“Contact – Wait Out”:

The Search for a Unique Australian

Counterinsurgency.

Nathan Sng

Student No. -

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Bachelor of Liberal Arts and Science (Honours) in History.

The University of Sydney

2020

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Abstract: Between 1962 and 1972 Australia was involved in a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.

Counterinsurgencies emerged as the definitive style of warfare during the Cold War. Many prominent nations employed their own unique counterinsurgency doctrines. This thesis examined whether a unique Australian counterinsurgency developed during the Vietnam

War. Review of a variety of primary resources indicated that although Australia did not appear to develop a unique counterinsurgency doctrine in the Vietnam War, there is evidence to suggest that distinctive Australian qualities were present, some of which were drawn from British and French examples of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Indochina.

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Contents

Introduction 4

Chapter One: Historiography of Counterinsurgency 10

Chapter Two: The Combat Corps 28

Chapter Three: The Support Corps 57

Conclusion 70

Bibliography 75

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Introduction For the past two decades Australia has been involved in counterinsurgency operations around the world, the two biggest engagements being in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Prior to these, the nation’s largest contribution to a counterinsurgency was during the

Vietnam War. Before that Australia’s military involvement from 1955 to 1972 was perfused with counterinsurgencies in South East Asia.1 This period in Australian military history placed heavy demands on all three armed services, in particular the Army, with an almost constant 20 years of military campaigning in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam.2

Counterinsurgency has, in many senses, been Australia’s preferred choice of warfare since the end of World War Two. As such the Australian Army has defined a counterinsurgency as

“the political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency”.3

The Australian military commitment to Vietnam lasted from 1962 to 1972. Its first contribution was a thirty-man training and advisory team. The initial group that arrived in

Vietnam consisted of a mixture of officers and non-commissioned officers from the infantry.

Before Australian soldiers were even committed to Vietnam in any capacity, it was noted by

Garfield Barwick, the Australian Minister for Defence in 1962, that the opinion held by

American officials in Saigon ‘were rather unenthusiastic’ about the possibility of Australian military contribution to Vietnam, as they believed that they had sufficient troops already.4

The advisory team arrived in August 1962, officially marking the beginning of Australia’s

1 Jeffrey Grey, A military history of Australia, Rev. ed. ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 214. 2 Grey, A military history of Australia, 214. 3 “Counterinsurgency” LWD 3-0-1, Land Warfare Doctrine, Australian Army (2009), 26-27. 4 Bruce Davies, Vietnam : the complete story of the Australian war, ed. Gary McKay (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 64.

4 military commitment to Vietnam.5 Later In 1965, the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian

Regiment was deployed to Vietnam and was attached to an American infantry unit, marking the first intentional combat troop commitment to South Vietnam.6 Eventually Australia would rotate over 60,000 military personnel to Vietnam, with around 40% of them being national service conscripts.7 While Australia would demonstrate their warfighting prowess in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam, they were most certainly not the only nation to conduct counterinsurgencies.

Most counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century emerged as a result of colonial revolts, though many styles of counterinsurgency and insurgency have come to the fore.

The British alone have fought counterinsurgencies in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus,

South Yemen and Northern Ireland.8 Each of these presented the British with a differing set of challenges and considerations where tactics and strategy used in one country did not work in another.9 During this time, the British demonstrated that they could succeed in counterinsurgency when other nations could not. Examples of this include the French failures in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the Soviets in Afghanistan.

During the mid-twentieth century tactics and strategies of waging war and revolution devised by communist regimes and ideological leaders such as Mao Ze Dong, Che Guevara,

Ngo Nguyen Giap and to an extent Vladimir Lenin flourished. British Army Brigadier Richard

Clutterbuck refers to two patterns of communist revolution in his 1966 publication on counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. The two patterns Clutterbuck refer to are the

5 Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, Australia and the Vietnam War : the essential history., (Coogee, N.S.W: NewSouth Publishing, 2014), 77. 6 Paul Ham, Vietnam : the Australian war (Pymble, N.S.W: HarperCollins, 2007), 118. 7 Jane Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," in Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second Indo-China War, ed. Peter King (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 72-75. 8 John Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 1. 9 Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland, 1-2.

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Russian model and the Chinese model.10 The Russian pattern relies heavily on focusing the seizure of power in urban centres through a coup d’état combining political manoeuvring, organised rioting and the capture of key points. In parallel with this, control of the army and police is also paramount. Any attempts to win public support would only be attempted after power has been seized.11 The Russian pattern is the preferred option as it is often the quicker one. However in reality, the Russian Communists of the time, crucially, had very little understanding of guerrilla warfare or organising popular support for guerrillas, as is evidenced during World War Two when their nation was under German occupation.12 By comparison, the Chinese pattern differs greatly from the Russian, with an ethos based on a grass roots movement focused on the rural side of the nation as well as its population.

However, Clutterbuck claims the Chinese pattern is a result of the Russian model failing to work in those circumstances.13. For a clearer, more concise, and a frankly less British perspective and understanding of revolutionary warfare, it is best to refer to the writings of the theorists themselves.14

Vietnam was a watershed moment of sorts for Australian society and the nation’s perception of soldiers. The history of the war is rife with controversies ranging from strategic, diplomatic, military, political and social failure, and ineptitude.15 Similarly

Australian involvement in Vietnam has been subject to a wide array of historical interpretation.

10 Richard L. Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 5-6. 11 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 6. 12 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 5-6. 13 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 6. 14 See Zedong Mao, Selected military writings of Mao Tse-tung, 1st ed. ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). And Nguyên Giáp Võ, Selected writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1977). While not as evident in the Asian guerrilla conflicts Che Guevara’s guerrilla warfare is also interesting Che Guevara, Guerrilla warfare, ed. Thomas M. Davies and Brian Loveman, 3rd ed. ed. (Wilmington, Del. ;: SR Books, 1997). 15 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, xii.

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While much historical literature has been written on the Australian involvement in

Vietnam, little attention has been placed on situating the Australian counterinsurgency in

Vietnam and where it stands by comparison to attempts by other nations. Peter Edwards addresses this when he forecasted the avenues of historical inquiry during the early 80s.

Edwards lists potential for further critical analysis in strategic policy, American-British-

Australian relations, changing military traditions and perceptions of the Australian soldier, as well as opportunities for inquiry into Australian social history.16 There is an abundance of literature authored by veterans of The Vietnam War, many of them detailing their personal experiences while others have attempted to provide a more analytical reflection on the war and how it was fought. Interestingly, very few of these works make specific reference to counterinsurgency, instead they focus on the innerworkings of their platoon, company dynamics or provide overall unit history of their deployment with some anecdotal commentary. Therefore, there is a gap in the literature that discusses the unique properties of Australian counterinsurgency, or how Australians managed to shape their own identity in counterinsurgency operations.

Researching the possibility of a unique Australian counterinsurgency could shed a great deal of light on how and where Australia fits globally regarding the conceptualisation of warfighting. Increasingly so, as counterinsurgency style wars are likely to remain at the forefront of most military engagements for the foreseeable future, looking at the lessons of the past are likely to prevent those mistakes from repeating.

In order to determine if there is a unique Australian perspective in counterinsurgency operations, this thesis will be divided into three sections:

16 Peter Edwards, "The Post - 1945 Conflicts: Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam," in Australia, Two Centuries of War and Peace, ed. Michael McKernan and Margaret Browne (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988), 296-309.

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Chapter 1 will focus on the historiography and background of Australian, British and

French counterinsurgency. Britain and France are crucial nations to examine when discussing counterinsurgency as these nations had vast overseas territories and colonies which sought independence and the right to self-determination through armed conflict after World War Two. Examination of British counterinsurgency in particular would provide pivotal and crucial contrast to the Australians as many military traditions and doctrines are shared between these two nations.17 Similarly, an analysis of the French experience will allow for further scrutiny of their counterinsurgency approach in a comparable setting with particular emphasis on their campaigns in Vietnam/Indochina. Finally, a look into the current Australian literature on counterinsurgency will allow for a solid foundational basis on which the other two chapters will build on.

Chapter 2 will focus on the military operations conducted in Vietnam by the combat corps, specifically focusing on the Special Air Service and the Infantry. Looking at the

Infantry is vital when looking at any Australian military involvement in armed conflict as the infantryman in a rifle platoon was the basic element of Australian forces in all military campaigns.18 The Infantry, while strictly focused on combat, were at the forefront of meeting and communicating with the local population. Comparisons between the

Australians and Americans will also be discussed in this chapter, allowing for a greater contrast of how Australian counterinsurgency distinguished itself from its allied counterparts.

Chapter 3 covers the remaining combat support corps, with emphasis on the

Armoured Corps, Intelligence Corps, Engineer Corps and the military advisors in the

17 Russell Parkin, "The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942-1974," Small Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 1 (2009). 18 Edwards, "The Post - 1945 Conflicts: Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam," 305.

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Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV). These corps represent different facets of counterinsurgency operations, which in most cases were concerned with military contributions. While some of these corps were combat oriented, they also had non-military objectives. The Engineer Corps encompassed both civilian and military engineering projects, while the Intelligence Corps focused on all aspects of information transferred throughout the war. Meanwhile the AATTV was constantly engaged in combat and noncombat roles all throughout South Vietnam.

This thesis will attempt to discover if there was a uniquely Australian style of counterinsurgency, using the Vietnam War as an example. Given that there are many counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners, as well as various historians who have dedicated their careers to studying counterinsurgency, a number of different conclusions have emerged. In which case it is an interesting line of inquiry to investigate whether

Australia, a relatively young nation with an established military history, ever endeavoured to craft its own form of counterinsurgency.

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Chapter 1: Historiography of Counterinsurgency Conventional warfare refers to opposing forces fighting against each other engaging in peer to peer combat using regular armies.19 Typically, in a conventional war the primary objective is to eliminate or incapacitate the enemy forces and their ability to engage in conflict using conventional military means. Irregular or unconventional warfare, as the name implies, differs from conventional warfare quite significantly. Insurgency and counterinsurgency fall under the banner of unconventional warfare’ as it often does away with the peer against peer, well defined forces style of combat and instead features ill- defined combatants conducting guerrilla style, clandestine and subversive operations.20 In many cases the cessation or stalling of a conventional war may lead to the adoption of unconventional tactics as a continuation of fighting. The US Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency states that “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.”21 Thus, with the primary goal of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies being political in nature, it may seem to suggest that conventional military forces are not directly involved. While there is an element of truth to that, conventional forces are still used quite extensively, even in counterinsurgency operations.

Engagement in a conventional war is where a conventional force may be solely concentrated on defeating an established and well-defined enemy. This can be juxtaposed against an unconventional war where the same military units are dedicated to engaging in

19 Anna M Wittmann, Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare (ABC-CLIO, 2016), 81. 20 Wittmann, Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare, 335. 21 Army United States. Department of the, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual : U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24 : Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5, University of Chicago Press ed. / foreword by John A. Nagl ; with a new introduction by Sarah Sewall. ed., U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3.

10 warfare with a less defined or elusive enemy. In this case, the insurgent forces will have both a political and military basis.

Many countries have engaged in counterinsurgencies, where some have resulted in success, whereas others have unequivocally failed. Clear examples indicate that there is no established “one size fits all” style of warfare that suits all insurgencies. While similarities may be apparent, each conflict presents its own unique set of challenges. Religious and ethnic groups are often of paramount interest to counterinsurgent strategists as the political goals of insurgents revolve around these groups. The tactics, strategies, and doctrine of communist thinkers, like Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, laid the foundations on which many insurgencies conducted their uprisings and revolts.

First, it is important to define what a counterinsurgency is and what it entails. “The essence of success in counter-insurgency was to win the political and social support of the civilian population, both in the major cities and in the rural areas.” This quote by Robert

O’Neill describes the fundamental requirement when conducting counterinsurgency operations.22 However, with a heavy commitment in engaging against the communist forces in combat, creating solid and meaningful connections with the civilian populace is not an easy task. While Australian soldiers had experience with quelling communist uprisings with military strength in Malaya and Papua New Guinea during World War Two, a significant portion of the preparation for a tour in Vietnam was geared towards actively seeking out and closing with the enemy.

A constant amongst most Cold War counterinsurgencies is the concept and fixation over “winning hearts and minds”.23 While this phrase has since been appropriated to

22 Department of Veteran's Affairs, "Robert O'Neill (Australian Army), Counter-insurgency," (ANZAC portal, 2018). 23 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 4.

11 accommodate a variety of counterinsurgencies conducted by a number of other nations, its first association with counterinsurgency is believed to be during the Malayan Emergency.24

The phrase itself is believed to have been coined by a Frenchman by the name of Marshal

Hubert Lyautey during his posting in Indochina in 1894 where he was tasked with quelling the Black Flag pirate rebellion and later in Morocco. The phrase itself does have some deceptive elements, as by Lyautey’s own admission he saw it as a use of particular wording to appease the French public opposed to a viable military solution.25 While Lyautey may have used the phrase somewhat ironically, the British and other adopters of the phrase did so with the ‘intention’ of following the phrase literally.

French Counterinsurgency

The French gained the majority of their twentieth century counterinsurgency experience in their colonies, namely Algeria and Indochina. The origins of modern French counterinsurgency can be seen in the 1940’s under German occupation during World War

Two. It should be stated however, that French experiences of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency derivatives can be dated back to the medieval era.26 The counterinsurgency seen in Nazi occupied France largely came as a result of France’s inability to counter its invaders in regular warfare, and the subsequent guerrilla warfare, in the form of the French Resistance, seen combating Nazi occupation was, in some ways, forced onto the French.27 In a perverse way of thinking, the French counterinsurgency in Nazi occupied

24 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare : the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960, The Malayan emergency 1948-1960, (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004), 1. 25 Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: the development of French colonial warfare," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the nuclear age (1986): 391-94. 26 Élie Tenenbaum, "French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War," Journal of Strategic Studies: Myths and Realities of the French Way of War, Edited by Olivier Schmitt 40, no. 4 (2017): 555. 27 Tenenbaum, "French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War," 555-56.

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France, could also be viewed as an insurgency through the eyes of the invading Nazis. It was commonplace in mainstream French military culture that warfare should be chivalrous in nature, and the colonial wars seen in the nineteenth century was regarded as a second-rate theatre of war in comparison to the main theatre in Europe.28 As a result of this thinking, their experience and approach to counterinsurgency had to be built through trial and error or from the assistance of allied nations.

Interestingly, by the end of World War Two it looked as if forms of irregular warfare were being sidelined with many specialist and wartime organisations, like the Special

Operations Executive (SOE), Special Air Service (SAS UK) and the Office of Strategic Services

(OSS) having been disbanded by 1946.29 Only during the early stages of the Cold War when the threat of communist fifth column groups became of growing concern for the west were these espionage and insurgency specialists reactivated and transformed into countersubversion and counter-insurgent specialists. The British SAS later saw extensive service in Malaya and Borneo. However, France was still yet to make a specialist mission force despite gaining the required experience during World War Two.

While France’s allies were reinstating its specialist units to deal with this growing threat of insurgency during the early Cold War, the French state responded by raising its own specialist unit to deal with its communist uprising in Indochina. In 1951 the

Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes (Composite Airborne Commando group,

GMCA) was established, with their primary goal being to defeat the communist Vietminh

28 Tenenbaum, "French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War," 556. 29 R. Harris Smith, OSS: the secret history of America's first central intelligence agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 363.

13 using their own revolutionary concepts and tactics against them.30 Their first commanding officer stated that the aim of the GMCA was to “bring the struggle to the political and military fields; using as much psychological operations as possible; to combine their effects with those of the guerrilla to snatch the population from the Vietminh influence.”.31 The role the GMCA provided, that of a counter guerrilla force, would prove to be a very effective counterinsurgency strategy in Indochina with traces of their presence still seen in the well organised anti-communist guerrilla forces even after the French withdrawal.32

A similar strategy was used near the end of 1956 in Algeria where French forces tried using former rebel leaders to organise counter-guerrillas.33 However, unlike the GMCA who were French soldiers, the Algerian counter-guerrillas quickly turned against the French as adequate steps to ensure French political alignment amongst the Algerian ranks was not established. Eventually the French raised counter-guerrillas would start engaging French forces and begin to create their own political force in the regions they had been assigned to patrol.34 While proven to have worked in Indochina, its failure in Algeria went on to solidify another tenet of counterinsurgency warfare. That tenet being the lack of workable uniform strategies and tactics that can transcend each individual insurgency. Thus, it can be concluded that the actions taken to combat the insurgency need to be tailored to suit the varied cultural, political, ethnic, economic and military factors associated with them.

The French military presence in Vietnam would end soon after a colossal defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The base at Dien Bien Phu came as a result of a French desire to set

30 Philippe Pottier, "GCMA/GMI: a French experience in counterinsurgency during the French Indochina war," Small wars and insurgencies 16, no. 2 (2005): 125. 31 Pottier, "GCMA/GMI: a French experience in counterinsurgency during the French Indochina war," 125-26. 32 John J. McCuen, The art of counter-revolutionary war : the strategy of counter-insurgency (London: Faber, 1966), 240. 33 McCuen, The art of counter-revolutionary war : the strategy of counter-insurgency, 241. 34 McCuen, The art of counter-revolutionary war : the strategy of counter-insurgency, 241-42.

14 up a base of operations which was situated close to the Laotian and Chinese border in northern Vietnam.35 The Battle of Dien Bien Phu lasted for 55 days, coming to an end on the

7th of May, 1954.36 The communists launched repeated artillery barrages which destroyed the airfield, cut off radio communications and devastated the supply reserves, resulting in the French being well and truly cut off from support and surrounded. Eventually, they were forced to surrender as they were overrun, with only 3,000 of the 16,000 troops garrisoned at Dien Bien Phu surviving, only to experience harsh treatment as prisoners.37 The defeat at

Dien Bien Phu is not solely interesting in that it meant the French counterinsurgency in

Indochina had, in large part, failed, but that the communists had now reached a stage where they were capable of launching large scale attacks in a conventional manner. This was something which their successors in the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong

(VC) would go on to demonstrate during the American attempt years later. Ultimately the example of Dien Bien Phu in the context of counterinsurgency demonstrates that the counterinsurgent force should also be able to counter the enemy in a conventional warfare type manner.

Ultimately it is the opinion of some scholars and military officers that France fundamentally failed at counterinsurgency due to a lack of forward thinking and an insufficient degree of sensitivity to the political aspect of this style of warfare. Jules Roy, a former French military officer, is one of these individuals who support this position. Roy drew his conclusions from actively taking part in the Indochina war and Algeria. He stated that France failed in Indochina due to the leadership placing their faith in the “classic

35 George Odgers, 100 years of Australians at War: One hundred years of Australians at war, Revised ed. ed. (Sydney: New Holland, 2003), 295-96. 36 Odgers, 100 years of Australians at War: One hundred years of Australians at war, 296. 37 Odgers, 100 years of Australians at War: One hundred years of Australians at war, 296.

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Western military axioms and in practice sought a conventional military solution”.38 Roy’s position on French counterinsurgency being that they were relatively narrowminded is in line with the thinking presented by his compatriot Field Marshal Layutey who coined the phrase “hearts and minds” with little to no intention of following suit with the political actions the phrase implies should be taken.

While France, as a warfighting nation, may appear to have been more than capable of fighting counterinsurgencies, the unique properties of their strategy came into question when analysing their successes and failures. Élie Tenenbaum argues that France did not establish their own style of counterinsurgency and instead stated that, fundamentally, the

French military was swept up in the Cold War and followed the examples of the British.39

Tenenbaum’s argument is further supported by the French overconfidence in Indochina which resulted in a colossal failure in Dien Bien Phu. While Tenebaum’s assessment of

French counterinsurgency was correct, France was still capable of producing counterinsurgency theorists who were, for the most part, ‘successful’.

Amongst these theorists is David Galula, a veteran of the Algerian war for independence turned scholar. David Galula is often attributed as the primary theorist who shifted the focus of military action in counterinsurgency towards targeting the civilian population.40 As such one of Galula’s primary tenets of counterinsurgency was the separation of the insurgent from the population.41 This would prove to be crucial in the

38 Jules Roy, The battle of Dienbienphu, 1st Carroll & Graf ed. ed. (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1984), xvi. 39 Tenenbaum, "French Exception or Western Variation? A Historical Look at the French Irregular Way of War," 555-56. 40 Thomas Rid, "The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," Journal of strategic studies 33, no. 5 (2010): 729. 41 Rid, "The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine," 729.

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British victory in Malaya, though as will be discussed later in this chapter, was not necessarily done so by the counterinsurgent forces.

British Counterinsurgency

The United Kingdom has been involved in modern counterinsurgency operations since the end of the Second World War. To be exact the United Kingdom has taken part in seventy-two military campaigns and actions since the end of World War Two, seventeen of these were counterinsurgencies, and of those only seven can be classified as successes.42

The British effort in counterinsurgency is best analysed when approaching from two angles, the political and the military. The political side involves intelligence gathering, propaganda and media. The military angle covers the involvement and operations of the British armed forces and greater military effort. Given the extensive police involvement in the Malayan

Emergency and their role combining the political and military efforts, the police will be discussed in both sections. British Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck claimed that during his time in Malaya the counterinsurgency campaign could be divided into three parts: the defensive, the offensive and the victorious phases.43 The defensive stage was focused on civilian and military security. The civilian security aspect relied heavily on police presence and government control in villages, whereas the military security aspect was focused on breaking up large groups of the enemy, forcing them to split up, in turn relieving pressure on the villages.44 The offensive stage involved intelligence gathering at the grass roots level, preventing insurgents from benefiting from information provided by the local population who were their primary support.45 The final stage concerned the government, where the

42 Ian A Rigden, The British approach to counter-insurgency: myths, realities and strategic challenges, ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA (2008), 207. 43 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 3-5. 44 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 4. 45 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 4-5.

17 establishment of a stable central government capable of growing an economy, backed by a solid police force and supported at the grass roots level would prove a fatal blow to the communist insurgency.46 At a cursory glance the British counterinsurgency effort in the post-World War Two era can be summed up as an attempt to win over local hearts and minds. While Malaya did result in victory for the British, it was not done through a succinct well-designed plan, and was most certainly not done without encountering problems.

Amongst the most prominent examples of twentieth century British counterinsurgency and irregular warfare are the operations and activities of the Special

Operations Executive (SOE). The task of the SOE was “to co-ordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas”.47 The SOE was sent all over the world to conduct these missions, and by the end of WW2 there was hardly a country where

SOE agents had not conducted operations.48 The operations of the SOE were extensive, however, the operations covered in this thesis will be limited to their actions in South East

Asia. Michael Foot makes mention that the SOE’s failure to support the anti-Japanese resistance in Malaya could have played a large part in communist uprising which lead the declaration of the Emergency.49 Foot goes on to state that, had the British assisted the majority ethnic Chinese anti-Japanese resistance in Malaya, the British return to Malaya may have been met with less resentment.50 While Foot’s argument may have some significance to the possibility of preventing the Malayan Emergency if the SOE had

46 Clutterbuck, The long long war : counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, 5. 47 Patrick Howarth, Undercover, the men and women of the Special Operations Executive (London ;: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 3. 48 M. R. D. Foot, SOE : an outline history of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946 (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984), 172-73. 49 Foot, SOE : an outline history of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946, 242-43. 50 Foot, SOE : an outline history of the Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946, 243.

18 supported the resistance, it is far more likely that the emergency still would have happened as the uprising was driven by communist beliefs within the community.

By some accounts, the British troops were effective at winning over the ‘hearts and minds’. There were accounts of some corporals who had become unofficial mayors of communities and privates who had acted as midwives and doctors. On most occasions, when patrols would meet villages, they would be met by some form of dance and in return the patrols would also engage in dance.51 Other accounts, however, paint a much bleaker picture of the British troops. The British, upon realising that their primary enemy was mostly the ethnic Chinese, developed the ‘New Villages’, which were effectively concentration camps.52 Chinese were rounded up from communist sympathiser or aligned villages in the rural regions and forcibly resettled into the ‘New Villages’. No freedoms were afforded to the Chinese inmates of the villages, their living conditions were cramped, and they were under constant supervision by the British forces or police. While ethically questionable, the

‘New Villages’ proved to be very effective in diminishing the available support for the

Malayan Communist Party (MCP). This form of containment in counterinsurgency, at least modern counterinsurgency, was something that the British would implement in most of their counterinsurgencies.

Conversely, while there are accounts of British troops successfully managing to win over the ‘hearts and minds’, there are also accounts which discredit the phrase and otherwise ‘praiseworthy’ conduct of the British troops. Paul Dixon argues that ‘hearts and minds’ does not accurately describe the British approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya.53

51 David French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 174-75. 52 French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967, 175. 53 Paul Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq," Journal of Strategic Studies: 'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq 32, no. 3 (2009): 355.

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Instead, according to Dixon, the British “used high levels of force, was not fought within the law and led to human rights abuses”.54 While there are certainly cases of British soldiers not embodying the “hearts and minds” mantra it is important to take into account that in wars, and especially counterinsurgencies, humanitarian concerns were often be cast aside in order to achieve military goals. Therefore, while Dixon may be correct in his assessment that

British forces in Malaya were at times inhumane, it should also be taken into consideration that the nature of the conflict required the soldiers to be forceful. The need for force during war does not excuse war crimes. Furthermore, as Julian Paget points out, the British essentially won the war by granting Malaya independence which allowed for both Malayan and Chinese people to rally behind the British forces in ousting the Communists.55

Although Malaya was a British dominion during the emergency, the primary British interest in Malaya was mostly economic. Malaya was vital to the British at the time because the export of rubber and tin was a very important source of United States dollars.56

Malaya’s economy was booming because of the Korean War. Their main export commodities, rubber and tin, were in high demand to maintain and support the war effort.57

The economic incentives and opportunities provided by the Korean War aided the British in their efforts to defeat and minimise the effects of the insurgents political subversion as they could not take advantage of a poor economic situation to invoke nationalist feelings when the nation was doing well.58 Though, there is an element of irony in the economic situation

54 Dixon, "'Hearts and Minds'? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq," 355. 55 Julian Paget, Counter-insurgency campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 64. 56 Walter Ladwig, "MANAGING COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS FROM MALAYA," Military Review 87, no. 3 (2007): 57. 57 Ladwig, "MANAGING COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS FROM MALAYA," 57-58. 58 French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967, 47.

20 in Malaya, while Malaya was doing well in terms of exports and the local economy by 1960 the British taxpayers had spent over £84 million to fund the emergency.59

The insurgents the British faced in Malaya were the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

Consisting mainly of ethnic Chinese, the MCP had gained significant favour amongst the

Malayan Chinese given their prestige as the primary opponent of the Imperial Japanese during World War Two.60 The armed group of the MCP was the Malayan National Liberation

Army (MNLA) they had a peak average manpower strength of 7292 guerrillas 1951.61

Despite only making up 38 percent of the population of Malaya at the start of the emergency, the Chinese-Malayans made up 90% of the MNLA, with only a minor number of

Malays and Indians inspired to fight by anti-colonialism sentiment or militant unionism.62

Although, the Communists did attempt to win over the Malay population, the Malay population did not harbour any strong nationalist feelings or had any local grievances that the Communists could exploit.

While the MCP were greatly outmatched on a peer to peer level they were also not aided by the fact that a significant portion of their support base lived in urban centres. Even on their military campaign the MCP did not have any outside political support as they were cut off from allies by the sea controlled by the Royal Navy.63 Heavily influenced by Chairman

Mao’s people’s warfare, where guerrillas would draw the enemy conventional forces out into the countryside where popular support and the over stretching of supply lines would eventually cause their capitulation, the MNLA required there to be a sizeable rural agrarian

59 French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967, 179. 60 Susan L. Carruthers, Winning hearts and minds : British governments, the media, and colonial counter- insurgency, 1944-1960 (London ;: Leicester University Press, 1995), 74. 61 Karl Hack, "Everyone lived in fear: Malaya and the British way of counter-insurgency," Small Wars & Insurgencies: British Ways of Counter-Insurgency: A Historical Perspective 23, no. 4-5 (2012): 671. 62 Hack, "Everyone lived in fear: Malaya and the British way of counter-insurgency," 672. 63 Paget, Counter-insurgency campaigning, 75.

21 population. Initially, the central committee of the MCP took a rational position of ‘peaceful agitation’, but through time the central committee began to lose its control over the party, allowing for more radical and militant factions to take over.64 However, the rural population was severely limited with almost half of the ethnic Chinese population living in the urban centres where the British maintained large amounts of popular support and security.65

Therefore, given the unique situation of the insurgent forces consisting primarily of an ethnic minority in an ethnically diverse colony, played into British strategies quite conveniently.

The media and how it reports events played, and continues to play, a large and influential role in armed conflict. The Vietnam War, for example, was one such conflict where news reporting heavily swayed popular support against the United States and its allies. However, the media was largely absent in Malaya. While there could be a plethora of reasons for this absence, Louis Heren, a reporter for The Times, was in Malaya on numerous occasions and recalled the Malayan emergency “was not an exciting war. It was very difficult to report, and only occasionally made the front pages.”66 While Heren proposes that Malaya wasn’t exciting, the emergency was also one where heavy censorship took place. One such attempt of censorship was in the aftermath of the Batang Kali massacre in 1948, which left

24 Chinese civilians dead.67 The massacre was successfully suppressed by British authorities for over 22 years. Moreover the newspaper Daily Worker featured a photograph of a smiling

Royal Marine commando holding the severed head of a guerrilla in April, 1952, authorities expecting a mass backlash from the British public prepared for the worst, yet surprisingly

64 Stubbs, Hearts and minds in guerrilla warfare : the Malayan emergency, 1948-1960, 253. 65 French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967.@ 178-184 66 Louis Heren, Growing Up on The Times (Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 144. 67 Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland, 48.

22 there was none.68 It is assumed that the lack of protest from the public was due to the Daily

Worker being the only British newspaper that featured such an image or commented on the beheadings of guerrillas. This is in stark contrast to the media coverage of the Vietnam War, where the media and press coverage would ultimately be one of the determining factors of foreign withdrawal from the war.

Information matters a great deal in war, knowing enemy composition, strengths and weaknesses allows for better and more effective planning to thoroughly prepare and equip a side to combat the enemy. The Special Branch concerned itself with such matters. They hoped to gain this intelligence through the use of turning captured enemy personnel and repurposing them as double-agents.69 While the usage of double agents wasn’t exactly a novel concept in the history of warfare, the British attempt at ‘turning’ captured enemy personnel was a somewhat unique tactic in modern counterinsurgency. To further compliment the use of captured guerrillas, the British also extensively used local populations to form militia groups. By the middle of 1953 the British trained local militia group, modelled off the Home Guard during World War Two, consisted primarily of Malays and some 50,000 Chinese.70 Initially, the ethnic Chinese were specifically targeted by the

British given that they were the majority ethnic group that made up the MCP, though later into the conflict more ethnic Chinese were enlisted into the British security forces ranks.

Malaya was by no means Britain’s only successful counterinsurgency, but it arguably laid the foundations from which Australia would base its counterinsurgency doctrine on.

Australian Counterinsurgency Historiography

68 Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland, 48-49. 69 French, The British way in counter-insurgency, 1945-1967, 28. 70 Newsinger, British counterinsurgency : from Palestine to Northern Ireland, 77.

23

Writing and other forms of literature on the analysis of Australian counterinsurgency is limited. While there is a small collection of literature on Australian counterinsurgency operations throughout the twentieth century, the vast majority have been authored by former practitioners of counterinsurgency. Paul Dixon presents a theory where unit affiliated military historians often promote, consciously or unconsciously, an image that the unit “has usually been flawlessly brave and efficient” throughout its history.71 This idea can be similarly applied to former Australian military forces servicemen turned historians. While their intentions may be analytical in nature, the connections they have due to their service may complicate this as they may skim over or neglect harmful aspects which could diminish the image or morale of the military.

During World War Two Australia created a cross branch special missions task force called Z Special Unit. While this was a large unit with an extensive combat and operational history during WW2, the attention this thesis gives Z Special Unit will be through the contributions of a Chinese Australian, Jack Wong Sue. Z Special Unit would operate behind enemy lines and conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions, and were very similar to the SOE and OSS, at times even being supported by agents from those agencies.72 Jack Sue, being a Chinese Australian, was recruited because he had an Asian appearance and could speak Chinese fluently.73 Unlike the SOE, the Z Special Unit did not operate in areas in plain civilian clothes largely because of the racial differences in their operational region. A person of Anglo Australian heritage would be conspicuous amongst a mainly Asian population,

71 P. Dixon, The British approach to counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 9. 72 Morag Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, ed. Judith Winternitz (Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1989), 77. 73 Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, 77.

24 allowing Jack Sue to fill that niche role which other Australians could not fulfill.74 While Z

Special Unit was predominantly Australian, it was still an international agency. Z Special Unit were in many ways the precursor unit to the Special Air Service.

When discussing Australian counterinsurgency, the contributions of Phillip ‘Ted’

Serong cannot be understated. Serong was a pioneer in developing Australian counter insurgency and irregular warfare traditions.75 Modern accounts of Serong have portrayed him in a favourable and almost revered manner, but in reality, Australian Generals of the

1950-60s were hesitant to assign him command positions of strategic importance. In particular Major General Hugh Harlock who commented in a confidential report in 1957 that he had doubts over Serong’s command ability, further stating that Serong “did not have the balance or sense of responsibility appropriate to his command”.76 Harlock also noted in his report that Serong had little experience serving with troops in a combat zone, having seen little service during World War Two and did not serve in Korea or Malaya.77 Though, it may be the case that the lack of troop command appointments allowed Serong the time to develop, theorise and operationalise his counterinsurgency ideas, he built his theories on the established British method of jungle counterinsurgency warfare. Specifically, Serong adopted the British approach of using local police and militia as sources of information gathering groups.78 A deployment to Burma as a tactical adviser to Burmese Army schools solidified Serong’s theories and allowed him the opportunity to put them to practice. During his time in Burma, Serong suggested that a group of Australian officers should form a team

74 D. M. Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989). 75 Parkin, "The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942-1974," 127. 76 Davies, Vietnam : the complete story of the Australian war, 66-67. 77 Davies, Vietnam : the complete story of the Australian war, 66-67. 78 Parkin, "The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942-1974," 130.

25 that would go to Burma to develop the skills of the Burmese.79 While this suggestion would not be taken up, it was the precursor on which the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam would be based.

Prior to Malaya all forms of Australian warfighting doctrine were predominantly derived from the British. During Australia’s colonial period, local forces imitated and, in some cases, copied British traditions and organisational models. This would remain the case after federation and would last until the mid-1960’s. In some cases the official doctrines and training manuals were simply reproductions of the British originals with minor alterations to the cover and title pages to fit the Australian insignia.80 It is even more telling that Australia was somewhat dependent on the British for military doctrine guidance for counterinsurgency in the jungle. Although Australia did have a jungle warfare training centre in Canungra in Queensland it was devoted to training for jungle warfare in a conventional war setting.81

Peter Edwards makes note that all Australian operations in Malaya and Borneo were conducted under a clear hierarchical command structure which allowed for a high degree of coordination between different military, civilian and police agencies.82 Whereas in Vietnam, with the variety of international agencies present in South Vietnam, one unified command structure was difficult to establish as the agencies did not trust each other.83 This demonstrates another difficulty which Australians had to deal with in Vietnam which heavily contrasted their experience of counterinsurgency in Malaya, namely the ineffective

79 Bruce Davies, The men who persevered : the AATTV - the most highly decorated Australian unit of the Viet Nam War, ed. Gary McKay (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2005), 4. 80 Parkin, "The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942-1974," 119. 81 Peter Dennis, Emergency and confrontation : Australian military operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950-66, ed. Jeffrey Grey, The Official history of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-1975., (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996), 90-91. 82 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 147. 83 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 146-47.

26 command structures that the Australian forces were operating under. Edwards argued that the lack of clear command structures in Vietnam was in large part what enabled the

Australian military commitment to fall under its own task force and allowed for the deployment of forces in the administrative region of Phuoc Tuy at its own discretion.84 In other words, it is because of the ineptitude of the existing command structure that the

Australians were permitted to engage in their own counterinsurgency using the experiences they had from Malaya.

Jeffery Grey presents the Australian commitment to Vietnam as being unique in that

Australians went to Vietnam to fight using counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, while the

Americans were far more concerned with a ‘body count’.85 This would be a severe downfall of the American strategy in Vietnam as the body count goal would not be suitable for the counterinsurgency conflict. The American approach to Vietnam was to utilise their superior firepower to destroy the enemy by making use of their infantry to seek out the enemy, however, the American style of counterinsurgency completely ignored the local population.86 Andrew Krepinevich describes that although the Americans had killed many

Viet Cong, by not securing the local population, they had created a cycle of perpetual rejuvenation of the insurgent forces as they could freely interact with the locals and recruit from them.87 Despite Grey’s claim that Australians were ready and prepared to fight a counterinsurgency war in Vietnam, it would ultimately be America, the largest contributing nation in Vietnam, and their approach to Vietnam that would spell disaster.

84 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 146-49. 85 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army (Oxford University Press, USA, 2001), 220. 86 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 196-205. 87 Krepinevich, The army and Vietnam, 197.

27

Chapter 2 – The Combat Corps

The Royal Australian Regiment (RAR, Infantry) and the Special Air Service Regiment

(SAS) were the primary combat arm of the Australian army that served in Vietnam.

Consisting largely of light infantry and special forces, these Australian soldiers were well trained and prepared for counterinsurgency. While other combat focused corps, like the armoured (Royal Australian Armoured Corps, RAAC) and engineer (Royal Australian

Engineers, RAE) corps, also saw significant amounts of combat in Vietnam, their role was mostly in support of the infantry and their operations. The Australians were generally held in high regard for counterinsurgency capabilities in South Vietnam. A major factor for this was the near decade long experience of fighting insurgent and guerrilla forces in South East

Asia from the 1950s to early 1960s.88 This chapter will provide a very brief unit history of both the SASR and RAR, then the focus will shift onto the inner workings and operations of the combat corps of the Australian Military Forces in Vietnam, analysing how Australian soldiers set themselves apart from their international counterparts. Looking at the

Australian combat units and the operations they conducted in Vietnam will allow for greater analysis of the unique properties of the military portion of Australian counterinsurgency.

Fundamentally, the role of the Royal Australian Infantry is “to seek and close with the enemy, kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground, by day or by night, regardless of season weather and terrain”.89 While this role definition still applies to most aspects of counterinsurgency, it required slight adaptations. One augmentation came in the form of patrolling. In previous conventional wars, patrolling was not a heavily emphasised skill but in

88 Stanley R. Larsen, Allied participation in Vietnam, ed. James Lawton Collins and Army United States. Department of the, Vietnam studies., (Washington, D.C: Dept. of the Army, 1985), 113. 89 Andrew Ross and Bob Hall, "Bang on target?: infantry marksmanship and combat effectiveness in Vietnam," Australian Army Journal 6, no. 1 (2009): 139.

28 a counterinsurgency, patrolling to ensure safety and denying the enemy freedom of movement amongst the local population is a necessity for success.90 Apart from patrolling, the operations that the infantry conducted to eliminate insurgent influence amongst local populations were ‘search and clear’ and ‘cordon and search’ missions.91 These operations, although similar in nature, had fundamentally different goals. Search and clear operations were solely focused on the killing dimension of the infantry role. Whereas with cordon and search, a softer approach was taken in order to win the support of village populations and deny safehouses to the enemy.

One crucial part of the success of a counterinsurgency is how a military force interacts with the population. While the Australian counterinsurgency would develop and adapt to challenges over the course of the war in Vietnam, the majority of operations and patrols that combat units conducted included reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, and assaults on enemy fortifications.92 Initially, the operations and missions that Australian combat units could legally conduct in south Vietnam were mostly related to base protection and local security.93 While this would be updated later into the war, the overwhelming majority of operations that Australians did conduct were primarily focused on patrolling the regions around the base and maintaining security in the local areas. Perhaps it is through this operational limitation that we see the first unique property of Australian counterinsurgency emerge. That being ensuring a constant Australian presence in and around the hamlets, villages, and the jungle.

90 “The Division in Battle. Pamphlet number 11 – Counter Revolutionary Warfare, 1965” (National Archives of Australia: Series no. A4311, Control Symbol: 691/9), 27-29. 91 John Church, Second to none : 2 RAR as the Anzac battalion in Vietnam 1970-71 (Mosman, N.S.W: Army Doctrine Centre, 1995), 29. 92 Michael English, The battle of Long Khanh : 3 RAR Vietnam, 1971 (Georges Heights, N.S.W: Army Doctrine Centre, 1995), 2. 93 Larsen, Allied participation in Vietnam, 91-92.

29

History – Organisation and Experience Prior to the Counterinsurgency Focused Australian

Army

In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, similar to what had been done after the Great War three decades earlier, Australia began to disband and discharge many units and personnel. Almost 350,000 army personnel were discharged between October 1945 and

February 1947.94 Australia would focus on raising a professional full-time regular army only after World War Two. Prior to this, the preferred method was to maintain a small regular army supplemented by citizen forces organised in militias.95 As Jeffery Grey and Peter

Dennis note, this was a common theme in Australian history, where only minimal funding was provided to the military during periods of peace.96 The demobilisation of the World War

Two Army allowed the nation to reorganise its military and create a new structure.

However, the Australian Army could not demobilise completely as it had new post war responsibilities, namely the occupation of Japan. Instead, a temporary military organisation was created to deal with the immediate responsibilities.97 David Horner argues that it was only because of the occupational duties in Japan that fulltime Australian Army infantry units were retained during the demobilisation.98 The regular army prior to Vietnam was only a brigade sized force with strategic thinking believing that in larger conflicts the Citizens

Military Forces (CMF) would provide the professional army with enough soldiers as it had done in the previous world wars.99 This new brigade sized force consisted of three infantry

94 D. M. Horner, Duty first : the Royal Australian Regiment in war and peace (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), 2- 3. 95 Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, Australian Army history series, (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 59. 96 Dennis, Emergency and confrontation : Australian military operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950-66. xiv-xvi 97 Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, 197. 98 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 27. 99 Davies, Vietnam : the complete story of the Australian war, 75.

30 battalions, an armoured unit, supporting artillery along with engineer, signal and administrative units.100

Australia was amongst one of the first nations to commit military forces to the United

Nations intervention in the Korean War. Initially, only Australian air and naval support were provided to the conflict, although ground forces would be committed later it was done so reluctantly. The decision to commit ground forces was further spurred on by General

Douglas Macarthur who, at the height of the Pusan crisis in late July 1950, personally requested the Australian government to deploy ground forces in Korea.101 While the government would assent to Macarthur’s request and offer the services of the 3 Battalion

Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), which was in an ideal location in Japan on occupational duties, some issues would arise. The most prominent issue was that the battalion that was to be sent was severely understrength, and to raise to full strength would take an estimated five months.102 Robert O’Neill has commented on the irony of the situation in Korea where the Australian Government and Army struggled to support three battalions, yet only a few years prior was capable of supporting six divisions with dozens of battalions in active operations around the world.103 The Australian Army would go on to serve the entire duration of the Korean War taking part in key battles earning themselves a positive reputation.

The Korean War would be a swan song for the Australian Army’s involvement in conventional wars. In only a few short years, the doctrine seen in Korea would be drastically shifted to combat communist insurgencies starting in Malaya and Borneo. Australian ground

100 Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, 206. 101 Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, 218. 102 Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, 219. 103 Palazzo, The Australian Army : a history of its organisation 1901-2001, 219.

31 forces were sent to Malaya due to the policy of Forward Defence and extensive talks with the British Government over the security of Southeast Asia.104 Many lessons were learnt in

Korea and participation in the war would have a lasting effect on Australia and its military.

Foremost amongst these lessons would be the issue of manpower and recruitment. A clear distinction should be made here that, while volunteer recruitment was an issue, it was an issue only for volunteer recruitment in the Citizen Military Forces. Volunteer service in the regular army, while not a popular choice, was more than sufficient for regular army demands and targets.105 In response to this, the Menzies Government introduced the national service scheme. National Service was a compulsory military service for 18-year-old men, with their term of service to be divided between three months of full time service followed by a minimum of three years part time service in a CMF unit.106 The national service scheme would be suspended in 1959 only to be restarted in 1965 when further military commitment to Vietnam was realised.107 Coincidentally, the national service scheme was actually a detriment and burden for the army which was already in a financially stringent position.108

The SAS had its operational origins in two special missions raised during World War

Two, the M and Z Special Unit. These units operated in small numbers deep behind enemy lines and conducted reconnaissance, sabotage and guerrilla warfare on the Japanese.

Although successful in most of their missions, the two units would not survive the mass demobilisation when the war had ended.109 It was the emphasis of which the Special Units

104 Dennis, Emergency and confrontation : Australian military operations in Malaya & Borneo 1950-66, 71. 105 Horner, Duty first : the Royal Australian Regiment in war and peace, 187. 106 “Employment of Infantry” LWD 3-3-7, Land Warfare Doctrine, Australian Army (2008). 107 Grey, A military history of Australia, 231. 108 Grey, The Australian Army, 203. 109 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 27.

32 operated in small units behind enemy lines that would go on to influence the SAS. The initial steps taken to establish an Australian SAS company were only taken when Australian leaders noticed how effective the British SAS had been in Malaya.110 The first SAS company was raised on the 25 of July in 1957 at Swanbourne Barracks in Perth, Western Australia.111

Due to operational requirements in Borneo and Malaya, the Special Air Service was in an awkward position as they could not sustain the tempo of operations in theatre. As such, on the 20th of August 1964, a second SAS squadron and headquarters was raised, elevating the

SAS to regimental status. The SAS was previously under the command structure of the RAR, hence this move effectively severed the link to the RAR.112 This allowed the SAS to solidify a far more independent approach to war as they fulfilled a very specialist role for the army, that being intelligence and reconnaissance.

The Australian Army was woefully unprepared for a prolonged war in Vietnam.

Manpower constraints limited the extent of which combat forces could be readily deployed to South Vietnam in the early years. Due to this, there was a dire requirement to raise up infantry battalions specifically for sustained service in Vietnam. Although it was a slightly different conflict, a similar issue existed during the Korean War. Prior to Vietnam, only three infantry battalions were in existence, the First, Second and Third Battalion of the Royal

Australian Regiment. All three of the original founding infantry battalions saw service in

Korea. It was in Korea that we saw a partial departure from a conventional war mindset.

Unlike in World War Two, units sent to combat theatres would be there on a rotational basis, in Korea it was the operational norm to have one battalion deployed for twelve

110 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 27-29. 111 D. M. Horner, SAS : phantoms of war : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 2002 ed. ed. (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 36-40. 112 Horner, SAS : phantoms of war : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 70.

33 months after which another battalion would replace it.113 During the Vietnam War this twelve month rotational deployment system would be expanded, but manpower issues would remain a constant source of trouble for the Australian Army for the duration of the war.

With the potential threat of war in three South East Asian counties, Australia took a proactive measure in deploying Army units and assets to maintain peace, and to reduce the possibility of a war throughout the region. Thus, the 1960-70’s were a significantly busy time for the RAR. By the end of 1967 Australia simultaneously had three infantry battalions in

Vietnam and another in Malaysia.114 Eventually, when operations in Vietnam escalated and the Army had raised a total of nine infantry battalions as such, the commitment to the 1

Australian Task Force was raised to three battalions, with the battalions each serving twelve months before being rotated back to Australia to reorganise and prepare for another twelve month tour.115 At the peak of the war the Army would have a total of nine infantry battalions with three on deployment in Vietnam, three in training to go to Vietnam, and another three reorganising from service overseas in Vietnam.116 By 1970 the training cycle and establishment of the expanded battalions had become very robust.

The Other Ranks (Enlisted Soldiers)

The role of each individual soldier in an infantry platoon is vital to the unit’s effectiveness in combat. The formation of an infantry section reflects the type of combat that was expected to occur and can reveal a great deal on how the Australian infantry

113 9th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment : proud to serve : an historical tribute to those who served in 9RAR, ed. Brian Vickery, Ninth Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, (Kingscliff, N.S.W: 9RAR Association National, 2006), 67. 114 Horner, Duty first : the Royal Australian Regiment in war and peace, 178. 115 Grey, The Australian Army, 218. 116 R. N. L. Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1978), 232.

34 distinguished themselves in counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. During Vietnam, the infantry section was the smallest autonomous unit. The section consisted of 3 groups: the scout group, the rifle group and the gun group. Three sections and a platoon headquarters would make a rifle platoon, three rifle platoons would constitute an infantry company.117

Typically four rifle companies and a support company consisting of an anti-tank, pioneer and mortar platoon would make an infantry battalion.118 A section was commanded by a section commander, a corporal, a section second in command (2IC), a lance corporal, scouts (private soldiers), riflemen (private soldiers) and the gun group (private soldiers).119 An ideal section consisted of nine men in total: two scouts, four riflemen, and three in the gun group, however, this number of soldiers may not have always been available in the field due to a range of reasons ranging from illnesses, equipment availability, soldiers away on leave and injuries both on and off the battlefield.120 The implementation of all these elements within a section demonstrates the style of warfare that the Army was expecting to encounter in

Vietnam, with forward scouts to detect traces of enemy and a gun group capable of defensive and offensive moves.

The scout was a role with a great amount of responsibility, and with that responsibility came great danger. Often the scout would be forward from the larger section by some distance and would generally be the first to either initiate or take fire from a contact with the enemy.121 Scouts would encounter a tremendous amount of fatigue both physically and mentally, having to pay attention to every detail in the jungle looking out for

117 Gary McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 37. 118 “Australian Army Training Information Bulletin: Number 69, Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965- 1971”, Australian Army, Canberra ACT, 1988, 28-32. 119 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 37-39. 120 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 38. 121 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 38-39.

35 signs of enemy movement, traps and viable paths for the section and platoon to travel in.

An issue while on counterinsurgency operations that the scout had to deal with was when and if they should initiate contact when an enemy was spotted.122 This was an issue in that if a single enemy had been spotted the likelihood of that enemy being a forward scout of a much larger unit was very real, which, if engaged would alert the nearby enemy force to the presence of the Australians. The infantry section’s scout demonstrated a unique property of

Australian counterinsurgency in that Australia employed a soldier who would, in most cases, initiate contact with the enemy opposed to waiting for enemy to do so.

The section commander had the responsibility of ensuring that all the soldiers in the section were informed and doing their jobs. This was a difficult task as it was not uncommon for patrols to last an indefinite amount of time, which in turn could lead to complacency amongst the ranks if solid leadership did not take the appropriate steps to curtail it. All the while the section commander also had to be capable of leadership amid a fire fight, as the adjudication and positioning of the eight men under his command were his responsibility.123

The section commander does not necessarily indicate a unique aspect of counterinsurgency warfare, as in any type of war the section commander is expected to use his experience to best order and dictate their section and execute orders from the chain of command.

Although the machine gun group and the rifle group were separate entities within the section, they revolved around and relied on each other to work effectively in combat. The machine gun group would, as the name implies, carry and operate the machine gun. The section revolved around the machine gun and based most combat manoeuvres around the suppressing fire from the gun, as such machine gun teams often carried up to 800 rounds of

122 Ross and Hall, "Bang on target?: infantry marksmanship and combat effectiveness in Vietnam," 147. 123 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 40.

36 ammunition with the supporting riflemen carrying a further 200-400 rounds each.124 The machine gun used by RAR in Vietnam was the American made M60 General Purpose

Machine Gun, weighing at 10.4 kilograms unloaded, it was a heavy and somewhat cumbersome piece of equipment.125 While effective during combat, by the end of the war it was deemed “too heavy and cumbersome for general patrol and section work”.126 The riflemen were often the lowest ranked soldiers of the section, generally the newest recruits would begin as riflemen and over time would either graduate to different roles in the section or platoon or go on to do specialised classes.127 The rifleman was the utility soldier of an infantry platoon, they were assigned to almost all infantry tasks.

As the infantry section is the smallest autonomous unit in the infantry, it was well trained and structured to conduct counterinsurgency operations. All the groups of the section worked in support of each other and were all vital to the larger platoon. Individually all the soldiers in the section played a role which capitalised on facets and features of counterinsurgency warfare. Ranging from the forward scouts who watched for enemy at the front, the machine gun team as both an offensive and defensive tool, and the riflemen who played a “jack of all trades” type of position in a section involved in all aspects of a counterinsurgency.

The Officers

There is an argument to suggest that Vietnam was a war in which success relied on the leadership of a platoon commander. While McKay and other Vietnam veterans may suggest that it was the section commander who fought the “real war”, as many

124 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 41. 125 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 41. 126 “Australian Army Training Information Bulletin: Number 69, Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965- 1971”, Australian Army, Canberra ACT, 1988, 91. 127 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 45.

37 engagements and actions were rather small skirmishes, Roger Wainwright and Terry

O’Hanlon argue differently.128 Instead, Wainwright and O’Hanlon argue for the platoon commanders as those fighting the “real war”, and claim that this was the case in Vietnam due to the platoon commander being at the peripheral node of radio communications and receiving and issuing of orders.129 They argue this to infer that Vietnam was a conflict which heavily relied on the clear and concise distribution of information up and down the chain of command.

Since the Australian Army had just undergone a wide scale restructuring process, greater numbers of small unit leaders were required to sustain a war in Vietnam. In order to meet this requirement leadership schools were established, such as specific military training units like the Officer Training Unit, Scheyville (OTU). Situated in the north west of Sydney, just outside of the suburb of Windsor, Scheyville operated from 1965 to 1973.130 OTU’s primary goal was to forge national service officer cadets into infantry platoon commanders capable of leading soldiers in combat within twenty-two weeks.131 The course itself was a fast tracked version of the twelve month officer course at the Officer Cadet School in

Portsea.132 By 1970, around 40% of all the Australian Army’s officers in Vietnam were national servicemen.133 Thus, the necessity of infantry platoon commanders for service in

Vietnam may represent a unique facet of Australian counterinsurgency where specific schools had been set up to prepare for a specific kind of warfare.

128 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 40. 129 Roger Wainwright and Terry O’Hanlon, "A PLATOON COMMANDER’S WAR – PART 1," in Vietnam Vanguard, ed. R. O. N. Boxall and Robert O’Neill, The 5th Battalion's Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966 (ANU Press, 2020), 151. 130 Roger Donnelly, The Scheyville experience : The Officer Training Unit Scheyville : 1965-1973 (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 2001), ix. 131 Donnelly, The Scheyville experience : The Officer Training Unit Scheyville : 1965-1973, ix-x. 132 Gary McKay, In good company : one man's war in Vietnam (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 12. 133 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 76.

38

An interesting development in Vietnam was the unprecedented level of autonomy afforded to company and platoon level commanders. Major Harry Smith, company commander of Delta Company 6RAR who fought at Long Tan, recalls his disagreement with his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Townsend, over the implementation of a training regime which derived from his own unique techniques developed through service in Malaya and with special forces.134 The two officers came from different military backgrounds and operational experience, Townsend had seen a year of combat service in Korea and as such was still in the mindset of engaging with the enemy on a conventional warfare basis and had his own ideas for the war in Vietnam. Ultimately Townsend conceded to Smith as they both came to the realisation that Vietnam would be a company war and it would be best if the company commanders could implement their own styles of warfighting.135 Major Bob

Hogarth of 4RAR also recalls that company and platoon level leaders were given a high level of autonomy on how they operated and trained.136 Though at times this autonomy was restricted because of the bureaucratic process in the Army requiring a standard of training to be achieved by various examiners before deployment to Vietnam.137

On Operations

The history of conflict is rife with examples of forces utilising subversive underhanded tactics, superior technology and overwhelming manpower to achieve victory. Often advantages are somewhat immeasurable or immaterial as wars and conflicts can be won by fighting with a combination of cognitive and physical capabilities. Thus, one of the biggest

134 Robert Grandin, The Battle of Long Tan : as told by the commanders to Bob Grandin (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 8-9. 135 Grandin, The Battle of Long Tan : as told by the commanders to Bob Grandin, 9. 136 Jerry Taylor, Last out : 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's second tour in Vietnam (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 17. 137 Taylor, Last out : 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's second tour in Vietnam, 16-18.

39 advantages any military force can possibly have is experience. Fortunately, Australia was well versed in counterinsurgency with extensive operational experience in Malaya under

British tutelage.138 Though, this does have strong implications that suggest most, if not all,

Australian developments have roots in British counterinsurgency theory.

A development within 5RAR was the conception and retraining of the anti-armour platoon into a reconnaissance platoon. While the SAS existed for intelligence and recon, they would not be given missions well within the scope of the regular infantry.139 Due to this there was a gap in the available intelligence that could be gathered for operations which the battalion and intelligence officer relied on. As such the training of a carefully selected recon platoon which was specifically trained as a lite SAS force without sacrificing any of the rifle platoons in the battalion was invaluable to the commanding officer. Interestingly, 5RAR would be the only battalion to create or train a recon platoon during the entirety of the war.

Robert O’Neill speculates a reason for this could be that the recon platoon required a special combination of flexibility, understanding, coupled with suitable and adaptable persons who could work effectively, from the officer to the riflemen, to be feasible.140 Thus, the 5RAR recon platoon is an interesting and unique creation which not only set itself apart from the other allied nations but also set itself apart from its sister battalions.

While outside of the base and conducting operations, the tactics implemented by the

Australians could be boiled down to four activities: patrolling, ambushing, security contacts, and bunker assaults.141

138 Larsen, Allied participation in Vietnam, 113. 139 Michael Deak, "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON," in Vietnam Vanguard, ed. R. O. N. Boxall and Robert O’Neill, The 5th Battalion's Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966 (ANU Press, 2020), 317. 140 Deak, "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON," 317. 141 Andrew T. Ross, "The Tactics and Strategy of the Australian Light Infantry in Counter-Revolutionary Operations in South Vietnam, 1966-71," The RUSI journal 162, no. 3 (2017): 76.

40

In popular images, Australians in Vietnam are often seen wearing hats opposed to helmets, whereas, popular footage and photos of American servicemen are regularly seen wearing body armour and helmets. This had two benefits which were political and military in nature. One benefit, which wasn’t recognised during the war, was that when soldiers would patrol in hamlets and villages the perceived image of the soldiers would, hopefully, not be that of combat forces and instead be seen as preservers of security and peace. It was much easier to demonstrate to the people that they were a force for preserving peace and the security when the soldiers adopted a much more benign posture. This was something that the British would adopt in Afghanistan as they quickly dropped a warrior outlook by removing their body armour and helmets when patrolling in villages.142 The other benefit was that while on patrol, weight and fatigue was an important factor in the overall combat effectiveness of the individual soldier.143 This is also supported by the observation of

Michael Deak, who recounts his time in Vietnam and the issue of body armour and helmets not being worn as a result of it ‘severely’ loading down the infantry to the point where they could not operate effectively in the jungle environment.144

While both Australia and America fielded considerable conscript forces in Vietnam, the American forces seemed to be rife with insubordination and morale issues, whereas the majority of Australian national service conscripts blended in with regular soldiers well.145

Furthermore the way in which the conscripts were distributed throughout the Australian

Army was fundamentally different from the Americans. The American fashion of distributing

142 Egnell Robert, "Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?," International affairs (London) 87, no. 2 (2011): 298. 143 “Australian Army Training Information Bulletin: Number 69, Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965- 1971”, Australian Army, Canberra ACT, 1988, 98. 144 Deak, "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON," 310. 145 Gary McKay, Bullets, beans and bandages : Australians at war in Viet Nam (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 32-33.

41 involuntary soldiers was to send them to the least desirable jobs and corps, whereas the

Australian cycle distributed conscripts evenly throughout the corps.146 The corps allocations for Australians was specifically suited so that the short term conscript could effectively be trained and still have some meaningful contribution in their brief stint in the army.147 Jane

Ross reported from her trip to Vietnam where she interviewed Australian national servicemen that over 72% of them responded with being happy or content with their corps allocation.148 Ross also attributes that the training Australian national servicemen received was of higher standard and the training was of a lengthier duration before service in

Vietnam. Whereas by contrast Ross notes that a report attributed the inadequate training in unit formations, as well as its rotational and reinforcement polices adopted by the

Americans lead to the vast amount of problems and incidents, including the My Lai massacre, of the US Army in Vietnam.149 While Australia was far more considerate of where and how it distributed its conscript soldiers throughout the Army, this was perhaps a consequence of its small size. It is important to note that the Australian commitment in

Vietnam, by comparison to other foreign nations in Vietnam, was very small. America, a considerably larger nation, with a superior amount of resources and available manpower was bound to encounter a wider variety of issues.

Unique aspects of Australian counterinsurgency may lie outside of military doctrine and instead point towards cultural characteristics. For example, Gary McKay recalls his first experience of meeting his American counterparts as a slight form of culture shock.150 This event happened to occur while on patrol and McKay was issued orders to link up with the

146 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 74. 147 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 74. 148 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 74-75. 149 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 77. 150 McKay, In good company : one man's war in Vietnam, 81.

42

Americans to set up a defensive position in support of a larger bunker assault.151 McKay was shocked to see the sheer unprofessionalism by the Americans as they were talking loudly, did not have proper sentries or pickets and were very informal with superiors. However, it is important to take into consideration that American and Australian joint operations were quite rare. This could indicate that McKay’s encounter with the ‘rambunctious’ American infantry platoon may have been a one off. However, American hot headedness and stubbornness was not an uncommon occurrence. On another occasion American artillery opened fire on an Australian position by accident, while earlier that night American tanks and APC’s had almost run over an Australian platoon.152 This action also clearly represented a distinct difference between Australian and American approaches to the war. It was reported that the Americans had a tendency to chase after the enemy with a flurry of .50 calibre machine gun fire, which in the eyes of the Australians would in turn “cut up the jungle and scatter every VC in the jungle”.153 Furthermore, during the early days of

Australian combat forces in Vietnam it was noted by Bruce Davies, an infantryman with

1RAR in 1965, that at the end of the day American patrols would open fire into the jungle when settling down for the evening ensuring no enemy were present.154 This confused

Australian soldiers greatly as there was always an uncertainty when hearing gunfire. Thus, with accounts that coincide with McKay’s impressions of the Americans it can be concluded that the two allies clearly came from two very different mentalities in regards to how to conduct themselves in Vietnam.

151 McKay, In good company : one man's war in Vietnam, 81. 152 Ham, Vietnam : the Australian war, 317. 153 Ian McNeill, On the offensive : the Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967-June 1968, ed. Ashley K. Ekins, The Official history of Australia's involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts 1948-1975, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2003), 205. 154 McKay, Bullets, beans and bandages : Australians at war in Viet Nam, 115.

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A further example of the difference between the Australians and Americans was the way in which the soldiers conducted themselves when outfield. Still in line with Gary

McKay’s observation of the American infantry as, by most accounts, they were very loud while in the field which would often advertise to everyone in the vicinity that they were there. The Australians on the other hand understood the difficulties and necessity of discipline when in the field. As such Australians had been drilled to maintain silence when on patrol and instead relied on hand signals and only return to vocal commands when contact with the enemy broke out.155

An interesting juxtaposition seen between the American and Australian forces in

Vietnam is the vision and primary goal senior leadership had for the war. Brigadier Stuart G.

Graham once summarised the difference between the Australians and Americans by recalling a U.S briefing which started with the statement “Our mission is to kill the V.C”.156

While that may have been the viewpoint of American leadership, the Australian Brigadier described the mission in Vietnam as “ensuring the security of the main areas of population and resources of Phuoc Tuy and so enable the Government to restore law and order to get on with the job of developing the social, economic, and political life of the province.”157

From this statement it can be inferred that the Australian counterinsurgency effort in

Vietnam was unique insofar that senior Australian military leadership actually understood what was required to achieve a victory.

Perhaps an overlooked aspect when dealing with counterinsurgency is looking at the ethnic and racial harmony of military forces on all sides. As shown in the example of

155 Michael Caulfield, The Vietnam years : from the jungle to the Australian suburbs (Sydney, N.S.W: Hachette Australia, 2007), 11. 156 Albert Palazzo, Australian military operations in Vietnam, vol. 3 (Simon and Schuster, 2010), 19. 157 Palazzo, Australian military operations in Vietnam, 3, 19.

44 counterinsurgency in Malaya, the insurgents were largely ethnic Chinese which played into the British and Australians favour in being able to single out insurgents. Though, conversely, the British and Australians in Malaya did not have an issue, or at least a perceived issue, that the Americans did in Vietnam, that being a large integrated force of different ethnic groups.

It can be noted that most primary source material authored by white Australians indicated that that African American soldiers would often be referred to as “negros”.158 Perhaps this may just be a product of the time period in which these Australians wrote their experience of Vietnam. Jefferey Grey also observes that many American units had issues of racial discontent and frequent drug use, whereas in Australian units it was virtually non- existent.159

A unique property of Australian counterinsurgency was the prevalence of patrolling during night-time while on operations. In addition to patrolling during night, ambushes and tactical manoeuvres were also common.160 This was unique in the context of Vietnam as other allied forces would settle in and wait for the night-time to pass before resuming operations during daylight. Australians having taken notice that many VC and NVA units moved under the cover of night, many patrols had the dilemma of either pursuing that enemy or holding their position to ambush another group.161

Given the nature of the war in Vietnam and the unpopularity that developed throughout the course of the war, opposition rose. As such the American military began experiencing extreme problems amongst the lower enlisted, some would kill their officers

158 For instance In many of Gary Mckays works he refers to African Americans as ‘Negros’ 159 Grey, The Australian Army, 219. 160 Max Carroll et al., "5 RAR ON OPERATIONS, MAY–SEPTEMBER 1966," in Vietnam Vanguard, ed. R. O. N. Boxall and Robert O’Neill, The 5th Battalion's Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966 (ANU Press, 2020), 78. 161 Carroll et al., "5 RAR ON OPERATIONS, MAY–SEPTEMBER 1966," 78.

45 deliberately in actions called “fragging”, while others would desert.162 There was, at one stage of the war, a community of American deserters living in southern Vietnam in the hills near Vung Tau.163 Peter Haran recalls being on leave in Vung Tau where he met one of these deserters who went by the name “Red”.164 Haran and Red got along quite well, with

Haran explaining to Red the various intricacies of Australian idioms and nicknames, as well as talking about the motivations behind desertion in Vietnam which highlighted the great disconnect between the political belief and the individual beliefs of why they were in

Vietnam.165 The gist of the disconnect was that many American soldiers did not fully understand why they were in Vietnam and it was not a war they wanted to be a part of.166

While Peter Haran might have gotten along with his American friend while on leave,

Martin Cameron an infantry veteran of Vietnam recalls his experience of Americans while on leave and in the field differently. Cameron was no fan of the Americans, describing them to be “big nothing arseholes with big wallets and nothing between the ears”.167 In large part

Cameron’s view of the Americans was driven from his observation of the American marines who would throw ration cans in front of moving tanks and take bets on whether orphaned kids would risk their lives to retrieve the food.168

Search and destroy operations, while a mainstay of the Australian counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, were often the case of committing a large amount of resources for little in return. Peter Haran and Robert Kearny, Australian infantry veterans of Vietnam, recall that riflemen on search and destroy operations would exert maximum energy and effort only to

162 Grey, The Australian Army, 219-20. 163 Peter Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, ed. Robert Kearney (Frenchs Forest, N.S.W: New Holland Publishers, 2001), 178. 164 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 178. 165 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 178-79. 166 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 178-79. 167 Martin Cameron, Australia's longest war (Hawthorn East, Vic: M. Cameron], 1987), 113. 168 Cameron, Australia's longest war, 113.

46 patrol for days, set up ambushes, all for an enemy who wouldn’t show up.169 Though, even by Haran and Kearny’s admission search and destroy operations did deny the enemy freedom of movement in large sections of land.170

The Americans noticed the proficiency of the Australians and their ability to conduct a counterinsurgency early in the war. During 1RAR’s first tour of Vietnam, then linked with the

American 173rd airborne infantry, they had caught the attention of American Colonel David

Hackworth, who was the highest decorated serving member in the American military at the time.171 Hackworth points out that the Australians specifically trained for a jungle war in

Vietnam with even further specific training to combat a guerrilla force.172 This points towards another unique aspect of the Australian effort in South Vietnam as Hackworth seems to suggest that, unlike the Americans, the Australians trained for a conflict set in the jungle by preparing and training in a similar jungle environment. However, although this may have been the case with the Americans, it is important to keep in mind that much of the American foreign policy had a heavy military focus on the more direct Soviet threat in the European theatre. Nevertheless, the fact that Australians took the time to prepare its soldiers to fight a war in a jungle environment by conducting training in an appropriate setting does loosely indicate, that the approach to the Vietnam war was taken more seriously in contrast to the Americans.

Perhaps one unifying experience of the counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War that transcended national origin was the first impressions and combat handling of the Armalite

M-16 rifle. The M-16, while having proven itself to be a very effective rifle still in service

169 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 33-34. 170 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 34. 171 David H. Hackworth, About face, ed. Julie Sherman (Sydney: Pan Books, 1990), 493-94. 172 Hackworth, About face, 494.

47 with many nations today, did not have an easy or seamless introduction into military service. The rifle in both American and Australian service initially did not fare well in the jungle environment and were issued without cleaning kits.173 Despite the shaky introduction, some soldiers, like David Savage, were very pleased with the M16 and its smaller calibre as it weighed less than the standard service rifle, meaning he and other soldiers could carry significantly more ammunition for the same amount of weight.174

Large-scale Battles

While there is much debate in what can or should be considered a “large scale battle”, this thesis will acknowledge any conflict which involved, at minimum, a battalion sized element as a large-scale battle. This definition will also include prolonged battles against enemy bases and fortifications. The Australian Army was involved in few large-scale battles during the Vietnam War. Prominent amongst these are the battle of Long Tan and the Battle of Fire Support Base Coral and Balmoral (FSB Coral Balmoral). Interestingly while the Battle of Long Tan may be better known amongst Australians for 6RAR’s victory against an enemy far greater in size, The Battle of Coral Balmoral was of a much larger scale than

Long Tan, involving a larger number of soldiers on both sides.175 There is much to be gained by analysing the effects that large-scale battles have on counterinsurgency operations.

Notably these effects include impacts on enemy propaganda and the reaffirmation of strength and sense of security that a local population has in the counterinsurgency forces.176

173 Stan Maizey, "FACING NEW REALITIES FROM HOLSWORTHY TO NUI DAT," in Vietnam Vanguard, ed. R. O. N. Boxall and Robert O’Neill, The 5th Battalion's Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966 (ANU Press, 2020), 48. 174 David Savage, Through the wire : action with the SAS in Borneo and the Special Forces in Vietnam (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 40. 175 Lex McAulay, The Battle of Coral : Vietnam fire support bases Coral and Balmoral, May 1968 (Milsons Point, N.S.W: Arrow Australia, 1989), 1. 176 Jonathan J. Moore, A history of the Australian military : from the First Fleet to the modern day, Australian military, (Chatswood, New South Wales: New Holland Publishers, 2018), 216.

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The Battle of Long Tan occurred on the 18th of August 1966, where Delta company of the sixth battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (D coy 6RAR), fought off and achieved victory against an overwhelming enemy force of Viet Cong.177 Long Tan is a revered and distinguished battle in Australian military history, in part due to its uniqueness and somewhat anomalistic characteristics where such a small Australian force of only 108 men was intensely engaged for so long by a formidable and sizeable enemy.178 The Battle of Long

Tan initially began as a company-wide patrol 4000 metres east of the newly established

1ATF base in Nui Dat.179

The aftermath of Long Tan reaffirmed many of the Army’s traditional counterinsurgency practices and provided a vast amount of lessons which impacted future operations for the RAR. In a report by Lt Colonel Townsend and Major Smith, one such lesson was that in the event of an emergency ammunition resupply, it was of vital importance that the ammunition come pre-loaded into magazines to allow for more rapid replenishment amongst troops.180 The Colonel and Major also stated that in situations where heavy enemy contact is expected or likely to occur that a greater allotment of ammunition be provided to soldiers. Perhaps the most vital revision that Townsend and

Smith stress is for a reserve rifle company to be on standby and ready to move within thirty minutes of receiving orders in a quick reaction force capacity.181 Outside of the infantry the

Battle of Long Tan also highlighted short comings of support elements. The heavy Browning

.50 calibre machine guns equipped on the M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers were without

177 Lex McAulay, The battle of Long Tan (Hawthorn, Vic: Hutchinson, 1986), 1. For a definitive account of the Battle of Long Tan, it is recommended to read the entirety of McAulay’s book, another book on Long Tan that is recommended is by Robert Grandin, The Battle of Long Tan : as told by the commanders to Bob Grandin. 178 McAulay, The battle of Long Tan, 1-3. 179 “The Battle of Long Tan. South Vietnam 18 Aug 1966. By Lt Col C. M. Townsend and Maj H. A. Smith, MC” (Australian War Memorial Archives. Series Number: AWM102, Control Symbol: 42). 180 “The Battle of Long Tan” Series no.: AWM102, Control: 42. 181 “The Battle of Long Tan” Series no.: AWM102, Control: 42.

49 shields and exposed vehicle commanders to enemy fire.182 Artillery support, while having performed magnificently and being one of the major factors in preventing Delta Company’s fall, was also deemed insufficient to sustain a battle on the scale of Long Tan, in which a revision was made where American 105 howitzers should be sought to replace existing guns.183

Perhaps one of Australia’s largest, and largely unknown, operations in Vietnam is

Operation Coburg. It involved elements of all three infantry battalions (2RAR, 3RAR and

7RAR), teams of engineers, and armour in support.184 The operation itself was a

“reconnaissance in force” and was conducted over the period of 24 January to 1 March

1968. Contact with the enemy was almost a constant from the start to the end of the operation. 2RAR reported that contacts with the enemy composition early on in the operation were at least platoon strength with some engagements reaching company strength.185 Operation Coburg would also see Australians test themselves in urban combat, with 2RAR having reported that house to house engagements had occurred during the reclaiming of a communist occupied village.186

The Battle of Coral Balmoral, while not being as glamourous a victory as Long Tan, was a significantly larger battle which involved two whole infantry battalions with supporting tanks and other support soldiers. Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral came into existence through a desire to establish bases that could cut off NVA and VC attacks if they were to retreat from Saigon, namely after the Tet Offensive.187 The battle of FSB coral

182 Moore, A history of the Australian military : from the First Fleet to the modern day, 216-17. 183 McAulay, The battle of Long Tan, 150-51. 184 “Operation Coburg After Action Report. Headquarters, 1 Australian Task Force, Australian Army Commanders’ Diaries.” (Australian War Memorial Archives. Series Number: AWM 95. Control Symbol: 1/4/86). 185 McNeill, On the offensive : the Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967-June 1968, 296. 186 Ham, Vietnam : the Australian war, 351. 187 Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, 137-38.

50 and Balmoral was the first time Australian forces had engaged in a large scale battalion wide conventional attack since Long Tan. What can be concluded from the Battle of Coral

Balmoral is that the infantry was highly adaptable and were more than capable of efficiently conducting counterinsurgency operations while also being prepared to engage in defensive operations against large scale enemy assaults.

The large-scale battles seen in Vietnam demonstrates the fundamental difference between the counterinsurgency that was experienced in Malaya. In Malaya, the MNLA was never in a position to launch any attack against the Commonwealth forces as they lacked both the required manpower and equipment. The North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong however were more than capable of launching attacks as they had ample manpower and equipment provided to them by their communist allies abroad. Thus, another key tenet to an Australian counterinsurgency focused military was that, while equipped and trained to deal with small scale contacts, they had proved, as it had done in Korea, to be more than capable of fighting off enemy assaults in a conventional warfare manner. Something which the French failed to address during their time in Indochina.

The Special Air Service Regiment

The Special Air Service provides the army with an advanced infantry force capable of conducting missions outside the capabilities of a regular infantry unit. As two Vietnam veterans, Peter Haran and Robert Kearney, describe “The Australian Infantry was highly trained, but the soldiers of the SAS were specialist trained.”188 This idea that the SAS was a specialist force was also found in an official report by the War Office which claimed that the

SAS was never to deprive the infantry of its best men, instead the SAS would take an

188 Haran, Crossfire : an Australian reconnaissance unit in Vietnam, 50.

51 average infantryman and turn him into a specialist.189 When the first SAS squadron was deployed to Vietnam in June 1966, their primary task was to perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions for the 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF).190 Essentially they were to act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of any Australian force.191 Even in the modern day the SASR still primarily exists as the Australian Defence Force’s information and intelligence gathering force. In Vietnam the SAS conducted a plethora of missions, the majority of which were clandestine in nature. Their role was vital to the greater 1ATF mission as the SAS were invaluable in gaining intelligence on enemy movement, habits and whereabouts.192

Interestingly the SAS conducted a “hearts and minds” programme during their deployment to Borneo and Malaya. During their deployment they would collect topographical information on tracks and rivers, win the hearts and minds of the indigenous peoples, and observe enemy movement and strength.193 The “hearts and minds” portion of their deployment was mostly to build rapport and confidence with the indigenous tribes, on a number of occasions SAS patrols did this by creating cricket bats for the tribes and played games with them.194 Other unconventional means of winning the hearts and minds of the tribes people included using plastic explosives to catch fish and providing them with kerosene.195 Amongst the greatest effort of the SAS in winning the hearts and minds was providing medical assistance to the tribes. It was reported that many children were often infected with some sort of flu, chicken pox was out of control, many people also had open

189 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 28. 190 Gary McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1999), xvi. 191 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 38. 192 Horner, SAS : phantoms of war : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 180. 193 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 87. 194 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 90-91. 195 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 91.

52 wounds, and a few times an SAS medic was required to help deliver babies.196 There were conflicting accounts on whether the hearts and minds effort was well received by the indigenous people. Some tribes had notorious “poker faces”, and despite having received large amounts of fish, kerosene, two shotguns and an outboard motor, some tribesmen would not have a change in expression.197 Whereas with other tribes, SAS patrols were often inundated with such degrees of local hospitality that they would often stay in the village for up to two weeks longer than intended.198 The inconsistent feedback by the indigenous tribes perhaps contributed to the decision by the SAS to drop, this “hearts and minds” approach during the Vietnam War.

While the size of an SAS patrol was far smaller than an infantry patrol, they were still capable of inflicting the same amount of damage as a platoon. One such way that they would achieve this was by modifying standard issue equipment and tailoring them to their specific and operational needs. The service rifle of the Australian Military Forces at the time was the Belgian designed 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle (SLR), which was only capable of firing in a semi-automatic capacity, however, many SAS troopers modified the SLR by giving it an fully automatic fire capability.199 Modifying weaponry in the regular forces was frowned upon by the Army headquarters, which 7RAR found out the hard way. Soldiers from 7RAR once painted their rifles with green and brown heat-proof camouflage paint much to the dismay of headquarters, however, in a stroke of luck a senior ordinance officer happened to like the idea of camouflaging personal weapons.200 Fortunately, this specific incident was

196 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 91-92. 197 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 91. 198 Horner, SAS : phantoms of the jungle : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 92-93. 199 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 97. 200 Michael O'Brien, Conscripts and regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin in association with Seventh Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment Association Inc., 1995), 154.

53 allowed to fly under the radar, however the liberty was not extended to any other unit.201

Another method was the use of excessive amounts of claymore anti-personnel mines. Some

SAS troopers like Ian ‘Bagza’ Stiles always carried explosives while on patrol, typically a combination of claymore mines and hand grenades.202 In a similar vein to the SLR modifications, Stiles was known to modify his explosives, with one of his exploits being the creation of a long fuse hand grenade, where he would splice the long detonation fuse of a claymore mine and install it into a hand grenade. In his own words the grenade was useful for situations where “you were being pursued, you could drop this and set it to go off in front or behind them or whenever you wanted to confuse them”.203 The SAS represents not only a unique facet of Australian counterinsurgency, but also a unique development of specialist forces. Specialist forces, unlike that of the regular infantry and broader army, allowed individuals to bring more of themselves into the fold, to think outside of the traditional doctrines and trained limitations to problem solving in war. Thus, the unique properties and contributions of the SAS in Vietnam distinguished the Australian counterinsurgency effort by allowing for individuality to shape how the war was fought.

There were two types of patrols that the SAS primarily conducted in Vietnam, the recon patrol, and the recon/ambush patrol. The recon patrol was strictly in line with their primary role as a reconnaissance intelligence gathering force. Whereas, the recon/ambush patrol would be focused on doing as much harm to the enemy as possible.204 The ambush patrol conducted by the SAS allowed for Australian forces to further engage in counter- guerrilla warfare by acting as and utilising guerrilla style tactics. After the war, Gary McKay

201 O'Brien, Conscripts and regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, 154-55. 202 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 95-97. 203 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 95. 204 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 94-95.

54 would go on to interview some former Viet Cong soldiers who had encounters with the SAS, many of them would ironically describe the SAS as unfair as they used guerrilla tactics against them.205 This indicates that most SAS patrols managed to ‘out guerrilla’ the guerrillas to a significant extent. This was something the outspoken American Colonel David

Hackworth had urged the American approach to Vietnam to mirror, essentially, using the guerrilla tactics against the guerrillas. Thus, when compared to their American counterparts, the Australian SAS were an example of a unique Australian approach to counterinsurgency.

The adoption of enemy tactics was not particularly uncommon amongst special forces and special operations capable units conducting counter insurgencies during the Cold War.

Though, one peculiar and somewhat comedic adoption of enemy tactics was when SAS patrols would take midday “siestas”.206 At face value this may seem odd to take long naps or breaks in the middle of a jungle surrounded by the Viet Cong. However, when you consider the realities of the climate in South Vietnam it is a sensible decision. Temperatures would peak during midday which created an undesirable climate to fight in. Ironically the idea of having prolonged breaks during midday was a tactic adopted from the Viet Cong after a chance encounter. On a few occasions SAS patrols would unwittingly encounter enemy encampments during the middle of the day where most if not all enemy were asleep.207

Service in Vietnam saw the perception of the role of the SAS as a force primarily focused on reconnaissance operations change. This would ultimately lead to the formation of modern-day idea of special forces. In large part the change in perception was brought on by SAS officers and NCO’s who had also served on operations embedded with the American

205 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam. 206 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 161. 207 McKay, Sleeping with your ears open : on patrol with the Australian SAS, 161-62.

55

Army Special Forces, Navy SEALS and Central Intelligence Agency.208 On these joint operations, the SAS participated in raising and training indigenous units, raiding by small strike forces, psychological operations and the recovery of prisoners or equipment.209

Conversely, although the SAS were held in high regard amongst Australian and allied soldiers and leadership in Vietnam their overall role in counterinsurgency was not uniquely

Australian. The French GMCA provided France with a unit with very similar capabilities to the SAS, and their forerunner organisation, the British SAS, also provided the same role in counterinsurgency in previous conflicts. However, the Australian SAS were unique in their capabilities when compared to the Americans in Vietnam.

208 Horner, SAS : phantoms of war : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 398-99. 209 Horner, SAS : phantoms of war : a history of the Australian Special Air Service, 399.

56

Chapter 3 – The Support Corps

The previous chapter discussed the role of Australian combat corps engaged in a counterinsurgency. The supporting corps and units who supported the infantry while simultaneously engaged in its own operations in the context of the wider counterinsurgency effort will be discussed in this chapter. Doctrinally, the support corps primary mission is to support the infantry whether directly or indirectly, both in the field and in garrison. As such, focus on these three corps and one unit of the Australian forces in Vietnam Royal Australian

Armoured Corps (RAAC), Royal Australian Engineers (RAE), Australian Intelligence Corps

(AUSTINT) and the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam (AATTV). An analysis of these corps will allow for a look into the ‘softer’, less combat focused, with the partial exception of the RAAC, side of Australian counterinsurgency in Vietnam and further establish how these corps contributed to the uniqueness of the Australian effort.

It should also be noted that this thesis does not mention specifically or devote a part of a chapter to the role of artillery in counterinsurgency. Its overall absence in this thesis is due in part to the fact that the role of artillery does not change in a counterinsurgency when compared to a conventional war and that artillery tactics and usage do not vary a great deal between nations.

Armoured Corps

A distinction should be made with the RAAC and their role as a combat unit before further discussion and analysis is given. While the purpose of tanks and other armoured vehicles is clearly combat oriented in nature, their existence is almost always to support the infantry in some form or another. We see this quite clearly with the first use of tanks in

57 combat when the British debuted the Mark I tank during the Battle of the Somme.210 The

Mark I tanks were used in support of the infantry as a breakthrough weapon and while there were some mechanical breakdowns, they proved to be valuable and effective in combat. In terms of the Vietnam War, in addition to the Australian Army, tanks and other armoured vehicles had been used by the French, Americans and both South and North

Vietnam forces. The French largely used old obsolete American made light tanks, halftracks and lightly armoured vehicles.211 Initially the French strategy was to utilise their armour as a highly mobile force to act as a quick reaction force to respond to Viet Minh activity. As the war developed and manpower issues became more apparent, French armour began to adopt a far more defensive role.212

The armoured corps fielded two kinds of vehicles in Vietnam, the M113 Armoured

Personnel Carrier and the Centurion Main Battle Tank. These two vehicles fulfilled two different tasks on operations. As the name implies, the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier

(APC) carried infantry soldiers into the battlefield, they would also support the infantry in manoeuvres.213 The Centurion tanks would be utilised in offensive and defensive operations, they existed in offensive operations as mobile armoured gun platforms to attract enemy fire, while in defensive positions they would entrench themselves and engage enemy from a distance beyond small arms fire.214 Centurions, as Jerry Taylor reports, showed their true worth when involved in bunker assaults alongside the infantry.215 On a few occasions Centurion tanks would patrol alongside the infantry in areas where heavy

210 Alaric Searle, Armoured warfare : a military, political and global history (London ;: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2017), 18-19. 211 Douglas F Baker, Relevance of Armor in Counterinsurgency Operations, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS (2012), 4-5. 212 Baker, Relevance of Armor in Counterinsurgency Operations, 5. 213 Taylor, Last out : 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's second tour in Vietnam, 109-10. 214 Taylor, Last out : 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's second tour in Vietnam, 111-12. 215 Taylor, Last out : 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion's second tour in Vietnam, 111.

58 enemy resistance was to be expected.216 The introduction of the M113 APC was revolutionary in how Australian infantry fought as it offered the infantry a reliable armour support vehicle which was capable of assisting in combat and transportation. It is also important to take note that many of the exploits of Australian armour units in Vietnam have not been properly recognised or have had very little written in the official war records. Paul

Anderson believes this is due to the Infantry officers who would write the official reports and after-action reports were unwittingly omitting the actions of the armour.217 As such the majority of written history about the operations of Australian armour in Vietnam has been done by veterans of the war, and has not received a significant amount of historic analytical attention.

Unlike the infantry, which was the favoured form of military contribution for overseas service, the RAAC had not seen a war or combat since World War Two.218 Ironically, it would be through the voices of senior infantry officers that would result in more armoured vehicles being sent to Vietnam as part of 1ATF. The APCs already in Vietnam quickly gained appreciation by the infantry as they had proved to be a valuable and crucial asset in combat.

In many cases APCs were employed as faux light tanks as there was little other armoured support on offer to the infantry, this was also only possible as the enemy in Phuoc Tuy did not possess armoured vehicles of their own.219 The M113s had the opportunity to establish themselves as worthy additions in Vietnam during the battle of Long Tan, when the APC squadron came to D coy 6RAR’s rescue.220

216 McKay, Bullets, beans and bandages : Australians at war in Viet Nam, 199. 217 Paul Anderson, When the scorpion stings : the history of the 3rd cavalry regiment, South Vietnam 1965- 1972 (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2002), xii-xiv. 218 Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, 232. 219 Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, 232. 220 Anderson, When the scorpion stings : the history of the 3rd cavalry regiment, South Vietnam 1965-1972, 19- 36.

59

The decision to send Australian tanks to Vietnam came as a surprise to officers and they were unprepared for the deployment. While Australian armour, in the form of the

APCs, had been present in Vietnam since 1ATF had been established, the decision to send tanks would occur two years later in 1967. The decision to send tanks came as a result from the failure of Operation Bribie which exposed the shortcomings of the APCs as armoured fighting vehicles when encountering heavy weapons.221 Thus, it is safe to assume that the introduction of Australian tanks to Vietnam was made from a decision based on conventional warfare concerns. The enemy posed a much greater military threat, therefore tanks were required to provide a platform for mobile guns to support the infantry was apparent. Even when the announcement was made that tanks were to be sent it came as a surprise to the officers of the 1st Armoured Regiment. They first heard of the order over the radio announcement from Parliament that the Government had made the decision to add tanks and another infantry battalion to 1ATF.222 At this stage of the war the 1st Armoured

Regiment had been sending men in support of the APC squadron already in Vietnam, and in turn was vastly undermanned with only 80 out of the 160 soldiers needed.223 The decision to send tanks to Vietnam in a counterinsurgency war raised a great deal of controversy, foremost amongst the soldiers and officers of the armoured corps.

At face value an armoured vehicle of any sort may seem like a conspicuous entity, though it is through this conspicuous nature that deceptive tactics can arise. A uniquely

Australian development when using armour was born through inserting SAS patrols via APC.

Given that the SAS required absolute stealth to conduct their missions effectively the APCs needed to accommodate this. In order to do so, APCs would enter thick parts of the jungle,

221 Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, 246. 222 Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, 250. 223 Hopkins, Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972, 250.

60 keeping engines running at low revolutions and speed, then lower the ramp to allow the patrols to walk off while maintaining the same sound signature to deceive nearby enemy.224

This unique Australian tactic demonstrated that Australian military forces were capable of developing and adopting new counterinsurgency tactics to suit the context. By 1970 the working relationship between the APC squadron and the SAS had solidified greatly with both units understanding the tactical and operational modus operandi of each other.225

An Australian invention specifically suited for the jungle warfare in Vietnam was a shotgun style pellet round fired from a tank cannon.226 Other ammunition used by the

Centurions in Vietnam were a solid shot armour piercing capped ballistic cap (APCBC) and a high explosive (HE) round. The APCBC round was useful for penetrating armour and bunker systems, while the high explosive round was effective at long ranges against soft targets like infantry and light armour vehicles, though the HE round was seldom carried and used as long range engagements were a rarity in Vietnam.227 The canister round offered the

Centurions a far more suitable anti-infantry tool when compared to its other ammunition, as the APCBC was too ineffective a round for standard engagements while on patrol and HE too dangerous to use at close range. As a consequence of the destructive nature of canister ammunition it was also a good “anti-environment” round as it altered the geography of the affected area to a great extent creating good visibility.228 Canister ammunition represents a unique facet of Australian counterinsurgency, as it is a clear example of an Australian

224 Gary McKay, Jungle tracks : Australian armour in Viet Nam, ed. Graeme Nicholas (St. Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 148-49. 225 Anderson, When the scorpion stings : the history of the 3rd cavalry regiment, South Vietnam 1965-1972, 221. 226 McKay, Jungle tracks : Australian armour in Viet Nam, 91. 227 McKay, Jungle tracks : Australian armour in Viet Nam, 91-100. 228 O'Brien, Conscripts and regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, 250.

61 adaptation of a usage of a vehicle designed for conventional warfare to suit a different requirement in a different style of warfare.

Engineer Corps

Amongst their other tasks, combat engineers (sappers) had the unenviable task of clearing out and exploring the vast and extensive Viet Cong tunnel networks. Colloquially these men were referred to as “tunnel rats”.229 It is argued by many Australian commenters that the Australians were the pioneers of exploring Viet Cong tunnels.230 Sandy MacGregor, an engineer officer and Vietnam veteran, argued that it is questionable if the Americans were the first to explore the tunnels because the Americans did not make mention to anyone else in the allied forces about the dangers of operating and exploring the tunnels, namely the problem of oxygen depletion.231 Given that the Americans did not provide this crucial information it is highly unlikely that the Americans were the first to explore the tunnels.

Interestingly unlike their comrades in the infantry, the Australian sappers got on quite well with their American counterparts. Les Colmer, a sapper and Vietnam veteran, remembers that the Americans slack attitude was well represented in many Vietnam War films with depictions of soldiers with poor uniform discipline, radios blaring and talking while out field.232 Colmer also states that the Americans loose attitude resonated well with his fellow sappers and engineers, as it suited the missions and attitude that the members of the RAE had. Which is in stark contrast to the experience of many Australian infantrymen as

229 Jimmy Thomson and Sandy MacGregor, Tunnel rats : the larrikin Aussie legends who discovered the Vietcong's secret weapon (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2011), 2. 230 Thomson and MacGregor, Tunnel rats : the larrikin Aussie legends who discovered the Vietcong's secret weapon, 109. 231 Thomson and MacGregor, Tunnel rats : the larrikin Aussie legends who discovered the Vietcong's secret weapon, 108-09. 232 Thomson and MacGregor, Tunnel rats : the larrikin Aussie legends who discovered the Vietcong's secret weapon, 44.

62 they were often bewildered and disgusted by the nonchalant attitude of the American infantry. Thus, while the Americans had a completely different approach to the war when compared to the Australian infantry, the attitude was not incompatible with some other

Australian units.

The Australian engineers were, in an odd turn of events, the embodiment of “winning the hearts and minds”, so much so that it was believed that even the NVA and VC had been ordered not to target Australian army construction workers. Army construction workers of the Seventeen Construction Squadron (17CS) saw service in Vietnam from 1966 until

Australian withdrawal in 1972.233 The job that 17CS had was under the ‘civil affairs’ portion of the war, they were to build and improve the local infrastructure in an effort to improve the lives of and persuade the rural Vietnamese to shift support away from the Viet Cong.

While the exact effect this had on the rural Vietnamese is largely unknown, it is known that the Viet Cong saw the benefit of the 17CS.234 At the time the Viet Cong believed that south

Vietnam would soon belong to them, so in turn, whatever helped the allies would soon come to the benefit of the entire country. A legend of the 17-construction squadron was the

Little Bear. The Little Bear was an insignia that was etched onto vehicles of the 17- construction squadron after Major Peter Lofthouse contacted the Behr-Manning corporation for permission to use their logo of a cartoon bear to celebrate the squadrons

21st birthday.235 The little bear caught the eye of the NVA and there was evidence to suggest that a decree had been issued to say that anyone displaying the Little Bear was not the be targeted, “as they were doing work to help the country and that this type of construction

233 Jimmy Thomson and Sandy MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2012), 194. 234 Thomson and MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong, 194. 235 Thomson and MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong, 193- 95.

63 would be of great benefit when control was assumed’.236 While this may have been the case, there was no official declaration or order that had been found that explicitly stated this. Instead the only source that is known to have contained this information was when

Major Lofthouse was in Canberra after the war and had met a senior intelligence officer who mentioned it in passing. Though, there may be a significant amount of truth to the cessation of targeted attacks on the 17th construction as after the Little Bear had been adopted there were only two reports of injured soldiers from the unit.237 One of which was when a driver who was instructed not to go off road went off road to turn his vehicle, the other was during a land clearing operation when a dozer dug up a buried 500 pound bomb.238 Both of these were accidents and clear examples of bad luck. Two conclusions can be gained by the Little Bear and the 17th construction squadron. The first being that the

Australian army did make concerted efforts to get the local populace on side, which, in a strange twist of fate, also managed to get the approval and ‘support’ of the enemy.

The Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam

The Australian Army Training Team (AATTV) was the longest serving Australian unit during the Vietnam War, it had the honour of being the first Australian unit sent and was the last to return. The team also arguably performed the most unique role during the war.

Initially sent as advisors to train the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), they were not to take part in combat or go on operations with the ARVN which severely reduced the value of their advisory effort.239 As the war developed it was decided that to best utilise the advisory

236 Thomson and MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong, 195. 237 Thomson and MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong, 195- 97. 238 Thomson and MacGregor, A sappers' war : how the legendary Aussie tunnel rats fought the Vietcong, 195- 96. 239 Grey, A military history of Australia, 230.

64 ability of the AATV they were required to go on operations with the ARVN units they were assigned.240 Some Australian advisors also moved into American Special Forces units training the Montagnard tribesmen.241 Amongst some American organisations it was believed that

Australians were experts in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism given their operational experience in Malaya.242 Because of this the contributions of the AATTV were highly valued.

The United States Special Forces Green Berets performed a very similar role to the

AATTV. Their mission in war was to go behind enemy lines, raise and train local populous militias to conduct irregular warfare disrupting the enemy’s ability to fight on the frontline.

In Vietnam the Green Berets mission was to organise and train the already existing peasant militias into capable self-defence forces. By the spring of 1961 President John F Kennedy had dispatched over seven hundred Green Beret advisors to South Vietnam.243

One issue Americans faced when training and advising south Vietnamese forces was that they would often have less combat experience than people they were training.

Australians on the other hand did not have this issue, or at least did not run into the problem as much as the Americans. David Savage noted that when he was posted to the

AATTV and saw American special forces training Montagnard units, the Americans would often ignore the advice of the veteran Montagnard soldiers to avoid hurting their pride.244

Australians, although running into the issue less often, did on most occasions welcome the suggestions that Montagnard leaders had as they had a better understanding of the geography than the advisors ever could.

240 Ian McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972 (Buccaneer Books, 1984). 241 Grey, A military history of Australia, 230. 242 Barry Petersen, Tiger men, an Australian soldier's secret war in Vietnam, ed. John Cribbin (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1988), 18. 243 Larry H. Addington, America's war in Vietnam : a short narrative history (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2000), 58. 244 Savage, Through the wire : action with the SAS in Borneo and the Special Forces in Vietnam, 45.

65

By 1964 the AATTV numbered 100 officers and NCOs, this began to have negative effects on the wider Australian Army as there was a considerable drain on highly qualified soldiers in the combat and support corps in an already small army.245 The Americans never had a leadership problem as dire as the Australians, primarily due to the vast manpower and resources available to the Americans.

A familiar concept of counterinsurgency would be seen again in Vietnam with the use of trained turncoats. The South Vietnamese government had a program in place called

Chieu Hoi which recruited former Viet Cong into the various armed forces who had switched allegiances.246 According to Ossie Ostara, a warrant officer who served on the AATTV on multiple occasions, recalled that the prior knowledge and experience of the former Viet

Cong under his command were an invaluable asset.247 Here we see the resurgence of double agent/counter-guerrilla force that was used by the British and French in their respective counterinsurgencies. While the Chieu Hoi programme was not of Australian conception, it does demonstrate that the British and French examples of counterinsurgency had a significant amount of influence on other nations.

One of the most unique developments of the AATTV was the curious case of Captain

Barry Petersen and the Montagnard community.248 Initially Petersen was posted to the

AATTV in August 1963 and was tasked with supporting and supervising the paramilitary political action teams of the Montagnards in Darlac province in the southern central highlands.249 Petersen was posted here for two years and was under the loose command of

245 Grey, The Australian Army, 215. 246 McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, 398. 247 McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, 397-98. 248 The term Montagnard was a blanket term used by the French to collectively group the primitive mountain tribes. It is estimated that there were over 2 million Montagnard’s living in Laos and Vietnam. 249 McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, 34.

66 the American CIA.250 He lived in some of the most remote and lonely places in Vietnam, eventually he became a concern and security risk for American and South Vietnamese authorities when he gained acceptance by the community as a Montagnard Chieftain.251 By the end of Petersen’s two years with his Montagnard community he commanded a small personal army 1000 men strong.252 In a sense Petersen was a non-fictional version of the character Colonel Kurtz from the film entitled “Apocalypse Now” (1979) and “Heart of

Darkness”, a book published in 1899 that the film was based on.

It is difficult to argue that the AATTV was a unique Australian commitment to

Vietnam. This is in large part, due to the Americans fielding a 24,000-man strong advisory group in Vietnam, a group on par, in terms of size with the pre-expansion full time size of the Australian Army.253 Though, specific aspects of the AATTV were certainly uniquely

Australian, the overall concept of using advisers was not. This was demonstrated by the allied guerrilla units during WW2 and the overwhelming numbers that the Americans fielded in Vietnam, as well as the existence of the French GMCA who would conduct similar operations.

Intelligence Corps

The soldiers and officers of the Intelligence Corps were never short of work during the Vietnam War. They were primarily tasked with the collection of information which would be either drawn from the field while soldiers were out on patrol, information provided by the villages, or doing joint operational work with other allied nations. The intelligence corps also included the soldiers who would survey and record the land to make

250 McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, 34. 251 Barry Petersen would record his experience of Vietnam as a Chieftain in his partial autobiographical book Tiger Men. Petersen, Tiger men, an Australian soldier's secret war in Vietnam. 252 McNeill, The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, 34-67. 253 Savage, Through the wire : action with the SAS in Borneo and the Special Forces in Vietnam, 29.

67 maps.254 Although, it should be stated the source base for the actions of the intelligence corps is limited given the secretive nature of intelligence work.

In a reverse sense of interpreting the uniquity of Australian Intelligence in Vietnam, it is important to look at what Australians were prohibited from doing. The issue of torture is key amongst these. Australian Intelligence soldiers were held to a strict ‘Code of Conduct’ and were not ‘supposed’ to torture prisoners for information.255 Despite this, there was one occasion in which Australians were caught torturing a VC prisoner with water by the

Australian press, which implies that it was highly unlikely that torture, at least with water, was not an uncommon practice amongst Australians.256 However, other intelligence corps soldiers had doubts on the legitimacy of the claim and instead chalked the incident up to journalist sensationalism.257 In reality, the official report listed that the VC prisoner did swallow half a cup of water but the interrogation quickly ceased afterwards, the image of an

Australian sergeant carrying jerry cans outside of the interrogation chambers, which the media ran with as the source of their claim, was done so “for theatrical effect”.258 On other occasions one Australian intelligence soldier claimed that Australians were strictly forbidden from torturing prisoners and instead gave prisoners over to the Vietnamese and South

Koreans, who were notorious torturers and very effective at extracting information.259

Captain Bullen also reaffirms this notion by claiming that the Vietnamese were so good at extracting information from prisoners that “there was no point in Australians doing it”.260

254 John Bullen, Captain Bullen's war : the Vietnam War diary of Captain John Bullen, ed. Paul Ham, Vietnam War diary of Captain John Bullen, (Pymble, N.S.W: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), v-vii. 255 Mark Dapin, Australia's Vietnam : myth vs history (Sydney, NSW: NewSouth Publishing, 2019), 110. 256 Dapin, Australia's Vietnam : myth vs history, 109-10. 257 Bullen, Captain Bullen's war : the Vietnam War diary of Captain John Bullen, 61-62. 258 Dapin, Australia's Vietnam : myth vs history, 110. 259 Dapin, Australia's Vietnam : myth vs history, 111. 260 Bullen, Captain Bullen's war : the Vietnam War diary of Captain John Bullen, 62.

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One intelligence corps soldier, Dominic Yau, had an interesting story and experience of the Vietnam War. Dominic Yau was a Chinese Australian soldier, and by his own account it was very likely that he was the only Asian Australian, if not one of a very small handful of

Chinese Australians, to have served in Vietnam.261 As an intelligence soldier Yau was assigned to learn Vietnamese at the school of languages back in Australia due to his aptitude and ability to speak English and Cantonese fluently.262 On a number of occasions

Yau went out on patrol with the infantry and the armour to interrogate prisoners and act as a translator between soldiers and villagers. Yau also participated in the defence of FSB Coral in 1968, where he essentially became an infantryman in the trenches during the numerous attacks from the NVA. He recalls being confronted in the aftermath of the battle when he, as an intelligence soldier, was required to go through the belongings of dead Vietnamese for any information.263 Yau highlights a unique facet of Australian intelligence, that there was a tendency for many Australian intelligence soldiers to go out on patrol with the infantry and armour to allow for rapid collection of information and a more trustful translator.

261 Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, 138. 262 Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, 136-37. 263 Loh, Dinky-di : the contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988, 138.

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Conclusion

Prior to the modern deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan during the Global War on

Terror, Vietnam was Australia’s longest war. As counterinsurgencies are unlikely to leave the global stage anytime soon, especially with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan having defined the military experience for generations, the historical analysis and study of counterinsurgencies is paramount. Studying Australian counterinsurgency provides a multitude of different avenues of historical inquiry, ranging from social, political, economic, and military history. This thesis has largely focused on the military aspects of Australian counterinsurgency.

There were certainly unique aspects to the Australian counterinsurgency in Vietnam.

Though, this should be specifically reinforced to mean that it was unique in the context of the Vietnam war from 1962-1972. The French, during their colonial wars, did attempt and utilise some strategies that Australia would implement during their time in Vietnam. These strategies included the use of specialist units and forces to train and organise villagers to become counter guerrillas who fought the communist guerrillas using guerrilla tactics. Even the tactics that set Australians apart from their American counterparts during the Vietnam

War arose due to the extensive British tutelage received during operations in the Malayan

Emergency.

Counterinsurgency in the twentieth century has almost always produced some form of controversy. Whether it be the ethical concerns over the forced resettlement of the

Chinese during the Malayan Emergency or the issue of torture. Although it wasn’t discussed in the thesis, the My Lai massacre conducted by the Americans during the Vietnam War was a watershed for the American public’s perception on the war. Similar parallels can be drawn to the current trial and investigation of war crimes committed by Australian Special

70

Forces.264 In Afghanistan, Australian special forces saw much of the combat experienced by

Australian forces, often times special forces would receive missions that were well within the scope of the regular infantry.265 This lead to a large amount of mental fatigue and operational attrition as the individual soldier was unable to adequately maintain the operational tempo or maintain a healthy mental separation of military work and civilian life, in turn leading to the extrajudicial killings of Afghans. Compared to Vietnam, Australian infantry and special forces clearly had differing roles and worked around and in support of each other, once again reiterating that in Vietnam the SAS were never given missions that the infantry could do.266

In some other cases the actions of Australians in counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War have influenced other nations. Notably the influence on the British in

Afghanistan and Iraq who would patrol villages, towns and hamlets without helmets to demonstrate to the local population that they were friendly and did not emanate standoffish warrior like imagery.267 In a roundabout way we can see that Australians take influence from and adopt the British methods, only for the British to adopt some Australian mannerisms of counterinsurgency later.

An interesting dichotomy developed in Vietnam between the Australian and

American forces. By most accounts of Australian infantry and combat corps soldiers they did not view their American counterparts with much fanfare and were often critical of their behaviour when outfield. Whereas, the Australian soldiers from noncombat corps, for the

264 Christopher Knaus, "Australian special forces involved in murder of 39 Afghan civilians, war crimes report alleges; ," The Guardian (London) 2020. 265 The issues of Special Forces being assigned an absurd amount of missions is explored in depth in Chris Masters, No front line : Australian special forces in Afghanistan (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2017). 266 Deak, "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON," 317. 267 Robert, "Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?," 297-315.

71 most part, liked the Americans and enjoyed interacting and working alongside them.268 The reason for this discrepancy is highly likely to do with the two nation’s vastly different conduct and approach to combat. In this sense there was an element of uniqueness to

Australian counterinsurgency demonstrating that, on many levels, the Australian approach to Vietnam was different to their Allies who were fighting the same war.

Australia may have succeeded militarily in Vietnam, but it was ultimately an embarrassing success as the war would be lost on the political front. Thus, it is hard to judge whether the counterinsurgency in Vietnam was, in actuality, a counterinsurgency. There was clearly a heavier focus on the military concerns than there were placed on political objectives to get the local population onside with the south Vietnamese government. While it had the hallmarks of a counterinsurgency which came as a result of British tutelage from the Malayan Emergency, the overall lack of a political portion to coincide with the military actions makes it hard to firmly say that Vietnam was a counterinsurgency, as counterinsurgency is a combined effort of military and political action. Despite this, the

Australian soldiers who served in Vietnam did not view the overall loss as ‘their’ loss.269 In their view they had won their war by completing their military duties with pride and professionalism.270 Though, conversely, some soldiers also felt that their efforts were in vain.271

Australian combat support corps in Vietnam also did not wholly engage in nor were they sent to war with counterinsurgency considerations. For instance, the Australian tank force that was sent to Vietnam was driven by a desire to protect Australian soldiers who

268 Thomson and MacGregor, Tunnel rats : the larrikin Aussie legends who discovered the Vietcong's secret weapon, 44-45. 269 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 203. 270 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 203. 271 McKay, Delta four : Australian riflemen in Vietnam, 203.

72 saw the shortcomings of the already present APCs through conventional warfare style engagements. Whereas, when compared to other commitments from support corps, like the engineers and the Little Bear, it is shown that some aspects of Australian counterinsurgency were political in nature, to bring the Vietnamese on side in a notional

“winning the hearts and minds” fashion.

Australia has had a proud military history over the past century, proving time and time again that it can perform in war and is more than capable of producing efficient, well- disciplined professional soldiers. While Australia may not have had a properly unique

Australian counterinsurgency, it is important to note that Australia did not ever have the conditions to have the overall command over the entirety of all operations under Australian command, and as such was never able to implement its own ideas of counterinsurgency on a wide scale. Peter Bourne, a psychiatrist attached to the 1ATF, commented that the

Australian contribution to Vietnam was “only a token force and their efforts were largely only of symbolic value, their real contribution to the war effort is trivial”.272

While this thesis has attempted to examine if there was a unique Australian counterinsurgency, it is important to remember that the sheer scale of the study of counterinsurgency casts a large shadow over the feasible scope that a thesis of this size can cover. There are topics within this thesis which deserve their own papers. For instance, the case of Captain Barry Petersen who carved his way into a Montagnard tribe, or the contributions of ethnic Australian minorities like Dominic Yau, or the differences between the American and Australian infantry in Vietnam to list a few. In addition, analytical works on the Australian involvement in the Malayan Emergency are limited. As such the volume of

272 Ross, "Australian soldiers in Vietnam: Product and Performance," 83.

73 material on Australian counterinsurgency that is yet to be analysed and revealed is vast.

Further research needs to be conducted before a clearer and more concise answer can be provided. In summary, given the current information available, this thesis has shown that it is likely that the Australian effort in counterinsurgency was not wholly unique in a doctrinal sense. Rather, there were unique qualities that other comparable nations did not demonstrate during specific counterinsurgency conflicts.

74

Bibliography Archival Material

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