are likely to prevent those mistakes from repeating. In order to determine if there is a unique Australian perspective in counterinsurgency
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