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Contents The Cult of the Offensive:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Cult of the Offensive: The Islamic The Islamic State on Defense State on Defense By Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello By Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello

REPORTS 7 Chad: A Precarious Counterterrorism Partner By Margot Shorey and Benjamin P. Nickels

11 Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria By Adrian Shtuni

14 Canadian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria By Christopher Anzalone

20 A View From the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Tom Wheelock By LTC Bryan Price

23 Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream By Animesh Roul

26 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts An image from an Islamic State video, showing improvised rockets during an attack in April at Al-bu-Ayyuda in Anbar Province, Iraq

he islamic state has been on to argue that the Islamic State has a the defensive in Iraq for more distinctive defensive operational style than eight months and it has and that this style has many exploitable lost practically every battle weaknesses as the coalition considers Tit has fought. After peaking in August new offensives in Anbar province 2014, its area of control has shrunk, and Mosul. In many ways, the Islamic slowly but steadily. The group’s ability State’s defensive style is reminiscent About the CTC Sentinel to control terrain has been dictated of the German military between 1944 The Combating Terrorism Center is an largely by the weakness of its opponents. and 1945:2 At the tactical level they independent educational and research When the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and institution based in the Department of Social the Kurdish Peshmerga have committed Sciences at the United States Military Academy, resources to an attack they have dislodged due to the availability of good quality imagery and news West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Islamic State’s defenses, particularly reporting, particularly from behind Kurdish lines. This the Center’s global network of scholars and when Western airpower, intelligence, part of Iraq has witnessed the bulk of offensive actions practitioners to understand and confront and planning have been a large part of against IS, both launched by the Kurds and by federal contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the mix. ISF and Hashd forces. Northern battles have also been other forms of political violence. well-supported by Western airpower and intelligence This paper will use case studies from support, a factor that is increasingly relevant to the next recent battles in north-central Iraq1 stages of the conflict in Iraq and perhaps in Syria also. The views expressed in this report are those of Detailed focus on southern battles like Jurf as-Sakr, the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 This research draws on case studies from Iraq’s north- Samarra and Dhuliyah might provide subtly different the Department of the Army, or any other agency lessons. of the U.S. Government. ern provinces for a number of reasons. The authors have focused their six-month research program in this area 2 One tactical treatise notes of the German army in the

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are highly dangerous and can still win line soldiers are a mix of location- it currently dominates.7 They boast engagements, but at the operational specific part-time fighters and Iraqi many skilled and charismatic small unit level they lack strategic coherence auxiliaries who have signed on with the leaders,8 but they are not a professional and they display a chronic inability to Islamic State for an unknown period, military institution by any measure. defend terrain. uprooted Iraqis who may be willing Their base of experienced fighters may to fight anywhere that the Islamic be weakened by attrition rates even if The Islamic State’s Operational Style State raises its flag, and fully nomadic foot soldiers may still be flooding to the Like all organizations the operational foreign fighters with varying levels of jihad because leaders and specialists behavior of the Islamic State in Iraq is commitment to the Iraqi theater and take time to develop and the war in Iraq driven by its composition, structure, specific Iraqi locations.5 Well over half is both intensifying and accelerating.9 ideology, and leadership. As a number of the Islamic State’s fighters appear of studies argue,3 the Islamic State under 30 years of age, though some are Armaments are a problem too. The seems to have been effectively led at clearly considerably older.6 Islamic State has access to many the strategic level by some genuinely different types of captured weapons,10 capable planners, but at the operational The different sources of fighters have but their arsenal is slowly degrading too level there is seemingly much less created disparate outlooks for each thanks to ongoing airstrikes and other opportunity for centralized control. operational Islamic State unit active engagements.11 They are ultimately Instead, the Islamic State group’s in the Iraqi theater. Some may be military operations have become highly committed to fighting in just gradually more disjointed and localized one location, particularly when their 7 See “CIA says IS numbers underestimated,” Al- in their scope and scale since the fall of involvement with the Islamic State is tied Jazeera English, September 12, 2014, and “How Many “Some have conflated the Mosul. to local tribal and sectarian conflicts. Fighters Does the Islamic State Really Have,” Daveed For some locally focused affiliates, if the Gartenstein-Ross, War on the Rocks, February 9 2015. idea of verbal expressions A number of dissimilar ideologies and fight is lost in that specific area, the war The Islamic State has attempted to fast-forward its of support to mean objectives seem to be pulling the Islamic is over. Many fighters will be fixated on expansion from its insurgent core into a hybrid army State military operations in different their own experience of the jihad, their by boosting recruitment and imposing conscription the same as a pledge directions. Within the leadership there personal odyssey, and exploits in search measures in areas like its stronghold of Hawijah district of allegiance (bay`a). are Salafi ideologues, former Baathist of a reputation and military glory. in Kirkuk province. military officers of considerable Others will be much more seriously 8 For example one of the Islamic State’s most high- These two concepts are skill, and hybrids of the two.4 Front committed to the goals of the Islamic profile mid-tier commanders, Abu Umar ash-Shishani not equivalent and have State’s leadership: the defense of (Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili), a 29-year old Caliphate territories and the imposition former Georgian Army sergeant from the Georgia’s different implications.” Second World War: “Defensive operations were origi- of religious structure in those territories Pankisi Gorge, who initially fought in Syria as leader nally envisaged as holding situations pending resump- for as long as is possible. In many cases of Jaysh al-Mujahirin wal-Ansar, a group of hardened tion of the offensive and laying great stress on immedi- there will be differences between the foreign fighters from Chechnya and the Caucasus region ate and violent counter-attacks.” W.J.K Davies, German needs of the group and the preferences before pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in May Army Handbook 1939-1945 (London: Purnell, 1973). p. 57. of individuals. 2013 and went on to command the ‘northern sector’ This method achieved many tactical successes but was in Syria, the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia. also costly, especially when enemy troops became used Then there are the practical issues that See “Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist to predictable counter-attacks and prepared for them. underlay military strength: experience, Fighter Facilitators,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, German tactics in the First World War also showed this, numbers, and equipment. The core September 24, 2014. with Paddy Griffith describing them as “an over-rigid Islamic State is still a very small military 9 The Islamic State forces in Iraq initially drew on lead- and excessively expensive system.” Commonwealth movement in Iraq. It is far too small ers whose military experience went back thirty years or forces learned the “bite and hold” tactic—to seize ground to perpetually defend the territories more (in terms of Baathist officers and some jihadists cheaply in surprise attacks and then inflict heavy with Afghan experience), whilst even some younger casualties on the German counter-attackers, a situation commanders have extensive experience in combat not unlike today’s Kurdish/Western tactics on their within Iraq or Syria over the last half decade. At the time frontlines in northern Iraq. Paddy Griffith,Battle Tactics upper-tier leadership cadres in early 2014 are known to of writing it has only been ten months since the fall of of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of the Attack have been high-ranking officers in the Saddam-era Iraqi Mosul but casualties have been steady. It is uncertain 1916-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. Army, the Republican Guard, Directorate General of that combat skills can be learned fast enough to make up 32, 194. Military Intelligence, and air force intelligence. for operational attrition in leaders and specialists. 3 See Richard Barret “The Islamic State,” The Soufan 5 The Islamic State draws from a range of sources for 10 These include over a hundred T-55, T-69 and T-72 Group, October 28, 2014; Hisham al-Hashimi and the its manpower: foreign fighters, released prisoners who main battle tanks, dozens of M113 APCs, M117 armored Telegraph interactive team, “Revealed: the Islamic may it have resettled in their home areas, and existing security vehicles, hundreds of Humvees, trucks, 4WD State ‘cabinet’”, The Telegraph, July 9, 2014; Hisham al- insurgent group members who merged with Islamic pickup trucks, and several towed artillery pieces. For Hashimi “Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the State, some of whom have a very localized outlook and a comprehensive list see “Vehicles and equipment new ‘caliphate’ is run,” The Telegraph, July 9 2014. joined purely to gain advantages over local rivals. Mi- captured and operated by the Islamic State inside Syria,” 4 See Richard Barret “The Islamic State,” The Soufan chael Knights, personal interview, Islamic State expert Oryx Blog, November 10, 2014, and “Vehicles and equip- Group, pp. 18-21, 24-34, “The hidden hand behind the Aymenn Al-Tamimi, November 19, 2014. ment captured, operated and destroyed by the Islamic Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s.” Liz Sly, 6 The authors’ assessment of the age distribution among State inside Iraq,” Oryx Blog, November 22, 2014. Washington Post, April 4, 2015; “Iraqi Officer Takes Dark Islamic State fighters is based off a year-long survey of 11 For an comprehensive, regularly updated list see Turn to al Qaeda,” Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, imagery and video footage derived from Islamic State’s “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targets Damaged/De- March 17, 2014. At least six of the Islamic State’s social media output. stroyed,” CENTCOM, April 8, 2015.

2 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 capped at being a confederation of lack of military strength the Islamic symbolic and strategic value, the fierce motorized war bands, most often State cannot mount an exclusionary Islamic State seems more focused on undertaking tactical engagements at perimeter defense if sufficient attackers actively defending the rural zones in reinforced platoon strength.12 The above come forward. The limiting factor on which urban areas are located. In many factors—organizational, ideological, the speed of advance against the Islamic cases, the urban center may be the and logistical—have a strong influence State in Iraq is gathering sufficient part of the defended zone allocated the on the Islamic State’s defensive style of quantities of capable Iraqi forces to fill smallest proportion of available Islamic war. up the spaces. State forces. The Islamic State has not shown a tendency to fight “last stand” Can the Islamic State Defend Terrain? An early example of preemptive defensive actions. Snipers, mobile Since June 2014, the Islamic State withdrawal behind a screen of IEDs, shooter teams, and thick improvised has fought major defensive actions booby-trapped buildings, and snipers minefields made of crude canister IEDs in at least 14 Iraqi locations: Ramadi, was Jurf as-Sakr, the Sunni town and explosive-filled houses are more Mosul Dam, the Amerli district, Jalula- overlooking the pilgrim route between than sufficient to slow, but not stop, an Saadiyah, Muqdadiyah, Rabiya, Jurf as- Baghdad and Karbala, which was advancing force: populated areas are Sakr and northern Babil, the Samarra- decisively cleared and occupied by denied rather than actually defended.18 Jallam-Udaim desert, Sinjar, Beyji, Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) in Makhmour, Aski Mosul, Kirkuk, and late October 2014.15 The Islamic State’s The rural belts surrounding the city Tikrit.13 The Islamic State has lost every main forces likewise melted away are often more actively contested by time they faced a determined and well- when long-awaited Peshmerga and ISF the Islamic State and for longer. This resourced ISF or Peshmerga attack. In offensives began in mid-November 2015 strategy first appeared in the battle fact, when outnumbered the Islamic to liberate Jalula-Saadiyah,16 the Islamic for Baghdad in 2006 and 2007, when State frequently relinquishes terrain State-occupied twin towns by the the phrases “Baghdad belts”19 and to suit its own operational needs and Hamrin Dam. In a wide range of areas— “commuter insurgency” summed up the often signals an awareness that they from small towns like Suleiman Beg to pivotal role of the rural periphery to will be forced from attacked areas in Mosul city—the Islamic State seems to the urban battle. This strategy is still in short order. Though the Islamic State accelerate its destruction of religious, play. In Ramadi, the Islamic State has frequently holds out until the last cultural, and administrative sites (and been pursuing a commuter insurgency possible moment before withdrawing, its withdrawal of the Islamic State strategy20 for more than a year, because they have a track record of draining families and economic equipment) when the difficult task of securing the city’s their main forces from areas that are it feels that an attack is imminent.17 In rural belts has not been adequately about to be attacked—for instance in essence, the Islamic State seems to have resourced.21 Jalula and Jurf as-Sakr.14 Due to a basic a clear-headed assessment of its own limited defensive capabilities. The same problem of nearby 12 The authors’ review of Islamic State attacks since ungoverned sanctuaries afflicts all the June 2014 suggest that a typical attack force comprises The Islamic State’s Defensive Playbook areas the Islamic State group is still around 20–40 foot soldiers—historically the size of Though towns and cities are of both the average insurgent cell, including indirect-fire, IED- 18 See “Operation to retake Tikrit from Islamic State laying/triggering teams, RPG/ambush teams, etc.—plus mined, most homes booby trapped,” Rudaw, November stalled by heavy casualties, discord,” Mitchell Prothero, three to five armored cars and unarmored utility ve- 25, 2014. McClatchy, March 20, 2015, for an example of Islamic hicles, with a couple of heavy support weapons. When 15 “Iraqi security forces and Kurds gain ground against State’ defensive preparations encountered by the ISF larger attacks are undertaken, it is usually coordinated, Islamic State,” Ahmed Rasheed and Isabel Coles, Re- during the operation to clear Tikrit. IS made use of huge simultaneous but only loosely connected activity by uters, October 25, 2014. numbers of IEDs, booby-trapped buildings and small these small war bands, not a larger unit action per se. 16 See ISW Iraq Situation Reports for November 22-23 sniper and suicide attacker cells to slow the ISF advance 13 See the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)’s daily and November 24, “Jalawla heavily mined, most homes and cause maximum casualties, but its stay-behind updated Iraq Situation Report blog for a daily coverage booby trapped,” Rudaw, November 25, 2014. presence in the city (likely well under 750 fighters by of events in Iraqi since summer 2014. 17 In only one week period at the end of March Islamic the authors’ calculations of simultaneous daily engage- 14 The ISF carried out 13 clearing sweeps of Jurf State demolished the 2nd Iraqi Army division head- ments) was not intended to fight a prolonged, intensive as-Sakhr between January 2014 and a final conclusive quarters at Camp Kindi, the Mosul Police Academy, urban battle. operation in October 2014. The Islamic State consis- Mosul Traffic Directorate, police stations, plus dozens 19 For a great account of the battle of the Baghdad belts tently chose to withdraw and re-infiltrate, with the area of houses of ISF and Peshmerga members. See “The see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The End- permanently cleared only when it was entirely depopu- terrorist organization blew up the Traffic of Nineveh Di- game (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), pp. 336-401. lated and turned into a closed military zone. See “The rectorate building in northern Mosul,” NINA, March 30, 20 The “commuter insurgency” refers to an urban fight Clearing Of Iraq’s Jurf Al-Sakhr, Babil And Its Impact,” 2015; “ISIL terrorists steal contents of Police Academy, in which insurgents travel in each day, like suburban Joel Wing, Musings on Iraq, January 15, 2015; and“Iraqi detonate it in Mosul” All Iraq News, March 24, 2015; commuters, from support zones in the outskirts. Coined security forces and Kurds gain ground against Islamic “Daash blow up the headquarters of army Second north by U.S. forces in Iraq, the concept is explained further in State,” Ahmed Rasheed and Isabel Coles, Reuters, Octo- of Mosul” NINA, March 21, 2015; “IS blew up three David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small ber 25, 2014. The Islamic State held Jalula and Saadiyah police stations north of Mosul” NINA, March 28, 2015. Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University for months, but then collapsed its defense in a few days Islamic State demolitions are remarkably widespread Press, 2009), p. 142. during November 2014 with under a hundred casualties and must consume a significant proportion of the time of 21 For an account of the Ramadi battle’s first three by most estimates. See ISW Iraq Situation Reports for members who might otherwise be undertaking military months see Michael Knights, “The ISIL’s Stand in the November 22-23 and November 24, “Jalawla heavily operations. Ramadi-Falluja Corridor,” CTC Sentinel 7:5 (2014).

3 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 effectively defending. In some Anbar State has never defended a populated were rather empty, with porous gaps battlefields, uncontrolled deserts and city before. Will they drive out the between forces, and the Islamic State riverside groves leave the Islamic population or let them leave when the had great mobility. ISF and Peshmerga State with clear reinforcement routes military operation begins? Will they forces had not yet learned to consolidate and fallback options.22 In Sinjar, the adopt the same approach in other their hold on newly-won positions and Syrian border offers the Islamic State a places or will that decision be locally they lacked anti-armored weapons and degree of sanctuary. The Islamic State controlled? The ISIL view regarding the air support.33 remains able to defend in areas where presence of civilians in the defended the Kurds are disunited and do not zone should be a priority area of near- The optimal conditions for counter- provide sufficient resources. 23 And in term research. attacking warfare do not currently exist areas such as Bayji,24 which backs onto yet the Islamic State keeps trying. Both the remote Jallam Desert and Hamrin Active Defense the ISF and the Peshmerga are now Mountains, the Islamic State is also able When the Islamic State does commit to undertaking more methodical clearing confound attempts to dislodge it. The the defense of a zone it often chooses the operations with large numbers of units Islamic State exacerbates the challenge most aggressive offensive approach to operating in close proximity and often by extensively shaping terrain. It often the mission. This probably reflects the with Western or Iraqi air support.34 The impedes force movement by clogging mindset of many junior Islamic State Kurdish frontline between Mosul and mobility corridors with improvised commanders, who appear to have very Makhmour offers a good case study. In minefields and destroying key bridges.25 considerable latitude in the planning one week-long period (February 17–23, and execution of operations.28 Many 2015) the Islamic State attempted to One unknown in the Islamic State Islamic State units appear to be afflicted launch ten major raids along the 170- defensive playbook is their true attitude with chronic “tactical restlessness,”29 mile front: eight were repelled with toward civilians. They were unable to an almost pathological need to take the the aid of Western airpower, and the prevent the outflow of civilians from initiative and attack the enemy. This remaining two were disrupted before Tikrit, Jurf as-Sakr, and many other approach can and does help sustain they had even commenced when aircraft areas, but they have actively prevented morale and extend the operational destroyed the attack forces in their the inhabitants of Mosul from leaving experience of surviving troops, but it assembly areas.35 Though body counts thanks to a variety of security also tires troops and continually erodes should always be treated with caution, measures.26 It is unclear whether this overall force strength.30 the Coalition’s claims to have inflicted is because they want to prevent the over 150 casualties are probably not too depopulation of the Caliphate’s biggest A prime example of this restlessness is wide of the mark.36 city or whether they are planning to use the tendency to mount tactical counter Mosul’s residents as human shields or as attacks soon after suffering a setback. For many months the Islamic State’s a way to blunt airstrikes.27 The Islamic This trend almost approaches doctrinal leaders appear to have been stubbornly instinct and is one of the ways in which the Islamic State units resemble German 22 See “ISIS Offensives in Ramadi City and Al-Asad forces during the final phase of the 33 This impression was gained during months of open- Airbase in Al-Anbar, Iraq,” Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, Second World War.31 The Wehrmacht’s source reporting and imagery analysis plus interviews. and Sinan Adnan, December 24 2014. experience also shows how predictable Michael Knights, multiple personal interviews, Iraqi and 23 See “Kurdish Forces Show The Strain Of The counter-attacks can prove very costly Peshmerga leadership, June to March 2015. ISIS Fight,” Mike Giglio, February 19 2015. in the face of growing enemy power and 34 Examples include the recent Kurdish offensives at 24 “Islamic State recapture parts of northern refinery air superiority.32 Aski Mosul (January 21, 2015) and Kirkuk (March 9, city Baiji,” Reuters, December 17 2015. An ISF column 2015) which both involved Kurdish brigades fighting in punched through Bayji in November 2014 to relieve the Such immediate counter-attacks are also line abreast, with no unguarded flanks or gaps between besieged Bayji refinery clearing the neighborhoods along achieving fewer and fewer successes. units. the main urban area. The Islamic State withdrew to the After Mosul fell the battlefields in Iraq 35 The ISIL attacks struck at Sinjar, Aski Mosul, peripheries and in December reinfiltrated the city, over- Baqufa/Tall Asqof, Fasiliyah/Mt Bashiqa, Quban/Mt running several isolated ISF positions. At the time of Bashiqa, Hassan Shami, Makhmour peninsula (Tall writing IS in control of some 80% of Bayji, with ISF con- 28 For an excellent overview of ISIL’s operational art, Shair, Sultan Abdullah, Jarallah, Tall al-Reem). Attacks fined to holding a corridor along the central road axis. command and control and mission-type tactics see in the Badush area and Mt. Zartak east of Mosul were 25 For a detailed overview of ISIL’s extensive use of IED “How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine,” Metin disrupted by airstrikes before they commenced. See minefields see “The Hidden Enemy In Iraq,” Mike Giglio, Gurcan, al-Monitor, October 14, 2014. Horizon Client Access, Northern KRG Security Threat March 19, 2015. 29 The authors’ phrase to sum-up the Islamic State’s Triggers, November 17-23, 2014 (subscriber service 26 In Mosul residents are kept in by a security trench restless patrolling and attacking actions along the available via www.hcaccess.com ). that channels movement to vehicle check points, where frontline. 36 Ibid. See “(22) Elements of the IS killed by Coali- persons leaving are forced to give the names of friends or 30 “U.S. officials say 6,000 ISIS fighters killed in tion planes bombing to the outskirts of Sinjar,” NINA, relatives as hostages who may be harmed if they do not battles,” Barbara Starr, CNN, January 22, 2015. We February 16, 2015; “Coalition shells ISIS-held bridge return. Residents also fear that may permanently lose discuss this casualty metric later in this piece. on eastern Tigris River” Rudaw February 21, 2015; their property if they leave the city. See “How to Retake 31 See W.J.K Davies, German Army Handbook 1939- “Peshmerga forces repulse the IS attacks north of Mo- Mosul From the Islamic State,” Michael Knights and 1945 (London: Purnell, 1973). sul” NINA February 21, 2015; “Warplanes pound ISIS Michael Pregent, February 27 2015. 32 See Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western group near Mount Zartak” Rudaw February 20, 2015; 27 See “Mosul residents prepare for battle,” Saleh Elias, Front: The British Army’s Art of the Attack 1916-1918 “Warplanes blast ISIS positions in Kirkuk, Mekhmour” March 13, 2015. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 32, 194 Rudaw February 17, 2015.

4 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 unwilling to accept that the military Makhmour.40 The centerpiece of the motivations that make up the Islamic tide has turned against it in Iraq. operation was a double envelopment State in Iraq. Decentralized operational Their commitment to a version of the of Kurdish forces that had pressed control gives significant leeway to local “cult of the offensive”37 led them to southwest of Erbil to the Tigris River, commanders, often at platoon level, experiment with two even more costly deep in territory held by the Islamic to plan and undertake operations. versions of counter-attacking warfare. State since June 2014. The northern Individual volunteers are clearly The first was the creation of tactical flank of the Kurdish salient suffered a driven by their personal commitment reserves made up of Suicide Vehicle- series of platoon-sized river assaults to the armed jihad, by their desire to Borne Improvised Explosive Devices across the Tigris and Zab rivers,41 fight, and by a personal and small-unit (SVBIEDs), often a quick reaction while the southern flank buckled under quest for glory.45 The defense of specific force made up of armored suicide truck the weight of motorized blitzes up the terrain, or even of Mosul itself, may not bombs. This kind of shock force has Tigris, which overran Kurdish advance be important to the significant elements been used on a range of battlefields— guard outposts that had reached the of the Islamic State who are not tied to Udaim Dam, Hamrin oilfield, Tikrit38— river.42 The operation was impressive, particular Iraqi locales. but the largest such counter-attack achieving tactical surprise with dawn came at Aski Mosul, south of Mosul attacks under cover of river mist, and The willingness of Islamic State fighters Dam. On January 21, 2015, Peshmerga Kurdish forces remain stalled in the to undertake offensive action can be an forces achieved a breakthrough across area at the time of writing. But the front asset. The group creates a constant flow a 30-mile front that seemed to threaten opened up by the counter-offensive has of well-publicized actions that bolster the city of Mosul. In response, the sucked the Islamic State forces into its propaganda efforts.46 These images Islamic State committed its operational a grueling battle in open areas where create the sense among sympathizers reserve. In a scene that could have been Kurdish forces and Western airpower that the Islamic State is still on the lifted straight from the dystopian vision continue to inflict heavy casualties.43 offensive, whereas the reverse is of the Mad Max movies, 14 armored fuel This operational-level counter- true. Images of offensive warfare and tanker SVBIEDs were directed against offensive by the Islamic State in Iraq particularly of suicide operations may the Peshmerga breakthrough, all of could well be their “Battle of the Bulge,” be powerful recruitment tools, aiding which were destroyed by Western the doomed and costly German effort the “refresh rate,” the rate at which it is airpower and guided anti-tank missiles in late 1944 to regain the initiative in able to bring in fresh troops. before they reached their targets.39 Western Europe.44 At the tactical level, the active patrolling Another costly experiment was a Operational Impact of Tactical Restlessness undertaken by Islamic State units has theater-wide counter-offensive from The “cult of the offensive,” manifested in often slowed down their opponents. the Islamic State on January 9-11, 2015. tactical restlessness, is probably driven Like other proficient infantry forces, This was the largest of the Islamic by the fusion of individual and group the Islamic State uses fighting patrols State group’s coordinated operations, to dominate no man’s land, fix the drawing together more than a dozen enemy and prevent enemy intelligence- platoon-sized attacks cells to mount 40 “Peshmerga Respond to Islamic State Attacks in gathering, and reconnoiter attack assaults on the area held by Kurdistan Zumar” Basnews January 11, 2015;”ISIL launches fierce routes. The Islamic State desensitized Regional Government (KRG) forces attacks across Iraq” al-Jazeera January 15, 2015; “Kurd- units with constant patrolling, with a between the Syrian border and ish official: Daash suffered 125 killed in Qwayer battles,” sub-set of attacks being well-planned NINA January 11, 2015, “Kidnapped Civilians Freed by Peshmerga in Gwer,” BasNews, January 12, 2015;“ISIS 37 This concept, adapted slightly here, describes the Assault on “Gwer: Shaikh Serwan Barzani and His 45 IS video releases show motivated, predominately belief that the power of offensive action is so decisive Team Ran a Way, 70 Reported Killed or Missing,” Millet young, 20–40 man groups—the size of an old Iraqi that static defence is almost never adopted, regardless of January 10, 2015. IS video footage of the Gwer attacks army platoon—making their military reputations local circumstances. For a good review of the issue see 41 “In heaviest fighting since August, Kurds turn back with daring attacks. Foreign fighters and suicide and Jack. L Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Islamic State assault near Irbil,” Mitchell Prother, Mc- SVBIED operatives are also prominently featured. For Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Clatchy, January 11, 2015; IS footage of the Gwer attacks two recent examples see footage of the complex assault Cornell University Press, 1984). 42 Ibid. on Peshmerga positions near Kirkuk in “Raiding the 38 Between March 29 and April 6, 2015, the Islamic 43 Since January 2015 Coalition airstrikes have Barracks of the Peshmerga #2 – Wilayat Kirkuk,” Jihad- State launched at least six SVBIEDs at ISF positions pounded exposed Islamic State forces holding the ology, April 11, 2015, and the raid on a Zerevani outpost in the Hamrin oil field (footage of Hamrin SVBIED Makhmour front including pinpoint close air support in Kisik area, “Storming the Barracks of the Peshmerga utilizing a captured ISF M113 APC) . IS threw numerous on frontline Islamic State vehicles and positions, Islamic in the Area of Shandukhah – Wilayat al-Jazirah,” Jihad- SVBIEDs at the ISF in Tikrit and the surrounding areas State concentrations massing for attacks, and rear-area ology, April 5, 2015. during recent operations to clear the city, see “Casualties support infrastructure sustaining the front. See “The 46 The Gwer raid video footage makes good propa- Increase In Iraq Due To Tikrit Operation,” Joel Wing, International Coalition bombed a gathering to the IS “in ganda use of captured ISF Humvees and advanced Musings on Iraq, April 2, 2015. Tal al-Sha’ir village in al-Qayyarah district in Nineveh” weapons systems, such as a captured 155mm M198 39 See Isabel Coles, “Kurdish forces squeeze Islamic NINA March 11, 2015; and “Coalition aircraft bomb ISIL howitzer, to create the image of formidable, well-armed State supply line in northern Iraq,” Reuters, January 21, hideouts in Gwer sun-district” PUK Media February 20, military force. IS deliberately emphasizes operations 2015, “Peshmerga Kills Over 200 IS Militants in East 2015. with high propaganda value versus statistically far Mosul Operation,” BasNews, January 21, 2015. Video 44 For a thorough account of this operation see Charles more numerous, run-of the mill IED attacks, indirect- footage of the destruction of several SVBIEDs by Pesh- B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Bulge (London: George fire harassment and small-unit ambushes, which in fact merga anti-tank guided missiles . Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1984). inflict the majority of ISF and Peshmerga casualties.

5 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 trench raids intended to overrun and and other fruitless probing actions are Mosul is far bigger than Tikrit—around massacre or capture small garrisons.47 wearing down the Islamic State at the 144 square miles versus eight square The Islamic State got particularly battlefront, a factor that may contribute miles respectively56—but as Tikrit effective at dominating the night and to a less effective defense of key ISF showed, ISF forces do not need to attack attacking under cover of morning mist or objectives like Mosul, Fallujah, and Tall the whole city at once. Additionally, fog, greatly undermining the confidence Afar. Tikrit is probably too big for the Islamic of ISF and Peshmerga units.48 This State to mount an exclusionary defense enabled the Islamic State to move Attrition to Islamic State forces is with their relatively small numbers. through encirclements as if they did not undoubtedly mounting. On January 22, Coalition forces will be able to penetrate exist, allowing surrounded groups to be 2015, U.S. ambassador to Iraq Stuart the city. Getting into the Islamic State- reinforced or to slip away, and letting Jones told Al Arabiya television that dominated areas is rarely the problem. the Islamic State reposition forces with an estimated 6,000 fighters had been great freedom.49 This night advantage killed at that point in the campaign. An under-acknowledged aspect of the has increasingly ebbed away on more Breakdowns of the target types in the Islamic State’s military campaign in static battlefields where Western air campaign to that date52 suggest Iraq is that it has been a theater-wide airpower and intelligence assets have that the figure may be quite likely.53 “economy of force” effort. The Islamic been provided to support the Kurds or, Counting in the Islamic State losses to State forces have engaged in a blur less frequently, the ISF. On a visit to the Kurdish forces, ISF and other causes, of active defense to conceal the basic frontlines at Kirkuk in March 2015 one the Islamic State might have credibly thinness of their troops on the ground. of the authors was told by Peshmerga lost many more than the U.S. estimate If sufficient forces are available to take infantrymen that the Islamic State’s of six thousand in the first 24 weeks over and consolidate recaptured areas, technicals could only break cover for since Mosul fell, and at the time of then a step-by-step approach can be used a few moments to undertake heavy writing there has been another 12 to reduce the lethality and effectiveness machine-gun attacks on Peshmerga weeks of increasingly effective strikes of the Islamic State delaying tactics.57 fighters before they would be inevitably and battles against the Islamic State in The key limiting factor on the speed destroyed by airpower in over-watch Iraq. Though the Islamic State refresh of advance against the Islamic State mode.50 rate is unknown, the Islamic State is the mustering of sufficient clearing group may struggle to replace weekly forces, the development of effective In general, however, the costs of losses of more than 250 fatalities54 plans to clear areas, and the use of offensive actions are rising steeply for (plus commensurate numbers of other sufficient numbers of effective units to the Islamic State while the benefits casualties and desertions), particularly fill up contested spaces and consolidate are declining. The Peshmerga and leaders and skilled specialist manpower. ownership.58 ISF are planning and conducting offensive operations with little The Islamic State after Mosul This finding suggests that the Islamic apparent disruption from the Islamic The battle of Tikrit shows that the State might also be defeated in other State active patrolling.51 Such raids coming battles of Mosul and Fallujah Iraqi cities and even in Raqqa, Syria, will be tough but winnable, if the which is not a great distance from right formula of planning, adequate potential military jump-off points in 47 See the same video footage cited above, for an excel- resources, Western airpower, and Turkey, if motivated, well-supported lent example of this: footage of the complex assault on intelligence support is employed.55 forces can be developed to liberate Pesh positions near Kirkuk “Raiding the Barracks of and consolidate those areas. There is the Peshmerga #2 – Wilayat Kirkuk,” Jihadology, April nothing mystical about the Islamic State 11, 2015, and video of the raid on a Zerevani outpost in Mosul, and Kirkuk have taken place despite frequent as a defensive force: it has succeeded Kisik area, “Storming the Barracks of the Peshmerga in ISIL raids on the frontline. Where the Kurds are not at- almost entirely due to the absence of the Area of Shandukhah – Wilayat al-Jazirah,” Jihadol- tacking—Makhmour, Sinjar, Bashiqa—it is because they ogy, April 5, 2015. have chosen not to attack further. 48 On January 11 ,2015 Islamic State took advantage of 52 See Chris Woods, US & allied airstrikes Iraq 2014-15: sively booby-trapped buildings successfully absorbed poor weather conditions to stage a boat-borne infiltra- Dataset maintained by freelance reporter Chris Woods and repulsed an assault on Tikrit in mid-March by Pop- tion attack across the Zab river at Gwer southeast of 53 Targeting data showed that of the strikes, around a ular Mobilization Units (PMUs), but rapidly collapsed in Mosul. They were able to control the town and its vital quarter were programmed strikes aimed at low-lethality early April under a multi-pronged push into the city by Mosul-Erbil highway bridge for several hours, killing 25 fixed targets (buildings, often empty). The remain- Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF) and battle-hardened federal rear-area Asayesh security force personnel in one of the der (1,300–1,500 strikes by late January 2015) were police backed by Coalition air support. See “Divisions deadliest single attacks on Peshmerga forces since the dynamic targets where very careful real-time positive Over Iraq War Exposed In Victory In Tikrit,” Joel Wing, fall of Mosul. identification was possible because enemy units were Musings on Iraq, April 6, 2015. 49 Ibid. The January 11 boat-borne raid on Gwer is undertaking military activity, creating high potential for 56 See “How to Retake Mosul From the Islamic State,” a prime example. Islamic State undertook a night at- multiple enemy casualties. An average of around four Foreign Policy. Michael Knights and Michael Pregent, tack, also taking advantage of fog and bad weather to fatalities per strike (1,500 times four) would give 6,000 February 27, 2015. infiltrate across the river and achieve complete tactical fatalities from airstrikes alone, hardly unimaginable 57 “Iraqi prime minister claims victory against Islamic surprise. considering the fact that Western controllers had eyes- State in Tikrit,” Loveday Morris, Washington Post, 50 Michael Knights, personal group interview, on most IS targets until the moment of weapon impact. March 31, 2015. Peshmerga lieutenant and Peshmerga private soldiers, 54 Six thousand divided by 24 weeks, as of January 22, 58 “CENTCOM Outlines Battle for Mosul, Doubles Maktab Khalid, Kirkuk, March 8, 2015. 2015, gives an average of 250 fatalities a week. Estimate for IS Dead,” Paul McLeary, Defense News, 51 For instance Peshmerga advances at Khazr, Aski 55 ISIL’s defensive system of IEDs, snipers, and exten- February 19, 2015.

6 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 effective opposition, not because of its redoubts in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic Chad: A Precarious inherent strength. State has failed to hold terrain, but they may prove adept at preventing post- Counterterrorism Partner What will follow the liberation of cities conflict resettlement and stabilization By Margot Shorey and Benjamin P. Nickels such as Mosul, Fallujah, and Tall Afar? of affected areas.62 This is where One option is the Ramadi model—that the Islamic State’ real paramilitary the Republic of Chad is building a Islamic State elements will remain in strength lies and this is the real military reputation as a leading African state place to mount commuter insurgencies challenge faced by Iraqis and their in the fight against terrorism. Chad in areas where population centers and coalition partners. will provide more than a third of the economic hubs can be attacked from 8,700 soldiers—3,000 men, nearly as rural redoubts. This kind of operational Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at The many as Nigeria’s 3,250—currently model could work along some stretches Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He assigned to the African Union (AU) of the Syrian border, in parts of the has worked in all of Iraq’s provinces, including approved Multi-National Joint Task 1 Western Desert and Jazira, in Beyji, in periods embedded with the Iraqi security forces. Force (MNJTF), and Chadian forces the areas between Ramadi and Fallujah, Dr. Knights has been briefing U.S. officials on the have already claimed successes against and in areas adjacent to the Hamrin resurgence of Al-Qa`ida in Iraq since 2012 and Boko Haram in its strongholds along Mountains. It could even work in Mosul provided congressional testimony on the issue in Nigeria’s borders. From the capital if the ISF and Kurds repeat the error December 2013. He has written on militancy in N’Djamena, President Idriss Déby Itno of failing to adequately garrison the Iraq for the CTC Sentinel since 2008. is busy working to project an image of city and its desert belts and satellite his country as a regional powerbroker towns (most significantly Tall Afar).59 Alexandre Mello is the lead Iraq security analyst at and valuable counterterrorism player. A key lesson of the last six months Horizon Client Access, an advisory service working A closer look, however, reveals is that retaking town centers is not a with the world’s leading energy companies. worrying vulnerabilities and triggers of real measure of success: stabilizing the instability that raise concerns about the whole defensive zone, including the risks of overreliance on this precarious rural belts, is the real victory. partner to contain and counter terrorist threats in Central and West Africa. Rebuilding large reliable locally accepted occupation forces will not This article provides an analysis of be easy given today’s sectarian and Chad’s role in regional counterterrorism economic climate in Iraq. Counter- efforts, examining its track record in insurgency efforts will benefit from the such efforts and a number of its political, resettlement of displaced persons but economic, and structural vulnerabilities. restoring governance and services for The article concludes by examining the returnees will also be very difficult. implications of these concerns through The formula of leaving Sunni areas some possible scenarios for instability as depopulated garrisoned zones has in Chad, with serious consequences been used in some places—Amerli, if Western partners were to rely too Jurf as-Sakr, and Jalula-Saadiyah60— heavily on Chad’s help in regional but it is not a mid-term solution and counterterrorism ventures. will only create ghost towns that are favorable haunts for the Islamic State. A New Prominence Resettling populations will be a major In the past few years, Chad has earned challenge because the Islamic State has international recognition as a regional destroyed hundreds of police stations, security leader, thanks to its provision administrative offices, bridges, and of a tough peacekeeping force and its official dwellings61 in a deliberate successes as a strong counterterrorism counter-stabilization effort that may partner in a troubled part of Africa. hint at a slow-burn strategy to wear A large country located in the heart down the Iraqi nation with repeated of Africa, Chad is strategically well sorties from insurgent-controlled placed to partner with regional and international actors seeking to counter various insurgent and extremist threats 59 For a great account of the neglect of Mosul see Joel throughout West and Central Africa. Rayburn, Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Re- 62 The current situation in Diyala province, which the In President Déby, Chad has a ruler sistance The Great Unraveling: the Remaking of the Middle Iraqi government declared cleared in January 2015, is who has demonstrated the political East, Hoover Institution Press Publication; No. 643, a cautionary example. ISF cleared IS from its urban will to lead in security cooperation August 1, 2014, pp. 137-162. stronghold in Jalula/Saadiyah in November 2014, but and a willingness to enforce collective 60 Human Rights Watch, “After Liberation Came De- the insurgents merely dispersed and regrouped in rural decisions. struction: Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli,” sanctuaries along the middle Diyala river valley and March 18, 2015 . their historic support zones south of Balad Ruz, with the 61 See footnote 17 for examples of the Mosul demoli- result that overall insurgent activity in Diyala has not 1 Thomas Fessy, “Boko Haram: Can regional force beat tions. measurably declined since November 2014. Nigeria’s militant Islamists?” BBC News, March 3, 2015.

7 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4

Chad has raised its regional security Chad’s ability to act in Mali is in part Enduring Vulnerabilities profile since 2013 through leadership thanks to long-term counterterrorism Yet on closer inspection, Chad’s in several multilateral bodies. Chad investments by international partners, counterterrorism successes obscure currently represents Central Africa such as France and the United States. some troubling traits in its politics, in the AU Peace and Security Council, France has provided financial and military, economy, and diplomatic and it recently successfully campaigned military support to President Déby relations that, if considered for a seat as a non-permanent member for decades, and it has maintained a pragmatically, cast doubt on its of the United Nations Security Council military base in N’Djamena since 1986.7 leadership and hint at the possibility of with its two-year term concluding at In August 2014, when the French future crisis. the end of 2015. A founding member government restructured its Sahel of the Economic Community of Central strategy following its intervention in The most salient political reality is that African States (ECCAS), Chad provided Mali, it showed its ongoing commitment President Déby heads an authoritarian the organization’s current and previous to and reliance on Chad by basing troops regime that relies on patronage and secretaries-general.2 Chad’s government for Opération Barkhane in N’Djamena, repression for its longevity. Like other has also made new connections to even though actual operations will African strongmen, his tenure as the Economic Community of West likely have a West African focus.8 president has long outlasted the typical African States (ECOWAS) through span of democratic rule. President Déby on-the-ground operations, displaying For Washington, Chad is a successful took power in 1990 by overthrowing the its military prowess in responding example of the light-footprint approach country’s previous ruler, Hissène Habré, to terrorism and instability in the to security in Africa. Chad served whose harsh eight-year term seems brief neighboring sub-region. as a base for recent U.S. support to compared to President Déby’s current Nigeria in combating Boko Haram quarter-century tenure.12 President With its strong experience fighting in and the search for the approximately Déby claimed victory in elections in the Saharan terrain, Chad’s military 230 young women kidnapped from 1996 and 2001, before rewriting the has been very active in countering Chibok in mid-April 2014.9 Chad also constitution to do away with term limits al-Qa’ida–linked Islamist extremists has been a core partner for over a to run and win again in 2006 and 2011. in northern Mali. Chadians fought decade in initiatives such as the Trans- On each occasion ballots were cast, but alongside the French to halt the Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership massive restrictions, intimidation of extremists’ southern offensive towards (TSCTP), through which the United opponents, and widespread fraud meant Bamako in early 2013, and the Chadian States seeks to build African capability President Déby’s electoral successes government contributed approximately and capacity to combat terrorism in the were far from democratic.13 Chad’s 2,000 troops to the African-led region. Between 2009 and 2013, the politics have prompted concerns from International Support Mission in United States obligated approximately many quarters, including, for example, Mali (AFISMA).3 When AFISMA was $13 million in TSCTP funds to Chad.10 Freedom House, which has categorized replaced by the UN Multidimensional Through the Partnership, the United Chad as “Not Free” in its Freedom in the Integrated Stabilization Mission in States trained the Chadian Army’s World report for more than a decade.14 Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, Chad elite Special Anti-Terrorism Group, again contributed to the mission, the only African force to participate Politicization and patronage in the sending approximately 1,100 troops.4 in the French-led offensive in Mali in Chadian Armed Forces also creates Although described in peacekeeping early 2013.11 In February and March points of concern. President Déby has terms, these missions saw soldiers in 2015, Chad hosted the annual U.S.- cultivated a military elite that is drawn direct combat with extremists, and sponsored Exercise Flintlock, a regional predominantly from his own ethnic Chad’s contingent has suffered the counterterrorism exercise for countries group, the Zaghawa,15 and Chad’s senior most casualties in MINUSMA.5 Chad is in the Sahel. officers are loyal to the president rather again taking casualties in the regional than the republic. President Déby has counterterrorism fight against Boko deployed his armed forces against Haram, with 71 dead and 416 wounded Chadian rebel groups. Chad’s military in less than three months of fighting in killed fighting Boko Haram”, April 10, 2015. has been lauded for its efficiency in the Lake Chad Basin.6 7 French Defense Ministry, “Les éléments français au Tchad (EFT),” February 24, 2014 . 8 French Defense Ministry,“Opération Barkhane,” 12 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise 2 “UNOCA présent à la cérémonie d’installation du August 11, 2014 . and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, nouveau SG,” UNOCA, Bureau régional des Nations 9 Ernesto Londoño, “U.S. deploys 80 troops to Chad to November 13, 2014. Unies pour l’Afrique centrale, help find kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls,”The Washing- 13 Freedom House, “Chad: Freedom in the World 3 African Union Peace and Security Council, 358th Meet- ton Post, May 21, 2014. 2014”; Freedom House “Freedom in the World : Chad ing, Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commission 10 United States Government Accountability Office, 2013”; Amy McKenna, “Idriss Déby, President of Chad,” on the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Encyclopedia Britannica. March 7, 2013. Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management, 14 See the annual reports available at Freedom House 4 United Nations, Troop and Police Contributers, June 2014. “Chad: Freedom in the World 2014.” August 31, 2014. 11 Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter 15 Gaël Grilhot, “Les forces tchadiennes au Mali : mythe 5 Unted Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” Fa- Terrorism Partnership Building Partner Capacity to et réalités,” RFI, January 21, 2013 , and “L’armée tchadi- talities by Nationality and Mission, (As of March 31, 2015) Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” Center for enne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali,” Le Monde, 6 Agence France-Presse, “Chad army says 71 soldiers Naval Analyses, March 2014. March 4, 2013.

8 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 Mali, but the hallmark of its success, its some 350,000 Sudanese refugees, could become a danger in and of itself, expertise in desert warfare, stems from largely from Darfur,23 who could become rather than the source of stability in the campaigns against insurgents in the a greater humanitarian or security risk Sahel it is currently perceived to be. country’s desert north and east.16 if conflict between Chad and Sudan were to reignite. In addition, President Implications and Scenarios There are also socio-economic concerns Déby’s long-time links with Libya’s Chad’s combination of under- driven by Chad’s failure to meet its former leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi has appreciated vulnerabilities and potential. Despite the discovery of oil, complicated Chad’s relations with its importance to regional counterterrorism which Chad began exporting in 2003, northern neighbor.24 efforts could lead to unwelcome the inequitable distribution of Chad’s developments. new wealth means that life for most These long-term drivers of instability Chadians remains extremely difficult.17 make Chad fragile, and any number President Déby’s personalized Poor governance and corruption—Chad of near-term triggers might tip the diplomacy and penchant for interfering sits at 154 out of 174 on Transparency country into crisis. Protests, especially in neighbors’ affairs raises concerns, International’s Corruption Perception by young people, have become an given N’Djamena’s central role in Index18—have ensured that increasingly common disturbance the MNJTF and Chad’s enthusiastic unemployment remains very high and in N’Djamena and smaller cities cross-border operations against Boko development remains limited. Chad, for across the country. In March 2015, Haram in Cameroon and Nigeria. Such example, ranks 184 out of 187 countries enforcement of a new law requiring entanglements have limited Chad’s on the 2014 UN Human Development motorcyclists to wear helmets, like the effectiveness in other regional forces Index.19 President Déby has used Chad’s one that sparked Boko Haram violence over the years. Once peace support oil wealth to fund national security in Nigeria in July 2009,25 spurred an operations began in the Central African at the expense of other development intense round of demonstrations that Republic (CAR) in 2013, for example, projects, breaking a deal with the led to three deaths and closed high Chad’s long history of interference in World Bank in 2006 to do so.20 To this schools and universities.26 Meanwhile, the CAR’s internal affairs,28 coupled day, despite its military partnerships, new technologies are empowering with reports of financial and military Chad receives less international non- and accelerating unrest. A recent support to the Seleka rebels, undermined humanitarian development aid than its video of Chadian police violently N’Djamena’s role in the International neighbors in the Sahel, such as Niger beating unarmed students went viral, Support Mission to the Central African and Mali.21 causing outrage among civil society Republic. Subsequent accusations that and invigorating the opposition.27 Chadian forces conducted politically Diplomatically, Chad’s international These incidents could be just a taste of motivated killings of unarmed civilians relations are potentially volatile because future events. For example, following in March 2014 eventually forced they rely on President Déby’s tenuous the popularity of the #lwili hashtag in President Déby to withdraw from the personal dealings with neighboring Burkina Faso’s rallies that eventually mission altogether.29 autocrats, a risky approach with great helped push the former president potential for sudden and complete Blaise Compaoré from power, Chadians External reliance on Chad as a force for reversals. Chad, for example, has a adopted the hashtag #Goum_Mou during regional security might also exacerbate working relationship with Sudan at the November 2014 protests, demanding internal drivers of instability. The moment, but President Déby had hostile a leadership transition in Chad’s perception among Western partners relations with President Omar al-Bashir upcoming 2016 elections. that N’Djamena’s support is needed for in the early 2000s, when both men success in regional counterterrorism supported rebel groups operating in If a crisis in Chad were to develop, efforts may encourage them to each other’s country.22 Chad still houses multiple vectors and sustainers of compromise on their values in order instability could easily aggravate and to protect their interests, just as prolong instability across the country. it lets President Déby trade on his 16 Peter Tinti, “In Mali fight, Chad proves a powerful Once in the grip of a major crisis, Chad government’s perceived international partner for France,” Christian Science Monitor, March 7, utility as a way to compensate for a 2013. lack of domestic legitimacy. The more 17 Celeste Hicks, “Chad’s oil project 10 years on: has November 13, 2014. the international community depends anything changed?” African Arguments, July 31, 2013 23 “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Chad,” on Chad as a security partner, the more 18 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,” Transparency United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees important its stability becomes, even if International. 24 International Crisis Group, “Africa without Qaddafi: it comes at the expense of democracy, 19 “Human Development Index and its components,” The Case of Chad.” Africa Report No. 180, October 21, respect for human rights, and economic 2014 Human Development Report, United Nations Devel- 2011. development. Of course this dynamic opment Programme. 25 “Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” National Consortium is not unique to Chad: the tradeoff is 20 Celeste Hicks, “Is Chad managing to beat the ‘oil for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, May curse’?” The Guardian, April 14, 2014 2014. 21 See and compare Organisation for Economic Co- 26 Siobhán O’Grady, “Why Are Chadian Youth Rioting 28 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise operation and Development data from Chad and its Over a Motorcycle Helmet Law?” Foreign Policy, March and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, neighbors. 11, 2015. November 13, 2014. 22 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise 27 “Violences policières: l’opposition tchadienne appelle 29 “UN Investigators: Chadian Soldiers Fired on Civil- and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, à des sanctions,” RFI, March 15, 2015. ians in CAR,” Voice of America, April 4, 2014.

9 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 apparent in several countries in Africa activity, is only some 250 kilometers and operations across both Central and and beyond. from N’Djamena, compared to the more West Africa. than 800 kilometers separating this Yet that focus may be short-sighted remote town in northeastern Nigeria Margot Shorey works in academic affairs at the even in relation to counterterrorism from the Nigerian capital Abuja. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where she issues. There are no guarantees that focuses primarily on West Africa and the Sahel. Chad will remain stable long enough The threat of further retaliatory attacks She holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher to mitigate or overcome terror threats is real and concerning for the citizens School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. in West and Central Africa. Chad’s of N’Djamena, as are the economic many vulnerabilities mean that implications of the loss of important Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels is Academic Chair for scenarios in which the country becomes trade routes through northeastern Transnational Threats and Counterterrorism more unstable are easy to envisage. Nigeria. Finally, Chad’s stability at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where Elite infighting, along with possible could suffer not only from this type he focuses primarily on the Sahel, North Africa, military discontent from repeated of terrorist spillover, but also from and the Horn of Africa. He holds a doctorate and deployment, significant casualties, or a sub-regional conflagration, with a master’s degree from the University of Chicago. unfair distribution of pay from regional combination of refugees, proxy forces, missions against terrorists could and state aggression coming from precipitate a coup d’état. Factionalism bordering nations, if the country’s could also increase tensions if rivalries delicate personalized relations with based on religious, ethnic, or regional neighboring heads of state were to sour. divisions harden and turn violent, something that could emerge in the These scenarios are not farfetched. The event of disputes over the country’s oil recent fall of Burkina Faso’s president revenues, for example. Blaise Compaoré, one of the Sahel’s other enduring strongmen, is a vivid example Any of these developments could be of an authoritarian ruler toppled by a the spark for significant destabilization mobilized population. President Déby given the underlying reality of has also come close to losing power. In Chadian life. There is little economic 2008, rebel forces reached the capital opportunity, few ways to express city and nearly overthrew the regime, political dissent, and no near-term end but retreated from the capital after a in sight to the regime led by the 62-year- three-day battle. Ultimately, France old president who has already ruled continued its role as President Déby’s for nearly 25 years. In this context, the protector, helping thwart the rebels in citizens of Chad—especially residents N’Djamena before they could oust the of the capital city, where a tenth of the president.32 President Déby survived population lives—could take inspiration the attack and made some reforms, but from recent revolutions on the continent they did not go far enough to avoid and foment a broader popular uprising. another such crisis.

Alternatively, these factors might Chad may seem to be a strong provide fertile ground for the attempted counterterrorism partner with radicalization of disaffected young a capable military in a troubled Chadians by terror groups. Boko Haram region, but the country’s internal could conceivably target Chadians for vulnerabilities warrant more attention recruitment or expand operations in from a wide variety of stakeholders. Chad, as it has in northern Cameroon. Regional states and international According to news reports, Boko partners who invest in and depend Haram is already operating in Chad heavily on Chad’s security and and has already moved some of the girls counterterrorism capabilities should kidnapped in Chibok, Nigeria, across remain alert. Another crisis might yet the border into Chad.30 Boko Haram’s push this regional powerbroker into first attack on Chadian soil occurred turmoil, with grave consequences for shortly after Chadian troops joined the regional counterterrorism strategies MNJTF.31 Also, Boko Haram’s activities are close to the border with Chad. 32 See “Chadian Army, Rebels Battle in Capital; Maiduguri, a hotbed of Boko Haram The views expressed are those of the authors Hundreds Killed; Civilians Flee; France, U.N. Back Gov- and do not necessarily represent the views ernment,” Facts on File World News Digest, February 7, of the Department of Defense, USMA, or the 30 “Chibok abductions: Nigeria girls ‘taken abroad’,” 2008; Ketil Fred Hansen, “Chad’s Relations with Libya, ACSS. BBC News, April 29, 2014. Sudan, France and the US,” Norwegian Peacebuilding 31 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants attack Chad for first Resource Centre, April 15, 2011. time,” BBC News, February 13, 2015.

10 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 Ethnic Albanian Foreign during the communist era. Albania’s In contrast, ethnic Albanians who long-time dictator Enver Hoxha went lived in the territories of the former Fighters in Iraq and Syria so far as to declare his country to be Yugoslavia as an ethnic and religious By Adrian Shtuni the first atheist state in the world, and minority struggling for civil rights all religion was banned between 1967 embraced Islam. It was not simply a extensive research suggests that about and 1990.2 The fall of communism dogma for them, but it was also part of 500 ethnic Albanians from the Western in the early 1990s, however, created a pragmatic strategy intended to secure Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq significant volatility, both political and ethnic and territorial preservation. since 2012, predominantly joining the ideological. Yugoslavia’s decade-long violent Islamic State and Jabhat-al-Nusrah dissolution intensified ethno-religious (JN).1 For the most part these fighters The vacuum attracted pan-nationalist cleavages, creating a more welcoming are the product of a well-integrated movements and Islamist revivalists environment for a militant strain of regional network of extremist entities across the Balkans, including some Islam. As the 1998–1999 Kosovo war painstakingly expanded across the 20 Arab Islamic foundations, which came to an end, and almost a decade region over the past two decades. Recent established a strong presence in after infiltrating Albania, dozens counterterrorism operations in Albania Albania.3 These foundations financed of foreign faith-based charities— and Kosovo have shed some light on the building of hundreds of mosques particularly Saudi-funded groups—set the structure and inner workings of and awarded educational scholarships up shop in Kosovo. Besides providing this network. These efforts by local law to thousands of malleable young humanitarian aid and building schools enforcement agencies have revealed that Muslim Albanians. Many of these young and community centers, they also the web of extremist actors primarily men who took up these opportunities erected significant numbers of Wahhabi comprises a new generation of local returned home from their studies in Arab mosques and madrassas,8 the financing fundamentalist clerics trained in the and Asian religious institutions with a of which was opaque. Middle East and closely affiliated with strong sense of spiritual identity and an a number of foreign-funded Islamic eagerness to promote a puritanical form The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for charities and cultural associations. of Islam.4 The impoverished Albanian Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), whose government, due to its law enforcement activities have been linked to al- This article examines the involvement agencies’ lack of experience in dealing Qa’ida operatives,9 reportedly built of ethnic Albanian foreign fighters in with extremist groups and the country’s 98 primary and secondary schools in Syria and Iraq and provides an analysis critical need for foreign aid and rural Kosovo after the war. The most of their backgrounds, affiliations, investment, paid inadequate attention promising students were enrolled in and activities. The data reveal that to the dubious dealings of some of 30 Koranic schools sponsored by the the age groups most vulnerable to these charities for many years, until Islamic Endowment Foundation, an recruitment are different among the in June 1998 law enforcement agencies SJRC entity.10 In a massive construction countries examined—Albania, Kosovo, raided the offices of the Revival of boom, more than 100 unlicensed and Macedonia—despite broad ethno- Islamic Heritage Society and four sites mosques sprouted across Europe’s linguistic and cultural similarities. linked to other charities, arresting four poorest country within ten years. 11 The study concludes that if they are foreign terrorist operatives in their Kosovo covers just 4,212 square miles. to be effective, counter-narrative employ.5 The raids broke up a cell of campaigns and government responses the Egyptian Islamic Jihad6 terrorist The development of an extensive must take into account evolving trends organization and reportedly foiled a religious infrastructure required a of radicalization, and that they should bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in significant increase in the number be fine-tuned to target the age groups Tirana.7 Nevertheless, almost a quarter of qualified clerics. Agencies and most vulnerable to being swept up into century of forced atheism had made groups such as The World Assembly of violent extremism. Albanian society comparatively less Muslim Youth made available hundreds susceptible to radical Islam. of scholarships to Middle Eastern Historical Conditions Islamic education institutions.12 The The Western Balkans are home to the returning graduates, often sporting largest indigenous Muslim population 2 Finngeir Hiorth, “Albania: An Atheistic State?,” in Europe and a long standing tradition Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 8 David Gardner, “Saudis Have Lost the Right to Take of moderate Islam that dates back to the 10:5, Article 3, 1990. Sunni Leadership,” Financial Times, January 1, 2014. Ottoman conquest of the peninsula in 3 Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Defense Acad- 9 “Written Testimony Of Jean-Charles Brisard, Interna- the 15th century. There are important emy of the United Kingdom, March 1, 2008. tional Expert On Terrorism Financing Lead Investigator distinctions, however, among the 4 Ibid. 911 Lawsuit, CEO JCB Consulting International–Before different countries of the region. Islam 5 Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probes Blasts’ Possible Mideast The Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Af- lost significant ground in Albania Ties.” The Washington Post, August 12, 1998. fairs United States Senate.” October 22, 2003. 6 The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an al-Qa’ida affiliate 10 “Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Tali- established in the 1970s responsible for the assassina- ban Coming to the Balkans?” KIPRED, June 1, 2005. 1 This estimate is based on data provided by multiple tion of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and 11 “Kosova Mbyll Sytë Para Xhamive Ilegale,” (Kosovo specialized reports tracking the flow of foreign fighters for targeting U.S. and Israeli facilities in a number of turns a blind eye towards illegal mosques), Balkan to Syria, hundreds of articles from regional media out- countries. Insight, January 12, 2012. lets reporting on this issue, and social media inquiries 7 John Kifner, “Police Seek Suspects Tied To Terrorism 12 William Finnegan, “The Countdown,” The New between November 2012 and early March 2015. In Albania.” The New York Times. August 21, 1998. Yorker, October 15, 2007. 11 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 the Salafis’ trademark long beard with for Albanian citizens range from 90 confluence of particular sociopolitical, the clean-shaven upper lip, created a to 148.18 By comparison, published economic, and demographic factors steady supply of hard-line clerics for estimates of Macedonian fighters—just may help explain Kosovo Albanians’ the growing network of mosques and 12—are very low, and other evidence disproportionate rate of radicalization. madrassas across Kosovo. Tellingly, seems to suggest a higher number may With 44 percent of the population aged eight of the 11 Kosovo imams arrested be more accurate. The similar number below 25, Kosovo has the youngest between August and September 2014 of reported casualties among jihadists population in Europe.25 There is also a on charges of preaching extremism from Albania (12) and ethnic Albanian surplus of young men, with a ratio of and helping to recruit jihadists were jihadists from Macedonia (14) would 1.1 male(s) per female. This youth bulge relatively young and educated in the indicate that the total number of ethnic makes the country more susceptible Middle East.13 Albanian fighters from Macedonia is to radicalization and social unrest, about 100. This estimate is further especially as it is combined with Genci (Abdurrahim) Balla, a 35-year- supported by the reported death rate rapid urbanization and poor economic old imam educated in Saudi Arabia, of around 10 percent among German,19 conditions.26 In fact Kosovo has the is typical of those caught up in the Belgian,20 Dutch,21 and Bosnian22 lowest Human Development Index operation. He was arrested in April jihadists. Only one ethnic Albanian in Europe and the lowest per capita 2014 in Albania on suspicion of leading jihadist from Serbia has been reported income in the Balkans.27 Also, as of a recruitment ring authorities believe to dead so far. 2013, Kosovo’s unemployment rate for have sent dozens of fighters to Syria.14 the 15–24 age group was 56 percent.28 These imams were closely affiliated The data also reveals that relative to A number of studies demonstrate a with a chain of 14 Islamic charities and its population of 1.8 million, Kosovo is significant association between an cultural associations whose leaders arguably the largest source of European excessive rate of youth unemployment were also educated in the Middle East jihadists in Syria and Iraq. With a rate of and incidence of terrorism in Europe.29 and which the authorities in Kosovo over 16 fighters per 100,000 nationals, Furthermore, according to United shut down recently because of their Kosovo’s recruitment rate is more than National Development Programme alleged ties to Islamist organizations eight times that of France, Europe’s (UNDP) 62 percent of Kosovo’s adult such as the Muslim Brotherhood.15 largest overall source of jihadists in population has low levels of education.30 Syria and Iraq.23 Kosovo’s per capita Ignorance and lack of proper The Scale of the Problem rate of recruitment exceeds by about 60 educational opportunities often make There were only a small number of percent even that of a failed state like people more vulnerable to ideological ethnic Albanian individuals involved Libya.24 indoctrination and radicalization.31 in jihadist activity prior to the Syrian This vulnerability is compounded by conflict.16 The evidence now suggest There are several likely factors for this Kosovo’s significant ethnic polarization that the number of ethnic Albanians development. Geographic proximity, and exacerbated by a recent traumatic who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq lack of visa restrictions, and low ethno-sectarian conflict that had sharp as of early March 2015 is about 500. transportation costs make the trip religious undertones. Among the data points that are publicly to Syria logistically easy. Yet the available, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Who are the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters? Affairs in a late February 2015 interview The author researched, examined, and stated that the number of foreign Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs). VOA. February categorized publicly available data fighters from Kosovo stands at “about 20, 2015. related to ethnic Albanian foreign 300.”17 The latest available estimates 18 Peter R Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/ fighters and their known associates Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan published between November 2012 and Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, 26 January, 2015 and 13 Fatos Bytyci, “Imam Arrested in Kosovo on Suspi- “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” The Washington Post, cion of Recruiting Islamist Fighters,” Reuters, August, January 27, 2015. 25 “The World Factbook: Kosovo,” Central Intelligence 2014 14, and Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in 19 Daniel H. Heinke, and Jan Raudszus, “German For- Agency and “Kosovo Population and Housing Census Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, eign Fighters in Syria and Iraq | Combating Terrorism 2011,” UNSTATS. November 1, 2012 . September 17, 2014. 2015 . Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at 26 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth 14 Nikoleta Kovaci, “Lufta Në Siri, Zbulohet Celula Ter- West Point, NY. January 20, 2015. Bulges and Political Violence,” UN Department of Eco- roriste Në Tiranë” (War in Syria: Terrorist Cell Identi- 20 Christian Levaux, “Belgian Police Kill Two in Raid nomics and Social Affairs. January 1, 2012 . fied in Tirana,Shekulli Mobile, February 1, 2014 . on Suspected Islamists,” Reuters. January 15, 2015. 27 “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private 15 Fatos Bytyci, “Indebted to America, Kosovo Strug- 21 Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun, “Dutch Foreign Sector and Employment,” UNDP November 2012 . gles to Curb Islamist Recruits,” Reuters, October 14, Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria | Combating Terror- 28 “Workforce Survey Results,” Kosovo Statistics 2014 and “Mbyllet OJQ-ja e imamit qe eshte e lidhur me ism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center Agency 2014 . ‘Vellazerine Myslimane’” (Shut down the imam’s NGO at West Point, NY, July, 20 2014. 29 “Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing the Impact with links to ‘Muslim Brotherhood’), Portali Telegrafi, 22 Rusmir Smajilhodzic, “Bosnia Arrests 16 Would-be of Terrorism for the Last Decade” Institute for Econom- September 22, 2014. Fighters, Balkans Move Against Jihadists,” Agence ics and Peace, 2012. 16 Timothy Holman, “Foreign Fighters from the West- France Presse, September 3, 2014. 30 “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private ern Balkans in Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center at 23 “France to Get Better Weapons, Hire More Intel- Sector and Employment,” UNDP. 2012 . West Point, NY, June 30, 2014 . ligence Agents to Fight Homegrown Terror,” CBS News, 31 Omer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terror- 17 “Intervistë me Skender Hysenin, Ministrër i January 21, 2015. ism’: Root Causes Of An International Actor Redefined,” Brendshëm i Kosovës” (Interview with Skender Hyseni, 24 Ibid., Neumann. SAIS Review XXIX, no. 2 (2009), pp. 75–86.

12 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 early March 2015 by media outlets, Kosovo.35 The presence of at least two Kosovo and Macedonia in late 1990s and released by regional governments, or groups of ethnic Albanians fighting in the beginning of 2000s and four former posted on social media. The resulting Syria was also recorded in November Albanian Army Commandos in the dataset compiled for the purposes of 2012.36 data set.38 Media reports suggest they this study contains information on 211 traveled to the conflict zone in groups ethnic Albanian men who have either The deadliest year was 2014 with at and that the number of KLA veterans fought in Syria and/or Iraq at some point least 29 reported deaths. The deadliest who have already fought in Syria may between 2012 and 2015 or have been month was September 2014 with ten be even higher. One press article from arrested and are being investigated for reported deaths mostly the result of mid-2013 quotes a KLA veteran as recruiting fighters or attempting to join U.S.-led airstrikes targeting Islamic stating that he was planning to join terrorist groups. This number does not State strongholds. January 2014 was the war in Syria “with about a dozen include the dozens of women, children, the second deadliest with five reported war comrades, experts in different and other family members who have deaths, mainly linked to intensified weaponry.”39 accompanied them. clashes between the Islamic State and JN. Media reports on at least three, Meanwhile, the pool of imams and According to official sources at least and possibly as many as six, Kosovo madrassa students involved either 13 Albanian nationals have traveled to Albanian youths traveling to Syria directly or indirectly in this armed Syria with their wives and 31 children.32 in early January 2015 attest to the conflict increases from ten to 23 when Another report claims that about continued flow of fighters despite adding the 13 imams arrested in Kosovo 20 Kosovo Albanian families have the punitive measures taken by local and Albania for inspiring or recruiting “made hijrah”33 to live and fight in the governments to curb the phenomenon.37 jihadists.40 Albanian authorities region and that one of these families— reportedly possess strong evidence that composed of three brothers, two wives, At least ten of the fighters identified a ring operated by two imams in the and five children— traveled to Syria as in the dataset belong to the ethnic suburbs of Tirana is responsible for late as September 2014.34 Bearing in Albanian diaspora in Western Europe recruiting 70 fighters.41 mind the patriarchal family structure and possibly had dual nationality, common among ethnic Albanians, specifically five from the ethnic Not surprisingly, due to a tradition particularly in Kosovo, it would be Albanian diaspora originating from of close-knit families among ethnic reasonable to assume that more than Macedonia, and five from the ethnic Albanians, a third cluster of fighters is 100 ethnic Albanian relatives of Albanian diaspora originating from connected to each other mainly through jihadists have made the trip, some Kosovo. Their last reported residences kinship ties. There are at least eight of whom may have received military were in Germany, Sweden, Norway, cases in which a small group of fighters training and eventually participated in Austria, and Switzerland. Other related to each other (e.g., brother or armed operations. fighters or would-be fighters arrested cousins) traveled to the Middle East, for before they could travel to Syria or Iraq a total of 20 known fighters. In five of Of the 211 men in the data set, at least are known to have resided at some point these cases, the fighters originate from 152 of these men from Albania (70), in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Kosovo. This is in line with a similar Kosovo (64), Macedonia (17), and Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, trend observed among fighters from Serbia (1) have fought in Syria and/ Egypt, and Syria. other countries such as France and or Iraq in the past three to four years. Britain.42 Of those 152 men, 49 were reportedly Two main clusters of fighters that stand killed in action: 12 from Albania, 22 out are those with previous military from Kosovo, 14 from Macedonia, and experience (14) and those with previous 38 “Katër Komando Të Zall Herrit Shkuan Për Të Luf- one from Serbia. The first local media formal religious training (ten). At least tuar Në Siri. Dy U Vranë” (Four Commandos from Zall report of an ethnic Albanian casualty 14 of the fighters from the dataset have Herr Went to Fight in Syria: Two Now Dead), Gazeta came in early November 2012 regarding previous guerilla warfare experience or Tema, March 21, 2014. Naman Demolli, a 35-year-old Kosovo formal military training. There were ten 39 Ismet Hajdari, “Unknown to Their Families, Balkan Liberation Army (KLA) veteran and a KLA and/or National Liberation Army Former Guerrillas Join Rebels,” The Daily Star Newspa- staunch activist for a radical Islamic veterans from the armed conflicts in per, August 8, 2013. movement turned political party in 40 Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to 35 “Vritet Ish-ushtari I UCK-se Ne Siri Gjate Sulmeve Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September Kunder Asadit (Former KLA Soldier Killed in Syria dur- 17, 2014. 32 Aleksandra Bogdani, and Flamur Bezaj, “Dhjetra ing Raids against Assad).” Shqiptarja.com, November 41 “Tetë Në Pranga, Rekrutonin Luftëtarë Besimtarë Fëmijë Shqiptarë, “pengje” Te Xhihadisteve Ne Siri 14, 2012. Shqiptarë Për Të Luftuar Në Siri” (Eight Arrested for (Tens of Albanian kids, “hostages” of Jihadis in Syria),” 36 “Grupe Shqiptarësh Në Luftë Kundër Assadit (Al- Recruiting Albanians to Fight in Syria), Gazeta SHQIP, Reporter.al, December 16, 2014 . banian Groups in War against Assad),” Portali Telegrafi, March 12, 2014. 33 Hijrah refers to Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to November 14, 2012 . 42 “French Brothers Seek Jihad in Syria,” BBC News, Medina to escape persecution, but in this context is used 37 “Dy Nga Tre Gjilanasit Qe Shkuan Ne Siri Nuk August 20, 2013, and Chris Pleasance, “Last Surviving simply as migrate. Kishin Pasaporta; E Paraqarte Si Dolen” (Two of the Brother of Trio of British Extremists Who Left Britain to 34 Besiana Xharra and Anita Kadriu, “Familja Dhjeta- Three People from Gjilan That Travelled to Syria Did Fight in Syria Says He Will Not Return to UK until All nëtarëshe Në ISIS. (Ten-member (Albanian) Family Not Have Passports; Unclear How They Managed to Muslim Lands Are ‘liberated’,” Mail Online, November with ISIS.).” Zeri, January 25, 2015 . Travel), KOHA. January 20, 2015 . 15, 2014.

13 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4

What Age Groups are Most Susceptible to causal factor worth exploring may be Recruitment for Violent Jihad? the fact that Kosovo society experienced Canadian Foreign Fighters Of the 152 ethnic Albanian foreign the growth of Middle Eastern charities in Iraq and Syria fighters identified by name or by with extremist links well after Albania By Christopher Anzalone pseudonym in the media, the data did—post-1999 in Kosovo compared to set contains demographic data for 88 post-1990 in Albania. The outbreak of mass popular protests fighters. Based on this information the against the Syrian government of ethnic Albanian fighters range in age Conclusion President Bashar al-Assad in the from 17–70 and they are on average The unprecedented proportion of ethnic spring of 2011 and the country’s rapid 30 years old. The data suggests that Albanians being drawn to violent descent into an increasingly brutal the age group most susceptible to extremist organizations testifies that civil war following violent repression recruitment for violent jihad among militant Islamist narratives have struck by state security forces and militias ethnic Albanians is 21–25 years old. a chord. This preliminary study based have produced a chaotic environment on a detailed, yet partial footprint of in which armed groups such as the While the individuals in this data set the ethnic Albanian foreign fighters, Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra have share similar ethnic and linguistic identified two distinct age groups flourished. backgrounds and are clustered particularly susceptible to recruitment together on the battlefields of Syria into violent extremism. While the The Syrian government’s brutality and Iraq, they originate from three typical foreign fighter from Albania is and use of mass violence, including different socio-economic and political a male between 31 and 35 years old, the the bombing of civilians, the environments. Ethnic Albanians from typical ethnic Albanian foreign fighter widespread use of torture and rape, Kosovo and Macedonia have more from Kosovo and Macedonia is a male and campaigns of starvation, has been points of commonality due to their between 21 and 25 years old. The data well documented. The emotive images, common Yugoslav past than they share indicate that country-specific dynamics, coupled with ease of travel and a host with Albanian nationals. In order to despite all the many ethno-linguistic of highly personalized factors ranging detect potential variances between and cultural similarities among ethnic from a search for a greater purpose fighters, the data was segmented by Albanians in the Balkans, may have had and identity to troubled backgrounds country of origin: Albania (23), Kosovo a more determining role in their path to involving crime and mental illness, (49), Macedonia (15), and Serbia (1). radicalization. have helped fuel the mobilizations of Though the sample sizes of fighters foreign fighters, first to Syria and later originating from each country are not A more granular understanding of the to Iraq.1 equal, they represent comparable ratios complex radicalization environment relative to the number of estimated and recruitment patterns identified This article examines the flow of fighters per country, 16, 16, and 15 in this study would allow for a more Canadian foreign fighters to the Syrian percent respectively. informed counter-radicalization and Iraqi theaters, placing it in context strategy and effective counter- of earlier Canadian involvement in The data segmentation reveals distinctly narrative campaigns targeting the most jihadi groups, and in particular other different patterns of recruitment among susceptible age groups. Moreover, these recent cases, such as Somalia. Canadian this pool of foreign fighters. While counter-radicalization efforts would foreign fighters, like those from the age group most susceptible to benefit from frequent monitoring and other countries, are a diverse set of recruitment is the same among ethnic assessment of evolving radicalization individuals with different backgrounds Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia patterns in the region. Ultimately, the who have traveled to the battlefield at (21–25) that changes by a decade in the long-term success of these efforts will different times.2 This article describes case of Albania (31–35). This variance be determined by the ability to adjust to is largely reflected in the fighters’ and anticipate the radicalization trends. average age by country of origin as 1 On the ease of access to the battlefront in Syria, and by follows: Albania 35.6, Kosovo 28, and Adrian Shtuni is a Washington, D.C.-based extension Iraq, as a possible factor for high mobilization Macedonia 25.8. These differences, foreign policy and security analyst with a regional numbers of Europeans, see the Project on Middle East which are somewhat explained by focus on the Western Balkans and the Eastern Political Science interview with Thomas Hegghammer, Kosovo’s younger median population Mediterranean. He holds a M.Sc. in Foreign Service “POMEPS Conversations 32,” 20 January, 2014. age and other drivers of radicalization with a concentration in International Relations 2 The timing of travel is often significant. In previous listed above, could also be influenced by and Security from Georgetown University, and cases, such as Somalia, individuals who traveled earlier the demographics of the most radical, consults for think tanks and academic institutions were seemingly driven by different factors than those in- charismatic, and successful recruiters on issues of radicalization and violent extremism. dividuals who went later, particularly in regard to their in each country. In Kosovo this includes ideological affinity with al-Shabab. From 2007 to Janu- a 25-year-old Islamic State commander ary 2009, when the Ethiopian military still occupied named Lavdrim Muhaxheri, who parts of Somalia, nationalism seems to have played an until recently ran an Islamic cultural important role in the decisions of foreign fighters. Later association. His counterpart in Albania foreign fighters appear to have had more specifically was, until his arrest, the 35-year-old ideological motives, rather than wanting to simply join Imam Genci Balla. Another potential an effective organization.

14 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 the different types of individuals who who joined al-Shabab were of Somali motivations because of the limits of the have joined jihadi groups in Syria and descent, but those joining the Islamic information. There is often a dearth Iraq and examines Canada’s mentions State, Jabhat-al-Nusra, or other Syria of open source information, which is in the Islamic State’s official media -and Iraq-based militant groups are limited to jihadi primary sources and discourse, particularly related to claims more diverse in terms of their ethnic, whatever insights are available from that it inspired recent lone wolf attacks religious, and family backgrounds.6 the friends and family of fighters. It in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Canadian recruits are also featured is difficult to interview most of these near Montreal. prominently in the Islamic State’s individuals once they leave Canada. media operations, more so than in the Some fighters have produced material The Canadian Contingent media operations of other jihadi groups. once on the ground in Syria or Iraq, Despite some uncertainty around the but their motivations generally have margins, it is clear that the number of Like the foreign fighters from other evolved by that point, limiting analysis. foreign fighters traveling to the ongoing countries, many of the Canadians who conflicts in Syria and Iraq far outstrips left in 2011 and 2012 were motivated in Personal reasons are also factors, though earlier episodes of jihadi mobilization. part by a desire to engage in what they see they are often overlooked in much of The national, ethnic, and linguistic as a kind of “armed humanitarianism”7 the analysis of Muslim foreign fighters. diversity of the foreign fighters is on behalf of Syrian civilians who are These motivations include the desire to also much broader. A record number being violently suppressed by the atone for self-perceived sins (such as of Canadians or those with Canadian al-Assad government. Others were previously living in an un-Islamic way), connections, around 30 according to motivated by the search for identity feelings of disillusionment, and a desire the federal department, Public Safety and purpose, which, for them, was to belong to a group and participate Canada, have joined jihadi groups active fulfilled by the fight against the Syrian in a “noble” cause.8 Such motivations in Syria and Iraq, primarily Jabhat al- government and the idealized rhetoric are difficult to classify concretely for Nusra and the Islamic State. This is of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and, analytical purposes because they often somewhat more than the estimated to an even greater degree, the Islamic vary significantly among individuals. 20 to 25 Canadians who joined al- State and its claim to have reformulated As a result, it is difficult, if not Shabab in Somalia between 2007 and a caliphate. impossible, to develop a fully applicable 2013.3 Other high-end estimates put and explanatory typology. the possible number between 35-100 As with other foreign fighters, there individuals.4 There are a total estimated are multiple factors influencing the The decision to travel to Syria and Iraq 130 Canadians who are believed to decision to join armed groups abroad. rather than other battlefields is also have joined militant groups overseas, It is often difficult to construct a likely influenced by logistical factors. with Syria and Iraq being the most full picture about the underlying Travel to Syria is easier than traveling popular theater of choice for Canadian to jihadi battlefronts in Afghanistan, foreign fighters.5 Most of the Canadians Pakistan, or Somalia, for example. Attracts Canadians to Fight on Front Line,” September The international news media and the 4, 2013. See also the article’s accompanying video report, images of suffering civilians also put 3 Colin Freeze and Joe Friesen, “Why the Canadian “Canadians Fighting in Syria.” American photogra- the spotlight on the Syrian conflict, Pipeline to al-Shabab has Dried Up,” The Globe and Mail, pher Matthew Schrier, who was imprisoned for seven likely influencing the decision-making September 30, 2013. months in 2013 by Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo, also of prospective foreign fighters. Finally, 4 Public Safety Canada, “2014 Public Report on the Ter- reported being interrogated in fluent English by three there is also the powerful allure of rorist Threat to Canada,” p. 30, Aaron Zelin; “ICSR In- masked individuals whom he believed to be Canadians. the media narratives put forward by sight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise See “US Photojournalist Recounts Horror of Captivity jihadi groups, especially for those among Western Europeans,” International Centre for after Escaping al-Qaeda in Syria,” Agence France-Pres- fighters who are not well educated in the Study of Radicalisation, December 17, 2013; Michelle se, August 23, 2013; “American Photographer Escapes the nuance of Islamic theology, history, Shephard, “Canadians Hurrying to Syria in Record Syrian Islamist Torturers: Paper,” Reuters, August 23 or jurisprudence. This is particularly Numbers to Join Rebels,” Toronto Star, August 23, 2013; 2013; C.J. Chivers, “American Tells Odyssey as Prisoner true of certain concepts such as that of Amarnath Amarasingam, “Canadian Foreign Fighters of Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times, August 22 2013, the ghuraba, the strangers who will once in Syria: An Overview,” Jihadology, March 4, 2015. and Michelle Shephard, “Canadians Hurrying in Record again emerge as the “true Muslims” and The high-end estimate of up to 100 Canadian foreign Numbers to Join Rebels,” The Toronto Star, August 23, the important placement of Syria in fighters was repeated on January 15, 2014 by Abu Turab 2013 eschatological narratives and certain al-Muhajir (the Emigrant), a Twitter user claiming to be 6 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Somalia and hadith.9 These are concepts that jihadi one of them. See “Canadian ‘Martyred’ while Fighting in Al Shabaab.” Syria, Jihadist Says,” QMI Agency, January 17, 2014. 7 This description was coined by Thomas Heggham- 5 Public Safety Canada, “2014 Public Report,” p. 11, p. mer. See: Stefan Binder, “Interview: Syrien: Humanitäre 8 Libération, “Je suis allé en Syrie pour racheter mes 17. Estimates of the number of Canadians fighting in Helfer mit Kalaschnikow,” Der Standard, February 13, péchés,” February 12, 2014, and Charlotte Boitiaux, Syria and, later, Iraq, also come from non-governmental 2014. Jihadi rebel groups operating in northern Syria “Confessions of a French Jihadist in Syria,” France24, sources, such as documentary filmmaker Bilal Abdul have set up, according to British government officials, February 13, 2014 Kareem, who interviewed fighters from various Islamist fronts whose members pose as aid workers in order to 9 The framing of the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq rebel groups in Syria in 2013. He noted in a Septem- facilitate the travel of foreign fighters into Syria, see An- in eschatological/apocalyptic terms can be seen most ber 2013 interview with the Canadian Broadcasting thony Lloyd, Alex Christie-Miller, and Michael Evans, clearly in the naming of the Islamic State’s English lan- Company (CBC) that he met 20–30 Canadian fighters “Jihadists Using Aid Agencies as Cover to Join Syria guage e-magazine, Dabiq, and the name of an affiliated during his time in Syria. See CBC News, “Syria Conflict Fight,” The Times, February 10, 2014. media organization, the Al-Amaq News Agency. Both

15 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 media operatives and ideologues derive Poulin, who had married in Syria, was of emigrating from non-Muslim from selective readings of historical expecting a child at the time of his countries and coming to the blessed treatises, the hadiths, the Qur’an, and death.13 A convert of only six years, land of Syria to live a life of purity.18 In exegetical works. Poulin had a troubled youth, including his recruitment pitch, he emphasizes some criminal activity, before he left for his identity as an “average” Canadian Individual Case Studies Syria.14 Early on, he reportedly adhered who “loved” hockey and other sports as Although open-source data on the to a particularly rigid, black-and-white well as summers in the countryside, and Canadian foreign fighters in Syria and interpretation of Islam.15 In a series of who was employed in a well-paying job Iraq are limited, there are significant Internet postings, he claimed that he as a street cleaner, saying, “You know, data on some individuals that provide had been accused of terrorism, had been mujahidin are regular people too.”19 useful, if tentative, comparisons with imprisoned, and was feared by people other groups of Canadian foreign in his hometown of Timmins. He also He is at pains, though, to also note fighters. claimed that his activities were being the support network that he says monitored constantly by the police.16 is in place for foreign fighters.20 André Poulin Poulin posted about his legal troubles Ultimately, though, the reward for Poulin, a 24-year-old from Timmins, online, describing some of the acts he those who emigrate, he says, will be Ontario, who left for Syria in late 2012 was accused of, including threatening the recompense (ajr) from God.21 He from Calgary, was killed in August to blow up a Timmins gas station. He calls for those with any skill, from road 2013 during an assault on the Syrian also described arrest for making death construction to technology, to come government-held military airbase of threats after he was caught having an rebuild Syria. In Flames of War, Poulin’s Menagh in the governorate of Aleppo.10 affair with the common-law wife of a frontline participation in the battle Reports of his death emerged in January man whose house he was then living in for Menagh is prominently featured in 2014.11 Poulin was featured in a June as well as arrests for harassment, theft, the film’s narrative, though he is not 2013 report about Western foreign and carrying a weapon illegally.17 identified by name. fighters in Syria broadcast by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom, in which he The Islamic State has posthumously The Calgary Group: Damian Clairmont, Salman noted that he was “helping people” featured Poulin in two major films, Al- Ashrafi, and the Gordon Brothers in Syria, something that he said his Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from Different Lands, Clairmont, 22, a resident of Calgary from parents supported but did not fully released in July 2014, and Flames of War, an Acadian family, was killed in Syria in understand.12 In the Channel 4 report, released in September 2014. In the January 2014 during fighting between Poulin was shown fighting alongside first, Poulin speaks candidly about his Jabhat al-Nusra and Free Syrian Army a number of Europeans in Katibat al- previous life as a “normal Canadian” (FSA) militias.22 He had left Canada in Muhajirin (Brigade of the Emigrants), a before urging Muslim viewers to fulfill November 2012 after telling his mother rebel group founded and commanded by what he says is their religious obligation that he was going to study Islam and Russians and foreign fighters from the Arabic in Egypt. He instead traveled to Caucasus. Turkey before crossing the border into 13 CBC News, “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Syria and joining Jabhat-al-Nusra.23 Ont., Confirmed Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014, and names are those of places mentioned in Sunni hadith ICI Radio-Canada, “André Poulin, un autre Canadien about locations of a final great battle with “Rome,” djihadiste tué en Syrie selon CBC,” January 16, 2014. 18 Islamic State film,Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from which is today often interpreted by jihadis as referring These rumors were confirmed in a film released by the Different Lands, July 2014. Poulin, when speaking about to “Christendom” generally. Islamic State in July 2014, Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few the rewards from God that await emigrants, notes that 10 CBC News, “Syria Conflict Attracts Canadians to from Different Lands. it is Ramadan at the time of recording, suggesting that Fight on Front Line,” September 4, 2013, CBC News, 14 He converted sometime between late 2008 and early it was recorded during Ramadan in 2013, which fell in “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Ont., Confirmed 2009, just after turning 20. See CTV News, “Another July and early August. Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014; ICI Radio-Canada, Canadian Man Dies Fighting in Syria,” January 17, 2014. 19 Ibid. “André Poulin, un autre Canadien djihadiste tué en Poulin confirmed that he had converted six years before 20 Ibid. Syrie selon CBC, January 16, 2014; The Canadian Press, in the Islamic State filmAl-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from 21 Ibid. “Canadian Man Killed Last August in Syrian Conflict: Different Lands. 22 Jean-Marie Yambayamba, “Un jeune Calgarien tué Report,” January 17, 2014; and The Canadian Press, 15 Ibid., “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Ont., en Syrie après s’être rallié à un groupe djihadiste,” ICI “Another Canadian Reported to Have Been Killed while Confirmed Dead in Syria.” Radio-Canada, 15 January, 2014, and Fadi al-Haruni, Fighting in Syria,” January 17, 2014. 16 Ibid. Poulin posted about his legal troubles online, “Death of a Canadian Jihadi in Syria,” Radio Canada 11 CBC News, “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, describing some of the things he was accused of. These International, January 15, 2014 . Ont., Confirmed Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014, and included threatening to blow up a Timmins gas station. 23 The Huffington Post Alberta, “Damian Clairmont ICI Radio-Canada, “André Poulin, un autre Canadien He also had been arrested for making death threats after Dead: Calgary Islam Convert Killed Fighting in Syria,” djihadiste tué en Syrie selon CBC,” January 16, 2014. he was caught having an affair with the common-law 15 January, 2014 and CBC News, “Damian Clairmont Photographs of Poulin’s body following the battle were wife of a man in whose house he was then living in, Killed Fighting with al-Qaeda-linked Rebels in Syria,” tweeted on March 20 and March 21, 2014 by Twitter harassment, theft, and carrying a weapon illegally. and Postmedia News, “Canadian Man Fighting against user “Abu Bakr al-Muhajir,” who claimed to be a Cana- 17 Ibid., “Canadian ‘Martyred’ while Fighting in Syria, Regime ‘Executed’ by Other Rebels: Report,” January dian foreign fighter in Syria. Al-Muhajir confirmed that Jihadist Says”, QMI Agency, and Michael S. Schmidt, 16, 2014; Nick Logan, “Calgary Man Damian Clairmont Poulin had died during the battle for the airbase. “Canadian Killed in Syria Lives On as Pitchman for Reportedly Killed Fighting in Syria,” Global News, Janu- 12 Channel 4, “Britons Fighting with Syria’s Jihadi Jihadis: ISIS Uses Andre Poulin, a Convert to Islam, in ary 15, 2014; Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: ‘Band of Brothers’,” June 14, 2013. Recruitment Video,” The New York Times July 15, 2014 How a Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil

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Once in Syria, he was attracted to the The news of Clairmont’s killing was Iraqi forces for the Islamic State.36 The “al-Qa’ida types,” such as those in first reported on Twitter through user Gordon brothers left for Syria sometime Jabhat al-Nusra, because they “do not Abu Turab al-Muhajir, who claimed in late 2012, around the same time as steal, rape, or sell drugs or murder or to be a foreign fighter in Syria.32 On Clairmont and Ashrafi.37 kidnap for ransom.”24 January 14, he tweeted a photograph of Clairmont, whom he called Abu Farah Mohamed Shirdon Clairmont, who suffered from bipolar Talha al-Canadi (the Canadian), and, Shirdon, another former Calgary disorder and, between 15 and 17, in subsequent conversations with other resident, first emerged publicly as an agoraphobia, had a troubled childhood. Twitter users, reporting that his “bro” Islamic State foreign fighter in a film His family moved to Calgary in October had been killed fighting FSA militias in released by the group in mid-April 1997 when he was seven.25 At 17, he Aleppo.33 2014 in which he is shown tearing up attempted suicide.26 After turning 20, and burning his Canadian passport he became “very angry, very political,” His execution was confirmed by FSA- and threatening both Canada and U.S. according to his mother, and began to affiliated sources.34 Like many foreign President Barack Obama.38 From a speak forcefully about the worldwide fighters in Syria and elsewhere, prominent Canadian-Somali family, he suffering of Muslims.27 Despite holding Clairmont reasons for engaging in had previously studied at the Southern some basic jobs for short periods, he militant activism were guided not Alberta Institute of Technology before lived largely off a disability pension that only by a personalized and peculiar leaving for Syria after stating that he his psychiatrist had recommended he interpretation of Islam, but also by no longer felt comfortable living in apply for after he was released from the graphic scenes of conflict and the Canada.39 He was active on Twitter, hospital following his suicide attempt.28 suffering of civilians as well as highly urging readers to join the Islamic State individualized characteristics, life and posting ideological messages about Though he initially lied about his experiences, and personal motivations. martyrdom and the religious duty of destination, Clairmont later admitted to becoming mujahidin.40 Shirdon was his mother and in correspondence with Group dynamics and interpersonal reported to have been killed fighting a Canadian newspaper that he wanted relations, however, are also important in Iraq in August 2014, but subsequent to fight in Syria because women and aspects of the recruitment process for reports suggested that he was still children were being tortured and killed militant groups and, more broadly, alive.41 there by the al-Assad government and he social movements in general.35 While believed that, by fighting, he was doing living in Calgary, Clairmont was part John Maguire something productive by contributing of a study group that also included Maguire, 24, left for Syria sometime to a cause greater than himself.29 He fellow converts and brothers Gregory in 2013 after expressing views that also stated that the afterlife was a better and Collin Gordon and Salman Ashrafi. Islamic law should be enforced through place than this world, hinting at his The four men also shared an apartment violence and criticizing a local Calgary- desire for martyrdom.30 Although he together in downtown Calgary during based imam for condemning the Islamic initially kept in contact with his mother, 2011 and 2012. Ashrafi left Canada in State.42 According to the Royal Canadian it tapered off.31 October 2012 and in November 2013 carried out a suicide bombing against 36 Stewart Bell, “Canadian ISIS Member’s Online War,” National Post, July 12, 2014 . ‘Wake Up Call’ Urges Muslims to Follow Example of 24 Stewart Bell, “Canadian Killed in Syria: Calgary determined to be in Syria fighting.” CBC News, “Damian Calgary Suicide Bomber,” National Post, June 16, 2014. Man, 22, Joined Fight after Converting to Islam,” Na- Clairmont Killed Fighting with al-Qaeda-linked Rebels 37 CBC News, “Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary tional Post, January 15, 2014. in Syria” and Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Brothers, Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS,” 25 Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” August 29, 2014. Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War,” 32 His Twitter account, which has since been sus- 38 Islamic State film,They Hear You, O’ Muslims, April National Post, July 12, 2014; Stewart Bell, “‘He was a pended, was: https://twitter.com/abu_muhajir1. 2014. He was not identified by name or nationality, sitting target’: Mother of Canadian Muslim Convert 33 http://twitter.com/abu_muhajir1/sta- though he spoke in English. says Sons Recruited into Syrian Conflict from Calgary tus/423121184180281344/photo/1 and https://twitter. 39 CBC News, “Farah Mohamed Shirdon of Calgary Mosque,” National Post, June 20, 2013. com/abu_muhajir1/status/423127061188706305 Fighting for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” June 18, 26 Ibid. 34 Murray Brewster and Ben Makuch, “Calgary Man 2014. 27 Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Cal- Killed in Syria Prompts Warning on Homegrown Radi- 40 Shirdon tweeted on everything from his desire for gary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” cals,” The Canadian Press, January 15, 2014. martyrdom and the inability of his parents to prevent 28 Ibid. 35 For example: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Interests, him from engaging in military action to calls for other 29 Postmedia News, “Canadian Man Fighting against Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt,” Islamic Activism: Canadians to join the Islamic State. His account has Regime ‘Executed’ by Other Rebels: Report,” January 16, A Social Movement Theory Approach, (ed) Quintan Wik- since been suspended, but the author has recorded 2014, and Stewart Bell, “Alberta High School Dropout torowicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, and saved many of his tweets. His former account was: Explains Why He, and Many Others, Have Gone to pp. 231–249 and Donatella della Porta, “Recruitment http://www.twitter.com/MuhajirSumalee. Fight in Syria,” National Post, September 26, 2013. Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian 41 CBC News, “Farah Mohamed Shirdon of Calgary, 30 Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Calgary Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social Movement Re- Fighting for ISIS, Dead in Iraq, Reports Say,” August High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” search, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action: Comparing Social 15, 2014. and Bryan Passifume, “Calgary Jihadi May Not 31 He last called her on June 22, 2013 and had become, Movement Research Across Cultures, (ed) Bert Klander- Have Been Killed in Iraq,” QMI Agency, 12 September, according to his mother, even angrier. He also, she said, mans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, London, 2014. “became increasingly angry about Canada, increasingly JAI Press, 1988. 42 Jessica Hume, “Canadian ISIS Fighter: Headed

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Mounted Police (RCMP), Maguire was Ali Mohamed Dirie to Harakat Ahrar al-Sham and then to part of a group of six young men in Dirie, a member of the “Toronto Jabhat al-Nusra before he was killed Ottawa sympathetic to jihadi activity. 18” group who had been previously fighting in Azaz in February 2013.52 One other member, Khadar Khalid, 23, imprisoned for his role in a domestic is also believed to have traveled to Syria terrorism plot to attack the Toronto Zouaidia, Senouci, Rifaat, Rafai, Kadem, and Iraq. Suliman Mohamed, 21, twin Stock Exchange, the Canadian Security and Ismaili, who were all students at brothers and recent converts, Ashton Intelligence Service, and a military the College de Maisonneuve, a public and Carlos Larmond, 24, and Awso base, left Canada in 2012 using someone pre-university college in Montreal, Peshdary, 25, were later arrested by else’s passport since he was forbidden reportedly left for Syria and Iraq in mid- the RCMP and charged with terrorism- to have one of his own as part of his January 2015 to join the Islamic State.53 related offenses, including funding parole.47 He traveled to Syria via Dubai Rafai, Kadem, and Zouaidia come from Maguire’s travel.43 and is believed to have joined Jabhat al- Algerian-Canadian families and Ismaili Nusra.48 Reports of his death surfaced is originally from Morocco.54 At least In early December 2014, Maguire was in late September 2013 from sources one of the six is believed to have briefly featured in a video series produced close to his family and friends.49 Born attended classes run by Quebec-based by the Islamic State, titled Message in Somalia, he had come to Canada as a teacher Adil Charkaoui, though he of a Mujahid.44 Standing amid rubble refugee when he was seven. denies that there is any connection to and presenting himself as a “typical his classes and the choice to travel to Canadian,” educated and with no Quebec Foreign Fighters Syria and Iraq.55 criminal history, he calls for Muslim Montreal residents Jamal Mohamed viewers, particularly those in Canada, Abd al-Qadir, 24, Bilel Zouaidia, 18, The Islamic State and Lone Wolf Attacks to join the Islamic State. He also links Shayma Senouci, 18, Mohamed Rifaat, In addition to seeking recruits for the the two lone wolf attacks in Canada 18 or 19, Imad Eddine Rafai, 18 or 19, Syria and Iraq battlefields, the Islamic to that government’s participation in Ouardia Kadem, 18 or 19, and Yahia State is also seeking to project its power attacks on the militant group. Maguire Alaoui Ismaili, 29, are suspected of and influence abroad by claiming to clearly displayed his heavy ideological having left to fight in Syria. Abd al- have influenced the decision-making debt to the late al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Qadir was from a Kurdish Syrian- of a number of lone wolf militants in Peninsula (AQAP) preacher Anwar al- Canadian family and is believed to have Western countries, including Canada, Awlaki, closely paraphrasing him and left Canada in the summer of 2012. He the United States, Australia, and even basing his own nom de guerre, grew up in Montreal and was a college France.56 The Islamic State claims “Abu Anwar al-Kanadi,” on al-Awlaki’s student at the time of his departure.50 the two lone wolf attacks in Canada name.45 Maguire and another Canadian, He said that he was driven to become a during October 2014 were inspired by Mohamud Mohamed Mohamud, 20, foreign fighter because of the suffering calls from its official spokesman and a formerly a student at York University, of his fellow Syrians and the inaction of prolific ideologue Abu Muhammad al- were reportedly killed during the the world powers in stopping the Syrian Adnani al-Shami. The assertion came months-long battle for Kobane in government’s atrocities.51 Abd al-Qadir in a story in Dabiq, the Islamic State’s northern Syria along the Turkish first joined the Free Syrian Army but e-magazine in an article attributed border.46 later transferred his allegiance first to John Cantlie, a captive British journalist. The Islamic State, however, 47 CBC News, “‘Toronto 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Di- does not state that either the shooting Down Dark Path,” QMI Agency, August 26, 2014. rie was under Strict Court Order,” September 26, 2013 . attack in Ottawa by Michael Zehaf- 43 Andrew Duffy and Meghan Hurley, “From JMag to 48 Ibid., CTV News, “Toronto 18 Member Killed Fight- Bibeau or the vehicle attack in St. Jean- Jihad John: The Radicalization of John Maguire,” Ottawa ing in Syria,” September 25, 2013; CBC News, “‘Toronto sur-Richelieu on two Canadian soldiers Citizen, February 7, 2015 . 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Dirie Reportedly Died in by Martin “Ahmad” Couture-Rouleau 57 44 Islamic State film,Message of a Mujahid 5: Abu Anwar Syria,” September 25, 2013; and The Canadian Press, received any operational support. al-Kanadi, December, 2014. “Toronto 18 Plotter says He’s Changed,” September 13, 45 Maguire specifically mimicked or copied a message 2010. For his role in procuring and smuggling weapons 52 Ibid. from al-Awlaki featured in AQAP’s eulogy video for the for the plotters, Dirie received a seven-year prison 53 CTV News, “Six Young Montrealers Believed to Be preacher, The Martyr of Da‘wa, December 2011. Simi- sentence in 2009, but was given credit for five years Fighting for ISIS in Syria,” 27 February, 2015, and Hugo larities or outright paraphrasing or citation includes of pre-trial custody and paroled in October 2011. He Joncas, “Deux derniers djihadistes allégués identifies,” Maguire’s urging of non-Muslim viewers to read the served his two years imprisonment in Canada’s highest March 1, 2015. Qur’an themselves in order to determine its validity, maximum security prison, the Special Handling Unit, 54 Joncas, “Deux derniers djihadistes allégués identi- warning Muslims against trusting promises of Western in the province of Quebec. At a parole hearing in 2010, fies.” governments that the war is not one against Muslims, Dirie claimed that while he still opposed Canada’s then- 55 Alan Woods, “Tough Terror Laws Won’t Stop and even his closing, “peace be upon those who follow involvement in Afghanistan, he no longer subscribed to Canadians from Fleeing to Islamic State, says Adil the guidance.” violence and wanted to find peaceful and political ways Charkaoui,” The Toronto Star, February 27, 2015, and 46 Stewart Bell and Meghan Hurley, “Mother Mourns to express his opposition. Steve Rukavina, “Collège de Rosemont severs ties with Ottawa Jihadi Maguire, Believed Killed in Syria,” Ot- 49 CBC News, “‘Toronto 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Adil Charkaoui group,” CBC News, April 16, 2015 . tawa Citizen, January 14, 2015; Bill Dunphy and Nicole Dirie Reportedly Died in Syria.” 56 Islamic State e-magazine, Dabiq, issue 5, November O’Reilly, “Hamilton Family Fears Son Killed Fight- 50 Kurt Pelda, “Fodder for the Front: German Jihadists 2014, p. 37, and issue December 6, 2014, pp. 3-5. ing for Islamic State in Syria,” The Hamilton Spectator, on Syria’s Battlefields,”Der Spiegel, April 30, 2013. 57 Islamic State, Dabiq, issue 5, pp. 36-37. The Islamic September 25, 2014 . 51 Ibid. State issued even stronger claims on having influenced

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By claiming responsibility, even if only in their late teens to mid-twenties, with campaign and make it a less attractive “spiritual” and not operational, for lone the average age decreasing over time.59 group for prospective foreign fighters. wolf attacks in the West, the Islamic This average age range is similar to State is trying to further inflate its image the ranges (twenties to early thirties) Christopher Anzalone is a Ph.D. candidate in the of power and influence has already seen in other samples of Islamist Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. benefited from non-stop coverage by the militants from the United Kingdom, His research focuses on political Islam, including international news media and attention continental Europe, the United States, contemporary jihadi movements, Shi’ite Islam and from world leaders. This, in turn, and elsewhere.60 The sample sizes are contemporary Shi’ite social movements, as well allows it to nudge the news narrative small, making it difficult to identify a as political violence in comparative perspective, away from the increasing on-the- firm trend, but there also appears to an the social and ideological construction of jihadi ground pressures it faces, particularly increasing number of Canadian converts narratives of martyrdom, and Muslim visual in Iraq, toward an image of the group as who participate in jihadi militancy— cultures. an inexorable regional and global force. from just one before the September 11, A similar media strategy was quite 2001 attacks to four after that date.61 successful for al-Shabab, which has called for lone wolf attacks in Europe Assessing the religiosity of these and North America as well, garnering individuals is difficult due to lack significant amounts of news media of information, but some tentative coverage and masking its battlefield conclusions are possible.62 Poulin, setbacks inside Somalia.58 Clairmont, and the Gordon brothers were all converts, while others, Conclusion including Shirdon and possibly The current group of Canadian foreign Abd al-Qadir, were newly religious. fighters in Syria and Iraq has evolved The available information indicates in comparison with previous Canadian that Poulin, Clairmont, the Gordon jihadists, particularly those who brothers, and many other Canadian joined al-Shabab. The fighters who foreign fighters had limited knowledge have traveled to Syria and Iraq have about Islam, particularly its diverse no familial, ethnic, or national ties to historical, literary, theological, and either Syria or Iraq. This stands in legal heritages. This evidence suggests stark contrast to those who joined al- further avenues for research, perhaps Shabab, the second largest grouping of on the commonality of such patterns foreign fighters. The majority of those among other groups of foreign fighters jihadists had Somali roots, which was or the impact of educational campaigns a significant factor for many in their on the flow of foreign fighters. decision to travel to Somalia. In the meantime, it is possible that the There are also some significant number of Canadians attempting to join commonalities between the grouping in the Islamic State or other jihadi groups Syria and Iraq and previous Canadian in Iraq or Syria may decline. These foreign fighters, however. These include Canadians face tighter surveillance by similar demographic characteristics the authorities and the confiscation of among most individuals, present or past, their passports, making it difficult to including age. The fighters are usually travel. The Islamic State also continues to lose territory in Iraq, which will likely further impede it from living up Man Haron Monis’ hostage-taking in a Sydney café, to the grandiose claims of its media connecting him to the militant group due to his bay‘a to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and describing him as a mujahid engaged in jihad in the path of God. Islamic State, Dabiq, 59 Sam Mullins, ““Global Jihad”: The Canadian Experi- issue 6, p. 4. ence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 5 (2013): pp. 58 Al-Shabab films,Woolwich: It’s an Eye for an Eye, Oc- 734–776, p. 744. tober 2013 and The Westgate Siege: Retributive Justice, 60 Ibid. February 2015, and Christopher Anzalone, “The Rapid 61 Mullins, “’Global Jihad’: The Canadian Experience,” Evolution of Al-Shabab’s Media and Insurgent ‘Journal- p. 746. This was out of a sample of 35 cases in the pre- ism’”, openDemocracy, 16 November, 2011. Al-Shabab is September 11 period and 29 cases in the post-September keenly aware of the power of the news media and the 24- 11 period. hour news cycle and has frequently designed its media 62 It is also difficult to define religiosity or piety, though operations to take advantage of the need for sources by both are often presented in accounts of Muslim foreign journalists, such as during the Westgate Mall attack in fighters, particularly in the news media, as being suf- Nairobi in September 2013. See Christopher Anzalone, ficient explanations of individuals’ decisions to engage “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy,” in militant activism. CTC Sentinel 6, no. 10 (October, 2013), pp. 1-6.

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A View From the CT CVE-relevant programming tries to individuals under the influence of favorably shape the environment for radical ideologies. The question Foxhole: An Interview with a particular community in terms of becomes: How can we reach them and Tom Wheelock political, social, and economic issues. convey a message that they will respond By LTC Bryan C. Price Basically, what you’re trying to do is to to in a positive manner? ameliorate the grievances that people Tom Wheelock is a Senior Vice President of have and make them less vulnerable CTC: What role can the U.S. Creative Associates International and the to extremist recruiters. You’re making government play in regards to Director of its Communities in Transition communities more resilient to the lure conducting CVE activities in other Division. He oversees implementation of a of violent extremism. countries? wide range of development, stabilization, and political transitions programs funded by the State There is also more targeted CVE-specific Wheelock: Many of our foreign Department and the U.S. Agency for International programming. It consists of four stages: assistance programs are CVE-relevant Development (USAID). Over the past few years, prevention, intervention, interdiction, programs. These include improving these programs have increasingly focused on and rehabilitation. These match closely educational systems, fostering countering violent extremism (CVE). His portfolio with the stages of crime and violence economic growth, and facilitating good of countries includes Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, prevention (CVP) programming, so governance. These programs attempt to Iraq, Nigeria, Colombia, and numerous other at- there may be a lot of c rossover in best reduce the window of opportunity for risk countries. He is a 1969 graduate of the U.S. practices that we can apply in a CVE extremists to take advantage of political, Military Academy, and was awarded the Bronze context. Here you get down to the nuts economic, and social grievances. Star Medal for Valor and a Purple Heart for and bolts inside a specific community, action during combat operations in Vietnam. He trying to identify youth at risk by In terms of U.S. CVE-specific later received an M.P.A. from the Kennedy School analyzing a range of appropriate risk programming overseas, there isn’t of Government at Harvard. factors. Then, having identified those that much right now. There are U.S.- youth at risk, it is about intervention: sponsored CVE communication CTC: Countering Violent Extremism working with families, local leaders, and campaigns in various countries (CVE) programs have received a lot institutions to guide those individuals and pilot programs—some of which of attention since the White House away from these negative activities we at Creative implement—to test hosted an international summit on the and toward more positives ones. The how a program can gain entry into topic in late February. The concept is United Kingdom and some U.S. cities communities, create the space needed not new, but it has gained momentum such as Los Angeles and Boston have to operate, and build the confidence of with the rising numbers of foreign community-level programs focused on local partners, communities, and local fighters flocking to Iraq and Syria, prevention and intervention. governments to emphasize messages of many of whom are from the West. peace and tolerance and introduce CVE- How would you best articulate the Next is the interdiction phase, where specific type of programming. A U.S. concept of CVE to our readers? law enforcement and the military implementing partner such as Creative respond to those that have already would not directly conduct prevention Wheelock: CVE is the use of non- radicalized. or intervention activities. That is best coercive means to dissuade individuals done by local organizations. Our role or groups from mobilizing towards The final phase is the reintegration would be to train local organizations violence and to mitigate recruitment, phase. This entails de-programming in best practices for conducting support, facilitation, and engagement those who have radicalized and bringing prevention and intervention activities, in ideologically motivated terrorism them back into mainstream society. making technical assistance available, by non-state actors in furtherance of Saudi Arabia CVE programming is an and providing funding to support the political objectives. It complements example of this. The U.S. government CVE programs of our local partners and but should not be confused with does not engage in reintegration. broadcast media. counterterrorism operations. It recognizes a wide range of motives— A strategic communications campaign Having said that, we don’t call it CVE— such as political or economic grievances, should be overlaid on all of these that kind of language is offensive feelings of marginalization, money, phases. Broadcast and print media can to a foreign government and local kinship, coercion, and radicalization. emphasize the broader values of peace, communities. So it might be called unity, resilience, and tolerance of other a “peace and unity campaign,” or a CTC: This is such a broad and all- views. It can also highlight instances “resilience campaign.” This sets it into a encompassing topic. What is the best where acts of violent extremism go positive light and mitigates the political way to frame CVE? How do we go against established religious or cultural difficulties that these types of activities about conducting CVE practically? norms. A more focused communications may cause a partner government. There campaign would concentrate on social is a USG program designed to interact Wheelock: The best framework I have for media and interact with specific with potential extremists through social thinking about CVE has two parts: CVE- media, but it does not have sufficient relevant and CVE-specific programming.1 capacity to counter the overwhelming Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: number of social messages generated by Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention Is extremist groups. 1 Editor’s note: For a more in-depth discussion see Flawed.” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2015.

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CTC: Is it best to conduct CVE at conducting CVE, is there support at including programs in Los Angeles the grassroots level or is it better the community level? and Central America. When an area is coordinated by the host country identified as a hotbed of extremism, government? Wheelock: There is support for the a best practice that can be adapted to most part—especially when we are CVE is to implement an integrated Wheelock: My view is the more local implementing in communities where program of prevention, intervention, the better. Community leaders, civil we’re already working with a trusted policing, and rehabilitation—along with society organizations, and parents and respected interlocutor or partner an overlay of strategic communications. know their communities, the context, organization. The level of community This has been successful in Los Angeles. and relevant grievances. They are best support is generally high once someone The U.S. State Department and USAID placed to identify and work with youth has made the introduction and we’re are starting an integrated CVP strategy at risk. The central government should allowed to execute one or two activities, in Honduras and El Salvador. [Editor’s provide grants to fund these programs which may not be directly relevant to note: These two countries have among and then determine and disseminate CVE but which gain trust and allow a the highest murder rates in the world best practices. When it comes to the partnership to develop. You’re not going due to gang and drug-trafficking law enforcement aspect of it, of course to get anywhere without community activities.] you need the capabilities of the central support. government, but on the prevention CTC: You’ve had experience with and intervention side, those activities CTC: How do we measure the CVE programs in some of the planet’s should be very much locally driven. effectiveness of CVE programs? How most conflict-ridden countries. What do we know which ones work and country or countries do you feel are CTC: When you talk about gaining which ones do not? leading the pack in implementing CVE entry into these kinds of communities, strategies? is it through the central government or Wheelock: It is a difficult issue because going directly into these communities it is hard to empirically prove a negative. Wheelock: The emphasis changes yourself? If recruitment of youth to extremist in different countries. For example, organizations declines in a community, in Saudi Arabia the focus is on Wheelock: All U.S. development what caused the drop? CVE-specific rehabilitation and less on prevention. assistance programs are implemented programming, strong police action or The British are focused more on with concurrence from the host country changes in public policy that remove prevention and intervention. government, which may ask us to work grievances? Anecdotally, you can cite in certain communities. We deliberately examples of success, but how do you CTC: What about the differences seek to work with relevant government quantify and ascribe causation for that between crime and violence prevention ministries (education, sports, and success? Right now I don’t have the programs in Latin America where youth) to gain their buy-in and support. answer for it, and I don’t think the CVE religion is not a motivating factor Partner civil society organizations, community yet has an answer either. in the violence like it is in countries local government officials, or other such as Nigeria and Pakistan? trusted interlocutors generally facilitate It is somewhat easier to evaluate metrics entry into communities. In order for a when you look at crime and violence Wheelock: The religious component is program to be sustainable over a long prevention (CVP) programs. You can a major distinction between CVP and period of time, the government must see if the number of crimes has gone CVE programs. To be clear, gangs do buy-in to the program with its approval down and if the number of murders has have an ideological component, but I and, we hope, financial support. gone down, even if it takes a long time would argue it is not as enduring, nor to gather the data. There was a recent as strong as it is in the case of Islamic CTC: What about CVE in failed states Vanderbilt University study on our extremism. such as Somalia or Yemen, where the primary crime and prevention programs government is non-existent, unable or in Central America, and there was a CTC: Can you provide examples of unwilling? strong correlation between these kinds some successful counter-narratives? of programs and the drop in homicide Specifically, what counter-narrative Wheelock: You’re not going to be rates. can we provide to discourage able to do much, if any, CVE-specific disenfranchised Sunnis from prevention and intervention programs CTC: So would you recommend that radicalizing? What could dissuade in those kinds of places. Those types U.S.-sponsored CVE programs borrow those who are considering joining of situations can only be dealt with somewhat liberally from the crime jihadist groups such as Islamic State through a counterterrorism type of and violence prevention programs? in situations where the predominant approach. grievances can be legitimately focused Wheelock: Certainly there are on the corrupt central government? CTC: That seems like a major problem techniques and best practices of CVP that does not bode well for our that are applicable and can be adapted Wheelock: Counter-narratives long-term prospects in minimizing to CVE programming. We can learn ultimately have to be locally driven. radicalization in these countries. from successful CV programs that have They have to come from the people who In the countries where we are an integrated, place-based strategy, know the context and what is going to

21 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 appeal to the populace. For the Middle CTC: How would you invest the This is not just in the broad sense— East, the people you have to convince lion’s share of resources among the the broadcast media where we can are the senior sheiks and tribal leaders four buckets in your CVE-specific overlay messages of peace, resilience, as well as the religious authorities. framework (prevention, intervention, unity, tolerance—but also in regard interdiction, and rehabilitation)? to how we can shape some of the more It is vital for religious authorities individualized communications on to articulate messages of peace and Wheelock: The key word there is social media and work with companies tolerance and to provide convincing resources. Policymakers are more likely like Twitter that are involved at that arguments bolstered with religious to invest resources into the interdiction level. underpinnings explaining why part because these activities go after nonviolent methods are better able individuals who have already been The question we need to answer is how to accomplish change in political radicalized and are easier to identify. can we get locally driven messaging to and economic systems. Beyond You get short-term results. the forefront. The U.S. government can the contributions from trusted provide funding in the background for interlocutors, there are several The prevention/intervention part is the technology and provide funding for instances of locally produced television going to be much more difficult to do. the programming element as well. But and radio programming and print You have to mobilize a lot of community local leaders and institutions have to media that promote values of peace and groups, get them on board, train them, frame and articulate the message. The tolerance. and it may be more costly—especially U.S. government cannot and should not when you are attempting to identify do it all. You don’t want to “hug your CTC: What are some things that youth at risk and work with them. It is partners” too hard because that will decision-makers should know very manpower intensive. In the long- expose them to criticism and undercut about CVE? What are some of the run, however, investing resources in any media campaign’s effectiveness. misconceptions? this area is probably more effective than interdiction. How we strike that Wheelock: A lot of U.S. foreign balance between the policing effort and assistance can be viewed as being the prevention/intervention effort is relevant to CVE in building resilient going to be the essential issue. communities, removing economic grievances, and reducing political CTC: I imagine that some practitioners grievances. The increasing emphasis would recommend concentrating on CVE, I think, will result in more of resources into interdiction because the typical foreign assistance programs evaluating its effectiveness is being couched in these kinds of terms. relatively easy. In comparison, it will be difficult to gather metrics on But that just sets the context. I think prevention/intervention, even though that much debate will center on how it may be the most effective over the the United States can contribute to long-run. CVE-specific types of programming— prevention, intervention, interdiction, Wheelock: Exactly. It is tough to prove and reintegration. Where in the a negative. spectrum will the U.S. focus? Maybe the U.S. role is only supporting prevention CTC: Given your knowledge of violent or intervention programs or assisting extremism around the globe, which police work on the interdiction side. It region or group do you think poses will be different in each country, but at the greatest risk to the security of the least there is a framework for how to United States? think about and discuss CVE programs. Wheelock: Syria and the Islamic State The second point I’d like to make is along with Yemen and AQAP have to be about the prevention/intervention side. high up on the list of threats, but CVE I think you can take a good hard look programs need to focus on countries at the lessons from crime and violence such as Tunisia and Jordan that are prevention programs in Los Angeles major sources of jihadi foreign fighters. and in Central America. These programs excel at identifying youth at risk and CTC: Final question. What question working with them to bring them back or issue do you think is important for from the brink. If we can apply that our readers to know about? framework and appropriate lessons to the countries where want to do CVE, I Wheelock: I think communications think that’s a great place to start. campaigns are an area that needs improvement and should be a priority.

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Khalaq (IKK).2 3 Despite these efforts, jihadists to form the Markaz Ad- Jamaat-ud Daawa: JuD has flourished. Da’awa Wal Irshad (MDI) or the Center Into the Mainstream for Proselytization and Preaching. One By Animesh Roul This article explores JuD’s shifting of MDI’s early online releases clearly narrative and its efforts to secure socio- mentions Saeed’s original role and how Pakistan’s Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD) political legitimacy both by supporting the organization raised funds for jihad is often compared with Lebanon’s the government and the military and in the name of Mujahidin-e- Lashkar- Hezbollah thanks to its efforts at by conducting humanitarian works i-Tayyiba.4 The group’s ostensible blending charitable works and Islamic intended to improve its reputation in role was to implement humanitarian proselytization with overt political civil society. The article also examines missions and preaching according to activism. The JuD is consciously JuD’s efforts to strike a balance between the Islamic tenets. Below the surface attempting to improve its image, taking its roles as a jihadi proxy for Pakistan, though, the group’s links to jihadi advantage of Pakistan’s religiously a political pressure group, a social philosophies and aims were readily charged socio-political environment. welfare group, and its efforts to remain apparent. One MDI document details It appears that it is being aided by domestically relevant under direct state how “the brothers [Lakhvi, Saeed, government policy, notwithstanding patronage. and others] gathered and in 1989, international sanctions imposed on Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad was the group. The JuD’s influence has The Historical Context established. This caravan of Da’wah now extended to even the most remote Pakistan arguably provides a unique and Jihad, started its journey towards corner of the country through its environment for terror groups. its destination under the guidance exploitation of the media, the expansion Internationally designated terrorist of Professor Mohammad Saeed.”5 of its social services that range from leaders and operatives, sometimes Another document states: “We declare health care to education, and its ability claiming a cover as religious scholars that Lashkar-e-Taiba is not a terrorist to assist affected populations during or social workers, appear to travel and organization […] but is fighting for natural calamities outside its epicenter work with little legal restraint. This freedom and liberty of Kashmiris.”6 of power in the province of Punjab. situation has its roots dating back more than 20 years to the early days After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the The JuD has been banned by many of the mujahidin revival in the 1980s. MDI and LeT shifted their attention to countries and international groupings, Pakistan’s then-government served Kashmir as part of Pakistan’s Operation including the United States, India, and as a willing partner in efforts to fund Tupac. The LeT established a number of the European Union, for its association and supply Afghan rebels in their fight training camps in Pakistan’s Kashmir with terrorist violence. As a sister against Soviet troops. As part of that and engaged in terror attacks across the organization to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba process, it allowed the creation and border in India’s Jammu and Kashmir, (LeT), JuD, along with all its associated operation of many activist groups. After along with other Islamist terror groups entities, has been designated as a the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, nurtured by Pakistani agencies.7 There terror organization under UN Security elements within Pakistan’s government is evidence suggesting that MDI and LeT Council Resolution 1267. Many of its top moved to use the mujahidin groups in were jointly operated by the same group commanders have been designated as their efforts to secure gains against of leaders, even after the Pakistani terrorists, including Hafiz Muhammed long-time rival India. Some of the government banned MDI’s operations Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the individuals and organizations that in 2002 and despite some frictions two founding fathers of JuD and LeT, flourished, or their descendants, between the two groups in 2004, which who were listed in December 2008.1 continue to operate today. 4 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” More recently, in June 2014 the U.S. JuD, its sister group LeT, and Hafiz https://web.archive.org/web/20020109200440/ Department of the Treasury named Muhammed Saeed are examples of this http://www.markazdawa.org/english/organization/in- Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry and Muhammad dynamic. JuD was originally created troduction.htm, October 30, 2001. For the fund raising Hussein Gill of LeT as Specially in 1985 in Muridke, Lahore, as a small activities in the name of LeT, See, https://web.archive. Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), preaching group. A year later it merged org/web/20010128024900/http://markazdawa.org/ taking the number of designated with Lakhvi’s group of anti-Soviet English/organization/contribution.htm. terrorists associated with LeT and JuD 5 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” to more than 20. Treasury also listed six 2 United States Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Two Se- https://web.archive.org/web/20011217234502/http:// entities associated with LeT, including nior Lashkar-E-Taiba Network Leaders,” June 25, 2014 www.markazdawa.org/English/organization/introduc- Jamaat-ud-Daawa, Al-Anfal Trust, 3 United States Department of State added Jamaat- tion.htm. Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, Tehrik-e- Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat-E-Khalq to the Specially 6 Official Site for Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad and Tahafuz Qibla Awwal, Falah-i Insaniat Designated Global Terrorist Designation of LeT on April Mujahidin- e- Lashkar- e Taiba, URL, https://web. Foundation (FIF), and Idara Khidmat- e 27, 2006 and added Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) archive.org/web/20001017212716/http://www.marka- as an alias of LeT on November 24, 2010, along with FIF zdawa.org/English/radio/news. cheif Hafiz Abdur Rauf as Specially Designated Global 7 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Terrorist. See, United States Department of State, “Ad- Militant Islam, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. dition of Aliases Jamaat-Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat- 55-59, Also See, K Santhanam (ed.) Jihadis in Jammu and 1 For UN listing of JuD, See, http://www.un.org/sc/ E-Khalq to the Specially Designated Global Terrorist Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, Sage (New Delhi), 2003, pp. committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf. Designation of Lashkhar-E-Taiba,” April 28, 2006. 22–24.

23 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 was reportedly resolved with help from Kashmir (PAK), the Northern Areas mujahidin would create three Pakistans Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (Gilgit and Baltistan), or the Federally- in India.”14 More recently in mid-April (ISI).8 Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 2015, he stated in an interview with Channel-4 Pakistan that JuD would There is significant evidence linking In an attempt to ensure continuity, the support action by the Pakistani army LeT to attacks on Indian targets and MDI’s senior leaders decided to split in Jammu and Kashmir. “We support installations throughout the 1990s and the organization into two distinct units the Pakistani government and Pakistan beyond as the tensions in Jammu and as laid out in an internal MDI document army in their efforts to help the people Kashmir escalated. LeT was involved from October 2002. The document of Kashmir…we call it jihad.” 15 He also in skirmishes during 1999, fighting describes the planned division in admitted that Lakhvi has been a senior alongside Pakistan army regulars.9 LeT light of the fast-changing security member of JuD, negating earlier claims organized numerous terrorist attacks scenario in the region and how JuD was by the JuD’s leadership, who in the in India, including the December reconstituted. “A general council of months after the 2008 Mumbai attack 2000 Red Fort (Delhi) attack, the May Lashkar-i-Tayyiba has been established had denied Lakhvi and Zarar Shah’s role 2002 Kaluchak (J&K) massacre, and which will work under the chairmanship within the organization.16 Six months the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, of Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri earlier, the newspaper Dawn quoted among other deadly strikes. Even who belongs to Poonch [Jammu and Saeed saying that “if India can send Pakistan’s government has admitted Kashmir]. The Lashkar-i-Tayyiba will its troops to Afghanistan, it can’t stop LeT’s role in the late November 2008 continue its jihadi activities in occupied mujahidin from entering Kashmir to Mumbai attacks in its July 2009 report, Kashmir…rather it will further intensify win freedom for the oppressed Muslim and underscored the roles of Zaki- them. On the other hand, to continue the brothers.”17 ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Zarar Shah, mission of Markaz al-Dawa Wal Irshad another LeT operative, in the tragic in the country [Pakistan], JuD has been Hafiz Saeed and other senior JuD event.10 established. All the organizational, leaders have pursued several strategies political, and reformatory work will be to maintain JuD’s continued relevance Charity Camouflage accomplished under the Jamaat.”12 This in the face of growing international The September 11, 2001, terror attacks shift also marked the beginning of JuD’s scrutiny and sanctions. JuD carried in the United States and the December move to the mainstream. out humanitarian relief activities in 13 attack on the Indian Parliament in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir the same year changed the security As part of the reorganization, Hafiz earthquake and the 2010 floods dynamics in the region and forced Saeed took control of JuD while Lakhvi in Pakistan via the IKK and FiF a response from Pakistan. Under became the supreme commander of respectively. JuD had several motives. significant U.S. and Indian pressure, LeT. Notwithstanding the internal Not only was it able to heighten its the Pakistani government, led at the arrangements, JuD maintained its public support, but by assisting in this time by President Pervez Musharraf, financial and logistic support, especially way it was also able to gain favor with on January 12, 2002, ordered a crack- for LeT operations in Jammu and senior government officials. The JuD down on militant groups active in Kashmir, via various existing charity was careful to work in tandem with the Kashmir region and in Pakistan, fronts and other channels such as Idara the Pakistani Army and other agencies including LeT and Jaish-e Muhammad, Khidmat-e Khalaq (IKK) and Falah-i- during rescue and relief operations another terror group active in Jammu Insaniyat Foundation (FiF).13 and use these opportunities to win the and Kashmir.11 The order, however, hearts and minds of the refugees.18 did not affect Pakistan-Administered There is, however, much evidence The JuD’s ability to reach inhospitable to indicate that Saeed’s aggressive regions such as North Waziristan or language directed at India going Balochistan before government help 8 Evidently, in 2004 Saeed and Lakhvi increasingly back nearly 20 years more accurately arrives during natural calamities and disagreed over financial irregularities and nepotism, describes his ideological leanings and other humanitarian relief operations which eventually led to the creation of a breakaway intent. On February 18, 1996, while has not surprisingly made the JuD quite faction of JuD/LeT, Khair-un Naas (KuN or People’s addressing the Lahore Press Club, he popular. Welfare). It was able to forcibly control JuD’s headquar- stated that “jihad in Kashmir would ters in Muridke and other assets before ISI intervened soon spread to all of India and the to find a truce between two factions. See, for example, 14 For example Navnita Chadha Behera, “Demystifying Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, Mashal books, 2004, Kashmir,” Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p, 162. pp. 95–113. 12 “Strategy to Foil Nefarious Designs of India”, Voice of 15 See, Hafiz Saeed’s Interview with Mujahid Barelvi on 9 In June 1999, Hafiz Saeed reportedly claimed that his Islam, January 2002. Channel 24, April 16, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ organization led the war against Indian troops in Kargil. 13 For instance, See, “Extremists given ‘free hand’ to watch?v=H_Hyl4_cFCE. See, Praveen Swami, “The Other Wars,” Frontline, June collect funds for flood victims”,Daily Times, August 27, “JuD supports Pak Army’s jihad in Kashmir,” Kashmir 19—2 July 2, 1999. 2010; Also, “Secretary of State’s Terrorist Designation of Monitor, April 19, 2015, 10 “After admission, Pak files 26/11 charge sheet”, Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation.” 16 Amir Mir, “LeT commander furious at JuD chief,” Times Now TV, 18 July, 2009; Also See, “Part of 26/11 U.S. Department of State Press Release, Novem- The News, January 15, 2009. plot hatched on our soil, admits Pak,” Mid Day, Febru- ber 24, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 17 “JuD call to arms to help Kashmiris,” Dawn, Decem- ary 13, 2009. ps/2010/11/151931.htm; Khalid Khattak, ber 6, 2014, 11 “Musharraf bans Lashkar, Jaish; says no terrorism on “Government takes over 10 JD schools”, 27 December, 18 “Footprints: Extremist bodies run IDP relief efforts”, name of Kashmir,” Daily Excelsior, 12 January, 2002. 2008. Dawn, July 4, 2014,

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Such activities also helps generate claiming that the groups were primarily by the fact that most of the Kashmir- further charitable contributions, some charities. Following the June 2009 focused terror groups, including of which it can funnel to LeT, and also verdict from the Lahore High Court that LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul refreshes the flow of recruits to the quashed all terrorism charges against Mujahidin have never targeted Pakistan cause of Kashmiri reunification. JuD Hafiz Saeed, JuD was able to continue or its interests abroad. In contrast, the also used its humanitarian efforts, such its move into the mainstream. government has occasionally used these as during relief operations, to spread groups to counter other anti-Pakistan Islamic teachings, along with a dose of In many regards, the government militant extremist groups such as the Kashmiri or Afghan jihad.19 intervention in the wake of Mumbai Pakistani Taliban. The government attacks can be best seen as an effort has even deployed ideologues such as The central government has been to avoid international criticism.22 Saeed in the government’s militant hesitant to take action against the Additionally, it is no secret that the rehabilitation or reform program.26 JuD. On at least three occasions the provincial government of Punjab has government has cracked down on the provided and continues to provide Most recently, JuD has heightened its JuD, and all three occasions were the significant financial and physical profile by supporting Saudi Arabia. result of India raising its concerns security for JuD’s properties and It spearheaded a campaign along with with Pakistan about the involvement of establishments.23 In fact, the government other religious groupings such as Ahle Lashkar-i-Tayyiba militants in attacks approach could be interpreted as Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), pressing against India. protecting the JuD in an effort to use it the government to send troops to Saudi to further policy goals with an apparent Arabia to protect Muslim holy sites In January 2002, as a result of the degree of deniability. On January 24, against possible aggression by the September 11 terror events in the 2015, for example, Pakistan’s High rebels in Yemen.27 Issues like these are United States and the December Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, another way that JuD can garner public 2001 Indian Parliament attacks, the clarified that there is no ban on JuD’s and government support while pleasing Pakistan government did take action activities, only that its accounts have multiple stakeholders, including the against militant groups including LeT. been frozen and a travel ban has been people. In 2006, the government intervened implemented restricting foreign travel in JuD facilities and placed its top by its leaders, in accordance with the The Mainstreaming of JuD leaders under house arrest following UN Security Council resolution.24 Over the years, JuD has grown into the July 2006 Mumbai commuter train a socio-religious behemoth with its bombings. Saeed was detained until Pakistani agencies, such as the ISI, Islamic education and health service mid-October that year and subsequently have systematically used Islamist units spread across Punjab and other released by the Lahore High Court for ideologues like Saeed to raise issues parts of Pakistan. Free education and lack of concrete evidence against the like Jammu and Kashmir, but at a free medical treatments comprising five JuD leader.20 distance.25 This analysis is supported hospitals, 200 dispensaries, ambulance services, and 250 schools fuels growing Then, in early December 2008, in the 22 Khalid Khattak, “Government takes over 10 JD support for JuD’s presence and facilitate wake of the LeT’s Mumbai attacks and schools”, The News, December 27, 2008. its legitimacy substantially within the 28 under pressure from the United States 23 For example, in the fiscal 2009-2010 the Punjab Pakistan. and India, Pakistan launched a brief government allocated Pakistan Rupees 79.7 million police operation against LeT hideouts (US$936,240) to JuD’s Al-Dawa School System, a Despite international pressure, it and training camps. Top leaders mosque, hospital, and other health facilities built on the appears that at least some elements including Hafiz Saeed, Lakhvi, and JuD Markaz-e-Taiba campus at Muridke. An additional Zarar Shah were arrested and security Rs. 3 million (US$35,207) was given to schools run by is handled by one of more ISI officials. For example he forces again took control of JuD Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Again in the budget for fiscal 2013-14 named Maj. Sameer Ali and Maj. Iqbal who took care of 21 establishments across the country. the Punjab provincial government allocated more than him, Brig. Riaz handled Zaki ur Rahman Lakhvi (Chief Rs. 6.1 crore for Markaz-e-Taiba and allocated a further military commander of LeT). Headley also revealed how Despite these actions, there are many Rs. 35 crore for setting up a Knowledge Park at the Maj. Iqbal gave him US$25,000 in cash for his India signals that the JuD enjoys a privileged centre along with other developmental activities. See, trip prior to Mumbai attacks. See, “Interrogation Report status with various levels of government. “Punjab Govt. funded outfits on UN terror blacklist: of David Coleman Headley,” National Investigation This kind of protected status has report, Express Tribune/ AFP, June 17, 2010; Also, Agency, India. helped the group fuel its move into the “Pakistan’s Punjab Government allocates funds for JuD 26 “Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalize militants, says mainstream of Pakistani society and centre,” Hindu/Press Trust of India, June 18, 2013. official”,Dawn /Reuters, April 6 2012. politics. Despite the UN ban, the central 24 “JuD not banned, only accounts frozen: envoy”, Daily 27 “JuD, ASWJ activists ask govt. to send troops to government has not shut down JuD’s Times, January 24, 2015. Saudi Arabia”, The News, April 4, 2015. or FIF’s establishments completely, 25 Pakistan’s ISI has nurtured LeT and other Kashmir 28 According to JuD’s own website, there are 146 Ad centric Islamic extremist groups (e.g. Jaish-e-Moham- Dawa model schools with an estimated 2,050 teachers 19 JuD includes religious lessons with flood relief,” med) financially and with other logistics since their and nearly 35,000 students enrolled throughout the Express Tribune, October 26, 2011. inception. The latest piece of evidence comes from 26/11 country. See, http://jamatdawa.org/en/education/. Also 20 “Hafiz Saeed set free”,Dawn , August 29, 2006 accused David Coleman Headley during interroga- for a rough estimation of overall strength, See, “Banned’ 21 “Pakistan cracks down on Lashkar, JuD”, Reuters, 13 tion by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA). Jamaat-ud-Dawa group thrives in Pakistan,” Dawn/ December, 2008. According to Headley, every important member of LeT AFP, February 10 2015

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CTC Sentinel Staff of the Pakistani government consider its jihadi roots. With highly motivated, actors such as Saeed to be assets. trained, and fanatically committed John Watling There are clear signals that this cadres, JuD could find success in national Managing Editor is so, to include, for example, his politics or as a significant lobby. These participation in the de-radicalization many developments underscore JuD’s and rehabilitation of former militants, apparent move into the mainstream, but as mentioned above.29 Other evidence is also raise concerns about the direction Editorial Board seen in the group’s own conclaves and of politics in Pakistan. COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. rallies, such as “Revival of Pakistan Department Head Ideology” and the Takbeer Conventions Animesh Roul is the executive director (research) Department of Social Sciences (West Point) that focus attention on its pro-Pakistan of the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, agenda.30 These conventions are usually a think tank based in New Delhi that focuses on COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. well attended by political and religious security issues. He studies militant Islamist groups Deputy Department Head leaders and the general populace. active in South Asia and has published widely on Department of Social Sciences (West Point) the subject. He has been awarded a M. Phil from the JuD is also engaged in transforming School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal LTC Bryan Price, Ph.D. its self-image. It aggressively uses Nehru University in New Delhi, India. Director, CTC social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook, as well as the Internet, and a variety of Urdu- and English- language publications to showcase its socio-religious works, including health and education programs. There are also reports about JuD’s political ambitions and possible participation in Assembly elections in Punjab province, its traditional stronghold.31 The JuD itself, however, claimed that the group CONTACT or leadership do not believe in power Combating Terrorism Center politics, but are engaged in educating U.S. Military Academy people on various political and security 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall issues and in constructive criticism of West Point, NY 10996 political actions. This could be loosely Phone: (845) 938-8495 termed as political activism, and may Email: [email protected] be prelude to large-scale political action Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ in the future, something that would complete the JuD’s move from the * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 shadows into the light and cement its legitimacy.

Conclusions The shift from an entity that supported violence in Kashmir and India in general into a ubiquitous pro-State entity hints SUPPORT at JuD’s likely new trajectory of Islamic The Combating Terrorism Center would nationalism, fueled by the legitimacy of like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the 29 ‘Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalise militants’,The CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you Nation, 7 April, 2012. are interested in learning more about how 30 “JuD calls for reviving Pakistan ideology,” The to support the Combating Terrorism Center, News, March 24, 2014. For Takbeer Convention, See for please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call example, “Takbeer Convention” held in solidarity with Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association Pak Army attracts Karachi public,” June 18, 2014. of Graduates at 845-446-1561. 31 Hafiz Saeed once reiterated that it was a miscon- ception to consider JuD as apolitical. As a political platform, JuD brings together different religious and political entities and raising awareness on issues, like the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. For details on this, See, “Difa-e-Pakistan Council: Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries questions on electoral ambitions”, Express Tribune, 1 February, 2012.

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