Texas Navy Association Historical Article The Cruise of a Forgotten Flotilla: An Historiographical Survey of the Texas Navy Jerry C. Drake The seacoast is the threshold of American prehistory and history, of American culture, and like most well-passed thresholds, it is hal- lowed and worn. And historians routinely ignore it. --John Stilgore, Alongshore n 1994 historian Stephen L. Hardin has been largely ignored by American 19th century so heavily dependent upon the Ipublished Texian Iliad: A Military History historians. Richard V. Francaviglia, in his coast, sea power played a pivotal role in the of the Texas Revolution, 1835-1836 in which introduction to From Sail to Steam: Four outcome of the Texas Revolution. he attempted to provide a concise overview Centuries of Texas Maritime History, 1500- of the war from a military standpoint. The 1900, outlined a number of reasons why Historian Peter J. Kastor has argued that careful student of the revolution, however, historians have neglected the Texas coast. the model so often employed by military will find something lacking in Hardin’s Although he diligently follows the argument historians to analyze warfare is inadequate work. While he paints a masterful portrait of Ellis W. Shuler, that the coast of Texas is when one attempts to use it to understand of the war on the ground, he fails entirely really “a barrier to rather than an invitation naval operations. Military historians and at his aforementioned purpose: a military to settlement,” he ultimately chalks the biographers return, ultimately, to a kind history of the conflict. Nowhere in this cause of neglect up to “simple bias” on the of “great man/great battles” history that volume does the word “navy” appear. While part of historians.1 In terms of the Texas emphasizes personal heroism without it is one thing to write about the revolution Revolution, simply put, historians have bringing warfare into its broader context.2 from a landlubber’s perspective it is quite always preferred to write about land battles When considering such a tightly focused another to proclaim this a “military history” and, as a result, their significance has been model one is reminded of General George when such a gigantic portion of what makes over amplified. While the vainglory of the Smith Patton’s remark when he cynically up the military has been omitted in total. Alamo and the desperate vengeance of San sniffed “History is replete with accounts Jacinto are certainly more romantic than of military inventions, each heralded by Hardin is not entirely to blame for his shipping tonnage and materiel lines, it is its disciples as the ‘Dernier Cri,’ the ‘Key’ error, for historians of Texas have been the presence--or lack thereof--of munitions, to victory.”3 Military historians seem to repeating this same mistake for generations. food supplies, clothes, and capital that engage in this fallacy when they focus in on The history of the “Third Coast” of the ultimately determines the outcome of wars. an individual battle or person that becomes United States, in general, is one that In an economy such as that of Texas in the a metaphor for the war. Napoleon and Hitler did not fight their wars alone, nor did they do Cussler, himself a popular writer of best- what is called for is a true military history so in a vacuum. Thus the Texas Revolution selling adventure novels and the discoverer of the Texas Revolution that intersects the must become something more than just of the wreck of the Texas Navy Ship Zavala, roles of both the army and navy within an a series of skirmishes highlighted by the echoed this lament best when he wrote overarching social, political, and economic overarching personalities of its leaders. “Regretfully, the day may never come when context. Texas naval heroes such as Moore, Hurd, Kastor has stated that most modern and Hawkins are as familiar as Travis, Although it is not the purpose of this essay historians who write on naval affairs do Bowie, and Fannin.”6 to provide an in-depth historical analysis so under the powerful influence of Alfred of the Texas Navy, it will be worthwhile to Thayer Mahan. As an historian he did much All-in-all it will take a new model of draft a thumbnail sketch of the highlights to bring about the idea that the traditional understanding in order to adequately of its career. Some historians, including model of military history as propounded by evaluate the role of the Texas Navy in the most recently Douglas V. Meed, have the scholar of action on the ground could broader history of the Texas Revolution. argued that the “navy” was actually born in be applied to war afloat. Consequently, What is most earnestly needed is a synthesis 1832, some three years before the General historians of naval activity have failed to of not only the Texas military at sea, but Council formally created a navy for Texas. place it into its proper context. Modern of the entire maritime operation, both It is true that ships played a major role in historians have neglected more recent merchant marine and ship-of-war alike, the tariff revolts that took place in the cities historiographical developments and, as a into the broader history of the revolution. of Galveston and Anahuac in that year. In result, the writing of naval history--and by Until this is done it will be impossible to fact, a small flotilla of three schooners was extrapolation military history as a whole-- fully understand why the ground war played organized that did a remarkable job of has suffered. Kastor has written: “Like their out the way it did and, in the long run, how patrolling the sea lanes. The commander intellectual ancestors, they [naval historians the Republic of Texas was able to play a role of one of these little vessels, the Red River, and biographers] have celebrated individual in commerce on the high seas. Historians named Captain David L. Kokernot, would skill and heroism without trying to integrate can ill afford to pretend that Texas is a write years later, “We were the first Texas naval personnel into a broader social, landlocked place. Navy.”7 cultural, or institutional context.”4 The aim of this paper is, in some small Several skirmishes involving naval As early as 1963 James M. Merrill attempted way, to begin that task. What is performed activity took place before there was an open to warn us away from this trend with an herein is an historiographical survey of the declaration of hostilities between Texas and evaluation of post-Mahan historiography. literature of the Texas Navy with an eye Mexico. It can be argued, although with He dedicated an entire article to what he toward the encouragement of synthesis. considerable trepidation, that the first shots believed was an emerging trend towards Thus this paper should function as a tool that of naval ordinance at Anahuac represent placing naval and military history into a places bibliographic resources in the hands the opening volley of the Texas Revolution. much broader context.5 Sadly this trend of scholars and serves to guide the direction Although Meed and others have made this failed to develop. Perhaps nowhere is this of subsequent research toward a broader case, this, once again, removes “military” stunted growth more clearly exhibited than understanding of the maritime role in the activity from its broader context and unduly in the writing of Texas history. Author Clive War for Texas. What is needed and, indeed, highlights it. Although these skirmishes were, in a very real since, open conflicts they Diplomacy to the navy’s influence on the navy with resolve. Texas was fortunate that were not viewed at the time as a pretext to outcome of the battle of San Jacinto. Many Mexico never attempted to launch a major war. That was to come later. So, perhaps, of Santa Anna’s actions, according to Hill, naval sortie, for what had been brokered then, the first munitions spent at Gonzales were dictated by lack of supplies. The in Velasco was not so much a treaty as a deserve to hold the distinction of being the Mexican military never opened a marine simple armistice built on somewhat shaky first shots fired “in war”. But subsequent front and proponents of the Texas Navy legal ground. Texas had never received the research may reveal a deeper importance often argue that they were kept from doing recognition it desired from its parent nation of those beginning skirmishes at Anahuac. so by the presence of the roving Texan “fleet”. and by 1840 it was clear that this would not Needless to say, these early altercations However, it is more likely that the Mexicans happen without further military conflict.10 taught the Texans the importance of even simply never concerned themselves with Most scholars of the Texas Revolution the most rudimentary sea power. trying. have long abandoned their narratives by this point, but a truly thick description of By late in 1835 the provisional government It must be remembered that General the fight must include the work of the navy of Texas had begun to see the importance Santa Anna considered himself to be Le during the intervening years of the Republic. of a formal naval force. On November Petit Napoleon. Napoleon, himself a For during this time period the Texas Navy 25 the General Council passed a bill land general, never fully understood the was to be the young nation’s major line of establishing a navy of four schooners. This importance of sea power and deeded it defense against her neighbor to the south.