DEFAMATION 1

[2005] 1 MLJ 15 MAJLIS PEGUAM & ORS v RAJA SEGARAN A/L KRISHNAN

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–75 OF 2000 , HASHIM YUSOFF, TENGKU BAHARUDIN SHAH MAHMUD JJCA 24 SEPTEMBER 2004

Civil Procedure — Parties — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing against that cause of action — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of law — Whether special injury proven

Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial misconduct — Allegation of judicial misconduct — Discussion on judicial misconduct — Whether ultra vires Federal Constitution — Federal Constitution arts 125 & 127

Legal Profession — Malaysian Bar — Powers — Resolution to appoint board to make inquiries and recommendations to restore confidence in judiciary — Whether amount to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of Legal Profession Act 1976 — Whether Malaysian Bar be injuncted from holding meeting to discuss such resolutions — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1) (d)

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether maker’s intention is relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous

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There are five appeals all filed by the appellants and they arose from two civil suits namely S2–23–93 of 1999 (‘the first suit’) and S2–23–33 of 2000 (‘the second suit’) both filed by the respondent which will be decided together. The first suit was triggered by the move of the Malaysian Bar to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting ‘EGM’ to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice. The respondent, a member of the Bar initiate the first suit seeking various declaration and injunction on the ground that the EGM, and the proposed resolution were ultra vires, contemptuous and seditious. Pending the trial of the first suit the respondent filed an application for an interlocutory injunction while the appellants applied for the suit to be struck out. The learned judge allowed the respondent’s application and dismissed the appellants’ application. The appellants appeals against both the decisions were also dismissed. Subsequently, the respondent filed an application under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of the 1980 (‘the RHC’) for a preliminary issue to be tried and the learned judge allowed the respondent’s application. And on 10 November 2003 the learned judge allowed the various declarations sought by the respondent. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants filed three separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–75 of 2004 (Appeal 75) which is against the ||Page 16>> judgment of the learned judge delivered on 10 November 2003; (b) Civil Appeal W–02–647 of 2000 (Appeal 647) which is against the ruling of the learned judge allowing the application by the respondent for the trial of a preliminary issue pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC and (c) Civil Appeal W– 02–780 of 2000 (Appeal 780) which is against the dismissal by the learned judge of the preliminary objection on the issue of secrecy of proceedings conducted by the Bar Council. The second suit was filed as a result of two events, namely, the letter issued on or about 7 June 2000 and amended on 8 June 2000 by the then secretary of the Bar Council to all its members and the public statement purportedly released by the Chairman of the Bar Council in connection with a proposed general meeting of the Malaysian Bar. There were various declaration and injunctions sought by the respondent. An application for interlocutory injunction was also filed in relation to the second suit. It was heard by the same learned judge for the first suit. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellants but it was dismissed. The second suit still

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pending before the High Court. Dissatisfied with the decisions the appellants also filed two separate appeals inter alia, (a) Civil Appeal W–02–512 of 2000 (Appeal 512) which is against the dismissal of a preliminary objection and (b) Civil Appeal W–02–521 of 2000 (Appeal 521) which is against the granting of the interlocutory injunction. The issues for consideration were: (a) whether the actions of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar in calling for the EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’); (b) whether the respondent had the locus standi to institute the suits; (c) whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought for in the suits and/or the interlocutory applications vis-à-vis contempt of court and the offence of sedition; (d) whether the learned judge failed to observe any of the guidelines above before granting the interlocutory injunction; (e) whether it was correct for the learned judge not to disqualify himself from hearing the suits and applications related thereto; (f) whether the learned judge was correct in refusing to recognize s 76(2) of the LPA as providing the shield of secrecy of all proceedings conducted by the Bar Council and (g) whether O 33 r 2 the RHC properly invoked.

Held, dismissing all the appeals: (1) Being creatures of statute the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar must act and conduct their affairs within the framework of the LPA. Acts or conducts beyond its parameters would be ultra vires. Hence, in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting to discuss allegations of impropriety against the then Chief Justice, the Bar ||Page 17>> Council and the Malaysian Bar must be able to satisfy the court that they were acting within the ambit and the parameters of the LPA. The trial judge had correctly noted that this was not the case (see para 54). (2) There was no evidence adduced during the trial in respect of the first suit that there was a request from any quarters for the Bar Council or the Malaysian Bar as a statutory body to express their views or to act or conduct as they did. As such, the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar were not legally entitled to claim the right or even the privilege to act or conduct as they did notwithstanding the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 4

constraints in the LPA. As to who should request for their views is of course another issue but surely it has to come from a relevant and proper authority. At the same time, the appellants’ contention that the sub-s 42(1)(d) is ambiguous was also rejected (see para 56). (3) The act or conduct in convening the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting was contrary to or undermined Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. Such act or conduct of the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar was unconstitutional, and hence ultra vires the LPA (see para 58). (4) It is inconceivable to say that the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting would be upholding the cause of justice or to protect the public in matters touching or incidental to the law when the net effect is to ‘censure’ the Judiciary while permitting discussion on the conduct of His Majesty’s Judges in flagrant disregard to Arts 125 and 127 of the Constitution. There is much to say in support of the wisdom of art 127. And allowing an open discussion on conduct of His Majesty’s Judges could amount to questioning the wisdom of the King in his selection. Further the judiciary thrives on the public confidence in the system. Openly criticizing the judiciary could bring about public misunderstanding of the system and would then produce unwarranted public misgivings (see para 61). (5) The notice of 12 October 1999 and the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 issued by the appellants were contemptuous particularly the language used in the notice of 12 October 1999 seems to suggest that it was a fact that serious allegations of impropriety have been made against certain members of the judiciary. By using the word ‘understands’ it was clear that the appellants, whilst insidiously suggesting a fact, yet are not taking responsibility for asserting such a fact. It is also to be noted that what amounts to contempt of court in this country is also very much a question of fact and guided by common law principles and the learned judge is correct in applying the facts and principles before him (see para 70). (6) The respondent could take out an injunction to restrain the appellants to protect his own interest and if the court is satisfied that the act ||Page 18>> complained of could give rise to the respondent facing criminal

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prosecution, the respondent ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the appellants (see para 83). (7) The element of being a member of a statutory body is vital and as a member the respondent has the right to restrain a corporation from doing ultra vires acts. Since, the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999, the holding of the proposed EGM and the proposed general meeting were ultra vires the LPA the question of locus standi of the respondent should not arise and the question of special damage in such situation plays only a minor role. It follows that there is no question of the civil court being asked to enforce any criminal law (see para 95). (8) As a member of the Malaysian Bar the respondent would definitely have been exposed to potential prosecution for sedition and contempt had the proposed EGM and the general meeting proceeded. The fact that he was only one of the many members should not negate his standing to sue on his own to ensure that he would not be exposed to unnecessary legal complexities. The test would be the ‘special damage’ test and the respondent had satisfied the test (see para 97). (9) There is no strict requirement in an application for injunction that the analysis must be systematic and perhaps erudite. Reading the judgment of the learned judge as a whole it can be said that there were serious issues to be tried such as whether the allegations were true or plain hearsay, whether there was any basis to call for the suspension of the then Chief Justice and the consequence of the acts of the appellants. Further, the learned judge did consider where the justice of the case should lie, public interest and balanced the damage that could arise if the proposed general meeting was held (see para 6–7). (10) In determining a recusal issue the primary questions to consider should be whether there was a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge and whether the allegation and the factual circumstance could have caused a fair-minded and informed bystander to entertain a fear of real danger of bias. And it would be stretching too far the principles of law enunciated on when judges and arbiters should recuse from hearing cases which involves similar issues and points (see para 120).

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(11) There is no provision in the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the EA’) which allows a witness to rely on a statutory protection such as contained in s 76(2) of the LPA and also no expressed exclusion in s 76(2) of the LPA. Unless it is expressly excluded the provisions of the EA apply in any court proceedings as founded in s 2 of the EA. Sections 118 and 136 would have been the provisions in answer (if any objection raised) when Mr R Rajasingam former member of Bar Council was called as a witness to answer a specific question, that is, whether the motion proposed by ||Page 19>> the Bar Council was the same as the proposed resolution of 12 October 1999 to be tabled during the proposed EGM. However, this was not raised and the issue of secrecy fails (see paras 123 and 128). (12) In invoking O 33 r 2 of the RHC the issues in a case should be clear and not riddled with complexities and the facts should not be in dispute. Where the issues on point of law to be decided involve the consideration of facts, resort to O 33 r 2 of the RHC is inappropriate. It is undesirable to resolve such issues on a purely hypothetical state of facts. Further, in the court below the second appellant was conceding to the approach taken by the respondent in proceeding under O 33 r 2 of the RHC and in fact suggested the proposed question in determining the contempt and sedition issues. In addition thereto, since intention is not an element that has to be proved to establish the contempt and sedition, the appellants’ contention that they might call witnesses for the purpose of establishing intention or motive is irrelevant. As such the learned judge was right in allowing the invocation of O 33 r 2 of the RHC in determining the contempt and sedition issues (see paras 135, 136, 138, 139 and 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Terdapat lima rayuan yang kesemuanya difailkan oleh perayu dan rayuan-rayuan ini berbangkit daripada dua guaman sivil iaitu S2–23–93 tahun 1999 (guaman pertama tersebut) dan S2–23–33 tahun 2000 (guaman kedua tersebut) kedua-duanya difailkan

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 7

oleh responden yang akan diputuskan secara bersama. Guaman pertama berbangkit menerusi tindakan oleh Majlis Peguam untuk mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam dan ahli Majlis Peguam memulakan guaman pertama tersebut memohon pelbagai perintah deklarasi dan injunksi atas alasan bahawa EGM dan resolusi yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires, menghina dan hasutan. Sementara menunggu perbicaraan guaman pertama tersebut responden telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk perintah injunksi manakala perayu-perayu memohon supaya permohonan tersebut dibatalkan. Hakim bijaksana membenarkan permohonan responden dan menolak permohonan perayu-perayu. Kedua-dua rayuan perayu-perayu kemudiannya telah ditolak. Seterusnya, responden memfailkan satu permohonan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk satu isu utama dibicarakan dan hakim bijaksana telah membenarkan permohonan responden. Dan pada 10 November 2003 hakim bijaksana membenarkan deklarasi-deklarasi yang dipohon oleh responden. ||Page 20>> Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut di atas perayu-perayu telah memfailkan tiga rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W– 02–75 tahun 2004 (Rayuan 75) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang bertarikh pada 10 November 2003; (b) Rayuan sivil W–02–647 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 647) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan responden untuk membicarakan isu permulaan berdasarkan A 33 k 2 KMT dan (c) Rayuan sivil W–02–780 tahun 2000 (Rayuan 780) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan permulaan terhadap isu kerahsiaan prosiding yang telah dilaksanakan oleh Majlis Peguam. Guaman kedua telah difailkan akibat daripada dua peristiwa, iaitu, surat yang dikeluarkan pada atau 7 Jun 2000 dan kemudiannya dipinda pada 8 Jun 2000 oleh setiausaha Majlis Peguam pada masa itu kepada kesemua ahli-ahlinya dan pernyataan awam yang kononnya dikeluarkan oleh Pengerusi Majlis Peguam yang berkaitan dengan mesyuarat am Majlis Peguam yang telah dicadangkan. Responden memohon pelbagai deklarasi dan injunksi. Satu permohonan untuk injunksi turut difailkan oleh responden. Permohonan ini turut didengar oleh hakim bijaksana yang mendengar

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 8

guaman pertama tersebut. Satu bantahan awalan dibangkitkan oleh perayu-perayu akan tetapi bantahan awalan tersebut telah ditolak oleh perayu. Guaman kedua masih menunggu untuk perbicaraan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Tidak puas hati dengan keputusan-keputusan tersebut perayu-perayu memfailkan dua rayuan yang berasingan antara lain, (a) Rayuan sivil W–02– 512–00 (Rayuan 512) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang menolak bantahan awalan dan (b) Rayuan Sivil W–02–521–00 (Rayuan 521) adalah terhadap keputusan hakim bijaksana yang membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori. Isu-isu untuk pertimbangan adalah: (a) sama ada tindakan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam dalam memanggil EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang telah dicadangkan adalah ultra vires Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976 (“APU”); (b) sama ada responden mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan tindakan-tindakan ini; (c) sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membenarkan relif-relif yang dipohon dalam tindakan-tindakan ini dan/atau permohonan-permohonan interlokutori iaitu penghinaan mahkamah dan kesalahan hasutan; (d) sama ada hakim bijaksana gagal untuk memberi perhatian kepada mana-mana panduan di atas sebelum membenarkan permohonan injunksi interlokutori; (e) sama ada adalah betul untuk hakim bijaksana untuk tidak mengecualikan dirinya daripada mendengar guaman-guaman dan permohonan-permohonan yang berkaitan dengannya; (f) sama ada hakim bijaksana adalah betul apabila enggan mengiktiraf s 76(2) APU yang diperuntukkan sebagai perisai rahsia kepada segala prosiding yang dijalankan oleh Majlis Peguam dan (g) sama ada A 33 k 2 KMT tersebut adalah sesuai untuk diguna pakai. ||Page 21>>

Diputuskan, menolak kesemua rayuan: (1) Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan oleh suatu Akta ia hendaklah bertindak dan menjalankan segala tindak-tanduknya di bawah lingkungan APU. Perbuatan dan tindakan di luar lingkungan adalah ultra vires. Maka, dalam mengadakan EGM yang dicadangkan dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan untuk membincangkan dakwaan salah laku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara, Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam hendaklah memuaskan mahkamah bahawa mereka bertindak di bawah skop lingkungan APU. Hakim

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bicara dengan sememangnya betul dalam mengambil perhatian bahawa ini bukanlah keadaannya (lihat perenggan 54). (2) Tidak terdapat sebarang keterangan telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan khususnya guaman pertama bahawa di dalam itu terdapat satu permintaan daripada mana-mana pihak di dalam Badan Peguam ataupun Majlis Peguam yang merupakan badan berkanun untuk menyatakan pandangan mereka atau bertindak atau berkelakuan seperti mereka. Oleh itu, Badan Peguam dan Majlis Peguam tidak berhak di bawah undang-undang untuk menyatakan bahawa mereka mempunyai hak atau mempunyai keistimewaan untuk bertindak atau berkelakuan sebagaimana yang dilakukan meskipun terdapat sekatan-sekatan di bawah APU. Berkaitan dengan siapa yang perlu memohon kepada pandangan-pandangan mereka adalah satu isu yang lain tetapi sebenarnya ia adalah terjatuh di bawah pihak yang sesuai dan relevan. Pada masa yang sama, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa sub-s 42(1)(d) adalah kabur juga hendaklah ditolak (lihat perenggan 56). (3) Tindakan atau kelakuan dalam mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah bertentangan kepada atau memperkecil-kecilkan Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Tindakan atau kelakuan Majlis Peguam dan badan Peguam sedemikian tidak berperlembagaan dan dengan itu adalah ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan 58). (4) Tidak dapat dibayangkan bahawa EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan akan mempertahankan keadilan atau melindungi orang awam dalam perkara-perkara tentang atau berkaitan dengan undang-undang sedangkan kesan akhirnya adalah untuk “mengecam” badan kehakiman di samping membenarkan perbincangan tentang kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong secara ketara tidak menghormati Perkara 125 dan 127 Perlembagaan. Banyak boleh diperkatakan dalam menyokong kearifan Perkara 127. Dan membenarkan perbincangan terbuka kelakuan hakim-hakim Yang Dipertuan Agong boleh terjumlah kepada mempersoalkan kebijaksanaan Yang Dipertuan Agong dalam pemilihan baginda. Tambahan pula, badan kehakiman berkembang maju dalam sistemnya atas dasar kepercayaan orang awam. Mengkritik badan kehakiman secara terbuka akan menyebabkan orang awam

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salah ||Page 22>> sangka terhadap sistem keadilan dan akhirnya menghasilkan perasaan waswas di kalangan umum (lihat perenggan 61). (5) Notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 dan resolusi yang dicadangkan yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu-perayu adalah menghina khususnya bahasa yang digunakan di dalam notis bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999 yang mencadangkan ia adalah satu fakta bahawa dakwaan salah laku yang serius telah dibuat terhadap segolongan ahli-ahli kehakiman. Dengan penggunaan perkataan ‘understands’ adalah jelas bahawa perayu-perayu, secara dari dalamnya mencadangkan fakta bahawa, walaupun enggan bertanggungjawab dalam menyatakan fakta sedemikian. Adalah perlu diambil kira bahawa apa yang terjumlah kepada penghinaan di negara ini adalah persoalan fakta dan dibimbing oleh prinsip-prinsip common law dan hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam menerima pakai fakta-fakta dan prinsip-prinsip di hadapannya (lihat perenggan 70). (6) Responden boleh memohon perintah injunksi untuk menghalang perayu-perayu demi menjaga kepentingannya dan sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu yang mana akan menyebabkan responden didakwa bagi kesalahan jenayah, responden seharusnya dibenarkan untuk mengguna langkah tahanan bagi menghalang perayu-perayu (lihat perenggan 83). (7) Menjadi ahli satu badan statutori adalah elemen yang penting dan sebagai ahli, responden mempunyai hak untuk menghalang satu perbadanan daripada melakukan tindakan yang ultra vires. Memandangkan resolusi yang bertarikh 12 Oktober 1999, mengadakan EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan adalah ultra vires APU maka persoalan locus standi responden tidak seharusnya timbul dan persoalan ganti rugi khas hanya memainkan fungsi kecil. Ia diikuti bahawa tiada persoalan yang mana mahkamah sivil diminta untuk menguatkuasakan undang-undang jenayah (lihat perenggan 95). (8) Sebagai ahli Badan Peguam responden pasti didedahkan kepada kemungkinan pendakwaan untuk hasutan dan penghinaan sekiranya EGM dan mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan. Fakta bahawa responden hanya seorang daripada banyak ahli yang lain tidak patut menyangkal kedudukannya

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untuk membawa tindakan secara sendiri untuk memastikan bahawa responden tidak didedahkan kepada kompleksiti undang-undang yang tidak wajar. Ujiannya adalah ujian ‘special damage’ dan responden telah memuaskan ujian tersebut (lihat perenggan 97). (9) Tidak terdapat keperluan yang ketat dalam permohonan untuk injunksi bahawa analisis hendaklah sistematik dan seharusnya berilmu. Pembacaan penghakiman hakim bijaksana secara keseluruhan adalah ||Page 23>> boleh dikatakan bahawa terdapat isu-isu serius patut dibicarakan seperti sama ada dakwaan-dakwaan adalah benar atau hanya dengar cakap, sama ada terdapat apa-apa asas dalam memanggil untuk penggantungan Ketua hakim Negara pada masa itu dan juga kesan tindakan perayu-perayu itu sendiri. Seterusnya, hakim bijaksana turut mengambil kira di mana keadilan kes tersebut patut wujud, kepentingan awam dan juga mengimbang ganti rugi yang akan timbul sekiranya mesyuarat agung yang dicadangkan itu diteruskan (lihat perenggan 106–107). (10) Dalam menentukan isu penarikan diri hakim bijaksana persoalan utama yang harus diambil kira adalah sama ada terdapat ‘real danger of bias’ dipihak hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana dan sama ada dakwaan fakta-fakta keadaan yang mana boleh menyebabkan seseorang yang berfikiran adil dan bijaksana akan menganggap wujudnya ‘real danger of bias’. Dan adalah meregangkan terlalu jauh prinsip undang-undang yang telah diperuntukkan bilamana hakim dan penimbang tara patut menarik diri daripada mendengar kes-kes yang melibatkan isu-isu dan butir-butir yang sama (lihat perenggan 120). (11) Tidak terdapat sebarang peruntukkan dalam Akta Keterangan 1950 (“Akta”) yang membenarkan saksi untuk bergantung kepada perlindungan statutori seperti yang terkandung di dalam s 76(2) APU dan juga tidak terdapat pengecualian yang nyata di dalam s 76(2) APU. Kecuali dengan nyata dikecualikan peruntukkan Akta Keterangan adalah terpakai di mana-mana prosiding mahkamah seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam s 2 Akta. Seksyen-seksyen 118 dan 136 merupakan peruntukan yang akan menjadi jawapan (sekiranya bantahan dibuat) apabila En R Rajasingam ahli terdahulu Majlis Peguam yang telah dipanggil sebagai saksi untuk menjawab soalan

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spesifik, iaitu, sama ada usul yang dicadangkan oleh Majlis Peguam adalah sama dengan resolusi yang dicadangkan pada 12 Oktober 1999 yang akan dibentangkan semasa EGM yang dicadangkan. Walau bagaimanapun, ini tidak bangkitkan maka isu kerahsiaan adalah gagal (lihat perenggan 123 dan 128). (12) Dalam menerima pakai A 33 k 2 KMT isu-isu dalam kes hendaklah jelas dan tidak dipenuhi dengan kompleksiti dan fakta-fakta tidak boleh dipertikaikan. Di mana, persoalan perundangan yang diputuskan melibatkan pengambilan kira fakta-fakta, penggunaan A 33 k 2 KMT adalah tidak sesuai. Adalah susah untuk menyelesaikan isu-isu seumpama tersebut melalui fakta-fakta yang berdasarkan andaian. Malah, di Mahkamah Tinggi perayu kedua turut bersetuju kepada pendekatan yang diambil oleh responden di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT dan juga telah mencadangkan persoalan yang dapat menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan. Di samping itu, memandangkan niat bukan merupakan elemen yang perlu dibuktikan di dalam kedua-dua ||Page 24>> penghinaan dan hasutan, pernyataan perayu-perayu bahawa mereka berkemungkinan akan memanggil saksi-saksi untuk membuktikan niat atau motif adalah tidak relevan. Maka, hakim bijaksana adalah betul dalam membenarkan pemakaian A 33 k 2 KMT dalam menentukan isu-isu penghinaan dan hasutan (lihat perenggan 135, 136, 138, 139 dan 140); Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (dirujuk).

Notes For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924– 3981. For cases on the judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Advocate General v D Seshagiri Rao AIR [1966] Andhra Pradesh 167 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 13

Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [2002] 4 MLJ 327 (refd) American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Attorney-General v Fred Zimmerman & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 89 (refd) Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council and Another v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd and Another 155 ALR 684 (refd) Beevis v Dawson [1956] 3 All E R 837 (refd) Bermuda Cablevision Ltd v Colica trust Co Ltd (PC) [1998] AC 198 (refd) Brahma Prakash v State of UP AIR [1954] SC 10 (refd) C Ravichandran lyer v Justice AM Bhattacherjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim () Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd) Crown v A Rafique & Ors IR [37] 1950 Sind 1 (refd) DP Vijandran v Majlis Peguam [1995] 3 MLJ 576 (refd) Gallagher v Durack [1983] 57 ALJR 191 (refd) Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 (refd) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 (distd) Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (refd) Hock Hua Bank () Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213 (refd) Hoole v Great Western Railway (1867) 3 Ch App 262 (refd) Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-employed & Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 (refd) Jenkin v Phamaceutical Society of Great Britain (1921) 1 Ch D 392 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 14

||Page 25>> Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (refd) Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd & Anor [2000] 1 All ER 65 (refd) Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kamala Devi a/p Ramadass & Anor And Another Appeal [2003] 2 MLJ 36 (refd) Malaysia Shipyard v Bank Rakyat [1985] 2 CLJ 427 (refd) Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 MLJ 321 (refd) Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd v Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241 (refd) Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd) Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd) Oh Keng Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 244 (refd) Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse [1897] 2 QB 242 (refd) Public Prosecutor v Oh Keng Seng [1979] 2 MLJ 174 (refd) R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [1999] 1 All ER 577 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2004] 1 MLJ 34 (refd) Rondel v Worsley [1967] 1QB 443 (refd) Simpson v Westminster Palace Hotel Co (1860) 8 HL Cas 712 (refd) Tan Ah Chin & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd)

Legislation referred to Federal Constitution Arts 125, 127 Evidence Act 1950 ss 118, 123, 136, 162(2) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 41(1)(a), (e), (g), 42(1)(d), 56, 57, 76(2) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 15

Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(c), 4(1) (a)

YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Christopher Leong, Leo Su Chang, Ambiga Sreenevasen, Ranjit Singh, Kalvin Seet, James Kong, Gopal Sreenevasen with him) (Chooi & Co and Sivananthan) for the appellants. DP Vijandran (DP Vijandran & Associates) for the respondent.

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[2005] 1 MLJ 115 INSAS BHD & ANOR v DAVID SAMUELS & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–47 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 20 OCTOBER 2004

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article in magazine — Whether words complained of defamatory of and concerned plaintiff — Whether words referred to plaintiff — Whether words published to third person

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article in magazine — Damages — Assessment

This was a libel action instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants arising out of the publication of a feature article entitled ‘Malaysian Justice On Trial’ (‘the said article’) which was published in the November 1995 issue of the International Commercial Litigation magazine (‘the said magazine’). The said magazine was published in London and circulated in Malaysia and elsewhere.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 16

In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs pleaded that the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of in the said article were meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs and each of them had connived at, and participated in the corruption, or the attempted corruption by one Dato’ VK Lingam of the Malaysian judiciary, in the course of the plaintiffs’ litigation against Ayer Molek Rubber Company Berhad in Malaysia. The defendants did not enter appearance to the plaintiffs’ action. The plaintiffs set the matter for trial rather than entering interlocutory judgment against the defendants.

Held, allowing the plaintiffs’ claim: (1) In a defamation action, the plaintiff must prove that: (a) the words complained of were defamatory of and concerned the plaintiff; (b) the words referred to the plaintiff; and (c) the words had been published to a third person (see paras 11). (2) In the instant case, the said article was clearly defamatory of and concerned the plaintiffs. The words complained of bore the natural and ordinary meaning pleaded by the plaintiffs, that is, the plaintiffs had connived at, and participated in the corruption or the attempted corruption by Dato’ VK Lingam of the Malaysian judiciary, in the course of the plaintiffs’ litigation against Ayer Molek Rubber Company Berhad (see para 27). (3) The names of the first and second plaintiffs were clearly stated in the said article. Therefore, the second element of the identity of the plaintiffs had been established (see para 20). ||Page 116>> (4) In proving that there was publication, the plaintiffs had submitted an original copy of the said magazine. The plaintiffs had also called several witnesses who testified that they had received and read the said article. Accordingly, the plaintiffs had proven that the words complained of were published to third parties as required by the law of defamation (see paras 14, 18). (5) Having regard to the established principles of law applicable in the award of damages in libel actions and taking into account the grave and serious libel perpetrated by the defendants against the plaintiffs and to vindicate the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 17

plaintiffs’ business and trading reputation, and bearing in mind the guideline given by the Court of Appeal not to award large and extensive awards, a sum of RM500,000 for each of the plaintiffs would be sufficient compensation (see para 47).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah tindakan libel yang dimulakan oleh plaintif-plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan yang timbul daripada penerbitan sebuah artikel bertajuk ‘Malaysian Justice On Trial’ (‘artikel tersebut’) yang diterbitkan dalam majalah International Commercial Litigation keluaran November 1995 (‘majalah tersebut’). Majalah tersebut telah diterbitkan di London dan diedarkan di Malaysia dan tempat lain. Dalam pernyataan tuntutan mereka, plaintif-plaintif telah memplidkan bahawa maksud semualjadi dan biasa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut bermaksud dan difahami mambawa maksud bahawa plaintif-plaintif dan setiap daripada mereka telah bersubahat, dan terlibat dalam rasuah, atau cubaan rasuah oleh Dato’ VK Lingam daripada kehakiman Malaysia, semasa litigasi plaintif-pliantif terhadap Syarikat Getah Ayer Molek Berhad di Malaysia. Defendan-defendan tidak memasuki kehadiran terhadap tindakan plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif telah menetapkan perkara tersebut untuk perbicaraan dan tidak memasuki penghakiman interlokutori terhadap defendan-defendan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif: (1) Dalam satu tindakan fitnah, plaintif perlu membuktikan bahawa: (a) perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah dan berkaitan plaintif; (b) perkataan-perkataan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif; dan (c) perkataan-perkataan tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada orang ketiga (lihat perenggan 11). (2) Dalam kes semasa, artikel tersebut dengan jelas berunsur fitnah dan berkaitan plaintif-plaintif. Perkataan-perkatan yang diadukan ||Page 117>> mengandungi maksud semula jadi dan biasa yang diplidkan oleh MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 18

plaintif-plaintif, iaitu, plaintif-plaintif telah bersubahat, dan terlibat dalam rasuah atau percubaan rasuah oleh Dato’ VK Lingam daripada kehakiman Malaysia, semasa litigasi plaintif-plaintif terhadap Syarikat Getah Ayer Molek Berhad (lihat perenggan 27). (3) Nama-nama plaintif pertama dan kedua dengan jelas dinyatakan dalam artikel tersebut. Oleh itu, elemen kedua berhubung pengenalan plaintif-plaintif telah dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 20). (4) Dalam membuktikan bahawa terdapat penerbitan, plaintif-plaintif telah mengemukakan satu salinan asal majalah tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif juga telah memanggil beberapa orang saksi yang memberi keterangan bahawa mereka telah menerima dan membaca artikel tersebut. Sewajarnya, plaintif-plaintif telah membuktikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan telah diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga sebagaimana dikehendaki oleh undang-undang fitnah (lihat perenggan 14, 18). (5) Berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang tetap yang terpakai dalam award ganti rugi untuk tindakan libel dan mengambil kira libel yang berat dan serius dilakukan oleh defendan-defendan terhadap plaintif-plaintif dan untuk menjustifikasikan perniagaan dan reputasi perniagaan plaintif-plaintif, dan mengambil kira panduan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan untuk tidak memberi award yang besar dan melampau, sejumlah RM500,000 untuk setiap plaintif adalah pampasan yang memadai (lihat perenggan 47).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For libel, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].

Cases referred to Baltrop v Canadian Broadcasting Corp [1978] 86 DLR (3d) 61 (NSSC App Div) (refd) Bonnick v Morris [2002] 3 WLR 820 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 19

Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] AC 1027 (refd) Cassell & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (refd) Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohamed Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] AC 371 (refd) Gillick v British Broadcasting Corporation & Anor [1996] EMLR 267 (refd) Insas Bhd & Anor v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 833 (refd) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) ||Page 118>> Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Manning et al v Hill [1995] 126 DLR (4th) 129 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278 (refd)

V Siva (R Thayalan with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the plaintiffs. Shubhaa holding watching brief for Raphael Pura. Defendants not represented.

[2005] 2 MLJ 397 UTUSAN MELAYU (M) BHD & ORS v TJANTING HANDICRAFT SDN BHD & ANOR

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 20

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–228 OF 2001 MOKHTAR SIDIN, AND NIK HASHIM JJCA 30 NOVEMBER 2004

Tort — Defamation — Slander of goods — Criticism over costumes manufactured by plaintiffs worn by world leaders — Whether slander of goods proven

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Work of art to general public — Whether criticism over costumes manufactured by plaintiffs worn by world leaders amounts to work of art to general public

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Alleged libel by defendant of first plaintiff — Whether second plaintiff alter ego of first plaintiff and therefore also suffered damage

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Criticism over costumes made by plaintiffs worn by world leaders at APEC meeting — Whether words in its natural and ordinary meaning defamatory of plaintiffs — Whether language used is extreme — Meaning intended by article in its original language

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Libel and slander of goods — Libellous article published in monthly women’s magazine — Whether damages of RM1.3 million excessive — Whether trial judge influenced by prevailing trend in awarding damages

Tort — Defamation — Malice — Whether libellous article injured reputation of plaintiffs — Defendant taken to have intended consequences naturally resulting from his act

Tort — Defamation — Aggravated damages — Whether malice proved — Whether amount of aggravated damages may be as much as mother award

The appellants were the publisher, editor, journalist and printer respectively of a

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 21

monthly magazine called ‘Wanita’. The first respondent carried on the business of manufacturing batik materials and the second respondent was its managing director and its alter ego. The respondents were commissioned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (‘MITTI’) to supply batik costumes to all APEC leaders who attended the 1998 APEC meeting. The respondents claimed that the appellants’ Bahasa Melayu article in the magazine had in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean that the respondents produced unsightly batik and the second respondent had brought shame to the country by allowing world leaders to wear unsightly and ugly costumes made from those batik materials. The respondents claimed for damages for slander of goods, libel and ||Page 398>> aggravated damages. The learned trial judge found in favour of the respondents and awarded damages amounting to RM1.3 million against the appellants. The appellants appealed. The appellants submitted essentially on four grounds: (i) batik, being a work of art, once displayed to the general public, may thenceforth be commented and/or criticized upon by any member of the public and therefore the article was an honest comment not actuated by malicious intent on the part of the appellants against the respondents; (ii) in determining whether the said article was defamatory or not, consideration should be given to the original Bahasa Malaysia version in its entirety rather than to its English translation; (iii) the finding that the second respondent was the alter ego of the first respondent was erroneous; (iv) the damages awarded was excessive influenced by the prevailing trend in awarding the damages.

Held, dismissing the appeal on liability and allowing the appeal on quantum; damages reduced to total of RM250,000: (1) The photograph as published in ‘Wanita’ was not taken on occasion of a display of batik silk materials before the public. What was worn by the leaders as appeared in the photograph was presented by MITTI and it was not put on display by the respondents. In the premises it was not meant to invite criticism. Moreover, there was no evidence to show that the third appellant was a qualified art critic (see para 9). (2) The words complained of far exceeded the bound of fair comment and just

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 22

criticism. The language used was so extreme that no fair-minded person, however obstinate and prejudiced his views were, would have honestly used them (see para 10). (3) On the question of malicious intent, the law looks at the tendency and consequences of the publication and if the defendant has published words which have in fact injured the plaintiff’s reputation, the defendant must be taken to have intended the consequences naturally resulting from his act (see para 12). The learned judge had correctly construed and assessed the Bahasa Malaysia text of the article in its entirety meticulously and given the natural and ordinary meaning that a reasonable man on the street would have of the article and consequently found that the words complained of were defamatory of the respondents (see para 14). (4) There were evidence to support the finding that the second respondent was the alter ego of the first respondent (see para 15). Thus, considering the evidence as a whole and particularly from the contents of the articles complained of and the defences put forward, the article was a grave slander of the first respondent’s goods and libel upon the second respondent. By reasons of the words and in consequence thereof the first respondent had been gravely injured in its manufacturing and ||Page 399>> trading character and the second respondent had been seriously injured in her personal business reputation and goodwill (see para 16). (5) The learned judge had failed to properly address his mind when he held that the article complained of was published in the newspapers when in actual fact it was published in more restricted publication (see para 24). This amounted to misdirection on the part of the learned judge that warranted interference by the court (see para 25). The learned trial judge had misapprehended the facts and was also influenced by the prevailing trend in awarding the damages (see para 26); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 followed. (6) With regard to the award of aggravated damages, there was indeed a case for the award. The finding of fact that the appellants were motivated by actual malice in publishing the article complained of warranted the making of an award of aggravated damages. However, the amount of aggravated damages

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 23

must be a reasonable one. A reasonable amount should not be as much as the mother award (see para 27). (7) The learned judge was correct in refusing to make separate awards under the head of innuendo for slander of goods and libel as suggested by the respondents. At the trial, the respondents had not applied to amend to include separate causes of action for innuendo. And since in this case the respondents had not pleaded specifically for damages for innuendo, the claim for such damages cannot be entertained (see para 30).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu-perayu merupakan penerbit, penyunting, wartawan dan pencetak kepada majalah bulanan yang ‘Wanita’. Responden pertama telah menjalankan perniagaan pengilangan material batik dan responden kedua merupakan pengarah urusannya dan alter egonya. Responden telah diarahkan oleh Kementerian Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri (‘MITTI’) untuk membekalkan pakaian batik kepada kesemua ketua negara yang menghadiri persidangan APEC. Responden mengatakan bahawa satu artikel Bahasa Melayu perayu di dalam majalah di dalam maksud biasa dan semula jadi bermaksud dan difahamkan sebagai bermaksud bahawa responden mengeluarkan batik-batik yang tidak cantik dan responden kedua telah membawa malu kepada negara dengan membenarkan pemimpin dunia memakai baju yang hodoh dan tidak cantik yang diperbuat daripada material batik tersebut. Responden telah menuntut ganti rugi bagi slander barang-barangan, libel dan ganti rugi teruk. Hakim telah memihak kepada responden dan telah mengawardkan ganti rugi berjumlah RM1.3 juta terhadap perayu. Perayu telah merayu. Perayu telah berhujah berdasarkan kepada empat alasan: (i) Batik, yang merupakan satu kerja seni, apabila dipertontonkan kepada orang awam, boleh seterusnya dikomen dan dikritik oleh mana-mana orang ||Page 400>> awam dan oleh kerana itu artikel tersebut merupakan komen ikhlas yang tidak digerakkan oleh niat jahat di pihak perayu terhadap responden; (ii) untuk menentukan sama ada artikel tersebut adalah fitnah atau tidak, pertimbangan hendaklah

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 24

dibuat kepada versi asal Bahasa Malaysia secara keseluruhannya berbanding terjemahan Inggeris; (iii) keputusan bahawa responden merupakan alter ego kepada responden pertama adalah salah; (iv) Ganti rugi yang diawardkan adalah keterlaluan yang dipengaruhi oleh budaya yang wujud di dalam mengawardkan ganti rugi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan atas liabiliti dan membenarkan rayuan terhadap kuantum; ganti rugi dikurangkan kepada RM250,000: (1) Fotograf yang diterbitkan di dalam ‘Wanita’ tidak diambil semasa pameran material batik sutera kepada orang awam. Apa yang dipakai oleh pemimpin-pemimpin seperti mana yang kelihatan di dalam fotograf telah disampaikan oleh MITTI dan tidak dipamerkan oleh responden. Kerana itu ia bukanlah bertujuan untuk menarik kritikan. Lebih-lebih lagi, tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa perayu ketiga yang menulis artikel adalah seorang pengkritik seni yang layak (lihat perenggan 9). (2) Perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan jauh melampaui had komen wajar dan kritikan adil. Bahasa-bahasa yang digunakan adalah melampau di mana tiada seorang pun yang berfikiran waras, sekalipun tegar dan prejudis pandangannya, secara jujur akan menggunakannya (lihat perenggan 10). (3) Pada persoalan niat jahat, undang-undang melihat kepada kecenderungan dan kesan-kesan penerbitan dan sekiranya defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang telah merosakkan reputasi plaintif, defendan mestilah dianggap berhasrat kepada kesan-kesan yang secara semula jadinya terhasil daripada tindakannya (lihat perenggan 12). Hakim telah mentafsir dan menilai dengan betulnya teks Bahasa Malaysia artikel dan telah berbuat demikian secara keseluruhan dan berhati-hati dan mengambil kira makna biasa dan natural artikel tersebut kepada orang biasa sebelum mendapati bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan itu telah sebenarnya memfitnah responden-responden (lihat perenggan 14). (4) Terdapat keterangan bagi menyokong penemuan bahawa responden kedua adalah alter ego responden pertama (lihat perenggan 15). Oleh itu, melihat kepada keterangan secara keseluruhannya dan terutamanya kepada kandungan artikel yang diadu dan pembelaan yang diutarakan, artikel adalah suatu slander

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 25

yang teruk terhadap barangan responden pertama dan suatu libel terhadap responden kedua. Akibat daripada perkataan-perkataan dan kesan-kesannya, perniagaan dan perusahaan responden pertama telah rosak dengan teruknya, sementara responden ||Page 401>> kedua pula mengalami kerosakan pada nama baik dan reputasi niaganya (lihat perenggan 16). (5) Hakim gagal membuat pertimbangan yang sewajarnya apabila mendapati bahawa artikel yang diadukan itu diterbitkan di dalam surat khabar apabila pada fakta sebenarnya ia diterbitkan di dalam penerbitan yang terhad (lihat perenggan 24). Ianya dengan itu adalah suatu salah arahan oleh hakim bicara sekaligus mewajarkan campurtangan mahkamah (lihat perenggan 25). Hakim telah tersalah faham akan fakta-fakta dan telah dipengaruhi oleh trend semasa ketika mengaward ganti rugi (lihat perenggan 26); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 diikut. (6) Sebenarnya terdapat sokongan untuk award ganti rugi teruk. Penemuan fakta bahawa perayu didorong oleh niat jahat sebenar dalam menerbitkan artikel yang diadukan menjustifikasikan pemberian ganti rugi teruk. Walau bagaimanapun, kadar ganti rugi yang diawardkan mestilah munasabah. Kadar yang munasabah mestilah tidak sama banyak dengan award ibu (lihat perenggan 27). (7) Hakim adalah betul apabila enggan memberi ganti rugi berasingan di bawah tajuk innuendo bagi slander barangan dan libel. Semasa perbicaraan, responden tidak membuat permohonan untuk meminda bagi memasukkan kausa tindakan berasingan bagi innuendo. Oleh kerana responden tidak memplid permohonan untuk ganti rugi bagi innuendo secara spesifik, tuntutan bagi ganti rugi berkenaan tidak boleh dilayan (lihat perenggan 30).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409. For cases on defences in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 26

For cases on aggravated damages, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 116. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For defences in defamation, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.092]– [80.102]. For libel generally, 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].

Cases referred to Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (refd) E Hulton & Co v Jones (1910) AC 20 (refd) Fisher v Clement (1830)10 B&C 472 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (folld) McQuire v Western Morning News (1903) 2 KB 100 (refd) ||Page 402>>

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 9

Appeal from Civil Suit No S2–23–72 of 1999 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Mohd Ariff Yusof (M Reza Hassan with him) (Cheang & Ariff) for the appellants. Shamsul Bahrain Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the respondents.

[2005] 3 MLJ 485 BRE SDN BHD & ORS v TUN DATUK PATINGGI HJ ABDUL RAHMAN YA’KUB

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 27

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO Q–02–434 OF 1996 DENIS ONG, MOHD GHAZALI AND HASHIM YUSOFF JJCA 11 MARCH 2005

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Fair comment — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether appellants could prove publication was fair comment on balance of probabilities

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Justification — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether appellants could prove truth of defamatory imputations on balance of probabilities

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Qualified privilege — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper during state by-election — Whether appellants could prove qualified privilege on balance of probabilities — Whether publication was privileged as by-election generated public interest

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether letter defamatory of respondent — Whether letter calculated to expose respondent to hatred, ridicule or contempt in mind of reasonable man or lower him in estimation of right-thinking members of society

The respondent filed a claim against the appellants for damages as well as for an injunction and costs for libel contained in an article appearing in a daily newspaper in Sarawak (‘the said article’). The said article concerned a letter to the third defendant as the editor of the newspaper regarding a state constituency by-election where the respondent accompanied an independent candidate to the nomination centre on the nomination day. After a full trial, the High Court found in favour of the respondent and awarded the sum of RM100,000 against the appellants as compensatory damages

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 28

together with interest at 8% per annum from date of judgment until full payment as well as an order for injunction and costs. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and contended that the words complained of in the said article were not defamatory of the respondent. The appellants further argued that even if such words were defamatory of the respondent, they could rely on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The said article clearly stated the meaning of the allegations and imputations of the words complained of. The High Court had adopted the correct test, ie whether the words complained of were calculated to expose the respondent to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower the respondent in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally (see para 10); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed. ||Page 486>> (2) The respondent had relied on imputations couched in specific terms or charges of wrong-doing that could be concluded from the said article. The appellants did not suggest any alternative imputations that could arise from the said article. The burden was therefore on the appellants to establish the truth of those specific charges or imputations bearing in mind s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 (see para 17). On a balance of probabilities, the appellants had failed to establish the truth of the material statements in the words complained of in the said article and therefore their defence of justification failed (see para 18). (3) The High Court held that it was unable to find that the words complained of in the said article were capable of being fair comments (see para 20). It is now the well-settled rule that in a finding of ‘libel’ or ‘no libel’, the appellate court would rarely interfere because, this was due to the difficulty of applying the principle to a finding that was to a considerable extent, a matter of opinion (see para 22); Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 followed. (4) On the balance of probabilities the defence of qualified privilege failed because

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 29

the said article was not specifically pleaded to be a report on the by-election and that it was confined to the voters of the constituency. Moreover, the respondent was not even a candidate for the by-election (see para 15).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden telah memfailkan satu tuntutan terhadap perayu-perayu untuk ganti rugi dan juga untuk satu injunksi dan kos kerana libel yang terkandung dalam artikel sebuah akhbar harian di Sarawak (‘artikel tersebut’). Artikel tersebut berkaitan sepucuk surat kepada defendan ketiga sebagai editor akhbar berhubung pilihan raya kerajaan negeri di mana responden telah menemani seorang calon bebas ke pusat undian pada hari undian tersebut. Selepas perbicaraan penuh, Mahkamah Tinggi menyebelahi pihak responden dan mengawardkan sejumlah RM100,000 terhadap perayu-perayu sebagai ganti rugi pampasan berserta faedah pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga bayaran penuh dan juga satu perintah untuk injunksi dan kos. Perayu telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan menegaskan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut tidak memfitnah responden. Perayu-perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa jika perkataan-perkataan sedemikian memfitnah responden, mereka boleh bergantung kepada pembelaan justifikasi, komen adil dan perlindungan bersyarat.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Artikel tersebut dengan jelas menyatakan maksud pengataan dan andaian perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menggunakan ujian yang betul, iaitu sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan ||Page 487>> dianggap sebagai mendedahkan responden kepada rasa benci, malu atau hina dalam pemikiran seseorang yang waras atau mungkin menjatuhkan maruah responden dalam pemikiran masyarakat secara umum (lihat perenggan 10); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut. (2) Responden bergantung kepada pengataan dalam istilah atau penuduhan spesifik

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 30

yang boleh disimpulkan daripada artikel tersebut. Perayu-perayu tidak mencadangkan apa-apa pengataan alternatif yang mungkin timbul dari artikel tersebut. Beban terletak ke atas perayu-perayu untuk membuktikan kebenaran penuduhan atau pengataan spesifik tersebut menurut s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957 (lihat perenggan 17). Berdasarkan imbangan kebarangkalian, perayu-perayu gagal untuk membuktikan kebenaran pernyataan-pernyataan penting berdasarkan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut dan oleh itu pembelaan justifikasi mereka gagal (lihat perenggan 18). (3) Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa ia tidak mendapati perkataan- perkataan yang diadukan dalam artikel tersebut sebagai komen yang adil (lihat perenggan 20). Adalah rukun yang tetap bahawa dalam satu penemuan ‘libel’ atau ‘no libel’, Mahkamah Rayuan jarang campur tangan kerana kesukaran menggunapakai prinsip ke atas suatu penemuan yang sebahagian besar daripadanya adalah berdasarkan suatu pendapat sahaja (lihat perenggan 22); Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 diikut. (4) Atas imbangan kebarangkalian pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat gagal kerana artikel tersebut tidak khusus diplidkan sebagai satu laporan pilihan raya kecil dan terhad kepada pengundi-pengundi bahagian pilihan raya. Tambahan pula, responden bukan seorang calon untuk pilihan raya kecil ini (lihat perenggan 15).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on fair comment, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 289–293. For cases on justification, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 309–312. For cases on defences for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273.

Cases referred to

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 31

Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Blackshaw v Lord [1983] 2 All ER 311 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) ||Page 488>> JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 (folld) Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1997] 189 CLR 520 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 (refd) Odger v Matimer (1872) 28 LT 472 (folld) Reynolds v Times Newspaper [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (folld)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 12

Appeal from Suit No KG 400 of 1986 (High Court, Kuching)

Sim Hui Chuang (Reddi & Co) for the appellants. Chong Siew Chiang (Cheng Hui Hang with him) (Cheng & Cheng) for the respondent.

[2005] 3 MLJ 494 CHIN CHOON @ CHIN TEE FUT v CHUA JUI MENG

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–372 OF 2000

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 32

GOPAL SRI RAM, ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN AND NIK HASHIM JJCA 14 OCTOBER 2004

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Compensatory damages — Aggravated damages — Exemplary damages — Whether aggravated and exemplary damages should be made — Whether separate awards for aggravated and exemplary damages should be made — Whether of award of damages manifestly excessive

The appellant is an advocate and solicitor. At the date of publication of the admitted libel, the respondent was the deputy minister for International Trade and Industry. The appellant made a charge against the respondent that was of the gravest nature. He alleged that the respondent had acted corruptly in the discharge of his duties. This charge was made at a press conference called at the appellant’s behest. The story was carried by two newspapers of the Chinese vernacular. Later, the appellant repeated the defamatory words to a very limited audience outside the office of the Anti Corruption Agency where he had gone to lodge a report. He said that he had ‘boxes of evidence’ against the respondent. As it turned out, there was no such evidence. This was the appellant’s appeal against the award of damages made against him in respect of the libel admittedly committed by him upon the respondent. The trial judge awarded a total sum of RM1,500,000 made up of RM500,000 as compensatory damages, RM500,000 as aggravated damages and a further RM500,000 as exemplary damages. The appellant complained that these awards were excessive.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Aggravated damages should be awarded based on the appellant’s conduct. In this case, we have an arrogant appellant who had not only put a plea of justification on record but said that he had ‘boxes of evidence’ against the respondent. The boxes, as it transpired were empty and the plea of justification was withdrawn. The court was therefore unable to accept the submission that the respondent should receive only nominal damages. That submission itself which suggested that the respondent was of poor character meriting to receive

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 33

only nominal damages constituted an aggravating factor. In a defamation action, the way in which a defendant conducts the trial or an appeal may be grounds for awarding aggravated damages (see para 10). (2) Any form of advantage gained by a defendant in a defamation case suffices. It need not produce an immediate profit in money terms. It may produce an immediate non-pecuniary advantage that may translate itself into a monetary reward sometime later. In this case, the appellant by his tortuous conduct wanted to impress members of the Chinese community ||Page 495>> that he was an advocate who feared no one, not even a deputy minister of the government when it came to advancing his client’s cause. Reasonable persons who read his statement may well decide to retain his services because of the impression created by him. So, he stood to gain from what he did. This is accordingly a suitable case to make an award of exemplary damages (see para 12); Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 followed. (3) Separate awards for aggravated and exemplary damages should not be made in a defamation case. It was never the practice to award interest on each separate head of damages (aggravated and exemplary damages). Interest was merely granted on the single award. In defamation cases, the court should maintain the age old practice of making a global award in order to limit the size of awards. Otherwise there will be runaway damages once again (see para 13); Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 followed. (4) The court having considered and taken into account all the factors operating in the respondent’s favour were of the view that the award of RM1,500,000 was manifestly excessive. It was certainly far in excess of the range of awards in defamation cases. Having regard to the very special circumstances of this case, an award of RM200,000 was a fair sum by way of a global award of damages. The award included compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages (see para 14); Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161; Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 distinguished.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 34

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu merupakan seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Semasa tarikh penerbitan libel yang dikatakan, responden merupakan timbalan menteri Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri. Perayu membuat penuduhan terhadap responden yang menjejaskan sifatnya. Beliau mengatakan bahawa responden telah bertindak secara tidak amanah dalam melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya. Penuduhan ini dibuat semasa sidang akhbar yang dipanggil atas permintaan perayu. Cerita ini disiarkan oleh dua akhbar bahasa Cina. Kemudian, perayu mengulangi perkataan-perkataan berunsur fitnah tersebut kepada beberapa orang di luar pejabat Agensi Pencegah Rasuah di mana beliau membuat aduan. Beliau berkata bahawa beliau mempunyai ‘boxes of evidence’ terhadap responden. Namun sebaliknya, tiada bukti sedemikian. Ini merupakan rayuan perayu terhadap award ganti rugi yang dibuat terhadapnya berkaitan libel yang dikatakan dilakukan oleh beliau terhadap responden. Hakim perbicaraan telah mengawardkan jumlah keseluruhan RM1,500,000 yang membentuk RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi pampasan, RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi melampau dan selebihnya RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi teladan. Perayu mengadu bahawa award-award berikut adalah keterlaluan. ||Page 496>>

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Ganti rugi melampau hendaklah diawardkan berdasarkan perbuatan perayu. Dalam kes ini, perayu bukan sahaja membuat pli justifikasi atas rekod tetapi mengatakan beliau mempunyai ‘boxes of evidence’ terhadap responden. Kotak-kotak tersebut, rupa-rupanya kosong dan pli justifikasi ditarik balik. Mahkamah oleh itu tidak dapat menerima hujah bahawa responden patut menerima ganti rugi yang nominal sahaja. Hujah itu sendirinya mencadangkan bahawa responden tidak mempunyai sifat baik yang memeritkan diri untuk menerima ganti rugi yang nominal sahaja yang membentuk faktor yang melampau. Dalam satu tindakan fitnah, cara bagaimana defendan mengendalikan perbicaraan atau rayuan boleh menjadi alasan untuk

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 35

mengawardkan ganti rugi melampau (lihat perenggan 10). (2) Apa-apa bentuk kelebihan yang diperoleh oleh defendan dalam kes fitnah adalah mencukupi. Tidak ada keperluan untuk mengemukakan keuntungan segera dalam bentuk wang. Ia mungkin akan mengemukakan kelebihan segera yang tidak berunsur wang yang mungkin boleh membentuk satu ganjaran berbentuk wang kemudiannya. Dalam kes ini, perayu melalui perbuatan tort beliau hendak menunjukkan kepada golongan Cina bahawa beliau seorang peguam yang tidak takut kepada sesiapa, walaupun timbalan menteri kerajaan sekalipun dalam mengendalikan kes anakguamnya. Sesiapa yang waras membaca kenyataan beliau akan mengekalkan khidmatnya kerana reputasi beliau yang sedemikian. Oleh itu, beliau mempunyai kelebihan daripada apa yang beliau lakukan. Ini adalah satu kes yang sesuai untuk membuat satu award untuk ganti rugi teladan (lihat perenggan 12); Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 diikut. (3) Award-award berasingan untuk ganti rugi melampau dan teladan tidak patut dibuat dalam kes fitnah. Bukan satu amalan untuk mengawardkan faedah ke atas setiap kepala ganti rugi yang berasingan (ganti rugi melampau dan teladan). Faedah hanya dibenarkan dalam satu award. Dalam kes- kes fitnah, mahkamah hendaklah mengekalkan amalan lama membuat award secara global bagi tujuan menghadkan bilangan award. Jika tidak, ganti rugi runaway akan berlaku (lihat perenggan 13); Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 diikut. (4) Setelah mahkamah mengambilkira dan menimbangkan semua factor yang berpihak kepada responden ia berpendapat award RM1,500,000 adalah keterlaluan. Ia melampaui batas award-award untuk kes fitnah. Berdasarkan keadaan tertentu kes ini, award RM200,000 adalah jumlah yang adil mengikut award ganti rugi secara menyeluruh. Award tersebut termasuklah ganti rugi-ganti rugi pampasan, malampau dan teladan (lihat perenggan 14); Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161; Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 dibeza.] ||Page 497>>

Notes

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 36

For cases on damages for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 254–264.

Cases referred to Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (folld) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (folld) Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 (distd) Karpal Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (distd) Liew Yew Tian v Cheah Cheng Hoc [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Rookes v Barnar d [1964] AC 1129 (refd)

Appeal from Civil Suit No S2–22–503 of 1994 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Mohamed Zaini Mazlan (CL Chin & Associates) for the appellant. Darryl SC Goon (Yvonne Ong with him) (Raja, Darryl & Loh) for the respondent.

[2005] 5 MLJ 539 DATO’ SERI S v PENERBITAN SAHABAT (M) SDN BHD & ORS (NO 2)

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S6–23–72 OF 2003 ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J 9 MAY 2005

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Conspiracy to defame — Whether cause of action would abate with the death of second defendant — Whether claim of conspiracy to defame merged

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 37

with claim for libel — Civil Law Act 1956 s 8(1)

Tort — Malicious falsehood — Publication of falsehood — Whether cause of action would abate with death of second defendant — Civil Law Act 1956 s 8(1)

The second defendant had passed away. His death gave rise to the question of whether the various causes of action in the plaintiff’s amended Statement of Claim would abate. In the amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff claimed for the following causes of action: (a) damages for the tort of conspiracy; (b) damages for the tort of malicious falsehood; and (c) damages for the tort of libel.

Held: (1) The tort of conspiracy related to conspiracy to injure by publishing defamatory statements. It was a pure and simple cause of action for defamation. It was also a cause of action for libel which derives its origin from the root word ‘defamation’. But, under the law, there is no separate tort of conspiracy to defame by publishing defamatory statements. And, under the law too, the tort of conspiracy to defame by publishing defamatory statements merge with the plaintiff’s claim for libel: Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 which was adopted by the Malaysian High Court in Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123. It must abate with the death of the second defendant (see para 29). (2) An action for libel is captured by the provision to s 8(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 thereby excluding the general application of that section to the tort of defamation. A personal action dies with the person when the person dies. This was what had happened to the deceased second defendant. This cause of action for libel must abate with the death of the second defendant (see para 31). (3) The tort of malicious falsehood survives and that the case of Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 is still good law and it is binding on this court. Since the claim against the deceased second defendant for malicious falsehood would protect the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 38

||Page 540>> plaintiff’s interest in the deceased second defendant’s property the right of the plaintiff to sue the deceased second defendant survived and such right was transmitted to the deceased second defendant’s personal representatives and administrators (see para 40). The tort of malicious falsehood was not caught by the proviso to s 8(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (see para 41).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan kedua telah meninggal dunia. Kematian beliau menimbulkan persoalan sama ada pelbagai kausa tindakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif yang dipinda akan diberhentikan. Dalam pernyataan tuntutan itu, plaintif telah menuntut kausa tindakan berikut: (a) ganti rugi untuk tort konspirasi; (b) ganti rugi untuk tort kepalsuan berniat jahat; dan (c) ganti rugi untuk tort libel.

Diputuskan: (1) Tort konspirasi adalah yang berkaitan untuk menjejaskan melalui kenyataan fitnah. Ia adalah kausa tindakan untuk fitnah yang jelas dan mudah. Ia juga satu kausa tindakan untuk libel yang wujud asalnya daripada perkataan pangkal ‘fitnah’. Tetapi, di bawah undang-undang tersebut, tiada tort konspirasi yang berasingan untuk memfitnah dengan menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan fitnah. Dan, di bawah undang-undang tersebut juga, tort konspirasi untuk memfitnah dengan menerbitkan kenyataan- kenyataan fitnah disatukan dengan tuntutan libel plaintif: Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 yang diguna pakai oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaysia dalam Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123. Ia hendaklah diberhentikan dengan kematian defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 29). (2) Suatu tindakan untuk libel diperuntukkan dalam s 8(1) Akta Undang- Undang Sivil 1956 yang mengecualikan pemakaian am seperti mana seksyen untuk tort untuk fitnah. Tindakan peribadi lenyap dengan kematian seseorang itu. Inilah yang berlaku kepada defendan kedua. Kausa tindakan untuk libel ini hendaklah

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 39

diberhentikan dengan kematian defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 31). (3) Tort kepalsuan berniat jahat kekal dan kes Mrs Kok Wee Kiat v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 masih undang-undang yang baik dan ia mengikat dalam mahkamah ini. Memandangkan tuntutan terhadap defendan kedua yang telah meninggal dunia untuk kepalsuan berniat jahat melindungi kepentingan plaintif dalam hartanah si mati defendan kedua, hak plaintif untuk menyaman defendan kedua yang telah meninggal dunia berpindah kepada wakil peribadi dan pentadbir- pentadbir si mati defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 40). Tort kepalsuan berniat jahat tidak terikat oleh proviso kepada s 8(1) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 (lihat perenggan 41).] ||Page 541>>

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on publication of falsehood, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 566–568. For libel, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].

Cases referred to Astrovlanis Compania Naviera SA v Linard [1972] 2 QB 611; [1972] 2 WLR 1414 (refd) Ban Guan Sdn Bhd v United Malaysian Steel Mills Bhd [1977] 2 MLJ 52 (refd) Brown v Feeney [1906] 1 KB 563 (refd) Fhilipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 139 (refd) Hatchard v Mege & Ors (1887) 18 QBD 771 (refd) Kok Wee Kiat, Mrs v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 71 (refd) Kok Wee Kiat, Mrs v Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Bhd & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 123 (folld)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 40

Lonrho plc & Ors v Fayed & Ors (No 5) [1994] 1 All ER 188, [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (refd) Lonrho plc v Fayed & Ors [1991] 3 All ER 303 (refd) Metall und Rohstoff AG v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Inc [1990] 1 QB 391 (refd) Milbank v Milbank [1900] 1 Ch 376 (refd) Mitchell v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1958) 60 WAIR 38 (refd) Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1894] 1 QB 671, 692 (refd) Mulcahy v R (1868) LR 3 HL 306 (refd) Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (refd) Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd Ward v Lewis & Ors [1955] 1 WLR 9 (folld) Yorkshire Provident Life Assurance Co v Gilbert [1895] 2 QB 148 (refd) Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures (1934) 50 TLR 581 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 8, (1)

Jeffrey John (Frida Krishnan with him) (Shafee & Co) for the plaintiff. Rajasingam Gothandapani (K Saraswathy with him) (Shearn Delamore) for the defendants.

[2004] 1 MLJ 34 RAJA SEGARAN A/L S KRISHNAN v BAR COUNCIL MALAYSIA & ORS

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 41

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–93 OF 1999 (5) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 NOVEMBER 2003

Administrative Law — Remedies — Declaration —Whether applicant had locus standi to make application — Whether application was an attempt to avoid a penal sanction — Whether applicants suffered special injury

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Court — Civil courts — Criminal jurisdiction of civil courts — Whether civil courts could declare proposed action seditious

Civil Procedure — Locus standi — Association of persons proposing a course of action — Individual arguing that course of action seditious — Whether individual could seek injunction to prevent association from acting in breach of the law — Whether individual must have suffered special injury

Constitutional Law — Judiciary — Judicial Misconduct — Allegations of judicial misconduct — Discussion of judicial misconduct — Whether such discussion unconstitutional — Federal Constitution art 127

Legal Profession — Law Society/Malaysian Bar — Powers of the Bar — Allegations of judicial misconduct — EGM to discuss allegations of misconduct — Whether an attempt to by pass constitutional safeguard — Whether amounts to contempt of court and sedition — Whether ultra vires powers of the Bar — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 42(1)(d)

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Maker of statement — Whether statement contemptuous — Whether position and standing of maker of statement relevant in deciding whether statement contemptuous

The Malaysian Bar had resolved to hold an EGM to discuss allegations of impropriety

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 42

against the then Chief Justice. The plaintiff, a member of the Bar, was concerned that the notice of the EGM, the resolution and the proposed meeting were ultra vires the powers and objects of the Malaysian Bar under the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the LPA’) on the grounds that they may be contemptuous, seditious and unconstitutional. The plaintiff argued that since he could be liable for any actions taken by the defendants. The plaintiff thus sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding the proposed EGM. Pending the disposal of the action, the court granted the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction (see [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Since then the former Chief Justice, the subject of the Bar’s motion, retired and then Chief Justice, also since retired, had exhorted for better Bench/Bar relationship. Thus in reserving judgment in this case, the court urged the parties to settle their differences. Taking the advice of the court, the plaintiff sought leave to discontinue this action. The plaintiff’s application for leave to discontinue was allowed and the suit struck off and each party required to meet its own costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeal against this decision and directed that the court deliver its judgment on the substantive trial. The defendants argued, inter alia, that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a member of the Bar did not automatically confer any private law rights on him. In any event, the defendants argued that a civil court could not make a finding of contempt or sedition.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s application and granting the declarations sought: (1) In deciding whether a statement was contemptuous, the court may consider the position and standing of the person making the statement. The Malaysian Bar must accept the fact that it is a voice that is heard by the public. It acts as a regulator. It must also act as a moderator; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 followed. If the impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest court in the land had acted on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, confidence in the administration of justice was bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that could be imagined (see paras 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 followed. (2) The Bar Council had asserted they were not concerned with the truth of the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 43

allegations as they did not have the power to investigate them. Such callous indifference to the truth of the allegations, coming from an august body, was totally unacceptable. It was a clear abrogation of its duty to the general public as its watchdog. This flagrant disregard to verify the truth of the allegations before calling for an EGM fell far short of the aspirations of a noble Bar (see paras 46–47). (3) Unlike countries like the UK, Australia, the USA and India, the Bar Council in Malaysia has been given statutory recognition. The LPA sets out the Bar as a corporate statutory body duly recognized by the Government. It is imperative that the Bar recognizes this fact and, because of its unique position, acts with concern when making statements. Since the Bar Council and the Malaysian Bar are creatures of statute, their conduct must be confined within the provisions of the LPA. While the Bar sought to rely on s 42(1)(a), (e) or (g) of the LPA, s 42(1)(d) strictly confines the Bar to expressing its views on matters affecting the administration of law only if requested so to do (emphasis added). Since the Bar has not been requested to give its views on the state of the judiciary, the resolution and the motion were clearly in breach of that section ( see paras 27–28, 51–54). (4) The constitutional scheme envisages removal of a judge on proved misbehaviour or incapacity and the conduct of a judge is prohibited from discussion in Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies. The call for the resolution on admitted hearsay evidence was far from the requirement of ‘proved misbehaviour’. It is absolutely essential that people who hold high office be fair and just in their criticisms and not open themselves, and the organizations they represent, to criticisms. It is clear that the Bar has no power to discuss the conduct of the Judiciary and that any attempt to do so was contrary to art 127 of the Constitution. It must be seen to be manifest that no external pressure is exerted against the Judiciary, whether from the executive or from any other sources, including the Bar Council (see paras 57, 59, 63). (5) Where the plaintiff showed he has the locus to make the application, and where he further showed that the conduct of the defendants was such as to put the plaintiff, in peril of such prosecution as the defendants could face if the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 44

defendant was allowed to act, the plaintiff need not wait to see the outcome of the defendant’s actions before acting. To protect his own interest a plaintiff can take out an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting and, if the court is satisfied that the act complained of could give rise to the plaintiff facing criminal prosecution, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to use injunctive measures to stop the defendant. Therefore, the argument that if the plaintiff did not attend the meeting, he could not be sued or punished and that he could have chosen not to attend, is unacceptable (see paras 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 distinguished, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 followed. (6) In resolving the motion as spelt out, the public needed no legal advice, assistance or representations. Besides, the Bar Council have not been able to show which section of the public in particular they intend to protect. Their act of moving the resolution and having the meeting for that purpose were both ultra vires the LPA (see paras 81–82); Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 and Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 referred.

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Badan Peguam Malaysia telah memutuskan supaya mengadakan suatu EGM bagi membincangkan dakwaan salahlaku terhadap Ketua Hakim Negara pada masa itu. Plaintif, seorang peguam, bimbang bahawa notis EGM, resolusi serta mesyuarat yang dicadangkan itu adalah ultra vires kuasa dan matlamat Badan Peguam di bawah Akta Profession Undang-Undang 1976 (‘APU’) di atas alasan bahawa ia adalah menghina, hasutan dan melanggar perlembagaan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa, memandangkan beliau mungkin bertanggungjawab dalam sebarang tindakan yang diambil defendant, beliau memohon suatu perintah injunksi menahan defendant daripada mengadakan mesyuarat tersebut. Sebelum diputuskan tindakan itu, mahkamah telah membenarkan permohonan plaintif bagi injunksi sementara (lihat [2000] 1 MLJ 1). Sejak itu bekas Hakim Negara, yang menjadi tajuk usul Badan Peguam itu, telah bersara dan penggantinya, yang juga MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 45

telah bersara, telah menegur hubungan yang lebit erat antara pihak peguam dan penghakiman. Sebelum mengumumkan penghakiman dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah mendesak pihak-pihak menyelesaikan perbezaan antara mereka. Dalam mengikut nasihat mahkamah, plaintif memohon kebenaran memberhentikan tindakannya. Permohonan plaintif memberhentikan tindakan ini telah dibenarkan dan tindakan ini dibatalkan dengan kos ditanggung oleh pihak-pihak sendiri. Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan rayuan defendan terhadap keputusan ini dan mengarahkan supaya Mahkamah Tinggi memberikan keputusannya ke atas perbicaraan substantif. Defendan-defendan telah berhujah, antara lain, bahawa hanya kerana plaintif merupakan seorang peguam tidak semestinya mengurniakan sebarang hak undang-undang peribadi ke atas plaintif. Malahan mahkamah sivil tidak dapat memutuskan mengenai penghinaan atau hasutan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan dan memberikan deklarasi yang dipohon: (1) Dalam memutuskan sama ada sesuatu pernyataan adalah menghina, mahkamah dapat mengambil kira kedudukan orang yang membuat pernyataan tersebut. Badan Peguam harus menerima fakta bahawa ia adalah suara yang didengar oleh orang awam. Ia bertindak sebagai pengawalselia. Ia seharusnya juga bertindak sebagai kuasa redaan; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 diikut. Sekiranya tanggapan diberikan kepada orang awam bahawa hakim-hakim mahkamah teragung telah bertindak di atas pertimbangan yang tidak wajar, keyakinan dalam pentadbiran keadilan pasti dilemahkan dan tidak terdapat sebarang kecelakaan yang lebih berat (lihat perenggan-perenggan 33–34); Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 diikut. (2) Majlis Peguam telah menerangkan mereka tidak berminat ke atas kebenaran dakawaan memandangkan mereka tiada kuasa menyiasatnya. Sikap tidak ambil peduli ke atas kebenaran dakwaan seperti ini, yang datang dari badan guaman agung ini, tidak dapat diterima. Ia sememangnya suatu pembantutan kewajipannya sebagai pengawal bagi orang awam. Keengganannya menentusahkan kebenaran dakwaan sebelum memanggil mesyuarat tidak memadai memandangkan aspirasi sebuah badan guaman seperti ini (lihat perenggan-perenggan 46–47).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 46

(3) Berbeza daripada negara-negara asing seperti UK, Australia, Amerika Syarikat and India, Majlis Peguam di Malaysia telah diberikan pengiktirafan statutori. APU mendirikan badan guaman sebagai suatu badan berkanun korporat yang diiktiraf kerajaan. Adalah wajar Badan Peguam mengenali fakta ini dan, memandangkan kedudukannya yang unik, bertindak wajar apabila membuat pernyataan. Memandangkan Majlis Peguam dan Badan Peguam adalah diwujudkan statut, maka tingkahlaku mereka harus dihadkan kepada peruntukan APU. Walaupun Badan Peguam ingin bergantung kepada s 42(1)(a), (e) atau (g) APU, s 42(1)(d) menghadkan Badan Peguam supaya menyuarakan pendapatnya ke atas perkara pentadbiran keadilan hanya sekiranya diminta berbuat demikian (penekanan ditambah). Memandangkan yang Badan Peguam tidak pernah diminta memberikan pendapatnya ke atas kedudukan badan kehakiman, maka resolusi dan usul jelas melanggar peruntukan itu (lihat perenggan-perenggan 27–28, 51–54). (4) Rancangan perlembagaan membayangkan penyingkiran seseorang hakim sekiranya salahlakunya yang dibuktikan atau disebabkan kurang upayanya dan tingkahlaku seseorang hakim dilarang dibincangkan di Parlimen atau Dewan Undangan Negeri. Permintaan bagi resolusi tersebut di atas keterangan dengar cakap jauh dari keperluan ‘proved misbehaviour’. Adalah mustahak orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi bertindak secara adil dan saksama dalam kritik mereka dan tidak menjadikan diri mereka, mahupun badan yang mereka wakil, terbuka kepada pengkritikan. Adalah jelas bahawa Badan Peguam tidak mempunyai kuasa bagi membincangkan tingkah laku Badan Kehakiman dan sebarang percubaan berbuat demikian melanggar perkara 127 Perlembagaan. Ia harus menjadi jelas bahawa tiada sebarang penekanan luar diberikan terhadap Badan Kehakiman, sama ada dari pihak exekutif mahupun daripada sumber lain, termasuk dari Majlis Peguam (lihat perenggan-perenggan 57, 59, 63). (5) Sekiranya seseorang plaintif dapat menunjukkan bahawa beliau mempunyai locus membuat sesuatu permohonan, dan jika beliau juga dapat menunjukkan bahawa tindakan yang diambil defendan akan membuka plaintif kepada pendakwaan yang mungkin dikenakan ke atas defendan sekiranya defendan dibenarkan terus bertindak, maka plaintif itu tidak perlu menunggu melihat

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 47

akibat tindakan defendan sebelum bertindak. Bagi memelihara hak sendirinya seseorang plaintif dapat memohon perintah injunksi menahan defendan dari bertindak dan, sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang diadu itu mungkin menyebabkan plaintif didakwa, maka plaintif harus dibenarkan menggunakan perintah injunksi bagi menahan defendan. Oleh yang demikian, hujah bahawa sekiranya plaintif tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, beliau tidak dapat didakwa atau hukum dan beliau dapat membuat keputusan tidak menghadiri mesyuarat itu, tidak dapat diterima (lihat perenggan-perenggan 71, 82); Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors & Other Appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 dibezakan, Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 diikut. (6) Dalam membuat ketetapan usul seperti dinyatakan, pihak awam tidak memerlukan sebarang nasihat, pertolongan atau representasi undang-undang. Lagipun Majlis Peguam gagal menunjukkan bahagian mana antara orang awam yang ingin mereka melindungi. Tindakan mereka mencadangkan resolusi itu dan memanggilkan mesyuarat baginya kedua-duanya ultra vires APU (lihat perenggan-perenggan 81–82); Swain & Anor v The Law Society [1983] AC 598 dirujuk, Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] LR 435 dirujuk.]

Notes For cases on the remedy of declaration, see 1 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 321–382. For cases on jurisdiction of courts, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 3670–3672. For cases on locus standi, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reisue) paras 3924–3981. For cases on the Judiciary, see 3 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 1660. For cases on the powers of the Law Society/Malaysian Bar, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) para 1585. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 48

Cases referred to Airport Restaurants, Ltd v Southend-On-Sea Corporation [1960] 2 All ER 888 (refd) Aswini Kumar v Arabina Bose & Anor AIR 1953 SC 75 (folld) Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 (refd) Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman & Ors [1987] 2 MLJ 633 (refd) C Ravichandran Iyer v Justice AM Bhattacharjee & Ors [1995] 5 SCC 457 (refd) Crown, The v A Rafique & Others 1950 37 AIR 1 (refd) Gallagher v Durack (1983) 57 ALJR 191 (folld) Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1977] 3 All ER 70 (refd) Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 (refd) Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors and other appeals [1997] 3 MLJ 23 (dist) Land Executive Committee of Federal Territory v Syarikat Harper Gilfillan Bhd [1981] 1 MLJ 234 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & 2 Lagi v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–47–00 dan Rayuan Sivil No W–02–48–00 (refd) Majlis Peguam Malaysia & Ors v Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan [2002] 3 MLJ 155 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 1 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 472 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 3) [2001] 5 MLJ 305 (refd) Raja Segaran a/l S Krishnan v Bar Council Malaysia & Ors (No 4) [2001] 6 MLJ 166 (refd) Swain and another v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 49

Tengku Jaffar bin Tengku Ahmad v Karpal Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 156 (folld)

Legislation referred to Commissions of Enquiry Act [UK]1950 s 2(1)(d) Constitution [India] art 32 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 43 Evidence Act 1950 ss 123, 162(2) Federal Constitution arts 125(3), 127 Landlord and Tenant Act [UK] 1954 Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 32(d), 42(1), (a), (d), (e), (g), 46, 76(2) Post Office Act 1953 [UK] ss 38, 68 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33, r 2 Sedition Act 1948 ss 3(1)(a), (c), 4(1)(a) Solicitors Act 1974 [UK] s 37 Solicitors’ Indemnity Rules 1975 [UK] Telegraph Act 1863 [UK] s 45

DP Vijandran (Raja Segaran & Assoc) for the plaintiff. YM Raja Aziz Addruse (Malik Imtiaz Ahmed bin Ghulam Sarwar, Gopal Sreenevasan, D Bhaskaran, Karina Yong, M Mogan and Michele N Kaur with him) (Sivananthan) for the defendants. Ahmad Kamal bin Mohd Shahid holding a watching brief for Attorney General.

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[2004] 3 MLJ 140

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 50

HUSSIN MOHD ALI v HO KAY TAT & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S6–22–38 OF 2001 AZMEL J 31 DECEMBER 2003

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Newspaper articles — Whether publication of articles defamed plaintiff — Whether defence of fair comment proved — Whether words complained of were comments — Whether of public importance — Whether based on proven facts

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages including aggravated and/or exemplary damages, as well as for injunction and costs for libel contained in two articles published by the defendants in the daily newspaper, The Sun. At the material time, the plaintiff was the general manager of Sepang International Circuit Sdn Bhd (‘SIC’). The second defendant was the owner and publisher of The Sun and the first defendant, the editor-in-chief. It was the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants had defamed him by the publication of the said two articles. The construction of the Sepang International Circuit was the venue for Malaysia’s motorsports, the first success being the Formula One Race whereby SIC was awarded the best organizers. However, the subsequent two events that it conducted did not appear to be as successful as the event of the Formula One Race and it was extensively criticized by the newspapers. It was contended by the plaintiff that with the publication of the said articles in The Sun, the defendants had falsely and maliciously written, printed and published words which were defamatory against the plaintiff as there was a natural implication of the first article that the plaintiff as the general manager of the SIC was responsible for the three problems described in the first article and that he was incompetent to hold office as the general manager of the SIC. The defendants argued that the plaintiff as the general manager was to be accountable for the problems, and not that he was personally be blamed for them. Further, there was no suggestion or inference that the plaintiff was incompetent. Being held accountable would not be the same as being incompetent.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 51

Further, the three problems reported in the first article did occur and the replacement of the plaintiff as general manager did take place. Therefore, the defendants were justified to make such comments. Apart from that, the defendants also pleaded defence of fair comment on matters of public importance.

Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claims with costs: (1) The defence of fair comment on a matter of public importance consists of four elements, namely: (i) the words complained of are comments, although it may consist or include inference of facts; (ii) the comment is a matter of public importance; (iii) the comment is based on facts; and (iv) the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved (see para 17). (2) Regarding the first element, the gist of the plaintiff’s complaint was not about the words actually used but the natural and ordinary meaning of the articles read as a whole. Opinions and also inference or deduction of facts can amount to a comment. The implications that the plaintiff ||Page 141>> complained of were clearly comments in the sense of being inferences of opinion or conclusion drawn from those facts. They contained the defendant’s belief or conclusion based on or drawn from the established facts (see paras 18-19). (3) As to the second element, there was no doubt that the SIC and the position of the plaintiff was a matter of public importance. Events that were held in the SIC attracted public interest not only locally but also internationally. Even the Prime Minister had shown great interest in SIC and had attended some of the events held there (see para 20). (4) Referring to the third element, the plaintiff had not disputed the material allegation of facts in the said articles. As such, the comments made by the defendants were based on actual facts (see para 22). (5) There were no denials to the truth of the existence of the three problems of SIC. The plaintiff was responsible for incidents occurring in SIC. It would not be unreasonable to comment that the plaintiff should be held accountable for

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 52

the said problems. Therefore, based on the facts, comments made by the defendants were honest and in absence of malice. If the facts had been inaccurately published, it was mainly due to the unwillingness of the plaintiff and the staff of SIC to give the relevant information sought by the defendant. Thus, the defendant had succeeded in establishing a defence of fair comment on a matter of public importance (see paras 25-26).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah menyaman defendan-defendan untuk ganti rugi termasuklah ganti rugi teruk dan/atau teladan, dan juga untuk injunksi dan kos untuk libel yang terkandung dalam dua artikel yang diterbitkan oleh defendan-defendan dalam akhbar harian, The Sun. Pada masa matan, plaintif adalah pengrus besar Sepang International Circuit Sdn Bhd (‘SIC’). Defendan kedua adalah pemilik dan penerbit The Sun dan defendan pertama, ketua editor. Adalah dakwaan plaintif bahawa defendan-defendan telah memfitnah beliau dengan penerbitan dua artikel tersebut. Pembinaan Sepang International Circuit adalah tempat untuk sukan motor Malaysia, yang pertama berlangsung dengan jayanya iaitu Formula One Race di mana SIC telah diawardkan sebagai penganjur terbaik. Namun begitu, dua perlumbaan berikutnya yang berlangsung tidaklah begitu berjaya seperti perlumbaan Formula One Race dan ia telah dikritik dengan meluas di akhbar-akhbar. Adalah hujah plaintif bahawa dengan penerbitan artikel-artikel tersebut dalam The Sun, defendan-defendan telah secara tipu dan niat jahat menulis, mencetak dan menerbit perkataan-perkataan yang berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif kerana terdapat implikasi semula jadi berdasarkan artikel pertama bahawa plaintif sebagai pengurus besar SIC adalah bertanggungjawab untuk tiga permasalahan yang dibentangkan dalam artikel pertama dan bahaw beliau adalah tidak kompeten untuk memegang jawatan sebagai pengurus besar SIC. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa plaintif sebagai pengurus besar adalah bertanggungjawab terhadap masalah-masalah tersebut, dan beliau tidaklah dipersalahkan secara peribadi untuk ||Page 142>> masalah-masalah tersebut. Tambahan pula, tiada cadangan atau inferens bahawa plaintif adalah tidak kompeten. Untuk menjadikan seseorang itu

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 53

bertanggunjawab tidak sama seperti menjadikannya tidak kompeten. Tambahan pula, ketiga-tiga masalah yang dilaporkan dalam artikel pertama memang berlaku dan pengganti plaintif sebagai pengurus besar memang wujud. Oleh itu, defendan-defendan dijustifikasikan untuk membuat komen sedemikian. Selain daripada itu, defendan-defendan juga memplidkan pembelaan komen berpatutan berhubung perkara-perkara kepentingan awam.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Pembelaan komen berpatutan mengandungi empat elemen, iaitu: (i) perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan adalah komen-komen, walaupun ia mengandungi atau termasuklah inferens fakta; (ii) komen tersebut adalah perkara kepentingan awam; (iii) komen tersebut adalah berdasarkan fakta; dan (iv) komen tersebut adalah di mana seorang yang waras boleh dengan jujur buat berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 17). (2) Berhubung elemen pertama, inti pati aduan plaintif bukanlah mengenai perkataan-perkataan sebenar yang digunakan tetapi maksud semula jadi dan biasa artikel-artikel tersebut bila dibaca secara keseluruhan. Pendapat dan juga inferens atau pemotongan fakta-fakta boleh menbentuk satu komen. Implikasi-implikasi yang plaintif adukan dengan jelas merupakan komen-komen dalam erti kata ianya merupakan inferens pendapat atau kesimpulan yang diperolehi daripada fakta-fakta tersebut. Ia mengandungi kepercayaan atau kesimpulan defendan berdasarkan atau didapati daripada fakta-fakta yang telah dibuktikan (lihat perenggan 18-19). (3) Berhubung elemen kedua, tiada keraguan bahawa SIC dan kedudukan plaintif adalah perkara kepentingan awam. Perlumbaan-perlumbaan yang berlangsung di SIC telah menarik kepentingan awam bukan sahaja secara tempatan tetapi juga antarabangsa. Perdana Menteri juga telah menunjukkan minat dalam SIC dan telah menghadiri beberapa perlumbaan yang berlangsung di sana (lihat perenggan 20). (4) Behubung elemen ketiga, plaintif tidak dipertikaikan tentang pengataaan material fakta-fakta dalam artikel-artikel tersebut. Oleh itu, komen-komen yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan adalah berdasarkan fakta-fakta sebenar (lihat

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 54

perenggan 22). (5) Tiada penafian tentang kebenaran wujudnya tiga masalah SIC tersebut. Plaintif adalah bertanggungjawab untuk kejadian-kejadian yang berlaku di SIC. Bukanlah tidak munasabah untuk membuat komen-komen bahawa plaintif patut dipertanggungjawabkan untuk masalah-masalah tersebut. Oleh itu, berdasarkan fakta-fakta, komen-komen yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan adalah dan berniat jahat. Jika terdapat ketidaktepatan dalam fakta-fakta yang diterbitkan ia dilakukan terutamanya disebabkan keengganan plaintif dan pekerja SIC untuk memberikan maklumat relevan yang diminta oleh defendan. Oleh itu, defendan telah berjaya membuktikan terdapat satu pembelaan komen berpatutan berhubung perkara kepentingan awam (lihat perenggan 25-26).] ||Page 143>>

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For libel generally, 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113].

Cases referred to Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 WLR 1109 (refd) Silkin v Beaverbrook [1958] 2 All ER 516 (refd)

Chan Tse Yuen (Ronnie Wong Chun Yiam and Haniza Abdul Rani with him) (Chan Tse Yuen & Co) for the plaintiff. N Nadkarni (Azman Thaiyub Khan with him) (Lee Hishammuddin) for the defendants.

[2004] 5 MLJ 377 ABU SAMAH BIN OMAR v ZAINAL BIN MONTEL

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 55

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 11–30 OF 2001 LOW HOP BING J 4 NOVEMBER 2003

Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Statements made in police report — Whether qualified privilege — Whether in compliance with drafting requirements in pleading libel

This is an appeal by the appellant/defendant (‘the defendant’) against the decision of the learned magistrate who found the defendant liable in libel against the plaintiff and awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM8,000 as damages, and a further sum of RM1,000 as exemplary damages. The basis of the libel claim was on a police report made by the plaintiff against the defendant who was appointed to carry out demolition and construction works in the plaintiff’s house, after money and jewellery were found to be missing. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s statement of claim has failed to comply with the drafting requirements in pleading libel to establish the tort of libel against the defendant, and that the learned magistrate has erred in law in holding that the defence of qualified privilege did not apply.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The tort of defamation, ie libel and slander requires a special treatment in so far as the drafting of the pleading is concerned, in particular the plaintiff’s statement of claim. The draftsman of the plaintiff’s statement of claim has pleaded ‘bilik tidak diselang’ (the room was not intervened (or interposed)) when the police report stated ‘bilik tidak diselongkar’ (the room was not rummaged). In any event, it has fallen short of the requirement of drafting the statement of claim for the tort of libel as it was not what the defendant has stated in his police report (see paras 7, 9 and 10). (2) In relation to the police report lodged by the defendant, neither the plaintiff’s fundamentally flawed statement of claim nor his oral evidence has ever identified which particular words therein are defamatory of him or has

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 56

contained any defamatory imputation against him, since the actual words in the police report have never been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff in his statement of claim. The learned magistrate did not appear to have considered this fundamental flaw in the plaintiffs statement of claim (see para 15). (3) Since the plaintiff’s statement of claim did not plead the actual words used in the police report, it is impossible for the learned magistrate to come to a specific finding as to which defamatory words or defamatory imputations were published of and concerning the plaintiff (see para 17). (4) The plaintiff’s statement of claim merely stated that the defendant has made a police report but did not plead to whom the alleged libel has been published. No police personnel has been called by the plaintiff to prove this essential issue of publication to a third party (see para 19). ||Page 378>> (5) The learned magistrate has erred in failing to apply the defence of qualified privilege as the plaintiff was unable to adduce any evidence of malice on the part of the defendant and indeed the learned magistrate has come to a specific finding that there was no malice on the part of the defendant (see para 23).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah rayuan daripada perayu/defendan (‘defendan’) terhadap keputusan majistret yang arif yang telah mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab di dalam libel terhadap plaintif dan mengawardkan jumlah RM8,000 sebagai ganti rugi dan jumlah selanjut RM1,000 sebagai ganti rugi teladan. Dasar tuntutan libel adalah laporan polis yang dibuat oleh plaintif terhadap defendan yang telah dilantik untuk melaksanakan kerja-kerja perobohan dan pembinaan di dalam rumah plaintif, selepas wang dan barangan kemas telah didapati hilang. Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa penyataan tuntutan plaintif telah gagal mematuhi peruntukan-peruntukan draf di dalam merayu untuk libel untuk mendirikan tort libel terhadap defendan dan bahawa majistret yang arif telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang di dalam memutuskan bahawa pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat tidak terpakai.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 57

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: (1) Tort fitnah iaitu libel dan slander memerlukan perlakuan yang khas di mana pendrafan pliding berkenaan, khususnya penyataan tuntutan plaintif. Pendraf penyataan tuntutan plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa bilik tidak diselang apabila laporan polis menyatakan bilik tidak diselongkar. Walau bagaimanapun, ia tidak mematuhi peruntukan untuk mendraf penyataan tuntutan itu untuk tort libel kerana ia bukan apa yang defendan menyatakan di dalam laporan polis (lihat perenggan-perenggan 7, 9 dan 10). (2) Berkenaan laporan polis yang dibuat oleh defendan, penyataan tuntutan plaintif yang cacat pada dasarnya ataupun keterangan lisannya tidak mengenalpasti perkataan-perkataan yang khusus yang memfitnahkannya atau mempunyai kaitan fitnah terhadapnya, memandangkan bahawa perktaan-perkataan sebenarnya tidak diplidkan oleh plaintif di dalam penyataan tuntutannya. Majistret yang arif seakan-akan tidak mempertimbangkan kecacatan dasar di dalam penyataan tuntutan plaintif (lihat perenggan 15). (3) Memandangkan bahawa penyataan tuntutan plaintif tidak memplidkan perkataan-perkataan sebenarnya yang digunakan di dalam laporan polis, ia tidak mungkin untuk majistret memutuskan secara khusus perkataan-perkataan fitnah atau kaitan-kaitan fitnah yang mana yang diterbitkan atau berkait plaintif (lihat perenggan 17). (4) Penyataan tuntutan plaintif hanya menyatakan bahawa defendan telah membuat laporan polis tetapi tidak memplid kepada siapa libel yang dikatakan itu diterbitkan. Tiada polis yang dipanggil oleh plaintif untuk membuktikan isu penting terbitan ke parti ketiga (lihat perenggan 19). ||Page 379>> (5) Majistret yang arif telah khilaf di dalam gagal memakai pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat memandangkan plaintif tidak menunjukkan apa-apa keterangan niat jahat pada defendan dan majistret yang arif telah memutuskan secara khusus bahawa tiada niat jahat pada defendan (lihat perenggan 23).]

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 58

Notes For cases on qualified privilege, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 473-479. For qualified privilege, see 2 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, paras [30.108]– [30.127].

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Hebditch v MacIlwaine [1894] 2 QB 54 (refd) Hoe Thean Sun & Anor v Lim Tee Keng [1999] 3 MLJ 138 (refd) Hough v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 2 KB 507 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management, United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 32 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 PC (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies & Ors [1989] 1 SLR 1063 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (refd) Murugason v The Straits Times Press [1975] Ltd [1984–1985] 1 SLR 334 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 1 CLJ 771, [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) SB Palmer v AS Rajah & Ors [1949] MLJ 6 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd) Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635 (refd) Yussoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 58 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 59

Appeal from Summons No 73–123 of 1998) (Magistrate’s Court, Melaka)

P Vanaja Dewi (A Rengganathan & Co) for the defendant.

[2004] 5 MLJ 573 PUNEET KUMAR v MEDICAL CENTRE JOHORE SDN BHD

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–243 OF 1995 ABDUL KADIR MUSA J 7 APRIL 2004

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Qualified privilege — Whether occasion of publishing to persons who took down letter, who transcribed it on typewriter and who filed and dealt privilege occasion

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Qualified privilege — Whether publishing by and to people carrying out legal or moral duty covered by qualified privilege

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Allegation that plaintiff’s conduct was improper and unbecoming of a consultant surgeon — Test applicable

Labour Law — Employment — Termination of employment — Visiting consultant surgeon — Wrongful termination — Total failure of consideration of team work — Whether termination justified

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant alleging: (i) he was wrongly terminated by the defendant by their letter dated 7 August 1995 from carrying on the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 60

duty of a visiting consultant at the defendant’s specialist centre in spite of the fact that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was extended till 31 March 1996; and (ii) by the reason of certain words used in the said letter, he was defamed having regard to his status as a specialist. The defendant’s defence was that the publishing occasion of the defamatory words caught by qualified privilege and the termination was justified as the plaintiff’s action was total failure of team work.

Held, dismissing plaintiff’s claim: (1) Based on decided cases consideration must be given to: (i) under what circumstances the alleged defamatory words were published?; (ii) to whom the statement with those alleged defamatory words communicated and or circulated?; and (iii) whether the said statement was published, communicated and or circulated in good faith or otherwise, must be looked into by the court where the defence of qualified privilege was put up (see paras 12–13). (2) The dictation to typist and the handing to the printer was the accepted mode of writing the documents. The occasion (publishing to persons who took down the letter, who transcribed it on the typewriter and who filed and dealt) was, thereof, privileged (see para 22). (3) A privileged occasion is, in reference to qualified privilege, an occasion where the person who makes the communication has the interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, make to the person[s] to whom it is made and those person[s] to whom it is so made have a similar and corresponding interest or duty to receive it. The maker of the letter was certainly under a legal and moral duty to communicate the letter to the ||Page 574>> four persons referred to by the plaintiff and they similarly have corresponding duty to receive (see paras 28–29). (4) None of the relevant medical staff which formed the ‘team’ on the material date was willing to work with plaintiff anymore thereafter as a result of his conduct on that day. That similar stand of ‘other medical staff’ must have propelled the defendants to conclude that there was a ‘total failure of consideration of team work’ ‘so essential to the very existence of guarding the ‘best interest of the patients. The termination was not only justified but was also well within the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 61

defendants legal right to do so (see paras 64–65).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan mendakwa: (i) beliau telah ditamatkan secara salah oleh defendan melalui surat mereka bertarikh 7 Ogos 1995 dari menjalankan tanggungjawabnya sebagai konsultan yang mengunjungi di pusat pakar defendan walaupun kontrak di antara plaintif dan defendan telah dilanjutkan sehingga 31 Mac 1996; dan (ii) kerana beberapa perkataan yang digunakan di dalam surat tersebut, beliau telah difitnah mengambilkira statusnya sebagai seorang pakar. Pembelaan defendan adalah penerbitan perkataan berfitnah tersebut adalah dilindungi oleh perlindungan bersyarat dan penamatan tersebut adalah adil kerana tindakan plaintif adalah kegagalan kerjasama sepasukan.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: (1) Berdasarkan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan, pertimbangan harus diberi kepada: (i) dalam keadaan apa perkataan fitnah yang dituduh diterbitkan?; (ii) kepada siapa perkataan fitnah tersebut dikomunikasikan dan atau disebarkan?; dan (iii) sama ada penyataan tersebut diterbitkan, komunikasikan, disebarkan dengan niat baik atau sebaliknya; harus diteliti oleh mahkamah bila pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat dikemukakan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 12–13). (2) Makluman pada jurutaip dan pemberian kepada pencetak adalah cara menulis dokumen yang diterima. Keadaan tersebut (menerbit kepada orang yang mencatit surat tersebut, orang yang menaip dengan mesin taip dan orang yang memfailkan dan berurus) adalah dilindung (lihat perenggan 22). (3) Keadaan yang terlindung merujuk kepada perlindungan bersyarat adalah keadaan di mana orang yang membuat komunikasi tersebut mempunyai hak atau tanggungjawab, undang-undang, sosial atau moral membuat kepada orang yang ditujukan dan orang tersebut mempunyai kepentingan atau tanggungjawab yang sama untuk menerimanya. Orang yang membuat surat ini sudah tentu mempunyai tanggungjawab undang-undang dan moral untuk menghantar surat

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 62

tersebut kepada empat orang yang dirujuk oleh plaintif dan mereka mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk menerimanya (lihat perenggan-perenggan 28–29). ||Page 575>> (4) Tiada seorang pekerja perubatan yang terdiri dari ‘pasukan tersebut’ pada tarikh yang material sudi untuk bekerja dengan plaintif selepas itu kerana kelakuan plaintif pada hari tersebut. Pendapat yang sama oleh pekerja perubatan yang lain membuat defendan untuk membuat kesimpulan bahawa terdapat kegagalan pertimbangan bekerja sekumpulan. Penamatan tersebut bukan sahaja adil tetapi adalah di bawah hak undang-undang defendan (lihat perenggan-perenggan 64–65).]

Notes For cases on defences in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 267–273. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on termination of employment, see 8(1) Mallal’s Digest (4 th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1070–1140. For defences in defamation, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.092]– [80.102]. For libel generally, see 5 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia paras [80.110]–[80.113]. For termination of employment, see 7 Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia (2003 Reissue) paras [120.080]–[120.089].

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Bryanston Finance Ltd & Ors v de Vries & Anor [1975] QB 703; [1975] 2 All ER 609 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 63

58 (refd) Horrocks v Lawe [1975] AC 135 (refd) John Lee & Anor v Henry Wong Jan Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Luk Kai Lam v Sim Ai Leng [1978] 1 MLJ 214 (refd) Lyndon v Yorkshire Regional Health Authority 10 BMLR 49 (refd) Osborn v Thomas Boulter & Son [1930] 2 KB 226 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Veitch v De Mornay (1805–1884) SS Vol 1 418 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 7(3)

P Suppiah (Suppiah & Co) for the plaintiff. Subayogan Sinniah, (Rita Elizabeth Iype with him) (Zainal Abidin & Co) for the defendant.

[2004] 6 MLJ 478 ABDUL MANAF BIN AHMAD v MOHD KAMIL DATUK MOHD KASIM

HIGH COURT (SANDAKAN) — SUIT NO T(22)16 OF 2001 LINTON ALBERT JC 26 AUGUST 2004

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 64

Civil Procedure — Action — Limitation period — When did cause of action accrue — Burden of proof — Whether onus on plaintiff to prove action commenced within time — Whether action statute-barred — Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3

Tort — Defamation — Proceedings — Action for defamation and malicious falsehood — Limitation period — Burden of proof — Whether onus on plaintiff to prove action commenced within time — Whether action statute-barred — Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3

The plaintiff and defendant were members of the Tawau Native Timber Co-operative Society (‘the Co-operative’. He sought damages for defamation against the defendant who had made a police report accusing the plaintiff of misappropriating moneys belonging to the Co-operative. The main issue before this court was whether his claim was beyond the limitation period as prescribed by the Sabah Limitation Ordinance (‘the Ordinance’).

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s action: (1) The onus is on the plaintiff to prove that his action for defamation and malicious falsehood occurred within the period set out in the Ordinance (see para 4). (2) The plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in 1987, when the words complained of were published at the time they were recorded in the police report and damages to the plaintiff ensued at the annual general meeting of the Co-operative on 23 August 1987. However, by commencing the action 16 years after the expiry of the limitation period, it was caught by s 3 of the Ordinance (see paras 8, 10 and 11).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif dan defendan merupakan ahli kepada Kesatuan Koperatif Kayu Balak Anak

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 65

Watan Tawau (‘Koperatif tersebut’). Dia menuntut ganti rugi untuk fitnah, terhadap defendan yang telah sebelum ini membuat aduan polis menuduh plaintif melesapkan wang Koperatif. Isu utama di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah sama ada tuntutannya berada di luar had masa seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Ordinan Hadmasa Sabah (‘Ordinan tersebut’)

Diputuskan, menolak tindakan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Beban bukti terletak pada plaintif untuk membuktikan bahawa tindakan fitnah dan kepalsuan niat jahat dimulakan dalam lingkungan had masa seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam Ordinan tersebut (lihat perenggan 4). ||Page 479>> (2) Kuasa tindakan plaintif terakru dalam tahun 1987, bila perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan terpapar semasa ia direkodkan di dalam aduan polis dan ganti rugi kepada plaintif terhasil pada perhimpunan umum tahunan Koperatif pada 23 Ogos 1987. Akan tetapi, dengan memulakan tindakan 16 tahun selepas penamatan tempoh had masa, ia dihalang oleh s 3 Ordinan tersebut ((lihat perenggan 8, 10 dan 11).]

Notes For cases on limitation, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 138–141. For cases on defamation proceedings, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 468–469.

Cases referred to Credit Coporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 (folld) Ong Ah Bee v Hii Chung Siong, Robin [1993] 1 CLJ 504 (folld) Wong Yoke Cheng & Ors v Lai Siew Wah Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [1998] MLJU 439 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 66

Legislation referred to Sabah Limitation Ordinance (Cap 72) s 3, Items 11, 12, 20 of Schedule

Alice Imelda Chin (Alice Imelda Chin) for the plaintiff. Mirdin Mamdin (Chin Mirdin and Co) for the defendant.

[2004] 7 MLJ 7 LAU YEONG NAN v LIFE PUBLISHER BERHAD & ORS

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — CIVIL SUIT NO MT1-22-123 OF 1997 SURIYADI J 1 OCTOBER 2004

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspapers — Aggravated damages — Special damages

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspapers — Whether wordings defamatory — Whether defence of fair comment available

This was the plaintiff’s defamation action against the defendants. The alleged defamation arose out of an article entitled ‘Praiseworthy Bravery’ published in the ‘New Life Post’ newspaper. The plaintiff had divided the alleged defamatory contents of the article into three portions. The article (translated from Chinese) contained the following ‘… There are not many local recording companies bosses who are so ‘generous’. The first album suffered losses. Maybe could give the second album a try. If the second album also suffered losses, may the singer please practise singing the song ‘Fen Fei Yen’ … Using a naked photograph on the album front cover is a taboo

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 67

in the musical circle in Malaysia. Later he revealed himself that that a rich woman approached him ‘to borrow his seeds’ to give birth to a child, a homosexual raped him etc ... Recently he even spread news that he would march into China market … His MTV new songs were aired in the Central Television Station. It is not known whether this matter is true or false? Alright, let it be true. But Mr Lau’s image and skill of singing still need ‘polishing’. If he is put out to win honour for his country hastily the Chinese who do not know the truth will think that he is most popular, most potential and has the most representation in Malaysia …’. According to the plaintiff’s pleadings, the above statements in their natural and ordinary meaning were meant to carry the message, inter alia, that the plaintiff was an unknown and a liar, incompetent to sing in the various media and that he was attempting to deceive the public that his music was heard by the world at large and had cheated the Chinese public in China. According to the plaintiff, the sum effect of the above malicious publication was that his character, credit and reputation as a prominent singer had been besmirched and destroyed and, as he has suffered seriously, he thus was entitled to damages. As regards damages, the plaintiff claimed that he had suffered pecuniary losses in the like of several concert contracts being terminated with a company called Sri Steps Sdn Bhd (‘Sri Steps’). The pecuniary loss allegedly suffered by the plaintiff pursuant to the cancellation of the agreement amounted to RM4.5 million. The eventual compensation sought was RM10 million, made up of general, special, aggravated and exemplary damages.

Held: (1) The court had to first arrive at a conclusion that the words complained of were defamatory. After that pronouncement, the law would then presume that they were false, whereupon the onus would shift to the ||Page 8>> defendant to prove justification, namely that those words were true (see para 14). (2) The defendants in their respective capacity did publish the libellous article and evidentially the person mentioned in the article was beyond any doubt the plaintiff. The article did not only identify the plaintiff by name but the defendants had also admitted that the words referred to the plaintiff by calling

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 68

evidence to that effect (see paras 22 and 37). (3) The article was capable of being defamatory. Any reader in the court selected group, after reading the article would naturally arrive at an opinion that not only was the plaintiff an untalented and unsuccessful singer who thrived on sympathy from recording companies but was also a liar, a homosexual, a sexually perverted person, a sodomised victim, someone no parent would want his or her child to emulate and someone who breached all rules of decency (see para 23). (4) To rebut the presumption that the article was false, in order to be entitled to the defence of fair comment, the defendants had attempted to adduce rebuttal evidence justifying the facts supplied in the article. In respect of the defendants’ statement in the article that the plaintiff had used a naked photograph on his album cover, the cover showed only the bared back of the plaintiff. With all the available evidence, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff never was proven to have posed naked during that impugned photography session. That being so, the defendants’ testimony as regards the naked factor on the album cover was far from the truth (see paras 30 and 31). (5) Another relevant point open to dispute was whether the plaintiff was raped at all. The article prepared by one Ms Lim Mee Fong, which was the very source supposedly reproduced by the defendants, merely stated that the plaintiff was sexually assaulted, an offence which was less demeaning or humiliating. Certainly the plaintiff was not raped (see paras 33 and 34). (6) The message relayed to the public in the article was that the plaintiff’s first album had suffered losses and that he was not a viable investment to any recording company. Despite that spirited statement, the defendants had failed to adduce any admissible evidence to rebut the presumption of falsity of the said facts. Accordingly, the defendants had not been successful in proving that: (a) the plaintiff was a bad and an unsuccessful singer; (b) the plaintiff’s albums had suffered losses; (c) the plaintiff had posed naked on the cover of one of his albums; and (d) the plaintiff was raped (see paras 35 and 36). (7) The defence of fair comment related to matters of public interest. Any person who filled a public position rendered himself to scrutiny and public discussion,

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 69

and if any of his public acts, which were of public interest, were improper or wrong, he must accept fair criticism from the critical public. This right of fair comment was subject to certain principles, namely, the words complained of must be fair and were bona fide comments and of public interest, and the statements must be true. Even though comments based on untrue facts may be frowned upon, a ||Page 9>> plea of fair comment would not necessarily fail merely on some minor but inaccurate fact made public. In the instant case, the false facts not only were substantial and highly important but effortlessly recognisable as being the heart and soul of the libellous article. With such a failure by the defendants to establish factually the contents of the libellous article, the defendants had thus failed to rebut the presumption of falsity of facts and thus must be denied the legal right to rely on the defence of fair comment (see paras 38, 39, 41 and 42). (8) The negative picture painted by the defendants had clearly stunted the plaintiff’s career growth when contracts suddenly begin to dry up or executed contracts were terminated or not extended. Since the libellous attacks were sarcastic, withering, demeaning, scandalous and outright false and showed how heartless and unfair the defendants were, the court was entitled to award aggravated damages. The unforgiving behaviour of the defendants, which apart from damaging the reputation of the plaintiff, had humiliated him and in the process practically caused mental stress to him. Accordingly, an award of RM300,000 for general and aggravated damages was a fair sum in the circumstances of the case (see para 48, 49 and 51). (9) As for special damages, although the plaintiff had alleged that contracts had dried up and that he was suffering financial setbacks, the plaintiff did not make any attempts to prove those losses except for the termination of a contract with Sri Steps. Despite the oral testimony of Sri Step’s director, supported by a documented agreement, the plaintiff had not succeeded in proving this loss satisfactorily on a balance of probabilities. Although the statement of claim was filed on 24 April 1997, the supposed contract with Sri Steps (signed on 20 December 1996) was only included in the pleadings after an amendment had

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 70

been made on 26 April 1998. This development was certainly unusual as several negative interpretations can unfold from that, such as it being an afterthought and thus a sham contract. Further, at the time of the supposed execution of the contract with Sri Steps, the plaintiff had already signed a contract with another company (‘Layar Opera’). This agreement with Layar Opera stipulated that the plaintiff was not to appear or perform in any motion picture, stage plays, television features or radio programmes of any kind without the producer’s prior written consent. Written consent was not obtained from Layar Opera. The plaintiff was a singer by profession, yet Sri Step’s principal activity, as reflected in its director’s report was ‘educating and promoting dancing and arts’. Having considered all the evidence of inactivity and unreasonableness of the Sri Steps agreement, the plaintiff’s claim for special damages was accordingly rejected (see paras 52–54 and 57).

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini merupakan tindakan plaintif untuk fitnah terhadap defendan-defendan. Fitnah yang dikatakan timbul daripada satu artikel yang bertajuk ||Page 10>> ‘Praiseworthy Bravery’ yang diterbitkan di dalam suratkhabar’ New Life Post’. Plaintif telah membahagikan kandungan-kandungan fitnah artikel itu kepada tiga bahagian. Artikel (yang diterjemahkan daripada Bahasa Cina) mengandungi yang berikut: ‘... There are not many local recording companies bosses who are so ‘generous’. The first album suffered losses. Maybe could give the second album a try. If the album also suffered losses, may the singer please practise singing the song ‘Fen Fei Yen’ ... Using a naked photograph on the album front cover is a taboo in the musical circle in Malaysia. Later he revealed himself that a rich woman recently approached him ‘to borrow his seeds’ to give birth to a child, a homosexual raped him etc ... Recently he even spread news that he would march into China market ... His MTV new songs were aired in the Central Television Station. It is not known whether this matter is true or false? Alright, let it be true. But Mr Lau’s image and skill of singing still need ‘polishing’. If he is most popular, most potential and has the most representation in Malaysia...’ Mengikut pliding plaintif, penyataan-penyataan seperti di

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 71

atas di dalam maksud biasa mereka adalah bahawa, inter alia, plaintif adalah seorang yang tidak terkenal dan penipu, tidak berbakat menyanyi di dalam media dan beliau mencuba memperdayakan orang awam bahawa muzik beliau didengar oleh dunia dan beliau telah memperdayakan orang awam di China. Mengikut plaintif, kesan keseluruhan terbitan niat jahat adalah bahawa peribadi, kebolehpercayaan dan nama baik beliau sebagai seorang penyanyi yang terkenal telah dicemarkan dan dihancurkan dan beliau telah menderita dan berhak kepada ganti rugi. Berkait dengan ganti rugi, plaintif berkata bahawa beliau mengalami kerugian kewangan seperti beberapa kontrak konsert beliau ditamatkan dengan syarikat bernama Sri Steps dn Bhd (‘Sri Steps’). Kerugian kewangan yang dikatakan dialami oleh plaintif menurut penamatan kontrak berjumlah RM4.5j. Pampasan yang dituntut adalah RM10j, iaitu ganti rugi am, khas, teruk dan teladan.

Diputuskan: (1) Mahkamah perlu membuat kesimpulan bahawa perkataan yang diadu adalah fitnah. Setelah itu, undang-undang akan menganggap perkataan-perkataan itu palsu, di mana beban akan memindah kepada defendan untuk membuktikan justifikasi, iaitu perkataan itu adalah benar (lihat perenggan 14). (2) Defendan-defendan di dalam tugas mereka telah menerbitkan artikel berlibel itu dan di sisi keterangan orang yang dikatakan di dalam artikel itu melebihi keraguan adalah plaintif. Artikel itu bukan sahaja mengecamkan plaintif dengan nama beliau tetapi defendan-defendan telah mengaku bahawa perkataan-perkataan itu merujuk kepada plaintif dengan memanggil keterangan mengenai itu (lihat perenggan 22 dan 37). (3) Artikel itu boleh dikatakan fitnah. Sebarang pembaca daripada kumpulan yang dipilih oleh mahkamah, setelah membaca artikel itu akan membuat kesimpulan bahawa plaintif adalah seorang penyanyi ||Page 11>> yang tidak berbakat dan tidak berjaya yang bergantung kepada belas kasihan syarikat rekod dan seorang penipu, homoseks, seorang penyumbaleweng, seorang mangsa yang telah diliwat, seorang yang ibubapa-ibubapa tidak hendak kanak-kanak mereka mengikut jejak orang itu dan seorang yang melanggar semua aturan kesopanan (lihat perenggan 23).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 72

(4) Untuk mematahkan anggapan bahawa artikel itu palsu, untuk berhak kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan, defendan-defendan telah cuba mengemukakan keterangan pematahan yang menjustifikasikan fakta-fakta di dalam artikel itu. Berkait dengan penyataan defendan-defendan di dalam artikel itu bahawa plaintif telah menggunakan foto bogel pada penutup album beliau, penutup itu hanya menunjukkan bahagian belakang terdedah plaintif itu. Dengan segala keterangan yang sedia ada, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa plaintif tidak dibuktikan bergaya bogel semasa sesi mengambil foto. Oleh itu, testimoni defendan-defendan berkait dengan faktor bogel pada penutup album adalah tidak benar (lihat perenggan 30 dan 31). (5) Satu lagi fakta penting adalah sama ada plaintif dirogol. Artikel yang disediakan oleh Ms Lim Mee Fong yang mendapat sumbernya dari defendan telah menyatakan bahawa plaintif telah dieksploit secara seksual, satu kejadian yang memalukan. Plaintif sememangnya tidak dirogol (lihat perenggan 33 dan 34). (6) Apa yang telah dikemukakan kepada masyarakat dalam artikel tersebut adalah bahawa album pertama plaintif telah mengalami kerugian dan beliau tidak memberi sebarang manfaat terhadap syarikat rakaman beliau. Walaupun kenyataan ini agak kasar defendan tidak berjaya memberikan sebarang bukti terhadap ketidaksahihan fakta tersebut. Defendan juga gagal membuktikan bahawa: (a) plaintif adalah seorang yang berkelakuan buruk dan penyanyi yang teruk; (b) album plaintif mengalami kerugian; (c) plaintif telah merakamkan gambarnya muka albumnya dalam keadaan bogel dan (d) plaintif telah dirogol (lihat perenggan 35 dan 36). (7) Pembelaan komen berpatutan yang digunakan itu berdasarkan kepentingan masyarakat. Individu yang menjadi tumpuan masyarakat akan mendapati dirinya diteliti dan dibincang oleh masyarakat dan jika kelakuan individu tersebut adalah salah atau tidak berpatutan maka beliau mesti menerima kritis yang adil dari masyarakat. Ini adalah hak pembelaan komen dan tertakluk kepada beberapa prinsip, iaitu kenyataan yang dikomen mestilah adil dan bona fide dan untuk kepentingan masyarakat. Walaupun komen tersebut berdasarkan fakta yang tidak benar, komen ini tidak akan berjaya jika kenyataan itu hanya kecil dan dinyatakan kepada masyarakat. Dalam kes ini fakta palsu yang dibuat

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 73

agak substantif dan merupakan nadi kepada artikel yang libel. Defendan juga gagal membuktikan kepalsuan fakta tersebut dan tidak patut diberi pembelaan komen berpatutan (lihat perenggan 38, 39, 41 dan 42). ||Page 12>> (8) Gambaran negatif yang ditonjolkan oleh defendan itu telah mencemar kerjaya plaintif apabila tiada kontrak baru dan kontrak yang lama telah dibatalkan. Komen-komen libel itu merupakan sindiran, skandal yang memeranjatkan, merendahkan martabat palsu dan memalukan plaintif serta menunjukkan bahawa defendan tidak berhati perut dan telah memalukan plaintif dan mengakibatkan tekanan mental terhadap plaintif. Maka mahkamah memberikan ganti rugi terhadap plaintif yang berjumlah sebanyak RM300,000. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ganti rugi ini adil dalam keadaan kes ini (lihat perenggan 49 dan 51). (9) Bagi ganti rugi khas, walaupun plaintif mendakwa bahawa tiada tawaran baru dan plaintif mempunyai masalah kewangan, plaintif tidak dapat membuktikan dakwaan ini. Beliau cuma menunjukkan kontrak Sri Steps yang telah dibatalkan. Dalam keterangan lisan pengarah urusan Sri Steps dan bukti dokumen plaintif tidak berjaya menunjukkan kerugiannya secara memuaskan. Walaupun penyata tuntutan difailkan pada 24 April 1997 kontrak dengan Sri Steps (ditandatangani pada 20 Disember 1996) dimasukkan dalam pliding selepas pembetulan dibuat pada 26 April 1998. perkembangan ini agak luar biasa dan terdapat beberapa implikasi negatif terhadap isu ini seperti kontrak ini tidak tepat dan merupakan satu penipuan. Pada masa kontrak ini patut ditandatangani, plaintif telah pun menandatangani kontrak dengan syarikat lain iaitu Layar Opera. Terma Syarikat Layar Opera ini adalah bahawa plaintif tidak boleh muncul untuk filem, televisyen, radio tanpa kebenaran bertulis dari produser. Kebenaran bertulis ini tidak diperolehi dari Layar Opera. Plaintif adalah seorang penyanyi dan aktiviti Sri Steps adalah untuk mempromosikan tarian dan seni. Setelah meneliti kesemua bukti ini dalam perjanjian Sri Steps permohonan plaintif untuk kerugian khas ditolak (lihat perenggan 52–54 dan 57).]

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 74

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263-352.

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenwasagam [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) Boardway Approvals Ltd v Oldhams Press Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 423 (refd) Cargill v Carmichael & Anor [1883] 1 Ky 603 (Civ) (refd) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (refd) Clarence Wilfred v Tengku Adnan bin Tengku & Anor [1983] 1 CLJ 136 (refd) Coopers & Lybrand v Singapore Society of Accountants & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 134 (refd) Curtis v Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (Oriental) Inc [1931] SSLR 42 (refd) Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 (refd) ||Page 13>> London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (refd) Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746 (refd) McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 947 (refd) Mohd Onn bin Muda (Haji) v Saniboy Mohd Ismail [1998] 1 CLJ 569 (refd) Pang Fee Siong v Piong Kien Siong [1999] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Purshottam Vijay v State AIR 1961 MP 205 (refd) R Murugason v The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd [1984] 2 MLJ 10 (refd) R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36 (refd) Raghunath Singh v Mukandi Lal AIR 1936 ALL 780 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd)

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Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) SB Palmer v AS Rajah & Ors [1949] MLJ 6 (refd) Scott v Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 256 (refd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Yakub v Bre Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 393 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Picture Ltd [1934] TLR 581 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 Civil Law Act 1956 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78

M Manoharan Malayalam (M Manoharan & Co) and Mahadevi (Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the plaintiff Lorraine Cheah (MK Yee with her) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants

[2003] 1 MLJ 149 Krishnan Rajan a/l N Krishnan v Bank Negara Malaysia & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S5–23–36 OF 2001 ABDUL MALIK ISHAK J 16 NOVEMBER 2002

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 76

Civil Procedure — Preliminary issue — Application for issue or question raised in pleadings to be tried on preliminary basis — First defendant allegedly blacklisted plaintiff wrongfully pursuant to first defendant’s BMC Guidelines — Plaintiff sued defendants for defamation and negligence — Preliminary issue or question on whether BMC Guidelines were ultra vires and unlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 — Whether outcome of preliminary issue or question would result or substantially result in disposal of case — Whether there would be a substantial saving of expense and time — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 r 2

The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation and negligence arising out of an incident in which the first defendant was said to have wrongfully blacklisted the plaintiff under the first defendant’s ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework and Reporting Guidelines’ (‘BMC Guidelines’). The BMC Guidelines were issued by the first defendant pursuant to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (‘the Act’). This was the plaintiff’s application (in encl 16) for an issue or question raised in the pleadings of this suit to be tried on a preliminary basis under O 33 r 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on the grounds that it would save considerable time and costs. The issue or question to be tried was whether the BMC Guidelines were ultra vires and unlawful under s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act. Section 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act permitted the first defendant to establish a central bureau to collect information relating to the rejection by a paying bank of any cheque for reason of insufficient funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque and to disclose any such information to any bank for the purpose only of assisting the bank to assess the eligibility of the said drawer to maintain or open any current account with the bank. The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that s 30(1)(mmmm) of the Act cannot be construed so as to give powers to compulsorily blacklist a bad cheque offender. The first defendant’s contention was that this court should not invoke its discretionary powers under O 33 r 2 of the RHC since the determination of the preliminary issue or question would not substantially dispose of the cause or matter. This was because whether the BMC Guidelines were valid or otherwise, this court would still have to decide on the issue of whether the alleged maintenance of the blacklist amounted to a defamatory statement. Furthermore, transmission of information to the first defendant in the instant case was in coded form

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 77

and the question of whether there was publication can only be determined at the trial proper by way of viva voce evidence. In this regard, extrinsic evidence would be required to be adduced to ascertain whether or not the maintenance of the blacklist amounted to publication. ||Page 150>>

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s application: (1) Order 33 r 2 of the RHC conferred upon the court a wide discretionary power to order any question or issue in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter. An application under O 33 r 2 of the RHC was not appropriate where the facts were in dispute or where extrinsic evidence was required to be adduced. The overriding consideration to take into account was whether the application would result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure. In addition, the court should also be wary and warn itself against the abuse of this process (see p 154E–G). (2) Even if the court were to find the BMC Guidelines to be ultra vires, that outcome would not result or substantially result in the disposal of the case. The plaintiff’s actions for libel and negligence were distinct causes of action and independent of whether the BMC Guidelines were valid or otherwise. The disposal of the proposed question in encl 16 would not render the trial for the actions of libel and negligence unnecessary as this court must also determine whether the legal ingredients for the actions of libel and negligence had been satisfied. Accordingly, if this court were to try the preliminary point as framed in encl 16, there would not be a substantial saving of expense and time (see pp 167E–F, 168G–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk fitnah dan kecuaian yang timbul dari satu kejadian di mana defendan pertama dikatakan telah dengan salahnya menyenarai

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hitamkan plaintif di bawah ‘Biro Maklumat Cek Operational Framework and Reporting Guidelines’ (‘Garis Panduan BMC’) defendan pertama. Garis Panduan BMC dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama menurut Akta Bank Negara Malaysia 1958 (‘Akta tersebut’). Ini merupakan permohonan plaintif (dalam lampiran 16) agar suatu isu atau soalan dibangkitkan dalam pliding guaman ini untuk dibicarakan atas dasar permulaan di bawah A 33 k 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) atas alasan bahawa ia akan menjimatkan masa dan kos. Isu atau soalan yang harus dibicarakan ialah sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires dan menyalahi undang-undang di bawah s 30(1)(mmmm) Akta tersebut. Seksyen 30(1)(mmmm) Akta tersebut membenarkan defendan pertama supaya mewujudkan satu pusat biro untuk mengumpul maklumat berhubung dengan penolakan oleh satu bank pembayar atas mana-mana cek dengan alasan kekurangan wang dalam akaun pembayar cek dan untuk mendedahkan maklumat demikian kepada mana-mana bank untuk tujuan semata-mata membantu bank menilai keupayaan pembayar tersebut untuk mengekal atau membuka mana-mana akaun semasa dengan bank. Peguam plaintif berhujah bahawa maksud s 30(1)(mmmm) Akta ||Page 151>>tersebut tidak boleh ditafsir sehinggakan memberi kuasa untuk semestinya menyenarai hitamkan seorang pesalah cek tendang. Hujah defendan pertama adalah bahawa mahkamah ini tidak harus menggunakan kuasa berdasarkan budi bicara di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT oleh kerana penentuan isu atau soalan permulaan tidak akan menyelesaikan kausa atau perkara secara substantial. Ini adalah kerana sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya, mahkamah ini masih tetap harus memutuskan isu tentang sama ada pengekalan senarai hitam yang dikatakan membawa kepada satu pernyataan berfitnah. Tambahan pula, penyampaian maklumat kepada defendan pertama dalam kes ini adalah berbentuk kod dan soalan sama ada berlakunya terbitan hanya boleh diputuskan di perbicaraan sebenar melalui keterangan viva voce. Berhubung hal ini, keterangan luar perlu dikemukakan untuk menentukan sama ada pengekalan senarai hitam berjumlah kepada terbitan.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif: (1) Aturan 33 k 2 KMT memberikan mahkamah kuasa berdasarkan budi bicara yang luas untuk memutuskan sebarang soalan atau isu dalam satu kausa atau

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perkara, sama ada mengenai fakta atau undang-undang atau sebahagian fakta dan sebahagian undang-undang, untuk dibicarakan sebelum, semasa atau selepas perbicaraan sesuatu kausa atau perkara. Satu permohonan di bawah A 33 k 2 KMT tidak wajar bila mana fakta-fakta dipertikaikan atau di mana keterangan luar perlu dikemukakan. Timbangan paling utama untuk diambil kira adalah sama ada permohonan tersebut akan mengakibatkan penjimatan masa dan perbelanjaan yang substantial. Tambahan pula, mahkamah juga harus berwaspada dan berjaga-jaga terhadap penyalahgunaan proses ini (lihat ms 154E–G). (2) Jikapun mahkamah mendapati Garis Panduan BMC adalah ultra vires, keputusan tersebut tidak akan mengakibatkan atau secara substantial mengakibatkan penyelesaian kes. Tindakan plaintif untuk fitnah dan kecuaian merupakan kausa tindakan berlainan dan bebas daripada sama ada Garis Panduan BMC adalah sah atau sebaliknya. Penyelesaian soalan yang dicadangkan dalam lampiran 16 tidak menyebabkan perbicaraan untuk tindakan fitnah dan kecuaian tidak perlu kerana mahkamah ini mesti juga memutuskan sama ada unsur-unsur perundangan untuk tindakan fitnah dan kecuaian telah dipenuhi. Oleh yang demikian, sekiranya mahkamah membicarakan hujah permulaan seperti yang dirangka dalam lampiran 16, penjimatan perbelanjaan dan masa yang substantial tidak mungkin berlaku (lihat ms 167E–F, 168G–I).]

Notes For cases on preliminary issue, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) para 4903. ||Page 152>>

Cases referred to Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Meridien International Credit Corporation Ltd London [1993] 3 MLJ 193 (refd) Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Herbert Smith [1968] 2 All ER 1002 (refd) Chan Kum Loong v Hii Sui Eng [1980] 1 MLJ 313 (refd)

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Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P & O Branch Services [1923] AC 191 (refd) Dawson v Lunn (1984) 149 JP 491 (refd) Dominic J Puthucheary v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor; Module Construction Sdn Bhd & Ors v Jet Age Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 252 (refd) Everett v Ribbands & Anor [1952] 2 QB 198 (refd) Federal Insurance Co v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [1992] 1 SLR 390 (refd) Fulcrum Capital Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Samsudin Abu Hassan; Rahaz Sdn Bhd & Anor (Interveners) and another case [2000] MLJU 610; [2001] 5 CLJ 73 (refd) Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 (refd) Huang Ee Hoe & Ors v Tiong Thai King & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 51 (refd) Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 (refd) Thanaraj a/l Manikam & Ors v Lower Tamil Co-operative Society [1997] 4 MLJ 82 (refd) The Attorney-General & Ephraim Hutchings (Relator) v The Directors of the Great Eastern Railway Company [1880] 5 App Cas 473 (refd)

Legislation referred to Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 ss 2, 30(1)(mmmm) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 33 r 2 Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 ss s 43(3), 114

Amir bin Ismail (Goh Peng Hong and Tee Kim Chan with him) (Edmund Ponniah & Tee) for the plaintiff. Porres Royan (Shook Lin & Bok) for the first defendant. Adibah Ishak (Nur Nadia bte Mohd Amin with her) (Michael Chen, Gan, Muzafar & Azwar) for the second defendant.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 81

Chen Siew Mei (Raslan Loong) for the third defendant.

[2003] 2 MLJ 91 K SURJIT KAUR A/P GEAN KARTAR SINGH v BELINDA GHOI SHUK YEE

HIGH COURT (KOTA KINABALU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–25 OF 2002 IAN CHIN J 26 FEBRUARY 2003

Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Petition against appellant circulated and then forwarded to two persons of high ranks — Claim for damages for libel dismissed on the ground what was published enjoyed qualified privilege — Whether there was a common interest in the matter between the person issuing and the person receiving the communication — Whether the sessions court judge was right in his findings

The appellant, a cabin crew officer with the Malaysian Airline System (‘MAS’) sued the respondent for damages for libel but her claim was dismissed by the sessions court judge on the ground that what was published enjoyed qualified privilege. The defamation was contained in a letter authored by the respondent on behalf of the MAS cabin crew to the senior vice president and executive vice president of MAS to seek their interference as to remove the appellant from her post. It stated that some of the cabin crew were unhappy with the way they were treated in matters that were under the supervision of the appellant. The appellant, not being satisfied with the decision of the sessions court judge, appealed. The issue to be determined by the court was whether the session court judge was right in deciding that the petition letter published enjoyed qualified privilege and its requirements met.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 82

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) One of the essentials to be established for such a plea was that there must be a common interest in the matter between the person issuing and the person receiving the communication. The learned sessions court judge found that there was that common interest (see p 94E, G–H); Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 and Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 followed. (2) In his impeccable judgment, the sessions court judge concluded that there was a corresponding or common interest on the part of the two personages of MAS mentioned in the petition. These two persons held very high positions in MAS and any matter that might affect MAS, of which the unhappiness or grievances of the cabin crew must surely be one, and that must surely commanded their interest as much as it was the interest of the defendant as a member of MASEU to resolve the matter for the cabin crew. The High Court could add no more to the reasoning, except to adopt every word of it and found nothing wrong in that conclusion. The appellant had rested their appeal on this one ground of common interest and the High Court found that the ||Page 92>>sessions court judge was right in concluding that there was such (see pp 95H–96B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu, seorang pegawai pekerja kabin dengan Malaysian Airline System (‘MAS’) telah menyaman responden untuk ganti rugi kerana libel tetapi tuntutan beliau telah ditolak oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen atas alasan apa yang diterbitkan menikmati perlindungan bersyarat. Fitnah tersebut terkandung dalam sepucuk surat yang telah ditulis oleh responden bagi pihak pekerja kabin MAS kepada naib presiden kanan dan naib presiden eksekutif MAS yang memohon mereka campur tangan agar perayu dipecat daripada jawatannya. Ia menyatakan bahawa beberapa pekerja kabin tidak gembira dengan cara mereka dilayan dalam perkara-perkara di bawah penyeliaan perayu. Perayu, yang tidak puas hati dengan keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen, telah

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 83

membuat rayuan. Persoalan yang perlu ditentukan oleh mahkamah adalah sama ada hakim mahkamah sesyen betul dalam memutuskan bahawa surat petisyen tersebut menikmati perlindungan bersyarat dan keperluannya telah dipenuhi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Suatu yang penting yang perlu dibuktikan untuk pli sedemikian adalah perlu ada kepentingan bersama dalam perkara antara orang yang menyampaikan dan orang yang menerima komunikasi tersebut. Hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana telah mendapati terdapat kepentingan bersama (lihat ms 94E, G–H); Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 dan Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 diikut. (2) Dalam penghakiman beliau yang kemas dan rapi, hakim mahkamah sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat satu kepentingan yang sama atau bersama di pihak dua orang ternama MAS yang dinyatakan dalam petisyen. Kedua-dua orang yang memegang jawatan tinggi di MAS dan apa-apa perkara yang mungkin memberikan kesan kepada MAS, seperti perasaan tidak gembira atau kegelisahan pekerja kabin pasti merupakan salah satu daripadanya, dan yang harus diambil berat oleh mereka sama seperti keprihatinan defendan sebagai seorang ahli MASEU untuk menyelesaikan perkara tersebut untuk pekerja kabin. Mahkamah Tinggi tidak dapat menambah apa-apa kepada hujah tersebut, selain daripada memakai setiap perkataan dan mendapati tiada apa-apa yang salah dengan keputusan tersebut. Perayu telah menumpukan rayuan mereka atas satu alasan kepentingan bersama ini dan Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati bahawa hakim mahkamah sesyen adalah betul (lihat ms 95H–96B).] ||Page 93>>

Notes For cases on qualified privilege, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 377–380.

Cases referred to

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 84

Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (folld) Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 (folld)

Sugumar Balakrishnan ( Sugumar & Co) for the appellant. Ronny Cham ( Ronny Cham & Co) for the respondent.

[2003] 2 MLJ 385 KARPAL SINGH A/L RAM SINGH v DP VIJANDRAN

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–02 OF 2002(W) MOHAMED DZAIDDIN CHIEF JUSTICE, AHMAD FAIRUZ CJ (MALAYA) AND SITI NORMA YAAKOB FCJ 27 FEBRUARY 2003

Civil Procedure — Interest — Interest in defamation cases — No claim for interest on damage sought made in the writ of summons or statement of claim — No omnibus prayer in writ of claim seeking further or other relief — Whether court could in its discretion award interest on damages

Some time in March 1996, the appellant made a press statement published in two local English dailies concerning the conduct of the respondent in issuing a dishonored cheque to the appellant. As a result of the above publication, the respondent sued the appellant and the two English dailies for libel and claimed damages, injunction and costs. The High Court gave judgment for the respondent. As against the appellant, the trial judge awarded RM500,000 for compensatory and aggravated damages with interest at the rate of 4%pa from the date of the press statement and costs. The appellant appealed against the whole of the decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed

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the appeal against liability. On quantum, it held that the award was excessive and reduced the amount awarded by the High Court. The Court of Appeal did not however disturb the award of interest of 4%pa. On further appeal, leave was granted by the Federal Court on the following question of law: whether in a defamation action, interest ought to be awarded by the court on the damages ordered to be paid, particularly, where no claim for interest on the adjudged sum is made in the writ of summons or statement of claim and there is no omnibus prayer therein seeking any further or other relief deemed fit and proper.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: Under the new O 18 r 8(4) of the (English) Rules of the Supreme Court, all claims for interest must be specifically pleaded, whereas the corresponding provision in O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) has not been amended. After considering O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian RHC and O 18 r 8(4) of the English Rules of the Supreme Court, the applicable rule would be O 18 r 8 of the Malaysian RHC. Therefore, in the absence of specific provision that claims for interest must be pleaded in the pleadings in the Rules of the High Court, a judge in the exercise of his discretion can award such interest. It is unfair to deprive plaintiffs of interest for the period in which they have been deprived of their money, as interest ought to be awarded to the extent that is fair and proper. Thus, in the instant appeal, the trial judge had acted fairly when he awarded interest at half the normal rate, ie 4% from the date of publication to date of judgment and thereafter until the date of realization (see pp 388D–F, 392C–D); John Fairfax & ||Page 386>>Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada Mac 1996, perayu telah membuat pernyataan akhbar yang dilaporkan di dalam dua akhbar Bahasa Inggeris tempatan mengenai kelakuan responden dalam memberi cek tendang kepada perayu. Responden telah mendakwa perayu dan kedua-dua akhbar Bahasa Inggeris tempatan tersebut dalam libel dan menuntut ganti rugi, injunksi dan

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kos. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan untuk responden. Hakim telah memberi award RM500,000 untuk ganti rugi pampasan dan ganti rugi teruk dengan faedah pada 4%pa daripada tarikh pernyataan akhbar tersebut dan kos terhadap perayu. Perayu telah merayu keseluruhan keputusan tersebut. Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak rayuan terhadap liabiliti. Mengenai kuantum, mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa award tersebut adalah keterlaluan dan telah mengurangkan jumlah yang diawardkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Mahkamah Rayuan tidak campur tangan dalam award faedah 4%pa. Di dalam rayuan lanjutan, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memberikan kebenaran di atas soalan fakta berikut: sama ada di dalam tindakan fitnah, faedah patut diawardkan oleh mahkamah pada ganti rugi yang diperintahkan dibayar, khususnya, di mana tiada tuntutan untuk faedah pada jumlah yang dihakimi dibuat di dalam writ saman ataupun penyata tuntutan dan tidak terdapat permohonan pelbagai di dalamnya menuntut relif-relif lanjut yang sesuai.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: Di bawah A 18 k 8(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (England), segala tuntutan untuk faedah mesti dipohon dengan jelas, manakala peruntukan bersamaan A 18 k 8 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 Malaysia (‘KMT’) belum dipinda. Setelah mempertimbangkan A 18 k 8 KMT Malaysia dan A 18 k 8(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (England), kaedah yang terpakai adalah A 18 k 8 KMT Malaysia. Oleh itu, di dalam ketiadaan peruntukan khusus di mana faedah mesti dituntut di dalam pliding-pliding di dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi, seseorang hakim di dalam melaksanakan budibicara beliau boleh mengawardkan faedah tersebut. Ia tidak adil untuk tidak memberi plaintif faedah untuk tempoh di mana plaintif tidak dibayar wang memandangkan faedah patut diawardkan seperti mana yang adil dan sesuai. Oleh itu, di dalam rayuan ini, hakim perbicaraan telah berlaku adil dalam mengawardkan faedah separuh daripada kadar biasa, iaitu 4% daripada tarikh penerbitan sehingga tarikh keputusan dan selepas itu sehingga tarikh realisasi (lihat ms 388D–F, 392C–D); John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 diikut.

Notes ||Page 387>>

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For cases on interest, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue), paras 3009–3067.

Cases referred to Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Driscoll 1988 NSW Lexis 9678 (refd) BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [1982] 1 All ER 925 (refd) Jefford v Gee [1970] 1 All ER 1202 (refd) Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310 (refd) John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Kelly (1987) 8 NSWLR 131 (folld) Lim Eng Kay v Jaafar bin Mohamed Said [1982] 2 MLJ 156 (refd) Riches v Westminster Bank Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 725 (refd) Saunders & Anor v Edwards & Anor [1987] 1 WLR 1116 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 8 Rules of the Supreme Court [Eng] O 18 r 8(4)

Civil Appeal No W–02–385 of 2000 (Court of Appeal, Kuala Lumpur)

Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh ( Jagdeep Singh Deo with him) ( Karpal Singh & Co). DP Vijandran ( MS Murthi and P Selvaraj with him) ( DP Vijandran Associates).

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case

[2003] 2 MLJ 554 THIRUCHELVASEGARAM A/L MANICKAVASEGAR v MAHADEVI A/P NADCHATIRAM

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HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUITS NOS S5–23–08, S5–23–04 OF 1997 AND S5–23–13 OF 2000 AZMEL J 19 FEBRUARY 2003

Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Committal proceedings — Defence — Whether defence of absolute privilege available as in an action for defamation

Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Sentence — Wilful and contumacious conduct by contemnor — Complete disregard shown by contemnor to an order of the High Court Contemnor a senior member of the Bar — Contemnor financially well-off — Whether warning or fine manifestly inadequate — Whether a custodial sentence appropriate

Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Wilful and contumacious conduct by accused — Complete disregard shown by accused to an order of the High Court — Whether accused guilty of contempt

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Appeal against — Appeal filed to the Court of Appeal against injunction granted by High Court — Appeal heard but judgment reserved by Court of Appeal — Whether injunction of High Court ceased to be effective

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Breach of — Permanent injunction restraining defendant from publishing libellous and scandalous statements against plaintiff — Defamatory documents sent by defendant to Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board despite objection by plaintiff and non-assurance of protection from action by Disciplinary Board — Whether permanent injunction breached by defendant

Legal Profession — Professional privilege — Communication by litigant to Disciplinary Board/Investigating Tribunal — Whether such communication equal to communication by

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litigant to a court of law — Whether such communication protected or covered by absolute immunity — Whether proceedings before Disciplinary Board/Investigating Tribunal equal to proceedings before a court of law — Legal Profession Act 1976 s 111

On 22 January 2000, the Kuala Lumpur High Court, as a result of two defamation suits instituted by the plaintiff (‘the Kuala Lumpur suits’), inter alia, issued a permanent injunction against the defendant prohibiting her from publishing any libellous and scandalous statements against the plaintiff. In these two suits which were tried together, the Kuala Lumpur High Court had found the defendant liable for defamation, having ruled certain documents to be libellous and scandalous materials. These Kuala Lumpur suits were, inter alia, based on serious libellous and scandalous statements imputing criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff made by the defendant in a written submission in an earlier civil suit at the Seremban High Court (‘the Seremban suit’). The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court in the Kuala Lumpur ||Page 555>>suits. The appeal was heard but judgment reserved. Apart from the defamation suits, the plaintiff had also complained of the defendant’s conduct in the Seremban suit to the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board (‘the Disciplinary Board’). Pursuant to the complaint, an Investigating Tribunal (‘the Investigating Tribunal’) was established and by letters dated 9 and 24 October 2000, the Investigating Tribunal requested from the defendant, an explanation for her conduct in the Seremban suit. The defendant by letter dated 27 October 2000 sought direction from the Investigating Tribunal as to whether she could forward to the Board documents produced at the Kuala Lumpur suits. She also requested assurances from the Board and from the plaintiff that no further action would be commenced against her. Both the plaintiff and the Board rejected her requests for the assurances. Despite such rejections, the defendant by letter dated 27 November 2000 to the Board, sent all the documents produced in the Kuala Lumpur suits and certain pleadings filed in the Seremban suit. Some of the documents sent were documents ruled libellous and scandalous in the Kuala Lumpur suits. The plaintiff, having obtained leave of court, applied for an order to commit the defendant to prison for breaching the injunction. The High Court thus had to determine whether the defendant had in law contravened the injunction dated 22 January 2000. The plaintiff contended that the defendant had

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breached the injunction by publishing the documents which she had sent by her letter of 27 November 2000. The defendant however asserted that her disclosure did not breach the injunction for the reasons that such disclosure constituted privileged communication and was mandatory under s 101(4)(a)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1976.

Held, convicting the defendant for contempt of court and sentencing her to three months’ imprisonment: (1) The defendant was fully aware that the publication of the defamatory documents to any third party would constitute a breach of the injunctive order. It was for that reason that she sought directions and assurances from the Disciplinary Board not to bring any action against her for adducing additional documents which contained the prohibited documents. Despite her requests for assurances having been rejected by the Disciplinary Board coupled with the plaintiff’s objection, she had nevertheless sent the documents containing the defamatory statements against the plaintiff, such statements having established her liability for defamation in the Kuala Lumpur suits. There was thus no doubt whatsoever that the defendant had breached the permanent injunction issued by the Kuala Lumpur High Court. The fact that the defendant had filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal and that the appeal was heard but the court’s decision reserved did not mean that the injunctive order was no longer in force. The injunctive order would only cease to be ||Page 556>>effective and cease to be in force if the Court of Appeal had given a decision setting aside the injunction. On the facts, there was no evidence that the Court of Appeal had given an order setting aside the High Court’s injunction (see pp 564G–H, 565C–F). (2) Communications to the Disciplinary Board or to the Investigating Tribunal cannot be equated with communication to a court of law. Section 111 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 did not confer any immunity to the defendant when she communicated with the Disciplinary Board or the Investigating Tribunal. Section 111 only confers protection to the members of the Disciplinary Board and the Investigating Tribunal. Proceedings before the Disciplinary Board or

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the Investigating Tribunal cannot be equated to proceedings before a court of law where the litigants enjoy judicial immunity conferred by s 14(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (see pp 566H–567A).[See Editorial Note on p 567.] (3) In an action for committal proceedings a defendant cannot invoke a defence of absolute privilege in the manner available in an action for defamation. A litigant’s communication to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Tribunal is not covered by absolute immunity under s 111 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. Even communications to a court of law that contain defamatory statements may only be done within certain limits. If the limits are exceeded then the defence of absolute privilege will no longer be available (see p 567A–C); Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 176 followed. (4) On the facts, the defendant had gone beyond the reasonable limit principle as stated in Manjeet Singh Dhillon. Her act of sending the defamatory documents to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Tribunal was clearly wilful and contumacious. The defendant had failed to create any doubt in the plaintiff’s case and was guilty of contempt of court as alleged by the plaintiff. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the High Court was of the view that the acts of the defendant in sending the defamatory documents to the Disciplinary Board or Investigating Board were most unbecoming of a senior member of the Bar. She had shown complete disregard to an order of the High Court. As such, a caution or a warning was manifestly inadequate and a deterrent sentence should be imposed. A fine would serve no purpose as the defendant was financially well-off. A custodial sentence was most appropriate and would act as a deterrence. The defendant was thus sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. She was also ordered to bear the costs of the proceeding (see pp 567G–H, 568B–C, G–569A). ||Page 557>>

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Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada 22 Januari 2000, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur, akibat daripada dua guaman fitnah yang dimulakan oleh plaintif (‘guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut’), antara lain, mengeluarkan satu injunksi kekal terhadap defendan kerana menghalang beliau daripada menerbitkan apa-apa kenyataan yang berunsur libel dan melampau terhadap plaintif. Dalam kedua-dua guaman tersebut yang telah didengar bersama, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab kerana fitnah tersebut, setelah memutuskan beberapa dokumen adalah berunsur libel dan bahan-bahan yang penuh skandal. Guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut adalah, antara lain, berdasarkan kenyataan-kenyataan serius berunsur libel dan penuh skandal dengan mengatakan perbuatan jenayah ke atas pihak plaintif dibuat oleh defendan dalam satu hujah bertulis dalam guaman sivil terdahulu di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban (‘guaman Seremban tersebut’). Defendan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Rayuan tersebut telah didengar tetapi penghakiman ditangguhkan. Selain daripada guaman-guaman fitnah tersebut, plaintif juga mengadu tentang perbuatan defendan dalam guaman Seremban tersebut kepada Lembaga Tatatertib Peguambela & Peguamcara (‘Lembaga Tatatertib’). Berikutan aduan tersebut, satu Tribunal Siasatan (‘Tribunal Siasatan tersebut’) telah ditubuhkan dan melalui surat-surat bertarikh 9 dan 24 Oktober 2000, Tribunal Siasatan tersebut telah memohon daripada defendan, satu penjelasan untuk perbuatan beliau dalam guaman Seremban tersebut. Defendan melalui surat bertarikh 27 Oktober 2000 memohon arahan dari Tribunal Siasatan tersebut sama ada beliau boleh mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen yang telah dikemukakan dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Beliau juga memohon jaminan daripada Lembaga Tatatertib dan daripada plaintif agar tiada tindakan selanjutnya akan dimulakan terhadap beliau. Kedua-dua plaintif dan Lembaga Tatatertib telah menolak permohonan-permohonan beliau untuk jaminan-jaminan tersebut. Walaupun dengan penolakan-penolakan tersebut, defendan melalui surat bertarikh 27 November 2000 kepada Lembaga Tatatertib, telah menghantar kesemua dokumen-dokumen yang telah dikemukakan dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut dan pliding–pliding tertentu telah difailkan dalam guaman Seremban tersebut. Beberapa dokumen yang

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dihantar adalah dokumen-dokumen yang telah diputuskan sebagai berunsur libel dan melampau dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Plaintif, setelah mendapat kebenaran mahkamah, telah memohon satu perintah untuk memasukkan defendan ke dalam penjara kerana melanggar injunksi tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi dengan itu perlu menentukan sama ada defendan dari segi undang-undang telah menentang injunksi bertarikh 22 Januari 2000. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa defendan telah melanggar injunksi tersebut dengan ||Page 558>> menerbitkan dokumen-dokumen yang beliau telah hantar melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 27 November 2000. Defendan bagaimanapun menegaskan bahawa pendedahan beliau tidak melanggar injunksi tersebut atas sebab pendedahan sedekimian membentuk satu komunikasi terlindung dan adalah mandatori di bawah s 101(4)(a)(i) Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976.

Diputuskan, menyabitkan defendan kerana menghina mahkamah dan menjatuhkan hukuman tiga bulan penjara ke atas beliau: (1) Defendan amat sedar bahawa penerbitan dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada mana-mana pihak ketiga akan membentuk satu perlanggaran perintah injunksi. Adalah untuk sebab sedemikian beliau telah memohon arahan-arahan dan jaminan-jaminan daripada Lembaga Tatatertib tersebut agar tidak memulakan apa-apa tindakan terhadap beliau kerana mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen tambahan yang mengandungi dokumen-dokumen yang dilarang. Walaupun permohonan-permohonan beliau untuk jaminan-jaminan tersebut ditolak oleh Lembaga Tatatertib sekali dengan bantahan plaintif, namun begitu beliau telah menghantar dokumen-dokumen yang mengandungi kenyataan-kenyataan berunsur fitnah mengenai plaintif, kenyataan-kenyataan sedemikian telah membuktikan liabiliti kerana fitnah dalam guaman-guaman Kuala Lumpur tersebut. Oleh itu sama sekali tidak diragui bahawa defendan telah melanggar injunksi kekal yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. Hakikat bahawa defendan telah memfailkan satu rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan dan bahawa rayuan tersebut telah didengar tetapi keputusan mahkamah telah ditangguhkan tidak bermaksud bahawa perintah injunksi tersebut tidak lagi. Perintah injunksi hanya akan berhenti mempunyai kesan dan berhenti

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berkuatkuasa jika Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan satu keputusan mengenepikan injunksi tersebut. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta tersebut, tiada keterangan bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan satu perintah mengenepikan injunksi Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat ms 564G–H, 565C–F). (2) Perhubungan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau kepada Tribunal Siasatan tidaklah sama seperti perhubungan kepada satu mahkamah undang-undang. Seksyen 111 Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976 tidak memberikan apa-apa kekebalan kepada defendan apabila beliau berhubung dengan Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan. Seksyen 111 hanya memberikan perlindungan kepada ahli-ahli Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan. Prosiding di hadapan Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tidak boleh disamakan dengan prosiding di hadapan mahkamah undang-undang di mana litigan-litigan menikmati kekebalan kehakiman yang diberikan oleh s 14(1) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (lihat ms 566H–567A). ||Page 559>> (3) Dalam satu tindakan untuk prosiding kerana penghinaan seorang defendan tidak boleh menggunakan satu pembelaan perlindungan mutlak dengan cara sebagaimana yang ada dalam satu tindakan untuk fitnah. Perhubungan litigan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tidak dilindungi dengan kekebalan sepenuhnya di bawah s 111 Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976. Begitu juga dengan perhubungan kepada satu mahkamah undang-undang yang mempunyai kenyataan berunsur fitnah hanya boleh dibuat dalam batasan tertentu. Jika batasan tersebut dilanggar maka pembelaan untuk perlindungan mutlak akan lenyap (lihat ms 567A–C); Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ diikut. (4) Berdasarkan fakta-fakta tersebut, defendan telah melampaui batasan munasabah prinsip sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam Manjeet Singh Dhillon. Tindakan beliau menghantar dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tersebut dengan jelas dilakukan dengan sengaja dan tegar. Defendan telah gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan dalam kes plaintif dan adalah bersalah kerana menghina mahkamah sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Berdasarkan semua keadaan kes,

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Mahkamah Tinggi berpandangan bahawa tindakan-tindakan defendan menghantar dokumen-dokumen berunsur fitnah kepada Lembaga Tatatertib atau Tribunal Siasatan tersebut adalah tidak wajar dilakukan oleh seorang ahli kanan Majlis. Beliau telah menunjukkan bahawa beliau tidak menghiraukan langsung perintah Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh itu satu amaran memang tidak mencukupi dan satu hukuman pencegahan patut dikenakan. Satu denda tidak akan berkesan kerana defendan amat mampu dari segi kewangan. Satu hukuman penjara adalah sesuai dan akan bertindak sebagai satu pencegahan. Defendan oleh itu telah dijatuhkan hukuman penjara tiga bulan. Beliau juga diarahkan menanggung kos prosiding (lihat ms 567G–H, 568B–C, G–569A).]

Notes For cases on committal proceedings, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1466–1472. For cases on sentence, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1529–1534. For cases on injunction generally, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2463–3008. For cases on professional privilege generally, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 1832–1841.

Case referred to Attorney General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh Dhillon [1991] 1 MLJ 167 (refd) ||Page 560>>

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 14(1) Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 101(4)(a)(i), 111

Gurbachan Singh ( Malik Imtiaz with him) ( Syarikat M Segaram) for the plaintiff. Mahadevi a/p Nadchatiram ( Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the defendant.

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[2003] 4 MLJ 96 WONG YOKE KONG & ORS v AZMI M ANSHAR & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 23–61 OF 1996 HELILIAH MOHD YUSOF J 14 MARCH 2003

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article on political behavior of deputy minister — Comment hoping that ‘his legal firm’ was doing decent business — Whether defamatory of lawyers carrying on business under name and style including name of that politician

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Locus standi — Whether defamatory words referred to plaintif — Whether ‘his legal firm’ was capable of bearing reference to legal firm bearing name of deputy minister and in which he was no longer a partner

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Whether natural and ordinary meaning of words or innuendo defamatory — Whether the words ‘doing decent business’ were defamatory — Intention of defamer irrelevant — Whether the words capable of bearing the meaning that partners of the firm were not fit to practise as advocates and solicitors

Mohamed Nazri bin Abdul Aziz (‘Nazri Abdul Aziz’) was a politician and a qualified lawyer, and was, at one time, a partner of a firm of solicitors, Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. When Nazri Abdul Aziz was appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department in May 1995, he ceased his legal practice and terminated his partnership in Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. The remaining partners, however, continued to practice under the name and style of Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong. The first defendant was an editor employed by the second defendant newspaper, which was, in turn, published and

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printed by the third defendant. Barely nine months after Nazri Abdul Aziz had ceased legal practice and left the firm, the first defendant wrote an article in which he spoke disparagingly of Nazri Abdul Aziz. The article concluded with the observation that ‘… Now, in a turnaround, [Nazri Abdul Aziz] wants to give the [UMNO] Youth leader post back to Rahim on a silver platter. Hope his law firm is doing decent business …’. The plaintiffs, all solicitors practicing under the name and style of Messrs Nazri Aziz & Wong, contended that the ‘law firm’ referred to in the last sentence of said article could only refer to their firm and to no other. The plaintiffs were embarrassed and distressed by the connotations and implications arising from the sentence in the article which, they argued, was highly defamatory of their law firm. The plaintiffs sued for defamation. The defendants denied that the article was defamatory. Further the defendants denied that the article was defamatory of the plaintiffs. The defendants pointed out that the article in no way referred specifically to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were never identified in the article since, at the time of the publication, Nazri Abdul Aziz was also no longer practicing as a lawyer. The defendant further argued that the allegedly offensive sentence, understood in its natural and ordinary meaning, merely meant that, based on the behaviour of Nazri Abdul Aziz, it was hoped that his law firm would obtain good business. ||Page 97>>

Held, finding the defendants liable for defamation, and ordering that the parties proceed to the question of quantum of damages: (1) There being no dispute as to publication, and the defendants having chosen not to advance the plea of justification, the issues that were necessary for determination were, firstly, whether the words that were published were defamatory and, secondly, whether the words were defamatory of the plaintiffs (see p 101D–E). (2) There are two steps involved in deciding whether or not an alleged offensive sentence is defamatory. The first is to consider what meaning the words would convey to the ordinary person. Having established this, the next stage is to consider whether, under the circumstances in which the words were published, the reasonable man would be likely to understand them in a defamatory sense.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 98

The abstraction of the reasonable man was but a measure to strike a balance between freedom of speech and the safeguard of reputation (see p 123G–H). (3) The ‘test’ to be applied where a plaintiff is not specifically named is whether the words were such as would reasonably, in the circumstances, lead persons acquainted with him to believe that the person referred to by those words was the plaintiff (see p 110C) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 followed. Extrinsic evidence may go to show that a given statement, considered to be defamatory, was thought to refer to the plaintiff. A plaintiff will not need, in every case, to produce witnesses who will actually testify that they felt the article referred to him. It would, of course, be much better if the plaintiff could produce such witnesses (see p 113B). (4) The words bore a defamatory imputation on the conduct of the business of a legal firm in that it was implied that since Nazri Abdul Aziz was somewhat dubiously double dealing in his political activity it was hoped that his law firm would not conduct its business in a similar fashion. If, as alleged by the author, Nazri Abdul Aziz had been tergiversating, and if it was implied that the firm could be equated to him, it would be strange to suggest that the statement meant his firm ought to obtain good business (see p 127C–E). (5) The defendants’ argument was that the whole article related, as the title itself suggested, to politicians. Yet in relation to Nazri Abdul Aziz, there was an additional sentence incorporating the words ‘his law firm’. The first defendant himself had admitted to Nazri Abdul Aziz being associated with a law firm. What the first defendant intended to refer to was irrelevant. The first defendant was evasive when asked if he knew whether Nazri Abdul Aziz was still a partner in the firm (see p 113G–I). ||Page 98>> (6) The alleged offensive sentence was capable of bearing the meaning that the plaintiffs were carrying on an indecent business, using the firm as a front, that the plaintiffs were unprofessional and/or unethical in the conduct of their legal business, the plaintiffs were not fit and proper persons to practice as Advocates and Solicitors of the High Court of Malaya and that the plaintiffs were, accordingly, guilty of breaching rules of practice and etiquette (see p 114F–G).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 99

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Mohamed Nazri bin Abdul Aziz (‘Nazri Abdul Aziz’) seorang ahli politik dan peguamcara yang berkelulusan, pernah menjadi pekongsi suatu firma guaman, Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Apabila beliau dilantik sebagai Timbalan Menteri dalam Jabatan Perdana Menteri dalam bulan Mei 1995, beliau telah menghentikan amalan guamannya dan mengakhiri perkongsiannya dalam firma Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Walaubagaimanapun, pekongsi-pekongsi yang lain terus beramal di bawah nama dan gaya Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong. Defendan pertama adalah seorang editor yang dilantik oleh syarikat surat khabar defendan kedua, yang seterusnya diterbit dan dicetak oleh defendan ketiga. Hampir sembilan bulan selepas Nazri Abdul Aziz telah menghentikan amalan guamannya dan meninggalkan firma tersebut, defendan pertama telah menulis satu rencana di mana beliau telah memperkecilkan Nazri Abdul Aziz. Rencana tersebut diakhiri dengan tinjauan bahawa ‘ … Now, in a turnaround, [Nazri Abdul Aziz] wants to give the [UMNO] Youth leader post back to Rahim on a silver platter. Hope his law firm is doing decent business …’. Plaintif-plaintif, kesemua daripada mereka peguamcara yang beramal di bawah nama dan gaya Tetuan Nazri Aziz & Wong, mendakwa bahawa ‘law firm’ yang dimaksudkan dalam ayat terakhir rencana tersebut hanya merujuk kepada firma mereka dan tiada yang lain. Plaintif-plaintif merasa malu dan sedih dengan erti tambahan dan implikasi yang wujud daripada ayat dalam rencana tersebut, yang mereka mendakwa, memfitnahkan firma guaman mereka. Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa bagi fitnah tersebut. Defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa rencana tersebut berfitnah. Defendan-defendan juga menafikan rencana tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif-plaintif. Defendan-defendan menyatakan rencana tersebut tidak pernah merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif secara khusus. Plaintif-plaintif tidak dikenal pastikan dalam rencana tersebut memandangkan, pada masa penerbitan Nazri Abdul Aziz tidak lagi mengamal sebagai peguamcara. Defendan-defendan juga mengatakan bahawa ayat yang dikatakan menyakitkan tersebut, jika difahamkan dalam maksud semulajadi dan biasanya, hanya membawa maksud bahawa, berasaskan tingkah laku Nazri Abdul Aziz, adalah diharapkan firma guamannya akan mendapat perniagaan yang lumayan.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 100

||Page 99>>

Diputuskan, mendapati defendan-defendan bertanggungjawab bagi fitnah, dan mengarahkan pihak-pihak teruskan ke persoalan jumlah ganti rugi: (1) Memandangkan tiada pertikaian akan penerbitan, dan defendan memilih tidak menghadapkan dalih justifikasi, isu-isu yang perlu diselesaikan adalah, pertama, sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diterbitkan memfitkahkan dan, kedua, sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 101D–E). (2) Terdapat dua langkah yang terlibat dalam mengenalpasti sama ada perkataan-perkataan memfitnahkan. Pertama sekali perlu ditimbangkan maksud yang dibawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut kepada seorang awam. Setelah ini telah dikenalpasti, tahap seterusnya adalah untuk menimbangkan sama ada, dalam keadaan di mana perkataan-perkataan telah diterbitkan, orang awam mungkin menganggapkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut sebagai memfitnahkan. Abstrak orang awam adalah hanya sebagai sukat untuk membuat penimbangan antara kebebasan bersuara dan menjaga maruah (lihat ms 123G–H). (3) ‘Ujian’ yang perlu dipakai dalam situasi seseorang plaintif yang tidak dinamakan secara khusus adalah sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan munasabah, dalam keadaan yang sedia ada, membawa orang yang kenal plaintif untuk percaya bahawa orang yang dirujuk dengan perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah plaintif (lihat ms 110C); Knupffer v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] AC 116 diikut. Keterangan luar mungkin menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan, yang dianggap memfitnahkan, telah dianggap merujuk kepada plaintif. Seseorang plaintif tidak perlu, dalam setiap kes, mengemukakan saksi yang dapat memberi keterangan bahawa mereka menganggap rencana tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif. Sudah pasti lebih baik sekiranya plaintif dapat membawa saksi-saksi seperti itu (lihat ms 113B). (4) Perkataan-perkataan tersebut membawa imputasi memfitnahkan ke atas perlaksanaan perniagaan sesuatu firma guaman memandangkan ia membayangkan bahawa memandangkan tingkahlaku Nazri Abdul Aziz yang didakwa bersikap talam dua muka dalam kegiatan politiknya, maka adalah

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diharapkan firma guamannya tidak menjalankan perniagaan dalam cara yang sama. Jika, sepertimana didakwa oleh pengarangnya, Nazri Abdul Aziz telah berkelakuan penghianat, dan jika diimplikasikan bahawa firma tersebut dapat dipersamakan dengannya, adalah ganjil mencadangkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan membawa maksud diharapkan firmanya mendapat perniagaan baik (lihat ms 127C–E). (5) Hujah defendan-defendan adalah bahawa keseluruhan rencana tersebut merujuk, sepertimana tajuknya sendiri mencadangkan, ||Page 100>>kepada ahli politik. Akan tetapi berkait dengan Nazri Abdul Aziz, wujudnya suatu ayat tambahan yang menandungi perkataan-perkataan ‘his law firm’. Defendan pertama sendiri telah mengakui Nazri Abdul Aziz telah dikaitkan dengan sebuah firma guaman. Perkara yang defendan pertama ingin merujuk kepada adalah tidak relevan. Defendan pertama mengelak daripada ditanya sama ada beliau tahu Nazri Abdul Aziz masih menjadi pekongsi firma tersebut (lihat ms 113G–I). (6) Ayat yang dikatakan menyakitkan tersebut dapat membawa maksud bahawa plaintif-plaintif menjalankan suatu perniagaan yang tidak senonoh, menggunakan firma tersebut sebagai topeng, bahawa plaintif-plantif berkelakuan tidak profesional dan/atau tidak beretika dalam menjalankan perniagaan guamannya, plaintif-plaintif adalah orang yang tidak layak menjalankan amalan sebagai Peguambela dan Peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya dan plaintif-plaintif, sedemikian, bersalah kerana telah melanggar kaedah-kaedah amalan dan etiket (lihat ms 114F–G).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors [1999] 3 SLR 22 (refd) Abdul Khalid Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) & Ors [2001] 4 CLJ 15 (refd)

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Berkoff v Burchill and another [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (refd) Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] All ER 117 (refd) Charleston and another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and another [1995] 2 All ER 313 (refd) David Syme v Canavan [1918] 25 CLR 234 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (folld) Le Fanu and others v Malcomson and others [1843–60] All ER Rep 152, (1848) 1 HLC 637 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Lewis and another v Daily Telegraph, Ltd; Same v Associated Newspapers, Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (refd) Norman v Future Publishing Ltd [1999] EMLR 325 (refd) Slim and Ors v Daily Telegraph, Ltd and Anor [1968] 1 All ER 497 (refd) ||Page 101>>

R Thayalan (Charis Wong with him) (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the plaintiffs. Mohd Izral Khairy (Lorraine Cheah with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.

[2003] 4 MLJ 180 SOH CHUN SENG v CTOS-EMR SDN BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–35 OF 1997

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 103

RAMLY ALI J 12 JUNE 2003

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of information regarding creditor’s petition presented against plaintiff — Whether defendant under duty to publish most up-to-date account as to status of bankruptcy proceedings brought against plaintiff — Whether damages for omission to publish words in domain of tort of libel

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of information regarding creditor’s petition presented against plaintiff — Whether words complained of defamatory — Whether ordinary reasonable and fair-minded person would discern meanings as alleged by plaintiff — Whether words complained of true in substance and in fact

This was the plaintiff’s claim for damages for defamation arising from a libellous statement which had allegedly been published against him by the defendant. The plaintiff stated that by a report dated 29 April 1997 (‘the said report’), the defendant had published statements to Audio One Entertainment Sdn Bhd (‘AOE’) which by its natural and ordinary meaning and/or innuendo were false and libellous in nature. The said report stated, inter alia, that a creditor’s petition dated 30 October 1992 had been issued against the plaintiff by American Express (M) Sdn Bhd. A notation ‘Star 010493’ appeared in the said report, thus indicating that the information was sourced from the 1 April 1993 issue of newspaper. The following remark also appeared at the top of the said report: ‘Important: This report is confidential. Reproduction is prohibited. The report only indicates the information was published in the relevant source. It is not intended as confirmation of the ‘current status’ of the case. For the case’s current status, your further probe with the relevant parties is required’ (‘the header’). The plaintiff contended that the said report had caused injury to the plaintiff’s reputation as it inferred to anyone who had read the same that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt; had been adjudicated a bankrupt; was an insincere and untrustworthy person; was not fit to be a businessman and/or was not an honest and financially sound director; and the companies under the management of the plaintiff qua director were neither stable nor sound. The defendant admitted it had

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furnished to AOE the said report based on the information collated and compiled in its database relating to the plaintiff, which was obtained from The Star newspaper dated 1 April 1993. The defendant stated that the information furnished to AOE in respect of the plaintiff was correct in every respect, to wit, that a creditor’s petition dated 30 October 1992 was presented against the plaintiff at the instance of American Express (M) Sdn Bhd and a notice of the same was advertised in The Star newspaper by way of substituted service. The defendant denied that the information furnished was false or defamatory and was capable of ||Page 181>>bearing the meanings as pleaded by the plaintiff. The defendant’s defence was premised on the grounds that the words were not defamatory and the words were true in substance and in fact.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) The plaintiff must first discharge the onus of proving that the words complained of were defamatory of the plaintiff. Only upon the plaintiff establishing this would the burden then rest on the defendant to prove that those words were in substance and in fact true (see p 189A); Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 and Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 followed. (2) In considering whether the words complained of were defamatory or capable of bearing the meanings as alleged by the plaintiff, the court must construe the said report in its entirety and ask if an ordinary, reasonable and fair-minded person who had read the whole of the said report would discern the meaning as alleged by the plaintiff (see p 191B–C); Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529; Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 and Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 followed. (3) In the instant case, the court must scrutinize the matters stated in the said report relating to the plaintiff and in the light of the header which preceded the information, consider whether an ordinary, reasonable and fair-minded person who had read the whole of the said report would discern the meanings as

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alleged by the plaintiff. Here, the header had made it plain to any reasonable reader that the information appearing below it was not intended as confirmation of the current status of the creditor’s petition and that if the reader wished to know the current status, a check with the parties concerned was necessary. The header also made it plain that it only served to confirm that the information appearing below it had been obtained from a source, namely, The Star newspaper. Therefore, by the contents of the header, the defendant had in fact asserted that the information appearing below the header was not intended to mean any of the imputations that the plaintiff had alleged. As such, when the header was so read, it was impossible that any reasonable man should collect from it the libellous imputation alleged (see pp 191H–192A, F–G); Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 followed. (4) Accordingly, the court was satisfied that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the contents of the said report, which was the subject matter of the present action, were defamatory and on this ground alone, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant can be dismissed with costs (see p 194C–D). ||Page 182>> (5) The court could not agree with the plaintiff’s propositions that the defendant was under a duty, imposed in the law of libel, to publish the most up-to-date account as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings brought against the plaintiff or make every effort to ascertain the most up-to-date account as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings before it published the matters contained in the said report. The law of libel afforded a remedy where a person was libelled by the publication of defamatory words. Damages for the omission to publish words were not the domain of the tort of libel. It may well be that where such omission had occasioned loss to a party, that party may have his remedy in the tort of negligence, but as the law of libel catered for situation where words were published, a complaint of omission to publish, fundamentally, cannot found an action in libel. The law of defamation imposed a singular, paramount duty on the publisher — to speak to truth. The ingredients of the tort of negligence should not be allowed to be used to make true but defamatory statement actionable (see pp 194H–195D, 196C).

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(6) Even assuming the plaintiff had successfully established that the words were defamatory, the defendant by its own evidence as well as evidence of the plaintiff himself had clearly shown that those words were in substance and fact, true. As a matter of law, truth or justification was an absolute defence to an action in libel or slander. If the statement was true, no amount of malice or bad faith or belief in the falsity of the statement will make it actionable. If people think the worst of the plaintiff when they hear the truth about him, then his reputation had been reduced to the proper level (see pp 196F, 197E–F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah tuntutan ganti rugi plaintif kerana fitnah yang timbul dari kenyataan libel yang dikatakan telah diterbitkan terhadap beliau oleh defendan. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa melalui satu laporan bertarikh 29 April 1997 (‘laporan tersebut’), defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan kepada Audio One Entertainment Sdn Bhd (‘AOE’) yang mana melalui maksud semulajadi dan biasa dan/atau sindiran adalah palsu dan bersifat libel. Laporan tersebut menyatakan, antara lain bahawa satu petisyen pemiutang bertarikh 30 Oktober 1992 telah dikeluarkan terhadap plaintif oleh American Express (M) Sdn Bhd. Satu notasi ‘Star 010493’ tertera dalam laporan tersebut, yang menandakan bahawa maklumat tersebut diperolehi dari akhbar The Star keluaran 1 April 1993. Kata-kata tersebut juga tertera pada bahagian atas laporan tersebut: ‘Important: This report is confidential. Reproduction is prohibited. The report only indicates the information was published in the relevant source. It is not intended as confirmation of the ‘current status’ of the case. For the case’s current status, your further probe with the relevant parties is ||Page 183>>required’ (‘kepala tajuk tersebut’). Plaintif menegaskan bahawa laporan tersebut telah menjejaskan reputasi plaintif kerana ia membuat inferens kepada sesiapa yang membacanya bahawa plaintif adalah seorang yang bankrap dengan hutang yang tidak berbayar; seorang yang tidak ikhlas dan tidak boleh dipercayai; tidak layak menjadi peniaga dan/atau bukan seorang pengarah yang jujur dan mempunyai kedudukan kewangan yang kukuh dan syarikat-syarikat di bawah pengurusan plaintif

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sebagai pengarah tidak stabil mahupun kukuh. Defendan telah mengaku bahawa ia telah mengemukakan kepada AOE laporan tersebut berdasarkan maklumat yang dikumpul dan disusun dalam pangkalan datanya berkaitan plaintif, yang telah diperolehi dari akhbar The Star bertarikh 1 April 1993. Defendan menyatakan bahawa maklumat yang dikemukakan kepada AOE berkaitan plaintif adalah betul dalam semua aspek, bahawa satu petisyen pemiutang bertarikh 30 Oktober 1992 telah dikemukakan terhadap plaintif atas permintaan American Express (M) Sdn Bhd dan satu notis yang sama telah diiklankan dalam akhbar The Star melalui penyampaian gantian. Defendan menafikan bahawa maklumat yang dikemukakan adalah palsu atau berunsur fitnah dan mampu untuk membawa maksud sebagaimana yang diplidkan oleh plaintif. Pembelaan defendan berasaskan alasan-alasan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah dan perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah benar pada amnya dan secara fakta.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: (1) Plaintif perlu melepaskan beban membuktikan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan sebagai berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif. Hanya setelah plaintif dapat membuktikan ini maka beban tersebut terletak ke atas defendan untuk membuktikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan adalah pada amnya dan secara fakta benar (lihat ms 189A); Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 dan Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 diikut. (2) Dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah atau mampu untuk membawa maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif, mahkamah hendaklah menafsirkan laporan tersebut secara keseluruhan dan jika bertanyakan kepada seorang yang biasa, munasabah dan berfikiran waras yang telah membaca keseluruhan laporan tersebut akan menanggap maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif (lihat ms 191B–C); Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529; Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 dan Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 diikut.

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||Page 184>> (3) Dalam kes semasa, mahkamah hendaklah meneliti perkara-perkara yang dinyatakan dalam laporan tersebut berkaitan plaintif dan berdasarkan kepala tajuk tersebut sebelum maklumat tersebut, menimbangkan sama ada seorang yang biasa, munasabah dan berfikiran waras yang telah membaca keseluruhan laporan tersebut akan menanggap maksud-maksud sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Di sini, kepala tajuk tersebut dengan jelas menunjukkan kepada mana-mana pembaca yang munasabah bahawa maklumat yang tertera di bawahnya tidak dimaksudkan sebagai pengesahan kedudukan semasa petisyen pemiutang tersebut dan dan jika pembaca ingin mengetahui kedudukan semasa, perlulah memeriksa dengan pihak-pihak berkaitan. Kepala tajuk tersebut juga dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia hanya bermaksud untuk mengesahkan maklumat yang tertera di bahagian bawah telah diperolehi dari satu sumber, iaitu akhbar The Star. Oleh demikian, berdasarkan kandungan kepala tajuk tersebut, defendan pada hakikatnya menegaskan bahawa maklumat yang tertera di bahagian bawah kepala tajuk tersebut tidak berniat untuk membawa maksud apa-apa tuduhan sebagaimana yang diaktakan oleh plaintif. Dengan itu, apabila kepala tajuk tersebut dibaca, tidak mungkin seorang yang munasabah akan menganggapnya sebagai tuduhan berunsur libel sepertimana dikatakan (lihat ms 191H–192A, F–G); Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 diikut. (4) Sewajarnya, mahkamah berpuas hati yang plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa kandungan-kandungan laporan tersebut, yang merupakan perkara pokok tindakan semasa, berunsur fitnah dan atas alasan ini sahaja, tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan boleh ditolak dengan kos (lihat ms 194C–D). (5) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan plaintif bahawa defendan di bawah satu kewajipan, yang dikenakan di bawah undang-undang libel, untuk menerbitkan berita terkini berkaitan kedudukan prosiding kebankrapan yang dimulakan terhadap plaintif atau membuat apa-apa usaha yang patut untuk memastikan berita terkini berkaitan kedudukan prosiding kebankrapan sebelum ia menerbitkan perkara-perkara yang terkandung dalam laporan tersebut. Undang-undang libel memberikan satu remedi di mana seseorang yang difitnah

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secara libel melalui penerbitan perkataan-perkataan berunsur fitnah. Ganti rugi untuk peninggalan menerbit perkataan-perkataan bukan domain tort untuk libel. Ia boleh dikatakan di mana peninggalan sedemikian mengakibatkan kerugian kepada satu pihak, pihak tersebut boleh mendapat remedinya dalam tort untuk kecuaian, tetapi memandangkan undang-undang libel hanya membincangkan keadaan-keadaan di mana perkataan-perkataan yang diterbitkan, satu aduan terhadap peninggalan untuk menerbitkan, pada dasarnya, tidak boleh dimulakan dengan satu tindakan untuk libel. Undang-undang fitnah ||Page 185>>mengenakan satu kewajipan yang penting ke atas penerbit — untuk bercakap benar. Unsur-unsur dalam tort kecuaian tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan untuk digunakan bagi membuat kenyataan yang benar tetapi berunsur fitnah (lihat ms 194H–195D, 196C). (6) Walaupun dengan andaian plaintiff telah berjaya membuktikan perkataan-perkataan tersebut berunsur fitnah, defendan melalui keterangannya dan juga keterangan plaintif sendiri menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut pada amnya dan secara fakta adalah benar. Berdasarkan undang-undang, kebenaran atau justifikasi adalah pembelaan yang mutlak terhadap satu tindakan untuk libel atau slander. Jika kenyataan adalah benar, tiada niat jahat atau kepercayaan terhadap kepalsuan kenyataan tersebut membolehkan satu tindakan dibuat. Jika orang memikirkan perkara buruk berkenaan plaintif apabila mendengar kebenaran tentang beliau, maka reputasi beliau telah diturunkan ke tahap yang betul (lihat ms 196F, 197E–F).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434.

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (refd) Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 (folld) Balfour v Attorney-General [1991] 1 NZLR 519 (refd)

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Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney General [1989] 3 NZLR 148 (refd) Dato’ v SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 315 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (refd) Kapt (B) Hj Mohd Ismail v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (No 2) [2001] 5 CLJ 184 (refd) Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 (folld) Le Mercier’s Fine Furnishing Pte Ltd & Anor v Italcomm (M) Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 CLJ 590 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (folld) Pong Fee Voon v Piong Kien Siong & Ors [1999] 8 CLJ 383 (refd) Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd v RM Insurance Underwriting Agency Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 5 CLJ 321 (folld) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (folld) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Stubbs, Ld v Russel [1913] AC 386 (folld) ||Page 186>> Uniphone Sdn Bhd v Chin Boon Lit & Anor [1998] 6 MLJ 441 (refd) Zolkefly bin Haron v Yahya bin Chik & Anor [2001] 62 MLJ 1 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 3 Defamation Act 1957

Philip Chai (CW Kok with him) (Soo Thien Ming & Nashrah) for the plaintiff. Haris Mohd Ibrahim (Nor Isman Ismail with him) (Liza Chan & Co) for the defendant.

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[2003] 4 MLJ 216 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BHD & ORS V KHOO NEE KIONG

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL PROCEEDINGS NO 22–623 OF 2001 SU GEOK YIAM JC 5 JULY 2003

Civil Procedure — Parties — Proper parties to be sued, whether — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements on the internet — Whether defendant was person who had sent e-mails — Whether defendant was person who had operated website

Evidence — Documentary evidence — Computer printout — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements — Whether mandatory for plaintiffs to exhibit certificate pursuant to s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 in respect of the computer printouts containing impugned statements in their application for the interim injunction

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication on internet — Application for inter partes interim injunction to restrain defendant from publishing impugned statements — Whether impugned statements calculated to injure reputation of plaintiffs — Whether impugned statements had been published to third parties — Whether plaintiffs suffered irreparable loss and damage by reason of publication — Whether plaintiffs in financial position to meet undertaking as to damages — Whether there was delay on plaintiffs’ part in bringing application

Tort — Passing off — Name of business — Domain names — Defendant registered domain names containing the word ‘Petronas’ — Application for inter partes interim injunction to

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restrain defendant from passing off website with domain name comprising word ‘Petronas’ — Whether defendant had eroded exclusive goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’ — Whether domain names were instruments of fraud — Whether use of domain names by defendant would result in passing off — Whether plaintiffs had shown that there was threat of passing off and trademark infringement on defendant’s part

The first plaintiff was a well-known national petroleum corporation. The second plaintiff was one of the marketing arms of the first plaintiff and the third plaintiff was in the business of processing and transmitting natural gas and it conducted its gas business under the trade name ‘Petronas Gas’. The defendant was an individual carrying out trading operations as a registered sole proprietor under the trade/business name ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ and was in no way associated with the plaintiffs. Sometime in 2001, the plaintiffs made a series of searches of domain names on the Internet using the search engine ‘better-whois.com’ and discovered that the defendant had registered the domain names ‘petronas-dagangan.com’, ‘petronasgas.com’, ‘mypetronasdagangan.com’ and ‘mypetronas.com’ (‘the said domain names’) for purposes of sale. The defendant had also maintained a website under the name ‘www.petronasgas.com’ (‘the Petronas website’) which purported to provide information on, ||Page 217>>inter alia, the locality of the plaintiffs’ service stations. A printout of the main webpage of the Petronas website showed that it was maintained by the defendant. The Petronas website was also accessible via ‘URL HTTP://www.searchmalaysia.com’ (‘the searchmalaysia website’). On the searchmalaysia website, the domain name ‘petronasgas.com’ was described as a subsidiary of ‘searchmalaysia. com’. In response to a request from the first plaintiff to the defendant to transfer to the first plaintiff the registration of the said domain names on the ground that ‘Petronas’ was the first plaintiff’s trade name worldwide and the intellectual property rights in the trade name belonged to the first plaintiff, the defendant had published certain statements via e-mail (‘the impugned statements’) which the plaintiffs averred clearly referred to the plaintiffs and were defamatory. In this application, the plaintiffs sought the following reliefs on the grounds of passing off of domain names and defamation: (a) an inter partes interim injunction to restrain the defendant from: (i) passing off or attempting to pass off any website with a domain name comprising the word ‘Petronas’ which was

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not related to a website connected with the plaintiffs; (ii) making any representation to any registrar of domain names that the defendant was connected or associated with the plaintiffs and/or the name ‘Petronas’ and the goodwill subsisting therein; and (iii) registering or attempting to register on the internet any domain name containing the word ‘Petronas’; and (b) an inter partes interim injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing or posting or disseminating the impugned statements.

Held, allowing the plaintiffs’ application: (1) The plaintiffs had shown that the name in the e-mail address was that of the defendant and that the defendant was the sole proprietor of Araneum Consulting Services and that both the websites were operated by Araneum Consulting Services. The searches conducted by the plaintiffs on the said domain names showed that the registrants were the defendant, Araneum Consulting Services and ‘[email protected] for sales’. Further, the offensive e-mail also carried the hand phone number of the defendant. In the circumstances of this case, the court was more than satisfied that it was most probably the defendant who had sent the e-mail and who had set up the webpage and it followed, therefore, that the plaintiffs had sufficiently identified the defendant for the purposes of the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs in this application (see pp 233A–B, 235F, 236G–H). (2) It was not mandatory for the plaintiffs to exhibit a certificate pursuant to s 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the Act’) in respect of the computer printouts containing the impugned statements in the affidavit-in-support of their application for the interim injunctions. This was because at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs only had to show a bona fide case or a serious question ||Page 218>>to be tried and there was no necessity for the plaintiffs to show a prima facie case. The deponent of the plaintiffs’ affidavit-in-support had deposed that the contents of the affidavit were within his personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. The defendant had not challenged nor disputed the deponent’s affidavit-in-reply. The plaintiffs would only have to tender the s 90A certificate if the plaintiffs did not wish to call the officer who

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had personal knowledge as to the production of the computer printouts by the computer to testify to that effect in the trial proper (see pp 236H–I, 237F–H). (3) The impugned statements were manifestly defamatory. The plaintiffs had shown that the natural and ordinary meaning of the impugned statements was that: (a) the plaintiffs did not have any lawful claim to any domain name containing the word ‘Petronas’; (b) the plaintiffs were in the habit of resorting to strong-arm tactics to oppress and intimidate other local companies and/or local business entities; (c) the plaintiffs were attempting or have in the past attempted to extort money from local companies or business entities by forcing them to transfer domain names to the plaintiffs for free; (d) the plaintiffs consistently behaved in an arrogant or high-handed fashion to oppress and intimidate other local companies and/or local entities; (e) the plaintiffs had acted like a ‘robber’ and their actions may be likened to a form of theft; and (f) the legal services department of the plaintiffs was generally incompetent and/or ignorant. Secondly, the plaintiffs had shown that the impugned statements were: (a) calculated to injure the reputation of the plaintiffs by exposing them to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (b) intended to lower the plaintiffs in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally; (c) calculated to injure and disparage the plaintiffs’ reputation in the plaintiffs’ office, profession and trade; and (d) intended to bring the plaintiffs, by virtue of their standing, honour and integrity, into public scandal, odium and contempt. Thirdly, the plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that the impugned statements had been published to third parties. Fourthly, the plaintiffs had shown that by reason of the publication of the impugned statements, the plaintiffs had suffered grave injury to their trading personality and irreparable loss and damage and would continue to suffer such irreparable loss and damage. Fifthly, the court was satisfied that there had been no improper delay on the part of the plaintiffs in bringing this application because the existence of the Petronas website maintained by the defendant was only discovered by the plaintiffs on or about the end of November 2001 and the defendant’s official response to the plaintiffs’ solicitors was only received on 5 December 2001. Finally, the plaintiffs had given an undertaking as to damages and the court was satisfied that the plaintiffs were in a strong financial position to meet their

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undertaking should the defendant win at the trial (see pp 240I–241F, 242E–F, H–243B). ||Page 219>> (4) By registering the said domain names which contained the word ‘Petronas’, there was a serious issue to be tried in that the defendant was making a false representation to persons who may have consulted the register that the registrant, ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ was connected or associated with the name registered and thus the owner of the goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’. By registering the said domain names, the defendant had eroded the exclusive goodwill in the name ‘Petronas’ which had cause damage to the plaintiffs. The said domain names were instruments of fraud and any realistic use of them as domain names would result in passing off. This would cause irreparable injury and damage to the plaintiffs and by virtue of this, the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated that since the said domain names contained the word ‘Petronas’, the court can assume that the intention of the defendant in using the said domain names was to deceive the public by passing off himself as part of the Petronas group of companies or his business or products as those of the plaintiffs’. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs had shown that there was a threat of passing off and trademark infringement on the defendant’s part which was likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers of the plaintiffs’ products, thereby resulting in irreparable injury and damage to the plaintiffs’ trade, business and goodwill. Therefore, as the plaintiffs had provided an undertaking as to damages, the interim injunction sought for ought to be granted (see p 246B–H); British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama adalah satu perbadanan petroleum nasional yang terkenal. Plaintif kedua merupakan salah satu cabang pemasaran plaintif pertama dan plaintif ketiga

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merupakan satu perniagaan memproses dan mengalirkan gas semulajadi dan ia mengendalikan perniagaan gasnya di bawah nama dagangan ‘Petronas Gas’. Defendan adalah seorang individu yang menjalankan operasi-operasi dagangan sebagai seorang tuanpunya tunggal berdaftar di bawah nama dagangan/perniagaan ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ dan tiada kaitan langsing dengan plaintif-plaintif. Sekitar tahun 2001, plaintif-plaintif telah membuat rangkaian carian ke atas nama-nama domain dalam internet dengan menggunakan enjin carian ‘better-whois.com’ dan mendapati bahawa defendan mempunyai nama-nama domain berdaftar ‘petronas-dagangan.com’, ‘petronasgas.com’, ‘mypetronasdagangan.com’ dan ‘mypetronas.com’ (‘nama-nama domain tersebut’) bagi tujuan jualan. Defendan juga menyenggarakan satu laman web di bawah nama ‘www.petronasgas.com’ (‘laman web Petronas tersebut’) yang bertujuan memberikan maklumat tentang, antara lain, tempat stesen-stesen khidmat plaintif-plaintif. Cetakan ||Page 220>>laman web utama kepada laman web Petronas tersebut menunjukkan bahawa ia diselenggarakan oleh defendan. Laman web Petronas tersebut juga boleh dimasuki melalui ‘URL HTTP://www.searchmalaysia.com’ (‘laman web searchmalaysia tersebut’). Pada laman web searchmalaysia tersebut, nama-nama domain ‘petronasgas.com’ digambarkan sebagai satu anak syarikat ‘searchmalaysia. com’. Sebagai membalas permintaan dari plaintif kepada defendan untuk memindahkan kepada plaintif pertama nama-nama domain tersebut atas alasan bahawa ‘Petronas’ merupakan nama dagangan pertama seluruh dunia plaintif dan hak-hak harta intelektual dalam nama dagangan tersebut terletak pada plaintif pertama, defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan tertentu melalui e-mel (‘kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan’) yang plaintif-plaintif mengegaskan dengan jelas merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif dan adalah berunsur fitnah. Dalam permohonan ini, plaintif-plaintif telah memohon relief-relief berikut atas alasan kelirupaan nama-nama domain dan fitnah: (a) satu injunksi interim inter partes untuk menyekat defendan dari: (i) kelirupaan atau cubaan untuk mengekelirupakan apa-apa laman web dengan suatu nama domain yang mengandungi nama ‘Petronas’ yang tiada kaitan dengan satu laman web yang berkaitan dengan plaintif-plaintif; (ii) membuat apa-apa representasi kepada mana-mana pendaftar nama-nama domain bahawa defendan mempunyai kaitan atau hubungan dengan plaintif-plaintif dan/atau nama ‘Petronas’ dan nama baik yang wujud; dan (iii) mendaftar atau cuba untuk mendaftar dalam internet apa-apa nama domain yang

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mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’; dan (b) satu injunksi interim inter partes untuk menyekat defendan dari menerbit atau mempos atau mengedarkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan plaintif: (1) Plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa nama dalam alamat e-mel tersebut adalah alamat defendan dan bahawa defendan adalah tuanpunya tunggal Araneum Consulting Services dan bahawa kedua-dua laman web tersebut dikendalikan oleh Araneum Consulting Services. Carian-carian yang dijalankan oleh plaintif-plaintif ke atas nama-nama domain tersebut menunjukkan bahawa pendaftar-pendaftarnya adalah defendan, Araneum Consulting Services dan ‘[email protected] for sales’. Tambahan pula, e-mel yang menjelikkan tersebut juuga mempunyai nombor telefon bimbit defendan. Dalam keadaan kes ini, mahkamah lebih dari berpuashati bahawa ia adalah berkemungkinan besar defendan yang menghantar e-mel tersebut dan yang telah memulakan halaman web tersebut dan ia diikuti, oleh demikian, bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah dengan memadai mengenalpasti defendan bagi tujuan relief injunksi yang dipohon oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam permohonan ini (lihat ms 233A–B, 235F, 236G–H). ||Page 221>> (2) Ia tidaklah mandatori untuk plaintif-plaintif mengekshibitkan satu sijil menurut s 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 (‘Akta tersebut’) berhubung ccetakan-cetakan komputer yang mengandungi kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut dalam afidavit sokongan permohonan mereka untuk injunksi-injunksi interim tersebut. Ini adalah kerana di peringkat prosiding ini, plaintif-plaintif hanya perlu menunjukkan satu kes bona fide atau satu persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan dan tiada keperluan untuk menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Deponen kepada afidavit sokongan plaintif telah mendeposkan bahawa isi kandungan afidavit tersebut adalah dalam pengetahuan peribadinya kecuali dinyatakan sebaliknya. Defendan tidak mencabar maupun mempertikaikan afidavit jawapan deponen. Plaintif-plaintif hanya perlu menenderkan sijil s 90A jika plaintif-plaintif tidak berhasrat untuk memanggil pegawai yang mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi tersebut berhubung penghasilan cetakan-cetakan

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komputer oleh komputer untuk memberi keterangan mengenainya dalam perbicaraan sebenar (lihat ms 236H–I, 237F–H). (3) Kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut memang berunsur fitnah. Plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa maksud semulajadi dan biasa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut adalah bahawa: (a) plaintif-plaintif tidak mempunyai hak yang sah ke atas mana-mana nama domain yang mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’; (b) menjadi amalan plaintif-plaintif menggunakan taktik-taktik kekerasan untuk menindas dan menakut-nakutkan syarikat-syarikat tempatan dan/atau entiti-entiti perniagaan tempatan yang lain; (c) plaintif-plaintif cuba atau sebelum ini pernah mencuba untuk memeras wang daripada syarikat-syarikat tempatan atau entiti-entiti perniagaan dengan memaksa mereka memindahkan nama-nama domain kepada plaintif-plaintif dengan percuma; (d) plaintif-plaintif sentiasa bersikap angkuh atau melakukan perbuatan menindas yang begitu angkuh untuk menindas atau menakut-nakutkan syarikat-syarikat tempatan dan/atau entiti-entiti tempatan; (e) plaintif-plaintif telah bertindak seperti ‘robber’ dan tindakan-tindakan mereka boleh disifatkan sebagai membentuk pencurian; dan (f) jabatan perkhidmatan undang-undang plaintif-plaintif secara amnya tidak kompeten dan/atau bersikap tidak tahu. Kedua, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut: (a) dikira akan menjejaskan reputasi plaintif-plaintif dengan mendedahkan mereka kepada kebencian, penghinaan atau cemuhan; (b) bertujuan untuk merendah-rendahkan plaintif-plaintif pada anggapan masyarakat umum yang waras; (c) dikira untuk menjejas dan merendah-rendahkan reputasi plaintif-plaintif dalam jawatan, profesion dan dagangan plaintif-plaintif; dan (d) bertujuan untuk menjatuhkan plaintif-plaintif, menurut kedudukan, maruah dan integriti plaintif-plaintif, ke dalam skandal awam, rasa benci dan penghinaan. Ketiga, plaintif- ||Page 222>>plaintif telah menunjukkan dengan memadai bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut telah diterbitkan kepada pihak-pihak ketiga. Keempat, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa oleh sebab penerbitan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut, plaintif-plainti telah mengalami kerosakan pada personaliti dagangan dan kerugian yang tidak boleh diperbaiki dan akan berterusan mengalami kerugian

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dan kerosakan yang tidak boleh dipulihkan. Kelima, mahkamah berpuashati bahawa tiada kelewatan yang tidak betul berlaku di pihak plaintif-plaintif dengan memulakan permohonan ini kerana kewujudan laman web Petronas yang diselenggarakan oleh defendan hanya diketahui oleh plantif-plaintif pada atau akhir bulan November 2001 dan jawapan rasmi defendan kepada peguamcara-peguamcara plaintif-plaintif hanya diterima pada 5 Disember 2001. Akhirnya, plaintif-plaintif telah memberikan satu akujanji berhubung ganti rugi dan mahkamah berpuashati bahawa plaintif-plaintif mempunyai kemampuan kewangan yang kukuhs untuk memenuhi akujanji mereka sekiranya defendan berjaya dalam perbicaraan (lihat ms 240I–241F, 242E–F, H–243B). (4) Dengan mendaftar nama-nama domain yang mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’, terdapat persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan di mana defendan telah membuat representasi yang tidak benar kepada mereka yang pernah berunding dnegan pendaftar bahawa si pendaftar, ‘Araneum Consulting Services’ adalah berkaitan atau mempunyai hubungan dengan nama yang didaftarkan dan oleh itu tuanpunya nama baik dalam nama ‘Petronas’. Dengan mendaftar nama-nama domain tersebut, defendan telah menghakis nama baik eksklusif dalam nama ‘Petronas’ yang telah menyebabakan reputasi plaintif-plaintif terjejas. Nama-nama domain tersebut adalah unsur-unsur fraud dan apa-apa penggunaan realistiknya sebagai nama-nama domain akan mengakibatkan kelirupaan. Ini akan menyebabkan kerosakan dan kerugian yang tidak boleh dipulihkan kepada plaintif-plaintif dan menurut ini, imbangan kesesuaian berpihak menyebelahi plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif dengan memadai telah menunjukkan bahawa memendangkan nama-nama domain tersebut mengandungi perkataan ‘Petronas’, mahkamah boleh mengandaikan bahaw niat defendan untuk menggunakan nama-nama domain tersebutadalah untuk memperdayakan orang awam dengan mengelirupakan dirinya sebagai sebahagian dari kumpulan syarikat Petronas atau perniagaan atau produk-produknya sebagai perniagaan atau produk-produk plaintif-plaintif. Dalam keadaan ini, plaintif-plaintif telah menunjukkan bahawa terdapat ugutan kelirupaan dan pelanggaran tanda dagangan di pihak defendan yang berkemugkinan menyebabkan kekeliruan pada pemikiran pengguna produk-produk plaintif-plaintif, yang akan mengakibatkan kerosakan dan

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kerugian yang tidak boleh dipulihkan kepada dagangan, perniagaan dan nama baik plaintif-plaintif. Oleh itu, memandangkan plaintif- ||Page 223>>plaintif telah memberikan akujanji berhubung ganti rugi, injunksi interim yang dipohon sepatutnya diberikan (lihat ms 246B–H); British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 diikut.]

Notes For cases on documentary evidence of computer printouts, see 7(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2003 Reissue) paras 1104–1112. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on passing off, name of business, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 1421. For cases on the proper parties to be sued, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4322–4328.

Cases referred to Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Or v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (refd) American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (refd) British Telecommunications plc and another v One In A Million Ltd and others and other actions [1998] 4 All ER 476 (folld) Company of Proprietors of Selby Bridge Ltd v Sunday Telegraph Ltd (1966) 197 Estates Gazette 1077 (refd) D and L Caterers Ltd and Jackson v D’Ajou [1945] KB 3649; [1945] 1 All ER 563 (refd) Directors of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co v Broadbent (1859) 7 HL Cas 600 (refd)

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Fullwood v Fullwood (1878) 9 Ch D 176 (refd) Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v PP [1997] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Leather Cloth Co Ltd v American Leather Cloth Co Ltd (1865) 11 HL Cas 523 (refd) Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Lewis v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) Linotype Co Ltd v British Empire Type-Setting Machine Co Ltd (1899) 81 LT 331 (refd) Lyan v Lipton (1914) 49 L Jo 542 (refd) Magnolia Metal Co v Tandem Smelting Syndicate Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 477 (refd) Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins (1859) 4 H & N 87 (refd) Martin v Price [1894] 1 Ch 276 (refd) New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd, The v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (refd) Potts v Leyy (1854) 2 Drew 272 (refd) ||Page 224>> Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149; [1953] 1 All ER 179 (refd) Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Beall (1882) 20 Ch D 501 (refd) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Rubber Improvement Ltd v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Spottiswoode v Clark (1846) 2 Ch 154 (refd) Takenaka (United Kingdom) Ltd and Anor v Frankl [2001] EWCA CIV 348 (refd) Slazengers Ltd v C Gibbs & Co (1916) 33 TLR 35 (refd) South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (refd) Spalding & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449 (refd) Standard Chartered Bank v Mukah Singh [1996] 3 MLJ 240 (refd)

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United States v Smith 918 F 2d 1501 (refd) USA v Siddiqui US 11th Circuit Court of Appeals No 98-6994 (refd) Williams v Beaumont (1833) 10 Bing 260 (refd) Wood v Conway Coon [1914] 2 Ch 47 (refd)

Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 Evidence Act 1952 ss 62 explanation 3, 90A, 90B Federal Rules of Evidence [US] ss 901(a), (b)(4) Petroleum Development Act 1974 s 3(1)

Tai Foong Lam (Lee Hishammuddin) for the plaintiff. Ravin Vello (Lee Khai with him) (Tasn Beng Hong) for the defendant.

[2003] 4 MLJ 345 MAHADEVI A/P NADCHATIRAM v THIRUCHELVASEGARAM A/L MANICKANICKAVASEGAR

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02–22 OF 2001(W) STEVE SHIM CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK), ABDUL MALEK AHMAD FCJ AND MOKHTAR SIDIN JCA 3 SEPTEMBER 2003

Tort — Defamation — Absolute privilege — Whether statement was defamatory — Whether absolute privilege applied

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Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Whether statement was published — Whether defence of fair comment applied

There were various overlapping issues and preliminary objections before the court but the main issues for consideration concerned alleged defamatory statements (referred to as the ‘third defamation’ and the ‘seventh defamation’). The third defamation was based on the allegation that on 12 October 1993 at the courthouse of the High Court of Seremban and in the presence of several advocates and solicitors and members of the public, the appellant falsely and maliciously published concerning the respondent and of him in relation to his behaviour and conduct and in the way of this profession, the following words, ‘The several actions were brought by Vishi’s husband to cover-up the incest committed by Segaram with Shanti’. The seventh defamation was based on the writing at the back of the last page of the serving copy of a writ for Suit No 04. Suit No 04 was filed by the respondent. After the sealed copy of the writ was extracted, it was served on the appellant. Instead of the normal practice of affixing the signature at the rear of the seving copy, the appellant wrote and while writing, read out aloud to her staff present the following, ‘Segaram, I am not your enemy but your friend, I have not read your summons. It is most unfair for you to chase and harass me continously since London days in 1960s — that time you wrote to complain about me going out with white boys to my parents and now you keep chasing me’. With regard to the seventh defamation, the defendant argued that the statement was written in the private office and thereafter placed in a sealed envelope marked ‘private and confidential’.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) The utterance with regard to the third defamation was scandalous based on the facts that: (a) there was not truth in the allegation of incest by the respondent; (b) the remark was actually uttered by the appellant; (c) absolute privilege does not apply to any statement made not in the course of legal proceedings. The statement uttered by the appellant there was really an outburst to ||Page 346>> defame the respondent and the appellant could not rely on qualified privilege or absolute privilege (see p 353E–H).

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(2) With regard to the seventh defamation, as an advocate and solicitor, the defendant would be aware of the rules and procedures that require such an acknowledgement copy of a serving writ to be exhibited to an affidavit of service. With such a practice she would have known that there could not be no confidentiality for this document (see p 354G–I). (3) Although there seems to be some truth of the harrassment by the respondent, this was actually due to his frustration in not being able to gain control of this daughter and not because of any infatuation for the appellant. With regard to the incident that happened in London, even if true, it took place too long ago to be of any relevance and effect (see p 355B–C). (4) On the appellant’s claim of fair comment, the matter attracts no interest to the public. It is entirely a private family squabble (see p 355C–D).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Terdapat pelbagai persoalan-persoalan bertindan dan bantahan-bantahan awal di hadapan mahkamah tetapi persoalan-persoalan penting untuk dipertimbangkan adalah berkaitan kenyataan-kenyataan yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah (dirujuk sebagai ‘fitnah ketiga’ dan ‘fitnah ketujuh’). Fitnah ketiga berdasarkan pengataan bahawa pada 12 Oktober 1993 di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban dan dalam kehadiran beberapa orang peguambela dan peguamcara dan orang awam, perayu telah secara palsu dan berniat jahat menerbitkan berkaitan responden dan beliau berhubung kelakuan dan perbuatan beliau dan juga dalam profesyen ini, perkataan-perkataan berikut, ‘The several actions were brought by Vishi’s husband to cover-up the incest commintted by Segaram with Shanti’. Fitnah ketujuh berdasarkan tulisan di bahagian belakang mukasurat terakhir salinan penyampaian satu writ untuk Guaman No 04. Guaman No 04 telah difailkan oleh responden. Selepas salinan writ yang dimeteraikan telah dikeluarkan, ia telah disampaikan ke atas perayu. Dari amalan biasa menurunkan tandatangan di bahagian belakang salinan penyampaian, perayu telah menulis dan sementara menulis, telah membaca dengan kuat kepada kakitangan beliau seperti berikut, ‘Segaram, I am not your enemy but your friend, I have not read your summons. It is most unfair for you to

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chase and harass me continously since London days in 1960s — that time you wrote to complain about me going out with white bouys to my parents and now you keep chasing me’. Berhubung fitnah ketujuh tersebut, defendan menghujahkan bahawa kenyataan tersebut telah ditulis di pejabat persendirian dan selepas itu telah dimasukkan ke dalam sampul surat bertanda ‘sulit dan rahsia’. ||Page 347>>

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: (1) Ucapan berhubung fitnah ketiga menimbulkan skandal berdasarkan fakta-fakta bahawa: (a) tidak ada kebenaran dalam pengataan sumbang mahram tersebut oleh responden; (b) kenyataan tersebut sebenarnya diucapkan oleh perayu; (c) perlindungan mutlak tidak terpakai kepada apa-apa kenyataan yang tidak dibuat semasa prosiding menurut undang-undang. Kenyataan yang diucapkan oleh perayu hanyalah satu perasaan yang tiba-tiba naik radang untuk memfitnah responden dan perayu tidak boleh bergantung kepada perlindungan bersyarat ataupun perlindungan mutlak (lihat ms 353E–H). (2) Berhubung fitnah ketujuh, sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara, defendan harus sedar dengan peraturan-peraturan dan prosedur-prosedur yang diperlukakn untuk mengesahkan penyampaian salinan writ yang diekshibitkan kepada afidavit penyampaian. Dengan amalan itu beliau sepatutnya mengetahui bahawa tidak ada apa-apa yang rahsia tentang dokumen tersebut (lihat ms 354G–I). (3) Walaupun terdapat sedikit kebenaran tentang tentang gangguan oleh responde, ini adalah disebabkan oleh kekecewaan beliau kerana tidak dapat mengawal anak perempuan ini dan bukan kerana perasaan tergila-gila akan perayu. Berhubung kejadian yang berlaku di London, jikapun is benar, ia telah berlaku lama dahulu dan tidak mempunyai apa-apa relevan dan kesan (lihat ms 355B–C). (4) Berhubung tuntutan perayu untuk komen berpatutan, perkara tersebut tidak mempunyai kepentingan awam. Ia hanyalah satu pertelingkahan peribadi sebuah keluarga (lihat ms 355C–D).]

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Notes For cases on absolute privileges, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 230. For cases on fair comment, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 289–293.

Cases referred to Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 549 (refd) Capital Insurance Bhd v Aishah bte Abdul Manap & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 65 (refd) Dashtgard v Blair (1990) CCLT (2nd) 284 (folld) Demopolis v Peoples National Bank 796 p 2nd 426 (Wash 1990) (folld) Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 4 MLJ 1 (refd) Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237 (refd) Megat Najmuddin bin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) ||Page 348>> Minister for Human Resources, The v Thong Chin Yoong and another appeal [2001] 4 MLJ 225 (refd) Raphael Pura v Insas Bhd & Anor [2003] 1 MLJ 513 (refd) Watson v M’Ewan [1905] AC 480 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the Federal Court 1995, 47(4)

Civil Suits No S5–23–08 of 1997 consolidated with No S2(S5)–23–04 of 1997 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

KS Narayanan (Rishan Kumar with him) (Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the

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appellant. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Syarikat M Segaram) for the respondent.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case

[2003] 4 MLJ 494 JOCELINE TAN POH CHOO & ORS v V MUTHUSAMY

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO P–02–854 OF 2000 MOKHTAR SIDIN, ARIFIN ZAKARIA AND RAHMAH HUSSAIN JJCA 1 AUGUST 2003

Civil Procedure — DamagesA — ssessment of damages — Interest — Interest in defamation cases — No claim for interest on damage sought made in the writ of summons or statement of claim — No omnibus prayer in writ of claim seeking further or other relief — Whether court could in its discretion award interest on damages

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Court proceedings — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defamatory of plaintiff — Plaintiff a lawyer and member of state legislative assembly — Quantum of damages to be awarded

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages — Aggravated Damages — Failure to publish apology or retraction — Defence of absolute privilege — Apology or retraction would not be appropriate — Whether sufficient grounds for award of aggravated damages

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Plaintiff a lawyer and member of state legislative assembly — Whether quantum of damages

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awarded excessive

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Absolute privilege — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defence limited to report of proceedings in open court only — Whether defence applicable to report of statement in pleadings — Whether report of plaintiff’s pleadings a fair and accurate report of the proceedings

Tort — Defamation — Libel in newspaper — Court proceedings — Publication of report of proceedings in court — Whether defamatory of plaintiffQuantum of damages to be awarded

The defendants published an article reporting the suit of a driver who claimed to have been cheated of certain property as the result of an alleged conspiracy between a lawyer and another person. It was not in dispute that the ‘lawyer’ in the report referred to the plaintiff, a practicing lawyer and a state assemblyman. Accompanying the report was a photograph of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action claiming, inter alia, damages for libel against the author, the editor and the proprietor and publisher of the publication. The defendants relied on the defence of absolute privilege. The trial judge found that the defendants liable for libel and awarded RM300,000 in general damages, a further RM50,000 as aggravated damages, interest on the awards at 8% pa from the date of judgment and costs. The defendants appealed against the findings on liability and quantum. The plaintiff cross-appealed on the quantum and for interest on the awards to run from the date of the publication. ||Page 495>>

Held: (1) The first pertinent issue for determination was whether the report was defamatory of the plaintiff. Any reasonable person reading the report would form the opinion that the plaintiff was a cheat and a dishonest person, not fit to practise law or to hold public office. The finding of the trial judge that the report was defamatory of the plaintiff was thus upheld (see pp 500D, 501B); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 referred.

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(2) The critical issue here was whether the report was a fair and accurate report of the proceedings that had taken place in the open court. In order to be so regarded, the report should be confined to what was publicly heard in open court and not to matters contained in documents filed in court. Privilege will not attach to the publication of the contents of pleadings, affidavits or other papers which, although filed in civil proceedings, are not brought up in open court (see p 502C–D); McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] 1 WLR 855 distinguished and Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 referred. (3) In the present case defendants admitted that the article was based in part on the evidence given in open court, as well as on the statement of claim. The trial judge found that the report was primarily based on the statement of claim rather than on what had taken place in the open court. The publication of parts of the amended statement of claim, not having been read out in open court, was not within the scope of the protection given by the defence of absolute privilege (see p 503E, 504B, D). (4) The libel was contained in a newspaper article related to an on-going civil suit. The report merely contained allegations made by the driver against the lawyer. Such allegations were not uncommon in a court of law. The defendants were not free from blame but it is a question of degree. Judged in that light, and in the current trend of award of damages for libel in this country, the award by the trial judge was grossly excessive. The award of general damages was reduced from RM300,000 to RM100,000 (see p 506H–507A). (5) Whether a defendant’s failure or refusal to retract or to make a satisfactory correction of an report would render a defendant liable to aggravated damages depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Here, the want of apology could not, without more, have aggravated the plaintiff’s injury. The appellants had relied wholly on the statutory defence of absolute privilege, where an apology or retraction would not be appropriate. There was no evidence that the defendant’s conduct had been motivated by malice. The award of aggravated damages was thus wholly unwarranted and was set aside (see p 507H, 508B–C). ||Page 496>>

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(6) The award of interest should run from the date of publication of the reports (see p 508E–F); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia Summary

Defendan telah melaporkan tindakan yang difailkan oleh seorang pemandu yang mendakwa telah ditipu hartanahnya akibat suatu komplot antara seorang peguam dan seorang lagi. Adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa ‘peguam’ dalam laporan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif , seorang peguambela bertauliah yang juga ahli dewan undangan negeri. Laporan tersebut diiringi suatu gambar plaintif. Plaintif membawa tindakan menuntut, antara lain, ganti rugi bagi finath dari pengarang, penyunting serta tuanpunya dan penerbit akhbar tersebut. Defendan bergantung kepada pembelaan hak istimewa mutlak. Hakim perbicaraan mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab bagi fitnah tersebut dan memberikan award RM300,000 sebagai ganti rugi am, RM50,000 selanjutnya bagi ganti rugi peruncingan, faedah ke atas award pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman dan kos. Defendan merayu ke atas pendapatan mengenai liabiliti dan kuantum. Plaintif juga telah merayu balas ke atas kuantum dan memohon faedah dikira dari tarikh penerbitan laporan tersebut.

Diputuskan: (1) Isu relevan pertama yang perlu dikenalpasti sama ada laporan tersebut memfitnahkan plaintif. Seorang yang munasabah yang membaca laporan tersebut pasti berpendapat bahawa plaintif seorang penipu dan tidak jujur, tidak layak mengamal undang-undang atau memegang jawatan awam. Pendapat hakim perbicaraan bahawa laporan tersebut telah memfitnahkan plaintif dikekalkan (lihat ms 500D, 501B); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 dirujuk. (2) Isu penting di sini sama ada laporan tersebut suatu laporan adil dan tepat persidangan yang diadakan dalam mahkamah terbuka. Bagi menepati kehendak ini, laporan tersebut harus dihadkan kepada apa yang telah dibentangkan dalam

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mahkamah terbuka dan bukannya kepada perkara yang terkandung dalam dokumen yang difailkan dalam mahkamah. Hak istimewa tidak wujud kepada penerbitan kandungan sebarang pliding, afidavit atau dokumen lain yang, walaupun telah difailkan di mahkamah, tidak dibentangkan dalam mahkamah terbuka (lihat ms 502C–D); McCarey v Associated Newspaper [1964] 1 WLR 855 dibeza dan Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 dirujuk. (3) Dalam kes ini defendan mengaku laporan tersebut berasaskan dari keterangan yang diberikan dalam mahkamah terbuka, ||Page 497>> mahupun dari pernyataan tuntutan. Hakim perbicaraan mendapati laporan tersebut terutamanya berasaskan pernyataan tuntutan dan bukannya pada persidangan mahkamah terbuka. Penerbitan sebahagian pernyataan tuntutan, yang tidak dibentangkan dalam mahkamah terbuka, bukannya dalam skop perlindungan yang diberikan oleh pembelaan hak istimewa mutlak (lihat ms 503E, 504B,D). (4) Fitnah yang terkandung dalam laporan tersebut berkaitan suatu tuntutan sivil yang berterusan. Laporan tersebut hanya mengandungi dakwaan yang dibuat pemandu tersebut terhadap peguam tersebut. Dakwaan sebegitu lazimnya dibuat dalam mahkamah unbdang-undang. Walaupun defendan bersalah, ia persoalan setakat mana ia bersalah. Jika dilihat sebegini, dan aliran award-award ganti rugi dalam kes fitnah dalam negeri, award hakim perbicaraan jelas keterlaluan. Award bagi ganti rugi am dikurangkan dari RM300,000 kepada RM100,000 (lihat ms 506H–507A). (5) Sama ada kegagalan atau keengganan seseorang defendan menarik balik atau membetulkan sesuatu laporan menjadikannya bertanggungjawab terhadap ganti rugi teruk tertakluk kepada fakta dan keadaan sesuatu kes. Di sini, ketiadaan pembetulan laporan tersebut tidak, tanpa keterangan lain, menjejaskan kedudukan plaintif. Defendan berpegang kepada pembelaan statutori hak istimewa mutlak, di mana sesuatu pembetulan atau penarikan balik tidak memadai. Tiada sebarang keterangan menunjukkan bahawa defendan berniat jahat terhadap plaintif. Award ganti rugi teruk tidak wajar dan diketepikan (lihat ms 507H, 508B–C). (6) Faedah yang ditawarkan harus dikira dari tarikh penerbitan laporan tersebut

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(lihat ms 508E–F); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v D P Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 diikut.]

Notes For cases on assessment of damages, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 1919–1927. For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on libel in newspaper, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) para 440.

Cases referred to Capital and Countries Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 (refd) Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 113 AL 577 (refd) Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 2 SCR 1130 Jones v Skeiton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) ||Page 498>> Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoe & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2000] 4 MLJ 77 (refd) Mc Carey v. Associated Newspaper [1964] 1 WLR 855 (distd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Praed v Graham (1889) 24 QBD 53 (refd) Stern v Piper [1996] 2 All ER 385 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd)

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Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 11(1) Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888 [Eng]

Suit No 22–147 of 1992 (High Court, Pulau Pinang)

JA Yeoh (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the appellant. Dato’ V Muthusamy (C Prabhakaran with him) (V Muthusamy & Tan) for the respondent.

[2003] 5 MLJ 91 Chew Sew Khian @ Chew Hua Seng v Saniboey Mohd Ismail & Ors

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL SUIT NO (MT–1) 22–24 OF 1999 SYED AHMAD HELMY JC 23 JULY 2002

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspaper — Identity of plaintiff — Whether plaintiff was the person referred to in article

The plaintiff claimed against the defendants for damages for libel in respect of an article published in the Johor edition of the newspaper Harian Metro. The article stated that the district Police was pursuing a ‘jurujual’ known as Chew aged 56 years for cheating a timber merchant. The plaintiff claimed that by the article, the defendants meant and were understood by the readers to mean that the plaintiff was the person

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referred to in the article and that he was a cheat, untrustworthy, prepared to falsify documents and involved in criminal activities and was wanted by the police in connection with the activities aforesaid. By reason thereof, the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his credit and reputation and had been brought to public scandal, odium and contempt. The defendants proceeded in respect of the defence that the article did not refer to the plaintiff.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) A fair minded reader ‘not avid for scandal’ and not ‘unduly suspicious’ upon reading the article cannot be said to reasonably understand that the article and the words complained of refers to the plaintiff. The word specifically used was ‘jurujual’ (salesman) and not ‘ahli perniagaan’ (businessman). Nowhere in the article were the words ‘ahli perniagaan’ used. The word ‘jurujual’ means what it says, namely salesman and cannot by any stretch of imagination be extended to a businessman (see p 95B–C). (2) The cumulative effect of the evidence as presented would lead to the conclusion that a fair minded reader upon reading the article objectively would understand the article to refer to a salesman involved in the timber business who is being sought by the police, and hence the plaintiff cannot be said to fit in the descriptive category aforesaid (see p 95F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintiff telah menuntut terhadap defendan-defendan untuk gantirugi libel berhubung dengan suatu artikel yang diterbitkan di dalam suratkhabar Harian Metro edisi Johor. Artikel tersebut menyatakan bahawa polis daerah sedang mencari seorang ‘jurujual’ yang dikenali sebagai Chew, berumur 56 tahun kerana beliau telah menipu seorang saudagar balak. Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa melalui artikel tersebut, defendan-defendan bermaksud dan difahami oleh pembaca-pembaca untuk membawa makna plaintif merupakan orang yang dimaksudkan di dalam artikel tersebut dan bahawa beliau merupakan seorang penipu, tidak boleh dipercayai, sedia memalsukan

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dokumen dan terlibat dalam kegiatan jenayah dan dikejar oleh polis berkaitan kegiatan-kegiatan yang dikatakan itu. Oleh kerana itu, kebolehpercayaan dan reputasi plaintif telah terjejas dan beliau telah diheret ke dalam skandal awam, rasa benci dan penghinaan. Defendan-defendan memegang kepada pembelaan bahawa artikel tersebut tidak merujuk kepada plaintif.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Seorang pembaca yang berfikiran waras ‘not avid for scandal’ dan ‘unduly suspicious’ setelah membaca artikel tidak boleh dikatakan untuk faham secara munasabah bahawa artikel tersebut dan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk kepada plaintif. Perkataan-perkataan yang khusus digunakan adalah ‘jurujual’ dan bukan ‘ahli perniagaan’. Perkataan-perkataan ‘ahli perniagaan’ tidak digunakan di dalam artikel tersebut. Perkataan ‘jurujual’ bermakna seperti yang dikatakan, iaitu seorang jurujual dan tidak dapat dikatakan membawa makna seorang ahli perniagaan (lihat ms 95B–C). (2) Kesan kumulatif keterangan yang dikemukakan akan membawa kepada kesimpulan bahawa seorang pembaca yang berfikiran waras setelah membaca artikel tersebut secara objektif akan memahami artikel tersebut merujuk kepada seorang jurujual yang terlibat di dalam perniagaan balak yang sedang dikejar oleh polis dan oleh itu plaintif tidak boleh dikatakan merupakan orang yang digambarkan (lihat ms 95F).

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue), paras 263–352.

Cases referred to David Syme v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (refd)

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Appeal from:

Gobind Singh Deo (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Mohd Izral Khairi (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the first, third and fourth defendants.

[2003] 5 MLJ 481 J HENG CONSULTING SERVICES (M) SDN BHD & ANOR v THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (M) BHD

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–435 OF 2001 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 23 APRIL 2003

Tort — Damages — Aggravated damages — Whether the court should award aggravated damages — Present trend of award — Interest

Tort — Defamation — Freedom of speech — Duty of press in reporting court proceedings – Restriction imposed by law — Whether there is special privilege accorded to the press — Whether defendant recklessly and maliciously defamed the first plaintiff

The first plaintiff is engaged in providing professional secretarial services and advice to clients and has been so engaged for 20 years and has acquired a good reputation and is believed to have a good clientele from the Chinese business community. The second plaintiff, an accountant and a chartered secretary, was at all material times the managing director and the alter ego of the first plaintiff. The defendant is the foremost leading English daily in Malaysia with a very wide circulation. The defendant published

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a news article that one Tan Phaik Tin (‘Tan’), a company director from the first plaintiff was charged with four counts of forgery by using false resolutions. It was the case of the plaintiffs that at no time did they ever engage the services of, nor did they employ the said Tan. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant and contended that they suffered humiliation and felt defamed by the publication. The defendant entered appearance and filed an elaborate defence. Subsequently, the defendant and the plaintiffs recorded a consent judgment. Damages was awarded at RM200,000 but no aggravated or exemplary damages was awarded. Both parties were dissatisfied with that decision and appealed to the High Court.

Held, dismissing the defendant’s appeal: (1) Whilst the defendant has a duty to report on court proceedings, it must only report what is actually said in court. A distinction must be drawn between the right to ‘freedom of speech’ and the ‘freedom of the press’. Whilst the courts would endeavor to see that the right to freedom of speech is protected, there is no special privilege accorded to the press. It must conform and be liable for its publication just like any ordinary citizen if it transgresses the law relating to libel (see p 488E, H). (2) Neither the defendant nor its solicitors made a search at the Registry of Companies (‘the ROC’) to ascertain if Tan was a director of the first plaintiff. A search at the ROC would most certainly have shown that the first plaintiff had indeed been wronged; and at that very stage when the demand notice was ||Page 482>> received, the defendant could have, as requested in the demand letter, admitted liability and mitigated damages (see pp 487H–488A). (3) The adamant stand of the defendant with its ill-advised course of defence must lead the court to conclude that the defendant was reckless in its publication and was not concerned whether such an allegation was true or false. The defendant paid no heed to its publication and recklessly and maliciously defamed the first plaintiff (see p 489B–C). (4) The court declined to make an award of aggravated or exemplary damages because of the present trend to minimize the awards. The court found that the plaintiff had already been given a sufficiently reasonable award under general

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damages. The court, however, made the award of interest at 4% to run from the date of publication of the article to the date of assessment (see pp 489H–I, 490B); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama berniaga dengan memberikan perkhidmatan kesetiausahaan dan nasihat kepada pelanggan-pelanggan dan telah melakukan perkhidmatan tersebut selama 20 tahun dan mendapat nama baik serta dipercayai mempunyai hubungan yang baik dengan masyarakat peniaga China sebagai pelanggannya. Plaintif kedua, seorang akauntan dan setiausaha berkanun, adalah pada setiap masa matan pengarah urusan dan alter ego kepada plaintif pertama. Defendan adalah akhbar harian utama berbahasa Inggeris di Malaysia dengan sebaran yang luas. Defendan telah menerbitkan berita tentang Tan Phaik Tin (‘Tan’), seorang pengarah syarikat daripada plaintif pertama yang dituduh dengan empat pertuduhan pemalsuan melalui penggunaan resolusi-resolusi yang palsu. Plaintif-plaintif telah mengatakan bahawa mereka tidak pernah sesekalipun menggunakan khidmat atau menggaji Tan sebagai pekerja mereka. Plaintif-plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan dan menegaskan bahawa mereka telah dimalukan dan difitnah oleh penerbitan tersebut. Defendan telah memasuki kehadiran dan memfailkan satu pembelaan yang panjang lebar. Berikutan itu, defendan dan plaintif-plaintif telah merekodkan satu penghakiman persetujuan. Ganti rugi telah diawardkan sebanyak RM200,000 tetapi tiada ganti rugi teruk atau teladan telah diawardkan. Kedua-dua pihak berasa tidak puas hati dengan keputusan tersebut dan telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Tinggi.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan defendan: (1) Meskipun defendan mempunyai kewajipan untuk membuat laporan tentang prosiding mahkamah, ia hanya perlu melaporkan ||Page 483>> apa yang sebenarnya dikatakan dalam mahkamah. Satu perbezaan harus dinyatakan antara ‘kebebasan bersuara’ dan ‘kebebasan akhbar’.

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Walaupun mahkamah-mahkamah akan berusaha untuk memastikan bahawa hak kebebasan bersuara dilindungi, tiada apa-apa keistimewaan khas diberikan kepada akhbar. Ia harus akur dan bertanggungjawab terhadap penerbitannya seperti mana-mana warganegara biasa sekiranya ia melanggar undang-undang berkaitan (lihat ms 488E, H). (2) Defendan maupun peguamcaranya tidak membuat carian di Pendaftar Syarikat (‘PS’) untuk memastikan jika Tan adalah pengarah plaintif pertama. Satu carian di PS sudah pasti menunjukkan bahawa plaintif pertama memang telah teraniaya; dan pada peringkat tersebut di mana notis tuntutan diterima,. defendan sepatutnya seperti yang dikehendaki dalam notis tuntutan tersebut, mengaku bertanggungjawab dan meminta ganti rugi diringankan (lihat ms 487H–488A). (3) Pendirian tetap defendan untuk meneruskan dengan pembelaannya yang tidak bijak membawa mahkamah kepada kesimpulan bahawa defendan telah bersikap melulu dalam penerbitannya dan tidak peduli sama ada suatu pengataan itu benar atau palsu. Defendan tidak peduli tentang penerbitannya dan secara melulu dan dengan niat jahat telah memfitnah plaintif pertama (lihat ms 489B–C). (4) Mahkamah enggan untuk membuat satu award untuk ganti rugi teruk atau teladan kerana amalan sekarang yang mengurangkan jumlah award. Mahkamah mendapati plaintif telahpun diberikan satu award yang munasabah dan mencukupi di bawah ganti rugi am. Mahkamah, bagaimanapun, telah membuat award untuk faedah 4% bermula dari tarikh penerbitan artikel tersebut hingga tarikh penilaian (lihat ms 489H–I, 490B); Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 diikut.]

Notes For cases on aggravated damages, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 116. For cases on freedom of speech, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 248.

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Cases referred to Arnold v King Emperor (1914) 83 LJ PC 299 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2003] 2 MLJ 385 (folld) Langlands v Leng (1916) SC (HL) 102 (refd) Normala Samsudin v Keluarga Communications Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd) ||Page 484>> Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd)

John Khoo ( Ismail, Khoo & Assoc) for the plaintiffs. Harminder Kaur Gill ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.

[2003] 6 MLJ 433 DATO’ SERI TIONG KING SING v DATUK JUSTINE JINGGUT

HIGH COURT (BINTULU) — SUIT NO 22–14 OF 2002(BTU) SULAIMAN DAUD J 3 JULY 2003

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Pleadings — Offending statement reported in Chinese — Failure to plead actual words of offending statement — Whether action ought to be struck out for failure to reproduce actual words of offending statement — Whether actual words of offending statement must be set out in pleadings — Whether failure to set out actual words of offending statement fatal to action — Whether translation of gist of statement and identification of publication sufficient

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Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication — Defendant made offending statement at political party gathering — Statement reported in vernacular newspapers — Whether defendant responsible for re-publication — Defendant aware members of press present at meeting — Whether re-publication the natural consequence of the offending statement made by defendant

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Summary disposal — Whether court can summarily decide whether words complained of capable of bearing the meaning attributed to them — Supreme Court Rules (UK) O 82 r 3A — Whether such jurisdiction exists in Malaysia — Whether court ought to act under the Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19

Tort — Defamation — Slander — Actionable per se — Words calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business — Plaintiff a member of Parliament, a Justice of the Peace, CEO of a public listed company and adviser to clubs and associations — Whether such positions amount to the holding of an office, profession, calling, trade or business — Whether such action for slander ought to be struck out for want of proof of damages — Defamation Act 1957 s 5

The plaintiff was a member of Parliament and a member of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP). The defendant was the secretary general of the party. At a meeting with members of the party, the defendant allegedly spoke certain words defamatory of the plaintiffs. These words, or words to the like effect, were subsequently published in four local Chinese language newspapers. The plaintiff filed a claim for damages for libel and slander in respect of the speech and publications, in addition to other injunctionary relief related thereto. The defendant sought to strike out the plaintiff’s action. The defendant argued that, while the offending words were set out in full in the statement of claim and the publication of the offending words in the four newspapers were duly pleaded, the actual words in Mandarin as published in the newspapers were not reproduced. Only a translation thereof in English was set out in the pleadings. The defendant argued that the omission to state the words complained of, in the language they were published in the Chinese newspapers, was fatal to the plaintiff’s action for

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libel. The defendant also argued he could not be liable for libel as the words complained of were spoken and, in the absence of a plea for special damages, an action for libel ||Page 434>>could not be sustained. In any event, the defendant argued, the words complained of, as reproduced in the plaintiff’s statement of claim, were incapable of bearing any defamatory meaning as alleged by the plaintiff. Finally the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to allege special damage in the pleadings, thereby lacking an element of cause of action for slander. There was no averment that the words complained of were calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business for s 5 of the Defamation Act 1957 to apply. In the absence of such proof of special damage the plaintiff has no cause of action for slander against the defendant.

Held, dismissing the defendant’s application to strike out the action: (1) Although the alleged defamatory words were not stated in the statement of claim in the original language in which they were so published, such publication was specifically referred to in the statement of claim. The publications had been sufficiently identified. The translation of the alleged defamatory words in the language of the court in the statement of claim constituted sufficient cause of action for the purpose of striking out application. The omission to plead the actual words so spoken or published was not a fundamental defect which would nullify the pleadings. The question of whether the exact words complained of, which were in Chinese in the instant case, should be set out in the statement of claim, was not an issue for determination in an application to summarily strike out. Whether the same was the correct or accepted translation of the original publication was a question of fact to be determined at the trial upon examination of witnesses. The defendant was entitled to put the plaintiff to proof of all facts alleged in the statement of claim by the production of the original publications and by the examination of witnesses. It was open for the defendant to provide the court with his alternative version at the trial. This was not a plain and obvious case where the plaintiff’s writ and statement of claim could be struck out for want of cause of action (see pp 441C, G, 442A–D);

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Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 followed and Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 distinguished. (2) It was pleaded in the statement of claim that the defendant had falsely and maliciously intended to use, permit or cause the mass media or press to publish the defamatory allegations against the plaintiff, and the defendant well knew that the reporters of the newspaper were present at the meeting and that his impugned statements against the plaintiff would be published in newspapers. It was further pleaded that the defendant had caused or permitted to be published in the respective newspapers the words set out therein which were alleged to be defamatory of the plaintiff. It appeared the plaintiff has a cause of action in libel against the defendant. It was alleged that the defamatory words were spoken ||Page 435>>by the defendant in the presence of newspaper reporters. It could be said the publication of such defamatory words by the said newspapers was the natural consequence of the statement made by the defendant. The defendant himself should know or ought to have known that the words spoken by him, owing to its nature and content, would be picked up for republication (see p 443C–E, G–H); Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 distinguished and Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 followed. (3) The defendant argued that the court may, at any stage after service of the statement of claim, determine whether or not the words complained of were capable of bearing the particular meanings attributed to them. In support of this proposition he referred to a passage in Gatley on Slander & Libel (9th Ed). However that passage was nothing more than a restatement of the law as provided in O 82 r 3A of the Supreme Court Rules (UK). There is no such corresponding provision under our rules of court. While it cannot be doubted that the court was empowered, under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 or under its inherent jurisdiction, to dismiss an action on the ground that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action, such jurisdiction ought to be sparingly exercised, and only in very exceptional cases. Whether the words complained of were capable of the defamatory meaning attributed to

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them could only be resolved at a trial, upon a consideration of the context and circumstances in which the statement was made as a whole (see pp 445D–F, H–446A). (4) By virtue of s 5 of the Defamation Act 1957, a person who pursues any office, profession, calling, trade or business may have an action if slandered in respect of it. It was expressly pleaded in the statement of claim that the plaintiff was a member of Parliament, a Justice of the Peace, the chief executive officer of Wijaya Baru Global Berhad and the adviser to numerous clubs and associations in Sarawak. The plaintiff alleged that the words complained of was calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, profession, calling, trade or business which was actionable, without proof of special damages, even though not spoken directly to his vocation. The question as to whether any designation or post held by the plaintiff as pleaded in the statement of claim falls under the category office, trade or business cannot be determined solely on the pleading. Such a determination requires evidence to be adduced by witnesses at a trial. Likewise, the question as to whether the words complained of would disparage the plaintiff in such capacity was also a triable issue to be determined upon a consideration of the context of the words and the circumstances in which the same were so uttered (see pp 446E–F, 447A–C). ||Page 436>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif seorang ahli Parliamen dan ahli Parti Nasional Sarawak (SNAP). Defendan merupakan setiausaha agung parti tersebut. Pada suatu mesyuarat dengan ahli-ahli parti, defendan dikatakan telah melafazkan kata-kata yang memfitnahkan plaintif. Kata-kata ini, atau perkataan yang membawa maksud yang sama, telah diterbitkan dalam empat akhbar tempatan bahasa China. Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan ganti rugi bagi libel dan slander berkenaan dengan ucapan dan terbitan, sebagai tambahan kepada relief injunksi lain yang berkenaan. Defendan memohon membatalkan tuntutan plaintif. Defendan berhujah bahawa, walaupun kata-kata yang sama adakan itu tertera

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sepenuhnya di dalam pernyataan tuntutan dan penerbitan kata-kata tersebut dalam akhbar-akhbar telah diplidkan, kata-kata sebenarnya words dalam bahasa Mandarin seperti diterbitkan dalam akhbar-akhbar tersebut tidak diberikan. Hanya suatu terjemahan terbitan dalam bahasa Inggeris dinyatakan dalam pliding. Defendan berhujah bahawa peninggalan untuk menyatakan kata-kata yang diadukan, dalam bahasa ia diterbitkan dalam akhbar China, memudaratkan tindakan libel plaintif. Defendan juga mengatakan beliau tidak bertanggungjawab untuk libel memandangkan kata-kata yang diadukan itu telah dilafazkan dan, disebabkan tiada permintaan bagi ganti rugi khas, suatu tindakan bagi libel tidak patut wujud. Dalam apa keadaan, defendan mengatakan, kata-kata yang diadukan, sepertimana diterbitkan semula dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif, tidak dapat membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah sebagaiman yang dikatakan oleh plaintif. Akhirnya defendan mendakwa plaintif gagal menuntut ganti rugi khas dalam plidingnya, maka ada kekurangan suatu elemen kausa tindakan untuk slander. Tiada sebarang dakwaan bahawa kata-kata yang diadukan tersebut membawa maksud sama ada plaintif dalam sebarang jawatan, profesion, atau perniagaannya agar s 5 Akta Fitnah 1957 terpakai. Dengan ketiadaan bukti ganti rugi khas, plaintif tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan kerana slander terhadap defendan.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan defendan membatalkan tindakan: (1) Walaupun kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tidak dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan dalam bahasa asalnya yang diterbitkan, penerbitan tersebut telah dirujuk secara spesifik dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut. Penerbitan tersebut telah dikenalpasti secara memadai. Penterjemahan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tersebut dalam bahasa mahkamah dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut adalah memadai sebagai kausa tindakan bagi maksud suatu permohonan pembatalan. Kegagalan memplidkan kata-kata sebenar yang dilafazkan atau diterbitkan bukannya suatu kecacatan asas yang membawa kepada pembatalan pliding. Soalan sama ada kata-kata ||Page 437>>sebenarnya yang dakwa sama ada itu, dalam bahasa China dalam kes ini, wajib dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut, bukannya satu isu untuk diputuskan dalam suatu permohonan pembatalan terus. Sama ada kata-kata adalah penterjemahan yang betul dan dapat diterima akan penerbitan

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asal itu adalah persoalan fakta yang perlu diputuskan pada perbicaraan selepas pemeriksaan saksi. Defendan berhak menghendaki plaintif memberi bukti akan fakta-fakta yang didakwanya dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut dengan membawa penerbitan-penerbitan asal dan dengan pemeriksaan saksi. Defendan juga dapat memberikan kepada mahkamah versi alternatifnya semasa perbicaraan. Ini bukannya suatu kes yang jelas dan nyata di mana writ plaintif dan pernyataan tuntutan dapat di batal kerana ketiadaan kausa tindakan (lihat ms 441C, G, 442A–D); Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 diikut dan Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 dibeza. (2) Ia telah diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut bahawa defendan telah secara palsu dan niat jahat berniat untuk menggunakan, membenarkan atau menyebabkan media masa atau akhbar untuk menerbitkan pengataan-pengataan berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif, dan defendan memang mengetahui bahawa pemberita-pemberita dari akhbar hadir di mesyuarat tersebut dan pernyataan-pernyataan yang dipersoalkan terhadap plaintif akan diterbitkan dalam akhbar. Ia juga diplidkan bahawa defendan telah menyebabkan atau membenarkan diterbitkan dalam akhbar masing-masing kata-kata yang tertera dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut kata-kata yang didakwa sama ada plaintif itu. Nampaknya plaintif mempunyai suatu kausa tindakan libel terhadap defendan. Adalah dikatakan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah telah dilafazkan defendan dalam kehadiran pemberita akhbar. Boleh dikatakan penerbitan kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah oleh akhbar tersebut adalah akibat biasa kata-kata yang dilafazkan defendan. Defendan sendiri patut tahu bahawa kata-kata yang dilafazkannya itu, memandangkan sifat dan kandungannya, akan dipetik untuk penerbitan semula (lihat ms 443C–E, G–H); Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 dibeza dan Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 diikut. (3) Defendan berhujah mahkamah dapat, pada bila-bila masa selepas pernyataan tuntutan tersebut diserahkan, memutuskan sama ada kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah tersebut dapat membawa maksud yang diberikan kepadanya.

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Sebagai sokongan hujah ini mahkamah telah dirujuk kepada buku Gatley on Slander and Libel (9th Ed). Walau bagaimanapun, perenggan itu semata-mata suatu pernyataan undang-undang yang diberikan dalam A 82 k 3A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Agung (UK). Tiada sebarang peruntukan yang sepadan dengannya dalam kaedah ||Page 438>>mahkamah kita. Walaupun tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa mahkamah ini berkuasa, di bawah A 18 k 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 atau di bawah bidang kuasa semulajadinya, membatalkan suatu tindakan di atas alasan bahawa pliding tidak mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang munasabah, bidangkuasa itu tidak patut digunakan secara kebiasaan, hanya dalam kes teristimewa sahaja. Sama ada kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah itu dapat membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah hanya dapat diputuskan semasa perbicaraan, dengan mengambilkira konteks dan keadaan di mana pernyataan tersebut dibuat secara keseluruhan (lihat ms 445D–F, H–446A). (4) Di bawah s 5 Akta Fitnah 1957, seseorang yang memegang sebarang jawatan, profession, atau perniagaan dapat membawa suatu tuntutan fitnah ke atas jawatan yang dipegangnya itu. Adalah dikatakan secara nyata dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut bahawa plaintif seorang ahli Parliamen, seorang Jaksa Pendamai, ketua pegawai eksekutif syarikat Wijaya Baru Global Berhad dan penasihat kepada beberapa kelab dan persatuan di Sarawak. Plaintif mengatakan bahawa kata-kata yang dikatakan berunsur fitnah itu dimaksudkan untuk memperkecilkan plaintif dalam jawatan, profesion, atau perniagaan suatu tuntutan yang dapat dibawa, tanpa bukti ganti rugi khas, walaupun tidak memperkecilkan pekerjaannya secara terus. Persoalan sama ada sebarang jawatan yang dipegang plaintif yang disebut dalam pernyataan tuntutan tersebut termasuk dalam kategori jawatan, profession, atau perniagaan tidak dapat diputuskan di atas pliding semata-mata. Keputusan ini memerlukan keterangan diberikan oleh saksi pada suatu perbicaraan. Seperti itu juga, persoalan sama ada kata-kata yangdiadukan akan memperkecilkan plaintif dalam kedudukannya itu adalah suatu isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan diputuskan dengan mengambikira konteks kata-kata itu dan keadaan kata-kata itu dilafazkan secara keseluruhan (lihat ms 446E–F, 447A–C).]

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Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 314–434. For cases on slander, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2002 Reissue) paras 485–494.

Cases referred to Datuk Seri Panglima Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan v Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 923 (distd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (folld) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (distd) ||Page 439>> Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr [1997] 5 MLJ 523 (refd) Mooney & Ors v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1967] 1 MLJ 8 (refd) New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) Slipper v British Broadcasting Corp [1991] 1 All ER 165 (folld) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too; Workers’ Party v Attorney-General [1975] 1 MLJ 47 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 5 Defamation Act 1952 [UK] s 2 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19, O 78

Henry Ling Kuong Meng (Ling & Wong) for the plaintiff. Chong Siew Chiang (Chong & Brothers) for the defendant.

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[2002] 1 MLJ 160 Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2(S3)–23–57 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 13 AUGUST 2001

Tort — Defamation — Publication in newsletter of political party — Article undermined plaintiff’s journalistic credibility — Whether words referred to plaintiff, applicable test — Fair and natural meaning of words — Intention of defendant, whether relevant

The plaintiff was a journalist and a freelancer writer. Initially, he was employed by the Utusan Melayu newspapers. As a founder member of the National Union of Journalists, he was made its first secretary and sat in its national committee. He then left Utusan Melayu and launched his own daily newspapers. This was followed by a twice weekly tabloid and subsequently he ventured into magazines. In most cases he was the editor. The first defendant was a political party called Parti Islam Se Malaysia (‘PAS’). The first defendant’s appeals and struggles were channeled through a newsletter called Harakah. The second defendant was its editor and the third defendant was its printer. The plaintiff contended that in its issue of the Harakah of 29 March 1999, the defendants maliciously and with intent to vilify him, wrote, printed and published, or caused to be written, printed and published, in the issue of Harakah, of the plaintiff and of him in the way of his said occupation and employment and in relation to his character, conduct, journalistic ability, credibility, reputation therein and with the object of destroying the plaintiff’s character, reputation and journalist career.

Held:

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(1) It was not necessary that the words should refer to the plaintiff by name, provided that the words would be understood by reasonable people to refer to the plaintiff. The court would have to consider whether the libel designated the plaintiff in such a way so as to let those who knew him understand that he was the person alluded to. It was not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it was sufficient if those who know the plaintiff could make out that he was the person referred to. Reading the context of the impugned publication in its entirety, the court concluded that the name ‘Caled Jeffry’ was indeed meant to refer to the plaintiff (see p 167B–D). (2) It was immaterial that the defendant did not intend to refer to the plaintiff, or did not even know of his existence. The question was, would the words complained of be understood by reasonable people who knew the plaintiff to refer to him? If so, they were published of and concerning the plaintiff, no matter what the intention of the defendant may have been (see p 167G–H); ||Page 161>>Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444 (CA); [1910] AC 20 (HL) followed. The words and phrases in the article served as pointers to the identity of the person defamed, namely the plaintiff. The libel had indeed designated the plaintiff in such a way that those who know him would have understood that he was the person referred to (see pp 168A, F). (3) In determining whether the words were capable of defamatory meaning, the court would construe the words according to the fair and natural meaning which would be given to them by reasonable persons of ordinary intelligence. The test to be applied was to see the meaning and inference that would be drawn naturally upon reading the impugned article by a person of reasonable intelligence. So in actions based on libel, the meaning of the writer was quite immaterial. It was not a question as to what the writer meant but what he conveyed to those who read it (see pp 168G, 169B). (4) When the words complained of were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, the plaintiff needed prove nothing more than their publication. The onus was on the defendant to prove from the context in which the words were used, or from the manner of their publication or other facts known to those whom the words were published, that the words could not be understood by a

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reasonable man to convey the imputation suggested by the mere consideration of the words themselves. The plea of the defendants therefore that the words complained of were to be understood as a joke or as in no sense defamatory of the plaintiff could not be sustained (see p 169D–F). (5) The defendants falsely and maliciously and with intent to vilify, wrote, printed and published the words complained of. It was an act of sensationalism solely motivated by a desire to boost the sale of the newsletter and to live off the ruin of the plaintiff’s calling, pursuit and trade and the loss of his reputation. The defendants were not only callous of conduct but also indifferent to promulgating injurious falsehood and oblivious to the fact that the words were untrue and that the said words were calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his profession. The fact that the language of the defendants was unnecessarily strong and entirely disproportionate to the exigency of the occasion was evidence of malice. The defendants published the words without considering or caring whether they were true or not; they were indifferent to the truth. In that sense, they acted recklessly (see p 174C–E).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif adalah seorang wartawan dan penulis bebas. Sebelum ini, beliau diambil bekerja oleh akhbar Utusan Melayu. Sebagai pengasas Persatuan Wartawan Nasional, beliau dilantik sebagai setiausaha pertamanya dan mempengerusikan jawatan kuasa nasionalnya. Beliau ||Page 162>>kemudian meninggalkan Utusan Melayu dan memulakan akhbar harian beliau sendiri. Ini diikuti dengan tabloid dua kali seminggu dan kemudiannya beliau menerokai bidang majalah. Dalam kebanyakan kes beliau adalah seorang editor. Defendan pertama adalah parti politik yang dikenali sebagai Parti Islam Se Malaysia (‘PAS’). Rayuan-rayuan dan perjuangan-perjuangan defendan pertama disalurkan melalui satu surat berita bernama Harakah. Defendan kedua adalah editornya dan defendan ketiga adalah pencetaknya. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa dalam keluaran Harakah bertarikh 29 Mac 1999, defendan-defendan telah dengan niat jahat dan

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dengan niat untuk mencerca beliau, menulis, mencetak dan menerbitkan, atau menyebabkan ditulis, dicetak dan diterbitkan, dalam keluaran Harakah, tentang plaintif dan tentang beliau dalam pekerjaan beliau tersebut dan berkaitan dengan perbadi, perbuatan, keupayaan, kebolehpercayaan, reputasi kewartawanan beliau dan dengan tujuan untuk memusnahkan peribadi, reputasi dan karier kewartawanan plaintif.

Diputuskan: (1) Adalah tidak perlu bagi perkataan-perkataan tersebut merujuk kepada plaintif melalui nama, dengan syarat perkataan-perkataan tersebut boleh difahami oleh orang yang munasabah bahawa ia merujuk kepada plaintif. Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan sama ada libel tersebut menggelar plaintif sehingga sesiapa yang mengenali beliau memahami bahawa beliaulah orang yang secara tak langsung dimaksudkan tersebut. Adalah tidak perlu langsung untuk dunia memahami libel tersebut; adalah mencukupi jika sesiapa yang mengenali plaintif boleh mengagak bahawa beliau adalah orang yang dirujuk. Dengan membaca konteks penerbitan yang dipersoalkan secara keseluruhannya, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa nama ‘Caled Jeffry’ sememangnya bermaksud untuk merujuk kepada plaintif (lihat ms 167B–D). (2) Adalah tidak penting defendan tidak berniat untuk merujuk kepada plaintif, ataupun tidak langsung mengetahui tentang kewujudan beliau. Persoalannya ialah, adakah perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan akan difahami oleh orang yang munasabah yang mengenali plaintif bahawa ia merujuk kepada beliau? Jika begitu, perkataan-perkataan tersebut diterbitkan tentang dan berhubung plaintif, tidak kira apakah maksud defendan (lihat ms 167G–H); Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444 (CA); [1910] AC 20 (HL) diikut. Perkataan-perkataan dan frasa-frasa dalam artikel tersebut bertindak sebagai petunjuk kepada orang yang difitnahkan, iaitu plaintif. Libel tersebut sememangnya telah menggelar plaintif secara begitu sehingga sesiapa yang mengenali beliau akan memahami bahawa beliaulah orang yang dirujukkan (lihat ms 168A, F). (3) Dalam menentukan sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut mampu membawa maksud yang berunsur fitnah, mahkamah

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||Page 163>>akan mentafsirkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut menurut maksudnya yang adil dan biasa yang akan diberikan oleh orang yang munasabah dengan kepintaran yang biasa. Ujian untuk diterapkan adalah untuk melihat maksud dan inferens yang akan diperolehi dengan mudah setelah membaca artikel yang dipersoalkan oleh seorang yang munasabah dengan kepintaran yang biasa. Oleh itu tindakan-tindakan berdasarkan libel, maksud penulis tidak begitu penting. Ia bukan satu persoalan mengenai apa yang penulis maksudkan tetapi apa beliau telah sampaikan kepada sesiapa yang membacanya (lihat ms 168G, 169B). (4) Apabila perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah dalam maksud yang asal dan biasa, plaintif tidak perlu membuktikan apa-apa kecuali penerbitan mereka. Beban terletak ke atas defendan untuk membuktikan daripada penerbitan mereka atau fakta-fakta lain yang diketahui oleh sesiapa perkataan-perkataan tersebut telah diterbitkan, bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut tidak boleh difahami oleh seorang yang munasabah untuk menyampaikan tohmahan yang dicadangkan dengan hanya pertimbangan perkataan-perkataan tersebut. Pli defendan-defendan oleh itu bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan difahami sebagai gurauan atau tidak berunsur fitnah tentang plaintif tidak boleh dikekalkan (lihat ms 169D–F). (5) Defendan dengan palsu dan niat jahat dan dengan niat untuk mencerca, telah menulis, mencetak dan menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan. Ia adalah satu tindakan penggunaan sensasi yang semata-mata bermotivasikan hasrat untuk menggalakkan jualan surat berita tersebut dan bergantung atas kemusnahan pekerjaan, usaha dan perniagaan dan kehilangan reputasi plaintif. Defendan-defendan bukan sahaja tidak mempunyai perasaan tetapi juga bersikap tidak ambil peduli dengan menyebarluaskan penipuan yang memudaratkan dan tidak sedar tentang fakta bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah tidak benar dan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut dikira memperkecilkan plaintif dalam profesyen beliau. Hakikat bahawa bahasa defendan-defendan tidak perlu kasar dan memang tidak sesuai dengan keterdesakan keadaan adalah keterangan tentang niat jahat. Defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut tanpa mengambilkira atau

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mengendahkan sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah benar atau tidak; mereka bersikap tidak ambil peduli tentang kebenaran. Dalam erti kata yang sebenarnya, mereka telah bertindak secara melulu (lihat ms 174C–E).]

Notes For a case on publication in a newsletter of political party, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 375. ||Page 164>>

Cases referred to Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Bryce v Rusden (1886) 2 TLR 435 (refd) Capital & Counties Bank Ltd, The v George Henty & Sons (1882) 2 TLR 741 (refd) Citizens’ Life Assurance Co Ltd v Brown [1904] AC 423 (refd) Cook v Ward (1830) 130 ER 1338 (refd) Cuddington v Wilkins (1615) Hob 81 (refd) David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 (refd) Donoghue v Hayes (1831) Hayes (Ir Ex) R 265 (refd) Egger v Viscount Chelmsford & Ors [1965] 1 QB 248 (refd) Haire v Wilson (1829) 9 B & C 643 (refd) Hellwig v Mitchell [1910] 1 KB 609 (refd) J’Anson v Stuart (1787) ITR 748 (refd) Jones v E Hulton & Co [1909] 2 KB 444; [1910] AC 20 (folld) Lambert v Thomson (1937) 2 DLR 662 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davis [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Limpus v London General Omnibus Co (1862) 7 LT 641 (refd) Marks v Samuel [1904] 2 KB 287 (refd) PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (refd)

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Roach v Garvan (1742) 26 ER 683 (refd) Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 (refd) Shapiro v La Morta [1923] All ER 378 (refd) St James’ Evening Post: Case No 291; Roach v Garvan AKT 469 (refd) Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew & Co Ltd & Anor [1906] 2 KB 627 (refd) Watkin v Hall (1868) 3 QB 396 (refd) Webb v Beavan (1883) 11 QBD 609 (refd)

Legislation referred to Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 s 2(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 2 r 2(1) Societies Act 1966 s 9(c)

Shamsul Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine) for the plaintiff. Mohamed Hanipa bin Maidin (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the first, second and fifth defendants. KA Gan (Adlin Majid with him) (Lee Hishamuddin) for the third defendant.

[2002] 3 MLJ 341 Ngoi Thiam Woh v Maxwell, Kenion, Cowdy & Jones (sued as a firm) & Anor

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–894 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 5 JULY 2002

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 156

Tort — Defamation — Publication of proclamation of sale — Absence of conspiracy or fraud and negligence — Whether the first defendant defamed the plaintiff by causing the advertisement of the proclamation of sale — Whether the plaintiff could sustain an action in defamation against the defendants — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2 and O 8

The plaintiff borrowed a sum of money from the second defendant to pay the balance purchase price of one unit of a condotel and this sum was to be repaid by 156 monthly instalments. The plaintiff executed a deed of assignment as a security for the loan in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiff defaulted in his instalment payments and the first defendant, on instructions from the second defendant, issued a notice of demand dated 21 October 1997. Subsequently, the first defendant issued a notice of default dated 22 November 1997 demanding that the plaintiff make good the alleged default upon the expiry of seven days, failing which the second defendant would exercise its rights to sell the plaintiff’s condotel. The defendants then on 9 January 1998 advertised in The Star newspaper a proclamation of sale of the said condotel. The plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court in Ipoh, Civil Suit No 22–24–98 against the second defendant and others to restrain the second defendant from selling the said unit until disposal of the case. Meanwhile, the first defendant filed an originating summons under O 31 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) which they withdrew and filed a fresh originating summons under O 83 of the RHC. The second defendant filed another suit in the Ipoh High Court vide Civil Suit No 22–68–99 against the plaintiff to recover the loan sum together with interest. During case management, it was agreed that the court decide the case pursuant to O 33 r 2 of the RHC on two issues namely: (i) whether the first defendant, acting as solicitors for and on the instructions of the second defendant, defamed the plaintiff by causing the advertisement of the proclamation of sale dated 9 January 1998 and (ii) whether the plaintiff could sustain an action in defamation against the defendants upon the High Court in Ipoh having held in a civil suit filed by the second defendant against the plaintiff, that there was no conspiracy or fraud and negligence on the part of the second defendant.

Held, dismissing the suit with costs:

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(1) In this case, there was an absolute assignment and the second defendant had an absolute right to proceed to advertise the proclamation of sale and to auction off the condotel without ||Page 342>>applying for an order of the court. Since the second defendant had the absolute right to proceed with the proclamation of sale, the first defendant, who acted as solicitors and thus as agents of the second defendant, was clearly acting within the law when it caused the advertisement to appear in The Star, Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 followed (see p 347G–H). (2) In Civil Suit No 22–68–99 filed by the present second defendant against the present plaintiff claiming the loan sum, whilst the trial judge dismissed the second defendant’s claim, he however dismissed the present plaintiff’s contention of misrepresentation, conspiracy, fraud and negligence against the second defendants and related companies. Since the plaintiff was not appealing the decision the finding of the trial judge must be accepted as correct (see pp 347H–348A).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah meminjam daripada defendan kedua satu jumlah wang untuk membayar baki harga belian sebuah unit condotel dan jumlah ini hendaklah dibayar balik melalui 156 ansuran bulanan. Plaintif telah menyempurnakan satu suratikatan penyerahhakan sebagai jaminan untuk pinjaman tersebut yang memihak kepada defendan kedua. Plaintif telah mengingkari bayaran-bayaran ansuran beliau dan defendan pertama, atas arahan-arahan daripada defendan kedua, telah mengeluarkan satu notis tuntutan bertarikh 21 Oktober 1997. Kemudiannya, defendan pertama telah mengeluarkan satu notis keingkaran bertarikh 22 November 1997 menuntut supaya plaintif memulihkan keingkaran yang didakwa itu selepas tamat tempoh tujuh hari, kegagalan yang mana menyebabkan defendan-defendan kedua melaksanakan hak mereka untuk menjual condotel plaintif. Defendan-defendan kemudiannya pada 9 Januari 1998 mengiklankan di dalam akhbar The Star satu pengisytiharan jualan akan condotel tersebut. Plaintif

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telah memfailkan satu guaman di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh, Guaman Sivil No 22–24–98 terhadap defendan kedua dan pihak-pihak lain untuk menghalang defendan kedua daripada menjual unit tersebut sehingga penyelesaian kes tersebut. Sementara itu, defendan pertama memfailkan satu saman pemula di bawah A 31 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT tersebut’) yang mana telah mereka tarikh balik dan memfailkan satu saman pemula yang baru di bawah O 83 KMT. Defendan kedua telah memfailkan satu guaman yang lain dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh melalui Guaman Sivil No 22–68–99 terhadap plaintif untuk mendapatkan balik jumlah pinjaman tersebut bersama-sama faedah. Ketika pengurusan kes, telah dipersetujui bahawa Mahkamah memutuskan kes tersebut selaras dengan A 33 k 2 KMT atas dua isu iaitu: (i) sama ada defendan pertama, yang bertindak sebagai peguamcara untuk dan atas arahan-arahan defendan kedua, memfitnah plaintif dengan ||Page 343>>menyebabkan iklan pengisytiharan jualan bertarikh 9 Januari 1998 dan (ii) sama ada plaintif boleh mempertahankan suatu tindakan memfitnah terhadap defendan-defendan setelah Mahkamah Tinggi di Ipoh memutuskan dalam guaman sivil yang difailkan oleh defendan kedua terhadap plaintif, bahawa tidak terdapat konspirasi atau fraud dan kecuaian oleh defendan kedua.

Diputuskan, menolak guaman tersebut dengan kos: (1) Dalam kes ini terdapat penyerahhakan mutlak dan defendan kedua mempunyai hak mutlak untuk meneruskan bagi mengiklankan pengisytiharan jualan dan untuk melelongkan condotel tersebut tanpa memohon untuk mendapatkan perintah mahkamah. Oleh kerana defendan kedua mempunyai hak mutlak untuk meneruskan pengisytiharan jualan tersebut, defendan pertama, yang bertindak sebagai peguamcara dan oleh itu sebagai ejen defendan keluar, telah dengan jelasnya bertindak di dalam lingkungan undang-undang apabila ianya menyebabkan iklan tersebut dikeluarkan dalam akhbar The Star, Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 diikut (lihat ms 347G–H). (2) Dalam Guaman Sivil No 22–68–99 yang telah difailkan oleh defendan kedua semasa terhadap plaintif semasa menuntut jumlah pinjaman tersebut, sementara hakim perbicaraan menolak tuntutan defendan kedua, beliau walaubagaimana

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 159

pun menolak penegasan plaintif semasa mengenai salah-nyataan, konspirasi, fraud dan kecuaian terhadap defendan-defendan kedua dan syarikat-syarikat yang berkaitan. Oleh kerana plaintif tidak merayui keputusan tersebut, maka keputusan hakim perbicaraan mestilah diterima sebagai betul (lihat ms 347H–348A).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.

Cases referred to Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) MBF Finance Bhd v Ngoi Thiam Woh [2001] 7 CLJ 221 (refd) Phileoallied Bank (M) Bhd v Bupinder Singh a/l Avatar Singh & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 513 (folld)

Legislation referred to National Land Code 1965 s 221 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 31, O 33 r 2, O 83 ||Page 344>>

Ngan SH (Ahmad Yani with him) (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiff. Silvanathan (Rathi Nair with him) (Kean Chye & Sivalingam) for the first defendant. Loh Yen Zin (Jeyaratnam & Chong) for the second defendant.

[2002] 4 MLJ 371 Mark Ignatius Uttley @ Mark Ostyn v Wong Kam Hor & Anor

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 160

HIGH COURT (PULAU PINANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–369 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 11 SEPTEMBER 2002

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libel in newspaper — Whether the words in the impugned article were defamatory of the plaintiff — Test to be applied

The plaintiff was at the material time of the publication of the impugned article, the resident conductor of the Pulau Pinang State Symphony Orchestra and Chorus (‘PESSOC’). The first defendant was at the material time, the editor of the Nanyang Siang Pau, a Chinese daily newspaper, and the second defendant, the publisher and printer of the said Nanyang Siang Pau. On 10 June 1998, Chong Eng, the then sole DAP State Assemblywoman for Batu Lancang, Pulau Pinang, had in her adjournment speech in the Pulau Pinang State Assembly raised, for the consideration of Kee Phaik Cheen (‘Kee’), the Chairman of the PESSOC Committee and also the State Assemblywoman for Batu Uban and an Exco Member responsible for PESSOC, various matters concerning the academic qualifications and conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had in the statement of claim reproduced parts of the text of the impugned article as the basis for his claim that his credit and reputation had been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt. The plaintiff claimed that the words in the impugned article were defamatory of the plaintiff in that the words in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff had no qualifications and no experience to be the conductor of PESSOC, that he had obtained the appointment by false pretences and/or cheating, that he was a dishonest person who assaulted his students and ought to be investigated by the authorities, that he was giving lessons in musical instruments in which he was not qualified, that he had no permit to do so, and that he was a tax evader.

Held: (1) Where an issue is raised in the newspapers or in Parliament or at a state

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assembly, the court must assure that the matter is one of significance and is therefore more likely then not to convey a defamatory meaning to the ordinary reader. As to whether the said meaning is defamatory the test is to see if such words tend to make reasonable people think the worse of the plaintiff; or whether such words would cause him to be shunned or avoided. There is no requirement of the plaintiff to show that any of the readers actually thought the worse of him. Clearly therefore, an allegation that the plaintiff has been guilty of tax evasion would be defamatory. The allegation levied against the plaintiff that he lacked the qualification for the post of resident conductor, that he had obtained the appointment by false pretences and/or cheating, ||Page 372>>that he was a dishonest person who assaulted his students and ought to be investigated by the authorities, that he was giving music lessons illegally and was a tax evader, were all defamatory of the plaintiff (see p 382C–F). (2) When words tend to affect a person in his office, profession or trade, such words must impute to the plaintiff some attribute, the absence of which would be necessary to ensure his success or the presence of some attribute which would be detrimental towards his success. Here, the implications are severe enough to affect the plaintiff in his profession. He had been maligned as having lack of integrity (see p 382F–G). (3) In this case, the impugned article was entirely based on the press statement of Chong Eng and had quoted extensively from it. Where the defendants are repeating what somebody else had told them, they are generally to be treated as having said it themselves. So the defendants here are to be treated as though they had themselves made the defamatory allegation against the plaintiff (see p 385A). (4) In these days of investigative journalism, the defendants could not claim that they honestly believed in the truth of the impugned words when any information required could easily have been checked out. Since the press statement was given because of accusations by one politician against another, the defendants ought to have been all the more alert to verify the truth of the press statement and to ascertain from the plaintiff whether the information was

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reliable. The defendants omitted to take such steps because they did not care whether the matters relating to the plaintiff as contained in Chong Eng’s press statement were true or not. In short, the defendants were indifferent to the truth or otherwise of the statement (see p 388F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah pada masa material penerbitan rencana yang meragukan itu, merupakan konduktor tetap Pulau Pinang State Symphony Orchestra and Chorus (‘PESSOC’). Defendan pertama telah pada masa material itu merupakan pengarang Nanyang Siang Pau, sebuah Akhbar Harian Cina, dan defendan kedua, adalah penerbit dan pencetak Nanyang Siang Pau tersebut. Pada 10 Jun 1998, Chong Eng, wanita Dewan Undangan Negeri DAP tunggal bagi Batu Lancang, Pulau Pinang, telah di dalam ucapan penangguhan beliau di dalam Dewan Undangan Pulau Pinang membangkitkan, untuk pertimbangan berhubung Kee Phaik Cheen (‘Kee’), Pengerusi Jawatankuasa PESSOC dan juga wanita Dewan Undangan Negeri bagi Batu Uban dan seorang Ahli Exco yang bertanggungjawab bagi PESSOC, pelbagai perkara-perkara berkenaan kelayakan-kelayakan akademik dan perlakuan plaintif. Plaintif telah di dalam pernyataan ||Page 373>>tuntutan tersebut mengemukakan semula bahagian-bahagian teks rencana yang meragukan tersebut sebagai dasar bagi tuntutan beliau bahawa kebolehpercayaan dan reputasi beliau telah menjadi skandal awam, kebencian ramai dan penghinaan. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa perkataan-perkataan di dalam rencana yang meragukan adalah memfitnah plaintif iaitu perkataan-perkataan mengikut maknanya yang biasa dan asli bermakna dan difahamkan supaya bermakna bahawa plaintif tidak mempunyai kelayakan dan tiada pengalaman untuk menjadi konduktor PESSOC, bahawa beliau telah mendapatkan perlantikan itu melalui penipuan dan/atau kepalsuan, bahawa beliau merupakan seorang yang tidak jujur yang menyerang pelajar-pelajarnya dan haruslah disiasat oleh pihak berkuasa, bahawa beliau memberi kelas dalam alat-alat muzik yang beliau tidak berkelayakan, bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai permit untuk melakukan sedemikian, bahawa beliau adalah seorang yang mengelak daripada membayar cukai.

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Diputuskan: (1) Di mana satu persoalan dibangkitkan dalam akhbar-akhbar atau dalam Parlimen atau dalam satu dewan undangan negeri, mahkamah harus memastikan bahawa perkara tersebut adalah suatu yang penting dan oleh itu adalah lebih berkemungkinan dari tidak membawa satu maksud yang memfitnah kepada pembaca biasa. Berhubung dengan sama ada maksud tersebut adalah bersifat memfitnah ujiannya adalah untuk melihat jika perkataan-perkataan yang sedemikian berkemungkinan membuat orang yang berfikiran wajar untuk memikirkan perkara yang buruk berhubung dengan plaintif; atau sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang sedemikian akan menyebabkan beliau dijauhi atau cuba dielakkan oleh orang awam. Tiada keperluan untuk plaintif menunjukkan bahawa mana-mana pembaca sesungguhnya memikirkan perkara yang paling buruk mengenai beliau. Adalah jelas dengan itu, satu dakwaan bahawa plaintif telah bersalah kerana mengelak cukai akan bersifat memfitnah. Dakwaan yang dilevikan terhadap plaintif bahawa beliau tidak mempunyai kelayakan untuk jawatan residen konduktor, bahawa beliau telah mendapatkan perlantikan tersebut melalui penipuan dan/atau pemalsuan, bahawa beliau adalah seorang tidak jujur yang menyerbu pelajar-pelajar beliau dan haruslah disiasat oleh pihak berkuasa, bahawa beliau mengajar muzik secara tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan merupakan seorang yang mengelak daripada membayar cukai, adalah kesemuanya memfitnah plaintif. (lihat ms 382C–F) (2) Apabila perkataan-perkataan bermaksud untuk menjejaskan seseorang dalam jawatan, profesyen atau perdagangannya, perkataan-perkataan sedemikian semestinya melambangkan plaintif, ketiadaannya adalah perlu untuk menentukan kejayaaan beliau atau adanya anggapan yang akan menjejaskan kejayaannya. ||Page 374>>Di sini, akibatnya adalah memudaratkan sehingga menjejaskan plaintif dalam profesyen beliau. Beliau telah difitnah sebagai tidak jujur (lihat ms 382F–G). (3) Dalam kes ini, rencana yang meragukan itu adalah sesungguhnya berdasarkan kenyataan akhbar Chong Eng dan telah dipetik darinya secara ekstensif. Di mana defendan-defendan mengulangi apa yang setiap orang telah beritahu

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mereka, mereka adalah secara umumnya dianggapkan sebagai telah menyatakannya sendiri. Oleh itu defendan-defendan di sini hendaklah dianggap seolah-olah mereka telah dengan sendirinya mempunyai dakwaan memfitnah terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 385A). (4) Pada hari kewartawanan yang bersifat menyiasat ini, defendan-defendan tidak boleh mendakwa bahawa mereka sesungguhnya mempercayai akan kebenaran perkataan-perkataan yang meragukan itu sedangkan sebarang maklumat yang diperlukan boleh disemak dengan mudahnya. Oleh kerana kenyataan akhbar tersebut telah diberikan kerana tuduhan-tuduhan oleh seorang ahli politik terhadap seorang yang lain, defendan-defendan haruslah lebih berwaspada untuk menentusahkan kebenaran kenyataan akhbar tersebut dan untuk memastikan daripada plaintif sama ada maklumat tersebut boleh dipercayai. Defendan-defendan tertinggal untuk mengambil langkah-langkah yang sedemikian kerana mereka tidak mempedulikan sama ada perkara-perkata berkaitan dengan plaintif sepertimana yang terkandung di dalam kenyataan akhbar Chong Eng adalah benar ataupun tidak. Secara ringkasnya, defendan-defendan bersikap tidak peduli kepada kebenaran kenyataan tersebut atau sebaliknya (lihat ms 388F–G).] [Editorial Note: The defendants have appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Rayuan Sivil No P–02–773–2002.]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar Shah v Party Islam Se Malaysia & Ors [2002] 1 MLJ 160 (refd) DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 (refd) English & Scottish Co-operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440 (refd) Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 (refd)

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Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Reynolds v Times Newspaper Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd v Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 MLJ 574 (refd) ||Page 375>>

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 9 Penal Code s 420 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(2)

P Navaratnam (R Subramaniam with him) (Nava, Subra & Co) for the plaintiff. JA Yeoh (Harminder Kaur Gill with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants. Jagdeep Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) watching brief for YB Chong Eng.

[2001] 2 MLJ 1 Zolkefly bin Haron v Yahya bin Chik & Anor

HIGH COURT (MUAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–18 OF 1999 JEFFREY TAN J 6 FEBRUARY 2001

Tort — Defamation — Imputation of status of plaintiff’s banking account — Whether there was publication to third parties — Whether wordings defamatory — Whether there was libel — Justification

The plaintiff, an erstwhile customer of the second defendant, brought an action against

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the defendants for alleged defamatory imputations over oral and written statements made by the defendants about the status of his banking account. The plaintiff’s case was that the defendants published and communicated to third parties the following words: ‘that the plaintiff had a personal debt with the second defendants and that therefore the EAP could not open its current account with the second defendant’, and that the defendants released without the consent of the plaintiff the ‘customer account profile’ of the plaintiff. It was submitted that the facts asserted in the words spoken to the third parties and in the customer account profile of the plaintiff were false. Amongst the documents tendered were two copies of the customer account profile of the plaintiff (PB231 and 232), the second defendant’s ledger relating to the erstwhile account of the plaintiff (PB234), two letters of the plaintiff to the second defendant (DB18 and 19) and a letter of the second defendant to the plaintiff (DB20). Both parties agreed that a decision on the question ‘whether the statements in PB231 and 232 are true or false, in the light of the statements in PB234 and DB18-20’ could dispose of the cause or matter or could render the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim: When read as a whole, PB231 and 232 stated that a bad debt of RM7,469.83 was written off but also that nothing was owing on the account. That was all that was imputed by total statements in PB231 and 232. Objectively there were no words in their ordinary and natural meaning capable of any defamatory imputation, unless the words ‘bad debt’ were read in isolation. PB231 and 232 only reflected what had happened. The remaining debt was written off, but not the records. And the second defendant was entitled to its records. The defendants had clearly established that the imputation in respect of which they were sued was true. The defendants had proved the truth of every defamatory facts alleged. The customer account profile tallied with the truth (PB234). Until ‘written off’, there was a bad debt (see p 8C–D, F, H). ||Page 2>>

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Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif, seorang pelanggan defendan kedua, telah memulakan satu tindakan terhadap defendan-defendan untuk penuduhan yang dikatakan memfitnah ke atas pernyataan lisan dan bertulis yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan mengenai keadaan akaun pembankannya. Kes plaintif adalah bahawa defendan-defendan menerbit dan menyampaikan kepada pihak ketiga perkataan-perkataan berikut: ‘that the plaintiff had a personal debt with the second defendants and that therefore EAP could not open its current account with the second defendant’, dan bahawa defendan-defendan mengeluarkan ‘Customer Account Profile’ plaintif tanpa izin plaintif. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa fakta-fakta yang ditegaskan dalam kata-kata yang diucapkan kepada pihak ketiga dan dalam profil akaun pelanggan adalah palsu. Di antara dokumen yang dikemukakan adalah dua salinan profil akaun pelanggan plaintif (PB231 dan 232), lejar defendan kedua berhubung dengan akaun plaintif (PB234), dua surat plaintif kepada defendan kedua (DB18 dan 19) dan sepucuk surat defendan kedua kepada plaintif (DB20). Kedua-dua pihak bersetuju bahawa keputusan atas soalan ‘whether the statements in PB231 and 232 are true or false, in the light of the statements in PB234 and DB18-20’ boleh menyelesaikan kausa atau perkara atau boleh menyebabkan perbicaraan kausa atau perkara tersebut menjadi tidak perlu.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif: Apabila dibaca secara keseluruhan, PB231 dan 232 menyatakan bahawa satu ‘bad debt’ sebanyak RM7,469.83 telah dibatalkan tetapi juga bahawa tiada apa yang terhutang atas akaun. Cuma itu sahaja dikaitkan oleh pernyataan-pernyataan dalam PB231 dan 232. Secara objektif, tiada apa perkataan dalam maksud biasa dan semulajadi yang dapat memberikan apa-apa penuduhan yang memfitnah, melainkan perkataan ‘bad debt’ dibaca secara berasingan. PB231 and 232 cuma membayangkan apa yang telah berlaku. Baki hutang telah dibatalkan, tetapi bukan rekod-rekod tersebut. Dan defendan kedua berhak memperolehi rekodnya. Defendan-defendan telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa penuduhan itu berkenaan mana mereka didakwa adalah benar. Defendan-defendan telah membuktikan kebenaran setiap fakta fitnah yang

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dikatakan. Profil Akaun Pelanggan itu adalah selaras dengan kebenaran (PB234). Sehingga ia ‘dibatalkan’, ‘bad debt’ masih wujud (lihat ms 8C–D, F, H).]

Notes For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193-409. ||Page 3>>

Cases referred to Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v SH Alattas & 2 Ors [1991] CLJ 315 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (refd)

Amrit Pal Singh (Sukhdev & Amrit) for the plaintiff. Kumar Kanasingam (Allen & Gledhill) for the defendant.

[2001] 2 MLJ 574 Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–72 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 6 FEBRUARY 2001

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Compensatory damages — Aggravated damages — Assessment — Relevant factors

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Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Publication of defamatory article in magazine — Whether publication was a comment — Whether publication was fair — Whether a fair-minded person could honestly make such comment without having basic facts to rely upon — Defamation Act 1957 s 9

Tort — Defamation — Justification — Publication of defamatory article in magazine — Whether justifications made out on facts — Defamation Act 1957 s 8

Tort — Defamation — Malice — Meaning of — Publication of defamatory article in magazine without prior verification — Whether editor was reckless and not concerned with truth and falsity of article — Whether malice of editor can be imputed to his employer

Tort — Defamation — Slander of goods — Elements of the tort — Whether made out — Test of defamatory nature of a statement

The first plaintiff at all material times carried on the business of manufacturing batik materials under the trade name of Tjanting and the second plaintiff was and is its managing director and its alter ego. The first defendant was the publisher of the daily newspaper and of a monthly magazine called Wanita. The second defendant was the editor of the said magazine. The third defendant was employed by the first defendant as its journalist. The fourth defendant was the printer of the said magazine. In 1998, the plaintiffs were commissioned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (‘MITI’) who entered into a contract with the plaintiffs to supply batik attire to the leaders of the 21 countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (‘APEC’). The leaders wore their respective batik shirts and baju kurung during the ceremony held at Cyberjaya. In the issue of Wanita of February 1999, the defendants published and printed in Bahasa Malaysia an article written by the third defendant, in relation to the quality of the plaintiffs’ said products as well as concerning the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs contended that in their natural and ordinary meaning the words referred to meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiffs produced unsightly batik and the second plaintiff had brought shame to the country by allowing the world leaders to wear unsightly and ugly shirts. The contract to manufacture and supply batik shirts to

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be worn by APEC leaders should not have been given to the plaintiffs as they did not have the capability of producing quality handicraft befitting the country’s reputation. The first plaintiff thus pleaded that by reason of the said words and in consequence ||Page 575>>thereof it had been gravely injured in its manufacturing and trading character. The second plaintiff pleaded that she had been seriously injured in her personal business reputation and goodwill and had suffered considerable distress and embarassment. The defendants denied that the words complained of refererd to or were understood to refer to the plaintiffs or to any one of them. They also denied that the words bore or were capable of bearing any of the meanings alleged by the plaintiffs. They also denied any allegation of malice on their part. There was also reliance on s 8 (justification) and s 9 (fair comment) of the Defamation Act 1957.

Held: (1) There can be no other conclusive evidence of malice than evidence that shows that at the time the third defendant wrote the article complained of she knew it to be untrue. One look at the photograph of all the leaders shows even to a lay person that the charges levied against the plaintiffs by the defendants had not been borne out. The material and pattern were approved by MITI and as compared to the expertize of the second plaintiff in the field of batik, the third defendant had no stature (see p 591C–D). (2) Surely the defendants ought to have known that the vitriolic verbiage of condemnation heaped upon the plaintiffs in the impugned article could not have been true, more so when the first defendant had itself edited and published articles in adulation of the plaintiffs’ craftsmanship in the field of batik design. Therefore when there was recklessness in the publication with total disregard as to whether the statement is true or false, then it is fair and proper for the court to hold malicious intent (see p 591E–F). (3) In an action for slander of goods for libel it is not necessary that the words should refer to the plaintiff by name, so long as the words would be understood by reasonable people to refer to the plaintiff. In the present case, there was no doubt that the article referred to and was understood to refer to the plaintiffs (see p 592E, H).

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(4) The test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. There was no doubt that the words complained of were indeed defamatory of the plaintiffs in their ordinary meaning (see p 593C–D); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed. (5) The court was satisfied that there had been publication by the defendants of the plaintiffs whereby the defendants maliciously published false statements disparaging the plaintiffs’ hand-drawn batik silks under the brand name Tjanting. The plaintiff had alleged and proved that the article was published concerning the plaintiffs’ goods, that the said publication was false and that it was ||Page 576>>published maliciously with intent of injuring the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had indeed established their case for slander of goods (see p 594A–B, D). (6) The defendants had failed to confine their evidence strictly to the particulars of justification as set out in their defence. The libel contains numerous charges but the defendants were unable to prove any of them as true and neither have they pleaded some other defence such as qualified privilege. The authorities are clear in that any statement which alters the character of the main imputation or adds to its sting must be proved to be true; otherwise the defendant will fail in this plea. In any case the court had found that the defence of justification had been defeated by the present of malice (see p 597E–F, I). (7) The defendant had failed to comply with O 78 r 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 in not stating ‘which words of the words complained of they allege are statements of facts and of the facts and matters they had relied on in support of the allegations that the words are true’. A defendant should not enter a plea of fair comment unless he is satisfied that the facts which are relied upon in support of the plea are true and that he has reasonable evidence to support them or reasonable grounds for believing that he has sufficient evidence to prove them at trial. In any case, since the court had already found evidence of malice in this case, the defence of fair comment must therefore

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necessarily fail (see pp 598G–H, 599A). (8) Having considered the law relating to fair comment and freedom of speech the court found that the defendants had indeed with malicious intent transgressed the border and maligned the plaintiffs. The views expressed far exceeded the realm of fair and just criticism. The defendants published the criticism with reckless indifference as to whether they were true or not. The language used was so extreme that no fair-minded person however obstinate and prejudiced his views were would have honestly used them. There can be no room for an inference that the article in question was in fact the genuine expression of the defendants’ views (see pp 599F, H, 600A). (9) The court accepted from the evidence that the second plaintiff was the alter ego of the first plaintiff. This is the type of case other than those relating to the Companies Act Act 1965 where the corporate veil ought to be lifted because the first plaintiff is a nonentity without the second plaintiff (see p 601C, E). (10) Having considered the entire evidence and the submissions of all the defendants the court found that all four defendants as publisher, editor, writer and printer respectively liable. All the defendants were liable because they had taken part in publishing it or in ensuring its publication. The proprietor of a newspaper is ||Page 577>>liable even though the libel may have been published without his knowledge or even in his absence because the editor is his servant and it is within the scope of his employment to send to the printers whatever he thinks ought to be published (see p 601G–H). (11) The award of damages must be sufficient to convince any person of the baselessness of the libel and ought to show the public the vindication of the plaintiffs’ reputation. In the present case the court found that the defendants ought to pay the first plaintiff a sum of RM300,000 as damages for the slander of goods and a sum of RM700,000 to the second plaintiff as damages for libel. The court also found that there was a case for aggravated damages. An award of RM300,000 was awarded to the second plaintiff as aggravated damages (see pp 603E–F, H–I, 604F).

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Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama pada semua masa matan menjalankan perniagaan mengeluarkan bahan-bahan batik di bawah tanda niaga Tjanting dan plaintif kedua adalah pengarah urusannya atau alter egonya. Defendan pertama adalah penerbit akhbar harian dan majalah bulanan yang bernama Wanita. Defendan kedua adalah editor majalah tersebut. Defendan ketiga telah digaji oleh defendan pertama sebagai wartawannya. Defendan keempat adalah pencetak majalah tersebut. Pada tahun 1998, plaintif telah ditugaskan oleh Kementerian Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri (‘MITI’) yang telah memasuki suatu kontrak dengan plaintif-plaintif untuk membekalkan pakaian batik kepada 21 ketua negara Usahasama Ekonomi Asia Pasifik (‘APEC’). Para pemimpin memakai baju batik dan baju kurung masing-masing semasa upacara yang diadakan di Cyberjaya. Di dalam isu Wanita pada Februari 1999, defendan telah menerbitkan dan mencetak di dalam Bahasa Malaysia suatu rencana yang ditulis oleh defendan ketiga, berkenaan dengan kualiti barangan plaintif begitu juga dengan plaintif kedua. Plaintif-plaintif menegaskan bahawa di dalam maksud biasa dan semulajadi, perkataan-perkataan tersebut yang dirujuk bermaksud dan difahamkan sebagai bermaksud bahawa plaintif mengeluarkan batik-batik yang tidak cantik dan plaintif kedua telah membawa malu kepada negara dengan membenarkan pemimpin dunia memakai baju yang hodoh dan tidak cantik. Kontrak untuk membuat dan membekalkan baju batik yang akan dipakai oleh ketua-ketua APEC tidak sepatutnya diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif oleh kerana mereka tidak mempunyai kemampuan untuk menghasilkan kraftangan yang setaraf dengan reputasi negara. Maka plaintif pertama menghujahkan bahawa dengan alasan perkataan dan di atas akibatnya nama plaintif pertama telah tercemar dari segi kebolehan pengeluaran dan perdagangannya. Plaintif kedua menghujahkan bahawa beliau telah terjejas dengan teruk di dalam reputasi perniagaan dan nama baik peribadinya dan telah mengalami kesedihan dan dimalukan. ||Page 578>>Defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk atau difahamkan sebagai merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif atau kepada salah satu daripada mereka, Mereka juga menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut membawa maksud atau boleh bermaksud apa-apa yang dikatakan oleh plaintif-plaintif. Mereka juga menafikan sebarang pengataan niat jahat di

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pihak mereka. Terdapat juga pergantungan kepada s 8 (justifikasi) dan s 9 (komen berpatutan) Akta Fitnah 1957.

Diputuskan: (1) Tidak terdapat keterangan konklusif yang lain berkenaan dengan niat jahat daripada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa semasa defendan ketiga menulis recana yang diadukan beliau tahu ia adalah tidak benar. Sekali pandang ke atas kesemua gambar para pemimpin menunjukkan kepada orang biasa bahawa tuduhan terhadap plaintif-plaintif oleh defendan-defendan adalah tidak berasas. Bahan dan corak telah diluluskan oleh MITI dan berbanding dengan kepakaran plaintif kedua di dalam bidang batik, defendan ketiga adalah tidak berkaliber (lihat ms 591C–D). (2) Sudah tentu defendan-defendan patut tahu bahawa kata-kata mengkritik yang menyakitkan serta menjela-jela ke atas plaintif di dalam rencana yang dikatakan adalah tidak benar, lebih-lebih lagi apabila defendan pertama telah mengedit dan menerbitkan rencana memuji akan hasil pertukangan plaintif di dalam bidang batik. Oleh itu terdapat kesemberonoan di dalam penerbitan dengan tidak mengendahkan langsung sama ada kenyataan adalah benar atau salah, jadi ia adalah adil dan wajar bagi mahkamah untuk memutuskan niat jahat (lihat ms 591E–F). (3) Di dalam suatu tindakan slander barang-barangan untuk libel ia adalah tidak perlu bahawa perkataan-perkataan merujuk kepada plaintif dengan nama, selagi perkataan-perkataan akan difahamkan oleh orang munasabah untuk merujuk kepada plaintif. Di dalam kes ini, tidak dapat disangsikan bahawa rencana tersebut merujuk atau difaham sebagai merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 592E, H). (4) Ujian unsur fitnah di dalam suatu kenyataan adalah kecenderungannya untuk membangkitkan pendapat yang bertentangan terhadap plaintif oleh orang lain, walaupun tiada sesiapa percaya kenyataan tersebut sebagai benar. Tidak dapat disangsikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan adalah memfitnah plaintif-plaintif di dalam maksud biasa (lihat ms 593C–D); Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut.

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(5) Mahkamah berpuashati bahawa terdapat penerbitan oleh defendan-defendan mengenai plaintif-plaintif di mana defendan dengan niat jahat telah menerbitkan kenyataan palsu mengecil- ||Page 579>>gecilkan batik sutera plaintif yang dilukis sendiri di bawah jenama Tjanting. Plaintif telah mengatakan dan membuktikan bahawa rencana tersebut diterbitkan berkaitan dengan barangan plaintif, bahawa penerbitan tersebut adalah palsu dan ia diterbitkan secara niat jahat dengan niat untuk memburukkan plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif telah membuktikan kes mereka untuk slander barangan (lihat ms 594A–B, D). (6) Defendan-defendan telah gagal untuk menghadkan keterangan mereka secara khusus mengenai justifikasi seperti yang dikemukakan di dalam pembelaan mereka. Libel tersebut mengandungi pelbagai pertuduhan tetapi defendan-defendan tidak dapat membuktikannya langsung sebagai benar dan mereka juga tidak memplidkan pembelaan yang lain seperti keistimewaan bersyarat. Nas-nas adalah jelas bahawa sebarang kenyataan yang mengubah bentuk tohmahan utama atau menokok tambah mestilah dibuktikan sebagai benar; jika tidak defendan akan gagal di dalam pembelaan ini. Di dalam sebarang kes mahkamah mendapati bahawa pembelaan justifikasi telah digagalkan dengan kehadiran niat jahat (lihat ms 597E–F, I). (7) Defendan telah gagal untuk mematuhi A 78 k 3(2) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 di dalam tidak menyatakan ‘perkataan-perkataan mana yang diadukan sebagai dikatakan mereka adalah kenyataan-kenyataan fakta dan fakta-fakta dan perkara-perkara yang mereka telah bergantung di dalam menyokong pengataan bahawa perkataan-perkataan adalah benar’. Seorang defendan tidak sepatutnya menghujahkan pembelaan komen berpatutan kecuali beliau berpuashati bahawa fakta-fakta yang digantung harap di dalam menyokong pembelaan tersebut adalah benar dan beliau mempunyai keterangan yang munasabah untuk menyokongnya atau alasan-alasan yang munasabah untuk mempercayai beliau mempunyai keterangan yang mencukupi untuk membuktikannya semasa perbicaraan. Di dalam sebarang kes, oleh kerana mahkamah telah mendapati keterangan niat jahat di dalam kes ini, pembelaan komen yang berpatutan mestilah gagal (lihat ms 598G–H, 599A).

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(8) Selepas mempertimbangkan undang-undang berkenaan dengan komen berpatutan dan kebebasan bersuara mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendan sememangnya dengan niat jahat melampaui sempadan tersebut dan memfitnah plaintif-plaintif. Pandangan-pandangan yang diluahkan telah melampaui ruang lingkup kritikan adil dan saksama. Defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan kritikan tersebut tanpa menghiraukan sama ada mereka adalah benar atau tidak. Bahasa yang digunakan adalah begitu keterlaluan sehinggakan tiada seorang yang berfikiran waras walaupun pandangannya adalah teguh dan prejudis akan secara jujur menggunakannya. Tiada ruang untuk inferens bahawa rencana tersebut adalah pada hakikatnya luahan ikhlas pandangan defendan (lihat ms 599F, H, 600A). ||Page 580>> (9) Mahkamah menerima daripada keterangan bahawa plaintif kedua adalah alter ego plaintif pertama. Ini adalah jenis kes selain daripada mereka yang berkenaan dengan Akta Syarikat 1965 di mana litupan korporat patut dialihkan oleh kerana plaintif pertama bukanlah suatu entiti tanpa plaintif kedua (lihat ms 601C, E). (10) Selepas mempertimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan dan hujahan-hujahan kesemua defendan-defendan mahkamah mendapati bahawa keempat-empat defendan sebagai penerbit, editor, penulis dan pencetak adalah masing-masing bertanggungan. Kesemua defendan-defendan adalah bertanggungan oleh kerana mereka telah mengambil bahagian di dalam menerbitkannya atau memastikan penerbitannya. Pengusaha akhbar adalah bertanggungan walaupun libel mungkin diterbitkan tanpa pengetahunannya atau walaupun dalam ketidakhadirannya oleh kerana editor adalah pekerjanya dan adalah di dalam skop pekerjaannya untuk menghantar kepada pencetak apa yang beliau berpendapat patut diterbitkan (lihat ms 601G–H). (11) Award gantirugi mestilah mencukupi untuk menyakinkan sesiapa akan ketiadaan dasar libel tersebut dan patut menunjukkan kepada orang awam justifikasi reputasi plaintif. Di dalam kes ini mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendan-defendan patut membayar plaintif pertama suatu jumlah sebanyak RM300,000 sebagai ganti rugi untuk slander barangan dan suatu jumlah

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 177

sebanyak RM700,000 kepada plaintif kedua sebagai ganti rugi untuk libel. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa terdapat suatu kes untuk ganti rugi teruk. Suatu award sebanyak RM300,000 telah diawardkan kepada plaintif sebagai ganti rugi teruk (lihat ms 603E–F, H–I, 604F).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.

Cases referred to Burnet v Wells [1700] 12 Mod 421 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) David Syme & Co & Anor v Canavan [1918] 25 CLR 234 (refd) Egger v Viscount Chelmsford & Ors [1965] 1 QB 248 (refd) Hunt v The Star Newspaper Company, Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 CLJ 583 (refd) McDonald’s Corp & Anor v Steel & Anor [1995] 3 All ER 615 (refd) McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd [1903] 2 KB 100 (refd) Mirzan bin Mahathir v Star Papyrus Sdn Bhd [2000] 6 MLJ 29 (refd) Payne v Sheffield [1882] 2 EDC 166 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) ||Page 581>> Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Salomon v A Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (refd) Simpson v Robinson [1848] 12 QB 511 (refd) Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd, The v Workers’ Party & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 186 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 178

Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (folld) Terry v Hooper [1663] 1 Lev 115 (refd) Whitaker v Bradley [1827] 7 D&R 650 (refd) Zenobia v Axtell [1795] 6 TR 162 (refd)

Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 Defamation Act 1957 ss 6, 7, 8, 9 Federal Constitution art 10 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(1), (2)

Shamsul-Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the plaintiffs. M Reza A Hassan (V Vishnu Kumar and Ng Thiang Tuan with him) (Syarikat Kam Woon Wah) for the defendants.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case(1)

[2001] 3 MLJ 86 K Magathevan v Shafie bin Hj Kassim

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–83 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 25 APRIL 2001

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 179

Tort — Defamation — Letter to regulatory authorities — Allegation that plaintiff caused substantial loss to defendant in securities trading — Recovery action filed against defendant, whether defendant’s complaints intended to stall recovery action against him — Proof of malice would defeat qualified privilege — Whether defendant’s complaints connote defamatory meaning as pleaded

The plaintiff was at all material times the operation manager of Lion Commodities & Futures Trading Sdn Bhd (‘Lion’). The defendant was at all material times a client/customer of Lion. The defendant was introduced to Lion by the Futures Broker Representative (‘FBR’), a commission agent of Lion. In a letter dated 2 October 1998 sent to the Executive Director of Lion, the defendant wrote and published of the plaintiff concerning his conduct in his employment as the operation manager which had caused substantial losses to the defendant. The defendant also sent copies of the said letter to the Chairman of Lion and to the Chairman of the Securities Commission of Malaysia. The plaintiff claimed that in their natural and ordinary meaning, the words contained in the letter meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff made decisions and carried out trading transactions without the defendant’s knowledge and consent, that the losses suffered by the defendant were caused by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff misled the defendant and also misled or lied to the management and that the plaintiff cheated the FBR of his commission. The plaintiff contended that by sending copies of the letter to the various chairmen the defendant was motivated by malice. It was the plaintiff’s case that he had been seriously injured in his character and reputation and had suffered damage. The plaintiff thus claimed both general and aggravated damages for libel. The defendant pleaded the defence of qualified privilege. He also pleaded that the complaints or allegations against the plaintiff were correct, accurate and true in substance and in fact. It was not in dispute that the transactions were done in 1997, ie more than 12 months before the letter was sent. The defendant had accepted the losses then. It was also a fact that the defendant wrote and published the letter in October 1998 after Lion had instituted legal proceedings against the defendant.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim:

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(1) The plaintiff’s evidence was given in a forthright and clear manner. There was no attempt at prevarication. The defendant, on the other hand, was not telling the truth. He never protested when he received the various statements. In spite of being told by ||Page 87>>the FBR that the plaintiff had messed up his accounts he waited until Lion actually sued him before sending the impugned letter. The court was satisfied that the defendant was clearly motivated by malice when he wrote the impugned letter and when he sent copies of same to the various chairmen. Evidence had been led to show that even after sustaining losses the defendant had been updating his account by payment through cheques (see p 95F–G). (2) It was clear that Lion had kept the defendant informed of every stage of the transactions. It was also clear that the defendant had ample opportunities to dispute any wrongful transaction. With all material and relevant evidence, the court accepted the plaintiff’s submission that the defendant was solely motivated by malice when he wrote the letter. Clearly it was a way out of his predicament. By accusing the plaintiff of wrong doings and by extending copies of the letter to the relevant regulatory authorities, the defendant intended to stall for time and stop the recovery action filed against him. There was no room here for the defendant’s defence of qualified privilege (see p 96A, E–F). (3) It is trite that proof of malice defeats the defence of qualified privilege even assuming that it is available to the defendant. Whilst the legitimate complaint to Lion of any wrong doing by its employees of matters where the defendant had an interest will come under qualified privilege accorded by common law, in this case there had been absolutely no wrong doing by any employee of Lion including the plaintiff. The complaint of the defendant was ill-founded and connote the defamatory meaning as pleaded by the plaintiff (see p 96G–H). (4) Having considered all aspect, in particular the plaintiff’s position and standing, the nature of the libel, the extent of the publication and also the refusal of an apology, the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM75,000 as general damages and a further sum of RM75,000 as aggravated damages (see p 97D–E).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 181

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif, pada semua waktu material, merupakan pengurus operasi Lion Commodities & Futures Trading Sdn Bhd (‘Lion’). Defendan, pada semua waktu material, merupakan seorang klien/pelanggan Lion. Defendan diperkenalkan kepada Lion oleh seorang wakil broker Futures (‘FBR’), yang juga agen komisen Lion. Dalam satu surat bertarikh 2 Oktober 1998 yang dikirim kepada Pengarah Eksekutif Lion, defendan menulis dan menerbitkan tentang kelakuan plaintif sebagai seorang pengurus operasi yang telah mengakibatkan kerugian yang besar kepada defendan. Defendan juga menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada Pengerusi Lion dan Pengerusi Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia. Plaintif menuntut bahawa dalam maksud semulajadi dan ||Page 88>>biasa kata-kata yang terkandung dalam surat tersebut, ia difahamkan bahawa plaintif membuat keputusan dan menjalankan urusan perdagangan tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran defendan, bahawa kerugian yang menimpa defendan disebabkan oleh plaintif, bahawa plaintif mengelirukan defendan dan juga mengelirukan atau menipu pihak pengurusan dan bahawa plaintif menipu FBR dari mendapatkan komisennya. Plaintif berhujah bahawa dengan menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pengerusi-pengerusi tersebut, defendan berniat jahat. Adalah hujahan plaintif bahawa perwatakan dan reputasi beliau telah terjejas dan beliau telah mengalami kerugian. Oleh itu, plaintif menuntut gantirugi am dan khas untuk fitnah bertulis. Defendan menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat. Beliau juga menuntut bahawa aduan dan dakwaan terhadap plaintif adalah betul, tepat dan benar dalam isi halnya dan dalam faktanya. Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa urusan-urusan tersebut berlaku pada tahun 1997, iaitu lebih dari 12 bulan sebelum surat tersebut disampaikan. Defendan telah menerima kerugian tersebut pada masa itu. Adalah juga satu fakta bahawa defendan menulis dan menerbitkan surat tersebut pada bulan Oktober 1998 selepas Lion telah memulakan tindakan undang-undang terhadap defendan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Keterangan plaintif diberi secara terus terang dan jelas. Beliau tidak cuba mereka cerita. Manakala defendan pula tidak bercakap benar. Beliau tidak

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 182

membantah apabila menerima pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut. Walaupun diberitahu FBR bahawa plaintif telah menyebabkan akaun-akaunnya kelam-kabut, beliau menunggu sehingga Lion mendakwanya sebelum menghantar surat yang dipersoalkan itu. Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa defendan didorong niat jahat apabila menulis surat yang dipersoalkan itu dan apabila beliau menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pengerusi-pengerusi tersebut. Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa walaupun selepas mengalami kerugian, defendan telah mengemaskinikan akaunnya melalui bayaran cek (lihat ms 95F–G). (2) Jelas bahawa Lion telah memaklumkan defendan mengenai setiap peringkat urusan. Juga jelas bahawa defendan mempunyai banyak peluang mempertikaikan apa-apa urusan yang salah. Dengan semua keterangan yang material dan relevan, mahkamah menerima hujahan plaintif bahawa defendan hanya didorong niat jahat semata-mata apabila beliau menulis surat tersebut. Jelas ini merupakan satu cara defendan menyelesaikan masalahnya. Dengan menyalahkan plaintif atas kesilapan yang dilakukan dan dengan menghantar salinan surat tersebut kepada pihak berkuasa yang relevan, defendan berniat melenggahkan dan menghentikan tindakan mendapatkan balik yang difailkan terhadapnya. Tiada ||Page 89>>ruang di sini bagi defendan menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat (lihat ms 96A, E–F). (3) Adalah difahami semua bahawa bukti niat jahat mengalahkan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat walaupun jika pembelaan ini dianggap terbuka kepada defendan. Aduan sah kepada Lion mengenai apa-apa salah laku pekerja mengenai perkara di mana defendan mempunyai kepentingan akan diliputi perlindungan bersyarat yang diberi oleh undang-undang duluan, akan tetapi, dalam kes ini, terdapat tiada salah laku oleh mana-mana pekerja Lion termasuk plaintif. Aduan defendan tidak berasas dan menunjukkan maksud fitnah seperti yang didakwa plaintif (lihat ms 96G–H). (4) Setelah mempertimbangkan semua aspek, terutamanya kedudukan dan status plaintif, jenis fitnah, tahap penerbitan dan keengganan defendan meminta maaf, mahkamah memberikan plaintif jumlah RM75,000 sebagai gantirugi am

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 183

dan jumlah tambahan RM75,000 sebagai gantirugi khas (lihat ms 97D–E).

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.

Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) Normala Samsuddin v Keluarga Communications Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd)

S Periasamy (M Kumar with him) (Radzi Sheikh Ahmad & Peri) for the plaintiff. Azhar Azizan Harun (RN Sivaraja with him) (Hashim Sobri & Kadir) for the defendant.

[2001] 3 MLJ 140 Tan Chong & Son Motor Co Sdn Bhd v Borneo Motors (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO (S2)P84 OF 1979 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 10 MAY 2001

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libellous advertisement — Allegation of imitation and unreliability of plaintiff’s product — Predominant purpose of advertisement, whether to discredit plantiff — Injury to plaintiff’s reputation — Considerations for awarding of damages

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 184

Tort — Malicious falsehood — Libellous advertisement — Allegation of imitation and unreliability of plaintiff’s product — Predominant purpose of advertisement, whether to discredit plantiff — Whether malicious falsehood proved

The plaintiff was the sole and exclusive importer and distributor of motor vehicles in Malaysia bearing the trade marks Datsun and Nissan. The first defendant traded in Toyota motor vehicles. The second defendant was a media specialist and had advertised for and on behalf of the first defendant. In the later part of 1970s, the plaintiff distributed the new Datsun B310/120Y with an original design and additional accessories, as its latest model passenger car. The said model was released into the Malaysian market in July 1978. In conjunction with the release of the new Datsun B310/120Y into the Malaysian market, the plaintiff caused an advertisement to be inserted in The New Straits Times in its issue on 15 July 1978 to inform the public of the availability of the new model. In the issues of The New Straits Times for 28 July 1978, 4 August 1978 and 8 August 1978, the defendants printed and published of and concerning the plaintiff in the form of advertisement a lateral view picture of the plaintiff’s new model Datsun B310/120Y motor car alongside that of a lateral view picture of the Toyota Corolla model motor car marketed by the first defendant with the words that the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y was an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla and was less reliable. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants under trade libel and malicious falsehood. The defendant admitted publication of the words in the advertisements. The issue before the court were: (i) whether those words were defamatory; and (ii) the plaintiff was the ‘person’ defamed.

Held: (1) The court found that the statements in the advertisements were of the kind which were calculated to be injurious to the plaintiff in its trade. It appeared that from the defendant’s advertisements, the publication was not intended solely to promote sale of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla cars but rather was intended with the predominant purpose of discrediting the new Datsun B310/120Y and the plaintiff company (see pp 149E, 150E).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 185

||Page 141>> (2) From the defendant’s advertisements, it was clear that the ‘other’ car in the comparison with the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla was the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y. It was obvious that the defendants’ remarks were made of and concerning the plaintiff’s new model and were false. The fact that the disparaging advertisements did not specifically identify the plaintiff is immaterial. Further the vehicle depicted in all of the defendants’ advertisements did refer to the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y and not to any other vehicle (see p 149G–I). (3) The court found that the said advertisements were published in a manner so as to indicate to the public that the plaintiff’s new Datsun B310/120Y was an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla. This was certainly not true. The words also gave the connotation that the plaintiff was dishonest and untrustworthy by its representations to the Malaysian public that its Datsun B310/120Y was new in the market. The first defendant, being a member of the car trade, ought to have known the falsity of the statements made in its advertisement, but blatantly disregarded the truth. In printing and publishing and/or causing to be published the said advertisements, the second defendant too failed to verify the truth of the advertisements with the plaintiff prior to the publications (see pp 150F, H–151A). (4) The defendants in using the word ‘imitation’ in the advertisements were defaming the plaintiff by unjustly and maliciously accusing it of dealing in the new Datsun B310/120Y which was, according to the defendants an imitation of the first defendant’s Toyota Corolla and of holding out the model as an authentic one (see p 151G–H). (5) The court found that the words and pictures published in the defendants’ advertisement which when read as a whole, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff had only a few days prior advertised its new Datsun B310/120Y in the same newspaper, and the fact that no other similar models were in the market at the material time, were defamatory of the plaintiff and referred to no one else but the plaintiff (see p 152D–E). (6) The court found that the plaintiff’s new Datsun was not an imitation of the first

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 186

defendant’s Toyota Corolla. The plaintiff’s Datsun B310/120Y was a new model and its design was registered in Japan. The alleged claim made by the defendants that the new Datsun was less reliable than the Toyota Corolla was also never established. In the circumstances the court found for the plaintiff in libel against both the defendants (see pp 152E–F, 153E). (7) The court found that all the ingredients for malicious falsehood had been satisfied and that the defendants had failed to prove that there was no malice in the publications. It was obvious that the defendants had gone to great pains to dress up their advertising material in disparagement of the plaintiff’s goods and since their ||Page 142>>advertisement had been shown to be false and the plaintiff had succeeded in proving malice, the court also found that the plaintiff had proved its case of malicious falsehood against the defendants (see p 154A–B, G). (8) The plaintiff’s standing in society is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in awarding damages. In the present case, the plaintiff’s reputation was extensive and well-known in Malaysia. The defamatory and malicious statements published against the plaintiff in a newspaper which has a nationwide circulation is a very relevant factor since such publication to so many persons has a greater effect and thus a far greater potential to harm the plaintiff. The defendants not only refused to apologize to the plaintiff but also denied liability. Taking all these factors and having read all the submissions the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM500,000 in damages for libel (see pp 157E–G, 158E). (9) The plaintiff’s reputation was injured as Datsun/Nissan vehicles have always been associated with the plaintiff, and hence, any false advertisements attacking the Datsun cars seriously affect the plaintiff’s reputation as well. Taking all factors into consideration, the court awarded the plaintiff a sum of RM500,000 as damages for malicious falsehood inclusive of aggravated damages (see p 159A–C). (10) As for the loss by way of special damages, the calculation provided by the plaintiff was too speculative and remote. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove special damages (see p 159C–D).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 187

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif merupakan pengimpot dan pengedar tunggal kenderaan bermotor di Malaysia berjenama Datsun dan Nissan. Defendan pertama menjalankan perdagangan kenderaan bermotor Toyota. Defendan kedua merupakan seorang pakar media dan telah mengendalikan kerja pengiklanan untuk dan bagi pihak defendan pertama. Pada penghujung tahun 1970-an, plaintif mengedar model baru Datsun B310/120Y dengan reka bentuk asli dan kelengkapan tambahan sebagai model kereta penumpangnya yang terbaru. Model tersebut dikeluarkan ke pasaran Malaysia pada bulan Julai 1978. Sempena pengeluaran model baru Datsun B310/120Y ke pasaran Malaysia, plaintif menyebabkan penerbitan suatu iklan di dalam akhbar The New Straits Times dalam isu bertarikh 15 Julai 1978 yang memaklumkan orang awam mengenai terdapatnya model baru tersebut. Dalam isu-isu The New Straits Times bertarikh 28 Julai 1978, 4 Ogos 1978 dan 8 Ogos 1978, defendan-defendan mencetak dan menerbitkan mengenai plaintif dalam bentuk suatu iklan, gambar pandangan sisi model baru motokar Datsun B310/120Y plaintif bersebelahan dengan pandangan sisi model kereta Toyota Corolla ||Page 143>>yang dipasarkan oleh defendan pertama, dengan perkataan yang membawa makna bahawa model baru plaintif, Datsun B310/120Y, adalah satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama dan kurang kebolehpercayaannya. Plaintif menuntut gantirugi daripada defendan-defendan di bawah fitnah bertulis perdagangan dan kepalsuan niat jahat. Defendan mengakui penerbitan perkataan-perkataan dalam iklan-iklan tersebut. Isu di hadapan mahkamah ialah: (i) sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut bersifat fitnah; (ii) plaintif ialah pihak yang difitnah.

Diputuskan: (1) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan dalam iklan-iklan tersebut adalah jenis yang sengaja diperhitungkan agar menjejaskan plaintif dalam perdagangannya. Ia kelihatan dari iklan-iklan defendan bahawa terbitan tersebut bukan hanya bertujuan mempromosikan jualan kereta Toyota Corolla defendan pertama, tetapi diniatkan dengan tujuan utama menimbulkan

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 188

kesangsian terhadap Datsun B310/120Y baru tersebut dan syarikat plaintif (lihat ms 149E, 150E). (2) Dari iklan-iklan defendan, ia jelas bahawa kereta ‘yang lagi satu’ yang dibandingkan bersama kereta Toyota Corolla defendan pertama adalah kereta Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif. Ia jelas bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan defendan dibuat terhadap dan mengenai model baru plaintif dan bersifat palsu. Hakikat bahawa iklan-iklan yang memperkecilkan itu tidak secara khusus mengecam plaintif tidak material. Selain itu, kenderaan yang diperlihatkan di dalam semua iklan defendan memang merujuk kepada Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif dan bukan kepada apa-apa kenderaan yang lain (lihat ms 149G–I). (3) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa iklan-iklan tersebut diterbitkan dalam cara yang memberitahu masyarakat umum bahawa Datsun B310/120Y baru plaintif merupakan satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama. Ini memang tidak benar. Perkataan-perkataan tersebut juga membawa maksud tersirat bahawa plaintif tidak jujur dan tidak boleh dipercayai dari representasinya kepada masyarakat umum Malaysia bahawa Datsun B310/120Ynya baru di pasaran. Defendan pertama, sebagai seorang ahli perdagangan kereta, sepatutnya tahu akan kepalsuan pernyataan-pernyataan dalam iklannya, tetapi sengaja tidak menghiraukan kebenaran. Dalam mencetak dan menerbitkan atau menyebabkan terbitnya iklan-iklan tersebut, defendan kedua juga gagal memastikan benar atau palsunya iklan-iklan tersebut dengan plaintif sebelum penerbitan (lihat ms 150F, H–151A). (4) Dalam menggunakan perkataan ‘peniruan’ dalam iklan-iklan mereka, defendan-defendan telah memfitnah plaintif dengan mendakwanya secara tidak adil dan dengan niat jahat bahawa plaintif menguruskan model baru Datsun B310/120Y yang, ||Page 144>>menurut defendan, merupakan peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama dan plaintif memberikan maklumat yang model tersebut merupakan satu model yang asli (lihat ms 151G–H). (5) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa perkataan-perkataan dan gambar-gambar yang diterbitkan dalam iklan-iklan defendan-defendan, apabila dibaca secara keseluruhan, dan tambahan pula cuma beberapa hari sebelum itu plaintif

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mengiklankan Datsun B310/120Y barunya dalam akhbar yang sama dan tiada model kereta yang serupa terdapat di pasaran pada waktu yang material, bersifat fitnah dan merujuk kepada tiada sesiapa yang lain melainkan plaintif (lihat ms 152D–E). (6) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa kereta Datsun baru plaintif bukannya satu peniruan Toyota Corolla defendan pertama. Datsun B310/120Y plaintif adalah satu model baru dan reka bentuknya telah didaftarkan di negara Jepun. Tuntutan yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan bahawa Datsun baru tersebut kurang boleh dipercayai berbanding dengan Toyota Corolla juga tidak berasas. Dalam hal keadaan ini, mahkamah membenarkan kes plaintif dalam fitnah bertulis terhadap kedua-dua defendan (lihat ms 152E–F, 153E). (7) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa semua unsur kepalsuan niat jahat telah dipenuhi dan bahawa defendan-defendan gagal membuktikan bahawa terdapat tiada niat jahat dalam terbitan mereka. Ia jelas bahawa defendan-defendan bersusah-payah merekabentuk bahan pengiklanan mereka untuk memperkecilkan barangan plaintif, dan oleh kerana iklan mereka telah dibuktikan palsu dan plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan niat jahat, mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa plaintif telah membuktikan kes pemalsuan niat jahat terhadap defendan (lihat ms 154A–B, G). (8) Kedudukan plaintif dalam masyarakat adalah satu faktor yang relevan yang perlu dipertimbangkan dalam menilaikan gantirugi. Dalam kes ini, reputasi plaintif luas dan terkenal di Malaysia. Pernyataan-pernyataan yang bersifat fitnah dan berniat jahat yang diterbitkan mengenai plaintif dalam akhbar yang mempunyai edaran seluruh negara ialah satu faktor yang sungguh relevan kerana penerbitan ini yang mencapai begitu ramai orang mempunyai kesan yang lebih ketara dan potensi yang lebih tinggi untuk menjejaskan plaintif. Defendan-defendan bukan hanya enggan meminta maaf dari plaintif tetapi juga menafikan liabiliti. Setelah mempertimbangkan semua faktor ini dan membaca semua hujahan, mahkamah memberikan plaintif jumlah RM500,000 sebagai gantirugi fitnah bertulis (lihat ms 157E–G, 158E). (9) Reputasi plaintif terjejas kerana kenderaan Datsun/Nissan memang selama ini dikaitkan dengan plaintiff, dan oleh itu, apa-apa iklan palsu yang

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memperkecilkan kereta Datsun juga akan menjejaskan reputasi plaintif secara serius. Setelah mempertimbangkan semua faktor, mahkamah memberikan ||Page 145>>plaintif jumlah RM500,000 sebagai gantirugi pemalsuan berniat jahat, termasuklah gantirugi tambahan (lihat ms 159A–C). (10) Mengenai kerugian melalui gantirugi khas, perhitungan yang diperuntukkan oleh plaintif bersifat terlalu spekulatif dan luar dugaan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa plaintif gagal membuktikan gantirugi khas (lihat ms 159C–D).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–358.For cases on malicious falsehood, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 458–463.

Cases referred to Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) De Beers Abrasive Products Ltd, De Beers Industrial Diamonds (Ireland) Ltd and Diamond Products (Sales) Ltd v International General Electric Co of New York Ltd and General Electric Co [1975] FSR 323 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Khodaparast v Shad [2000] 1 All ER 545 (refd) Lyne v Nicholls (1906) 23 TLR 86 (refd) Mark Sallows v Laurie Griffiths (2001) 15 FSR 188 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd & Anor v Milan Debelak & Ors 15 IPR 129 (refd) Sin Heak Hin Tyres Pte Ltd v Yuasa Battery Singapore Co Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 590 (refd) Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1998] 1 SLR 97 (refd) Timothy White v Gustav Mellin [1895] AC 154 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 191

Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 MLJ 574 (refd) Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1965-1966) 117 CLR 118 (refd) Wilts United Dairies Ltd v Thomas Robinson Sons & Coy, Ld (1957) 9 RPC 22 (refd)

Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 s 73A

Nagarajah Muttiah (Grace Ho with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the plaintiff. Rueben Mathiavaranam (Gurbakh Singh and Francis Tan with him) (Azman, Davidson & Co) for the defendants. ||Page 146>>

[2001] 4 MLJ 161 Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v DP Vijandran

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–385 OF 2000 HAIDAR, AND ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN JJCA 3 AUGUST 2001

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Press statement alleged to be defamatory — Plaintiff a politician, former deputy speaker of Dewan Rakyat, member of Parliament and lawyer — Allegation of issuing dishonoured cheque — Damage to reputation and credit of plaintiff — Whether plaintiff’s reputation was at its pinnacle at the time of libel — Award of RM500,000, whether excessive

Tort — Defamation — Pleadings — Press statement alleged to be defamatory — Failure to

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plead actual words in toto in pleadings — Translation into Bahasa Malaysia not certified — Whether pleadings defective

The respondent had sued the appellant for defamation. The High Court gave judgment for the respondent and awarded a total of RM500,000 in damages, taking into consideration the position and standing of the plaintiff as a politician, a former deputy speaker of the Dewan Rakyat, a member of Parliament and a lawyer (see [2000] 3 MLJ 22). The appellant appealed. It was submitted that: (i) the respondent did not sue the appellant on the actual words of the appellant’s press statement in the sense that the respondent did not quote the whole of the press statement issued by the appellant and thus rendering the pleading defective; (ii) the translation into Bahasa Malaysia was not certified; and (iii) the damages awarded was excessive.

Held, dismissing the appeal on liability and allowing the appeal on quantum: (1) There is neither statutory provision nor rules of court that the actual words must be pleaded in toto failing which the action fails. The court must look at the purpose, what prejudice it causes to a defendant in putting up his defence, in short the justice of the case. Where the libel turns on the meaning of a particular word or words, of course the words must be pleaded so that the word used can be understood in the proper context it was used. In the present case, the court were concerned with statements of facts. There were no two meanings to them. It was not even challenged before the court that they have other meanings. There was clearly no prejudice to the appellant. In the circumstances, the court found that even though the press statement was not quoted in toto in the statement of claim, the failure to do so, in the circumstances of this case, was not fatal (see p 178D–G). (2) The press statement and the press report were in English. The material words were quoted in the statement of claim. The lawyers and the judges understood them perfectly well. Anyway, a translation was given in Malay which, though not certified, was not disputed that it was correct. Under the circumstances, the court found no merit in the argument that the action failed because the translation into Bahasa Malaysia was not certified (see p 179H–I).

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(3) The trial judge had misapprehended the facts and was also influenced by the prevailing trend then in awarding the damages. No doubt the position and standing of the respondent was an important factor to be considered. But the fact that a person had at one time held a high position is not synonymous with his having a high personal integrity, reputation and honour. It would not be correct to say that the respondent’s standing, character, credit and reputation as a public figure was at its pinnacle at the time the libel was committed and totally collapsed because of this libel. This libel, after all, concerned a dishonoured cheque. Taking all factors into consideration, the court found that the award made by the trial judge was excessive. A total award of RM100,000 would be more reasonable (see pp 185H–I, 186B–C, G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Responden telah menyaman perayu kerana fitnah. Mahkamah Tinggi telah memberikan penghakiman yang menyebelahi responden dan mengawardkan sejumlah RM500,000 sebagai ganti rugi, dengan mengambilkira kedudukan dan pendirian plaintif sebagai seorang ahli politik, bekas timbalan speaker Dewan Rakyat, ahli Parlimen dan peguam (lihat [2000] 3 MLJ 22). Perayu telah membuat rayuan. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa: (i) responden tidak menyaman perayu berdasarkan perkataan-perkataan sebenar kenyataan akhbar perayu dalam erti kata bahawa responden tidak memetik keseluruhan kenyataan akhbar yang dikeluarkan oleh perayu dan oleh itu menyebabkan pliding tersebut cacat; (ii) tafsiran ke dalam Bahasa Malaysia tidak disahkan; dan (iii) ganti rugi yang diawardkan adalah keterlaluan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan atas liabiliti dan membenarkan rayuan atas kuantum: (1) Tiada peruntukan-peruntukan statutori maupun kaedah-kaedah mahkamah bahawa perkataan-perkataan sebenar mestilah diplikan sepenuhnya jika tidak tindakan akan gagal. Mahkamah mestilah melihat tujuannya, apa prejudis yang berlaku ke atas defendan dengan mengemukakan pembelaan beliau, pendek kata keadilan kes tersebut. Di mana libel membawa maksud satu perkataan atau

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perkataan-perkataan tertentu sememangnya perkataan-perkataan tersebut mestilah diplikan supaya perkataan yang digunakan boleh difahami dalam konteks yang betul ia digunakan. Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah mementingkan penyataan fakta-fakta. Tiada dua maksud kepada perkataan-perkataan tersebut. Ia tidak langsung dicabar di hadapan mahkamah bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut mempunyai maksud lain. Adalah jelas tiada perjudis terhadap perayu. Dalam keadaan demikian, mahkamah mendapati bahawa walaupun kenyataan akhbar tidak memetik sepenuhnya penyataan tuntutan tersebut, kegagalan untuk berbuat demikian, dalam keadaan kes ini, tidak memudaratkan (lihat ms 178D–G). (2) Kenyataan akhbar dan laporan akhbar adalah dalam bahasa Inggeris. Perkataan-perkataan yang penting telah dipetik dalam penyataan tuntutan. Peguam-peguam dan hakim-hakim memahami perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan baik sekali. Lagipun, satu penafsiran dalam bahasa Malaysia telah diberikan, meskipun tidak disahkan, tidak dipertikaikan bahawa ia adalah betul. Di dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah mendapati tiada merit dalam penghujahan bahawa tindakan tersebut telah gagal kerana penafsiran dalam bahawa Malaysia tidak disahkan (lihat ms 179H–I). (3) Hakim perbicaraan telah salah faham tentang fakta-fakta dan juga dipengaruhi oleh budaya yang wujud ketika itu semasa mengawardkan ganti rugi. Adalah tidak dinafikan kedudukan dan pendirian responden memainkan faktor penting untuk dipertimbangkan. Tetapi hakikat bahawa seseorang pada ketika itu memegang kedudukan tinggi tidak merupakan sinonim dengan beliau mempunyai integriti peribadi yang tinggi, reputasi dan dihormati. Adalah tidak betul untuk mengatakan bahawa kedudukan, sikap, kewibawaan dan reputasi responden sebagai seorang tokoh masyarakat berada di kemuncak pada masa libel dilakukan dan telah musnah sama sekali kerana libel ini. Libel ini, lagipun, adalah berkaitan satu cek tak laku. Dengan mengambilkira semua faktor-faktor dalam pertimbangan, mahkamah mendapati bahawa award yang dibuat oleh hakim perbiacaraan adalah keterlaluan. Award berjumlah RM100,000 adalah lebih munasabah (lihat ms 185H–I, 186B–C, G).]

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Notes For cases on damages in defamation cases, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 216–222.For cases on pleadings in defamation cases, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 366–369.

Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 (refd) British Data Management plc v Boxer Commercial Removals plc & Anor [1996] 3 All ER 707 (refd) Cheah Cheng Hock & Ors v Liew Yew Tiam & Ors [2000] 6 MLJ 204 (refd) Chong Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551 (refd) Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 (refd) Dato Musa bin Hitam v SH Alatas & Ors [1991] 2 CLJ 314 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohd Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) Dr Jenny Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 (refd) Great One Coconut Products Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 469 (refd) Harris v Warre 4 CPD 125 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak & Ors [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) John Lee & Anor v Henry Wong Jan Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hock & Ors [2000] 6 MLJ 204 (refd) Liew Yew Tiam & Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoe & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 385 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Liong Sik & Ors [1997] 5 MLJ 523 (refd) Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [2000] 4 MLJ 77 (refd)

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MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Ng Cheng Kiat v Overseas Union Bank [1984] 2 MLJ 140 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Normala Samsudin v Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd) Pang Fee Yoon v Piong Kien Siong & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1969] 1 All ER 497 (refd) Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hassan bin Hamzah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 39 (refd) Thiruchelvasegaram a/l Manickavasegar v Mahadevi a/p Nadchatiram [2000] 5 MLJ 465 (refd) Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 MLJ 544 (refd) Tournier v National Provincial Bank [1923] All ER 550 (refd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (refd) Ummi Hafilda bte Ali & Anor v Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [2000] 6 MLJ 532 (refd) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 124 (refd)

Legislation referred to Penal Code s 420

Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant. DP Vijandran representing himself as respondent.

[2001] 4 MLJ 307

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 197

Re Geoffrey Robertson QC

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — ORIGINATING MOTIONS NO R1–17–35 OF 1999 AND R2–17–56 OF 1999 KC VOHRAH J 2 APRIL 2001

Legal Profession — Admission — Ad hoc — Queen’s Counsel — Applicant with his extensive and formidable experience had special qualifications in defamation, media and civil liberties, whether such expertise readily available in Malaysia — Whether quantum of damages for defamation settled law in Malaysia — Whether complex and novel issues requiring expertise of applicant

The applicant, a Queen’s Counsel practising in England, sought to be admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya under s 18 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘the Act’). The solicitors of the first defendant in Civil Suit No S2–23–14–99 (‘S2’) and the solicitors for the defendant in Civil Suit No S5–22–13–99 (‘S5’) were instructed to engage the applicant as lead counsel for them in the suits. S2 and S5 concerned claims for damages against the defendants for alleged libel of the plaintiff arising from the publication of an article. The plaintiff disputed that the two civil suits raised complex issues which require the services of the applicant. It was argued that no novel, complicated or serious issues had been raised; that art 10 of the Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’) has been the subject matter of decided cases in Malaysia and that the same is not an issue which requires the services of the applicant; that the applicant in any event has no ‘special qualification or experience’ to argue constitutional issues arising from art 10 of the Constitution as he has not disclosed any particular expertise in the Malaysian Federal Constitution; that the issue pertaining to quantum of damages in defamation cases is settled law in Malaysia and as such the defendants could not be said to require the expertise possessed by the applicant in this field. The plaintiff also disputed that for the purpose of the particular

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cases, the applicant possesses any special qualifications or experience of a nature not available amongst advocates and solicitors in Malaysia.

Held, allowing the application: (1) There was no dispute, as disclosed in the verifying affidavits, that the applicant is accepted in England, in America and the British Commonwealth as being a leading barrister and a leading scholar in the area of defamation, media and civil liberty laws. The court had no doubt that the applicant with his extensive and formidable experience had special qualifications in the field of defamation, media and civil liberties law (see pp 314F, 315G, 316A). (2) Clearly there were complex issues posed by the two civil suits whether the defence of qualified privilege should also be extended or liberalized in this jurisdiction and whether this extension ||Page 308>>would be consonant with our art 10 of the Constitution. In addition there was the novel issue in Malaysia whether the publication of the said article in jurisdictions other than Malaysia are actionable in Malaysia. Then there was also the novel issue whether the role played by or the assistance given The Star makes The Star liable as a ‘printer’ at common law and whether The Star should be held liable for the publication within Malaysia (see p 318D–F). (3) As to the argument that the quantum of damages has been settled by case law, the court had grave hesitation to conclude that the matter is closed. The court agreed with the submission that the applicant’s ‘special expertise and qualifications’ in the area of defamation laws would give him an edge with respect to leading the argument on the issue of the proper quantum of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff in a libel action (see pp 318I, 319B). (4) There could be no doubt whatsoever that there are excellent lawyers in our country who have expertise in the area of law relating to defamation, the media and civil liberties. But these lawyers are not specialists in or devoted to these particular areas of law. The court found that the applicant possesses special qualifications and experience of a nature not really available amongst advocates and solicitors in practice in Malaysia (see pp 319E, 320A).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 199

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pemohon, yang merupakan seorang Queen’s counsel yang berkhidmat di England, memohon ingin diterima dan didaftarkan sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaysia di bawah s 18 Akta Profesyen Guaman 1976 (‘Akta tersebut’). Peguamcara defendan pertama dalam Guaman Sivil No S2–23–14–99 (‘S2’) dan peguamcara defendan dalam Guaman Sivil No S5–22–13–99 (‘S5’) diarahkan mengambil khidmat pemohon sebagai peguam utama mereka dalam guaman-guaman tersebut. S2 dan S5 adalah berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi terhadap defendan-defendan untuk dakwaan libel yang timbul dari penerbitan satu artikel. Plaintif mempertikaikan bahawa dua guaman sivil tersebut mewujudkan isu-isu yang rumit yang memerlukan perkhidmatan pemohon. Ia dihujahkan bahawa tiada isu yang baru, rumit atau serius telah dikemukakan; bahawa perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’) pernah menjadi perkara kes-kes yang telah diputuskan di Malaysia dan bahawa ia bukan satu isu yang memerlukan perkhidmatan pemohon; bahawa pemohon tidak mempunyai apa-apa ‘kelayakan atau pengalaman khas’ untuk membincangkan isu-isu perlembagaan berkenaan perkara 10 Perlembagaan kerana beliau tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kepakaran khas dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia; bahawa isu yang melibatkan lingkungan gantirugi dalam kes-kes fitnah adalah undang- ||Page 309>>undang mantap di Malaysia dan oleh itu defendan-defendan tidak boleh dikatakan memerlukan kepakaran pemohon dalam bidang ini. Plaintif juga mempertikaikan bahawa bagi tujuan kes-kes tertentu, pemohon memiliki apa-apa kelayakan atau pengalaman khas yang tidak terdapat pada peguambela dan peguamcara di Malaysia.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Terdapat tiada pertikaian, seperti yang didedahkan dalam afidavit penentusahan, bahawa pemohon diterima di England, Amerika dan negara-negara Komanwel sebagai seorang peguambela yang unggul dan

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seorang cendekiawan utama dalam soal fitnah dan undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam. Mahkamah tiada keraguan bahawa pemohon, dengan pengalamannya yang luas dan mengkagumkan, mempunyai kelayakan khas dalam bidang fitnah dan undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam (lihat ms 314F, 315G, 316A). (2) Jelasnya terdapat isu-isu rumit yang dikemukakan oleh dua guaman sivil tersebut yang melibatkan soal sama ada pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat patut dilanjutkan atau diberi kelonggaran dalam bidangkuasa ini dan sama ada lanjutan ini selaras dengan perkara 10 Perlembagaan. Tambahan pula, terdapat isu baru di Malaysia sama ada penerbitan artikel tersebut dalam bidang kuasa selain daripada Malaysia boleh didakwa di Malaysia. Terdapat juga isu baru sama ada peranan yang dimainkan oleh, dan bantuan yang diberikan oleh, akhbar The Star menyebabkan The Star turut bertanggungjawab bagi penerbitan di dalam Malaysia (lihat ms 318D–F). (3) Berkenaan penghujahan bahawa lingkungan gantirugi telah diselesaikan oleh kes-kes duluan, mahkamah ragu-ragu untuk membuat kesimpulan bahawa perkara ini dianggap selesai dan tidak boleh dibicarakan lagi. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan bahawa ‘kepakaran dan kelayakan khas’ pemohon dalam soal undang-undang fitnah akan memberikannya kelebihan dalam mengemukan hujahan mengenai isu lingkungan gantirugi yang sesuai yang patut diberikan kepada plaintif dalam satu tindakan libel (lihat ms 318I, 319B). (4) Terdapat tiada keraguan sama sekali bahawa terdapat peguam yang cemerlang dalam negara ini yang mempunyai kepakaran dalam bidang undang-undang berkenaan fitnah, undang-undang kebebasan media dan kebebasan awam. Tetapi para peguam ini bukannya pakar dalam, atau berjurusan khusus dalam, bidang-bidang undang-undang ini. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pemohon mempunyai kelayakan dan pengalaman khas yang tidak boleh didapati di kalangan peguambela dan peguamcara yang berkhidmat di Malaysia (lihat ms 319E, 320A).] ||Page 310>>

Notes

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 201

For cases on ad hoc admission, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) paras 1345–1363.

Cases referred to AG v Wain & Ors [1991] 2 MLJ 525 (refd) Ahmad bin Said v Zulkiflee bin Bakar [1997] 5 MLJ 542 (refd) Albert Reynolds v Times [1998] 3 All ER 961 (refd) Albert Reynolds v Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (refd) Berezovsky and Glouchkov v Forbes Inc & Anor Times, 27 November 1998 (refd) Bowman v UK [1998] 1 CLY 1 (refd) Chadha & Osicom v Dow Jones Inc [1999] CLY 283 (refd) Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management (UK) v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Chin Vui Khen & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 49 (refd) Lee KuanYew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Far Eastern Economic Review [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Pratt & Morgan v AG of Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1 (refd) Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn Bhd v Berita Harian [1998] 6 MLJ 529 (refd) Rees v Crane [1994] 2 AC 173 (refd) Reynolds v Times [1998] 3 WLR 862 (refd) Saif Al Islam Gaddafi v Telegraph Group Ltd [2000] EMLR 43 (refd) Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK [1995] 1 CLY 458 (refd)

Legislation referred to Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance 1947 s 8A

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 202

Federal Constitution art 10(1)(a), (2)(a) Legal Profession Act 1976 s 18(1)(a), (2)

Gurmeet Kaur (Bhag Singh with him) (Shafee & Co) for the applicant in Originating Motion No R1–17–35 of 1999. Ahmad Kamal (Senior Federal Counsel) for the Attorney General’s Chambers, Edmund Bon for the Bar Council and Yasmeen Shariff for the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee in Originating Motion No R2–17–56 of 1999. R Thayalan (Ashok Vijay with him) (VK Lingam & Co) for the plaintiff in Civil Suits No S2–23–14 of 1999 and No S2(S5)–23–13 of 1999.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case(2)

[2001] 4 MLJ 497 Albert Chew v Hong Leong Finance Bhd

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2-23-53 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 7 SEPTEMBER 2001

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Police report and complaint to Bar Council — Forged discharge document attested by legal assistant — Falsified attestation — Usual practice of legal firms, whether court should condone illegality — Whether defence of qualified privilege applied — Unmitigated delay in filling suit — Whether libel proved

The plaintiff was a legal assistant attached to the firm of LS Chua & Co. A police report was lodged requesting the police to investigate the alleged forgery of a

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 203

discharge document which was attested by the plaintiff. A formal complaint was also made against the plaintiff to the Bar Council requesting for an investigation to be conducted by the Disciplinary Board of the Bar Council. Having considered the complaint and the explanation from the plaintiff and the report of the Investigating Tribunal, the Bar Council dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff brought an action for defamation against the defendant whereby it was pleaded that the words contained in police report in their natural and ordinary meaning charged the plaintiff and/or implicated him with and/or imputed the offence of forgery in respect of the transaction adverted to therein. In respect of the complaint to the Bar Council the plaintiff pleaded that the said words in their natural and ordinary meaning charged the plaintiff and/or implicated him with and/or imputed the offence of forgery and that the said words were also calculated to further discredit him in his profession as an advocate and solicitor by falsely and maliciously attributing to and/or connecting him with unethical and/or dishonorable and/or discreditable and/or disreputable conduct that warranted him being disciplined. The plaintiff therefore prayed for special damages and damages for libel.

Held, dismissing the claim: (1) Having read the police report and the complaint to the Bar Council, the court could not found it anywhere stated that the plaintiff was the author of the forged document. All that the defendant said was that the plaintiff had attested as true, a document which was not a true document (see p 507D). (2) The plaintiff had certified to the genuineness and correctness of an untrue copy. The defence of qualified privilege must succeed in this case. The defendant had a duty to report because of a serious allegation of forgery. If the discharge of charge which the plaintiff was alleged to have attested to was genuine and a true document, then the charge would have been discharge and the defendant’s charge would have been duly registered. In the circumstances, the court could not fault the defendant for lodging the police report and the complaint to the Bar Council (see pp 507H, 508C–D). ||Page 498>> (3) The initial misconduct of the plaintiff was the causa causans for the defendant

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to lodge a police report and the complaint to the Bar Council. If this court accepts the plaintiff’s explanation that it is the practice of most legal firms to do as he did then it would be tantamount to condoning an illegal or improper act by this court. Legal assistant should have the courage to tell their respective employers that they will not be a party to any illegal or improper conduct (see pp 507C, 508E). (4) Another factor that the court had to take into consideration was the plaintiff’s unmitigated delay in filing this suit. His explanation that he was emotionally upset could not be a sufficient and valid reason for failing to forthwith file a suit to vindicate his reputation. He filed this suit hardly a month or two before the six-year limitation period had set in and no satisfactory explanation was given for the delay (see p 509B–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif merupakan seorang pembantu guaman yang bekerja dengan firma LS Chua & Co. Laporan polis telah dibuat meminta pihak polis supaya menyiasat jenayah pemalsuan yang dikatakan telah dilakukan ke atas suatu dokumen discaj yang disahkan oleh plaintif. Satu aduan rasmi telah pun dibuat terhadap plaintif kepada Majlis Peguam memohon supaya satu siasatan dijalankan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib Majlis Peguam. Setelah menimbang aduan tersebut dan penjelasan daripada plaintif serta laporan Tribunal Siasatan, Majlis Peguam telah menolak aduan tersebut. Plaintif telah memulakan suatu tindakan fitnah terhadap defendan yang mana ia dihujahkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang terkandung dalam laporan polis dalam maksud lazim dan biasa mereka telah mendakwa plaintif dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan dan/atau menuduhnya dengan kesalahan pemalsuan berhubung dengan transaksi yang dirujuk di dalamnya. Berkaitan dengan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam, plaintif berhujah bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut dalam maksud lazim dan biasa mereka telah menuduh plaintif dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan dan/atau menuduhnya dengan kesalahan pemalsuan dan bahawa kata-kata tersebut juga dijangka menjatuhkan namanya dengan lebih lanjut dalam profesyennya sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara dengan mengatakan secara palsu dan berniat jahat mendakwa dan/atau mengaitkannya dengan MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 205

kelakuan yang tidak beretika dan/atau tidak bermaruah dan/atau memalukan dan/atau yang kurang hormat yang mewajarkan tindakan tatatertib diambil ke atasnya. Maka plaintif memohon ganti rugi khas dan ganti rugi untuk fitnah bertulis.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut: (1) Setelah membaca laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam, mahkamah tidak menjumpai apa-apa kenyataan bahawa ||Page 499>>plaintif merupakan penulis dokumen yang dipalsukan. Apa yang dikatakan oleh defendan ialah bahawa plaintif telah mengesahkan apa yang benar, satu dokumen yang bukannya satu dokumen yang benar (lihat ms 507D). (2) Plaintif telah mengesahkan kesahihan dan ketepatan salinan yang tidak benar. Pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat mesti berjaya dalam kes ini. Defendan bertanggungjawab membuat laporan disebabkan dakwaan jenayah pemalsuan yang serius. Sekiranya discaj caj yang mana plaintif dikatakan telah mengesahkan adalah benar dan satu dokumen yang benar, maka caj itu tentunya dilepaskan dan caj defendan pastinya akan didaftarkan seperti yang sepatutnya. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah tidak boleh mempersalahkan defendan kerana membuat laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majlis Peguam (lihat ms 507H, 508C–D). (3) Salah laku permulaan plaintif merupakan causa causans yang menyebabkan defendan membuat laporan polis dan aduan kepada Majllis Peguam. Sekiranya mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan plaintif bahawa ia merupakan amalan kebanyakan firma guaman untuk membuat sebagaimana yang dilakukannya, ia sama sahaja dengan memaafkan tindakan yang salah di sisi undang-undang atau yang tidak wajar oleh mahkamah ini. Pembantu guaman seharusnya berani memberitahu majikan masing-masing bahawa mereka tidak akan menjadi pihak kepada apa-apa kelakuan yang menyalahi undang-undang atau yang tidak wajar (lihat ms 507C, 508E). (4) Satu lagi faktor yang harus diambil kira oleh mahkamah adalah kelewatan plaintif dalam memfailkan guaman ini. Penjelasan beliau bahawa emosinya tersinggung tidak boleh diterima sebagai satu alasan yang mencukupi dan sah atas kegagalan memfail satu guaman dengan serta-merta untuk membersihkan

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reputasinya. Beliau memfailkan guaman ini tidak hampir sebulan atau dua bulan sebelum tempoh had masa enam tahun luput dan tiada penjelasan yang memuaskan telah diberi untuk kelewatan tersebut (lihat ms 509B–C).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–252.

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 12 National Land Code 1965 s 211(2)

Terrance Marbeck (SG Yahna with him) (TS Marbeck & Co) for the plaintiff. Robert Lazar (TM Yap with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant. ||Page 500>>

[2001] 4 MLJ 510 Ngoi Thiam Woh v CTOS Sdn Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–87 OF 2001 ABDULL HAMID EMBONG J 30 AUGUST 2001

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Interim injunction in defamation action — Restraint against proclamation of sale in newspaper — Bona fide defence of qualified privilege — Whether court could grant interim injunction in defamation action — Delay in application for injunction — Whether plaintiff must provide undertaking to damages

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Tort — Defamation — Injunction — Interim injunction against proclamation of sale in newspaper — Bona fide defence of qualified privilege — Whether court could grant interim injunction in defamation action — Delay in application for injunction — Whether plaintiff must provide undertaking to damages

The plaintiff was a businessman and the sole distributor of a wide range of health and skin care products. He was also formerly a member of Parliament and a state assemblyman. The first defendant (‘CTOS’) was a computer database information company which collated information from newspapers, government gazettes, the registries of businesses and companies and stored them into its electronic archive for the information of its customers which included banks. The second defendant (‘The Star’), was the publisher of a popular daily newspaper and the third defendant was the printer of the second defendant. The plaintiff had, in May this year, filed a suit against the defendants seeking damages for defamation and for injunctive reliefs. In this application, the plaintiff sought for an interlocutory injunction pending the disposal of the suit to restrain the defendants, from, inter alia, publishing and communicating a proclamation of sale (‘the proclamation’). The defendants had raised two preliminary objections to this application. Firstly, it was submitted that the affidavit in support did not offer any undertaking for damages. Secondly, it was submitted that there had been a long delay of 40 months in seeking this injunctive relief, a delay for which there was no plausible explanation. The primary issue for determination was whether the court may grant an interim injunction in a defamation action.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The court should be slow in granting an interim injunction in a defamation action. The court may only grant interlocutory injunctions of this species if the following factors are satisfied: (i) that the statement is unarguably defamatory; (ii) there are no grounds for concluding that the statement may be true; (iii) there is no other defence which might succeed; and (iv) there is evidence of an intention to repeat or publish the defamatory statement. The burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff, and not on the defendants. In the instant application, the

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plaintiff had ||Page 511>>failed to satisfy the court all of the first three factors stated (see pp 517F, 519B, 520D–E). (2) The proclamation complained of was, on the face of it, a usual advertisement published on The Star, pursuant to its normal day to day transaction. The plaintiff had not satisfied the court that the proclamation was published out of malice. The plea of qualified privilege by the second and the third defendants should therefore be considered by this court as prima facie bona fide defence in refusing the grant of an interim injunction (see p 519G–H). (3) Form 58 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), ie the Form for an order for interim injunction shows that the court, in its discretion, may order that the plaintiff gives an undertaking as to damages. This order on an undertaking may be made by the court if it is of the opinion, after enquiring into the matter, that a defendant would sustain some damages as a result of the injunction granted. Clearly then, this order on the undertaking is left to the court’s discretion. The omission to provide for an undertaking for damages in the plaintiff’s affidavit or his application is thus not fatal, and that under the RHC, it is a non-mandatory requisite although the general practice, with some exceptions is for the court to require that such an undertaking be given. Being a discretionary remedy and one founded on equity, the court must have regard to the essential justice of the case (see p 522C–F). (4) The complaint here was a most grave and pressing matter, as was impressed upon this court by the plaintiff in his own application, and surely, one that required immediate attention and compelling action. The plaintiff need not have waited until after the writ was filed to seek this interlocutory relief. He should have acted promptly upon the proclamation coming to his knowledge. Discretionary remedies being exceptional in nature, should not be made available to those who sleep on their rights. In the instant case, the plaintiff’s prolonged slumber of some 40 months was certainly inexcusable (see pp 520I–521C). Obiter: The application before this court was defective and one wanting in procedure. There

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was no machinery to enable the plaintiff to apply for an interlocutory injunction by a motion to a judge in open court. An application that failed to comply with a mandatory procedural requirement is was and could not stand. A fundamental breach of an expressed requirement had occurred and one not curable under O 2 of the RHC. It was unfortunate that this matter was not earlier brought to the court’s attention for, if it had been, a summary striking out of this motion would not have been inappropriate in the circumstance (see pp 522I–523C). ||Page 512>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif merupakan seorang ahli perniagaan dan pengedar tunggal berbagai jenis barangan kesihatan dan penjagaan kulit. Beliau juga merupakan bekas ahli Parlimen dan ahli dewan undangan negeri. Defendan pertama (‘CTOS’) merupakan syarikat maklumat pangkalan data komputer yang mengumpul semak maklumat daripada suratkhabar, warta kerajaan, pejabat-pejabat pendaftaran perniagaan dan syarikat-syarikat dan menyimpannya di dalam arkib elektroniknya untuk maklumat pelanggan-pelanggannya termasuk bank-bank. Defendan kedua (‘The Star’) adalah penerbit suratkhabar harian yang popular dan defendan ketiga merupakan pencetak defendan kedua. Pada Mei tahun ini, plaintif telah memfailkan guaman terhadap defendan menuntut ganti rugi untuk fitnah dan untuk relif-relif injunksi. Di dalam permohonan ini, plaintif memohon untuk injunksi interlokutori sementara menunggu penyelesaian guaman untuk memberhentikan defendan-defendan daripada, inter alia, menerbitkan suatu proklamasi jualan (‘proklamasi tersebut’). Defendan-defendan membangkitkan dua bantahan awal kepada permohonan ini. Pertamanya, telah dihujahkan bahawa affidavit sokongan tidak mengandungi sebarang akujanji untuk ganti rugi. Kedua yang dihujahkan adalah bahawa telah berlaku kelewatan selama 40 bulan dalam memohon relif injunksi tersebut, dan kelewatan ini tidak beralasan. Isu utama untuk ditentukan adalah sama ada mahkamah boleh memberi injunksi interim di dalam guaman fitnah.

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Diputuskan, menolak permohonan tersebut: (1) Mahkamah tidak sepatutnya tergesa-gesa memberikan injunksi interim dalam guaman fitnah. Mahkamah hanya boleh memberikan injunksi sebegini jika faktor-faktor seperti berikut dipuaskan: (i) pernyataan tersebut adalah fitnah; (ii) tiada alasan untuk memutuskan bahawa pernyataan tersebut adalah benar; (iii) tiada pembelaan yang mungkin berjaya; dan (iv) terdapat keterangan yang menunjukkan niat untuk mengulangi ataupun menerbit fitnah tersebut. Beban membukti jatuh ke atas plaintif dan bukan defendan-defendan. Di dalam permohonan ini, plaintif gagal memuaskan mahkamah di atas ketiga-tiga faktor tersebut (lihat ms 517F, 519B, 520D–E). (2) Proklamasi yang dikatakan, pada dasarnya, adalah iklan biasa yang diterbitkan dalam The Star, sebagai urus niaga sehari-hari. Plaintif gagal memuaskan mahkamah ini bahawa proklamasi tersebut dibuat dengan niat jahat. Rayuan perlindungan bersyarat defendan kedua dan ketiga sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah sebagai pembelaan yang prima facie bona fide dalam menolak permohonan untuk injunksi interim (lihat ms 519G–H). (3) Borang 58 Keadah-Keadah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’), iaitu borang untuk perintah untuk injunksi interim, menunjukkan ||Page 513>>bahawa mahkamah, melalui budi bicaranya boleh memberi perintah supaya plaintif memberi akujanji ganti rugi. Jika mahkamah berpendapat bahawa, setelah menyiasat bahawa defendan akan menanggung kerugian oleh kerana injunksi tersebut, mahkamah boleh membuat perintah akujanji. Jelas bahawa perintah aku janji ini adalah pada budi bicara mahkamah. Kegagalan plantif dalam menyediakan aku janji di dalam afidavitnya atau permohonannya tidak membawa padah, dan di bawah KMT, ia tidak merupakan keperluan yang mandatori, walaupun, sebagai amalan, dengan kekecualian, mahkamah menghendaki aku janji sedemikian diberi. Sebagai remedi yang mengikut budi bicara dan berdasarkan ekuiti, mahkamah mestilah mengambil berat terhadap keadilan kes tersebut (lihat ms 522C–F). (4) Aduan di dalam kes ini adalah perkara yang serius dan mendesak, seperti yang ditekan oleh plaintif di dalam afidavitnya dan merupakan perkara yang memerlukan perhatian segera dan tindakan mendorong. Plaintif tidak perlu

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menunggu sehingga writ difailkan sebelum memohon untuk relif interlokutari tersebut. Beliau sepatutnya bertindak sebaik sahaja selepas beliau mendapat tahu mengenai proklamasi tersebut. Remedi yang mengikut budi bicara tidak sepatutnya diberi kepada pemohon yang tidak bertindak dengan segera. Di dalam kes ini, kegagalan plaintif untuk bertindak selama 40 bulan tidak dapat dimaafkan (lihat ms 520I–521C). Obiter: Permohonan di hadapan mahkamah ini adalah cacat dan tidak mengikut prosedur. Plaintif tidak boleh memohon untuk injunksi interlokutari melalui usul kepada hakim di dalam mahkamah terbuka. Permohonan yang tidak mengikut prosedur mandatori akan membawa padah. Kemungkiran asasi peruntukkan yang nyata telahpun berlaku dan tidak dapat dibetulkan di bawah A 2 KMT. Jikalau perkara ini dibawa kepada perhatian mahkamah terlebih dahulu, pembatalan terus usul ini tidak boleh dikatakan tidak patut di dalam situasi ini (lihat ms 522I–523C).

Notes For cases on interim injunction generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 2626–2706.For cases on an injunction in a defamation action, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 253–257.

Cases referred to Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors [1980] 2 All ER 502 (refd) American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504 (refd) ||Page 514>> Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kimden Housing Development Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 283 (refd) Best Electronics Sdn Bhd v Chen Li Yeng [1997] MLJU 167 (refd) Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (refd) Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 (refd)

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Coulson v Coulson (1887) 3 TLR 846 (refd) Delbert-Evans v Davies and Watson [1945] All ER 167 (refd) Evercrisp Snack Products (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sweeties Food Industries Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 297 (refd) Haji Wan Habib Syed Mahmud v Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud & Anor [1986] 2 MLJ 198 (refd) Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 (refd) Lim Hean Pin v Thean Seng Co Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 MLJ 10 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1988] 1 MLJ 50 (refd) Mogul Steamship Co v M’Gregor, Gow & Co (1885) 15 QBD 47 (refd) Murray Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321 (refd) New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd, The v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (refd) Noor Jahan bte Abdul Wahab v Md Yusoff bin Amanshah & Anor [1994] 1 MLJ 156 (refd) Perbadanan Nasional Insurans Sdn Bhd v Pua Lai Ong [1996] 3 MLJ 85 (refd) Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Beall (1882) 20 Ch D 501 (refd) Rajamanikam a/l Adaikalam v Bolton Finance Bhd [2000] 3 MLJ 454 (refd) Seema Development Sdn Bhd v Mah Kim Chye & Anor [1997] MLJU 235 (refd) Si Rusa Beach Resort Sdn Bhd v Asia Pacific Hotels Management Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 132 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 12(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 29 rr 1(2), 2A, Form 58

Ngan Siong Hing (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiff. Harris Ibrahim (Nor Isman with him) (Liza Chan & Co) for the first defendant.

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Bhag Singh (Bhag Sulaiman & Co) for the second and third defendants.

[2001] 5 MLJ 48 Anwar bin Ibrahim v Abdul Khalid @ Khalid Jafri bin Bakar & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–40 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 13 SEPTEMBER 2000

Civil Procedure — Amendment — Defence — Application to amend defence after summons for directions obtained — Defamation suit — Allegation of corrupt practice — Criminal conviction of plaintiff on corrupt practice — Appeal on conviction pending — Whether defendant justified in relying on criminal case

Evidence — Criminal conviction — Admissibility in civil proceedings — Defamation suit — Allegation of corrupt practice — Criminal conviction of plaintiff on corrupt practice — Appeal on conviction pending — Whether defendant justified in relying on criminal case as defence in defamation suit — Evidence Act 1950 s 43

The plaintiff was at all material times a Member of Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Malaysia while the first defendant authored a book entitled ‘50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM’. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for libel and conspiracy. The defendants pleaded justification and averred their intention to adduce evidence to substantiate their allegations. The parties had closed pleadings and obtained an order for summons for directions. At that stage, the defendants applied to amend their defence which was opposed by the plaintiff. The

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defendants had dropped the plea of justification and instead had cited the reported case against the defendant, ie PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 together with the charges and the sentence. In the reported case, the plaintiff (the accused) was charged with four counts of corrupt practices under s 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970. Having heard all the evidence, the court found the accused guilty on all four charges and sentenced him to six years imprisonment in respect of each of the four charges with the sentences to run concurrently from the date of conviction. It was the case of the defence that since the contents of exh P14A in the criminal charge actually represented the contents of part of the book, they were justified in relying on the case, the charges and the conviction.

Held, allowing the application: (1) Section 43 of the Evidence Act 1950 states that judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in ss 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. Clearly the conviction of the plaintiff herein for corruption is a fact in issue as the first defendant has accused the plaintiff of indulging in corrupt practices and the plaintiff had denied the same. The plaintiff therefore will have sufficient opportunity to ||Page 49>>explain the charges and the conviction in the civil case. Further, the character of the plaintiff is vital to the question of damages. The defendants must be given the liberty to plead all relevant facts that would be relevant towards mitigating damages (see pp 53B, 55G–H). (2) The defendants have referred to a decision of the court (and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeal) wherein the plaintiff had been charged and convicted of corrupt practices, the very essence of the defendants’ allegation against the plaintiff which led to the filing of the suit. The defendants ought not to be precluded from amending their defence to include the charges and the conviction (see pp 56I–57A). The argument that the appeal by the plaintiff against his conviction to the Federal Court is pending and hence the decision is not final is unacceptable. A court of competent jurisdiction had found the plaintiff guilty of four counts of corruption. An appeal to the Federal Court

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does not mean that the guilty verdicts are put in limbo or that the plaintiff is deemed innocent (see p 58C–D).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pada semua waktu material merupakan seorang ahli Parlimen, Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Kewangan Malaysia manakala defendan pertama telah mengarang sebuah buku berjudul ‘50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM’. Plaintif mendakwa defendan bagi gantirugi libel dan komplot. Defendan-defendan membawa pembelaan justifikasi dan menegaskan niat mereka mengemukakan keterangan untuk mengesahkan tuduhan-tuduhan mereka. Setiap pihak telah menutup pliding dan mendapatkan perintah saman untuk arahan. Pada peringkat itu, defendan-defendan memohon untuk meminda pembelaan mereka dan ini ditentang oleh plaintif. Defendan-defendan telah menggugurkan pembelaan justifikasi dan sebaliknya memetik kes yang dilaporkan mengenai defendan, iaitu PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 bersama dengan tuduhan-tuduhan dan hukumannya. Dalam kes yang dilaporkan itu, plaintif (tertuduh) dituduh dengan empat tuduhan kegiatan rasuah di bawah s 2(1) Ordinan Darurat (Kuasa-Kuasa Perlu) No 22 tahun 1970. Setelah mendengar segala keterangan, mahkamah telah mendapati yang tertuduh bersalah dalam keempat-empat tuduhan dan menjatuhkan hukuman enam tahun penjara bagi setiap satu daripada empat tuduhan tersebut, dan hukuman-hukuman tersebut dijalankan serentak dari tarikh sabitan. Kes pembelaan adalah memandangkan kandungan exh P14A dalam tuduhan jenayah tersebut sebenarnya mewakili kandungan sebahagian daripada buku tersebut, adalah munasabah bagi mereke untuk bergantung kepada kes, tuduhan dan sabitan tersebut. ||Page 50>>

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan tersebut: (1) Seksyen 43 Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan bahawa penghakiman, perintah atau keputusan selain daripada apa yang disebut dalam ss 40, 41 dan 42 adalah tidak relevan kecuali jika kewujudan penghakiman, perintah atau keputusan

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sedemikian ialah fakta yang dipertikaikan atau relevan di bawah peruntukan lain di bawah Akta tersebut. Jelasnya, sabitan plaintif bagi rasuah merupakan fakta yang dipertikaikan kerana defendan pertama telah menuduh plaintif melakukan kegiatan rasuah dan plaintif telah menafikan tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut. Plaintif mempunyai peluang yang mencukupi untuk menerangkan tuduhan-tuduhan tersebut dan sabitan dalam kes sivil tersebut. Selain daripada itu, keperibadian plaintif juga mustahak dalam soal gantirugi. Defendan-defendan mesti diberi kebebasan membuat pembelaan bagi semua fakta yang relevan dalam meringankan ganti rugi (lihat ms 53B, 55G–H). (2) Defendan-defendan telah merujuk kepada salah satu keputusan mahkamah (yang kemudiannya disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan) di mana plaintif telah dituduh dan disabit kesalahan kegiatan rasuah, intipati tuduhan defendan-defendan terhadap plaintif yang menyebabkan guaman tersebut difail. Defendan-defendan tidak harus dikecualikan dari mengubah pembelaan mereka untuk memasukkan tuduhan-tuduhan serta sabitan (lihat ms 56I–57A). Hujahan bahawa rayuan plaintif atas sabitannya ke Mahkamah Persekutuan masih menunggu keputusan dan oleh itu keputusan tersebut tidak muktamad tidak boleh diterima. Mahkamah yang mempunyai bidang kuasa telah mendapati plaintif bersalah atas empat tuduhan rasuah. Rayuan kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan tidak bermaksud bahawa keputusan bersalah itu terawang-awang atau bahawa plaintif dianggap tidak bersalah (lihat ms 58C–D).]

Notes For cases on amendment of defence, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 308–318 and 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3445–3455. For a case on admissibility of criminal conviction in civil proceedings, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 852.

Cases referred to Cohen v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 All ER 407 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2000] 2 MLJ 486 (refd)

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DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 (refd) PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 (refd) Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co. Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 35 (refd) Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 (refd) ||Page 51>> Ramanathan Chelliah v Penyunting, The Malay Mail & Anor [1998] 2 CLJ 691 (refd) Simetech (M) Sdn Bhd v Yeoh Cheng Liam Construction Sdn Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 11 (refd)

Legislation referred to Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No 22 of 1970 s 2(1) Evidence Act 1950 ss 40, 41, 42, 43 Penal Code ss 193, 354 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 34

Tuan Haji Sulaiman Abdullah (Leela J Jesuthasan with him) for the respondent/plaintiff. Shamsul-Bahrain bin Ibrahim (Skrine & Co) for the applicants/defendants.

[2001] 5 MLJ 277 Bitutech Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bosco Philip Anthony & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–(S6)–23–92 0F 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 12 OCTOBER 2000

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Civil Procedure — Striking out — Pleadings — Striking out statement of claim — Appeal against registrar’s decision in allowing application to strike out — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libellous statement in e-mail — Allegation that plaintiff had not conformed with court order and an order from the Majlis Perbandaran Selayang — Whether first defendant acting as agent or servant for third defendant — Whether constructive knowledge can be attributed to the third defendant

At all material times, the second, third and fourth plaintiffs were the directors of the first plaintiff, whereas the first defendant was the advocate and solicitor of the second and third defendants. On 12 July 1999, the first defendant obtained an ex parte order for an injuction to restrain the plaintiffs from manufacturing products that may pollute the surrounding area of Sungai Buloh. This order lapsed on 22 July 1999 and an application to extend the order was dismissed by the High Court in Shah Alam on 22 July 1999. On 3 August 1999, the first defendant issued an e-mail to the Yang Di-pertua Majlis Perbandaran Selayang and to the director, Department of Environment, State of stating that the first plaintiff had not ceased its operations notwithstanding the court order and an order from the Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (through a letter dated 30 June 1999) to the first plaintiff to cease operations. The plaintiffs took the words to mean that they had wilfully disobeyed the injunctive order of the court and thereby had been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt, and sued the defendants in libel. The third defendant applied to strike out the claim against him under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. In his supporting affidavit, the third defendant averred that he did not instruct the first defendant to send the e-mail and that the e-mailer was neither his agent nor his servant. The learned senior assistant registrar allowed the third defendant’s application and the plaintiffs appealed.

Held, dismissing the appeal with costs: The first defendant had expressly stated that he sent the e-mail on his own and without the instructions of the third defendant. It cannot be said then that constructive

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knowledge must be attributed to the third defendant. This admission must be taken together with the fact that the solicitor himself was the first defendant, and was also acting for himself with an interest in the matter in question. Once this evidence ||Page 278>>was before the court, it did not think it was necessary to hear from the respondent (see p 280G–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada semua masa yang material, plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat adalah pengarah kepada plaintif pertama, manakala defendan pertama adalah peguambela dan peguamcara kepada defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Pada 12 Julai 1999, defendan pertama telah memperoleh perintah ex parte untuk injunksi untuk menghalang plaintif-plaintif daripada membuat produk-produk yang mungkin mencemarkan kawasan Sungai Buloh. Perintah tersebut luput pada 22 Julai 1999, dan Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah, pada 22 Julai 1999, menolak permohonan untuk melanjutkan perintah tersebut. Pada 3 Ogos 1999, defendan ketiga telah menulis e-mail kepada Yang di-pertua Majlis Perbandaran Selayang dan kepada pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar, Negeri Selangor, menyatakan bahawa plaintif pertama gagal menghentikan kerja-kerjanya walau apa pun perintah Mahkamah dan perintah daripada Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (melalui sepucuk surat bertarikh 30 Jun 1999) kepada plaintif supaya menghentikan kerja-kerjanya. Plaintif memaksudkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut sebagai mengatakan bahawa mereka telah mengingkar perintah injunksi Mahkamah dengan sengaja dan dengan itu telah membawa kepada skandal awam, kebencian dan penghinaan dan telah menyaman defendan-defendan dalam libel. Defendan ketiga telah membuat permohonan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif dibawah A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) dan (c) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Defendan ketiga telah, didalam afidavit sokongannya, menyatakan bahawa defendan pertama bukan merupakan agen atau pengkhidmatnya dan beliau tidak pernah meminta penulis e-mail tersebut menghantar e-mail tersebut. Penolong kanan pendaftar yang arif membenarkan permohonan defendan ketiga dan pihak plaintif merayu.

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Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos: Defendan pertama telah dengan nyatanya berkata bahawa beliau telah menghantar e-mail tersebut dengan sendiri tanpa arahan daripada defendan ketiga. Maka defendan ketiga tidak boleh dikatakan mempunyai notis konstruktif. Pengakuan ini mesti diambil dengan fakta bahawa peguamcara adalah defendan pertama, dan beliau juga sedang bertindak untuk dirinya sendiri dengan mempunyai kepentingan didalam hal tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa responden tidak perlu memberi keterangan setelah keterangan itu didengar (lihat ms 280G–H).]

Notes For cases on defamation, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 193–409. ||Page 279>> For cases on striking out, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 4335–4344.

Cases referred to Boursot v Savage (1866) Vol II LR 134 (refd) Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 rr 19(1)(a), (b), (c)

Edwin Lim (Y Y Ho with him) for the plaintiffs. S Vanitha (Allen & Gledhill) for the second defendant. H P Lee (H P Lee & Co) for the third defendant.

[2001] 5 MLJ 590

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Malaysian Indian Congress (suing through its public officer Tan Sri K S Nijhar) & Ors v Makkal Osai Sdn Bhd & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — APPLICATION NO S2(S6)-23-52 OF 1999(2) KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 30 OCTOBER 2000

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Further and better particulars — Application for — Defamation — Purpose of particulars — Details of malice

The plaintiffs, the first being a political party, sued the defendants in libel for publishing an article which, the plaintiffs contended, in its natural and ordinary meaning, meant and was understood to mean, that members of Wanita MIC, particularly the leaders and high officials, are women of disrepute and loose morals, that they roam nightspots, neglect their families and that they are hypocrites in that they purport to speak of high moral values but instead behave in an immoral way. In their defence, the defendant denied that the said article was published with malice and without justification, and specifically relied on s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957. Alternatively, the defendants denied that said article in its natural and ordinary meaning bore or was capable of bearing the meanings the plaintiffs attributed to the article. The defendants further contended that the plaintiff’s action in filing this suit was actuated by bad faith. The defendants also relied on fair comment upon matters of public interest and claimed that they had acted in good faith. The defendants then filed this application for further and better particulars of the articles that were published by them that were offensive and antagonistic towards the first plaintiff and particulars of the articles that expressly or impliedly attempted to discredit and/or disparage and/or vilify the good name of the first plaintiff.

Held, dismissing the application with costs:

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(1) Whilst the defendants themselves have referred to some of their publications without naming them or giving details of the said publications which the defendants themselves admit were not well received by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs by their plea on which the particulars have been sought are themselves relying on what had been written in those same unnamed and unidentified publications, as conduct actuated by malice. The articles contained in those publications are clearly within the custody, control and possession of the defendants themselves and the plaintiffs can rely on a plea of malice (see p 594G–I). (2) Considering the tenure of the entire pleadings, the court is of the view that this application has no merits. The defendants well and truly know, as admitted in the defence, that some of their own ||Page 591>>publications have not been well received by the plaintiffs; it is these publications that the plaintiffs contend, form the basis of malicious intent (see p 595E).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plainitf, sebuah parti politik, mendakwa defendan dalam libel oleh kerana defendan telah menerbitkan sebuah artikel yang dikatakan oleh plaintif-plaintif bermaksud dalam maksud yang asalnya bahawa ahli-ahli Wanita MIC, khususnya pemimpin-pemimpin dan pegawai-pegawai yang berpangkat tinggi, merupakan wanita-wanita yang tidak bermoral dan bereputasi buruk yang merayau di tempat hiburan malam, mengabaikan keluarga mereka dan merupakan hipokrit yang menggambarkan seperti mempunyai nila-nilai moral yang tinggi, walhal berkelakuan sebaliknya. Dalam pembelaannya, defendan menafikan bahawa artikel itu diterbitkan dengan niat jahat dan tanpa justifikasi dan telah menggunakan s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957. Secara alternatif, defendan menafikan bahawa artikel tersebut, dalam maksud yang asalnya, memberikan maksud seperti yang diberikan oleh plaintif-plainitf. Selanjutnya, defendan berkata bahawa tindakan pihak plaintif digerakkan oleh niat jahat. Defendan juga bergantung kepada komen berpatutan di atas perkara-perkara kepentingan awam

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dan berkata bahawa mereka telah bertindak dengan suci hati. Defendan kemudiannya telah memfailkan permohonan untuk butir lanjut dan jelas artikel-artikel yang dikatakan secara nyata ataupun tersirat mencemarkan nama baik plaintif pertama.

Diputuskan, permohonan ditolak dengan kos: (1) Meskipun defendan-defendan telah merujuk kepada terbitan mereka tanpa menamakan atau memberi butiran terbitan-terbitan tersebut yang mana defendan-defendan sendiri mengaku bahawa terbitan-terbitan tersebut tidak diterima dengan baik oleh pihak plaintif, pihak plaintif, melalui pli mereka dimana butir tersebut dipohon, sendiri bergantung kepada apa yang ditulis dalam terbitan-terbitan yang tidak dinamakan dan tidak dikenalpasti tersebut, sebagai kelakuan berniat jahat. Artikel-artikel di dalam terbitan tersebut jelasnya berada di dalam jagaan dan milikan defendan-defendan. Plaintif boleh bergantung ke atas pli niat jahat (lihat ms 594G–I). (2) Memandangkan tempoh keseluruhan pliding, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan ini tidak bermerit. Defendan dengan sebenarnya tahu, seperti yang diaku di dalam pembelaan, bahawa sesetengah daripada terbitan-terbitan mereka tidak diterima dengan baik oleh pihak plaintif; terbitan-terbitan inilah pihak plaintif berkata yang merupakan dasar kepada niat jahat (lihat ms 595E).] ||Page 592>>

Notes For cases on application for further and better particulars in pleadings, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3547–3548.

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 8 Societies Act 1966

S Nanthabalan (Sujatabalan with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the plaintiffs.

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Saraswathy Kandasami (S Kandasami & Co) for the defendants.

[2001] 5 MLJ 642 Daniel KC Tan & Associates Sdn Bhd v Progressive Insurance Sdn Bhd

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO P22–34 OF 1986 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 14 MARCH 2001

Contract — Termination — Notice of termination — No notice given to plaintiff — Principal agency agreement, Insurance — Whether notice required to be given when plaintiff had breached agreement by not paying premiums within the time stipulated

Contract — Termination — Validity — Principal agency agreement, Insurance — Defendant terminated agreement on ground that plaintiff did not pay premiums within time stipulated — Whether termination of agreement valid

Contract — Terms — Arbitration clause — Whether plaintiff estopped from invoking arbitration clause when plaintiff had opposed to defendant’s earlier application to refer the matter to arbitration

Tort — Damages — Proof of damage — Whether plaintiff had proved its damage — Whether claim for future projected loss too remote and untenable

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Loss of business goodwill — Whether claim should be considered when plaintiff failed to plead for it

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Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Justification — Whether words in notice true — Whether defendant had a legal, moral and social duty to send out notices

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Meaning of words — Whether content of notice defamatory and was made in malice

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Plaintiff did not plead advertisements as libellous — Whether could rely on advertisements to find a case

The defendant is a local insurer and the plaintiff was at all material times in the business of insurance underwriting. By a principal agency agreement (‘the agreement’) dated 2 January 1981 between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff was appointed the defendant’s principal agent and authorized to issue policies of all kinds which included motor and non-motor policies. By virtue of cl 7 of the agreement, the plaintiff was given 90 days to settle all money due to the defendant for non-motor policies and there was no credit period for motor insurance. By virtue of cl 14 of the agreement, either party was to give the other party three months’ notice in the event it wished to terminate the agreement. Clause 21 of the agreement was an arbitration clause. The plaintiff had not remitted to the defendant the premiums collected and based on the plaintiff’s auditors’ documentation itself, the plaintiff had, as of 18 December 1986 owed the defendant the sum of RM1,050,100.25 as unpaid premiums. The ||Page 643>>defendant sent out notices dated 10 November 1986 to the plaintiff’s customers or policy holders or sub-agents stating that the agreement with the plaintiff had been terminated as of 30 September 1986. The plaintiff filed a claim against the defendant for breach of the clauses in the agreement. The defendant filed an application for a stay of proceedings pending reference to arbitration (‘the said application’) but was dismissed with costs after the plaintiff had opposed the said application. The issues for determination were: (i) whether there was a three months’ notice of termination given to the plaintiff pursuant to cl 14 of the agreement; (ii) when is a notice under cl 14 of the agreement required; (iii) whether there was a breach of cl

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7 of the agreement by the plaintiff; (iv) whether the defendant was required to give the three months’ notice of termination; (v) whether the defendant was in breach of cl 21 of the agreement, ie the arbitration clause; (vi) whether the defendant by sending out the notice of termination to all customers and policy holders and by placing such similar advertisement in the newspapers had defamed the plaintiff; (vii) whether the plaintiff could claim for loss of business goodwill when it failed to plead for this head of damage; and (viii) whether the plaintiff had proved its damage.

Held, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with costs: (1) There was no notice of termination that was alleged to have been given, that had been shown to the court. In the absence of any such document the court must find that no such notice has been given. It is a question of fact for the court to find if such a notice of termination had indeed been given by the defendant and it was the court’s finding that no such notice was indeed given (see pp 651I–652C). (2) The requirement of the notice pursuant to cl 14 became important only in cases of either party not wanting to continue with the agreement indefinitely. It was necessary for the court to consider the agreement as a whole rather than clause by clause in order to appreciate the reason why the requirement of the three months’ notice was stipulated in cl 14. Other than what was stated in cl 14 there were no other reasons given as to when parties could terminate the agreement. Therefore it only stands to logic that the need to give a three-month notice by either party wanting to terminate the agreement was to enable them to regulate their accounts and related matters. Clause 14 therefore need not apply to an instance of a breach of cl 7 of the agreement by the plaintiff. Clause 14 should be read as if it contained the words ‘except where there has been a breach of cl 7 of this agreement’ (see pp 652D–F, 653C); Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 followed. (3) As at 31 May 1986 the plaintiff had owed the defendant a sum of RM1,050,100.25. This was evidenced by an audit confirmation sent by the plaintiff’s auditors to the defendant. On the basis of ||Page 644>>the plaintiff’s failure to comply with cl 7 of the agreement, the

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defendant was entitled to terminate the agreement and that the three months’ required notice to be given pursuant to cl 14, was inapplicable in respect of a breach of cl 7. Hence, the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had been in breach of the agreement (see pp 653G–I, 654F). (4) The defendant had indeed filed an application for a stay of all further proceedings pending reference to arbitration. On 23 April 1987 the said application was dismissed with costs after the plaintiff had opposed the said application. The plaintiff was bound by issue estoppel and could not invoke this provision in the agreement. Although the said application was only an interlocutory application, the issue of arbitration had indeed been decided, albeit at an interlocutory stage, yet binding upon the parties. The plaintiff had given no explanation as to why it had to oppose the said application at the interlocutory stage if its intention was to go for arbitration. Surely the plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate (see pp 654H–655A). (5) Since in the pleadings the plaintiff had only relied on the notice to the customers as founding a case in defamation, the plaintiff could not now rely on the advertisements to found a case in defamation as this was not pleaded. In any case, the advertisements were taken out after the plaintiff had filed the statement of claim (see p 655F–G). (6) As for the notice, there was nothing defamatory about the contents. Since the plaintiff knew that in respect of motor policies at least the regulation requiring cash before cover must be complied with and since the plaintiff itself knew that it had collected such premiums and had not forwarded the same to the defendant, the defendant was certainly within its rights to enquire from the customers proof of payment because the defendant was not expected to carry the burden of insurance without receiving the premiums. As for the non-motor policies, the plaintiff knew well that it had not complied with the 90 day rule to settle premiums. If the plaintiff felt humiliated or defamed the plaintiff was the author of its own misfortune. In any case, the words contained in the notice were not defamatory (see pp 655G–656A). (7) It is important that the court does not put a strain or an unlikely construction upon the words used. The plaintiff called no witness nor led any evidence to

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show that the words complained of were defamatory. Applying the accepted objective test which is what the man in the street would think, upon reading the notice dated 10 November 1986, the said notices were merely issued for the protection of the policy holders themselves that was to ensure that the insurance policies were still in force. There was therefore no question of any malice on the part of the defendant. The ||Page 645>>defendant was under a legal duty pursuant to s 14A of the Insurance Act 1963 and reg 3 of the Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 and/or social duty to publish the said notices for the necessary protection of the general public and in particular the policy holders and also in the defendant’s own interest (see pp 656D–F). (8) The plaintiff claimed a sum of RM2.5m for loss of business goodwill. However, the plaintiff had failed to plead for this head of damage. On this ground alone this claim would not be considered. The plaintiff also led no evidence to prove this head of damage (see pp 658C). (9) The plaintiff led no evidence to show what it had actually collected. The plaintiff has failed to discharge its burden of proof. It had not tendered any of its audited accounts. As for the projected income for the future, no evidence was led to show the prospects of achieving such projected income. In the light of the decision of the then Supreme Court in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76, the plaintiff’s claim for future projected loss was too remote and untenable (see pp 658G–659A).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan merupakan syarikat insurans tempatan dan plaintif, pada semua masa material menjalankan perniagaan menaja jamin. Melalui suatu perjanjian agensi yang utama (‘perjanjian tersebut’) bertarikh 2 Januari 1981 di antara plaintif dengan defendan, plaintif telah dilantik sebagai agen utama defendan dan telah diberi kuasa untuk menerbitkan polisi-polisi termasuk polisi motor dan bukan motor. Memalui kl 7

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perjanjian tersebut, plaintif diberi 90 hari untuk menjelaskan segala wang yang perlu dibayar kepada defendan untuk polisi bukan motor dan tiada tempoh masa kredit untuk insurans motor. Melalui kl 14 perjanjian tersebut, parti-parti dikehendaki memberi notis sebanyak tiga bulan sekiranya mana-mana parti hendak membatalkan perjanjian. Klausa 21 perjanjian tersebut merupakan klausa penimbangtaraan. Plaintif belum mengirimkan premium yang dikutip kepada defendan dan berdasarkan pendokumenan juruaudit plaintif, sejak 18 Disember 1986, plaintif berhutang kepada defendan sebanyak RM1,050,100.25 sebagai premium yang belum dibayar. Defendan telah menghantar notis-notis bertarikh 10 November 1986 kepada pelanggan-pelanggan plaintif atau pemegang polisi atau subagen yang menyatakan bahawa perjanjian diantara plaintif dengan defendan telahpun ditamatkan sejak 30 September 1986. Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan terhadap defendan untuk pelanggaran klausa-klausa perjanjian. Defendan telah memfailkan permohonan perggantungan prosiding sementara menunggu rujukan kepada timbangtara (‘permohonan tersebut’), tetapi permohonan tersebut telah ditolak dengan kos ||Page 646>>setelah plaintif membuat bantahan terhadap permohonan tersebut. Isu-isu untuk ditentukan adalah: (i) sama ada notis penamatan perjanjian tiga bulan telah disampaikan kepada plaintif menurut kl 14 perjanjian tersebut; (ii) bila notis kl 14 perjanjian tersebut diperlukan; (iii) sama ada kl 7 telah dilanggar oleh plaintif; (iv) sama ada defendan perlu memberi notis penamatan perjanjian tiga bulan tersebut; (v) sama ada defendan telah melanggar kl 12 perjanjian tersebut, iaitu klausa timbangtara; (vi) sama ada defendan, dengan menghantar notis-notis penamatan perjanjian tersebut kepada pelanggan-pelanggan dan pemegang-pemegang polisi dan dengan memaparkan iklan sedemikian di dalam suratkhabar, telah memfitnahkan plaintif; dan (vii) sama ada plaintif boleh menuntut kehilangan nama baik perniagaannya memandangkan plaintif tidak memohon gantirugi tersebut; dan (viii) sama ada plaintif telah membuktikan kerugian tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Tiada notis penamatan perjanjian yang dikatakan telah diberi, yang dikemukan kepada mahkamah. Memandangkan demikian, mahkamah mestilah memutuskan bahawa tiada dokumen sebegitu telah dikemukakan. Ia menjadi persoalan fakta

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untuk mahkamah memutuskan sama ada notis penamatan perjanjian telah diberi oleh defendan dan mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa notis sebegitu tidak diberikan (lihat ms 651I–652C). (2) Keperluan notis kl 14 menjadi penting hanya di dalam kes di mana parti hendak menamatkan perjanjian bagi tempoh masa yang tidak pasti. Mahkamah perlu menimbang perjanjian secara keseluruhan dan bukan secara klausa demi klausa untuk mengetahui kenapa notis tiga bulan tersebut diperuntukkan di dalam kl 14. Selain daripada apa yang diperuntukkan di dalam kl 14, tiada sebab yang diberi mengena dengan bila parti-parti boleh menamatkan perjanjian. Oleh itu, ia adalah logik bahawa keperluan notis penamatan tiga bulan adalah untuk membolehkan parti yang hendak menamatkan perjanjian mengawal akaun-akaun mereka dan perkara-perkara yang berkaitan. Klausa 14 tidak digunakan dalam perlanggaran kl 7 perjanjian tersebut oleh plaintiff. Klausa 14 sepatutnya dibaca sebagai mengandungi perkataan ‘except where there has been a breach of this agreement’ (lihat ms 652D–F, 653C); Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 diikut. (3) Sehingga ke 31 Mei 1986, plaintif berhutang kepada defendan wang berjumlah RM1,050,100.25. Ini dibuktikan oleh pengesahan audit yang dihantar oleh juruaudit plaintif. Berdasarkan kegagalan plaintif untuk mematuhi kl 7 perjanjian tersebut, defendan berhak menamatkan perjanjian tersebut dan notis penamatan tiga bulan tersebut tidak boleh dipakai dalam perlanggaran kl 7. Oleh itu, plaintiff gagal membuktikan bahawa defendan telah melanggar perjanjian tersebut (lihat ms 653G–I, 654F). ||Page 647>> (4) Defendan sememangnya telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk satu penggantungan terhadap kesemua prosiding lanjutan sementara menunggu rujukan kepada penimbnagtara. Pada 23 April 1987 permohonan tersebut telah ditolak dengan kos setelah plaintif membantah permohonan tersebut. Plaintif terikat oleh persoalan estopel dan tidak boleh menggunakan peruntukan ini di dalam perjanjian. Walaupun permohonan tersebut hanya satu permohonan interlokutori, persoalan timbangtara telahpun diputuskan, sungguhpun di peringkat interlokutori, tetapi mengikat ke atas pihak-pihak. Plaintif tidak

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memberikan apa-apa penjelasan terhadap kenapa ia hendak membantah permohonan tersebut di peringkat interlokutori jika hasratnya adalah untuk merujuk kepada timbangtara. Pastinya plaintif tidak boleh memperkenan atau mengutuk (lihat ms 654H–655A). (5) Memandangkan pliding-pliding plaintif hanya bergantung kepada notis pelanggan-pelanggan di dalam kes yang didapati mengandungi fitnah, plaintif tidak boleh sekarang bergantung kepada iklan-iklan untuk membuktikan kes berunsur fitnah keran ini tidak dipohon. Dalam apa keadaan, iklan-iklan tersebut dikeluarkan setelah plaintif memfailkan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif (lihat ms 655F–G). (6) Berhubungan notis tersebut, tiada apa yang berunsur fitnah tentang knadungannya. Memandangkan plaintif telah mengetahui berkaitan polisi-polisi motor tersebut sekurang-kurangnya peraturan yang menghendaki bayaran wang sebelum diberikan perlindungan mestilah dipenuhi dan memandangkan plaintif sendiri telah mengetahui bahawa ia telah mengutip premium sedemikian dan tidak mengengemukakan yang sama kepada defendan, defendan sememangnya mempunyai hak untuk menanyakan daripada pelanggan-pelanggan bukti pembayaran kerana defendan tidak dikehendaki memikul beban insuran tanpa menerima premium. Berhubungan polisi-polisi tidak bermotor, plaintif memang mengetahui bahawa ia tidak mematuhi peraturan 90 hari untuk menyelesaikan premium tersebut. Sekiranya plaintif terasa dimalukan atau diaibkan plaintif adalah penyebab kerugiannya sendiri. Dalam apa keadaan, perkataan-perkataan yang terkandng di dalam notis tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah (lihat ms 655G–656A). (7) Ia adalah penting bahawa mahkamah tidak memberi erti yang tidak mungkin di atas perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan. Plaintif tidak memanggil saksi mahupun mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan adalah fitnah. Menggunakan ujian objektif, iaitu apa yang difikirkan oleh orang awam, setelah membaca notis bertarikh 10 November 1986, notis tersebut hanya digunakan untuk perlindungan pemegang polisi untuk memastikan bahawa polisi insurans masih dikuatkuasakan. Tiada persoalan niat jahat oleh defendan. Defendan

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mempunyai kewajipan menurut ||Page 648>>undang-undang menurut s 14A Akta Insuran 1963 dan peraturan 3 Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 dan/atau kewajipan sosial untuk menerbitkan notis-notis tersebut untuk perlindungan orang-orang awam dan khususnya pemegang polisi dan juga untuk kepentingan defendan sendiri (lihat ms 656D–F). (8) Plaintif menuntut RM2.5j untuk kehilangan nama baik perniagaannya. Walaubagaimanapun, plaintif tidak memohon ganti rugi tersebut. Oleh kerana itu, permohonannya tidak akan dilayan. Plaintif juga tidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk membuktikan ganti rugi ini (lihat ms 658C). (9) Plaintif tidak mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan apa yang telah dikutip. Plaintif gagal melaksanakan beban pembuktiannya. Plaintif todak mengemukakan akaun-akaun yang telah diauditkan. Berkenaan dengan pendapatan masa depan yang dirancangkan, plaintif juga gagal mengemukakan keterangan untuk menunjukkan prospek untuk mendapatkan pendapatan yang dirancang. Menurut kes Mahkamah Agung Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76, tuntutan plaintif adalah terlalu terpencil dan tidak dapat dipertahankan (lihat ms 658G–659A).

Notes For cases on termination of contract generally, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 3885–3904. For cases on terms of contract generally, see 3(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 3905–4048. For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352. For cases on damages in defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 216–222.

Cases referred to

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Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Trengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76 (folld) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 1 MLJ 305 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) Howe v Botwood [1913] 2 KB 387 (folld) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) The Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v George Henty and Sons [1882] 7 AC 741 (refd) ||Page 649>>

Legislation referred to Insurance Act 1996 ss 4(1), 14(A) Insurance (Assumption of Risk and Collection of Premium) Regulations 1980 reg 3 Public Health Act 1875

Wong Kam Leong (CC Cheng and Angela Low with him) (Wong Kam Leong & Partners) for the plaintiff. Muralee Menon (Allen Miranda with him) (Jaffar & Menon) for the defendant.

[2001] 6 MLJ 353 Halim bin Arsyat v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–35 OF 1998

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KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 2 JULY 2001

Tort — Defamation — News bulletin — Broadcast concerning secretary general of political party and permit holder of newspaper — Burden on plaintiff to show he was person identified by words complained of — Whether permit holder had automatic right to claim defamation — Defence of qualified privilege — Test applicable — Defence to be defeated by proof of express malice — What amounted to plea of express malice

The plaintiff was at the material time the Secretary General of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (‘PAS’). He was also the permit holder of a PAS’s newspaper known as Harakah. By the amended statement of claim, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants falsely and maliciously broadcast or caused to be broadcast of and concerning him as the then Secretary General of PAS and the permit holder of Harakah, the words complained of in the said Buletin Utama which were defamatory of him and that the words viewed in the context of the said telecast were understood to refer to him. The plaintiff, thus, claimed damages in the sum of RM20m against each of the defendants with interest and costs and a further order to direct the defendants to tender their apologies by broadcasting the same in the Buletin Utama for three days consecutively. In their defence, the defendants denied that the words in the said Buletin Utama either referred to the plaintiff or bore the meanings respectively as alleged by the plaintiff.

Held, dismissing the claim with costs: (1) The burden remains on the plaintiff to show that the words complained of refer to him. It is for the plaintiff to establish objectively that he was the person to be identified by the words used. The plaintiff had failed to identify himself as the person concerned as his case was based on no more than the spectre of a mere possibility raised in answer to what the court found as a leading question. No evidence had been adduced that any reasonable person other than interested witnesses of the plaintiff himself on watching the show and hearing the words broadcast would on rational grounds have identified the said words with the

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plaintiff. The plaintiff’s case, that as he was the permit holder of Harakah, this itself conferred on him the automatic right to claim to have been defamed by any defamation directed at the said publication, has no support both in law and in logic (see pp 361E, 362D, F); Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156, Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 and Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 ||Page 354>>followed and Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] 30 MLJ 332 distinguished. (2) The purpose of the defence of qualified privilege is to prevent liability from arising for untrue statements that may have been made on protected occasions since the defence of justification already protects true statements. For the defence of qualified privilege to apply, the defendants must be under a duty to speak and the public under a corresponding interest to hear what was said. The plaintiff’s witnesses all admitted in their evidence that what was said were matters of public interest. In any case, this was clearly a case where the circumstantial test can well apply (see pp 365I–366A, F–G); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 followed. (3) Once this defence is made out, it could be defeated only by proof of express malice by virtue of O 78 r 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Express malice must be pleaded in a reply and that particulars must be set out. Unfortunately, there was no reply filed by the plaintiff nor were there allegations of express malice. In any case, no evidence was even presented by the plaintiff on express malice. The reference in para 8 of the amended statement of claim to the words that the defendants published the words ‘falsely and maliciously’ was not a plea of express malice. Such allegations were meant to make out the plaintiff’s case. Thus, such words ‘falsely and maliciously’ as pleaded, did not make out a plea of express malice to negate the defence of qualified privilege (see pp 366G–H, 367A–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

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Plaintif pada setiap masa matan adalah Ketua Setiausaha Parti Islam Malaysia (‘PAS’). Beliau juga pemegang permit akhbar PAS yang dikenali sebagai Harakah. Melalui penyataan tuntutan terpinda, plaintif menuntut bahawa defendan-defendan telah dengan salah dan niat jahat menyiarkan atau menyebabkan disiarkan berhubung dan tentang beliau yang ketika itu Ketua Setiausaha PAS dan pemegang permit Harakah, perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan dalam Buletin Utama tersebut yang memfitnah beliau dan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut jika dilihat dalam konteks siaran televisyen tersebut difahami sebagai merujuk kepada beliau. Plaintif, oleh itu, menuntut ganti rugi berjumlah RM20j terhadap setiap defendan-defendan berserta faedah dan kos dan satu perintah selanjutnya mengarahkan defendan-defendan memohon maaf dengan menyiarkan yang sama dalam Buletin Utama untuk tiga hari berturut-turut. Dalam pembelaan mereka, defendan-defendan tersebut telah menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan dalam Buletin Utama tersebut sama ada merujuk kepada plaintif atau membawa maksud-maksud masing-masing yang didakwa oleh plaintif. ||Page 355>>

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut dengan kos: (1) Beban masih kekal di atas plaintif untuk menunjukkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan merujuk kepada beliau. Adalah untuk plaintif membuktikan secara objektif bahawa beliau merupakan orang yang dikaitkan dengan perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan. Plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan diri beliau sebagai orang yang berkaitan kerana kes beliau berdasarkan tidak lebih daripada hanya satu bayangan kemungkinan yang ditimbulkan sebagai jawapan kepada apa yang mahkamah dapati sebagai satu soalan pimpin. Tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan di mana sesiapa yang waras selain saksi-saksi plaintif sendiri yang berkepentingan dengan menonton siaran tersebut dan mendengar perkataan-perkataan yang disiarkan akan atas alasan-alasan yang rasional mengaitkan perkataan-perkataan tersebut dengan plaintif. Kes plaintif bahawa, oleh kerana beliau adalah pemegang permit Harakah, ini dengan sendirinya memberikan beliau hak serta-merta untuk menuntut bahawa telah difitnahkan oleh mana-mana fitnah yang ditujukan kepada penerbitan tersebut, tidak disokong oleh kedua-dua undang-undang dan

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logik (lihat ms pp 361E, 362D, F); Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156, Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 dan Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 diikut dan Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] 30 MLJ 332 dibeza. (2) Tujuan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat adalah untuk menghalang liabiliti daripada timbul untuk pernyataan tidak benar yang mungkin telah dibuat semasa kejadian-kejadian yang dilindungi; pembelaan justifikasi telahpun melindungi pernyataan-pernyataan yang benar. Untuk menggunakan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, defendan-defendan mestilah di bawah satu kewajipan untuk bersuara dan pihak awam mempunyai kepentingan yang sama untuk mendengar apa yang diperkatakan. Saksi-saksi plaintif semuanya mengaku dalam keterangan mereka bahawa apa yang diperkatakan adalah perkara-perkara yang mempunyai kepentingan awam. Dalam apa keadaan, ini dengan jelas satu kes di mana ujian mengikut keadaan sememangnya boleh terpakai (lihat ms 365I–366A, F–G); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 diikut. (3) Setelah pembelaan ini dibuat, ia boleh dikalahkan hanya dengan bukti niat jahat nyata menurut A 78 k 3(3) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahakmah Tinggi 1980. Niat jahat nyata mestilah diplikan dalam bentuk jawapan dan butiran-butiran tersebut mestilah dinyatakan. Malangnya, tiada jawapan telah difailkan oleh plaintif maupun terdapat dakwaan niat jahat nyata. Dalan apa-apa keadaan, tiada keterangan telah dikemukakan oleh plaintif tentang niat jahat nyata. Rujukan dalam perengaan 8 penyataan tuntutan terpinda terhadap perkataan-perkataan bahawa defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan yang ||Page 356>>‘salah dan berniat jahat’ bukan satu pli niat jahat nyata. Oleh itu, perkataan-perkataan yang ‘salah dan berniat jahat’ sebagaimana yang diplikan, tidak membentuk satu pli niat jahat nyata untuk menyangkal pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat (lihat ms 366G–H, 367A–C).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.

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Cases referred to A Balakrishnan & Ors v Nirumalan K Pillay & Ors [1999] 3 SLR 22 (refd) Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284 (folld) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [1999] 4 MLJ 58 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 1 MLJ 305 (refd) Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad [2001] 2 MLJ 65 (refd) Hough v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 2 KB 507 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (folld) Lee Kuan Yew v Davies & Ors [1989] SLR 1063 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (folld) Murugason v The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd [1984–1985] SLR 334 (refd) Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 (folld) Rubber Improvement Ltd & Anor v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (distd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(3)

Mohamed Hanipa bin Maidin (Mohamed Hanipa & Associates) for the plaintiff. PH Looi (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the defendants.

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[2001] 6 MLJ 368 M Prabhkaran v Salam bin Seran

HIGH COURT (TAIPING) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 11–16 OF 1997 VT SINGHAM JC 11 JUNE 2001

Civil Procedure — Amendment — Defence — Amended defence filed only after close of plaintiff’s case and after commencement of defence case — Whether plaintiff entitled to raise complaint over delayed filing at appeal

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defamation — Defendant filed amended statement of defence raising qualified privilege — Plaintiff intended to rely on express malice to defeat plea of qualified privilege — Whether plaintiff should have served reply to amended statement of defence providing particulars of express malice — Whether mandatory on plaintiff to serve reply with particulars of malice under Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 O 44 r 3(3)

Evidence — Documentary evidence — Admissibility of — Documents supporting defendant’s case produced only at hearing of defence case — Plaintiff failed to raise objections during submissions at trial — Whether plaintiff entitled to raise objections at appeal — Whether documents correctly held admissible at trial

Tort — Defamation — Malice — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Whether any basis on which inference may be drawn that defendant actuated with malice in making police report — Meaning of ‘malice’

Tort — Defamation — Police report — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Whether defendant acted with malice or made false report in

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making police report against plaintiff — Whether defendant made police report with honest belief in threat of harm by plaintiff

Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Defendant lodged police report regarding plaintiff’s alleged threat towards him — Defendant acting in accordance with sense of duty and in bona fide protection of legitimate interest — Whether defence of qualified privilege favoured defendant

In July 1990, an anonymous letter dated 29 June 1990 (‘IDD5’) was sent to, inter alia, the Education Department of Parit Buntar, alleging immoral conduct against a teacher (‘DW11’) who was employed at the school in which the defendant/respondent was the headmaster. On receipt of the letter, the assistant education officer of the district of Kerian, ‘DW2’, sent a copy of IDD5 to the defendant and instructed the defendant to investigate the complaint and to forward a complete report to the department. The defendant carried out an investigation and interviewed DW11, who allegedly informed the defendant that IDD5 was written by her estranged lover, the plaintiff/appellant, who had threatened to do anything possible to terminate her services at the school and had been making inquiries about the defendant’s whereabouts in contemplation of doing something to the defendant for not having terminated her employment contract. The defendant forwarded his report to the education officer of the district of Kerian. ||Page 369>>The State Deputy Director of Education Perak, Ipoh (‘DW4’), instructed the defendant to advise DW11 and a warning letter was issued to the latter. On 1 August 1990, DW11 reiterated the threat of the plaintiff against the defendant in the presence of two fellow teachers, DW7 and DW8, adding that the plaintiff had located and been to the defendant’s house when the defendant had not been there. The defendant reported the matter to his superior, DW4, who instructed him to lodge a police report, which the defendant accordingly did on 1 August 1990. The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the defendant for lodging the police report against him, wherein the defendant was alleged to have falsely stated and published the contents of the report with bad faith or malice against the plaintiff. The Magistrate’s Court, Parit Buntar, dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and he appealed.

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Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The defendant had just cause for making his police report and he had not acted with malice or made a false report. The defendant had been worried and frightened, which was a natural feeling and expected of any reasonable minded person that something would happen to him after he had been told by DW11 of the threat and the intended harm by the plaintiff and he had merely passed on his fears to the police, and the police had acted independently. The defendant was not prompted by malice against the plaintiff when he lodged the police report on 1 August 1990 and there was absolutely no basis for him to falsely invent the story of the plaintiff’s threat against him and his predominant desire was purely to place his safety in the hands of the police (see p 385F–H). On the facts and circumstances of the case, the police report lodged by the defendant was held to have been made with an honest belief that he was threatened with harm by the plaintiff as told to him by DW11 (see p 385H–I). (2) On the plaintiff’s own evidence, there was no basis for the trial court or this court to draw any inference that the defendant’s police report had been actuated with malice (see p 386B); Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 168 followed. ‘Malice’ in general defamation use meant ‘any ill will, spite or some wrong which can defeat a defence of qualified privilege’ and making use of the occasion for some indirect purpose. In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant had made use of the occasion for any indirect purpose other than for a lawful purpose to secure his safety. There was also no evidence that the defendant had been actuated by some indirect motive or connected with the privilege or had made use of the occasion or had been under the influence of some indirect motive (see p 386E–F); Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 and Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 followed. ||Page 370>> (3) The defendant had acted in accordance with the sense of duty and in bona fide protection of his own legitimate interest. In fact, he owed a duty, whether it was labelled as social, moral or legal duty, to draw the attention of the police to seek redress for his grievance, namely, the threat of the plaintiff which DW11

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had informed him about (see p 386F–G); Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 and Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 followed. On the facts and circumstances of this case, the defence of qualified privilege was in favour of the defendant. Consequently, on the facts and on the balance of probabilities, the plaintiff had not succeeded in showing malice against the defendant when he lodged the police report (see p 387F–G). (4) In the absence of any objection raised on behalf of the plaintiff at the lower court on the amendment to the statement of defence after the close of the plaintiff’s case, which included the defence of qualified privilege, this court was unable to accept the complaint raised for the first time on appeal. A party could not be allowed to lie by until the case came up for hearing before the Court of Appeal and then raise his complaint for the first time of the amendment, when this opportunity to object was available to the party at the trial (see p 388G–H). (5) Where the plaintiff wished to rely on express malice on the part of the defendant in order to defeat the plea of qualified privilege, he would have to plead to this effect and give particulars of facts and matters from which he alleged the malice was to be inferred and this should have been done by way of reply and not in the statement of claim (see p 389G–H); Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 and Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 followed. It was a mandatory requirement on the part of the plaintiff to have served a reply giving particulars of the facts and matters from which the malice was to be inferred as required under O 44 r 3(3) of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 (‘the SCR’). However, since the plaintiff had failed to serve a reply pleading express malice as required under O 44 r 3(3) of the SCR, he could not be allowed to rely on express malice without having served the reply to defeat the defence of qualified privilege, as only the reply would have formed the pleadings in the civil suit (see p 392A–B). (6) As to plaintiff’s counsel’s complaint that the documents produced on behalf of the defendant were only produced during the hearing of the defendant’s case, this complaint had not been specifically raised in the submissions before the magistrate to the effect that no weight or less weight should have been given to

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those documents, but was only raised for the first time on appeal. This should have been raised during the submissions at the trial and it was too late to raise it now. In any event, the documents complained about were clearly admissible to show the respective role and functions of DW2 and DW4, the sequence of events ||Page 371>> which made DW11 inform the defendant of the plaintiff’s threat and to corroborate the oral evidence of the defendant, and the evidence had been correctly held to be admissible by the magistrate (see p 392C–F). As for the plaintiff’s counsel’s contention that IDD5 should not have been considered by the magistrate, for the purpose of this case, all that was relevant was that such a letter existed and the magistrate was not prejudiced or clouded when he considered that such a letter existed as he did not admit the contents of the said letter (see p 393F–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Pada bulan Julai 1990, satu surat tanpa nama bertarikh 29 Jun 1990 (‘IDD5’) telah dihantar ke, antara lain, Jabatan Pendidikan Parit Buntar, yang mendakwa perbuatan tidak bermoral terhadap seorang guru (‘DW11’) yang telah diambil bekerja di sekolah di mana defendan/responden adalah guru besarnya. Setelah menerima surat tersebut, penolong pegawai pendidikan daerah Kerian, ‘DW2’, telah menghantar sesalinan IDD5 kepada defendan dan mengarahkan defendan menyiasat aduan tersebut dan mengemukakan satu laporan lengkap kepada jabatan. Defendan telah menjalankan siasatan dan menemuramah DW11, yang didakwa telah memberitahu defendan bahawa IDD5 telah ditulis oleh kekasih beliau yang telah ditinggalkan, iaitu plaintif/perayu, yang telah mengugut berbuat apa sahaja mungkin untuk menamatkan perkhidmatan beliau di sekolah tersebut dan telah membuat pertanyaan tentang di mana defendan berada dengan harapan untuk berbuat sesuatu kepada defendan kerana tidak menamatkan kontrak pekerjaan DW11. Defendan telah mengemukakan laporan beliau kepada pegawai pendidikan daerah Kerian. Timbalan Pengarah Pendidikan Negeri

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Perak, Ipoh (‘DW4’), telah mengarahkan defendan menasihati DW11 dan satu surat amaran telah dikeluarkan kepadanya. Pada 1 Ogos 1990, DW11 mengulangi ugutan plaintif terhadap defendan dengan kehadiran dua orang guru, DW7 dan DW8, dan menambah bahawa plaintif telah menjumpai dan telah pergi ke rumah defendan semasa defendan tidak berada di situ. Defendan telah melaporkan perkara tersebut kepada ketua beliau, DW4, yang mangarahkan beliau membuat laporan polis, yang defendan dengan wajarnya telah lakukan pada 1 Ogos 1990. Plaintif telah memulakan satu tindakan libel terhadap defendan kerana membuat aduan polis terhadap beliau, di mana defendan didakwa telah dengan salah menyatakan dan menerbitkan kandungan laporan tersebut dengan niat jahat terhadap plaintif. Mahkamah Majistret, Parit Buntar, telah menolak tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan dan beliau membuat rayuan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Defendan mempunyai sebab yang baik untuk membuat laporan polis beliau dan beliau tidak bertindak dengan niat jahat atau ||Page 372>>membuat satu laporan palsu. Defendan risau dan takut, yang merupakan perasaan biasa dan dijangkakan oleh sesiapa yang berfikiran waras bahawa sesuatu akan berlaku ke atas dirinya setelah beliau diberitahu oleh DW11 tentang ugutan dan kecederaan yang diniatkan oleh plaintif dan beliau hanya menyampaikan rasa takut beliau kepada pihak polis, dan pihak polis telah bertindak secara bebas. Defendan tidak digalakkan oleh niat jahat terhadap plaintif semasa beliau membuat laporan polis pada 1 Ogos 1990 dan tiada sebab langsung untuk beliau mereka-reka dengan salah cerita ugutan plaintif terhadap beliau dan niat utama beliau hanyalah memikirkan keselamatan beliau dalam jagaan pihak polis (lihat ms 385F–H). Berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan kes, laporan polis yang dibuat oleh defendan diputuskan telah dibuat dengan kepercayaan bahawa beliau diugut untuk dicederakan oleh plaintif sebagaimana yang diberitahu kepadanya oleh DW11 (lihat ms 385H–Î). (2) Berdasarkan keterangan plaintif sendiri, tidak terdapat apa-apa sebab untuk mahkamah perbicaraan atau mahkamah ini tiba kepada apa-apa inferens bahawa laporan polis defendan telah didorong oleh niat jahat (lihat ms 386B); Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 168 diikut. ‘Niat jahat’

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dalam penggunaan umum fitnah bermaksud ‘apa-apa rasa jahat, busuk hati atau sesuatu yang salah yang boleh mengalahkan satu pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat’ dan menggunakan keadaan tersebut untuk suatu tujuan yang tidak langsung. Dalam kes ini, tiada keterangan bahawa defendan telah menggunakan keadaan ini untuk apa-apa tujuan yang tidak langsung selain daripada tujuan yang sah untuk menjamin keselamatan beliau. Tiada juga keterangan bahawa defendan telah didorong oleh suatu motif yang tidak langsung atau berkaitan dengan perlindungan tersebut atau telah menggunakan keadaan tersebut atau berada di bawah pengaruh suatu motif yang tidak langsung (lihat ms 386E–F); Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 dan Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 diikut. (3) Defendan telah bertindak bersesuaian dengan sifat kewajipan dan secara bona fide untuk melindungi kepentingan sah beliau sendiri. Bahkan, beliau mempunyai satu kewajipan, sama ada ia dilabelkan sebagai kewajipan sosial, moral atau undang-undang, untuk menarik perhatian pihak polis memohon tebus rugi untuk kilanan beliau, terutamanya, ugutan plaintif yang DW11 telah beritahu kepada beliau (lihat ms 386F–G); Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 dan Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 diikut. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan keadaan-keadaan kes ini, pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat menyebelahi defendan. Akibatnya, berdasarkan fakta-fakta dan atas imbangan keberangkalian, plaintif gagal untuk menunjukkan niat jahat terhadap defendan semasa beliau membuat laporn polis tersebut (lihat ms 387F–G). ||Page 373>> (4) Dengan ketiadaan apa-apa bantahan yang ditimbulkan bagi pihak plaintif di mahkamah bawahan tentang pindaan kepada penyataan pembelaan selepas kes plaintif selesai, yang termasuklah pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima aduan yang ditimbulkan buat kali pertama atas rayuan. Satu pihak tidak boleh dibenarkan mendiamkan diri sehingga kes timbul untuk dibicarakan di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan dan masa itu barulah menimbulkan aduan beliau buat kali pertama tentang pindaan tersebut, apabila peluang untuk membantah ini sedia ada untuk pihak itu di perbicaraan tersebut (lihat ms 388G–H). (5) Di mana plaintif berhasrat untuk bergantung kepada niat jahat yang nyata di

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pihak defendan bagi tujuan menggagalkan pli perlindungan bersyarat, beliau harus membuat pli terhadapnya dan memberikan butiran-butiran fakta dan perkara-perkara daripada mana inferens tentang dakwaan beliau tentang niat jahat tersebut dibuat dan ini sepatutnya dibuat melalui jawapan dan bukan dalam penyataan tuntutan (lihat ms 389G–H); Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 dan Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 diikut. Ia merupakan satu keperluan mandatori di pihak plaintif untuk menyampaikan satu jawapan yang memberikan butiran-butiran fakta dan perkara-perkara daripada mana inferens niat jahat tersebut dibuat sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah A 44 k 3(3) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 (‘KMR’). Namun begitu, memandangkan plaintif telah gagal untuk menyampaikan jawapan memplikan niat jahat yang nyata sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah A 44 k 3(3) KMR, beliau tidak boleh dibenarkan bergantung kepada niat jahat yang nyata tanpa menyampaikan jawapan untuk menggagalkan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, kerana hanya jawapan tersebut akan membentuk pliding-pliding dalam guaman sivil (lihat ms 392A–B). (6) Mengenai aduan peguan plaintif bahawa dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan bagi pihak defendan hanya dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan kes defendan, aduan ini tidak secara khusus ditimbulkan dalam penghujahan di hadapan majistret yang membawa kesan bahawa tiada kepentingan atau kurang kepentingan patut diberikan terhadap dokumen-dokumen tersebut, tetapi hanya ditimbulkan buat kali pertama semasa rayuan. Ini sepatutnya telah ditimbulkan semasa penghujahan di perbicaraan tersebut dan adalah terlalu lambat untuk menimbulkannya sekarang. Dalam apa-apa keadaan, dokumen-dokumen yang telah diadukan dengan jelas boleh diterima untuk menunjukkan peranan dan fungsi DW2 dan DW4, urutan kejadian-kejadian yang membuat DW11 memberitahu defendan tentang ugutan plaintif dan menyokong keterangan lisan defendan, dan keterangan tersebut telah diputuskan dengan betul untuk boleh diterima oleh majistret (lihat ms 392C–F). Perbalahan peguam plaintif bahawa ||Page 374>>IDD5 tersebut tidak sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh majistret, bagi tujuan kes ini, apa yang relevan adalah bahawa surat itu wujud dan majistret tidak prejudis atau kabur semasa beliau mempertimbangkan bahawa

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surat itu wujud kerana beliau telah tidak menerima masuk kandungan-kandungan surat tersebut (lihat ms 393F–H).]

Notes For cases on amendment of defence, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 437–452.For cases on pleadings in a defamation case, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest For cases on admissibility of documentary evidence, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 989–994.For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.(4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 4481–4484.

Cases referred to AB Ltd, Re [1956] MLJ 197 (refd) Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 (folld) Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (distd) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (folld) Allied Capital Sdn Bhd v Mohamed Latiff Shah Mohd and another application [2001] 2 MLJ 305 (refd) Bank of China v Asiaweek Ltd [1991] 2 MLJ 505 (distd) Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326 (refd) Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (folld) Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (folld) China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal 1996] 3 MLJ 517 (refd) Chock Kek Ling v Patt Hup Transport Co Ltd & Ors [1966] 1 MLJ 120 (refd) Clarke v Edinburgh Tramways Co 1919 SC (HL) 35 (refd) Commercial Union Assurance (M) Sdn Bhd v Ng Chek Hung and another appeal [1997] 2 MLJ 465 (refd) Croucher v Inglis (1889) 16 R (refd)

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Green v Chalmers (1878) 6 R 318 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (distd) Henry Wong v John Lee & Anor [1980] 2 MLJ 254 (distd) Hoare v Jessop [1965] EA 218 (folld) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Institute Of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (distd) International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86 (distd) JB Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew [1979] 2 MLJ 282 (distd) Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196 (folld) ||Page 375>> Kerry v Carter [1969] 1 WLR 1372 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (distd) Lightbody v Gordon (1882) 9 R 934 (refd) Luk Kai Lam v Sim Ai Leng [1978] 1 MLJ 214 (refd) Mat Shah bin Mohamed & Anor v Foo Say Meng & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ 237 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (distd) Rasidin bin Partojo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214 (refd) Renal Link (Kl) Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Dr Harnam Singh [1997] 2 MLJ 373 (refd) Robin v Sunrise Investments (Pte) Ltd & Anor [1991] 2 MLJ 517 (folld) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (distd) Samar bte Mansor v Mustafa Kamarul Ariffin [1974] 2 MLJ 71 (refd) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (distd) Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 (refd) Soong Ah Chow & Anor v Lai Kok Cheng [1986] 1 MLJ 42 (folld) Syed Husin Ali v Syarikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (distd)

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Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 39 (distd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Ordinance 1957 ss 7, 7(3)(b) Evidence Act 1950 s 6 Stamp Act 1948 Sch 1 s 4 Statutory Declaration Act 1960 s 2, Sch 2 Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 O 19 r 22 Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 O 44 r 3(3)

SP Annamalai (Annamalai & Co) for the appellant. N Shanmugam (Syarikat Subbaiyah) for the respondent.

[2001] 6 MLJ 532 Doree Industries (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sri Ram & Co (sued as a firm) & Ors

HIGH COURT (IPOH) — CIVIL SUITS NO 22–264 OF 1999, NO 22–265 OF 1999, NO 22–266 OF 1999 AND NO 22–267 OF 1999 SU GEOK YIAM JC 16 FEBRUARY 2001

Civil Procedure — Striking out — Statement of claim — Unconditional appearance and defence filed, whether preclude application to strike out — Delay in filing application to strike out after filing of defence — No date fixed for trial — Whether delay fatal — Whether

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registrar relied on evidence in supporting affidavit in allowing application to strike out

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Complaint letter copied to Central Bank alleged to be defamatory — Whether publication to third party — Privileged documents attached to letter, whether tort of defamation could be invoked — Burden on defendant to prove that defamatory reports were privileged

The first plaintiff, a limited company, made a claim against its insurers, the fourth defendant, under some policies which included a fire insurance policy. The fourth defendant denied liability and refused to pay on the ground that the cause of fire was due to arson. It relied on a forensic report prepared by the second and third defendants. The first plaintiff was denied a copy of the report by the fourth defendant. So it lodged a complaint with Bank Negara against the fourth defendant. In response to a Bank negara’s letter, the first defendant, as solicitors for the fourth defendant, issued a letter dated 6 April 1999 to the first plaintiff with copies to Bank Negara and several other parties. The plaintiffs alleged that the words used in the letter dated 6 April 1999 in their natural and ordinary meanings meant and by way of innuendoes were understood to mean that the plaintiffs were arsonists and had deliberately burnt the factory themselves in order to cheat the fourth defendant so as to claim the insurance money. This had not only injured the plaintiffs’ reputation but also deprived the first plaintiff of its insurance claims. More than one year after entering its defence, the second defendant applied to strike out the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim pursuant to O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) on the ground that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action; alternatively the claim by the second, third and fourth plaintiffs (the directors and manager of the first plaintiff) in this action against the second defendant be struck out as being frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process of the court. The deputy registrar ruled in favour of the second defendant. The plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs submitted as follows: (i) the second defendant, having entered an unconditional appearance, was precluded or barred from applying under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC to strike out the plaintiffs’ statement of claim; (ii) no evidence was admissible yet the second defendant filed a supporting affidavit and the deputy registrar decided on a point of substantive law

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without a ||Page 533>>trial; (iii) the deputy registrar erred when he decided purely on the issue of publication of the report and did not deal with authorship of the report; and (iv) this was not a plain and obvious case for striking out.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) The words ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ in O 18 r 19 of the RHC expressly exclude any time limit for the making of an application for striking out and these words should be given effect to. The mere fact that the second defendant had filed an unconditional appearance and a statement of defence does not bar or preclude the second defendant from applying to strike out the plaintiffs’ claim under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC because the words ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ which qualify the words ‘The court may … order to be struck out’ in the rule itself presupposes the making of such an application unless the ground relied upon is a lack of locus standi or jurisdiction (see pp 549H, 550C–D). (2) A delay of more than one year after the filing of the statement of defence was not fatal to the second defendant’s application made pursuant to O 18 r 19(1) because the trial date has not yet been fixed for the action (see p 550H–I). (3) From a perusal of the registrar’s ground of decision, the court was satisfied that the registrar did not rely at all on the second defendant’s supporting affidavit when he allowed the defendant’s application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action (see p 551B). (4) There was nothing in the second defendant’s supporting affidavit to show that the second, third and fourth plaintiffs’ claim against the second defendant was filed to annoy or embarrass the second defendant. Their claim could not be said to be obviously unsustainable. The second, third and fourth plaintiffs have a legitimate grievance and they have instituted the action in order to obtain a remedy provided by law (see pp 552H–I, 553F, 555F). (5) The deputy registrar erred when he decided solely on the absence of

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publication of the alleged defamatory letter on the part of the second defendant to the third persons concerned. He had failed to consider that there was publication by the second defendant of the alleged defamatory report. It was clear that the contents of the alleged defamatory report which were wholly or partly authored by the second and third defendants were communicated to the fourth defendant who must have relied on the truth and accuracy of their contents when the fourth defendant denied liability under the insurance policy and repudiated the first plaintiff’s insurance claim and therefore there was sufficient publication to a third party which would entitle the plaintiffs to sue the second defendant for damages for libel (see pp 557E–F, 558B–C). ||Page 534>> (6) The fact that in para 3 of the alleged defamatory letter the reports of the second and third defendants have been described by the first defendant as ‘privileged documents’ should not be construed to mean that the tort of defamation could not be invoked against the second defendant by the plaintiffs. The burden was on the second defendant to prove that the alleged defamatory reports were privileged documents (see p 558E–F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif pertama, sebuah syarikat berhad, telah membuat tuntutan terhadap penanggung-penanggung insuransnya, defendan keempat, di bawah polisi-polisi tertentu yang mana termasuk polisi insurans kebakaran. Defendan keempat menafikan tanggungan dan enggan membayar atas alasan bahawa kebakaran tersebut telah disebabkan oleh perbuatan sengaja. Ia bergantung pada laporan forensik yang telah disediakan oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga. Plaintif pertama tidak diberikan sesalinan laporan tersebut oleh defendan keempat. Oleh itu ia telah membuat aduan dengan Bank Negara terhadap defendan keempat. Bagi menjawab surat Bank Negara, defendan pertama, sebagai peguamcara bagi defendan keempat, telah mengeluarkan surat bertarikh 6 April 1999 kepada plaintif pertama dengan salinan-salinan kepada Bank Negara dan beberapa pihak yang lain. Plaintif mendakwa perkataan-perkataan

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yang digunakan dalam surat bertarikh 6 April 1999 menurut maksudnya yang biasa dan asal bermakna dan secara sindiran difahamkan sebagai bermakna bahawa plaintif-plaintif adalah orang yang sengaja membakar dan telah sengaja membakar kilang mereka sendiri demi untuk menipu defendan keempat supaya dapat menuntut wang insurans. Ini bukan sahaja menjejaskan reputasi plaintif tetapi telah melucuthak plaintif untuk menuntut insuransnya. Lebih daripada satu tahun selepas memasukkan pembelaannya, defendan kedua telah memohon untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan terpinda plaintif-plaintif selaras dengan A 18 k 19(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) atas arahan bahawa ia tidak mendedahkan satu kausa tindakan yang wajar, secara alternatifnya, tuntutan oleh plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat (pengarah-pengarah dan pengurus plaintif pertama) dalam tindakan ini terhadap defendan kedua dibatalkan kerana remeh dan menyusahkan serta suatu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Timbalan pendaftar telah membuat keputusan yang memihak kepada defendan kedua. Plaintif-plaintif telah merayu. Plaintif berhujah seperti berikut: (i) defendan kedua setelah memasuki satu kehadiran tanpa bersyarat, telah dihalang atau terkecuali daripada memohon di bawah A 18 k 19(1) KMT untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif; (ii) tiada keterangan yang boleh diterima setakat ini namun defendan kedua telah memfailkan satu afidavit sokongan dan timbalan pendaftar telah membuat keputusan atas perkara undang-undang ||Page 535>>substantif tanpa suatu perbicaraan; (iii) timbalan pendaftar telah tersalah pertimbangan apabila beliau membuat keputusan semata-mata atas isu penerbitan laporan tersebut dan tidak mengendahkan asal usul penulis laporan tersebut; dan (iv) ini bukannya suatu kes yang nyata dan mudah untuk pembatalan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Perkataan-perkataan ‘dalam mana-mana peringkat prosiding’ (at any stage of the proceedings) dalam A 18 k 19 KMT dengan nyatanya mengecualikan sebarang had masa untuk membuat sesuatu permohonan untuk pembatalan dan perkataan-perkataan ini haruslah dikuatkuasakan. Hakikat bahawa defendan kedua telah memfailkan suatu kehadiran tidak bersyarat dan pernyataan pembelaan tidak menghalang atau menghindari defendan kedua daripada memohon bagi mengetepikan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif di bawah A 18 k 19(1)

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KMT kerana perkataan-perkataan ‘dalam mana-mana peringkat prosiding’ (at any stage of the proceedings) yang melayakkan perkataan-perkataan ‘Mahkamah boleh ... memberi perintah untuk dibatalkan’ (The court may … order to be struck out) dalam kaedah tersebut sendiri menjangkakan terlebih dahulu pembuatan suatu permohonan yang sedemikian kecuali jika alasan yang diberi adalah ketiadaan locus standi atau bidangkuasa (lihat ms 549H, 550C–D). (2) Kelewatan selama lebih dari satu tahun selepas pemfailan pernyataan pembelaan tidak memudaratkan permohonan defendan kedua yang dibuat selaras dengan A 18 k 19(1) KMT kerana tarikh perbicaraan masih belum ditetapkan untuk tindakan tersebut (lihat ms 550H–I). (3) Daripada suatu penelitian akan alasan keputusan pendaftar, mahkamah berpuashati bahawa pendaftar tidak bergantung sama sekali kepada afidavit sokongan defendan kedua ketika beliau membenarkan permohonan defendan untuk membatalkan tuntutan plaintif atas alasan bahawa ia tidak mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang wajar (lihat ms 551B). (4) Tidak terdapat apa-apa di dalam afidavit sokongan defendan kedua yang menunjukkan bahawa tuntutan plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat terhadap defendan kedua telah difailkan untuk memalukan atau menyakitkan hati defendan kedua. Tuntutan mereka tidak boleh diperkatakan sebagai pastinya tidak boleh dipertahankan. Plaintif-plaintif kedua, ketiga dan keempat mempunyai kilanan yang sah dan mereka telah memulakan tindakan tersebut demi untuk mendapatkan satu remedi yang diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang (lihat ms 552H–I, 553F, 555F). (5) Timbalan pendaftar tersalah pertimbangan apabila beliau membuat keputusan semata-mata atas ketiadaan penerbitan surat ||Page 536>>yang dikatakan fitnah tersebut oleh defendan kedua kepada pihak-pihak ketiga berkenaan. Beliau telah gagal untuk menimbangkan bahawa terdapatnya penerbitan oleh defendan kedua akan surat memfitnah yang dikatakan tersebut. Adalah jelas bahawa kandungan laporan yang dikatakan memfitnah itu yang mana keseluruhannya atau sebahagiannya telah ditulis oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga telah disampaikan kepada defendan

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keempat yang telah bergantung kepada ketepatan dan kebenaran kandungannya apabila defendan keempat menafikan tanggungan di bawah polisi insurans tersebut dan menyangkal tuntutan insurans plaintif pertama dan oleh itu telah terdapat penerbitan yang secukupnya kepada pihak ketiga yang mana akan memberi plaintif hak untuk mendakwa defendan kedua bagi mendapatkan gantirugi untuk libel (lihat ms 557E–F, 558B–C). (6) Hakikat bahawa dalam perenggan 3 dari surat yang dikatakan memfitnah itu laporan-laporan oleh defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga telah diterangkan oleh defendan pertama sebagai ‘dokumen terlindung’ tidak seharusnya bermakna bahawa tort memfitnah tidak boleh digunakan terhadap defendan kedua oleh plaintif-plaintif. Bebannya adalah terletak pada defendan kedua untuk membuktikan bahawa laporan-laporan memfitnah yang didakwa adalah dokumen-dokumen terlindung (lihat ms 558E–F).]

Notes For cases on striking out statement of claim, see 2(3) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2001 Reissue) paras 5631–5641.For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241 (refd) Attorney General of Duchy of Lancaster v London & North Western Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 274 (refd) Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (refd) Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Esme Osman and another action [1987] 2 MLJ 633 (refd) Bhailal Jagadish v Additional Commissioner, Akola AIR 1953 Nag 89 (refd) Brickwood Consolidated Sdn Bhd v Kenneth Teh Ah Kian & Anor [2000] 4 AMR

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4853 (refd) DC Sangma v State of Assam AIR 1978 SC 17 (refd) Hatchard v Mege (1887) QBD 771 (refd) Hough v Windus (1884) 12 QBD 224 (refd) ||Page 537>> Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Jamir Hassan v Kang Min [1992] 2 MLJ 46 (refd) Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monotech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637 (refd) Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (refd) Lim Seak Huat v Malayan United Realty Sdn Bhd [1997] 5 CLJ 336 (refd) Loh Holdings Sdn Bhd v Peglin Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1984] 2 MLJ 105 (refd) Low Yat v GC Grace [1947] MLJ 115 (refd) N Caruppaiya v MBf Property Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2000] 4 MLJ 389 (refd) Orr Ewing, Re 22 Ch D 456 (refd) Peck v Russell [1899] 1 QB 86 (refd) Pet Far Eastern (M) Sdn Bhd v Tay Young Huat & Ors [1999] 2 AMR 2553 (refd) Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co Ltd v Vandry AIR 1920 PC 181 (refd) Queen, The v Bishop of Oxford (1879) 4 QBD 245 (refd) S Manikam & Ors v Ismail bin Mohamad & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 90 (refd) Sarjit Singh Khaira v Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 251 (refd) Sheldon v Brown Bayley’s Steel Works Ltd & Dawnways Ltd [1953] 2 QB 393; [1953] 2 All ER 894 (refd) SK Shana Ltd v State of Bihar AIR 1953 Pat 161 (refd) Wenlock v Moloney & Ors [1965] 2 All ER 871 (refd)

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Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1), O 33 r 2

Ngan Siong Hing (Angie Neoh Hooi with him) (Abbas & Ngan) for the plaintiffs. PH Looi (Zaid Ibrahim & Co) for the defendants.

[2000] 1 MLJ 243 Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–17 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 24 AUGUST 1999

Tort — Damages — Defamation — False and malicious publication — Plaintiff was public servant — Matters to be considered — No apology — Conduct of parties — Plaintiff’s position and standing — Nature of libel — Extent of publication — Quantum to be awarded

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Test of the ordinary man — Whether word ‘miang’ is defamatory — Whether plaintiff’s photograph in uniform with caption words were defamatory to his reputation as public servant

The plaintiff claimed that the first defendant had falsely and maliciously printed and published statements in an article against him. The plaintiff submitted that, in its natural and ordinary meaning, the passages printed meant that the plaintiff encouraged ‘miang’ among men, and further that the plaintiff admitted to a feeling of ‘miang’ towards women. The plaintiff also vehemently denied that he authorized the taking of the photograph that appeared with the article.

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Held, finding the defendants liable and awarding damages in the sum of RM100,000: (1) The ordinary man-in-the-street would immediately connote ‘miang’ as relating to a person lusting for sexual favours or sexual intercourse. Thus, the court was satisfied that by referring to the plaintiff as ‘miang’, the defendants, who did not deny the publication, ought to be found liable as clearly that the reference to the plaintiff was defamatory of him (see p 247D–E, H–I). (2) In assessing damages, the court must consider the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendants, the plaintiff’s position and standing, the nature of the libel, the extent of the publication and the refusal of an apology. There must also be consideration given to the mental distress, hurt, anxiety and distress caused to the plaintiff as a result of the publication. Further, the fact that the plaintiff was a public servant subjected, in so far as their conduct was concerned, to constraint and restraint was expected to be impeccable; their standing in society irreproachable. They are subjected to general orders which guard and guide their conduct throughout their life in service. Therefore, when an injustice such as this had been beseted upon them, only the majesty of the law could come to their rescue (see p 248A–C). ||Page 244>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan pertama telah secara palsu dan niat jahat mencetak dan menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan di dalam sebuah artikel terhadap beliau. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa, di dalam maksud semulajadi dan biasa, petikan-petikan yang telah dicetak tersebut bermaksud bahawa plaintif menggalakkan kelakuan ‘miang’ di kalangan lelaki, dan seterusnya bahawa plaintif mengaku berperasaan ‘miang’ terhadap perempuan. Plaintif juga telah menafikan sekeras-kerasnya bahawa beliau telah memberikan kebenaran pengambilan gambar foto yang telah disiarkan bersama artikel tersebut.

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Diputuskan, mendapati defendan bertanggungjawab dan mengawardkan ganti rugi sejumlah RM100,000: (1) Seseorang biasa di jalanan akan serta-merta mengkonotasikan ‘miang’ dengan mengkaitkan seseorang yang berkeinginan pelawaan seksual atau perhubungan seksual. Oleh demikian, mahkamah telah berpuas hati bahawa dengan merujukkan plaintif sebagai ‘miang’, defendan-defendan, yang tidak menafikan penerbitan tersebut, sepatutnya didapati bertanggungjawab kerana dengan jelas rujukan kepada plaintif adalah fitnah mengenai beliau (lihat ms 247D–E, H–I). (2) Di dalam menaksir ganti rugi, mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan kelakuan plaintif dan defendan-defendan, jawatan dan kedudukan plaintif, sifat semulajadi fitnah bertulis tersebut, takat penerbitan tersebut dan keengganan meminta maaf. Pertimbangan juga perlu diberikan terhadap penderitaan mental, perasaan terluka, kerisauan dan penderitaan yang dialami oleh plaintif akibat daripada penerbitan tersebut. Tambahan pula, hakikat bahawa plaintif merupakan seorang kakitangan awam yang tertakluk, setakat mana yang melibatkan kelakuan mereka, kepada kekangan dan sekatan yang dijangkakan tidak dapat dielakkan; kedudukan mereka dalam masyarakat tiada cacat celanya. Mereka tertakluk kepada perintah-perintah am yang mengawal dan membimbing kelakuan mereka sepanjang kehidupan mereka di dalam perkhidmatan. Oleh demikian, apabila suatu ketidakadilan sebegini melandai mereka, hanya kuasa undang-undang sahaja yang boleh menyelamatkan mereka (lihat ms 248A–C).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230. For cases on damages on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 91–108. ||Page 245>>

Dennis Appaduray (R Rajasingam with him) (Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the plaintiff.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 260

Haris Ibrahim (Nurul Akmar bte Omar with him) (Adam & Co) for the first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth defendants.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case(3)

Cur Adv Vult

[2000] 2 MLJ 175 Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–17 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 29 DECEMBER 1999

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article alleged that plaintiffs as shareholders would make large profits by charging exorbitant rooms rates — Exorbitant rates proved wrong — Defence of fair comment — Objective test applied — Intention of defamer not relevant — Whether article read as a whole was defamatory — Plaintiffs gravely injured in reputation — Whether aggravated damages should be awarded

The plaintiffs were businesswomen involved in the tourism and hotel industry. The plaintiffs teamed up with a British company, Byrom Consultants Ltd (‘Byrom’) and formed Seamos Marketing Sdn Bhd (‘Seamos’) to make a bid for providing accommodation during the Commonwealth Games. However, the arrangement between the parties fell through and the plaintiffs transferred all their shares in Seamos to Byrom’s nominees and resigned as directors of Seamos on 21 July 1997 as shown in Form 49 of the Companies Act 1965 and lodged with the Companies Registry. On 8

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and 10 February 1998 respectively, two articles were published in The New Straits Times alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs as shareholders of Seamos would make large profits by charging exorbitant rooms rates. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for libel. The defendants pleaded the defence of fair comment.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) Both the plaintiffs were no longer either shareholders or directors or in any way involved with Seamos at the time the articles were published. Whilst the defendants could have easily ascertained whether the plaintiffs were indeed at the material time of the publication, directors and/or shareholders of Seamos by making a search at the Registrar of Companies, the defendant had failed to do so. In any case, in a defence of fair comment, the onus was on the defendants to prove any allegations of facts to be true, and this the defendants had failed to do (see p 186A–D). (2) The articles when read as a whole would lead those who were dealing with the plaintiffs to the conclusion that the articles referred to them and that both the articles were defamatory of the plaintiffs and were written with the intention of identifying them. The test is an objective test. The inference that is clearly drawn from the articles was that the plaintiffs as shareholders in Seamos would make millions from the raised hotel rates. The result would be that the tourists would conclude that the hotel rates were far too high and this would prevent tourists from visiting Malaysia (see p 186I–187B). ||Page 176>> (3) Whether the words complained of are defamatory or not is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, the articles clearly suggested that the plaintiffs cared only to make a quick buck and had no regard to the fact that such conduct would have an adverse effect upon tourists visiting this country and especially during the Commonwealth Games and the plaintiffs being involved in the hotel industry would no doubt be adversely affected by such publications (see p 187H–I). (4) Not only words and sentences can be defamatory, it is also possible, after reading the entire article, to hold that the article read as a whole was

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defamatory of the plaintiffs because of the chain of events entwined through out the article, to form a tapestry, that portrayed the plaintiffs as the ones defamed (see p 188A–B). (5) The averment as a fact that the plaintiffs owned Seamos was a fatal crack to the defence of fair comment. Further, the statement as a fact that the room rates were indeed exorbitant was again proven wrong through the evidence that was led (see p 188D–E). (6) Where the defendants rely on the defence of fair comment, it is necessary for the defendants to indicate what are the facts and what are the comments. Where the facts and comments are so intermingled as in this case, the reasonable reader would assume that the injurious statements were clearly based on adequate factual grounds known to the writers. It is trite law that any statement which does not indicate with reasonable clarity that it is a mere comment and not a statement of fact cannot be protected by the defence of fair comment (see pp 188H–189A). (7) Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957 did not come to the aid of the defendants. There was a fatal fundamental flaw in the defendants’ assertion as a fact that the plaintiffs were owners of Seamos at the material time of the publication when such was not a fact at all (see p 189C). (8) It is set law that where a defendant is indifferent to the truth or otherwise of the words complained of, express or actual malice may be inferred. It was clear that the first defendant had acted recklessly in failing to carry out any proper enquiry of the plaintiffs’ status in Seamos before concluding that they owned Seamos. It is necessary that responsible newspapers insist that proper checks be made of basic facts which facts can easily be ascertained before publishing the articles. It is trite law that a writer may not suggest or invent facts and then comment upon them on the assumption that they are true (see pp 189E, 190A–B). (9) Libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer and it is irrelevant to consider the meaning the writers and publisher intended to convey. Whatever the intention of the first defendant, by linking the plaintiffs to the company that was behind the

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||Page 177>>excessive mark-up of the hotel rates, when the plaintiffs had nothing to do with the said company, the first defendant had clearly embroiled the plaintiffs with the issue (see p 190D–F). (10) The court found that the plaintiffs hold themselves high in the business world and, considering the fact that The New Straits Times has a wide circulation in the country, there was no doubt that the plaintiffs had by the publications been brought to ridicule and contempt. The plaintiffs had been gravely injured in their reputation. Having considered all factors, the court awarded the first plaintiff general damages in the sum of RM300,000 and the second plaintiff the sum of RM200,000 (see p 191D–F). (11) In the light of the fact that no offer of apology had been tendered and considering the reckless manner in which the articles were written, clothing a non-existent fact with the mantle of truth, the award under aggravated damages must reflect the uncaring attitude of the defendants. The court awarded each of the plaintiffs a sum of RM200,000 as aggravated damages (see p 192A–B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif merupakan ahli perniagaan yang terlibat di dalam industri pelancongan dan perhotelan. Plaintif-plaintif telah bergabung dengan sebuah syarikat British, Byrom Consultants Ltd (‘Byron’) dan membentuk Seamos Marketing Sdn Bhd (‘Seamos’) untuk membuat satu tawaran bagi memperuntukkan penempatan semasa Sukan Komanwel. Bagaimanapun, rancangan antara kedua-dua belah pihak tidak berjaya dan plaintif-plaintif telah memindahkan semua saham-saham mereka di dalam Seamos kepada penerima namaan Byrom dan meletak jawatan sebagai pengarah-pengarah Seamos pada 21 Julai 1997 sebagaimana yang ditunjukkan di dalam Borang 49 Akta Syarikat 1965 dan membuat aduan kepada Pendaftar Syarikat. Pada 8 dan 10 Februari 1998 masing-masing, dua artikel telah diterbitkan di dalam akhbar The New Straits Times yang telah membuat aduan, antara lain, bahawa plaintif-plaintif sebagai pemegang-pemegang saham Seamos akan memperoleh keuntungan besar dengan mengenakan kadar harga bilik yang sangat tinggi. Plaintif-plaintif telah menyaman

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defendan-defendan untuk libel. Defendan-defendan telah membuat rayuan pembelaan komen berpatutan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Kedua-dua plaintif tidak lagi merupakan pemegang-pemegang saham atau pengarah-pengarah atau di dalam apa-apa cara pun terlibat dengan Seamos pada masa artikel-artikel tersebut diterbitkan. Walaupun defendan-defendan boleh dengan senang memastikan sama ada plaintif-plaintif sememangnya pada masa matan penerbitan tersebut adalah pengarah-pengarah dan/atau pemegang-pemegang saham Seamos dengan membuat carian di Pendaftar Syarikat tetapi defendan telah gagal untuk berbuat ||Page 178>>demikian. Di dalam apa keadaan di mana wujud satu pembelaan komen berpatutan maka beban adalah pada defendan-defendan untuk membuktikan apa-apa dakwaan-dakwaan fakta tersebut itu adalah benar dan inilah yang defendan telah gagal lakukan (lihat ms 186A–D). (2) Artikel-artikel tersebut apabila dibaca secara keseluruhannya akan membawa mereka yang berurusan dengan plaintif-plaintif untuk sampai ke satu kesimpulan bahawa artikel-artikel tersebut merujuk kepada mereka dan bahawa kedua-dua artikel tersebut berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif-plaintif dan telah ditulis dengan niat untuk dikaitkan dengan mereka. Ujian yang patut digunakan adalah ujian objektif. Inferens yang jelas dinyatakan daripada artikel-artikel tersebut adalah bahawa plaintif-plaintif yang merupakan pemegang-pemegang saham di dalam Seamos akan meperoleh jutaan wang ringgit daripada peningkatan kadar harga hotel tersebut. Kesan daripada itu adalah pelancong akan membuat kesimpulan bahawa kadar harga hotel telah melambung amat tinggi dan ini akan menghalang pelancong daripada melawat Malaysia (lihat ms 186I–187B). (3) Sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan berunsur fitnah atau tidak adalah satu persoalan fakta bergantung kepada keadaan-keadaan setiap kes. Di dalam kes ini, artikel-artikel tersebut dengan jelas mencadangkan bahawa plaintif-plaintif cuma menghiraukan tentang mendapat duit cepat dan tidak menghiraukan tentang fakta bahawa perbuatan sedemikian akan mengakibatkan

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kesan yang buruk terhadap pelancong yang melawat negara ini dan terutamanya semasa Sukan Komanwel dan plaintif-plaintif yang terlibat di dalam industri perhotelan tersebut tanpa diragui akan terjejas akibat daripada penerbitan tersebut (lihat ms 187H–I). (4) Bukan hanya perkataan-perkataan dan ayat-ayat boleh berunsur fitnah, adalah mungkin juga, jika setelah membaca keseluruhan artikel, untuk mengatakan bahawa artikel tersebut keseluruhannya adalah berunsur fitnah terhadap plaintif kerana rantaian kejadian yang berlaku sepanjang artikel tersebut, yang membentuk satu tapestri, menggambarkan bahawa plaintif-plaintiflah yang telah difitnahkan (lihat ms 188A–B). (5) Penegasan yang nyata bahawa plaintif-plaintif memiliki Seamos merupakan satu percubaan yang membawa padah untuk membuat pembelaan komen berpatutan. Tambahan pula, kenyataan yang nyata bahawa kadar harga bilik yang sememangnya tinggi juga sekali lagi telah dibuktikan salah melalui keterangan yang telah dikemukakan (lihat ms 188D–E). (6) Di mana defendan-defendan bergantung kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan, adalah perlu untuk defendan-defendan menunjukkan apakah fakta-fakta dan apakah aduan-aduan yang wujud. Di mana fakta-fakta adalah amat bercampur seperti di dalam kes ini, seorang pembaca yang munasabah akan ||Page 179>>menganggap bahawa kenyataan yang memudaratkan dengan jelas berdasarkan alasan-alasan fakta yang mencukupi yang diketahui oleh penulis. Adalah undang-undang lapuk di mana apa-apa kenyataan yang tidak menunjukkan dengan kejelasan munasabah bahawa ia hanya satu komen dan bukan satu kenyataan fakta tidak boleh dilindungi oleh pembelaan komen berpatutan (lihat ms 188H–189A). (7) Seksyen 7 Akta Fitnah 1957 tidak mampu membantu defendan-defendan. Wujud satu kecacatan asas yang membawa padah di dalam penegasan defendan-defendan yang nyata bahawa plaintif-plaintif merupakan pemilik Seamos pada masa matan penerbitan tersebut apabila tidak wujud langsung apa-apa fakta yang sedemikian rupa (lihat ms 189C). (8) Adalah undang-undang yang ditetapkan bahawa apabila defendan tidak menghiraukan tentang kebenaran atau sebaliknya tentang perkataan-perkataan

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yang diadukan, niat jahat yang nyata atau sebenar bolehlah dibuat inferens. Adalah jelas bahawa defendan pertama telah bertindak dengan melulu dan gagal untuk melaksanakan apa-apa siasatan yang betul tentang status plaintif-plaintif di dalam Seamos sebelum membuat kesimpulan bahawa merekalah yang memiliki Seamos. Adalah perlu untuk akhbar-akhbar yang bertanggungjawab menegaskan semakan yang betul dibuat tentang fakta-fakta yang asas di mana fakta-fakta boleh dengan mudah dipastikan sebelum penerbitan artikel-artikel. Adalah undang-undang lapuk bahawa seorang penulis tidak mungkin mencadangkan atau mereka fakta dan kemudiannya mengkomennya dengan andaian bahawa ia adalah benar (lihat ms 189E, 190A–B). (9) Libel tidak boleh bergantung kepada niat orang yang memfitnah dan adalah tidak relevan untuk mempertimbangkan apakah maksud yang ingin disampaikan oleh penulis-penulis dan penerbit. Apa sekalipun maksud defendan pertama, dengan mengaitkan plaintif-plaintif dengan syarikat yang meningkatkan kadar harga hotel yang berlebih-lebihan tersebut, tatkala plaintif-plaintif tidak terlibat dengan apa-apa berkaitan dengan syarikat tersebut, defendan pertama telah dengan nyata membabitkan plaintif-plaintif dengan isu tersebut (lihat ms 190D–F). (10) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah menonjolkan diri mereka sebagai berjaya di dalam dunia perniagaan dan, dengan mempertimbangkan hakikat bahawa The New Straits Times mempunyai edaran luas di negara ini, tidak boleh diragukan bahawa plaintif-plaintif melalui penerbitan tersebut telah dimalukan dan dihina. Plaintif-plaintif telah dicemari nama dan reputasi baik mereka. Setelah mempertimbangkan semua faktor-faktor, mahkamah telah memberi award kepada plaintif pertama ganti rugi am sebanyak RM300,000 dan plaintif kedua sebanyak RM200,000 (lihat ms 191D–F). ||Page 180>> (11) Dengan mengambil kira fakta bahawa tiada tawaran untuk meminta maaf telah dikemukakan dan mempertimbangkan sifat melulu di mana artikel-artikel tersebut telah ditulis, menyelubungi apa yang sebenar tidak wujud dengan litupan kebenaran, award tersebut di bawah ganti rugi teruk (aggravated damages) seharusnya menggambarkan sikap tidak peduli defendan-defendan.

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Mahkamah mengawardkan setiap plaintif sebanyak RM200,000 sebagai ganti rugi teruk (lihat ms 192A–B).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Charleston & Anor v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 WLR 450 (refd) Hunt v Star Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 (refd) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd)

Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 Form 49 Defamation Act 1957 s 9

GK Ganesan (S Chrishanthini with him) (GK Ganesan Saiful & Rokiah) for the plaintiffs. Ahmad Redza Abdullah (T Shanti and Mohd Nadzim Ibrahim with him) (Shahrizat & Tan) for the defendants.

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Cur Adv Vult

[2000] 2 MLJ 462

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 268

Abdul Aziz bin Jelani & Anor v Peter Chua Swee Lai

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO R1–12–301 OF 1997 KC VOHRAH J 15 FEBRUARY 2000

Tort — Defamation — Police report — Accusation of criminal breach of trust of ex-employee — Plaintiff arrested but released, whether malicious prosecution — Whether dishonest misappropriation or conversion of money received proved — Burden of proof — No positive or honest belief in truth of statement made — Whether defence of privilege applied

The plaintiff was the managing director of the second defendant company. He resigned on 22 March 1990. The new management of the company found an undated receipt signed by the plaintiff acknowledging receipt of RM7,000 in cash from one of the debtors of the company. On 4 July 1990, a police report was lodged by the first defendant on behalf of the company alleging that the plaintiff had committed criminal breach of trust. The plaintiff was arrested but subsequently was freed with no criminal charges preferred against him. The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation on the police report. The defendants submitted that since the receipt had the plaintiff’s signature, they assumed that the money was collected by him. The police report was lodged because they believed that the police would be of assistance in investigating the matter. The sessions court found the words complained of to be defamatory of the plaintiff and awarded RM25,000 as damages. The defendants appealed and raised issues relating to malicious prosecution, justification and privilege.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) It was clear from the evidence that although the plaintiff was arrested he was released without any charge made against him in a court of law and thus he

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 269

could not have brought a case of malicious prosecution against the defendants (see p 466D). (2) The accusation related to the offence of criminal breach of trust meaning that the plaintiff had been entrusted with the cash and had dishonestly misappropriated or converted the cash. It was up to the defendants to show positive evidence that the plaintiff had received the money and that he had dishonestly misappropriated or converted the cash. The burden on the defendants to prove these matters was certainly not discharged. Clearly the plea of justification could not stand (see p 467F–G, I). (3) The defamer is entitled to the protection of privilege if he can prove the positive belief or honest belief in the truth of what he ||Page 463>>published. In the present case, the court found that the defendants in publishing the defamatory statement did not believe the statement to be true. They merely wanted the assistance of the police to get the plaintiff to explain to them the receipt. It was a misuse of the process of law and this is conclusive evidence of express malice on the part of the defendants. The defence ofprivilege was properly rejected by the sessions court (see pp 469F–G, 471B–C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif adalah pengarah urusan syarikat defendan kedua. Beliau telah meletak jawatan pada 22 Mac 1990. Pengurusan syarikat yang baru telah menemui suatu resit yang tidak bertarikh yang ditandatangani oleh plaintif mengakusah penerimaan tunai sebanyak RM7,000 berbentuk tunai daripada salah satu penghutang syarikat tersebut. Pada 4 Julai 1990, suatu laporan polis telah dibuat oleh defendan pertama bagi pihak syarikat mengatakan plaintif telah melakukan jenayah pecah amanah. Plaintif telah ditahan tetapi kemudiannya telah dibebaskan dengan tiada dakwaan jenayah dibawa terhadapnya. Plaintif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk fitnah di atas laporan polis tersebut. Defendan-defendan menghujahkan bahawa oleh kerana resit mempunyai tandatangan plaintif, mereka mengandaikan bahawa wang telah dikutip olehnya.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 270

Laporan polis telah dibuat kerana mereka percaya bahawa polis boleh membantu menyiasat perkara tersebut. Mahkamah sesyen mendapati bahawa perkataan yang diadukan adalah bersifat fitnah dan mengawardkan RM25,000 sebagai ganti rugi. Defendan-defendan telah merayu dan membangkit isu berkenaan pendakwaan niat jahat, justifikasi dan tindakan terlindung.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Adalah jelas daripada keterangan bahawa walaupun plaintif telah ditahan, beliau telah dibebaskan tanpa sebarang dakwaan dibawa terhadapnya di mahkamah dan dengan itu beliau tidak dapat membawa suatu kes pendakwaan niat jahat terhadap defendan-defendan (lihat ms 466D). (2) Tuduhan berkaitan dengan jenayah jenayah pecah amanah bermaksud bahawa plaintif diamanahkan dengan tunai dan telah melesapkannya secara tidak jujur atau menggunakan tunai tersebut. Ia adalah terletak kepada defendan-defendan untuk menunjukkan keterangan positif bahawa plaintif telah menerima wang tersebut dan bahawa beliau telah melesapkan wang tersebut secara tidak jujur atau menggunakan wang tunai tersebut. Beban yang terletak di atas defendan untuk membuktikan perkara-perkara tersebut sudah pasti belum dilepaskan. Dengan jelas, pembelaan justifikasi tidak dapat bertahan (lihat ms 467F–G, I). ||Page 464>> (3) Pemfitnah berhak untuk dilindungi di bawah tindakan terlindung jika beliau boleh membuktikan kepercayaan positif atau secara ikhlas percaya akan kebenaran atas apa yang dirterbitkannya. Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah mendapati bahawa defendan-defendan di dalam menerbitkan kenyataan fitnah tidak mempercayai bahawa pernyataan tersebut adalah benar. Mereka hanya mahukan bantuan polis agar plaintif menjelaskan kepada mereka mengenai resit tersebut. Ia adalah penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang dan ini adalah keterangan konklusif niat jahat nyata di pihak defendan-defendan. Pembelaan tindakan terlindung telah ditolak dengan wajar oleh mahkamah sesyen (lihat ms 469F–G, 471B–C).]

Notes

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 271

For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (refd) Danby v Beardsley (1880) 43 LT 603 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Martin v Watson [1994] 2 All ER 606 (refd) Mohamed Lajan v Daud [1963] MLJ 209 (refd) Sewell v National Telephone Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 577 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 8

Appeal from: Session Court Suit No 52–1237–93 (Sessions Court, Kuala Lumpur)

KS Lopez (Kamarudin & Partners) for the appellant. K Kulasekar (Kulasekar & Associates) for the respondent.

Cur Adv Vult

[2000] 3 MLJ 1 Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2(S3)–22–503 OF 1994 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 272

10 MAY 2000

Tort — Defamation — Allegation of corruption — Allegations made by third party — Defendant informed the Anti Corruption Agency of allegations — Allegations repeated at press conference and published in newspapers — Whether allegations were defamatory — No evidence of corrupt practice proved — Whether malicious intent — Defence of justification and fair comment — Damages, quantum of — Compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages awarded

The plaintiff was at all material times the Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia. On 2 August 1994, the first defendant and his lawyer, the second defendant, published statements of and concerning the plaintiff to the press at a press conference. These statements were then republished in two national Chinese publications. It was alleged in the statements that the plaintiff was involved in corrupt practice. By way of a letter dated 1 August 1994, the first defendant wrote to the Anti Corruption Agency (‘the ACA’), alleging, inter alia, that he was told by one Yan Meng Jie that the plaintiff had accepted RM200,000 for corruption purposes. It was the plaintiff’s case that the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements published by the defendants and each of them meant and were understood to mean that the plaintiff was dishonest and corrupt and were calculated to discredit and disparage the plaintiff in his office as deputy minister. The first defendant submitted that the allegations were not defamatory and that there was no malicious intent when he made the statement. He also raised the defence of justification and fair comment. The second defendant relied on the defence of fair comment but he failed to testify.

Held: (1) There was no doubt that the words spoken of the plaintiff by the first defendant were defamatory of the plaintiff. In their natural and ordinary meaning, the words meant and were indeed understood to mean that the plaintiff was dishonest and corrupt. The vituperative and malicious intent of the first defendant was clearly shown in the scurrilous and venomous letter he wrote to the ACA (see p 11E–H).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 273

(2) It was obvious that the first defendant indeed had intended the press to publish his accusation of corruption against the plaintiff. Therefore having published the impugned statement to the reporters present, the subsequent republication of the impugned publication as appearing in the press was no doubt foreseeable as a natural and probable consequence. In the circumstances, the law is very clear in that the first defendant was liable for the ||Page 2>>subsequent republication of his allegations by the national Chinese publications (see pp 11I–12A). (3) Even if the first defendant’s report to the ACA is to be believed, his contention was pure adulterated hearsay. The first defendant did nothing to adduce any evidence to suggest that what Yan Meng Jie said could reasonably be true. The court was satisfied that the first defendant had no evidence of corrupt practice against the plaintiff. Therefore, if he can produce no evidence at trial, a fortiori, he must have had no evidence when he made the allegations. Therefore, he made these allegations without any honest belief, or he was reckless. In any case in either event, he was malicious (see p 13C–F). (4) It was clear from the circumstances of the case that none of the first defendant’s impugned allegations against the plaintiff had been proven to be a fact. The first defendant led no evidence to prove as fact, any element of the impugned allegations that he made. In the circumstances, the defence of fair comment must necessarily fail and therefore the question of public interest did not arise (see p 14D–E). (5) The second defendant had made allegations that were so wild and baseless that he did not even want to take the stand by declining an adjournment because he knew that he would not be able to justify the accusations. Just as the first defendant, the second defendant expected the two newspapers to publish his press statement and therefore he ought to have foreseen the natural and probable consequences of his foolhardiness. The court found the second defendant liable for the republication of the allegations by the national Chinese publications (see p 16C–E). (6) The various statements made by the second defendant were merely allegations of fact and not comments on any established facts. Accordingly, the defence of

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 274

fair comment could not stand. Further, since the second defendant had no direct evidence of the plaintiff’s involvement in any corrupt practice, it was totally reckless of the second defendant, as a lawyer, to have made such damaging and disparaging statement against the plaintiff (see pp 17D–E, 18A–B). (7) The court found that the plaintiff had proved his case against the defendants and awarded injunction against the defendants, compensatory damages of RM500,000, aggravated damages of RM500,000, exemplary damages at RM500,000 and interest at 4%pa on all the awards (see pp 19A, 20F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintiff pada setiap masa matan adalah Timbalan Menteri Perdagangan Antarabangsa dan Industri Malaysia. Pada 2 Ogos 1994, defendan pertama dan peguam beliau, defendan kedua, telah ||Page 3>>menerbitkan pernyataan-pernyataan tentang dan berkaitan dengan plaintif kepada akhbar pada sidang akhbar. Pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut telah diterbitkan semula di dalam dua penerbitan tempatan dalam bahasa Cina. Adalah didakwa di dalam pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut bahawa plaintif adalah terlibat dalam amalan rasuah. Melalui surat bertarikh 1 Ogos 1994, defendan pertama telah menulis kepada Agensi Pencegah Rasuah (‘APR’), mendakwa, antara lain, bahawa beliau telah diberitahu oleh seorang bernama Yan Meng Jie bahawa plaintif telah menerima RM200,000 bagi tujuan rasuah. Adalah kes plaintif bahawa maksud semula jadi dan biasa pernyataan-pernyataan yang diterbitkan oleh defendan-defendan dan masing-masing bermaksud dan difahami untuk bermaksud bahawa plaintif tidak jujur dan korup dan dikira sebagai mencemar dan memperkecilkan plaintif dalam jawatan beliau sebagai seorang timbalan menteri. Defendan pertama menghujahkan bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut tidak memfitnah dan bahawa tiada niat jahat apabila beliau membuat pernyataan tersebut. Beliau juga menimbulkan pembelaan justifikasi dan komen berpatutan. Defendan kedua bergantung kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan tetapi beliau gagal untuk memberikan keterangan.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 275

Diputuskan: (1) Tiada keraguan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang disebutkan tentang plaintif oleh defendan pertama adalah fitnah tentang plaintif. Dalam maksud semula jadi dan biasa perkataan-perkataan tersebut bermaksud dan sememangnya difahami untuk bermaksud bahawa plaintif adalah tidak jujur dan korup. Niat yang penuh cercaan dan jahat defendan pertama dengan jelas ditunjukkan di dalam surat yang cabul dan menyakitkan hati yang beliau tulis kepada APR (lihat ms 11E–H). (2) Adalah jelas bahawa defendan pertama memang berniat agar akhbar menerbitkan tuduhan rasuah beliau terhasap plaintif. Oleh demikian setelah menerbitkan pernyataan yang dipersoalkan kepada pemberita yang hadir, penerbitan semula kemudiannya tentang pernyataan yang dipersoalkan tersebut sebagaimana yang terdapat dalam sidang itu tidak diragui boleh diramal sebagai satu akibat yang semula jadi dan mungkin. Di dalam keadaan ini, undang-undang amat jelas di mana defendan pertama adalah bertanggungjawab kerana menerbitkan semula kemudiannya dakwaan-dakwaan beliau oleh penerbitan-penerbitan tempatan Cina tersebut (lihat ms 11I–12A). (3) Walaupun laporan defendan pertama kepada APR boleh dipercayai, penegasan beliau adalah dengar cakap yang dicemari. Defendan pertama tidak berbuat apapun untuk mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk mencadangkan bahawa apa yang Yan Meng Jie katakan mungkin agak benar. Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa defendan pertama tiada keterangan tentang amalan rasuah terhadap plaintif. Oleh demikian, jika beliau tidak boleh ||Page 4>>mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan di perbicaraan, a fortiori, beliau mungkin tiada keterangan apabila membuat dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut. Oleh itu beliau telah membuat dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut tanpa apa-apa kepercayaan secara jujur, atau beliau telah bertindak melulu. Dalam apa kes di dalam mana-mana kejadian, beliau telah berniat jahat (lihat ms 13C–F). (4) Adalah jelas daripada keadaan kes ini bahawa tiada dakwaan-dakwaan defendan pertama yang dipersoalkan terhadap plaintif telah dibuktikan sebagai satu yang nyata. Defendan pertama tidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk membuktikan dengan nyata, apa-apa elemen tentang dakwaan-dakwaan

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 276

yang dipersoalkan tersebut yang telah dibuat oleh beliau. Di dalam keadaan ini, pembelaan komen berpatutan hendaklah gagal dan oleh itu persoalan tentang kepentingan awam tidak timbul (lihat ms 14D–F). (5) Defendan kedua telah membuat dakwaan-dakwaan yang begitu liar dan tidak berasas sehingga beliau tidak langsung mahu masuk ke kandang saksi dengan menolak satu penangguhan kerana belaiu tahu bahawa beliau tidak akan berupaya untuk menjustifikasikan dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut. Seperti mana defendan pertama, defendan kedua menjangka dua surat khabar tersebut akan menerbitkan pernyataan akhbar beliau dan oleh itu beliau seharusnya boleh meramalkan akibat semula jadi dan mungkin akibat dari perbuatan belian. Mahkamah mendapati defendan kedua bertanggungjawab kerana penerbitan semula dakwaan-dakwaan oleh penerbitan tempatan Cina tersebut (lihat ms 16C–E). (6) Pelbagai pernyataan yang dibuat oleh defendan kedua hanyalah dakwaan-dakwaan fakta dan bukan komen tentang apa-apa fakta yang sudah mapan. Sewajarnya pembelaan komen berpatutan tidak boleh diterima. Tambahan pula, memandangkan defendan kedua tiada keterangan langsung tentang penglibatan plaintif di dalam mana-mana amalan rasuah, tindakan defendan kedua adalah benar-benar melulu, sebagai seorang peguam, untuk membuat pernyataan yang merosakkan dan memperkecilkan terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 17D–E, 18A–B). (7) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa plaintif telah membuktikan kes beliau terhadap defendan-defendan dan mengawardkan injunksi terhadap defendan-defendan, ganti rugi sebanyak RM500,000, ganti rugi tambahan sebanyak RM500,000, ganti rugi exemplary sebanyak RM500,000 dan faedah pada 4% setahun ke atas semua award-award tersebut (lihat ms 19A, 20F–G).]

Notes For a case on allegation of corruption, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) para 142. ||Page 5>>

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 277

Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) Abdullah Sani bin Hashim v Sharma Kumari a/p Oam Parkash & Anor (Guaman Sivil No S2(S5)–23–08–1998(2) (refd) Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 5

Darryl Goon (Raja Eileen Soraya bte Raja Aman with him) (Raja, Darryl & Loh) for the plaintiff. Damian Lim (Albert Koo with him) (CL Chin & Associates) for the defendants.

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Cur Adv Vult

[2000] 3 MLJ 22 DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 278

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2(S5)–23–29 OF 1997 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 3 MAY 2000

Evidence — Adverse inference — Failure to call witness — Plaintiff testifying on certain matters concerning a party — Plaintiff not calling the party as a witness — Plaintiff not cross-examined on matters concerning that party — Whether adverse inference should be drawn against plaintiff for not calling the party as a witness

Evidence — Judgments, when relevant — Production of prior judgment, effect of — Whether merely to establish existence of prior judgment — Whether gives rise to presumption that prior judgment is the correct decision on the matter

Legal Profession — Law Society/Malaysian Bar — Complaint against solicitor — Plaintiff solicitor issuing cheque drawn on closed clients’ account to first defendant solicitor — Bona fide error on the part of plaintiff solicitor — Whether disciplinary action would arise against plaintiff solicitor — Press statement maligning plaintiff solicitor issued by first defendant solicitor — Press statement made in first defendant’s capacity as politician — Whether first defendant solicitor had gone beyond requirements of the Legal Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978 — Whether conduct of first defendant solicitor reflected a conflict of interest — Whether conduct of first defendant indicated extent of his malicious and vituperative intentions

Newspapers — Libel — Press statement — Press statement and article based on press statement published in newspapers — Whether published statements tended to lower plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally — Whether published statements would cause plaintiff to be shunned or avoided or would expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule — Whether published words defamatory

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defence — Qualified privilege — The public interest — Distinction between ‘that which the public is interested in’ and ‘that which is in the public

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 279

interest’

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defence — Justification — Defendant to show in defence meaning of words he seeks to justify

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Evidence of plaintiff’s character — Whether to be confined to area of his life or character libelled

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages for — Compensatory damages, how assessed

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Damages for — Aggravated damages, how assessed

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Press statement — Allegation by first defendant that plaintiff’s case fatal as actual words in press statement issued by first defendant not reproduced in newspaper articles — Whether necessary for every word of first defendant to be reported in newspapers — Whether sufficient for plaintiff to prove that words said by defendant substantially the same as pleaded in statement of claim ||Page 23>>

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Press statement — Allegation by second defendant newspaper that their publication of impugned words less serious due to absence of word ‘cheat’ — Whether merely a matter of semantics — Implication of words published by second defendant when given their ordinary meaning

Tort — Defamation Libel — Press statement — First defendant making press statement with express intention that statement would be published in newspapers — First defendant ‘requested, procured or authorized publication’ of press statement — Whether first defendant responsible for newspaper reports of his press statement

Tort — Defamation — Malice — Cheque issued to first defendant by plaintiff from closed clients’ account — Plaintiff’s explanation of a bona fide error communicated to first defendant

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 280

— Replacement cheque sent by plaintiff and received by first defendant’s firm — First defendant subsequently issuing press statement maligning plaintiff — Complaint to Bar Council and Disciplinary Board against plaintiff by first defendant — Police report against plaintiff lodged by first defendant — Press statement, complaints, report made notwithstanding plaintiff’s explanation and in suppression of material facts — Whether actual malice shown on the part of first defendant

Tort — Defamation — Pleadings — First defendant’s pleadings alleging plaintiff convicted of a most serious offence — Plaintiff in actual fact acquitted of the most serious offence — First defendant failing to amend pleadings — First defendant not stating in pleadings that plaintiff an actor in a pornographic film — Whether trial court could consider a previous Court of Appeal finding that plaintiff was an actor in a pornographic film

Tort — Defamation — Proceedings — Certified Bahasa Malaysia translation of impugned words not tendered in the course of proceedings — Plaintiff provided literal Bahasa Malaysia translation instead — Whether literal translation sufficient — Whether for first defendant to provide court with alternate version of translation if disputing plaintiff’s version

The plaintiff had sued the first defendant on another matter, lost and was ordered to pay the first defendant taxed costs of RM9,414.38 (‘the sum’). The plaintiff had himself been charged for a criminal offence and as a result the Bar Council had refused to issue him a Sijil Annual to enable him to practise. As a result, the plaintiff was compelled to close his law office and let his staff go. The plaintiff had operated two clients’ accounts — one with Bank Buruh (‘the Bank’) and the other with Bank of Commerce. The plaintiff had closed the account with Bank Buruh and had transferred all funds to the account with the Bank of Commerce. On 9 February 1996, the plaintiff having decided to settle the sum with the first defendant quietly, posted a cheque for the said sum drawn on the Bank Buruh account to the first defendant’s firm. According to the plaintiff, when his staff was with him, he did not write cheques. Therefore when he had to write the cheque for the first defendant, he used a cheque book lying on top of a bunch of cheque books and with the words ‘Clients’ Account’. As the words ‘Account Closed’ were not endorsed on the said cheque

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 281

||Page 24>>book, he thought it was all right to issue the cheque from the Bank Buruh account. On 16 February 1996, the plaintiff received a phone call from the Bank informing him that the cheque had been issue from a closed account. He was on the same day informed by one Mr Indran, an accountant with the first defendant’s firm that there was a problem with the cheque. On the same day, the plaintiff made out a replacement cheque for the same amount, addressed a letter to the said Mr Indran and indicated in the letter that the earlier ‘cheque was issued from the wrong account due to a clerical error’. The letter was faxed through to the first defendant’s firm the same day and the said Mr Indran agreed to the plaintiff’s proposal that he could post the cheque notwithstanding the fact that a long stretch of holidays was imminent. On 28 February 1996, the plaintiff posted the letter dated 16 February 1996 and the replacement cheque to the first defendant whose firm received the same on 1 March 1996. However on 2 March 1996, the first defendant issued a press statement inter alia alleging: that the plaintiff’s conduct in issuing a cheque which was dishonoured amounted to a serious offence of cheating under s 420 of the Penal Code; the plaintiff’s conduct was dishonourable and rendered him unfit to be on the rolls of Advocates and Solicitors in the country; and that the country could ill afford to have the plaintiff in the legal profession. The second defendant published the contents of the press statement in the Sunday Star on 3 March 1996 whereas the third defendant published an article in the New Straits Times on 5 March 1996. On 4 March 1996, the plaintiff telephoned the said Mr Indran who confirmed that he had appraised the first defendant about the plaintiff’s explanation of the wrong cheque being sent and the subsequent replacement with the valid cheque. The plaintiff contended that the conduct of all the defendants had gravely injured him in his professional standing, character, credit and reputation and that he had been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt and sued inter alia for damages for libel. The first defendant raise in his defence and submissions inter alia the following issues: (i) that the plaintiff ought not to have dealt with Mr Indran as the latter was not a lawyer; (ii) as the actual words stated in his press statement were not reproduced in the newspapers, this was fatal to the plaintiff’s case; (iii) that since a certified translation of the words in Bahasa Malaysia had not been tendered in the course of proceedings, the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed; (iv) that it was necessary for him to report to the Bar and the

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police; and (v) the court ought to invoke the principle in s 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 and draw an adverse inference against the plaintiff for failing to call Mr Indran to testify. The second defendant contended that the words published in the Sunday Star were not capable of having a defamatory meaning or in any case were less serious because of the absence of the word ‘cheat’. The third defendant raised the defence of justification and in submissions counsel argued that the impugned words had a different ||Page 25>>meaning. Both the second and third defendants also claimed an indemnity against the first defendant.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) The court would accept the explanation as to why the plaintiff had issued the cheque from the closed Bank Buruh clients’ account. His explanation disclosed a genuine mistake with no ill-intention to mislead or deceive the first defendant. With regard to whether the plaintiff ought to have dealt with Mr Indran since Mr Indran was not a lawyer, it had to be assumed, in the absence of Mr Indran testifying, that he (Mr Indran) had the authority to communicate with parties issuing cheques and who were in a similar situation as the plaintiff was. Further as the plaintiff was suspended and not in practice, the plaintiff was then not a lawyer and it was in order for the plaintiff to have dealt with Mr Indran (see p 41B–D). (2) The words published in both the Sunday Star, and New Straits Times in their natural and ordinary meaning meant that the plaintiff had committed the criminal offence of cheating under s 420 of the Penal Code. It also meant that the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to act as a solicitor and that the Bar Council ought to, on the basis that the plaintiff had committed such a criminal offence, strike the plaintiff off the rolls as an advocate and solicitor. By calling the plaintiff a cheat as having committed an offence under s 420 of the Penal Code, the defendants had clearly imputed that plaintiff was a criminal who was unfit to hold the profession of an advocate and solicitor. The statements as published would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to

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expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule. It was beyond doubt that the words were in fact defamatory (see pp 41E–F, 42D, F). (3) The plaintiff’s explanation relating to the bona fide error was not challenged in cross-examination by the defendants and neither was it put to the plaintiff that he acted dishonestly. The law presumed the falsity of the words stated and the onus was on the defendants to rebut the falsity of the words stated. The onus was on the defendants to rebut the said presumption and they had not done so. The allegations made against the plaintiff of cheating and of dishonourable conduct were therefore absolutely false (see pp 42G–43A). (4) There was actual malice on the part of the first defendant. The plaintiff’s evidence that Mr Indran had informed him that he had informed the first defendant that the replacement cheque had already been received prior to the press statement was unrebutted. It stood unchallenged therefore that the first defendant was well ||Page 26>>aware that when he made the press statement he knew that there was a genuine error on the part of the plaintiff. In his complaint to the Disciplinary Board, the first defendant had omitted to enclose correspondences which would show the genuineness of the plaintiff’s error. Even in his police report, the first defendant had failed to mention many material facts. The first defendant further suppressed material facts when he made the press statement (see p 43B–F). (5) The sting of the libel as stated in the press statement was contained in both the publications. There was no doubt that the newspaper articles carried the actual words of the first defendant and in some areas repeated the first defendant’s words in the form of indirect speech. There was no requirement that every word of the first defendant had to be reported in the publications. The first defendant did not allege that any significant part of his statement had been left out nor did he allege that the part left out would vary the meaning of the part the plaintiff contended was defamatory of him. The plaintiff is not required to prove that what is alleged in the statement of claim is exactly what the defendant said. It is sufficient if the plaintiff proves that the words said by the defendant are substantially the same as those pleaded in the statement of claim

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(see pp 43I–44B, G–H). (6) If a defendant gives a press statement for publication, or in the expectation that it would be published, he becomes responsible for the republished version even if it is an edited version. On the facts, the first defendant was liable as the publisher of the libel in the two newspapers since he requested, procured or authorized the publication. On the basis of the law relating to republication, the first defendant was responsible for the newspaper reports as fully as if he himself had published the said reports (see pp 44I–45A, F–G). (7) The first defendant failed to see the distinction between the requirement of a literal translation and a certified translation. In the instant case, the plaintiff had indeed provided a literal translation in Bahasa Malaysia and if such a literal translation as provided by the plaintiff was in dispute, it was for the first defendant to provide the court with his alternate version, which he failed to do (see p 46B-C). (8) The first defendant went beyond what was required of him and of the Legal Profession (Practice & Etiquette) Rules 1978 (‘the Rules’). Though the first defendant was right in referring to the Bar Council, the explanation of the plaintiff would have justified not having to refer the matter to the Bar Council as a bona fide error by an advocate and solicitor can never be the basis for disciplinary action against him. In the instant case, not only did the first defendant refer the plaintiff to the Bar Council but he ||Page 27>>accused the plaintiff of committing a criminal offence of cheating under s 420 of the Penal Code. Further the Rules did not authorize the plaintiff to give a press statement. The press statement made in the first defendant’s capacity as a politician reflected a conflict of interest and was tantamount to using political mileage to gain an unfair advantage over the plaintiff. The making of the press statement and calling of its publication showed the extent of the malicious and vituperative intention of the first defendant (see pp 46F–H, 47B–C). (9) The first defendant’s submission on drawing an adverse inference against the plaintiff was unacceptable. The plaintiff had testified that it was Mr Indran who first telephoned him and had confirmed his conversation with Mr Indran in

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writing, which document was in the bundle of documents. The plaintiff was never cross-examined on the matters relating to Mr Indran. Thus the plaintiff having proved the matters relating to Mr Indran, the onus shifted to the first defendant to call Mr Indran, if he intended to dispute any of the evidence (see p 47D–E). (10) Although the second defendant had scrupulously avoided the use of the word ‘cheat’, that was a matter of semantics. The words published of the plaintiff by the second defendant when given their ordinary meaning implied that the plaintiff had indeed committed the criminal offence of cheating under s 420 of the Penal Code and that for this reason he was not a fit and proper person to act as a lawyer and that based on this fact the Bar Council ought to cause the plaintiff to be struck off the rolls as an advocate and solicitor. To compound the libel, the second defendant had used the word ‘bounced’ –– a commonly used term usually denigrating the issuer of a cheque as one devoid of any financial integrity (see pp 47G–48B). (11) The second defendant was not entitled to raise the defence of qualified privilege as the press statement of the first defendant did not fall into any of the categories referred to in Part 1 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act 1957. The element of public interest which is a quintessential aspect of the defence of qualified privilege was completely non existent in the instant case. The second defendant had failed to appreciate the real and very important distinction between ‘that which the public is interested in’ and ‘that which is in the public interest’. The first category pandered to the draw of the public and for which the courts would not lend their protection, whereas the second category catered for the benefit of the public and for which the courts would certainly extend their protection (see p 49C, E–F, H–I). (12) A defendant in a defamation suit need not necessarily give a meaning to the words complained of. However if the defendant ||Page 28>>pleads justification, he must show in his defence either as a specific averment, or in the particulars relied on, the meanings he seeks to justify. On the facts, since the third defendant did not even seek leave to amend its defence, it was certainly taking the plaintiff by surprise to ascribe to the words

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complained of, a different meaning and to thus depart radically from its pleaded defence. Where a defendant sets up a defamatory meaning different from that contended by the plaintiff, and seeks to justify such different meaning, he must clearly and unequivocally state the meaning he seeks to justify (see pp 50E–F, 51B). (13) The first defendant’s attack on the plaintiff’s character was based on his alleged conviction of a most serious offence. Nowhere in his pleadings did the first defendant aver that he sought to mitigate damages on the ground that the plaintiff was an actor in a pornographic video. However even though the plaintiff was acquitted of the most serious offence, the first defendant failed to amend his pleadings. In the absence of any amendment, it was not just and proper for the court to consider the earlier finding of the Court of Appeal that the plaintiff was a male actor in a pornographic video. If the defendants had intended to pursue the finding of the Court of Appeal that the plaintiff was the actor in the pornographic video, even if no amendments had been applied for, the defendants should have with leave of court applied to cross-examine the plaintiff on the allegation, indicating to the court that the purpose of the cross-examination would be to mitigate damages (see pp 51H–52A, D–E). (14) The first defendant sought to admit a certain passage from the judgment of the Court of Appeal as evidence in the instant case. However the existence of the judgment was not a fact in issue in the instant case. The production of a previous judgment merely establishes the existence of a prior decision and there is no presumption that a prior judgment is the correct decision on the matter. There is nothing in the Evidence Act to warrant the conclusion that the statements or findings of fact in another case can be used as evidence in a subsequent case to decide the points which are in issue in the subsequent case (see pp 53G, 54D, G–H). (15) Any evidence as to the character of the plaintiff must be confined to the particular area of his life or character that has been libelled. On the facts, it could not be said that the alleged libel had any connection with the finding of fact by the Court of Appeal in respect of the plaintiff’s performance as a pornographic actor in a video (see pp 55H–I, 56A–B).

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(16) In assessing compensatory damages in the instant case, the High Court considered the following factors: (i) personal distress and hurt suffered by the plaintiff and his pregnant wife; (ii) that the ||Page 29>>plaintiff’s professional standing had been affected; (iii) the first defendant’s complaint to the Bar Council and the Disciplinary Board; (iv) the first defendant’s police report; (v) the social standing of the parties; and (vi) the second and third defendants abject failure to verify before publication. Having regard to all the factors, the plaintiff should be awarded a sum of RM250,000 as compensatory damages against the first defendant. As against the second and third defendants, the plaintiff should be awarded a sum of RM100,000 against each of them (see pp 56H–58G). (17) In assessing aggravated damages, the court had to consider the following factors: (i) the conduct of the first defendant; (ii) the suppression of material facts by the first defendant; (iii) the repetition of the libel by the first defendant; (iv) the plaintiff’s standing as a lawyer had been affected; (v) the first defendant had not shown any remorse or tendered any apology; (vi) the second and third defendants’ failure to verify before publishing; (vi) the second and third defendants’ blatant refusal to give a copy of the first defendant’s press statement to the plaintiff despite repeated requests; (vii) the second and third defendants’ failure to publish an apology. Having considered all the factors, the plaintiff should be awarded a sum of RM250,000 as against the first defendant and as against each of the second and third defendants a sum of RM100,000 each (see pp 58G–61C). (18) The plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages against the defendants failed. The second and third defendants had to be liable for their own conduct. Accordingly their claims for indemnity also failed (see p 62A–B).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah mendakwa defendan pertama atas perkara lain, tetapi kalah dan diperintah membayar cukai ditaksir sebanyak RM9,414.38 (‘jumlah tersebut’) kepada defendan

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pertama. Plaintif sendiri telah dipertuduh dengan kesalahan jenayah dan akibatnya Majlis Peguam enggan mengeluarkan Sijil Annual kepadanya untuk meneruskan amalan. Akibatnya, plaintif terpaksa menutup firma guamannya dan memberhentikan kakitangannya. Plaintif telah mengendalikan dua akaun anak guam –– satu dengan Bank Buruh (‘Bank tersebut’) dan satu lagi dengan Bank of Commerce. Plaintif telah menutup akaun dengan Bank Buruh dan memindah semua wang kepada akaun dengan Bank of Commerce. Pada 9 Februari 1996, plaintif, dalam membuat keputusan untuk membayar jumlah tersebut dengan defendan pertama secara senyap, telah mengirim cek untuk jumlah tersebut dalam akaun Bank Buruh kepada firma defendan pertama. Menurut plaintif, semasa beliau masih menggaji kakitangannya, beliau sendiri tidak menulis cek. Dengan itu, apabila beliau terpaksa menulis cek untuk defendan pertama, beliau telah menggunakan ||Page 30>>buku cek yang terletak di atas buku cek yang lain dan dengan perkataan-perkataan ‘Akaun Anak Guam’. Oleh kerana perkataan-perkataan ‘Akaun Ditutup’ tidak diindorskan pada buku cek tersebut, beliau fikirkan adalah wajar untuk mengeluarkan cek tersebut dari akaun Bank Buruh. Pada 16 Februari 1996, plaintif menerima satu panggilan telefon dari Bank tersebut yang memaklumkan bahawa cek tersebut telah dikeluarkan dari akaun yang ditutup. Pada hari yang sama, beliau telah diberitahu oleh seorang bernama En Indran, seorang akauntan yang berkhidmat dengan firma defendan pertama bahawa ada masalah dengan cek tersebut. Pada hari yang sama, plaintif telah mengeluarkan cek ganti untuk jumlah yang sama, menulis sepucuk surat kepada En Indran, dan mencatatkan dalam surat tersebut bahawa ‘cek yang lebih awal telah dikeluarkan daripada akaun yang salah disebabkan kesilapan kerani’. Surat tersebut telah difaks kepada firma defendan pertama pada hari yang sama dan En Indran bersetuju dengan cadangan plaintif bahawa ia boleh mengirim cek tersebut tanpa mengira bahawa suatu jangka masa cuti sedang menghampiri. Pada 28 Februari 1996, plaintif mengirim surat bertarikh 16 Februari 1996 dan cek ganti kepada defendan pertama yang diterima oleh firmanya pada 1 Mac 1996. Walau bagaimanapun, pada 2 Mac 1996 defendan pertama telah mengeluarkan pernyataan akhbar antara lain mendakwa: bahawa kelakuan plaintif dalam mengeluarkan cek yang tidak dilayan tersebut adalah bersamaan dengan jenayah yang serius di bawah s 420 Kanun Keseksaan; kelakuan plaintif adalah mengaibkan dan menyebabkannya tidak layak didaftar sebagai Peguambela dan Peguamcara di negara

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ini; dan negara ini tidak harus mengiktiraf plaintif dalam profesyen guaman. Defendan kedua telah menerbitkan kandungan pernyataan akhbar dalam Sunday Star pada 3 Mac 1996 manakala defendan ketiga telah menerbitkan suatu rencana mengenainya dalam New Straits Times pada 5 Mac 1996. Pada 4 Mac 1996, plaintif telah menelefon En Indran yang mengesahkan bahawa beliau telah memberitahu defendan pertama mengenai penjelasan plaintif tentang kesilapan cek yang dikirim tersebut dan penggantian berikutnya dengan cek yang sah. Plaintif berhujah bahawa kelakuan semua defendan telah menjejaskan pendirian profesional, keperibadian, kebolehpercayaan dan reputasi beliau dan juga mengakibatkan rasa benci dan penghinaan terhadapnya dan mendakwa antara lain untuk ganti rugi untuk fitnah. Defendan pertama membangkitkan isu-isu berikut dalam pembelaan dan penghujahannya, antara lain: (i) bahawa plaintif tidak sepatutnya berurus dengan En Indran kerana ia bukan seorang peguam; (ii) kata-kata sebenar yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan akhbar tersebut yang tidak dikemukakan semula dalam suratkhabar ini adalah padah kepada kes plaintif; (iii) oleh kerana suatu terjemahan kata-kata tersebut dalam Bahasa Malaysia yang diakui sah tidak dikemukakan semasa perlangsungan prosiding, tuntutan plaintif harus ditolak; (iv) bahawa adalah perlu untuk beliau melaporkan kepada Majlis ||Page 31>>Peguam dan pihak polis; (v) mahkamah harus menggunakan prinsip dalam s 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan membuat inferens bertentangan terhadap plaintif kerana gagal memanggil En Indran untuk memberi keterangan. Defendan kedua berhujah bahawa kata-kata yang diterbitkan dalam Sunday Star tidak mungkin mempunyai maksud yang memfitnah atau dalam apa-apa kes adalah kurang serius disebabkan ketiadaan perkataan ‘menipu’. Defendan ketiga membangkitkan pembelaan justifikasi dan dalam penghujahan peguam berhujah bahawa kata-kata yang dipersoalkan mempunyai maksud yang berbeza. Defendan kedua dan ketiga juga menuntut tanggung rugi terhadap defendan pertama.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Mahkamah menerima penjelasan mengenai mengapakah plaintif telah mengeluarkan cek dari akaun anak guam Bank Buruh yang ditutup. Penjelasannya menunjukkan kesalahan yang tulen tanpa niat jahat untuk memperdayai atau menipu defendan pertama. Mengenai sama plaintif

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sepatutnya telah berurus dengan En Indran memandangkan En Indran bukan seorang peguam, ia hendaklah dianggap, dalam ketiadaan En Indran untuk memberi keterangan, bahawa beliau (En Indran) telah diberikuasa untuk berhubung dengan pihak yang mengeluarkan cek dan yang mana adalah dalam kedudukan yang seumpama plaintif. Selanjutnya oleh kerana plaintif digantung untuk sementara waktu dan bukan dalam amalan, plaintif bukanlah seorang peguam pada masa itu dan adalah mengikut aturan untuk plaintif berurus dengan En Indran (lihat ms 41B–D). (2) Kata-kata yang diterbitkan dalam kedua-dua Sunday Star and New Straits Times dalam maksud asal dan biasa bermakna bahawa plaintif telah melakukan kesalahan jenayah menipu di bawah s 420 Kanun Keseksaan. Ia juga bermakna bahawa plaintif bukanlah orang yang layak dan wajar bertindak sebagai peguamcara dan bahawa Majlis Peguam seharusnya, berlandas-kan alasan bahawa plaintif telah melakukan kesalahan jenayah demikian, membatalkan plaintif dari daftar sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Dengan memanggil plaintif seorang penipu yang telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah s 420 Kanun Keseksaan, defendan-defendan jelas telah menuduh bahawa plaintif adalah penjenayah yang tidak layak memegang profesyen peguambela dan peguamcara. Pernyataan seperti yang diterbitkan akan merendahkan plaintif dalam pendapat ahli-ahli masyarakat yang berfikiran adil pada amnya atau menyebabkan beliau disingkir atau dielakkan atau untuk mendedahkan beliau kepada perasaan benci, penghinaan atau cemuhan. Adalah melampaui keraguan bahawa kata-kata tersebut memang memfitnah (lihat ms 41E–F, 42D, F). (3) Penjelasan plaintif berhubung dengan kesilapan bona fide tidak dicabar dalam pemeriksaan balas oleh defendan-defendan ||Page 32>>dan ia tidak juga dikemukakan kepada plaintif bahawa ia telah bertindak tanpa kejujuran. Undang-undang menganggap kepalsuan kata-kata yang dinyatakan dan beban terletak pada defendan-defendan untuk menangkis kepalsuan kata-kata yang dinyatakan. Beban terletak pada defendan-defendan untuk menangkis anggapan tersebut dan mereka tidak berbuat demikian. Dengan itu, tohmahan yang dibuat terhadap plaintif atas

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penipuan dan kelakuan yang mengaibkan adalah tidak benar (lihat ms 42G–43A). (4) Defendan pertama memang berperasaan dengki. Keterangan plaintif bahawa En Indran telah memberitahunya bahawa beliau telah memaklumkan kepada defendan pertama bahawa cek pengganti telah pun diterima sebelum pernyataan akhbar tidak dipatah. Maka ia tidak dicabar bahawa defendan pertama memang sedar bahawa apabila beliau membuat pernyataan akhbar beliau tahu bahawa plaintif telah melakukan kesilapan yang tulen. Dalam aduannya kepada Lembaga Tatatertib, defendan pertama telah gagal melampirkan surat-menyurat yang menunjukkan ketulenan kesilapan plaintif. Bahkan dalam laporan polis, defendan pertama telah gagal menyebut banyak fakta material. Defendan pertama juga telah menahan fakta material ketika membuat pernyataan akhbar (lihat ms 43B–F). (5) Kesan fitnah sebagaimana yang ternyata dalam pernyataan akhbar terkandung dalam kedua-dua terbitan. Tiada keraguan bahawa rencana suratkhabar membawa kata sebenar defendan pertama dan dalam beberapa misalan mengulangi kata-kata defendan pertama dalam bentuk ucapan secara tidak langsung. Tiada keperluan untuk melaporkan setiap perkataan defendan pertama dalam terbitan tersebut. Defendan pertama tidak mendakwa bahawa mana-mana bahagian ucapannya yang penting telah tertinggal dan beliau tidak juga mendakwa bahawa bahagian yang tertinggal akan mengubahsuai maksud bahagian itu yang dihujahkan oleh plaintif memfitnahnya. Plaintif tidak dikehendaki membukti bahawa apa yang didakwa dalam pernyataan tuntutan adalah tepat-tepat apa yang telah dikatakan oleh defendan. Adalah memadai sekiranya plaintif membuktikan bahawa kata-kata yang diucapi oleh defendan pada dasarnya sama dengan kata yang diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan (lihat ms 43I–44B, G–H). (6) Sekiranya defendan memberi pernyataan akhbar untuk terbitan, atau dalam jangkaan bahawa ia akan diterbitkan, ia akan bertanggungan atas versi yang diterbitkan semula biarpun ia adalah versi yang telah disunting. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, defendan pertama bertanggungan sebagai penerbit fitnah dalam dua suratkhabar itu kerana beliau telah meminta, berusaha memperolehi atau

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membenarkan penerbitannya. Berlandaskan undang-undang mengenai terbitan semula, defendan pertama ||Page 33>>bertanggungjawab atas laporan suratkhabar sepenuhnya seolah olah beliau sendiri telah menerbitkan laporan tersebut (lihat ms 44I–45A, F–G). (7) Defendan pertama gagal melihat perbezaan di antara keperluan untuk terjemahan bulat-bulat dan terjemahan yang diakui sah. Dalam kes ini, plaintif memang telah menyediakan terjemahan bulat-bulat dalam Bahasa Malaysia dan andainya terjemahan demikian seperti yang dikemukakan oleh plaintif dipertikaikan, defendan pertama harus mengemukakan versi alternatif, yang gagal dilakukannya (lihat ms 46B-C). (8) Defendan pertama telah bertindak melampaui apa yang dikehendaki darinya dan Kaedah-Kaedah Profesyen Guaman (Amalan dan Etika) 1978 (‘Kaedah tersebut’). Walaupun defendan pertama betul dalam merujuk kepada Majlis Peguam, penjelasan plaintif akan menjustifikasikan ketidakperluan untuk merujuk hal tersebut kepada Majlis Peguam kerana kesilapan bona fide oleh seorang peguambela dan peguamcara tidak mungkin dijadikan dasar untuk mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadapnya. Dalam kes ini, defendan pertama bukan sahaja telah merujuk plaintif kepada Majlis Peguam bahkan menuduh plaintif telah melakukan kesalahan jenayah menipu di bawah s 420 Kanun Keseksaan. Seterusnya, Kaedah tersebut tidak memberi-kuasa kepada plaintif untuk membuat pernyataan akhbar. Pernyataan akhbar yang dibuat dalam keupayaan defendan pertama sebagai seorang ahli politik membayangkan pertelingkahan kepentingan dan bagaikan mengguna bantuan politik supaya memperolehi kelebihan yang tidak adil ke atas plaintif. Pembuatan pernyataan akhbar dan penyeruan penerbitannya menunjukkan takat perasaan defendan pertama yang bersifat dengki dan mencaci (lihat ms 46F–H, 47B–C). (9) Penghujahan defendan pertama mengenai inferens bertentangan terhadap plaintif tidak boleh diterima. Plaintif telah memberi keterangan bahawa En Indran telah menelefonnya terlebih dahulu dan telah mengesahkan perbualannya dengan En Indran secara bertulis, yang mana dokumen terletak dalam ikatan pliding. Plaintif tidak pernah diperiksa balas atas urusan yang berkaitan dengan

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En Indran. Justeru itu, setelah plaintif membuktikan urusan yang berkaitan dengan En Indran, beban mengalih kepada defendan pertama untuk memanggil En Indran, sekiranya beliau ingin mempertikaikan apa-apa keterangan (lihat ms 47D–E). (10) Walaupun defendan kedua telah mengelak dari menggunakan perkataan ‘menipu’, ini sekadar tafsiran ilmu makna. Kata-kata yang diterbitkan bersangkutan plaintif oleh defendan kedua apabila diberikan makna biasa menyifatkan bahawa plaintif memang telah melakukan kesalahan jenayah menipu di bawah s 420 Kanun Keseksaan dan bahawa atas alasan ini beliau tidak ||Page 34>>layak dan tidak wajar bertindak sebagai seorang peguam dan bahawa berdasarkan fakta ini Majlis Peguam seharusnya menyebabkan plaintif dibatalkan daripada daftar sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Untuk memburukkan lagi fitnah, defendan kedua telah menggunakan perkataan ‘ditendang’ (bounced) –– suatu istilah biasa yang lazim digunakan merendahkan pengeluar cek sebagai pihak yang tidak mempunyai apa-apa ketulusan kewangan (lihat ms 47G–48B). (11) Defendan kedua tidak berhak membangkitkan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat kerana pernyataan akhbar defendan pertama tidak dirangkumi oleh mana-mana kategori yang dirujuk dalam Bahagian 1 Jadual Akta Fitnah 1957. Unsur kepentingan awam yang merupakan suatu aspek pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat yang begitu mustahak langsung tidak wujud dalam kes ini. Defendan kedua telah gagal menilai perbezaan yang amat nyata dan penting di antara ‘apa yang orang awam meminati’ (that which the public is interested in) dan ‘apa yang merupakan kepentingan awam’ (that which is in the public interest). Kategori pertama bergantung pada sebahagian masyarakat awam dan pada mana mahkamah tidak akan memberi lindungan, manakala kategori kedua memelihara manfaat masyarakat awam dan pada mana mahkamah tentu akan memperluaskan perlindungan mereka (lihat ms 49C, E–F, H–I). (12) Defendan dalam suatu guaman fitnah tidak semestinya perlu memberi maksud kepada kata-kata yang diadu. Namun begitu, sekiranya defendan mengutarakan justifikasi, ia mesti menunjuk-kan dalam pembelaannya sama ada sebagai

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penegasan khusus, atau dalam butir-butir yang digunakan, maksud yang ingin dijustifikasikan olehnya. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, oleh kerana defendan ketiga tidak pun memohon kebenaran untuk meminda pembelaannya, ia memang menyerang plaintif secara tiba-tiba dengan menyifatkan kata-kata yang diadu, maksud yang berlainan dan dengan itu menyimpang secara radikal daripada pembelaan yang diplidkan. Di mana defendan memberikan maksud fitnah yang lain daripada apa yang dihujahkan oleh plaintif, dan cuba menjustifikasikan maksud berlainan demikian, ia mesti menyata-kan maksud yang ingin dijustifikasikan secara jelas (lihat ms 50E–F, 51B). (13) Serangan defendan pertama ke atas keperibadian plaintif kononnya berlandaskan sabitan adalah suatu kesalahan yang amat serius. Defendan pertama tidak pun menegaskan di mana-mana dalam pliding bahawa ia cuba mengurangkan ganti rugi atas alasan bahawa plaintif adalah pelakon dalam video lucah. Namun demikian, walaupun plaintif telah dibebaskan atas kesalahan yang paling serius, defendan pertama gagal meminda plidingnya. Dalam ketiadaan apa-apa pemindaan, adalah tidak adil dan wajar untuk mahkamah menimbang keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan ||Page 35>>yang lebih awal bahawa plaintif adalah seorang pelakon lelaki dalam video lucah. Andainya defendan-defendan berhasrat menurut keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa plaintif adalah pelakon dalam video lucah, biarpun tiada pemindaan telah dipohon, dengan kebenaran mahkamah defendan-defendan sepatutnya telah memohon untuk memeriksa balas plaintif atas tohmahan itu, dengan menunjukkan kepada mahkamah bahawa tujuan pemeriksaan balas adalah untuk mengurangkan ganti rugi (lihat ms 51H–52A, D–E). (14) Defendan pertama cuba mengemukakan suatu petikan tertentu daripada penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan sebagai keterangan dalam kes ini. Namun demikian, kewujudan penghakiman tersebut tidak merupakan suatu fakta yang dipersoalkan dalam kes ini. Pengemukaan suatu penghakiman yang lebih awal cuma membuktikan kewujudan keputusan yang dibuat terlebih dahulu dan tiada anggapan bahawa suatu penghakiman yang dibuat terlebih dahulu adalah keputusan yang betul tentang perkara tersebut. Tiada apa-apa dalam Akta

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Keterangan untuk mewajarkan kesimpulan bahawa pernyataan atau keputusan fakta dalam kes yang lain boleh digunakan sebagai keterangan dalam kes yang berikut untuk memutuskan pandangan yang dipersoalkan dalam kes berikut (lihat ms 53G, 54D, G–H). (15) Sebarang keterangan berkaitan dengan keperibadian plaintif mestilah dihadkan kepada perkarangan tertentu kehidupan atau keperibadian beliau yang telah difitnah. Berdasarkan fakta-fakta, ia tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa fitnah yang didakwa mempunyai apa-apa kaitan dengan keputusan fakta yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan berhubung dengan persembahan plaintif sebagai seorang pelakon lucah dalam suatu video (lihat ms 55H–I, 56A–B). (16) Dalam menaksir ganti rugi pampasan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Tinggi telah menimbang faktor-faktor berikut: (i) penderitaan dan kecederaan peribadi yang dialami oleh plaintif dan isterinya yang hamil; (ii) bahawa pendirian profesional plaintif telah terjejas; (iii) aduan defendan pertama kepada Majlis Peguam dan Lembaga Tatatertib; (iv) laporan polis defendan pertama; (v) pendirian sosial pihak yang terlibat; dan (vi) kegagalan melarat defendan kedua dan ketiga untuk menentusah sebelum penerbitan. Dengan mengambil kira segala faktor, plaintif harus diawardkan jumlah sebanyak RM250,000 sebagai ganti rugi pampasan terhadap defendan pertama. Berhubung dengan defendan kedua dan ketiga pula, plaintif harus diawardkan jumlah sebanyak RM100,000 terhadap setiap satu mereka (lihat ms 56H–58G). (17) Dalam menaksir ganti rugi melampau (aggravated), mahkamah harus menimbang faktor-faktor berikut: (i) kelakuan defendan pertama; (ii) penindasan fakta-fakta material oleh defendan ||Page 36>>pertama; (iii) pengulangan fitnah oleh defendan pertama; (iv) pendirian plaintif sebagai seorang peguam terjejas; (v) defendan pertama tidak menunjukkan sebarang kesalan atau membuat apa-apa permohonan maaf; (vi) kegagalan defendan kedua dan ketiga untuk menentusah sebelum penerbitan; (vi) keengganan defendan kedua dan ketiga untuk memberi sesalinan pernyataan akhbar defendan pertama kepada plaintif meskipun permintaan telah dibuat berulang kali; (vii) kegagalan defendan kedua dan ketiga untuk menerbitkan permohonan maaf. Setelah menimbang segala faktor,

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plaintif harus diberikan award jumlah sebanyak RM250,000 terhadap defendan pertama dan jumlah sebanyak RM100,000 terhadap defendan kedua dan ketiga setiap seseorang (lihat ms 58G–61C). (18) Tuntutan plaintif untuk ganti rugi teladan terhadap defendan-defendan telah gagal. Defendan kedua dan ketiga harus bertanggungjawab atas kelakuan mereka. Oleh itu, tuntutan mereka untuk tanggung rugi juga gagal (lihat ms 62A–B).]

Notes For cases on failure to call witness, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 116–129. For a case on complaint against a solicitor, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) para 1453. For cases on libel in newspapers, see 10 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 792–798. For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Abdullah Sani bin Hashim v Sharma Kumari Guaman Sivil No S2(S5)–23–08–1998(2) (refd) Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 577 (refd) Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) DP Vijandran v PP [1999] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) Gopalkrishna Gupthan v Ammalu Ammal AIR 1972 Ker 196 (refd) Hassan & Anor v Wan Ishak [1961] MLJ 45 (refd) Kumar Gopika Raman v Atal Singh AIR 1929 PC 99 (refd) Lim Kit Siang v Datuk Dr Ling Leong Sik & Ors [1997] 5 MLJ 523 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd)

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Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] 1 All ER 876 (refd) PP v Tan Koon Swan [1987] 1 MLJ 18 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) ||Page 37>> Sadasiba Panda v Bansidhar Sahu AIR 1962 Orissa 115 (refd) Samrathmal v Emperor AIR 1932 Nagpur 158 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Pencetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too [1975] 1 MLJ 47 (refd) YK Fung Securities Sdn Bhd v James Capel [1997] 2 MLJ 621 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 12, 12(3) Evidence Act 1950 ss 40, 41, 42, 43, 55, 114(g) Legal Profession Act 1976 s 88A Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 Penal Code ss 193, 420 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 92 r 1

DP Vijandran (K Raja Segaran, Hasnal Rezua Merican and CK Cham with him) (DP Vijandran & Associates) for the plaintiff. Karpal Singh (M Manoharan with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the first defendant. Bhag Singh (Bhag Sulaiman & Co) for the second defendant. Lorraine Cheah (MK Yee with him) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the third defendant.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case(6)

Cur Adv Vult

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[2000] 3 MLJ 684 Ummi Hafilda bte Ali & Anor v Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2 (S5)–23–38 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 30 MARCH 2000

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article does not carry full name of second plaintiff — Extrinsic facts to article conclude that article refers to second plaintiff — Whether statement of claim should be struck out

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had caused to be published, printed and distributed an article that the first plaintiff was married to one Khairuddin, the nephew of Suleiman Palestin, a former UMNO leader. The second plaintiff contended that he is the person named therein. The defendants applied to strike out the second plaintiff’s statement of claim and that the suit against them be dismissed pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’). The learned senior assistant registrar refused the application and hence this appeal. The plaintiffs alleged that by the article, the defendants meant and were understood to mean that both the plaintiffs had eloped to get married and that their reputation as a businesswoman and a businessman has been brought into disrepute, odium and contempt. The defendants argued that the mere mention of the word ‘Khairuddin’ could not amount to a pointed reference to the second plaintiff (Khairuddin Abu Hassan).

Held, dismissing the appeal: Notwithstanding the fact that the article did not carry the full name of the second

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plaintiff, there were sufficient matters in the pleadings referring to matters of fact extrinsic to the article that lead the court to conclude that the article did in fact refer to the second plaintiff or was capable in law of referring to him (see p 689A–B). There was clear reference to the Khairuddin who was supposed to have married the first plaintiff, as being the nephew of Sulaiman Palestin, the former UMNO leader. The second plaintiff had admitted in the statement of claim that he was indeed the nephew of Sulaiman Palestin, the former UMNO leader. There was also a further reference in the article to this marriage having taken place at Khairuddin’s home in a village called Kampung Kebun Sireh near Bukit Mertajam; and Khairuddin has admitted that he hailed from this village (see p 688G–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan kerana fitnah. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan-defendan telah menyebabkan ||Page 685>>supaya diterbitkan, dicetak dan diedarkan satu rencana bahawa defendan pertama telah berkahwin dengan seorang bernama Khairuddin, anak saudara Suleiman Palestin, seorang bekas ketua UMNO. Plaintif kedua menegaskan bahawa beliau adalah orang yang dinamakan di dalamnya. Defendan-derfendan telah memohon untuk membatalkan pernyataan tuntutan plaintif kedua dan supaya guaman terhadap mereka ditolak selaras dengan A 18 k 19(1)(a) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’). Penolong Kanan Pendaftar yang arif telah menolak permohonan tersebut dan dengan itu menyebabkan rayuan ini. Plaintif-plaintif tersebut mendakwa bahawa dengan rencana itu, defendan bermaksud dan telah difahami sebagai bermaksud bahawa kedua-dua plaintif-plaintif tersebut telah lari untuk berkahwin dan bahawa reputasi mereka sebagai ahli peniaga telah dikeji, dibenci dan dihina. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa sebutan perkataan ‘Khairuddin’ sahaja tidak boleh membawa kepada suatu rujukan yang ditujukan kepada plaintif kedua (Khairuddin Abu Hassan).

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut:

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Meskipun terdapatnya fakta bahawa rencana tersebut tidak menyebut nama penuh plaintif kedua, terdapat perkara-perkara yang mencukupi di dalam pliding-pliding tersebut yang merujuk kepada perkara-perkara fakta yang luar daripada rencana tersebut yang menyebabkan mahkamah memutuskan bahawa rencana tersebut tidak pada hakikatnya merujuk kepada plaintif kedua atau berkebolehan di sisi undang-undang untuk merujuk kepada beliau (lihat ms 689A–B). Terdapat rujukan yang jelas kepada Khairuddin yang diandaikan telah berkahwin dengan plaintif pertama, sebagai merupakan anak saudara Sulaiman Palestin, bekas ketua UMNO. Plaintif kedua telah mengakui dalam pernyataan tuntutan bahawa beliau adalah sesungguhnya anak saudara Sulaiman Palestin, bekas ketua UMNO tersebut. Terdapat juga rujukan selanjutnya dalam rencana tersebut kepada perkahwinan ini yang telah berlangsung di kediaman Khairuddin di sebuah kampung yang dikenali sebagai Kampung Kebun Sireh berdekatan Bukit Mertajam; dan Khairuddin telah mengakui bahawa beliau berasal daripada kampung ini (lihat ms 688G–H).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 (refd) ||Page 686>>

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(a)

John Clark Sumugod (Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the plaintiffs. Haris Ibrahim (Nurul Akmar bte Omar (Haris & Co) for the defendants.

Cur Adv Vult

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[2000] 4 MLJ 77 Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun

FEDERAL COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEALS NO 02–6 OF 1995(W), 02–5 OF 1995(W) AND 02–2 OF 1996(W) CHIEF JUSTICE, WAN ADNAN CJ (MALAYA) AND CHONG SIEW FAI CJ (SABAH AND SARAWAK) 12 JANUARY 1998

Defamation — Libel — Assessment of damages — Whether excessive and erroneous — Apology tendered — Cross-examination of plaintiff at trial aggravated libel — Whether awards of damages in defamation cases can be equated with awards of damages in personal injury cases

In a libel action brought against the appellants, the High Court awarded RM2m against the first appellant as general and aggravated damages; RM3m as general damages against the second appellant, and RM2m as general damages against the third appellant (see [1995] 1 MLJ 39). The Court of Appeal had upheld the awards made by the High Court (see [1995] 2 MLJ 493). The appellants appealed. They argued that the awards were excessive and ought to be reduced.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The court found that the awards made by the judge and affirmed by the Court of Appeal were reasonable in the circumstances and were based on established principles of law. The appellants had failed to show that the trial judge had

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acted on a wrong principle of law or had misapprehended the facts or had made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. Therefore the awards were not erroneous or excessive to warrant any interference by the court (see p 86G–H). (2) Awards of damages in defamation cases cannot be equated with awards of damages in personal injury cases. In personal injury cases, there is no intention to cause harm or damage to the plaintiff. In defamation cases, the defendant intentionally publishes the injurious false statement to cause humiliation and anguish to the plaintiff and to injure his reputation. The award of damages given to the plaintiff in a defamation case serves as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as a consolation to him for a wrong done (see pp 82F–G, H, 83A). (3) While an apology may be taken into consideration in assessing an award, in this case counsel for the appellants had by cross-examining the plaintiff at the trial had further aggravated the libel by insisting the truth of the defamatory publication. Further, no apology, retraction or withdrawal can ever be guaranteed completely to undo the harm the libel has done or the hurt it has caused (see p 85A–B). ||Page 78>> (4) Freedom of speech is not an absolute right and is not a licence to defame people. It is subject to legal restrictions. Every person has a right to reputation and that right ought to be protected by law (see p 85E–F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Di dalam suatu tindakan libel yang dibawa terhadap perayu-perayu, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengawardkan RM2 juta terhadap perayu pertama sebagai ganti rugi awam dan ganti rugi teruk; RM3 juta sebagai ganti rugi am terhadap perayu kedua; dan RM2 juta sebagai ganti rugi am terhadap perayu ketiga (lihat [1995] 1 MLJ 39). Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengesahkan award-award yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Tinggi (lihat [1995] 2 MLJ 493). Perayu telah merayu. Mereka menghujahkan bahawa award-award

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tersebut adalah melampau dan patut dikurangkan.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Mahkamah mendapati bahawa award-award yang dibuat oleh hakim tersebut dan disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan adalah munasabah di dalam keadaan-keadaan tersebut dan adalah berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip yang kukuh. Perayu-perayu gagal untuk menunjukkan bahawa hakim perbicaraan telah bertindak mengikut prinsip undang-undang yang salah atau telah salah faham akan fakta-fakta atau membuat anggaran yang salah akan kerugian yang dialami. Oleh itu, award-award tersebut bukanlah silap atau melampau untuk menjustifikasikan campur-tangan oleh mahkamah (lihat ms 86G–H). (2) Award-award ganti rugi di dalam kes-kes fitnah tidak boleh disamakan dengan award-award ganti rugi di dalam kes-kes kecederaan peribadi. Di dalam kes-kes kecederaan peribadi, tiada niat untuk menyebabkan bahaya atau kerugian kepada plaintif. Di dalam kes-kes fitnah, defendan telah secara sengaja menerbitkan kenyataan salah yang menyakitkan untuk menyebabkan kesakitan dan memalukan plaintif dan untuk menjejaskan reputasinya. Award ganti rugi yang diberikan kepada plaintif di dalam kes fitnah bertujuan menyangkal pandangan awam terhadap plaintif dan bertindak untuk menyenangkannya atas kesalahan yang dilakukannya (lihat ms 82F–G, H, 83A). (3) Sementara suatu kemaafan boleh dipertimbangkan di dalam menaksirkan award, di dalam kes ini peguam untuk perayu-perayu telah melalui pemeriksaan balas plaintif semasa perbicaraan memburukkan lagi libel tersebut dengan menegaskan kebenaran penerbitan fitnah tersebut. Selanjutnya, tiada kemaafan, penarikbalikan boleh dijamin sepenuhnya untuk memperbaiki kesan buruk libel yang telah dilakukan atau kesakitan yang diakibatkannya (lihat ms 85A–B). ||Page 79>> (4) Kebebasan bersuara bukanlah suatu hak mutlak dan ia bukanlah hak untuk memfitnahkan orang. Ia tertakluk kepada sekatan-sekatan undang-undang. Semua orang mempunyai hak reputasi dan hak tersebut patutlah dilindungi undang-undang (lihat ms 85E–F).]

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Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Associated Leisure Ltd (Phonographic Equipment Co Ltd) & Ors v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1970] 2 QB 450 (refd) Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1964] AC 371 (refd) Baltrop v Canadian Corp (1978) 86 DLR 61 (refd) Blackshaw v Lord & Anor [1984] 1 QB 1 (refd) Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome & Anor [1972] 1 All ER 801 (refd) Sutcliffe v Pressdam Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153 (refd) Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 269 (refd) Dato’ Musa bin Hitam v SH Alattas & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ 314 (refd) Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 (refd) Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601 (refd) Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors [1964] AC 371 (refd) Hayward v Thompson & Ors [1981] 3 All ER 450 (refd) Humphries v TWT Ltd (1993) 120 ALR 693 (refd) Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew & Anor [1992] 2 SLR 310 (refd) John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 (refd) Mahmod bin Kailan v Goh Seng Choon & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 239 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Smiths Newspaper Ltd & Anor v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279 (refd) Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun v Haji Hasan bin Hamzah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ

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39 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 18 Federal Constitution art 10

Apparao Apana (KC Yap Kamaluddin & Partners) for the forst appellant. Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo and Gobind Singh Deo with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the second appellant. Shamsul Bahrain (Skrine & Co) for the third and fourth appellants. ||Page 80>>

VK Lingam (Adam Bachek and W Satchithnandhan with him) (Adam Bachek & Associates) for the respondent.

[2000] 4 MLJ 120 Mohamed Azwan bin Haji Ali v Sistem Televisyen (M) Bhd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUMMONS NO S2(S3)–23–33 OF 1998 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 3 JULY 2000

Defamation — Slander — Alleged remarks made against public personality — Words spoken in jest in light entertainment programme — Whether defamatory in its natural and ordinary meaning or carry any secondary meaning or innuendo — Whether remarks fair comment

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 306

The plaintiff brought this action for libel against the defendants as the broadcaster, owner, the producer and maker of the defamatory statements in the programme called ‘Melodi’ aired by the first defendant. The fourth defendant in one of the segment of the programme had uttered ‘kau ni nak jadi macam Azwan Alilah menangis sebab Ziana Zain kahwin!’. In his amended pleadings, the plaintiff claimed that the word ‘menangis’ gives the impression to the public that the plaintiff was ‘hysterical’ when Ziana Zain married and hence it was the use of the word ‘menangis’ that had allegedly caused the plaintiff embarrassment and humiliation.

Held, dismissing the claim: (1) The plaintiff’s contention that ‘menangis’ means that he was ‘hysterical’ (melalak) is totally unsupported by any evidence (see p 125H). The plaintiff had amended the pleadings and substituted the word ‘melalak’ to read ‘menangis’. Whilst the fourth defendant had never used the word ‘melalak’ in the relevant segment of the ‘Melodi’ programme, the fact that the plaintiff had amended his pleadings to denote that the word used was ‘menangis’ and not ‘melalak’ ought to have indicated to the plaintiff that he ought not to have pursued with his arguments (see p 126B–C). (2) Public personalities ought to accept the fact that their lives are not confined within the cloistered walls of their own hermitage. Public personalities must accept the ‘buffets and blows’ that come with fame (see pp 126I–127A). Since the programme ‘Melodi’ in itself is a light entertainment programme, the said words were words spoken in jest and therefore not defamatory of the plaintiff (see p 127D). When the plaintiff makes such a public announcement of his intention to propose marriage to someone, surely he must accept the fact that when the object of his desire had turned him down, he must be ready to accept public comment either in the press or on TV. Any matter brought before the public so as to invite public criticism on it may be commented upon (see p 128C–D). ||Page 121>> (3) The whole statement was not defamatory when looked upon in its natural and ordinary meaning. The statements also did not carry any secondary meaning or

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innuendo because the whole statement was not derogatory and was not an attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff, nor did it attack the plaintiff in his professional capacity as an artiste (see p 127G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah membawa tindakan libel ini terhadap defendan-defendan sebagai penyiar, pemilik, penerbit dan pembuat kenyataan fitnah di dalam rancangan yang dipanggil ‘Melodi’ yang disiarkan oleh defendan pertama. Defendan keempat di dalam salah satu segmen rancangan tersebut telah berkata ‘kau ni nak jadi macam Azwan Alilah menangis sebab Ziana Zain kahwin!’. Di dalam pliding pindaannya, plaintif telah menuntut bahawa perkataan ‘menangis’ memberikan pandangan kepada orang awam bahawa plaintif diserang ‘histeria’ (melalak) apabila Ziana Zain berkahwin dan dengan itu penggunaan perkataan ‘menangis’ dikatakan telah menyebabkan plaintif berasa malu dan terhina.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut: (1) Penegasan plaintif bahawa ‘menangis’ berrmaksud bahawa beliau diserang ‘histeria’ (melalak) tidak disokong oleh sebarang keterangan (lihat ms 125H). Plaintif telah meminda plidingnya dan menggantikan perkataaan ‘melalak’ untuk dibaca sebagai ‘menangis’. Oleh kerana defendan keempat tidak pernah menggunakan perkataan ‘melalak’ di dalam segmen yang berkaitan di dalam rancangan ‘Melodi’, fakta bahawa plaintif telah meminda pliding-plidingnya untuk menunjukkan bahawa perkataan yang digunakan adalah ‘menangis’ dan bukan ‘melalak’ sepatutnya menunjukkan kepada plaintif bahawa beliau tidak patut meneruskan dengan hujahannya (lihat ms 126B–C). (2) Personaliti awam sepatutnya menerima hakikat bahawa hidup mereka tidak disekat oleh sempadan yang mereka bina sendiri. Personaliti awam mestilah menerima kutukan dan kritikan yang seiring dengan kemasyhuran mereka (lihat ms 126I–127A). Oleh kerana rancangan ‘Melodi’ itu sendiri adalah rancangan hiburan ringan, perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah diucapkan secara kelakar

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dan dengan itu tidak memfitnah plaintif (lihat ms 127D). Apabila plaintif membuat pengumuman awam tentang niatnya untuk melamar seseorang, beliau mestilah menerima hakikat bahawa apabila wanita idamannya enggan menerima, beliau mestilah bersedia untuk menerima komen awam sama ada di dalam akhbar atau TV. Sebarang perkara yang dikemukakan kepada orang awam sehinggakan mengundang kritikan awam boleh diberikan komen (lihat ms 128C–D). ||Page 122>> (3) Keseluruhan kenyataan tersebut bukanlah fitnah apabila melihat maksudnya yang semulajadi dan biasa. Kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut juga tidak membawa sebarang maksud sekunder atau sindiran oleh kerana kenyataan secara menyeluruh bukanlah menghina dan bukanlah serangan ke atas sifat moral plaintif, atau menyerang plaintif di dalam kapisiti profesionalnya sebagai seorang artis (lihat ms 127G).]

Notes For cases on slander generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 386–394.

Cases referred to Abdul Karim bin Ayob v Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 1 MLJ 243 (refd) Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) Glass v Perl [1929] TPD 264 (refd) Payne v Sheffield [1882] 2 EDC 166 (refd) Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v Shaik Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 3 MLJ 529 (refd) Warren v Green [1958] DLR 255 (refd) Willows v Williams [1951] 2 WWR (NS) 657 (refd)

John Clark Sumugod (Low Beng Choo with him) (Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the

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plaintiff. Looi Pek Hong (PH Looi & Co) for the first, second and third defendants. Hermes Ibrahim (Iszam Kamal bin Ismail and Harriri bin Mohd Noor) with him) (Iszam Kamal & Harriri) for the fourth defendant.

[2000] 4 MLJ 727 Insas Bhd & Anor v Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2(S1)–23–67 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 7 JULY 2000

Civil Procedure — Judicial precedent — International Court of Justice — Advisory opinion of International Court of Justice on immunity of special rapporteur — Whether binding on court

Tort — Defamation — Defence of immunity — Special rapporteur of United Nations commission — Words spoken or written during performance of mission as special rapporteur — Agreement to refer question of immunity for advisory opinion to International Court of Justice — Whether decision of International Court of Justice binding on court

The plaintiff instituted defamation proceedings against the defendant in relation to an article which appeared in the International Commercial Litigation magazine under the caption ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. The defendant argued that he had total immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written in the course of the performance of his mission as the special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers of the United Nations commission on human rights. The Government of Malaysia and the United Nations by consent agreed to refer the question of the

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defendant’s immunity for an advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). The ICJ ruled that the question of immunity from legal process ought to be decided as a preliminary issue. It also ruled that the defendant enjoyed such immunity. The defendant took out a summons under O 12 r 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for an order that the writ of summons be set aside and/or struck out and/or permanently stayed with costs. The senior assistant registrar dismissed the defendant’s application and ordered the defendant to enter his defence. The defendant appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Whilst this court might disagree with certain aspects of the decision of the ICJ, the decisive acceptance of the ICJ’s ruling by the parties prevailed in respect of this case because the parties had specifically agreed to refer this case for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. The court was bound to give binding effect to the advisory opinion in this case. Therefore the court would set aside the decision of the senior assistant registrar and allow the appeal. This case should not be treated as a set precedent for all future cases (see p 735E–F, H–I). (2) Considering the fact that the defendant had breached the basic law of failing to give the right to be heard to the plaintiffs or their lawyer or the judiciary before he ventured into giving the press statements, the court found that an order directing each party to bear its own costs would serve the ends of justice (see p 736B, F). ||Page 728>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah memulakan prosiding fitnah terhadap defendan berhubung dengan satu artikel yang disiarkan di dalam majalah International Commercial Litigation di bawah kapsyen ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa beliau mempunyai kekebalan menyeluruh daripada proses perundangan berhubung dengan perkataan-perkataan yang disebut atau ditulis dalam proses pelaksanaan tugas beliau sebagai pelapor khas mengenai kebebasan hakim-hakim dan peguam-peguam

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Suruhanjaya Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu berkenaan hak kemanusiaan. Kerajaan Malaysia dan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu telah bersetuju untuk merujuk persoalan mengenai kekebalan defendan berhubung pendapat penasihat kepada Mahkamah Kehakiman Antarabangsa (‘ICJ’). ICJ memutuskan bahawa persoalan mengenai kekebalan daripada proses perundangan sepatutnya diputuskan sebagai satu isu permulaan. Ia juga telah memutuskan bahawa defendan menikmati kekebalan sedemikian. Defendan telah memulakan satu saman di bawah A 12 k 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 bagi satu perintah agar writ saman diketepikan dan/atau dibatalkan dan/atau digantung selamanya dengan kos. Penolong pendaftar kanan menolak permohonan defendan dan memerintahkan defendan memasukkan pembelaan beliau. Defendan telah membuat rayuan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut: (1) Meskipun mahkamah ini mungkin tidak bersetuju dengan beberapa aspek keputusan ICJ, penerimaan muktamad keputusan ICJ oleh pihak-pihak tersebut kekal berhubung dengan kes ini kerana pihak-pihak tersebut telah bersetuju secara khusus untuk merujuk kes ini kepada pendapat penasihat daripada ICJ. Mahkamah terikat untuk memberikan kesan yang mengikat terhadap pendapat penasihat di dalam kes ini. Oleh demikian, mahkamah akan mengetepikan keputusan penolong pendaftar kanan dan membenarkan rayuan tersebut. Kes ini tidak patut dijadikan satu set duluan untuk kes-kes masa hadapan (lihat ms 735E–F, H–I). (2) Dengan mempertimbangkan hakikat bahawa defendan telah melanggar undang-undang asas kerana gagal untuk memberikan hak untuk didengari kepada plaintif-plaintif atau peguam mereka atau kehakiman sebelum beliau berusaha memberikan kenyataan-kenyataan akhbar, mahkamah mendapati bahawa satu perintah mengarahkan setiap pihak untuk menanggung kos masing-masing adalah adil (lihat ms 736B, F).]

Notes For cases on judicial precedent generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 2806–2831.

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||Page 729>> For a case on defence of immunity, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) para 224.

Cases referred to Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy v MBf Capital Bhd & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 824 (refd)

Legislation referred to Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ss 22(b), 30, 34 of art VI International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 s 7(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7

Porres P Royan (Trevor George De Silva) for the appellant/defendant. V Sivaparanjothi (S Rutheran and Ashokvijay J Sanghrajka with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the respondents/plaintiffs.

[2000] 5 MLJ 191 Tan Sri Abdul Rahim bin Datuk Thamby Chik v John Marcom & Ors (No 2)

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S4–23–51 OF 1998 RAHMAH HUSSAIN J 25 OCTOBER 1999

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — High Court — Writ served on defendant in Malaysia

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—Whether conferred jurisdiction on High Court of Malaya — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 11 r 1 — Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 23(2)

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Civil jurisdiction of the High Court — Defamatory article written outside Malaysia —Publication containing article circulated in Malaysia —Whether cause of action arose in Malaysia

The plaintiff sued the defendants for libel for an article published in The TIME Magazine. The fourth defendant did not dispute that the article was written by him. He applied to set aside the writ of summons against him claiming that pursuant to s 23(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (‘the CJA’), the court had no jurisdiction over him as the cause of action did not arise in Malaysia as he wrote the article in Jakarta, Indonesia and sent a draft of it to Hong Kong. He also contended that the mere service of the writ on him while he was in Malaysia, did not automatically confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Malaya. His application was dismissed by the senior assistant registrar and he appealed to the judge.

Held, dismissing the fourth defendant’s appeal with costs: (1) Service alone pursuant to O 11 r 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 was not the sole basis of jurisdiction as s 23(2) of the CJA conferred extra-territorial accreditation to the High Court. The position in respect of the High Court prior to Malaysia Day was that the service upon a defendant present in Malaysia was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the High Court. After Malaysia Day, by virtue of s 23(2) of the CJA, the High Court continued to exercise its jurisdiction over those served with proceedings whilst they were in Malaysia even if their presence was temporary in nature (see pp 194F–195G); American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 and Malayan Banking Bhd v International Tin Council and another appeal [1989] 3 MLJ 286 followed. (2) The cause of action for the tort of defamation was committed where the defamatory publication was read, seen or heard. The fourth defendant as the author of the article was thus liable for its publication on the basis of the

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principles of joint publication and/or authorized repetition. The cause of action in respect of the fourth defendant arose in Malaysia because the article was written by him with the intention and knowledge that it would be published in Malaysia. Further, the fourth defendant did not ||Page 192>>challenge the averments in the plaintiff’s statement of claim that the article written by him was published in Malaysia and that he knew and intended the article to be published in Malaysia (see p 195G–H).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah menyaman defendan-defendan untuk libel bagi suatu rencana yang diterbitkan di dalam The TIME Magazine. Defendan keempat tidak mempertikaikan bahawa rencana telah ditulis olehnya. Beliau memohon untuk mengetepikan writ saman terhadapnya dengan mendakwa bahawa menurut s 23(1)(a) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (‘AMK’), mahkamah tiada bidang kuasa ke atasnya kerana kausa tindakan tidak timbul di Malaysia oleh kerana beliau menulis rencana tersebut di Jakarta, Indonesia dan telah menhantar deraf tersebut ke Hong Kong. Beliau juga menegaskan bahawa penyerahan writ kepadanya semat-mata semasa beliau berada di Malaysia, tidak secara automatik memberikan bidang kuasa kepada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya. Permohonannya telah ditolakkan oleh penolong kanan pendaftar dan beliau merayu kepada hakim tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan defendan keempat dengan kos: (1) Penyerahan sahaja menurut A 11 k 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 bukanlah dasar tunggal bidang kuasa oleh kerana s 23(2) AMK telah memberikan kuasa pentauliahan wilayah yang lebih kepada Mahkamah Tinggi. Kedudukan berkenaan dengan Mahkamah Tinggi sebelum Hari Malaysia adalah bahawa penyampaian ke atas defendan yang hadir di Malaysia adalah mencukupi untuk memberikan bidang kuasa Mhakamah Tinggi. Selepas Hari Malaysia, menurut s 23(2) AMK, Mahkamah Tinggi terus melaksanakan bidang kuasanya ke atas mereka yang disampaikan dengan prosiding pada masa

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mereka berada di Malaysia walaupun kehadiran mereka adalah berbentuk sementara (lihat ms 194F–195G); American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 dan Malayan Banking Bhd v International Tin Council and another appeal [1989] 3 MLJ 286 diikuti. (2) Kausa tindakan untuk tort fitnah telah dilakukan apabila penerbitan fitnah dibaca, dilihat atau didengar. Defendan keempat sebagai penulis rencana adalah bertanggungan untuk penerbitannya atas dasar prinsip penerbitan bersama dan/atau pengulangan yang diberi kuasa. Kausa tindakan berkenaan dengan defendan keempat timbul di Malaysia oleh kerana rencana tersebut ditulis olehnya dengan niat dan pengetahuan bahawa ia akan diterbitkan di Malaysia. Selanjutnya, defendan keempat tidak mencabar penegasan di dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif bahawa rencana yang ditulisnya telah diterbitkan di ||Page 193>>Malaysia dan bahawa beliau tahu dan berniat rencana tersebut diterbitkan di Malaysia (lihat ms 195G–H).]

Notes For cases on jurisdiction of the High Court, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1999 Reissue) paras 3069–3070. For cases on liable generally see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 160 (folld) HRH Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 QB 283 (refd) Lee Teck Chee & Anor v Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd [1998] 4 CLJ 188 (refd) Malayan Banking Bhd v International Tin Council and another appeal [1989] 3 MLJ 286 (folld)

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Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 23(1)(a), (2), 24 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7(1)

Firoz Hussein (Puthucheary Firoz & Asmet) for the plaintiff. Darryl Goon (Raja, Darryl & Loh) for the fourth defendant.

[2000] 5 MLJ 465 Thiruchelvasegaram a/l Manickavasegar v Mahadevi a/p Nadchatiram

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUITS NOS S2(S5)–23–04 OF 1997 AND S5–23–08 OF 1997 JAMES FOONG J 22 JANUARY 2000

Tort — Conspiracy —Conspiracy to defame —Allegation of incest —Agreement to conspire — Whether proved

Tort — Defamation — Allegation of incest — General plea, whether acceptable — Whether incest proved — Submissions made in course of legal proceedings, whether protected by absolute privilege — Statements expunged from court’s record, whether statements defamatory — Utterance in court house while not in session, whether entitled to absolute privilege — Slander against profession, whether need proof of damage — Whether tort of conspiracy proved — Publication to plaintiff’s servant and/or agent, whether merely seeking clarification — Statement on last page of service copy of writ, whether defence of confidentiality and non publication valid

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Tort — Defamation — Libel and slander — Allegation of incest — General plea, whether acceptable — Whether incest proved — Submissions made in course of legal proceedings, whether protected by absolute privilege — Statements expunged from court’s record, whether statements defamatory — Utterance in court house while not in session, whether entitled to absolute privilege — Slander against profession, whether need proof of damage — Whether tort of conspiracy proved — Publication to plaintiff’s servant and/or agent, whether merely seeking clarification — Statement on last page of service copy of writ, whether defence of confidentiality and non publication valid

The plaintiff and the defendant are both advocates and solicitors. The plaintiff is the brother-in-law of the defendant, having married the defendant’s eldest sister, Vijayalakshmi. The plaintiff has a daughter, Shanti. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant conspired with her brother (Jega), sister (Saraswathy) and Shanti to defame him. The sting of the defamation was incest by the plaintiff on Shanti. The defamation was said to be contained in: (1) the submission of the defendant to the judge in a civil suit filed by Vijayalakshmi against the defendant; (2) utterance in the court house when the court was not in session; (3) the letter written by Jega to Vijayalakshmi’s solicitor; (4) the letter from the defendant’s solicitors’ firm addressed to the plaintiff’s legal company; (5) remarks written by Shanti contained in an acknowledgement copy of the plaintiff’s letter; (6) the writing on the back of the last page of the serving copy of the writ; (7) the writing on the back of a letter of demand for an apology; and (8) statutory declaration made by Shanti. The plaintiff claimed that the words stated imputed him to be a person of low morals, who had committed the sexual crime of incest and has discredited him and exposed him to hatred, contempt and ridicule in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. The defendant pleaded, inter-alia, the defence of absolute and qualified privileged, justification and non-publication. After setting out the substantive defences, the defendant pleaded a general plea. ||Page 466>>

Held: (1) In a defamation suit, it is well settled that a defendant must expressly plead the

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particular defence he wishes to rely on against each specific charge of defamation with full particulars; ie the ground and fact on which it is based. The general plea of the defendant related to no particular and distinctive allegation in the statement of claim. The defences raised were not supported by any disclosed facts and grounds. By the defendant’s own admission, this paragraph was intended as a net to capture anything that had been overlooked. This is certainly unacceptable as it will confuse the plaintiffs and take him by surprise. If the defendant is displeased with the so called ‘messy’ pleadings of the plaintiff, she can avail herself of all the remedies provided under the rules and procedures as set out under the Rules of High Court 1980; certainly it cannot be reciprocated with this generalised form of pleading. For this, the court shall not entertain the defences raised in the general plea (see p 482G–H). (2) After careful perusal of all the relevant evidence and having the opportunity to observe the demeanour of the witnesses, the court found that the claim of incest was not proved, even on the balance of probability (see p 483B–D). (3) The submissions of the defendant, however defamatory they were of the plaintiff, are protected by absolute privilege. The court accepted the submission when tendered. When this happened, the statements contained in these documents must be considered to be made in the course of legal proceedings (see p 488C–E). (4) Statements once made remain. When the court expunged them, it was only for the purpose of the court’s process and record. Other than this, the statements remain as statements made. Thus, the defendant’s assertion that since the offending parts of the submissions were expunged by the courts, no defamatory statements exist, was totally unacceptable and was a fallacy (see p 489C–D). (5) The utterance in the court house when the court was not in session was scandalous based on the finding that there was no truth in the allegation of incest by the plaintiff. Further, the remark was actually uttered by the defendant. A defamatory statement made by counsel outside the court room, with reference to the proceedings, is not entitled to absolute privilege (see p 489D–E, G). (6) By virtue of ss 5 and 6 of the Defamation Act 1957 in a slander to the plaintiff

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of his profession, there shall be no necessity for the plaintiff to prove that he has suffered damages. Here, the plaintiff is and was an advocate and solicitor, and the slander inflicted by the defendant on him was calculated to disparage him in his profession (see p 489H–I). ||Page 467>> (7) Conspiracy is a cause of action on its own in tort to cover a situation where there is a combination of two or more persons who wilfully injure a man in his trade resulting in damage to him. This cause of action is separate and distinct from that of the tort of defamation which is governed by different factors. By the pleadings of the plaintiff, I am of the view that the allegation of defamation in the letter written by Jega to Vijayalakshmi’s solicitors is more for the tort of conspiracy rather than defamation (see p 490D–H). (8) The court could not agree to the defendant’s explanation that the letter by the defendant’s solicitors’ firm addressed to the plaintiff’s legal company was to seek clarification. There was no request for clarification nor was there any subject matter that need to be clarified. The contents consisted of derogatory remarks, which had no truth in them. They imply that the plaintiff was a person of low morals, lustful and mean, and for this had exposed him to hatred, contempt and ridicule by the right-thinking members of society. Though the publication of the letter was to the plaintiff’s staff, the defendant was considered liable for defamation when such publication was to the plaintiff’s servant and/or agent (see pp 490I–491A, F). (9) Though the defendant had clarified that the remarks were written by Shanti, the liability for publication arose from authorization. The defendant is and was the sole proprietor of the legal firm and Shanti was only a legal assistant — an employee of the defendant. By allowing a staff to write defamatory remarks on a document meant and intended for the firm, and approving them amounts to the proprietor of the firm making such statements. For this, the defendant must be held responsible (see pp 491H–492A). (10) The defendant’s reliance on her assertion that the statement was written in her private office and thereafter placed in a sealed envelope marked ‘private and confidential’ was just not probable. As an advocate and solicitor, the defendant

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would be aware of the rules and procedures that require such an acknowledgement copy of serving writ to be exhibited to an affidavit of service. With such a practice, she would have known that there could be no confidentiality for this document. So it is most unlikely that she did what she claimed (see p 492C–E). (11) The plaintiff had not satisfied the court that the defendant directed Shanti to affirm contents in the statutory declaration. Shanti is and was then an adult and a member of the Bar. The court did not think such a serious act as affirming a statutory declaration, Shanti could be forced into it. She must have done this, most probably in furtherance of the conspiracy brought about by inducement by the defendant and Jega. But the court was not convinced to charge the defendant for making this defamatory statement (see p 493F–G). ||Page 468>> (12) After considering the evidence as a whole and particularly from the contents of the defamation and how they were executed, the court found the tort of conspiracy proved. The court detected a pattern of concerted actions by the defendant’s group to synchronise their attack on the plaintiff’s reputation and his profession. This is with the sole objective of forcing the plaintiff to influence his wife to compromise on the settlement of the estate property. Though the defendant had expressly denied any part in this scheme to injure the plaintiff in his profession, however the court found that she was and is in the thick and thin of the whole conspiracy as can be noticed by her actions in the carrying out these defamatory remarks in association and in conjunction with the others named. In conspiracy, the tort is committed as soon as the agreement with other conspirators is made, and it continues to be committed so long as the combination persists. The court concluded that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff under this cause of action of conspiracy (see p 494B–F). (13) Since the slander in this case involved the plaintiff in his profession and imputed him to a crime punishable with a term of imprisonment, there was no necessity for the plaintiff to tender proof of special damages. Undoubtedly, the defamatory remarks by the defendant were of grave and serious nature. The defendant’s act in publishing such defamatory statements over a substantial

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period; and with malice, had certainly exposed the plaintiff to much hatred, contempt and ridicule by society. The mode of publication of the defamation, especially those on formal and legal documents were contemptuous. It showed the defendant’s total disrespect for the image, integrity and honour of legal profession of which she, herself is a member (see p 495A–B, D–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif dan defendan adalah peguambela dan peguamcara. Plaintif merupakan abang ipar defendan, yang berkahwin dengan kakak sulung defendan, Vijayalakshmi. Plaintif mempunyai seorang anak perempuan, Shanti. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan telah bersubahat dengan abang beliau (Jega), kakak (Saraswathy) dan Shanti untuk memfitnah beliau. Kata-kata bisa fitnah tersebut adalah perbuatan inses (incest) oleh plaintif ke atas Shanti. Fitnah tersebut dikatakan terkandung di dalam: (1) penghujahan defendan kepada hakim di dalam guaman sivil yang difailkan oleh Vijayalakshmi terhadap defendan; (2) ucapan di dalam mahkamah semasa mahkamah tidak bersidang; (3) surat yang ditulis oleh Jega kepada peguamcara Vijayalakshmi; (4) surat daripada firma peguamcara defendan yang dialamatkan kepada firma guaman plaintif; (5) kenyataan yang telah ditulis oleh Shanti yang terkandung di dalam salinan akuan penerimaan kepada surat plaintif; (6) tulisan di belakang muka surat terakhir salinan writ serahan; (7) tulisan di ||Page 469>>belakang satu surat tuntutan tentang satu pemaafan; dan (8) deklarasi statutori yang dibuat oleh Shanti. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa kata-kata yang dinyatakan mengatakan beliau sebagai seorang yang mempunyai moral rendah, yang telah melakukan jenayah seks inses dan telah mencemarkan nama baik beliau dan mendedahkan beliau kepada kebencian, penghinaan dan cemuhan di mata masyarakat yang berfikiran waras. Defendan telah memohon, antara lain, pembelaan perlindungan mutlak dan bersyarat, berjustifikasi dan tiada penerbitan. Setelah mengemukakan pembelaan-pembelaan yang substantif tersebut, defendan membuat suatu plid am.

Diputuskan:

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(1) Di dalam satu guaman fitnah, adalah suatu yang mantap bahawa seorang defendan mestilah dengan nyata membuat plid tentang pembelaan tertentu bahawa beliau berhasrat untuk bergantung terhadap setiap pertuduhan khusus fitnah tersebut dengan butiran penuh; iaitu alasan dan fakta yang ia didasari. Plid am defendan tiada kaitan dengan apa-apa butiran dan dakwaan yang tersendiri di dalam penyataan tuntutan. Pembelaan-pembelaan yang ditimbulkan tidak disokong oleh apa-apa fakta-fakta dan alasan-alasan yang didedahkan. Dengan pengakuan defendan sendiri, perenggan ini adalah bertujuan sebagai satu jaring untuk menjerat apa-apa yang telah terlepas perhatian. Ini sememangnya tidak boleh diterima kerana ia akan mengelirukan plaintif dan mengejutkan beliau. Jika defendan tidak berpuas hati dengan pliding plaintif yang dikatakan sebagai ‘menyemakkan’, beliau boleh menggunakan semua remedi yang diperuntukkan di bawah peraturan dan prosedur sebagai mana yang telah ditetapkan di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980; tentu sekali ia tidak dapat ditukar dengan bentuk umum pliding ini. Dengan itu, mahkamah tidak akan melayan pembelaan-pembelaan yang ditimbulkan di dalam plid am tersebut (lihat ms 482G–H). (2) Setelah diteliti dengan cermat tentang semua keterangan relevan dan mendapat peluang meneliti perilaku saksi-saksi, mahkamah mendapati bahawa dakwaan inses tidak dibuktikan, walaupun atas imbangan kebarangkalian (lihat ms 483B–D). (3) Penghujahan defendan, walaupun berunsur fitnah tentang plaintif, dilindungi oleh perlindungan mutlak. Mahkamah menerima penghujahan tersebut ketika ditenderkan. Apabila ini berlaku, penyataan yang terkandung di dalam dokumen-dokumen tersebut sepatutnya dianggap sebagai telah dibuat di dalam prosiding perundangan (lihat ms 488C–E). (4) Penyataan-penyataan setelah dibuat kekal sedemikian. Apabila mahkamah memotongnya, ia hanya bagi tujuan proses dan rekod mahkamah. Selain daripada itu, penyataan-penyataan tersebut kekal sebagai penyataan-penyataan yang dibuat. Oleh itu, penegasan defendan bahawa memandangkan bahagian yang memalukan di dalam penghujahan tersebut telah dipotong oleh ||Page 470>>mahkamah tiada penyataan fitnah wujud tidak dapat diterima

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sepenuhnya dan adalah satu salah anggapan (lihat ms 489C–D). (5) Ucapan di dalam mahkamah semasa mahkamah tidak bersidang adalah bersifat skandal berdasarkan penemuan bahawa tidak ada kebenaran di dalam dakwaan inses oleh plaintif. Tambahan pula, kata-kata tersebut sebenarnya telah diucapkan oleh defendan. Suatu penyataan fitnah yang dibuat oleh peguamcara di luar bilik mahkamah, dengan merujuk kepada prosiding, tidak berhak untuk mendapat perlindungan mutlak (lihat ms 489D–E, G). (6) Menurut ss 5 dan 6 Akta Fitnah 1957 di dalam slander terhadap plaintif tentang profesyen beliau, tidak sepatutnya ada apa-apa keperluan untuk plaintif membuktikan bahawa beliau telah mengalami kerugian. Di sini, plaintif adalah dan merupakan seorang peguambela dan peguamcara, dan slander yang diakibatkan oleh defendan ke atas beliau dianggap sebagai memperkecil-kecilkan beliau di dalam profesyen beliau (lihat ms 489H–I). (7) Konspirasi merupakan satu kausa tindakan dengan sendirinya untuk menyembunyikan suatu situasi di mana terdapat satu kombinasi dua atau lebih orang yang dengan niat untuk mencederakan seseorang di dalam perniagaannya yang mengakibatkan kerugian pada diri beliau. Kausa tindakan ini adalah berasingan dan berlainan daripada fitnah tort yang dikawal oleh faktor-faktor yang berbeza. Melalui pliding plaintif, mahkamah berpendapat bahawa dakwaan fitnah di dalam surat yang ditulis oleh Jega kepada peguamcara Vijayalakshmi adalah lebih mirip kepada tort konspirasi daripada fitnah (lihat ms 490D–H). (8) Mahkamah tidak dapat bersetuju dengan penjelasan defendan bahawa surat oleh firma peguamcara defendan yang dialamatkan kepada firma guaman plaintif adalah untuk memperoleh penjelasan. Tiada permintaan untuk penjelasan mahupun terdapat apa-apa perkara pokok yang perlu dijelaskan. Isi kandungan tersebut terdiri daripada kenyataan yang menghina, yang tidak benar. Ia menandakan bahawa plaintif merupakan seorang yang mempunyai moral rendah, bernafsu dan kejam, dan kerana ini telah mendedahkan diri beliau kepada kebencian, penghinaan dan cemuhan oleh masyarakat yang berfikiran waras. Walaupun pengeluaran secara umum surat tersebut adalah kepada kakitangan plaintif, defendan telah dianggap ber-tanggungjawab kerana fitnah apabila pengeluaran umum tersebut adalah kepada pekerja dan/atau ejen plaintif

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(lihat ms 490I–491A, F). (9) Walaupun defendan telah menjelaskan bahawa kenyataan tersebut ditulis oleh Shanti, tanggungjawab untuk menerbitkannya secara umum timbul melalui pemberian kuasa oleh defendan. Defendan adalah dan merupakan tuan punya tunggal firma guaman tersebut dan Shanti hanya merupakan ||Page 471>>seorang peguam biasa –– seorang pekerja kepada defendan. Dengan membenarkan seorang kekitangan menulis kenyataan fitnah sedemikian di atas satu dokumen yang bertujuan dan digunakan oleh firma tersebut, dan membenarkannya bererti tuan punya tunggal firma tersebut telah membuat kenyataan sedemikian. Oleh kerana itu, defendan seharusnya dipertanggungjawabkan (lihat ms 491H–492A). (10) Kebergantungan defendan terhadap penegasan beliau bahawa kenyataan tersebut ditulis di dalm pejabat peribadi beliau dan selepas itu diletakkan di dalam sampul surat yang ditandakan ‘sulit dan peribadi’ adalah tidak mungkin sekali. Sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara, defendan sepatutnya peka dengan peraturan dan prosedur yang menghendaki akuan penerimaan salinan writ serahan tersebut diekshibitkan kepada satu serahan afidavit. Dengan amalannya, beliau sepatutnya mengetahui bahawa tidak ada kerahsiaan untuk dokumen ini. Oleh itu, tidak mungkin sekali beliau telah buat sebagai mana yang beliau dakwa (lihat ms 492C–E). (11) Plaintif tidak memuaskan hati mahkamah bahawa defendan telah mengarahkan Shanti untuk mengesahkan kandungan di dalam deklarasi statutori tersebut. Shanti adalah dan merupakan seorang dewasa dan ahli Majlis Peguam. Mahkamah tidak berpendapat satu perbuatan serius seperti membuat pengakuan satu deklarasi statutori, Shanti boleh dipaksa berbuat demikian. Beliau mesti telah berbuat demikian, besar kemungkinan untuk melanjutkan konspirasi yang telah timbul melalui dorongan oleh defendan dan Jega. Tetapi, mahkamah tidak yakin untuk membuat tuduhan terhadap defendan kerana membuat kenyataan fitnah tersebut (lihat ms 493F–G). (12) Setelah mempertimbangkan keterangan secara menyeluruh dan terutamanya daripada kandungan fitnah tersebut dan bagaimana ia dilaksanakan, mahkamah mendapati tort tentang konspirasi dibuktikan. Mahkamah mengenal pasti corak

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tindakan-tindakan yang dilakukan oleh kumpulan defendan untuk selaras dengan serangan mereka ke atas reputasi plaintif dan profesyen beliau. Ini adalah dengan objektif utama untuk memaksa plaintif mempengaruhi isteri beliau untuk mencapai kompromi tentang penyelesaian harta pusaka tersebut. Walaupun defendan telah menafikan dengan nyata apa-apa penglibatan di dalam komplot untuk mencemarkan profesyen plaintif, bagaimana pun mahkamah mendapati bahawa beliau adalah terlibat di dalam keseluruhan konspirasi sebagai mana yang dapat diperhatikan melalui tindakan beliau di dalam mengeluarkan kenyataan fitnah tersebut dengan perkaitan dan bersama yang lain yang telah dinamakan. Di dalam konspirasi, tort dilakukan sejurus selepas perjanjian antara yang membuat konspirasi tersebut dibuat, dan ia berterusan dilakukan asalkan kombinasi tersebut wujud. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa defendan bertanggungjawab ||Page 472>>terhadap plaintif di bawah kausa tindakan konsprasi tersebut (lihat ms 494B–F). (13) Memandangkan slander di dalam kes ini melibatkan plaintif di dalam profesyen beliau dan mengatakan beliau melakukan jenayah yang boleh dihukum satu tempoh pemenjaraan, tidak ada keperluan untuk plaintif membawa masuk bukti ganti rugi khas. Tanpa diragui, kenyataan fitnah oleh defendan bersifat teruk dan serius. Perbuatan defendan di dalam mengeluarkan secara umum kenyataan fitnah tersebut di dalam tempoh yang substantif; dan dengan niat jahat, tentu sekali mendedahkan plaintif kepada kebencian, penghinaan dan cemuhan yang amat sangat oleh masyarakat. Kaedah penerbitan fitnah tersebut, terutamanya yang di atas dokumen-dokumen rasmi dan perundangan adalah penuh kebencian. Ia menunjukkan sifat tidak hormat langsung defendan tentang imej, integriti dan maruah profesyen perundangan yang mana beliau sendiri merupakan seorang ahli (lihat ms 495A–B, D–G).]

Notes For cases on conspiracy, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 45–54. For cases on libel and slander, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 231–234.

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Cases referred to Brunswick v Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185 (refd) Dashtgard v Blair (1990) CCLT (2nd) 284 (refd) Demopolis v Peoples National Bank 796 p 2nd 426 (Wash 1990) (refd) Gulf Oil Ltd v Page [1987] 1 Ch 327 (refd) Henry Wong Jan Fook v John Lee & Anor [1976] 1 MLJ 231 (refd) Kennedy v Hilliard (1859) 10 Ir CL Rep (NS) 195 (refd) Lawson v Burns (1976) 6 WWR (refd) Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 238 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Munster v Lamb (1883) 11 QB 588 (refd) Osborn v Thomas Boulter [1930] 2 KB 226 (refd) R v Paine (1696) 5 Mod Rep 163 (refd) R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 55 (refd) Rahim Radhas v Bachcha Lall 1929 AIR 214 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 5, 6 National Language Act 1963/67 s 8 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 8

Gurbachan Singh (Malik Imtiaz Sarwar with him) (M Segaram & Co) for the plaintiff. ||Page 473>>

Mahadevi Nadchatiram (RS Sothi with her) (Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the defendant.

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[2000] 6 MLJ 29 Mirzan bin Mahathir v Star Papyrus Sdn Bhd

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2(S3)–23–09 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 7 MARCH 2000

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defence — Application to strike off — Defence of justification unsupported by evidence — Defendant must plead his case with sufficient particularity — Whether defence should be struck off

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Justification — Allegations in defence unsupported by evidence — Defendant must plead his case with sufficient particularity — Lucas-Box test applied — Whether defence should be struck off

The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was for damages and for an injunction restraining the defendant from further printing and publishing words or matter defamatory of the plaintiff. The plaintiff made an application seeking further and better particulars of the defendant’s defence. The plaintiff contended that when he instructed his solicitors to send a notice of complaint to the defendant before filing the writ, the defendant replied in a letter dated 15 January 1999 pleading that it was merely the printer and that it bore neither ill will nor malice against the plaintiff whatsoever. Subsequently, when the defence was filed, the defendant pleaded consent, fair comment and justification. What the plaintiff contended most obnoxious were the particulars pleaded in respect of justification which effectively alleged, amongst other things, corruption against him, despite the fact that the defendant had not ventured to specifically use the word ‘corruption’. Against this backdrop of vagueness and the unspecified nature of the allegations made against him with particulars of justification

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and since by his reply the plaintiff had pleaded that all such allegations were untrue and misconceived, the plaintiff sought particulars of the basis of the allegations. It was noted that when particulars were sought for, the defendant in the letter dated 6 April 1999, pleaded for time, contending it was requested to file such defences by a third party (Dow Jones Publishing Co (Asia) Inc) and that it had to await the documents and details from the third party. The senior assistant registrar allowed the plaintiff’s application with costs on indemnity basis to be paid by the defendant. The order also incorporated an ‘unless order’ whereby, in the event of any default in the compliance of the order, the defendant’s entire defence would be struck off. The defendant appealed. It was noted that the defendant had pleaded justification within the meaning as set out in Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 (‘Lucas-Box’).

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) It is trite that the defendant must not put in a plea of justification lightly or without carefully considering the available evidence ||Page 30>>before him and as to such evidence as would be likely to be available to him. A defendant setting up a plea of justification must plead his case with sufficient particularity, without circumlocution or obfuscation, so as to enable the plaintiff to know the possible defamatory meaning of the words complained of, which the defendant is seeking to justify. When a defendant by its Lucas-Box meaning or in reliance of its particulars of justification, makes a serious allegation of dishonesty or other improper conduct, even suggestive of acts of corruption, the obligations become even more compulsory and obligatory upon the defendant. The particulars pleaded must support the defendant’s Lucas-Box meaning so that if any particulars fall outside the ambit of the Lucas-Box meaning, such particulars ought to be struck out and/or if the Lucas-Box meaning makes any allegation which is unsupported by the particulars, that part of the Lucas-Box meaning should equally be struck out (see pp 35G, 38A–B, 39A, 40C-D). (2) It was apparent, based on the letter dated 15 January 1999, that the defence was pleaded lightly. It was obvious from the open letter dated 6 April 1999 that

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the evidence to substantiate the defence would be available only at the trial. The defendant had made no effort to obtain those documents either before the service of the defence or following service of the request for further and better particulars. It was obvious therefore that the defendant just had not with it the documents to answer those requests for particulars. The plaintiff was clearly at a handicap as the defendant was unable to comply with the decision in Lucas-Box. It was obvious that the plaintiff was not seeking evidence, but merely particulars which he was entitled to (see p 41B, F–G). (3) Decided authorities show that the defendant ought not to have put the cart before the horse. The defendant ought to have all the documents and evidence available before filing the defence. This case was the clearest case where an ‘unless order’ ought to be made (see p 46C–D). (4) The menial and subservient attitude adopted by the defendant in complying with the request of Dow Jones to include the defences of consent, justification, qualified privilege and fair comment in its defence, after initially writing to the plaintiff that it bore neither ill will nor malice against the plaintiff, was a clear indication that costs on a full indemnity basis be paid forthwith (see p 46H–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan adalah untuk ganti rugi dan untuk satu injunksi menahan defendan daripada terus mencetak dan ||Page 31>>menerbit kata-kata atau bahan yang memfitnah plaintif. Plaintif telah membuat permohonan yang meminta butir-butir lanjut mengenai pembelaan defendan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa apabila beliau mengarah peguamcaranya supaya menghantar notis aduan kepada defendan sebelum memfailkan writ, defendan telah menjawab dalam sepucuk surat bertarikh 15 Januari 1999 merayu bahawa ia cumalah pencetak dan bahawa ia tidak mempunyai niat jahat mahupun dendam terhadap plaintif. Seterusnya, apabila pembelaan difailkan, defendan memplidkan kerelaan, ulasan berpatutan dan justifikasi. Apa yang dihujahkan amat buruk oleh plaintif adalah butir-butir yang diplidkan berkaitan justifikasi yang mendakwa, antara lain, rasuah

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terhadapnya, meskipun defendan tidak cuba menggunakan perkataan ‘rasuah’ secara khusus. Berlandaskan latar belakang yang tidak jelas dan pendakwaan yang tidak disifatkan secara khusus yang dibuat terhadapnya bersama butir-butir justifikasi ini serta memandangkan melalui jawapannya plaintif telah memplidkan bahawa segala pendakwaan demikian adalah tidak benar dan salah, plaintif telah meminta butir-butir mengenai dasar pendakwaan tersebut. Adalah diperhatikan bahawa apabila butir-butir diminta, defendan dalam surat bertarikh 6 April 1999 merayu supaya diberikan masa, dengan berhujah bahawa ia dikehendaki memfailkan pembelaan sedemikian oleh pihak ketiga (Dow Jones Publishing Co (Asia) Inc) dan bahawa ia harus menunggu dokumen-dokumen dan butir-butir daripada pihak ketiga tersebut. Penolong kanan pendaftar membenarkan permohonan plaintif dengan kos atas dasar tanggung rugi untuk dibayar oleh defendan. Perintah tersebut juga menggabungkan suatu perintah ‘melainkan’ (unless order), yang mana, sekiranya berlaku apa-apa keingkaran dalam pematuhan perintah tersebut, keseluruhan pembelaan defendan akan dibatalkan. Defendan merayu. Adalah diperhatikan bahawa defendan telah memplidkan justifikasi dalam maksud seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 (‘Lucas-Box’).

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Adalah mantap bahawa defendan tidak harus memasukkan rayuan justifikasi secara tidak bersungguh-sungguh atau tanpa mempertimbangkan keterangan yang ada di hadapannya secara berhati-hati dan keterangan yang mungkin terdapat padanya. Defendan yang ingin menghujahkan rayuan justifikasi mestilah memplidkan kesnya dengan keutamaan yang mencukupi, tanpa keterangan yang berbelit dan panjang lebar atau mengelirukan, supaya membolehkan plaintif mengetahui maksud kata-kata yang diadu yang mungkin memfitnah, yang hendak dijustifikasikan oleh defendan. Apabila defendan melalui maksud Lucas-Box atau dengan bergantung pada butir-butir justifikasi membuat pendakwaan yang serius mengenai ketidakjujuran atau kelakuan lain yang tidak senonoh, termasuk yang bertujuan untuk menimbulkan perbuatan rasuah, obligasi menjadi lebih wajib dan ||Page 32>>perlu ke atas pihak defendan. Butir-butir yang diplidkan mestilah

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menyokong maksud Lucas-Box defendan supaya sekiranya mana-mana butir tidak dirangkumi oleh maksud Lucas-Box, butir-butir sedemikian haruslah dibatalkan dan/atau andainya maksud Lucas-Box menyebabkan apa-apa tohmahan yang tidak disokong oleh butir-butir tersebut, bahagian dengan maksud Lucas-Box itu haruslah juga dibatalkan (lihat ms 35G, 38A–B, 39A, 40C-D). (2) Adalah nyata, berdasarkan surat bertarikh 15 Januari 1999, bahawa pembelaan tidak diplidkan secara bersungguh-sungguh. Adalah jelas daripada surat terbuka bertarikh 6 April 1999 bahawa keterangan untuk mengukuhkan pembelaan hanya boleh didapati di perbicaraan. Defendan tidak membuat sebarang percubaan untuk mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen tersebut sama ada sebelum penyampaian pembelaan atau berikutan penyampaian permintaan untuk butir-butir lanjut. Maka adalah nyata bahawa defendan tidak memiliki dokumen-dokumen tersebut untuk membalas permintaan untuk butir-butir lanjut. Plaintif jelas menghadapi rintangan kerana defendan tidak dapat mematuhi keputusan dalam Lucas-Box. Adalah jelas bahawa plaintif bukannya memohon keterangan, cuma butir-butir yang merupakan haknya (lihat ms 41B, F–G). (3) Kes-kes yang diputuskan menunjukkan bahawa defendan tidak sepatutnya bertindak secara tergesa-gesa. Defendan seharusnya telah menyediakan semua dokumen dan keterangan sebelum memfailkan pembelaan. Kes ini merupakan kes yang paling jelas di mana suatu perintah ‘melainkan’ seharusnya dibuat (lihat ms 46C–D). (4) Sikap terlampau merendahkan diri yang diterimapakai oleh defendan dalam mematuhi permintaan Dow Jones supaya memasukkan pembelaan kerelaan, justifikasi, perlindungan bersyarat dan ulasan berpatutan dalam pembelaannya, selepas menulis kepada plaintif pada mulanya bahawa ia tidak mempunyai apa-apa perasaan yang tidak baik atau dendam terhadap plaintif, jelas menunjukkan bahawa kos atas dasar tanggung rugi sepenuhnya harus dibayar dengan segera (lihat ms 46H–I).]

Notes

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For cases on defence generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3493–3508. For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Atkinson v Fitzwalter & Anor [1987] 1 WLR 201 (refd) Control Risks Ltd & Ors v New English Library Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 183 (refd) ||Page 33>> Evans v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 429 (refd) Grand Metropolitan Nominee (No 2) Co Ltd v Evans [1993] 1 All ER 64 (refd) Goldschmidt v Constable & Co [1937] 4 All ER 293 (refd) Gordon v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd & Anor [1980] 2 NSWLR 410 (refd) Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 14 (refd) McDonald’s Corp & Anor v Steel & Anor [1995] 3 All ER 615 (refd) Morrell v International Thomson Publishing Ltd & Ors [1989] 3 All ER 733 (refd) Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 77 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Tan Hoe Kock & Anor v Ali Akarbara bin Mangudin & Ors [1997] 4 MLJ 311 (refd) Viscount De L’Isle v Times Newspapers Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 499 (refd) Wootton v Sievier [1913] 3 KB 499 (refd) Zierenberg v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 18 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 12, O 78 r 3(2)

Gurmeet Kaur (Amizaizul Izral bin Amran with her) (Bhag Sulaiman & Co) for the

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appellant/defendant. VK Lingam (VK Lingam & Co) for the respondent/plainitff.

Cur Adv Vult

[2000] 6 MLJ 204 Cheah Cheng Hoc & Ors v Liew Yew Tiam & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S5–22–505 OF 1995 JAMES FOONG J 11 FEBRUARY 2000

Legal Profession — Professional privilege — Communication between solicitor and client — Client suing solicitor — Whether privilege apply to litigation between solicitor and client — Solicitor’s witness disclosed confidential communication during examination-in-chief, whether privilege waived

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defence — Failure to prove libel statements were substantially true, whether justification proved — Publication made with malice, whether defence of qualified privilege proved

The plaintiffs were advocates and solicitors practising under the name and style of M/s Cheah Teh & Su (‘CTS’). They claimed that the defendants by two letters (‘the letters’) written by the defendants’ solicitors, M/s Wee Choo Keong & Faaiz (‘M/s Wee Choo Keong’) dated 15 August 1995 and 18 August 1995 respectively had defamed them. The plaintiffs claimed that the words contained in certain paragraphs of the letters meant and understood to mean that the plaintiffs were fraudulent in their conduct, breached their professional duty of care to the defendants, dishonest,

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untrustworthy, attempted or conspired to defraud the defendants, and not fit to be advocates and solicitors. The defendants pleaded the defences of qualified privilege, fair comment which was made in good faith without malice; and justification. The defendants also raised a preliminary issue that virtually all the evidence given and documents tendered by the plaintiffs in support of their case were inadmissible because of legal professional privilege. These related to or were connected with communication between advocate and client or legal professional advisor and client, and therefore inadmissible under ss 126,128 and 129 of the Evidence Act 1950 when the defendants, as clients of the plaintiffs, did not give their express consent for such disclosure. Further, it was argued that the first defendant should not be compelled to disclose any further confidential communication during the continuation of the trial. The plaintiffs submitted that the legal professional privilege did not apply to litigation between lawyer and client since there was no disclosure of communication in a solicitor-client relationship; the parties being well aware of the communication themselves, much unlike a demand by a third party for such disclosure.

Held, finding the defendants liable to the plaintiffs for defamation: (1) Section 126 of the Evidence Act 1950 declares that no advocate shall at any time be permitted to ‘disclose’ any privileged communication. If there was no disclosure then this provision ||Page 205>>would not apply. There could be no disclosure of such communication when the person seeking to prevent it from disclosure knew of the communication and was preventing it from exposure from a person whom he shared this communication with in a solicitor-client relationship in an action brought by such person against him where such communication was relevant to the issue. In such a situation, this legal professional privilege could not apply. In the present case, there was no dispute that the plaintiffs were at one time advocates of the defendants. The communications which the defendants sought to prevent disclosure were those covered under solicitor-client relationship. The plaintiffs were suing the defendants where those communications were relevant to the issue. Under such circumstances, the defendants were not entitled to claim legal professional privilege under s 126 of the Evidence Act

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1950 (see pp 217I–218G). (2) On the second limb of the defendants’ contention that they should not be compelled to disclose confidential communication under s 129 of the Evidence Act, the first defendant had, by her own accord during her examination-in-chief, disclosed and referred to most of the confidential communication. When this happened, her privilege to the protection from disclosure of such communication was waived under the provision of s 129. She could be compelled to disclose any such communications as may appear to the court necessary to be known in order to explain any evidence which she had given (see p 218G–I). (3) The subject matter in the defamatory statements had no public interest. It concerned only the purchaser, its solicitors, the vendors (which included the defendants), their present and former solicitors and the lawyers acting for the financial institutions which granted the loan to finance the purchase of the property. This was sufficient to justify the court in dismissing the defence of fair comment (see p 219D–E). (4) In a plea of justification, the defendant must prove that the statement published is substantially true. Slight inaccuracies in one or more of its details will not prevent the defendant from succeeding in this defence. It is sufficient to prove the main charge or the sting of the main charge or the gist of the libel is true. In the present case, the main charge or the gist of the libel was that based on the accusations, the defendants concluded that the plaintiffs conspired with others to defraud them in the land transaction. The court found that there was no substantial in virtually all the accusations. Therefore, the gist of the libel was untrue and thus the plea of justification could not succeed (see pp 219E–F, 223F–G). (5) The defence of qualified privilege will be lost if the occasion which gives rise to it is misused, ie if publication is made with malice. ||Page 206>>The burden of proving malice is on the plaintiff. In the present case, the court found that there were no grounds for the defendants to base their belief in the truth of the accusations. The accusations were created with the objective of terminating the agreements in order to extract more money

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from the purchaser. Such motive of the defendants in using those untrue accusations implied malice on their part. The court found that the plaintiffs had proved malice and the defendants could not succeed in the defence of qualified privilege (see pp 224C, 225D–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif adalah peguamcara dan peguambela yang mengamal di atas nama Tetuan Cheah Teh & Su (‘CTS’). Mereka mendakwa bahawa defendan-defendan melalui dua surat (‘surat-surat tersebut’) yang ditulis oleh peguam defendan, Tetuan Wee Choo Keong & Faaiz (‘Tetuan Wee Choo Keong’) bertarikh 15 Ogos 1995 dan 18 Ogos 1995 masing-masing telah memfitnah mereka. Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang terkandung di dalam perenggan-perenggan tertentu surat tersebut bermaksud dan difaham sebagai bermaksud bahawa plaintif-plaintif berkelakuan secara fraud, telah memecah tugas profesional kewajipan berjaga-jaga kepada defendan-defendan, tidak jujur, tidak boleh dipercayai, telah cuba dan berkomplot untuk melakukan fraud terhadap defendan-defendan, dan tidak layak untuk menjadi peguamcara dan peguambela. Defendan-defendan telah memplid pembelaan perlindungan ber-syarat, komen berpatutan yang telah dibuat dengan suci hati tanpa niat jahat dan justifikasi. Defendan juga membangkitkan isu permulaan bahawa semua keterangan yang diberikan dan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh plaintif-plaintif untuk menyokong kes mereka adalah tidak boleh diterimamasuk oleh kerana perlindungan profesion guaman. Ia adalah berkaitan atau bersangkut-paut dengan komunikasi antara peguam dan anak guam atau penasihat undang-undang profesional dan anak guam, dan oleh itu tidak boleh diterima masuk di bawah ss 126, 128 dan 129 Akta Keterangan 1950 apabila defendan-defendan sebagai anak guam-anak guam kepada plaintif-plaintif, tidak memberikan persetujuan nyata untuk pendedahan sedemikian. Seterusnya, adalah dihujahkan bahawa defendan pertama tidak patut dipaksa untuk mendedahkan sebarang komunikasi rahsia selanjutnya semasa perbicaraan bersambung. Plaintif-plaintif telah berhujah bahawa perlindungan profesion guaman tidak terpakai kepada litigasi antara peguam dan anak guam oleh kerana tiada pendedahan

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komunikasi di dalam hubungan peguam dan anak guam; di mana pihak-pihak sedar akan komunikasi itu sendiri, dan bukan seperti tuntutan daripada pihak ketiga untuk pendedahan sedemikian. ||Page 207>>

Diputuskan, mendapati bahawa defendan-defendan bertanggungan kepada plaintif-plaintif untuk fitnah: (1) Seksyen 126 Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan bahawa peguam tidak dibenarkan untuk ‘mendedahkan’ sebarang komunikasi terlindung pada bila-bila masa sekalipun. Tidak terdapat sebarang pendedahan komunikasi sedemikian apabila pihak yang memohon untuk menghalangnya daripada didedahkan tahu mengenai komunikasi tersebut dan menghalangnya daripada terdedah daripada seseorang yang beliau mengkongsi komunikasi tersebut di dalam hubungan peguam-anak guam di dalam tindakan yang dibawa oleh orang sedemikian terhadapnya apabila komunikasi tersebut adalah berkaitan kepada isu tersebut. Di dalam situasi begini, perlindungan profesion guaman tidak terpakai. Di dalam kes ini, tidak dipertikaikan bahawa plaintif-plaintif pada suatu masa tertentu adalah peguam-peguam defendan-defendan. Komunikasi yang defendan-defendan cuba untuk menghalangnya daripada didedahkan adalah diliputi oleh hubungan peguam-anak guam. Plaintif-plaintiif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan di mana komunikasi-komunikasi tersebut adalah berkaitan kepada isu. Di dalam keadaan sedemikian, defendan-defendan tidak berhak untuk menuntut perlindungan profesion guaman di bawah s 126 Akta Keterangan 1950 (lihat ms 217I–218G). (2) Berkenaan dengan hujahan bahagian kedua defendan bahawa mereka tidak patut dipaksa untuk mendedahkan komunikasi rahsia di bawah s 129 Akta Keterangan, defendan pertama telah, dengan persetujuannya sendiri semasa pemeriksaan utama, mendedahkan dan merujuk kepada kebanyakan daripada komunikasi rahsia tersebut. Apabila ini berlaku, keistimewaannya untuk dilindungi daripada pendedahan sedemikian telah diketepikan di bawah peruntukan s 129. Beliau boleh dipaksa untuk mendedahkan sebarang komunikasi yang mahkamah anggap perlu diketahui untuk menerangkan

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sebarang keterangan yang beliau telah berikan (lihat ms 218G–I). (3) Perkara subjek di dalam kenyataan-kenyataan fitnah tidak mempunyai kepentingan awam. Ia adalah berkaitan dengan pembeli, peguamnya, penjual (yang termasuk defendan-defendan), peguam semasa dan bekas peguam dan juga peguam-peguam yang mewakili institusi kewangan yang memberikan pinjaman terebut untuk membiayai pembelian harta tanah tersebut. Ini adalah mencukupi untuk menjustikasikan mahkamah di dalam menolak pembelaan komen berpatutan (lihat ms 219D–E). (4) Di dalam pembelaan justifikasi, defendan mestilah membuktikan bahawa kenyataan yang diterbitkan adalah sebahagian besarnya benar. Ketidaktepatan yang sedikit di dalam satu atau lebih butir-butir tidak akan menghalang defendan daripada berjaya di dalam ||Page 208>>pembelaan ini. Adalah mencukupi untuk membuktikan dakwaan utama atau pokok persoalan dakwaan utama atau inti pati libel itu adalah benar. Di dalam kes ini, tuduhan utama libel tersebut secara ringkas adalah berdasarkan fitnah-fitnah tersebut, defendan-defendan telah menyimpulkan bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah berkomplot dengan orang lain untuk melakukan fraud terhadap mereka di dalam transaksi tanah. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat asas di dalam semua pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Oleh itu, inti pati libel tersebut adalah tidak benar dan pembelaan justifikasi tidak boleh berjaya (lihat ms 219E–F, 223F–G). (5) Pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat akan hilang jika keadaan di mana ia bangkit telah disalah guna, iaitu jika penerbitan dibuat dengan niat jahat. Beban untuk membuktikan niat jahat adalah di atas plaintif. Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat alasan-alasan untuk defendan-defendan untuk mendasarkan kepercayaannya kepada kebenaran pengataan-pengataan tersebut. Pengataan-pengataan tersebut telah direka dengan bertujuan untuk menamatkan perjanjian-perjanjian untuk mendapatkan lebah banyak wang daripada pembeli. Motif sedemikian di pihak defendan di dalam menggunakan pengataan-pengataan yang tidak benar menyiratkan niat jahat di pihak mereka. Mahkamah mendapati plaintif-plaintif telah mem-buktikan niat jahat dan defendan-defendan tidak boleh berjaya di dalam pembelaan perlindungan

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bersyarat (lihat ms 224C, 225D–G).]

Notes For a case on communication between solicitor and client, see 9 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) para 1642. For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 (refd) Bullock v Corry & Co (1878) 3 QBD 356 (refd) CS Wu v Wang Look Fung [1981] 1 MLJ 178 (refd) Dato’ Au Ba Chi & Ors v Koh Keng Kheng & Ors [1989] 3 MLJ 445 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662; [1975] AC 135 (refd) Maidstone Pte Ltd v Takenaka Corp [1992] 1 SLR 772 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Rev Fr Bernad Thattil v Ramachandran Pillai (1987) CRI LJ 739 (refd) ||Page 209>>

Legislation referred to Evidence Act 1950 ss 126, 128, 129

Navaratnam (Chandran with him) (Saheran, Woon & Navaratnam) for the plaintiffs. Sulaiman bin Abdullah (Wee Choo Keong with him) (Wee Choo Kwong & Faaiz) for the defendants.

[2000] 6 MLJ 423

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Matchplan (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v William D Sinrich & Anor

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–22–561 OF 1997 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 11 FEBRUARY 2000

Civil Procedure — Appearance — Conditional appearance — Application for stay of further proceedings — Unchallenged denial of publication to third party in Malaysia of defamatory letters — Whether court has jurisdiction to try action

Tort — Defamation — Publication of libellous letters — Whether publication to third party in Malaysia

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for libel in respect of two publications made by the defendants. The plaintiffs then applied ex parte for and obtained an order dated 19 March 1998 to issue and serve a notice of writ outside jurisdiction and that the defendants be given 30 days to enter appearance from the date of service of the writ on them. The defendants then applied ex parte for leave to enter conditional appearance and for a stay of all further proceedings until determination of the defendants’ application to set aside or strike out the writ and statement of claim. The defendants stated in their affidavit in support that the alleged publication was not made in Malaysia and that the onus was upon the plaintiffs to establish that the publications were indeed done to third parties other than to the plaintiffs in Malaysia before the cause of action in libel accrued. The defendants also contended that Malaysia was not the forum conveniens. The senior assistant registrar (‘the SAR’) dismissed the application with costs and directed the defendants on 14 September 1999 to file the defence within 14 days from the date of the order. The defendants appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal with costs and setting aside the decision of the SAR and the

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action: In order to establish that the court has jurisdiction to try the action, the plaintiffs have to prove that the two defamatory letters were published in Malaysia. In order to constitute publication in Malaysia, the plaintiffs were required to prove that the letters were published to a third party in Malaysia and not just to the plaintiffs. Since the affidavit of the first defendant clearly denied any publication to any third party and since there was no challenge to that denial, such denial was accepted as true and thus acceded to the defendants’ application (see p 426F–G).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk libel berkenaan dengan dua penerbitan yang dibuat oleh defendan- ||Page 424>>defendan. Kemudian plaintif-plaintif memohon secara ex parte untuk dan memperolehi suatu perintah bertarikh 19 Mac 1998 untuk mengeluarkan dan menyampaikan notis writ di luar bidang kuasa dan bahawa defendan-defendan diberikan 30 hari untuk memasuki kehadiran dari tarikh penyampaian writ ke atas mereka. Kemudian defendan-defendan memohon secara ex parte untuk kebenaran memasuki kehadiran bersyarat dan untuk penggantungan semua prosiding selanjutnya sehingga keputusan permohonan defendan untuk mengetepikan atau membatalkan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan. Defendan-defendan menyatakan di dalam afidavit sokongan bahawa penerbitan yang dikatakan tidak dibuat di Malaysia dan bahawa beban adalah di atas plaintif-plaintif untuk membuktikan bahawa penerbitan-penerbitan sememangnya dibuat kepada pihak ketiga selain daripada plaintif-plaintif di Malaysia sebelum kausa tindakan libel terakru. Defendan-defendan juga menegaskan bahawa Malaysia bukanlah forum konveniens. Penolong kanan pendaftar (‘PKP tersebut’) menolak permohonan tersebut dengan kos dan mengarahkan defendan-defendan pada 14 September 1999 untuk memfailkan pembelaan di dalam masa 14 hari dari tarikh perintahnya. Defendan-defendan telah merayu.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan tersebut dengan kos dan mengetepikan keputusan

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PKP dan tindakan tersebut: Untuk membuktikan bahawa mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk membicara tindakan tersebut, plaintif-plaintif mestilah membuktikan bahawa kedua-dua surat fitnah diterbitkan di Malaysia. Untuk terjumlah kepada penerbitan di Malaysia, plaintif-plaintif diperlukan untuk membuktikan bahawa surat-surat tersebut diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga di Malaysia dan bukan kepada plaintif-plaintif sahaja. Oleh kerana afidavit defendan pertama dengan jelas menafikan sebarang penerbitan kepada pihak ketiga dan oleh kerana tiada cabaran kepada penafian tersebut, penafian tersebut diterima sebagai benar dan dengan itu menyetujui permohonan-permohonan defendan (lihat ms 426F–G).]

Notes For cases on conditional appearance, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 967–972. For cases on publication in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 212–216.

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7

Lorraine Cheah (Jyoti Sharma with her) (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the appellant/defendant. Harjit Singh Pannu (Gill & Tang) for the respondent/plaintiff. ||Page 425>>

[2000] 6 MLJ 532 Ummi Hafilda bte Ali & Anor v Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2)

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HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2(S5)–23–38 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 31 MAY 2000

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Allegation of wedding reception of single woman and involvement in defaming Deputy Prime Minister — Attempt to stir hatred against plaintiffs — Deprivation of opportunity to court someone of the opposite sex — Re-publication of internet webpage, whether amounted to publication of defamatory statement — Test applied — Compensatory damages awarded — Whether exemplary damages ought to be awarded

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for publishing an article about them in Bacaria. Both plaintiffs played a key role as witnesses in the corruption trial against the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. The headline on the front page of Bacaria stated: ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’. The article alleged that the first plaintiff had married one Khairuddin, which the second plaintiff maintained that the name referred to him. The article further alleged that the wedding reception had to be on a modest scale because it was not well received by the local folk because of the plaintiffs’ involvement in defaming the Deputy Prime Minister. The plaintiffs claimed that the article was untrue and false and thus had defamed them. Both plaintiffs claimed a sum of RM10m as general or compensatory damages and for exemplary damages. The defendants submitted that the impugned passages in the article were picked up from the Internet news and that by reporting such news the defendants had in fact shown the falsity of such news. Further it was submitted that whilst the headline read ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’, yet the final passage on that same front page quoted the first plaintiff’s brother as denying that the first and second plaintiffs were married. Therefore it was urged to apply the balm of the brother’s denial to soothe the bane of the headline.

Held: (1) Whilst the words per se ‘she is married’ are not defamatory but when they are

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directed towards a single woman who upon the admitted knowledge of the defendants had her face on the front page of major newspapers and whose character and personality had been exposed in the newspapers as a star witness in the Anwar Ibrahim corruption trial, under such circumstances the innuendoes and inferences that an ordinary man in the street would draw from the headline and the subsequent passages would convey the meaning attributed to the words by the plaintiffs (see pp 539I–540A). (2) The allegation that the plaintiffs had conspired to defame Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was a serious allegation and an attempt to stir the hatred of the villagers against the plaintiffs. If left uncorrected, this article would tend to cause a rift between the plaintiffs, their ||Page 533>>parents and the villagers. The allegation was an attempt to label the plaintiffs as liars and/or perjurers. It cast serious aspersions upon the conduct and character of both the plaintiffs (see p 541G–H). (3) The passages in the article suggested that both the plaintiffs were married. This is an unfair statement to make, knowing full well that they were indeed not married. Such a statement had clearly deprived the chance of each of them being free to meet someone or to court someone of the opposite sex (see p 542F–G). (4) The court accepted the plaintiffs’ submission that the impugned publications had injured their reputation and credibility. The publication when read by a fair minded and ordinary member of the public would hold the plaintiffs in odium and contempt (see p 542G–H). (5) The defendants’ failure to produce the printed Internet webpage must be held against them. Alternatively their failure to produce the writer’s or journalist’s notes as the source of the articles must also be held against them. The journalist did not make any effort to ascertain the truth or otherwise from the plaintiffs themselves. In any case, even if there was a re-publication of the Internet webpage, this in itself is publication of the defamatory statement (see p 543A–C). (6) Whilst the headline stated in black bold print ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’, the defendants had juxtapositioned the words ‘Azwan Ali jelas status adik’ in white

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print embedded in a splash of black with ray-like edges to highlight what Azwan Ali had said. Had that juxtapositioned statement not been positioned as it had been, the court might have been persuaded to reject the first passage as having any defamatory connotation applying the bane and the balm principle. However, far from soothing the wound, the defendants had indeed exacerbated the hurt (see p 544B–C). (7) The court was satisfied that this was a case where compensatory damages ought to be awarded against each of the defendants. Taking into consideration the fleeting appearance of both the plaintiffs in the limelight of publicity generated solely due to the Anwar Ibrahim corruption trial, the court awarded each of the plaintiffs a sum of RM25,000 against each of the defendants (see p 544D–E). (8) The defendants were out to sensationalize the so-called marriage of the plaintiffs to sell their Bacaria. They must therefore pay. Therefore the court awarded each of the plaintiffs a further sum of RM25,000 against each of the defendants. However, the court found that this was not a case for exemplary damages. Whilst there was the element of gain in the form of profits by the sale of Bacaria, the plaintiffs had failed to show that there was such ||Page 534>>extensive profit as to warrant an award under this head (see p 544H–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif-plaintif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan kerana menerbitkan suatu rencana mengenai mereka dalam Bacaria. Kedua-dua plaintif telah memainkan peranan utama sebagai saksi-saksi dalam perbicaraan sogokan terhadap bekas Timbalan Perdana Menteri Malaysia. Tajuk berita pada muka hadapan Bacaria menyatakan: ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’. Rencana tersebut mengatakan bahawa plaintif pertama telah berkahwin dengan seorang bernama Khairuddin, yang mana plaintif kedua mempertahankan merujuk kepadanya. Rencana tersebut selanjutnya mengatakan bahawa majlis perkahwinan terpaksa diadakan secara sederhana kerana ia tidak

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diterima dengan baik oleh orang tempatan disebabkan penglibatan plaintif-plaintif dalam memfitnah Timbalan Perdana Menteri tersebut. Plaintif-plaintif menuntut bahawa rencana tersebut adalah tidak benar dan justeru itu telah memfitnah mereka. Kedua-dua plaintif menuntut jumlah sebanyak RM10 juta sebagai ganti rugi am atau pampasan dan untuk ganti rugi teladan. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa petikan-petikan yang dipersoalkan dalam rencana tersebut telah diperolehi daripada berita Internet dan bahawa dengan melaporkan berita sedemikian defendan-defendan sebenarnya telah menunjukkan kepalsuan berita sedemikian. Selanjutnya, ia dihujahkan bahawa sedangkan tajuk berita membaca ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’, petikan akhir pada muka surat yang sama menyebut abang plaintif pertama sebagai telah menyangkal bahawa plaintif kedua dan ketiga telah berkahwin. Dengan itu, mahkamah diseru memakai ‘ubat’ penyangkalan abang untuk menenangkan kesan buruk daripada tajuk berita tersebut.

Diputuskan: (1) Sedangkan perkataan-perkataan ‘she is married’ sahaja tidak memfitnah, tetapi apabila ditujukan terhadap seorang wanita yang belum berkahwin dan ini telah pun diakui telah diketahui oleh defendan-defendan yang mana wajahnya disiarkan pada muka depan akhbar-akhbar utama dan yang mana sifat dan keperibadiannya telah didedahkan dalam akhbar-akhbar sebagai saksi utama dalam perbicaraan sogokan Anwar Ibrahim, maka di bawah keadaan sedemikian sindiran-sindiran dan inferens yang dibuat oleh orang biasa daripada tajuk berita dan petikan-petikan berikutnya akan menyampaikan maksud yang diberikan kepada kata-kata tersebut oleh plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 539I–540A). (2) Tohmahan bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah bersubahat untuk memfitnah Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim merupakan satu tohmahan ||Page 535>>yang serius dan satu cubaan untuk menimbulkan rasa benci penduduk kampung terhadap plaintif-plaintif. Sekiranya dibiarkan, rencana ini akan menyebabkan salah faham di antara plaintif-plaintif, ibu bapa mereka dan penduduk kampung. Tohmahan tersebut merupakan satu cubaan untuk melabel plaintif-plaintif sebagai pembohong dan/atau penyumpah bohong. Ia

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menebarkan umpatan yang serius ke atas kelakuan dan sifat kedua-dua plaintif (lihat ms 541G–H). (3) Petikan dalam rencana tersebut mencadangkan bahawa kedua-dua plaintif telah berkahwin. Ini adalah pernyataan yang tidak adil, walhal sedar sepenuhnya bahawa mereka memang tidak berkahwin. Pernyataan sedemikian jelas telah melucuthakkan peluang mereka masing-masing untuk menemu orang lain (lihat ms 542F–G). (4) Mahkamah menerima penghujahan plaintif-plaintif bahawa penerbitan yang dipersoalkan telah menyinggung reputasi dan kebolehpercayaan mereka. Penerbitan tersebut apabila dibaca oleh seorang ahli masyarakat yang bersikap adil dan biasa tentu menimbulkan perasaan kebencian ramai dan hina terhadap plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 542G–H). (5) Kegagalan defendan-defendan untuk mengemukakan muka surat Web yang dicetak mestilah dipertanggungjawabkan oleh mereka. Secara alternatif, kegagalan mereka untuk mengemukakan nota-nota penulis atau wartawan sebagai sumber rencana-rencana tersebut mestilah juga dipersalahkan terhadap mereka. Si wartawan tidak membuat sebarang percubaan untuk menentukan kebenaran atau sebaliknya daripada plaintif-plaintif sendiri. Dalam apa jua keadaan pun, sekiranya terdapat penerbitan semula muka surat Web Internet, ini dengan sendirinya merupakan penerbitan pernyataan yang memfitnah (lihat ms 543A–C). (6) Sedangkan tajuk berita dalam tulisan hitam menyatakan ‘Ummi Hafilda NIKAH’, defendan-defendan telah meletakkan kata-kata ‘Azwan Ali jelas status adik’ dalam tulisan putih yang terpacak dalam rintik hitam dengan sempadan bersinar untuk menitikberatkan apa yang telah dikatakan oleh Azwan Ali. Andainya pernyataan yang diletakkan berdampingan itu tidak diletakkan sedemikian, mahkamah mungkin menolak petikan pertama sebagai mempunyai apa-apa kesan memfitnah dengan memakai prinsip ‘bane and balm’. Namun demikian, jauh daripada mengubati kecederaan, defendan-defendan memang telah menggusarkan luka tersebut (lihat ms 544B–C). (7) Mahkamah puas hati bahawa ini merupakan suatu kes di mana ganti rugi pampasan harus diawardkan terhadap setiap seorang defendan. Dengan

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mengambil kira kehadiran sepintas lalu kedua-dua plaintif yang mendapat pemerhatian ramai akibat perbicaraan sogokan Anwar Ibrahim, mahkamah mengawardkan setiap ||Page 536>>seorang plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM25,000 terhadap setiap seorang defendan (lihat ms 544D–E). (8) Defendan-defendan berhasrat menggemparkan perkahwinan plaintif-plaintif yang dikatakan untuk melariskan jualan Bacaria. Dengan itu, mereka harus menerima akibatnya. Maka mahkamah mengawardkan setiap plaintif jumlah lanjut sebanyak RM25,000 terhadap setiap seorang defendan. Walau bagaimanapun, mahkamah mendapati bahawa ini bukanlah suatu kes untuk ganti rugi teladan. Sedangkan terdapat unsur manfaat dalam bentuk keuntungan daripada jualan Bacaria, plaintif-plaintif telah gagal menunjukkan bahawa wujudnya keuntungan yang begitu lumayan hinggakan mewajarkan suatu award di bawah kepala ini (lihat ms 544H–I).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 263–352.

Cases referred to Chalmers v Payne [1835] 2 CM (refd) Charleston & Anor v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Anor [1995] 2 WLR 450 (refd) Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 (refd) Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) Dato’ Abdullah Hishan bin Haji Mohd Hashim v Sharma Kumari Shukla (No 3) [1999] 6 MLJ 589 (refd) Morosi v Broadcasting Station 2 GB Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 418 (refd) Noor Asiah bte Mahmood & Anor v Randhir Singh & Ors [2000] 2 MLJ 175 (refd) Normala Samsudin v Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 654 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 349

Legislation referred to Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act 1984 s 13

John Clark Sumugod (Low Chee Hoong with him) (Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) for the plaintiffs. Haris Ibrahim (Nurul Akmat bte Omar with him) (Haris & Co) for the defendants.

[2000] 6 MLJ 763 Zainudin bin Muhammad v NEC System Intergration Construction Ltd & Ors

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–73 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 2 JUNE 2000

Tort — Defamation — Libellous letter — Defamatory meaning — Whether words ‘We expect that as a respectable businessman, your promise of “trust me, I will pay” will be kept’ were defamatory

Tort — Defamation — Publication — Alleged defamatory statement made to plaintiff only — Whether constitutes publication

The plaintiff had entered into a settlement agreement with two investors to return certain sums of money which they had invested with him. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff was directed to pay a sum of USD7.5m into a bank account belonging to the first defendant by 19 February 1999. The second and third defendants, acting as attorneys for the first defendant wrote to the plaintiff a letter dated 29 January 1999.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 350

The plaintiff contended that the first line of the last paragraph of the letter which reads, ‘We expect that as a respectable businessman, your promise of “trust me, I will pay” will be kept’ was defamatory. However, the senior assistant registrar (‘the SAR’) who heard the case found against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed.

Held, upholding the SAR’s decision and dismissing the appeal: (1) In his statement of claim, the plaintiff had only stated that the second and third defendants as servants or agents of the first defendant wrote and published or caused to be published the letter dated 29 January 1999. However, the plaintiff had made no reference in the statement of claim as to who else the publication was made to. In order to constitute publication, the allegedly defamatory matters must be published to, or communicated to, a third party other than to the plaintiff himself (see p 767C); Sheffil v Van Densen (1859) 79 Mass R 304 followed. The plaintiff also could produce no evidence to substantiate his contention that the letter had been sent by fax; on the contrary there was clear evidence that the said letter was dispatched by express delivery to the plaintiff personally (see p 767E). (2) Nothing defamatory can be found about the the first line of the last paragraph of the letter dated 29 January 1999. The plaintiff was unable to illustrate with any single authority to suggest that the said words had a defamatory meaning and did not even address the court as to how such words could be termed defamatory. Furthermore, the second and third defendants had a legal duty to write the letter to the plaintiff and in the absence of ||Page 764>>express malice, ex facie the letter cannot in any way be defamatory to the plaintiff. The entire final paragraph read together was a plea to the plaintiff to abide by his commitment and a subtle warning to the plaintiff to pay up or else face litigation (see pp 767F–G, I, 768C).

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Plaintif telah memasuki satu perjanjian penyelesaian dengan dua pelabur bagi

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mengembalikan sejumlah wang yang mereka telah melabur dengan beliau. Menurut perjanjian tersebut, plaintif diarahkan membayar sejumlah USD7.5 juta ke dalam akaun bank milik defendan pertama sebelum 19 Februari 1999. Defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga, yang bertindak sebagai peguam defendan pertama telah menulis kepada plaintif sepucuk surat bertarikh 29 Januari 1999. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa baris pertama kepada perenggan terakhir surat tersebut yang berbunyi ‘We expect that as a respectable businessman, your promise of “trust me, I will pay” will be kept’ adalah berunsur fitnah. Namun begitu, penolong kanan pendaftar (‘PKP’) yang mendengar kes tersebut tidak memihak kepada plaintif. Plaintif telah membuat rayuan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan keputusan PKP dan menolak rayuan tersebut: (1) Di dalam pernyataan tuntutan beliau, plaintif hanya menyatakan bahawa defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga sebagai kakitangan atau ejen defendan pertama telah menulis dan menerbitkan atau menyebabkan surat bertarikh 29 Januari 1999 diterbitkan. Namun begitu, plaintif tidak membuat apa-apa rujukan kepada pernyataan tuntutan tersebut tentang siapa lagi penerbitan surat tersebut ditujukan. Untuk membentuk satu penerbitan, perkara-perkara yang didakwa memfitnah mesti diterbitkan kepada, atau disampaikan kepada, satu pihak ketiga selain daripada plaintif seorang (lihat ms 767C); Sheffil v Van Densen (1859) 79 Mass R 304 diikut. Plaintif juga tidak dapat mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan untuk mengukuhkan penegasan beliau bahawa surat tersebut telah dihantar melalui faks; sebaliknya terdapat keterangan yang jelas bahawa surat tersebut telah dihantar melalui hantaran secara ekspres kepada plaintif secara peribadi (lihat ms 767E). (2) Tidak ada apa-apa unsur fitnah yang didapati pada baris pertama kepada perenggan terakhir surat bertarikh 29 Januari 1999 tersebut. Plaintif gagal untuk mengemukakan sebarang autoriti yang mencadangkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan tersebut mempunyai maksud memfitnah dan juga tidak menerangkan kepada mahkamah bagaimana perkataan-perkataan tersebut boleh disifatkan sebagai memfitnah. Tambahan pula, defendan kedua dan ketiga mempunyai kewajipan undang-undang untuk ||Page 765>>menulis surat kepada plaintif dan dengan ketiadaan niat jahat

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 352

nyata, pada ex facie, surat tersebut tidak dalam apa carapun berunsur fitnah kepada plaintif. Keseluruhan perenggan terakhir jika dibaca merupakan satu rayuan kepada plaintif agar mematuhi komitmen beliau dan sebagai amaran tegas kepada plaintif untuk membuat pembayaran, jika tidak akan dikenakan tindakan litigasi (lihat ms 767F–G, I, 768C).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2000 Reissue) paras 193–409.

Cases referred to Baker v Carrick [1894] 1 QB 838 (refd) Sheffil v Van Densen [1859] 79 Mass R 304 (folld)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d)

Abdul Razak Hashim (Razak Jay & Co) for the plaintiff. Vinayaga Raj Rajaratnam (Gowri R Kangeson with him) (Skrine & Co) for the defendants.

[1999] 1 MLJ 139 MBF CAPITAL BHD & ANOR v TOMMY THOMAS & ANOR AND OTHER SUITS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–52 OF 1996 AND OTHER SUITS

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 353

KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 4 DECEMBER 1998

Civil Procedure — Contempt of court — Failure to comply with court order — Plaintiffs sued defendant for defamation — Settlement reached and read in open court — Undertaking by defendant — Defendant later nullified proceedings — Whether defendant should be cited for contempt — Whether defendant should be given custodial sentence — Whether Bar Council should be allowed to have watching brief

The plaintiffs commenced defamation actions against the defendant for his quoted remarks in an article entitled ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’ published in a legal journal called ‘The International Commercial Litigation’. Upon coming to terms of settlement which was read in open court, the defendant accepts that none of the plaintiffs was guilty of the procurement of special favours or of any impropriety whatsoever in the litigation described in the article and apologized to the plaintiffs. The defendant also gave an undertaking to the plaintiffs that he will not repeat or publish the said words in the article and a substantial sum in damages was paid to the plaintiffs. However, subsequent to the recording of the settlement, the defendant faxed a message to three daily newspapers, saying that the settlement of the defamation actions was initiated and insisted upon by the insurance company and it was against his wishes. The defendant later retracted the press statement. The court issued the defendant a notice to show cause on why he should not be cited for contempt. At the hearing of the notice to show cause, the defendant did not oppose the said notice, but only wanted to mitigate. Counsel for the defendant submitted that there is a trend not to impose a custodial sentence when an apology has been tendered immediately. There was also an application by the Bar Council of Malaysia to hold a watching brief in respect of the show cause hearing.

Held, finding the defendant guilty of contempt and sentencing him to six months’ imprisonment: (1) The defendant had not been honest with the court. His explanation that the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 354

press statement which said that ‘the actions were settled despite his express objections’ was meant for the insurers did not hold any merit. It would be an insult to the intelligence of the court to expect the court to accept that explanation. Since the defendant was not challenging the notice to show cause and indicated his intention to only mitigate, he was therefore guilty of issuing a press statement in breach of a court order (see p 151B–C). ||Page 140>> (2) The defendant should have refrained from making any press statement without first consulting with his solicitors. His insistence in continuing to maintain his explanation that he had merely intended to convey his opposition to any settlement to the insurers only was a clear indication that he was not fully and completely contrite and remorseful. As such, a caution and discharge was totally unacceptable. This was a clear case where a custodial sentence was necessary (see pp 152H and 153E–G). (3) Although the Bar Council controls and regulates its members, it ought not to be construed as a licence at large to hold a watching brief. The three grounds provided under common law to enable the Bar Council to make the application for a watching brief had no basis here. Further, since the Bar Council relied on the Legal Profession Act 1976, such reliance must be taken as an abandonment of its reliance on common law (see pp 147F–G and 148D–E); Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v SM Idris & Anor and another application [1990] 1 MLJ 273 followed; Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193 and PP v Seeralan [1985] 2 MLJ 30 distinguished.

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif-plaintif telah memulakan tindakan-tindakan fitnah terhadap defendan kerana kenyataan yang disebutnya di dalam sebuah artikel berjudul ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’, yang diterbitkan oleh sebuah jurnal undang-undang yang dipanggil ‘The International Commercial Litigation’. Setelah mencapai penyelesaian yang telah dibaca di dalam mahkamah terbuka, defendan telah menerima bahawa tiada seorang pun daripada plaintif-plaintif yang bersalah ke atas pemerolehan pertolongan khas atau

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 355

apa-apa ketidaksopanan di dalam litigasi yang dinyatakan di dalam artikel tersebut dan telah meminta maaf kepada plaintif-plaintif. Defendan juga telah memberi akujanji kepada plaintif-plaintif yang dia tidak akan mengulangi atau menerbitkan perkataan-perkataan di dalam artikel tersebut dan sejumlah wang yang cukup banyak telah dibayar kepada plaintif- plaintif. Walau bagaimanapun, selepas sahaja rakaman penyelesaian tersebut, defendan telah memfaks satu pesanan kepada tiga akhbar harian, mengatakan bahawa penyelesaian bagi tindakan-tindakan fitnah tersebut telah dimulakan dan didesak oleh syarikat insurans itu dan adalah bertentangan dengan kehendaknya. Defendan kemudiannya telah menarik balik kenyataan akhbar tersebut. Mahkamah telah mengeluarkan kepada defendan notis tunjuk sebab mengapa dia tidak boleh disabitkan dengan kesalahan menghina mahkamah. Di perbicaraan notis tunjuk sebab tersebut, defendan tidak mempertikaikan notis tersebut, tetapi hanya hendak meringankannya. Peguam defendan menghujahkan bahawa terdapat satu arah aliran untuk tidak menjatuhkan hukuman penjara apabila ||Page 141>> defendan telah meminta maaf dengan segera. Terdapat juga permohonan daripada Majlis Peguam Malaysia untuk mengadakan arahan memerhati berkenaan dengan perbicaraan tunjuk sebab itu.

Diputuskan, mendapati defendan bersalah di atas penghinaan mahkamah dan menjatuhkan hukuman enam bulan penjara: (1) Defendan tidak jujur kepada mahkamah. Penerangannya yang menjelaskan bahawa kenyataan akhbar yang berbunyi ‘tindakan- tindakan tersebut telah diselesaikan walaupun dibantahnya’ telah dimaksudkan kepada syarikat insurans, tidak bermerit. Ianya menyindir kepandaian mahkamah jika mahkamah diharapkan menerima penerangannya itu. Oleh kerana defendan tidak mempertikaikan notis tunjuk sebab tersebut dan hendak meringankannya sahaja, beliau telah bersalah di atas pengeluaran kenyataan akhbar sambil memungkiri perintah mahkamah (lihat ms 150H–I dan 151B–C). (2) Defendan sepatutnya menahan diri daripada membuat kenyataan akhbar tanpa dahulunya berunding dengan peguamcara- peguamcaranya. Ketegasan beliau untuk berterusan mengekalkan penjelasannya yang beliau hanya bertujuan

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 356

memberikan tentangannya terhadap sebarang penyelesaian kepada penanggung insurans sahaja, adalah tanda jelas bahawa beliau tidaklah penuh sesal. Kerana itu, satu amaran dan pelepasan tidak boleh diterima. Ini adalah satu kes jelas di mana satu hukuman penjagaan adalah diperlukan (lihat ms 152H dan 153E–G). (3) Walaupun Majlis Peguam mengawal ahli-ahlinya, ia tidak sepatutnya ditafsirkan sebagai lesen untuk mengadakan arahan memerhati. Ketiga- tiga alasan yang diberikan di bawah common law untuk membolehkan Majlis Peguam untuk membuat permohonan untuk satu arahan memerhati tidak mempunyai dasar di sini. Lagi, oleh kerana Majlis Peguam telah bergantung kepada Akta Profesyen Undang-Undang 1976, pergantungan tersebut mestilah diambil sebagai penghentian pergantungannya ke atas common law (lihat ms 147F–G dan 148D–E); Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v SM Idris & Anor and another application [1990] 1 MLJ 273 diikut; Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193 dan PP v Seeralan [1985] 2 MLJ 30 dibeza.]

Notes For a case on failure to comply with court order, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) para 1124.

Cases referred to An Advocate & Solicitor, Re; Ex parte The Law Society of Singapore for Judicial Review [1987] 2 MLJ 21 (refd) ||Page 142>> Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos Ratos v City Specialist Centre Sdn Bhd [1996] 3 MLJ 349 (refd) Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193 (distd) Bar Council, Maharashtra v MV Dabholkar [1975] AIR 2092 (refd) Caxton (Kelang) Sdn Bhd v Susan Labrooy & Anor [1988] 2 MLJ 604 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 357

Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 MLJ 240 (refd) Dr Leela Ratos & Ors v Anthony Ratos s/o Domingos Ratos & Ors [1997] 1 MLJ 704 (refd) PP v Seeralan [1985] 2 MLJ 30 (distd) Trustees of Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi (Penang) Registered & Ors v SM Idris & Anor and another application [1990] 1 MLJ 273 (folld) Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor and another appeal [1995] 3 MLJ 549 (refd)

Legislation referred to Legal Profession Act 1976 ss 42(1)(a), (e), 57(d), 103E(1), (2), (3), (4) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 5(2)

Cecil Abraham ( Darryl Goon, Gurmeet Kaur and Raja Aileen Soraya with him) ( Raja Darryl & Loh) for the defendant. Zaitun Zawiyah bte Putih on behalf of the Attorney General’s Chambers. Mah Weng Kwai on behalf of the Bar Council of Malaysia.

[1999] 1 MLJ 371 CHOK FOO CHOO @ CHOK KEE LIAN v THE CHINA PRESS BHD

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO N–02–85 OF 1996 GOPAL SRI RAM, ABU MANSOR AND DENIS ONG JJCA 7 NOVEMBER 1998

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 358

Tort — Defamation — Press release — Article published in respondent’s newspaper — Appellant alleged words in article were defamatory — Trial judge held words were fair — Whether article was in fact defamatory — Whether defence of fair comment applicable

The appellant was a businessman and a member of the Malaysian Chinese Association or MCA. The respondent was the publisher of a well-known newspaper in the Chinese language. In one issue of the respondent’s newspaper, there appeared an article which the appellant argued had defamed him. He alleged that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the offending article meant that he was a cheat and that he was guilty of issuing false statements to the press with the intention of gaining popularity. In other words, the article conveyed the meaning that the appellant was untrustworthy. The first defendant in the High Court denied having used the alleged words which appeared in the article. The High Court judge found the article in question not to be defamatory and that it was ‘not lopsided’. He, therefore, dismissed the appellant’s claim.

Held, allowing the appeal: Whether the words complained of are defamatory is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. The article clearly suggested that the appellant was a person who, under the guise of doing service, was in fact making false statements in order to deceive people. The implication was that the appellant was a man given to deception and was untrustworthy. To say that a man is a cheat and a liar is a serious defamation of him. It has the effect of lowering the appellant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. The judge in the present case had erred when he held that the words complained of were not defamatory of the appellant. Further, the judge had found that the offending article was ‘not lopsided’, which meant that it was fair for purposes of the defence of fair comment. However, ‘fair’ in the defence of fair comment does not mean ‘not lopsided’, but actually ‘honest’. The facts of the present case clearly fell short of making out the defence of fair comment (see pp 375B–D, 376E–F and 377B).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 359

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Perayu adalah seorang ahli perniagaan dan seorang ahli Persatuan Orang-Orang Cina Malaysia atau MCA. Penentang adalah penerbit sebuah akhbar yang terkenal di dalam bahasa Cina. Di dalam satu isu ||Page 372>> akhbar penentang, terdapat satu rencana yang dikatakan perayu telah memfitnahya. Dia mengatakan bahawa makna biasa dan lazim perkataan-perkataan di dalam rencana yang menyinggungkan itu menunjukkan bahawa dia seorang penipu dan telah bersalah dalam mengeluarkan kenyataan-kenyataan palsu kepada pihak akhbar dengan niat untuk mendapat kepopularan. Dalam ertikata lain, rencana tersebut telah menyampaikan maksud yang perayu tidak boleh dipercayai. Defendan pertama telah menafikan, di dalam Mahkamah Tinggi, bahawa dia telah menggunakan perkataan- perkataan seperti yang dituduh, yang terdapat di dalam rencana tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati rencana tersebut tidak berunsur fitnah dan tidak berat sebelah. Beliau kemudiannya telah menolak tuntutan perayu.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan: Sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan adalah berunsur fitnah ialah satu persoalan fakta yang bergantung kepada hal keadaan sesuatu kes itu. Rencana tersebut dengan jelasnya mencadangkan bahawa perayu adalah seorang yang, ketika berpura-pura menjalankan perkhidmatan, sebenarnya membuat kenyataan- kenyataan palsu untuk menipu orang ramai. Implikasinya adalah perayu ialah seseorang yang suka menipu dan tidak boleh dipercayai. Mengatakan bahawa seseorang itu adalah penipu atau pembohong, adalah fitnah yang serius terhadap dirinya. Ianya membawa kesan merendahkan perayu di dalam tanggapan ahli-ahli masyarakat yang berfikiran waras amya. Hakim di dalam kes ini telah melakukan kesilapan apabila dia memutuskan bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang diadukan itu adalah tidak memfitnah perayu. Selanjutnya, hakim telah mendapati rencana yang menyinggung itu tidak berat sebelah, bermakna, ianya adalah wajar untuk tujuan pembelaan komen berpatutan. Walau bagaimana pun, ‘wajar’ di dalam pembelaan komen berpatutan tidak bermakna ‘tidak berat sebelah’, tetapi sebenarnya ‘jujur’. Fakta-fakta di dalam kes ini tidak menunjukkan bahawa pembelaan komen berpatutan boleh digunakan (lihat ms 375B–D, 376E–F dan 377B).]

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 360

Notes For cases on press release, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1995 Reissue) paras 242–243.

Cases referred to JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 (refd) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) Langlands v Leng (1916) SC (HL) 102 (refd) London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (refd) ||Page 373>> Sutherland & Ors v Stopes [1925] AC 47 (refd) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (refd)

Legislation referred to Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 s 8A

Civil Suit No 23(25)–198 of 1988 (High Court, Seremban)

Manian Raju ( R Shan & Associates) for the appellant. M Punitha ( YS Woo & Proctor) for the respondent.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case

[1999] 2 MLJ 654 NORMALA SAMSUDIN v KELUARGA COMMUNICATION

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 361

SDN BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–12 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 13 APRIL 1999

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of article alleging payment of money to husband to release wife from marriage bond by way of ‘tebus talak’ — Whether defamatory — Whether plaintiff authorized such publication — Whether aggravated and exemplary damages proved

The plaintiff is a well known television personality and a prime time newscaster with TV3. The defendant, the publisher of Mingguan Wanita (‘the magazine’), had on its 26 January - 2 February 1996 issue, published on its cover a photograph of the plaintiff, and an article which, inter alia, mentions a third person in her married life and the payment of RM3m to her husband to release her — by way of ‘tebus talak’ — from her marriage bond (‘the article’). The plaintiff alleged that the article was defamatory of her and was understood to bear the meanings and inferences that the plaintiff bought herself off from her marriage bondage by paying her ex-husband the sum of RM3m. The defendant, while admiting to publishing the magazine with the main photograph of the plaintiff: (i) denied that the article in its ordinary meaning bears any meaning defamatory of the plaintiff; (ii) averred that the plaintiff authorized the publication of the article; and (iii) alleged that as full satisfaction of the plaintiff’s cause of action, the defendant had caused to be published in a conspicuous position in the subsequent magazines an explanation and also an apology by the defendant for publishing the article.

Held, awarding a sum of RM100,000 as general damages for the libel, and a further sum of RM100,000 as aggravated damages with interest on both sums: (1) The article in its natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendoes

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conveyed the meaning that the plaintiff was a person whose marriage bond had a price tag to it and that for a payment of RM3m she was bought off her marriage vows. It connotes a loose charactered woman with lax morals. Thus, the words complained of by the plaintiff were indeed calculated to expose her to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or that such words tend to lower her in the esteem of right thinking members of the public generally (see p 662E–G). (2) Whilst ‘tebus talak’ by itself is an innocent expression of a mode of divorce available to a wife, the reference to a third party making payment of the compensation to the husband is downright vilification of the plaintiff’s good name (see p 663I). ||Page 655>> (3) On the defence contention that the plaintiff authorized or acquiesced in the publication of the article, the court found that this was not borne out by the evidence nor pursued by the defence. The court was therefore satisfied that the plaintiff had indeed made out a case for libel (see p 665H–I). (4) A case of aggravated damages had also been proved. The defendant aggravated the defamation by further repeating the libel in publications subsequent to the impugned publication, despite a complaint by the plaintiff. The defendant’s half hearted attempt at an apology was another factor to consider in awarding aggravated damages (see p 666D–F). (5) Since it is required that a claim of exemplary damages which are punitive in nature be specifically pleaded and since in this case the plaintiff had not pleaded specifically for exemplary damages, the court would decline to consider the same even though the plaintiff has included this claim in her submission (see pp 666I–667A).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif adalah seorang personaliti televisyen dan juga pembaca berita utama di TV3. Defendan, penerbit Mingguan Wanita (‘majalah tersebut’), telah pada isu 26 Januari - 2 Februari 1996, menerbitkan pada muka depan majalah tersebut gambar plaintif dan

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suatu rencana yang antara lain, menyatakan seorang pihak ketiga dalam kehidupan perkahwinannya dan pembayaran RM3 juta kepada suaminya untuk melepaskannya — secara tebus talak — daripada ikatan perkahwinannya (‘rencana tersebut’). Plaintif tersebut mengatakan bahawa rencana tersebut memfitnahkannya dan difaham sebagai membawa maksud-maksud dan inferens bahawa plaintif telah membeli diri daripada ikatan perkahwinannya dengan membayar bekas suaminya sejumlah RM3 juta. Defendan sementara mengaku menerbitkan majalah tersebut dengan gambar utama plaintif: (i) menafikan bahawa rencana tersebut dalam maksud biasa membawa apa-apa maksud yang memfitnah plaintif; (ii) menegaskan bahawa plaintif telah memberikan autoriti untuk menerbitkan rencana tersebut; dan (iii) mengatakan bahawa sebagai memuaskan sepenuhnya kausa tindakan plaintif, defendan telah menerbitkan dalam dengan jelas di dalam penerbitan yang seterusnya suatu penjelasan dan juga kemaafan oleh defendan kerana menerbitkan rencana tersebut.

Diputuskan, mengaward jumlah sebanyak RM100,000 sebagai ganti rugi am untuk libel, dan juga jumlah selanjutnya sebanyak RM100,000 sebagai ganti rugi teruk (aggravated damages) dengan faedah untuk jumlah kedua-dua ganti rugi: (1) Rencana tersebut dalam maksud semulajadi dan biasa dan/atau secara sindiran telah membawa maksud bahawa plaintif adalah ||Page 656>> seorang di mana ikatan perkahwinannya mempunyai tanda harga di atasnya dan dengan pembayaran RM3 juta, beliau dilepaskan daripada ikatan perkahwinannya. Ia membawa konotasi seorang wanita yang berperangai murahan dengan keruntuhan moral. Oleh itu, perkataan yang diadu oleh plaintif sememangnya dikira akan mendedahkannya kepada kebencian, cemuhan dan penghinaan di dalam pemikiran seorang yang munasabah atau perkataan-perkataan sebegini berkecenderungan secara am untuk merendahkannya di pandangan pemikiran orang awam yang biasa (lihat ms 662E–G). (2) Walaupun tebus talak dengan sendirinya merupakan ungkapan tidak negatif mengenai cara perceraian yang terbuka kepada seorang isteri, rujukan kepada pihak ketiga membuat pembayaran sebagai ganti rugi kepada suami adalah dengan jelas suatu pencercaan nama baik plaintif (lihat ms 663I).

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(3) Atas penegasan pembelaan bahawa plaintif telah memberi kebenaran atau bersetuju kepada penerbitan rencana tersebut, mahkamah mendapati bahawa ini tidak dibuat melalui keterangan atau ditegaskan oleh pembelaan. Oleh itu, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa plaintif telah membuktikan satu kes libel (lihat ms 665H–I). (4) Suatu kes ganti rugi teruk juga telah dibuktikan. Pihak pembelaan telah memburukkan fitnah tersebut dengan selanjutnya mengulang libel tersebut di dalam penerbitan-penerbitan yang kemudian kepada penerbitan yang dipersoalkan tersebut, walaupun telah diadu oleh plaintif. Cubaan defendan yang tidak ikhlas dalam membuat kemaafan adalah suatu faktor lain yang dipertimbangkan dalam mengaward ganti rugi teruk (lihat ms 666D–F). (5) Oleh kerana keperluan untuk tuntutan ganti rugi teladan yang berbentuk hukuman perlu diplidkan secara spesifik dan oleh kerana plaintif tidak memplid secara spesifik untuk gantirugi teladan, mahkamah tidak akan mempertimbangkannya walaupun plaintif telah memasukkan tuntutan ini di dalam hujahannya (lihat ms 666I–667A).]

Cases referred to Chapman v Lord Ellesmere & Ors [1932] 2 KB 431 (refd) Lewis & Anor v Daily Telegraph Ltd; Same v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493 (refd) Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Malayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd) ||Page 657>>

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

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Yusuf Khan bin Ghows Khan ( Cantius Leo with him) ( Yusuf Khan & Pathamanathan) for the plaintiff. Haris Ibrahim ( Zuwita Kamaruzaman with him) ( Adam & Co) for the defendant.

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[1999] 2 MLJ 681 NANANG INTERNATIONAL SDN BHD v THE CHINA PRESS BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–37 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 9 MARCH 1999

Civil Procedure — Estoppel — Issue estoppel — Plaintiff filed earlier suit for defamation against other defendants over publication of defamatory articles — Subsequent defamation suit against another defendant relying on same grounds and evidence — Contention that since defendant was different in subsequent suit, neither res judicata nor issue estoppel would apply — Whether doctrine of issue estoppel precluded plaintiff from attempting to obtain conflicting decision in respect of identical issues already determined in an earlier decision

The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant in respect of an article published by the defendant alleging that the article concerned was defamatory of the plaintiff. The plaintiff averred that the article in its natural and ordinary meaning and in the innuendoes contained therein was understood to contain 22 different explicit meanings. The plaintiff had also filed an earlier suit for defamation against three defendants

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alleging that the defendants had published several articles defamatory of the plaintiff. The earlier suit also contained an averment that the articles were understood to contain the identical 22 different explicit meanings. The earlier suit was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. The defendant made an application to stay the plaintiff’s action pending the outcome of the plaintiff’s appeal on the ground of issue estoppel. The plaintiff contended that in this suit, the defendant was different and therefore neither res judicata nor issue estoppel would apply against it.

Held, allowing the application: (1) Whilst the defendants in each of the two suits were different, the plaintiff had relied on the identical 22 explicit meanings that it had attributed to the articles appearing in both suits. Therefore, it was totally unrealistic to contend that because the parties to the earlier suit and the present suit were different, the plea of issue estoppel would not apply especially when the two actions arose from identical issues and similar evidence would be relied upon (see p 688B–C). (2) The wider approach to a plea of issue estoppel ought to be preferred. Thus, where the issue as to whether the articles published were defamatory of the plaintiff had been answered in the negative in the earlier suit, the plaintiff was estopped from arguing otherwise in respect of an identical article published in a different newspaper which was the subject matter of a different action and involving a different defendant. The doctrine of issue estoppel precluded the plaintiff from attempting to obtain a conflicting decision in respect of identical issues already determined against him in the earlier decision (see pp 686I– 687C); Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 followed. ||Page 682>> Obiter: There was no reason at all why the plaintiff could not have joined all the defendants in one suit. Alternatively, the plaintiff could have applied to consolidate this suit with the earlier suit so that the identical issues could have been disposed off at one and the same time (see p 686C–D).

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[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif memfailkan satu permohonan terhadap defendan berhubung dengan rencana yang diterbitkan oleh defendan dan mendakwa bahawa rencana yang berkenaan memfitnah plaintif. Plaintif menegaskan bahawa rencana tersebut dalam maksud biasa dan semulajadinya dan mengikut sindiran yang terdapat di dalamnya difahamkan sebagai mengandungi 22 maksud eksplisit yang berlainan. Plaintif telah juga memfailkan satu guaman memfitnah yang lebih awal terdapat tiga pihak defendan yang mendakwa bahawa defendan-defendan tersebut telah menerbitkan beberapa artikel memfitnah mengenai plaintif. Guaman yang lebih awal itu juga mengandungi penegasan bahawa rencana-rencana tersebut adalah difahamkan mengandungi 22 macam maksud eksplisit yang sama tersebut. Guaman yang lebih awal itu telah ditolak dan plaintif telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Defendan telah membuat satu permohonan untuk menggantung tindakan plaintif sementara menantikan keputusan rayuan plaintif atas alasan estopel isu. Plaintif telah memutuskan bahawa dalam guaman ini, defendan adalah berlainan dan dengan itu res judicata mahupun isu estopel tidak boleh dipakai terhadapnya.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan: (1) Walaupun defendan-defendan dalam setiap satu dari kedua-dua guaman tersebut adalah berlainan, plaintif telah bergantung kepada 22 maksud eksplisit yang sama itu yang ia telah kaitkan dengan rencana tersebut yang terdapat dalam kedua-dua guaman tersebut. Dengan itu, adalah sesungguhnya tidak wajar untuk memutuskan bahawa oleh kerana kedua-dua pihak kepada guaman yang lebih awal itu dan guaman semasa ini adalah berlainan, pengataan kepada isu estopel tidak akan terpakai, lebih-lebih lagi apabila kedua-dua tindakan tersebut berbangkit dari isu yang sama dan akan bergantung kepada keterangan yang sama (lihat ms 688B–C). (2) Pendekatan yang lebih luas kepada sesuatu pengataan isu estopel harus diutamakan. Dengan itu, di mana isu berhubung dengan sama ada rencana tersebut adalah bersifat memfitnah plaintif telah pun dijawab dengan tidak mengiakannya dalam guaman yang lebih awal itu, plaintif diestop daripada

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berhujah sebaliknya berhubung dengan rencana yang sama yang telah diterbitkan ||Page 683>> dalam surat khabar yang berlainan yang merupakan hal perkara tindakan yang berlainan dan melibatkan defendan yang berlainan. Doktrin isu estopel menghalang plaintif daripada mencuba untuk memperolehi keputusan yang bercanggahan berhubung dengan isu-isu yang sama yang telah pun ditentukan terhadapnya dalam keputusan yang lebih awal (lihat ms 686I–687C); Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 diikut. Obiter: Tidak terdapat sebarang alasan sama sekali mengapa plaintif tidak boleh menyertai semua defendan-defendan dalam satu guaman. Secara alternatifnya, plaintif sepatutnya boleh memohon untuk menggabungkan guaman ini dengan guaman yang lebih awal supaya isu-isu yang sama boleh diselesaikan pada masa yang sama (lihat ms 686C–D).]

Notes For cases on issue estoppel, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 1683–1685.

Cases referred to AMDB Factoring Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Arab-Malaysian Enterprises Sdn Bhd) v Iszajaya Sdn Bhd [1997] 5 MLJ 402 (refd) Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 (refd) North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547 (refd) Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd & Anor [1975] AC 581 (folld)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 Schedule, para 11

Mohan Krishnan ( Sri Ram & Co) for plaintiff.

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Lorraine Cheah ( Shearn Delamaore & Co) for defendant.

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[1999] 3 MLJ 138 HOE THEAN SUN & ANOR v LIM TEE KENG

HIGH COURT (ALOR SETAR) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22–117 OF 1994 KN SEGARA J 21 JUNE 1998

Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Statements made in police report — Onus to prove malice on plaintiff — Whether filing of civil suit negatives malice — Whether failure to withdraw police report and failure of civil suit relevant

The defendant was a director and shareholder of Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd (‘Sey Hoe’). On 1 September 1993, he lodged a police report pertaining to the sale of shares in Sey Hoe. The plaintiff was the solicitor who prepared the sale and purchase agreement of the shares. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant alleging that certain statements appearing in the police report were defamatory of him. The defendant testified that he believed the facts stated in the police report were true at the time he lodged the report. It was noted that the defendant had obtained an ex parte injunction to restrain Sey Hoe from transferring the shares.

Held, dismissing the claim: (1) When words are published which are both false and defamatory, the law presumes malice on the part of the person who publishes them. However, when

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the publication takes place under circumstances which create qualified privilege, the presumption of malice is rebutted by the privilege and the plaintiff has to prove express or actual malice on the part of the person responsible for the publication to defeat the privilege. The law clearly recognizes that all statements made in a police report are statements made on a privileged occasion. However, the privilege is qualified and not absolute (see p 142 B–D). (2) The onus lies on the plaintiff to prove malice and not the defendant to prove his bona fides or absence of malice. When the occasion is privileged, the bona fides of the defendant is always presumed. In the present case, there was no doubt that in law the defendant published the defamatory statements on a privileged occasion. It was therefore to be assumed that he published it honestly believing his statements to be true unless there was some evidence to the contrary (see p 142E–F). (3) The fact that the defendant had filed a civil suit against the plaintiff tend to negative any malice on the part of the defendant and in fact reinforced the defendant’s assertion that he sincerely believed the statements in the report were true. For the purpose of determining malice at the time the report was made, it was irrelevant whether the defendant succeeded in his suit against the plaintiff. The fact that he instituted the suit was clear evidence of bona fides on his part. The fact that the defendant had not withdrawn the police report to date even after he lost his case ||Page 139>> against the plaintiff was totally irrelevant to the issue of malice at the time the statements were made in the police report. The plaintiff had failed to discharge the onus to prove malice. There was neither intrinsic nor extraneous evidence of actual malice in this case. The defence of qualified privileged must succeed (see pp 142I–143C).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Defendan adalah pengarah dan juga pemegang saham Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd (‘Sey Hoe’). Pada 1 September 1993, beliau telah membuat laporan polis berkenaan dengam penjualan saham-saham Sey Hoe. Plaintif adalah peguam yang menyediakan perjanjian jual beli saham-saham tersebut. Plaintif telah membawa tindakan terhadap defendan

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dengan mengatakan bahawa beberapa kenyataan yang terdapat di dalam laporan polis memfitnahnya. Defendan telah memberikan keterangan bahwa beliau percaya bahawa fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan di dalam laporan polis adalah benar pada masa beliau membuat laporan polis. Perlu diperhatikan bahawa defendan telah mendapat injunksi ex parte untuk menghalang Sey Hoe daripada memindahkan saham-saham.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan tersebut: (1) Apabila perkataan-perkataan yang tidak benar dan memfitnah diterbitkan, undang-undang menganggap terdapat niat jahat di pihak orang yang menerbitkannya. Tetapi, apabila penerbitan tersebut berlaku di bawah keadaan yang mewujudkan keistimewaan bersyarat, anggapan niat jahat dipatahkan oleh keistimewaan tersebut dan plaintif terpaksa membuktikan niat jahat yang nyata atau sebenar di pihak orang yang bertanggungjawab untuk penerbitan tersebut untuk menolak keistimewaan tersebut. Undang-undang dengan jelas mengakui bahawa semua kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat di dalam laporan polis adalah kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat atas keistimewaan. Tetapi keistimewaan tersebut adalah bersyarat dan tidak mutlak (lihat ms 142B–D). (2) Beban adalah terletak di atas plaintif untuk membuktikan niat jahat dan bukan defendan untuk membuktikan bona fide atau ketiadaan niat jahat. Apabila wujud keistimewaan, bona fide defendan adalah sentiasa dianggapkan. Di dalam kes ini, tidak dapat disangsikan bahawa di dalam undang-undang, defendan telah menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan yang memfitnah semasa wujud keistimewaan. Oleh itu, boleh dianggapkan bahawa beliau telah menerbitkannya dengan secara jujur mempercayai bahawa kenyataan-kenyataannya adalah benar kecuali terdapat keterangan di sebaliknya (lihat ms 142E–F). (3) Fakta bahawa defendan telah memfailkan tindakan sivil terhadap plaintif berkencenderungan untuk menidakkan sebarang niat ||Page 140>> jahat di pihak defendan dan sebenarnya menyokong penegasan defendan bahawa beliau benar-benar percaya bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut di dalam laporan tersebut adalah benar. Bagi tujuan untuk menentukan niat jahat pada masa laporan dibuat, ia adalah tidak berkaitan sama ada

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defendan berjaya di dalam tindakannya terhadap plaintif. Fakta bahawa beliau memulakan tindakan tersebut adalah keterangan jelas bona fide di pihaknya. Fakta bahawa defendan tidak menarik balik laporan polis tersebut sehingga kini walaupun selepas kalah dalam kes terhadap plaintif adalah tidak berkaitan sepenuhnya kepada isu niat jahat pada masa kenyataan-kenyataan dibuat di dalam laporan polis. Plaintif telah gagal untuk memuaskan beban untuk membuktikan niat jahat. Tidak juga terdapat keterangan dalaman atau luaran berkenaan niat jahat yang sebenar di dalam kes. Pembelaan keistimewaan bersyarat tersebut mestilah berjaya (lihat ms 142I–143C).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 (refd)

George John ( George John & Co) for the plaintiffs. John Khoo ( Ismail, Khoo & Associates) for the defendant.

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[1999] 3 MLJ 189 PANG FEE YOON v PIONG KIEN SIONG & ORS

HIGH COURT (MELAKA) — CIVIL SUIT NO 22– 99 OF 1998 SURIYADI J

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5 JULY 1999

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Allegation that plaintiff accountant had acted contrary to ethics of accountant — Complaint filed with professional board of accountants — Burden of establishing truth of statement falls on defendant — Defence of qualified privilege — Test of ordinary and law abiding citizen — Assessment of damages on a compensatory basis — Whether claim proved

The defendants were members of a partnership. The plaintiff, an accountant, was employed by the partnership to audit and draw up its account. On 30 November 1993, the defendants withdrew from the partnership. On 9 January 1998, the defendants affirmed statutory declarations stating that they had been fraudulently induced to withdraw from the partnership by a valuation of business report (‘the report’) prepared by the plaintiff. They also affirmed that the plaintiff had acted contrary to the ethics of accountant and filed a complaint with The Malaysian Institute of Accountant (‘the MIA’). At the completion of the investigation by the MIA, the plaintiff had been exonerated. The plaintiff brought an action for defamation against the defendants alleging that his name had been smeared and had suffered financially and socially. There was no successful cross-examination, no aducement of documents or calling of witnesses by the defendants to rebut the assertion of the plaintiff that the report was only ready by 9 December 1993.

Held, allowing the plaintiff’s claim: (1) Perusing the evidence, it was clear that the defendants by 30 November 1993 had written in to declare of their intention to withdraw from the partnership. If the withdrawal had taken place earlier than the completion of the report, then it was baseless to allege that the report influenced the defendants’ decision. The lack of truth of the statutory declarations reflect their malice against the plaintiff (see p 196A–B). (2) The law presumes that defamatory words are false with the burden of establishing the truth of any statement falling squarely on the defendant. In the

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present case, the defendants failed to establish the truth of the statement. The evidential burden on this specific issue, not on the case proper, therefore was never reshifted to the plaintiff (see p 196F–H). (3) The defence of qualified privilege was not successfully implemented. There was absence of common interest or mutual concern between the defendants and the MIA. Further, the five-year period between the date of the withdrawal and the affirmation of the statutory declarations followed by the sending of the documents to the MIA magnified their ill-will. Any ||Page 190>> assertion of public spiritedness was insufficient to qualify for the defence of qualified privilege (see pp 196I–197C). (4) Having perused the statutory declarations irrespective of the effect of the incorrect accusation, the court was satisfied that the natural and ordinary meaning of those words meant exactly as how they were written. Those words were plain and not intrisincally ambiguous and easily interpreted as libellous by the ordinary man. To the ordinary and law abiding citizen, he had acted fraudulently, contravened the by-laws of his profession and had behaved in a manner unbecoming of an accountant (see p 197G–H). (5) The general rule is that damages are to be assessed on a compensatory basis, ie to compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused to him by those libellous words. That compensation may be inflated by certain aggravating factors. In the present case, the court took into account the fact that the plaintiff was an accountant whose very financial success would depend on the public’s estimation of his integrity and character. Any reduction in that estimation would directly affect his future, socially or financially (see p 199D–F).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Defendan-defendan merupakan ahli-ahli sebuah perkongsian. Plaintif, seorang akauntan, telah digaji oleh perkongsian tersebut untuk mengaudit dan membuat akaunnya. Pada 30 November 1993, defendan-defendan menarik diri daripada perkongsian tersebut. Pada 9 Januari 1998, defendan-defendan mengikrarkan akaun berkanun menyatakan bahawa mereka telah didorong secara fraud untuk menarik diri daripada perkongsian tersebut oleh suatu laporan penilaian perniagaan (‘laporan

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tersebut’) yang disediakan oleh plaintif. Mereka juga mengikrarkan bahawa plaintif telah bertindak bertentangan dengan etika-etika akauntan dan memfailkan suatu aduan dengan Institut Akauntan-Akauntan Malaysia (‘IAM’). Apabila selesainya siasatan oleh IAM, plaintif telah dilepaskan daripada tuduhan. Plaintif membawa suatu tindakan untuk fitnah terhadap defendan-defendan mendakwa bahawa nama beliau telah diburuk-burukkan dan telah terjejas dari segi kewangan dan sosial. Tidak terdapat pemeriksaan balas yang berjaya, tiada pengemukaan dokumen-dokumen atau pemanggilan saksi-saksi oleh defendan- defendan untuk mematahkan penegasan oleh plaintif bahawa laporan tersebut hanya siap pada 9 Disember 1993.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan plaintif: (1) Dengan meneliti keterangan, adalah jelas bahawa defendan- defendan menjelang 30 November 1993 telah menulis untuk mengisytiharkan niat mereka untuk menarik diri daripada perkongsian tersebut. Jikalau penarikan balik tersebut telah ||Page 191>> dibuat lebih awal daripada selesainya laporan tersebut, maka adalah tidak berasas untuk mendakwa bahawa laporan tersebut mempengaruhi keputusan defendan-defendan. Kekurangan kebenaran akuan berkanun menggambarkan niat jahat mereka terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 196A–B). (2) Undang-undang menganggap bahawa perkataan-perkataan fitnah tersebut adalah palsu dengan beban membuktikan kebenaran apa-apa pernyataan jatuh betul-betul pada defendan. Di dalam kes ini, defendan-defendan telah gagal membuktikan kebenaran pernyataan tersebut. Beban keterangan berkenaan dengan isu yang spesifik ini, bukan pada kes sebenarnya, tidak pernah dialih semula kepada plaintif (lihat ms 196F–H). (3) Pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat tidak berjaya dilaksanakan. Tidak terdapat kepentingan bersama atau ambil berat yang sama antara defendan-defendan dan IAM. Tambahan, tempoh lima tahun antara tarikh penarikan balik dan ikrar akuan berkanun tersebut dengan diikuti oleh penghantaran dokumen-dokumen tersebut kepada IAM menegaskan lagi niat buruk mereka. Apa-apa penegasan mengambil berat tentang orang ramai adalah tidak mencukupi untuk layak kepada pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat (lihat ms 196I–197C).

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(4) Setelah meneliti akuan berkanun tersebut, tanpa mengira kesan tuduhan tidak betul tersebut, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa maksud semulajadi dan biasa perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah sebagaimana yang telah ditulis. Perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah biasa dan bukannya secara intrinsik tidak jelas dan dengan mudahnya ditafsirkan sebagai libel oleh orang biasa. Kepada orang biasa dan warganegara yang mematuhi undang- undang, beliau telah bertindak secara fraud, melanggar undang- undang kecil profesion beliau dan telah berkelakuan dengan cara yang tidak wajar untuk seorang akauntan (lihat ms 197G–H). (5) Prinsip am adalah bahawa ganti rugi adalah ditaksirkan atas dasar pampasan, iaitu untuk memberi pampasan kepada plaintif untuk kerosakan kepada beliau yang disebabkan oleh perkataan- perkataan libel tersebut. Pampasan tersebut boleh dilambungkan oleh faktor-faktor tertentu yang lebih keruh. Di dalam kes ini, mahkamah telah mengambil kira fakta bahawa plaintif adalah seorang akauntan yang mana kejayaan kewangannya adalah bergantung kepada pandangan orang awam akan integriti dan perilaku beliau. Apa-apa pengurangan dalam pandangan tersebut akan secara langsung menjejaskan masa depannya, secara sosial atau kewangan (lihat ms 199D–F).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230. ||Page 192>>

Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 (refd) Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd (1948) 64 TLR 177 (refd) Chop Kim Lee Seng Kee v Yeo Kiat Jin [1956] MLJ 67 (refd) Clarence Wilfred v Tengku Adnan bin Tg Mahmud & Anor [1983] 1 CLJ 136 (refd) Coopers & Lybrand v Singapore Society of Accountants & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 134

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(refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohamed Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (refd) Gordon Berkeley Jones v Clement John Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 (refd) Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor [1978] 1 MLJ 75 (refd) Henry Wong v John Lee & Anor [1980] 2 MLJ 254 (refd) Hobbs v Tinling (CT) & Co Ltd; Hobbs v Nottingham Journal Ltd [1929] 2 KB 1 (refd) Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 2 SLR 310 (refd) John v Dharmaratnam [1962] MLJ 187 (refd) John Lee & Anor v Henry Wong Jan Fook [1981] 1 MLJ 108 (refd) Lau Chee Kuan v Chow Soong Seong & Ors [1955] MLJ 21 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Seow Khee Leng [1989] 1 MLJ 172 (refd) McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Ors (No 2) [1965] 2 QB 86 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) Rookes v Barnard & Ors [1964] AC 1129 (refd) S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 (refd) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too and Workers’ Party v Attorney General of Singapore [1975] 1 MLJ 47 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 18

CS Ng ( CS Ng & Associates) for the plaintiff. Peter Foo ( Foo Nyong Tiam & Associates) for the defendants.

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MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 378

[1999] 3 MLJ 529 RATUS MESRA SDN BHD v SHAIK OSMAN MAJID & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2–23–20 OF 1997 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 2 JUNE 1999

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Article in newspaper pursuant to advertisement put up by plaintiff — Objective test — Words must be given meaning in which reasonable man would understand it — Need to consider whole article — Fair comment upon matter of public interest — No proof of express malice shown to negative defence of fair comment — Whether claim for malicious falsehood should also be dismissed

The plaintiff was in the business of ostrich farming. The plaintiff had advertised its business in the newspaper inviting investment in ostrich farming. Following the publication of the advertisement, the defendant published an article entitled ‘Ostrich farms should provide prospectus’. The plaintiff claimed that the words contained in certain paragraphs of the article in their natural meaning were understood to mean that the public or potential investors must act with caution in respect of the plaintiff’s dubious advertisement, that the advertise- ment was deceiving, that there must be legal constraints on the plaintiff’s freedom to trade, that investors should be suspicious of the plaintiff’s motives, that the plaintiff’s scheme was a sham and nothing less than an unscrupulous scheme. The plaintiff thus claimed for damages for libel as well as for malicious falsehood against the defendant. The defendant submitted that the words in the article were not defamatory of the plaintiff, that the article was a fair comment upon a matter of public interest and that there was no proof of express malice shown to negative the defence of fair comment. The defendant also denied the claim for malicious falsehood.

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Held, dismissing the claim: (1) The test to be applied when considering whether a statement is defamatory of a plaintiff is an objective one in that it must be given a meaning in which a reasonable man would understand it and for this purpose, ie in considering whether the words complained of contained any defamatory imputation, it is necessary to consider the whole article. Having read the entire article, the court found that reading the article would convey to an ordinary reader that the investment in ostrich farming is risky and can result in losses as well as profits. It will also alert the reader to the fact that any potential investor must exercise caution when investing in ostrich farming. The court found that the alleged innuendoes could not have the meaning and intention attributed to the article as contended by the plaintiff (see pp 535C–D, 536E–G). (2) The defendant merely questioned the right of the promoters of this type of venture, including the plaintiff to freely solicit investments without even giving the general public a guideline by ||Page 530>> way of prospectus. The bare advertisement was so inadequate that any right-minded person would demand further details before investing in such a venture. The defendant had a duty to the general public to point out what has happened in England in such similar ventures. The article was a fair comment by the defendant on a matter of public interest (see p 538B–D). (3) The plaintiff’s action in placing the advertisement and which advertisement invited members of the public to invest in ostriches rendered the plaintiff’s activities in ostrich farming a matter of legitimate public interest. The advertisement as placed in the newspaper was a misleading advertisement and therefore clearly warranted a fair comment by the newspapers as a matter of public interest (see pp 538F, 540E–F). (4) The defendant’s comments on the need to introduce rules or to require prospectus from the plaintiff’s company were perfectly reasonable and were honestly made. At no time during the proceedings in court or in any of the articles published by the defendants had it been suggested that the plaintiff was out to cheat or swindle investors, that it was a liar or that the plaintiff’s

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 380

investment scheme was no more than a trap set for investors as alleged in the statement of claim (see p 539G–I). (5) Since the court had found against the plaintiff in his claim in libel, logically therefore the court ought to dismiss the claim for malicious falsehood. In any event, the plaintiff had failed to prove the falsity of the statements referred to in the statement of claim (see p 542H–I).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif terlibat di dalam perniagaan menternak burung unta. Plaintif telah mengiklankan perniagaan beliau di dalam suratkhabar mempelawa pelabur-pelabur ternakan burung unta. Setelah iklan tersebut diterbitkan, defendan menerbitkan sebuah artikel bertajuk ‘Ladang burung unta seharusnya membekalkan prospektus’. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang terkandung di dalam perenggan tertentu artikel tersebut secara maksud semulajadinya difahami sebagai bermaksud bahawa orang awam dan bakal pelabur-pelabur perlu bertindak dengan berhati-hati berkaitan iklan plaintif yang meragukan, bahawa iklan tersebut memperdayakan, bahawa perlu terdapat sekatan undang-undang ke atas kebebasan dagangan plaintif, bahawa pelabur-pelabur hendaklah berasa sangsi terhadap tujuan-tujuan plaintif, bahawa rancangan plaintif merupakan satu penipuan dan tidak kurang daripada satu rancangan yang tidak prihatin. Plaintif dengan itu menuntut ganti rugi untuk libel juga untuk penipuan dengan niat jahat terhadap defendan. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa perkataan-perkataan di dalam artikel tersebut tidak menfitnahkan plaintif, bahawa artikel tersebut adalah komen berpatutan untuk kepentingan orang awam dan ||Page 531>> bahawa tidak ada bukti niat jahat yang nyata yang telah ditunjukkan untuk menafikan pembelaan komen berpatutan. Defendan juga menafikan tuntutan untuk penipuan dengan niat jahat.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan: (1) Ujian yang patut digunakan apabila mengambil kira sama ada suatu pernyataan merupakan fitnah terhadap plaintif adalah satu yang objektif yang perlu diberi maksud di mana seorang yang waras akan memahaminya dan bagi tujuan ini, iaitu dalam menentukan sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang dikatakan

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mengandungi apa-apa tuduhan fitnah, adalah perlu untuk mengambil kira keseluruhan artikel tersebut. Setelah membaca keseluruhan artikel tersebut, mahkamah menemui bahawa dengan membaca artikel tersebut akan memberi gambaran kepada pembaca biasa bahawa pelaburan di dalam ladang burung unta adalah berisiko dan mungkin mengakibatkan kerugian mahupun keuntungan. Ia juga memaklumkan supaya pembaca berwaspada terhadap fakta bahawa mana-mana bakal pelabur-pelabur perlulah berhati-hati apabila melabur di dalam ladang burung unta. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa dakwaan sindiran-sindiran tersebut mungkin tiada makna dan tujuan disebabkan oleh artikel tersebut sepertimana yang ditegaskan oleh plaintif (lihat ms 535C–D, 536E–G). (2) Defendan hanya menyoalkan hak penganjur-penganjur di dalam usaha sebegini, termasuklah plaintif yang bebas mendapatkan pelaburan tanpa perlu memberi orang awam suatu garis panduan melalui prospektus. Iklan yang umum tersebut tidaklah lengkap sehingga mana-mana orang yang waras akan meminta keterangan lanjut sebelum melabur di dalam usaha sebegini. Defendan mempunyai kewajipan kepada orang awam untuk menunjukkan apa yang berlaku di England di dalam usaha-usaha yang sepertinya. Artikel tersebut merupakan komen yang berpatutan oleh defendan terhadap kepentingan orang awam (lihat ms 538B–D). (3) Tindakan plaintif membuat iklan tersebut dan di mana iklan tersebut telah mempelawa orang awam untuk melabur di dalam burung-burung unta membuatkan aktiviti-aktivit plaintif di dalam penternakan burung unta suatu perkara yang sah untuk kepentingan awam. Iklan yang diletakkan di dalam suratkhabar merupakan iklan yang mengelirukan dan dan dengan itu secara jelas mewajarkan komen berpatutan oleh suratkhabar-surat- khabar sebagai suatu perkara untuk kepentingan orang awam (lihat ms 538F, 540E–F). (4) Komen-komen defendan mengenai perlunya diperkenalkan peratutan-peraturan atau untuk memperoleh prospektus daripada syarikat plaintif adalah sungguh munasabah dan dibuat secara jujur. Tidak di dalam tempoh prosiding-prosiding di mahkamah atau di dalam mana-mana artikel yang diterbitkan oleh defendan- ||Page 532>> defendan mencadangkan bahawa plaintif bertujuan untuk menipu

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atau memperdayakan pelabur-pelabur, bahawa ia adalah suatu penipuan atau bahawa skim pelaburan plaintif tidak lebih daripada suatu perangkap yang dibuat untuk pelabur-pelabur tersebut sebagaimana yang didakwa di dalam penyataan tuntutan (lihat ms 539G–I). (5) Memandangkan mahkamah telah mendapati menentang tuntut- an libel plaintif, secara logiknya dengan itu mahkamah sepatutnya menolak tuntutan tersebut sebagai penipuan dengan niat jahat. Di dalam apa keadaan sekalipun, plaintif telah gagal untuk membuktikan penipuan kenyataan-kenyataan yang telah dirujuk di dalam penyataan tuntutan tersebut (lihat ms 542H–I).]

Notes For cases on libel generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Broadway Approvals Limited & Anor v Odhams Press Ltd & Anor (No2) [1965] 1 WLR 805 (refd) Hunt v The Star Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] 2 KB 309 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Lewis & Anor v Daily Telegraph Ltd and another appeal [1963] 2 All ER 151 (refd) Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 (refd) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (refd) New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd, The v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 6, 9 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 3(3)

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Amarjeet Singh ( BL Kerk with him)( Zubeda & Amarjeet) for the plaintiff. Lorraine Cheah ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.

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[1999] 4 MLJ 58 DATO’ SERI ANWAR BIN IBRAHIM v DATO’ SERI DR MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–07 OF 1999 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM J 30 AUGUST 1999

Civil Procedure — Striking out — Action against Prime Minister — Prime Minister and cabinet members to be protected from frivolous, vexatious and abusive suits — Whether such actions ought to be struck out

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Justification — Defendant is Prime Minister and Home Minister of Malaysia — Whether words spoken by defendant alleging sexual misconduct of plaintiff are true — Whether defendant had legal, moral and social duty to make such statements

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Qualified privilege — Accusations made by plaintiff — Whether defendant’s words were uttered to repel accusations made by plaintiff — Whether words were made bona fide and relevant to accusations made by plaintiff

The plaintiff — the former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysian Minister of

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Finance and Deputy President of UMNO, the main component party of the Barisan Nasional of Malaysia — brought this action against the defendant — the Prime Minister and Home Minister of Malaysia — for defamation. The plaintiff, who had been either dismissed or removed from his various governmental and political positions, claimed that on 22 August 1998, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published to national and international journalists of and concerning the plaintiff as well as accusing the plaintiff of homosexuality. However, the facts revealed that on 19 August 1998, one Dr Munawar Ahmad Anees (‘Munawar’) and one Sukma Darmawan Saasmitaat Madja (‘Sukma’) were charged separately in the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur under s 377D of the Penal Code for allowing themselves to be sodomised by the plaintiff. Both Munawar and Sukma pleaded guilty, were convicted and upon mitigation, sentenced to six months imprisonment each. In mitigation, Munawar had stated that the plaintiff made sexual advances to him as early as in 1989 and that immoral activities between the plaintiff and Munawar took place in the plaintiff’s car and house. Munawar admitted that at all times he was the passive partner. Sukma, admitted to allowing the plaintiff to sodomise him at the plaintiff’s official residence and in mitigation submitted a written, signed confession. The cases involving Munawar and Sukma were given wide and prominent publicity by the mass media, in particular by the local daily newspapers the very next day after their conviction and sentence. The facts further revealed that the defendant, as Prime Minister and Home Minister, received information from the police regarding the plaintiff’s homosexual activities as early as in 1993 and of the plaintiff’s homosexual relationships with Munawar and Sukma. ||Page 59>> The defendant admitted to having made a statement on the day in question but contended that his statement was based on matters that were already of public knowledge and on information related to him by the police and that they were true in substance and in fact. The defendant maintained that as Prime Minister of the country, he had a duty to the public who elected him and to his party to explain the reasons for the plaintiff’s dismissal from the various positions. The defendant further contended that he was badgered by various sources for explanations on the plaintiff’s dismissal from his various offices and that the alleged defamatory statement that he made was a direct response to a question posed by a member of the press at a press conference.

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The defendant relied, inter alia, on the defences of justification and qualified privilege and applied to strike out the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim and indorsement of claim pursuant to O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b) and (d) and also under the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

Held, allowing the defendant’s application: (1) From a study of the charges against Munawar and Sukma, the admitted facts, and Sukma’s confession, it was clear that the acts of gross indecency committed by Munawar and Sukma involved two persons and that the other person involved in both instances, was none other than the plaintiff himself. The information conveyed through the defendant’s words were in respect of matters that had been admitted in court as being true and which were given wide publicity in all the newspapers two days prior to the date when the defendant spoke the said words. The information was already of public knowledge at the date when the words were spoken (see pp 67G–H, 68A–B). (2) Given the indisputable facts before him based on the events that took place prior to the defendant speaking the said words and the calls made on the defendant to explain the removal of the plaintiff as the Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy President of UMNO, the defendant was duty bound to have disclosed the information concerning his ex-deputy. As the chief executive of the government, the defendant was under a legal, moral and social duty to inform the nation of the matters concerning the plaintiff. The information that was given to the defendant as disclosed in the press conference was true in substance and in fact. The defendant’s words that referred to the imputation or conclusion based on the information given to him were the correct imputation or conclusion to be drawn from the established facts including the conviction of Munawar and Sukma and the admitted confession. The conviction of Munawar and Sukma brought the facts within the ambit of s 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and accordingly the defence of justification was open to the defendant (see pp 68C–D, 70H, 69C–E). ||Page 60>> (3) The plaintiff upon his removal as Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy President

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 386

of UMNO launched vituperative attacks against the defendant, the officers of the Attorney General’s chambers, the government and UMNO. The attacks included an allegation that the plaintiff’s removal from his various offices was as a result of ‘a political conspiracy of the highest level’. In the circumstances, the defendant as the Prime Minister and President of UMNO was therefore obliged and compelled to respond to these attacks by the words spoken by him. The defendant’s words were uttered with a view to repelling the charges made by the plaintiff, they were made bona fide and were relevant to the accusations made by the plaintiff. The defendant’s words were therefore spoken on an occasion of qualified privilege. The defendant spoke the words with a mind devoid of malice and had also satisfied the tests set out in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 for assessing whether the defence of qualified privilege applies (see pp 69H–70C, 72F, 70I–71C). (4) The ‘primus inter pares’ of the country and his cabinet colleagues must be protected from frivolous, vexatious and abusive suits. Otherwise, rather than running the country towards achieving peace and prosperity for its citizens, the officials of the government will forever be looking over their shoulders for fear of being dragged to court with an unwanted but heralded suit. Whilst no one is above the law, yet the court must be ever vigilant, never indolent, ever watchful, never fearful of its duty to check on the conspiratorial machinations of parties or persons motivated with the express desire of dragging top officials who run the country, to court with intent to cause nothing more than embarrassment to such officials. The plaintiff’s claim was one that was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court and should therefore be struck out (see pp 72F–I).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif — bekas Timbalan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Menteri Kewangan Malaysia dan Naib Presiden UMNO, komponen utama parti Barisan Nasional Malaysia — telah memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan — Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia — untuk fitnah. Plaintif, yang telah sama ada dipecat atau disingkirkan daripada pelbagai jawatan-jawatan kerajaan dan politik beliau, menuntut

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 387

bahawa pada 22 Ogos 1998, defendan telah secara palsu dan niat jahat bercakap dan mengumumkan kepada wartawan-wartawan tempatan dan antarabangsa tentang dan berkenaan plaintif dan juga telah mendakwa kehomoseksualan plaintif. Bagaimanapun, fakta-fakta telah mendedahkan bahawa pada 19 Ogos 1998, seorang bernama Dr Munawar Ahmad Anees (‘Munawar’) dan seorang bernama Sukma Darmawan Saasmitaat Madja (‘Sukma’) telah dituduh secara berasingan di dalam ||Page 61>> Mahkamah Sesyen di Kuala Lumpur di bawah s 377D Kanun Keseksaan kerana membenarkan diri mereka diliwat oleh plaintif. Kedua-dua Munawar dan Sukma telah mengaku bersalah, telah disabitkan dan setelah mitigasi, dihukum penjara selama enam bulan tiap seorang. Di dalam mitigasi, Munawar telah menyatakan bahawa plaintif telah membuat desakan seksual terhadap beliau seawal tahun 1989 dan bahawa kegiatan-kegiatan kurang bermoral antara plaintif dan Munawar berlaku di dalam kereta dan rumah plainitf. Munawar telah mengaku bahawa pada setiap masa beliau merupakan pasangan yang pasif. Sukma, mengaku telah membenarkan plaintif meliwat beliau di rumah rasmi plaintif dan di dalam mitigasi telah mengemukakan suatu pengakuan bertulis yang ditandatangani. Kes-kes yang melibatkan Munawar dan Sukma telah diberi publisiti yang meluas dan menonjol oleh pihak media, khususnya oleh akhbar-akhbar harian tempatan sehari selepas sabitan dan hukuman mereka. Fakta-fakta seterusnya telah mendedahkan bahawa defendan, sebagai seorang Perdana Menteri, telah menerima maklumat daripada polis berhubung dengan kegiatan-kegiatan homoseksual plaintif seawal 1993 dan hubungan homoseksual plaintif dengan Munawar dan Sukma. Defendan telah membuat pengakuan bahawa beliau telah membuat pernyataan pada hari yang dibincangkan tetapi menegaskan bahawa pernyataan beliau adalah berdasarkan perkara-perkara yang sudahpun diketahui umum dan atas maklumat berhubung dengan beliau oleh polis dan bahawa ia adalah benar dalam isi dan fakta. Defendan mempertahankan bahawa sebagai seorang Perdana Menteri negara ini, beliau mempunyai tanggungjawab kepada rakyat yang telah mengundi beliau dan kepada parti beliau untuk menjelaskan sebab-sebab pemecatan plaintif daripada pelbagai jawatan- jawatannya. Defendan seterusnya telah menegaskan bahawa beliau telah dipaksa oleh pelbagai sumber untuk memberi suatu penjelasan terhadap pemecatan plaintif daripada pelbagai jawatan-jawatannya dan bahawa dakwaan penyataan fitnah yang dibuat oleh beliau merupakan akibat langsung daripada soalan yang telah diajukan oleh seorang

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ahli wartawan di sidang akhbar itu. Defendan bergantung kepada, antara lain, pembelaan-pembelaan justifikasi dan perlindung- an bersyarat dan memohon untuk membatalkan pindaan penyataan tuntutan plaintif dan pengindorsan tuntutan menurut A 18 k 19(1)(a), (b) dan (d) dan juga di bawah bidang kuasa sedia ada mahkamah.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan defendan: (1) Daripada kajian ke atas tuduhan-tuduhan terhadap Munawar dan Sukma, fakta-fakta yang diakui, dan pengakuan Sukma, adalah jelas bahawa kelakuan yang melampui tabii oleh Munawar dan Sukma melibatkan dua orang dan bahawa orang lain yang terlibat di dalam kedua-dua perlakuan ini, tidak lain daripada plaintif ||Page 62>> sendiri. Maklumat yang disampaikan melalui kata-kata defendan adalah berhubung dengan perkara-perkara yang telah diakui di mahkamah sebagai benar dan yang telah diberi publisiti yang meluas di dalam semua akhbar-akhbar dua hari sebelum tarikh defendan telah berkata sedemikian. Maklumat tersebut sudahpun merupakan pengetahuan umum pada ketika kata-kata tersebut dilafazkan (lihat ms 67G–H, 68A–B). (2) Dengan adanya fakta-fakta yang tidak boleh disangkal lagi oleh beliau berdasarkan kejadian-kejadian yang telah berlaku sebelum defendan melafazkan kata-kata itu dan panggilan-panggilan yang dibuat oleh defendan untuk menjelaskan pemecatan plaintif sebagai Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Naib Presiden UMNO, defendan mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk mendedahkan maklumat berhubung bekas timbalan beliau. Sebagai ketua eksekutif kerajaan, defendan mempunyai tanggungjawab di sisi undang-undang, moral dan sosial untuk memaklumkan kepada rakyat jelata tentang perkara-perkara yang melibatkan plaintif. Maklumat yang telah diberikan kepada defendan sebagaimana yang didedahkan olah sidang akhbar adalah benar dalam isi dan fakta. Kata-kata defendan yang merujuk kepada tuduhan atau kesimpulan berdasarkan maklumat yang diberikan kepada beliau merupakan tuduhan atau kesimpulan yang benar yang diperolehi daripada fakta-fakta kukuh termasuklah sabitan Munawar dan Sukma dan pengakuan yang telah dibuat. Sabitan Munawar dan Sukma telah membawa fakta-fakta itu di dalam lingkungan

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s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957 dan sewajarnya pembelaan justifikasi adalah terbuka kepada defendan (lihat ms 68C–D, 70H, 69C–E). (3) Plaintif, setelah pemecatan beliau sebagai Timbalan Perdana Menteri dan Naib Presiden UMNO, telah memulakan serangan- serangan penuh cercaan terhadap defendan, pegawai-pegawai di jabatan Peguam Negara, kerajaan dan UMNO. Serangan- serangan tersebut termasuklah dakwaan bahawa pemecatan plaintif daripada pelbagai jawatan-jawatannya telah disebabkan oleh ‘konspirasi politik tertinggi’. Di dalam keadaan berikut, defendan sebagai Perdana Menteri dan Presiden UMNO, oleh itu telah terpaksa dan terdesak untuk menjawab serangan-serangan ini melalui kata-kata yang dicakapkan oleh beliau. Kata-kata defendan dilafazkan dengan maksud untuk menolak tuduhan- tuduhan yang dibuat oleh plaintif, yang telah dibuat secara bona fide dan berkaitan dengan dakwaan-dakwaan yang dibuat oleh plaintif. Kata-kata defendan, oleh demikian, telah dilafazkan di dalam keadaan perlindungan bersyarat. Defendan telah melafaz- kan kata-kata tersebut dengan tujuan tidak mempunyai niat jahat dan juga telah memuaskan ujian yang terkandung di dalam kes Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 yang mentafsir sama ada pembelaan perlindungaan bersyarat adalah terpakai (lihat ms 69H–70C, 72F, 70I–71C). ||Page 63>> (4) ‘Primus inter parte’ negara ini dan teman sekabinet beliau perlu dilindungi daripada saman-saman yang remeh, menyusahkan dan disalahgunakan. Jika tidak, jauh dari mengendalikan sebuah negara untuk mencapai keamanan dan kesejahteraan bagi rakyat jelatanya, pegawai-pegawai kerajaan akan sentiasa melihat ke belakang kerana takut diheret ke mahkamah dengan saman yang tidak diingini. Walaupun tiada sesiapa yang melebihi undang- undang, mahkamah masih perlu sentiasa berjaga-jaga, tidak sekali berat tulang, sentiasa berhati-hati, tidak takut terhadap tanggung- jawabnya untuk memeriksa pihak-pihak atau orang yang berkomplot konspirasi yang mempunyai hasrat yang nyata untuk mengheret pegawai-pegawai atasan yang mengendalikan negara, ke mahkamah dengan niat untuk hanya memalukan pegawai- pegawai tersebut. Tuntutan plaintif merupakan suatu tuntutan yang remeh, menyusahkan dan menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah dan oleh demikian patut dibatalkan

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(lihat ms 72F–I).]

Notes For cases on striking out generally, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 4335–4344. For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Blackshaw v Lord & Anor [1984] QB 1 (refd) Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (refd) Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520 (refd) Marchioness of Huntly v Gaskell [1905] 2 Ch D 656 (refd) Perera (MG) v Peiris & Anor [1949] AC 1 (refd) Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1998] 3 WLR 863 (refd) Webb v Times Publishing Co Ltd [1960] 2 QB 535 (refd) Youngerwood v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (unreported), 13 June 1997 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 12 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (d)

Karpal Singh ( M Manoharan with him) ( Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. Mohd Adnan bin Shuaib ( Cecil Abraham and N Chandra with him) ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case ||Page 64>>

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 391

[1999] 6 MLJ 101 PERUNDING ALAM BINA SDN BHD v ERROL OH & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S5–23–05 OF 1996 JAMES FOONG J 15 AUGUST 1998

Tort — Defamation — Imputation of unprofessionalism and negligence of architects — Objective test of reasonable man with ordinary intelligence and of general knowledge and experience in worldly affairs applied — Whether defence of justification can succeed — Whether dishonesty and malice proved — Whether public has legitimate right to comment — Whether comments were fair

The plaintiffs were the architects for plans to build a hospital. The plaintiffs claimed that they were defamed in two articles written and published by the defendants in the newspaper. The plaintiff averred that they were the persons referred to in the articles and, by their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendo, it imputed that the plaintiffs were lackadaisical in their supervisory functions as consultant architects, had failed to give out proper instructions, were unethical, unprofessional, negligent, incompetent and were in breach of the architect’s professional code of conduct. As a result of the statements in the articles, the plaintiffs alleged that their credit and reputation were gravely injured and lowered in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally and had also suffered damages. The defendants admitted writing and publishing the articles but raised the defence of justification and fair comment. The issue before the court was whether the words complained of in the articles impute the plaintiffs of some quality which would be detrimental or adverse of such quality which was essential to successfully carry on their profession as architects.

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Held, dismissing the claim: (1) To decide on the issue of imputation, the objective test of the reasonable man with ordinary intelligence and of general knowledge and experience in worldly affairs would likely to understand the alleged defamatory words without being fettered with strict legal rules of construction but may include any implications or inferences must be used. In the present case, the first article focused on the unprofessionalism of the architects, ethics and breach of it, safety measures and negligence. These were obviously elements associated with unprofessional conduct. By the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, an ordinary reasonable person reading the statements would have the impression that the plaintiffs were unprofessional and unethical in their conduct. These statements were therefore defamatory (see pp 106H–107H). (2) With regard to the second article, except for the paragraph which directly refers to the plaintiffs, the entire alleged defamatory ||Page 102>> statements relates to the developer. It did not impute the plaintiffs at all. Reading the article as a whole, the court did not believe that an ordinary reasonable man could impute the alleged defamatory statement to the plaintiffs (see p 111A–D). (3) Though the defence pleaded justification, and even with particulars to certain facts being true, there was no disclosure as to what these facts alleged to be true impute. This particular imputation on the facts alleged to be true was nowhere stated in the statement of defence. Going by the rules of pleadings, where a party’s case must be confined to the four walls of its pleadings, the court found that the defendants’ alleged meaning imputed from the facts disclosed as true could not be accepted. There was no justification asserted that it imputed that the plaintiffs were unprofessional and incompetent in their work. For this, the plea of justification must fail (see p 108B–G). (4) The articles principally were comments or opinions made by the defendant. Further, the exposure of non-compliance of building plans was certainly a matter of public interest. So was the role of the architects. Not only an honourable and respected profession serving the community was involved, but

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 393

also the safety factor of structures constructed or to be constructed in this country. On this, the defendant, as a matter of the public had a legitimate right to comment and in the light of the situation, his comments on the conduct and ethics of the plaintiffs were fair. There was no dishonesty and malice on the part of the defendants nor were these ever proved (see p 110C–E).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif-plaintif merupakan arkitek-arkitek untuk rancangan- rancangan untuk membina sebuah hospital. Plaintif-plaintif mendakwa bahawa mereka telah difitnah dalam dua artikel yang ditulis dan diterbitkan oleh defendan- defendan di dalam suratkhabar. Plaintif-plaintif menegaskan bahawa mereka adalah orang-orang yang dirujukkan di dalam artikel-artikel tersebut dan dengan makna semulajadi dan biasa dan/atau melalui sindiran adalah dikaitkan bahawa plaintif-plaintif adalah acuh tak acuh di dalam fungsi-fungsi penyeliaan mereka sebagai arkitek-arkitek perunding, telah gagal untuk memberikan arahan-arahan yang sepatutnya, adalah tidak beretika, tidak profesional, cuai, tidak kompeten dan telah mungkir kod kelakuan profesional arkitek. Akibat daripada kenyataan- kenyataan di dalam artikel-artikel tersebut, plaintif-plaintif mendakwa bahawa kredit dan reputasi mereka telah dirosakkan dan dijatuhkan secara seriusnya di dalam pandangan ahli-ahli masyarakat yang berfikiran waras secara amnya dan telah mengalami ganti rugi. Defendan-defendan mengaku menulis dan menerbitkan artikel-artikel tersebut tetapi membangkitkan pembelaan justifikasi dan komen yang adil. Isu di hadapan mahkamah adalah sama ada perkataan-perkataan ||Page 103>> yang diadu tersebut di dalam artikel-artikel tersebut membawa kaitan bahawa plaintif-plaintif mempunyai kualiti tertentu yang menjejaskan atau bertentangan dengan suatu kualiti tertentu yang diperlukan untuk melaksanakan dengan jayanya profesion mereka sebagai arkitek-arkitek.

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan mereka: (1) Dalam menentukan isu pengaitan, ujian objektif orang yang munasabah dengan kebijaksanaan biasa dan berpengetahuan biasa dan berpengalaman di dalam hal-ehwal dunia dan berkecenderungan memahami perkataan-perkataan fitnah yang didakwa tersebut tanpa dihalang oleh peraturan-peraturan undang-undang

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penafsiran yang ketat tetapi boleh memasukkan sebarang implikasi atau inferens, mestilah terpakai. Di dalam kes ini, artikel pertama tersebut memfokus kepada ketidak- profesionalan arkitek-arkitek tersebut, etika-etika dan kemungkirannya, langkah-langkah keselamatan dan kecuaian. Ini jelas merupakan elemen-elemen yang dikaitkan dengan kelakuan tidak profesional. Dengan makna semulajadi dan biasa perkataan-perkataan yang dipakai tersebut, seorang yang munasabah yang membaca kenyataan-kenyataan tersebut akan mempunyai tanggapan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak profesional dan tidak beretika dalam kelakuan mereka. Maka, kenyataan- kenyataan tersebut adalah memfitnah (lihat ms 106H–107H). (2) Berkenaan dengan artikel kedua tersebut, kecuali untuk perenggan yang secara terusnya merujuk kepada plaintif-plaintif, keseluruhan kenyataaan-kenyataan yang didakwa memfitnah tersebut adalah merujuk kepada pemaju. Ia tidak mengaitkan plaintif-plaintif langsung. Membaca artikel tersebut secara keseluruhannya, mahkamah tidak mempercayai bahawa seorang yang munasabah akan mengaitkan kenyataan yang dikatakan memfitnah tersebut dengan plaintif-plaintif (lihat ms 111A-D). (3) Walaupun pembelaan tersebut memplidkan justifikasi, dan malahan jika butir-butir kepada fakta-fakta tertentu itu adalah benar, tetapi tiada terdapat pendedahan berkenaan apa yang fakta-fakta yang didakwa benar ini mengaitkan. Pengaitan tertentu ini atas fakta-fakta yang didakwa benar adalah tidak dicatatkan di mana-mana pernyataan pembelaan tersebut. Berasaskan peraturan-peraturan pliding, di mana kes suatu pihak mesti dihadkan pada batasan pliding-plidingnya, mahkamah mendapati bahawa makna yang dikatakan dikait dari fakta- fakta tersebut oleh defendan-defendan tidak boleh diterima. Tidak terdapat sebarang penegasan bahawa justifikasi tersebut mengaitkan plaintif-plaintif sebagai tidak profesional dan tidak kompeten di dalam kerja mereka. Untuk ini, alasan justifikasi mesti gagal (lihat ms 108B– G). (4) Artikel-artikel tersebut secara utamanya adalah komen-komen atau pendapat-pendapat yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan. ||Page 104>> Tambahan lagi, pendedahan ketiadaan pematuhan pelan-pelan

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bangunan sudah tentu adalah suatu perkara kepentingan awam. Begitu juga dengan peranan arkitek-arkitek tersebut. Bukan sahaja suatu profesion yang mulia dan dihormati yang berkhidmat kepada masyarakat adalah terlibat, tetapi juga faktor keselamatan struktur-struktur yang telah dibina atau akan dibina di negara ini. Berdasarkan ini, defendan, sebagai orang awam, mempunyai hak sah untuk memberi komen dan, di dalam keadaan situasi tersebut, komen-komen beliau ke atas kelakuan dan etika-etika plaintif-plaintif adalah adil. Tiada ketidakjujuran dan niat jahat di pihak defendan-defendan dan ia juga tidak pernah dibuktikan (lihat ms 110C–E).]

Notes For cases on defamation generally, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Lucas Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd; Lucas-Box v Associated Newspapers Group Plc & Ors [1986] 1 All ER 177 (refd)

N Navaratnam & Rueben Mathiavaranam ( Zaheeda Ariff with them) ( Azman Davidson & Co) for the plaintif. Robert Lazar ( Felix Raj with him)( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.

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[1998] 2 MLJ 201 DATO’ KAM WOON WAH & ORS v MOHD ABDUL JALIL BIN SARIP & ANOR

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HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S2-22-249 OF 1997 JAMES FOONG J 17 OCTOBER 1997

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Mareva injunction — Whether applicable in an action for defamation — Test to be adopted — Whether same test as in usual Mareva injunction to apply — Whether higher standard of proof as in interim injunction to restrain publication of defamation material to apply — Whether alleged defamation obviously untrue or defence of defendants would fail — Whether defendants had no other assets within jurisdiction or would dissipate assets before judgment

Tort — Defamation — Injunction — Mareva injunction — Whether Mareva injunction can be granted pending trial of action — Principles to be applied

On 20 March 1997, the defendants wrote a letter (‘the letter’) to the learned judicial commissioner, Dato’ Kamalanathan Ratnam (as he then was) referring to a consent order recorded by the parties before the learned judicial commissioner. The letter explained various arbitrary and unlawful acts taken by the plaintiffs in an attempt to dispose of a piece of property (‘the land’) which formed part of the subject matter of the consent order. The plaintiffs took offence to the contents of the letter and sued the defendants for defamation. The writ of summons was accompanied by a summons in chambers seeking a Mareva injunction to restrain the defendants from removing from the jurisdiction of the court any of the defendants’ assets, in particular the proceeds the defendants would receive from the land. The defendants had taken control over the disposal of the land from the plaintiffs and were in the course of concluding a sale of the land to third parties which would entitle the defendants to a substantial portion of the proceeds of sale. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had no other assets within the jurisdiction save for the proceeds and would take steps to dissipate or diminish the same, hence the application for a Mareva injunction. The defendants, inter alia, raised the following defences: (i) a Mareva injunction is not applicable to a

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defamation suit; (ii) as justification was pleaded as a defence in the defamation suit, the application for a Mareva injunction, which is of an interlocutory nature, could not be granted; and (iii) no solid evidence was adduced to support the contention that the defendants had no other assets or would be dissipating the assets which they would receive from the sale of the land.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The reservation in Allen’s case against the extension of a Mareva injunction in a personal injury case was based on the reasoning that a plaintiff in such a case may not be in a position to meet the liability that may accrue under the undertaking as to damages as compared to a mercantile transaction. By the same token, this ||Page 202>> reservation ought to apply to other causes of action. However, this factor of financial ability cannot outweigh the more fundamental consideration that justice ought to be done and the relief in the form of a Mareva injunction should be extended to all kinds of cases be it that of contract, personal injury or defamation, as in this case (see p 206C-G); Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors [1980] 2 All ER 502 followed. (2) In an action for a Mareva injunction, a ‘good arguable case’ must be shown whereas in a libel action, the courts are slow to issue an interim injunction unless it is clear that the alleged libel is untrue. The fundamental difference between these two propositions was that of the standard of proof, namely, that in an application for an interim injunction to restrain publication of defamatory material, a higher standard of proof was required as compared to that of an application for a Mareva injunction (see pp 207F and 208A-C). (3) When the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is placed on such a high pedestal that even the well-accepted principles of an interim injunction as disposed in American Cyanamid’s case were inapplicable in a suit concerning defamation where justification, comment or unqualified privilege without malice was pleaded as a defence, this same priority must similarly be accepted in the consideration of a Mareva injunction concerning a defamation case where the same defences are pleaded.The test for a Mareva injunction must

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therefore be altered to that of ‘where the statement is so obviously untruthful or where the plaintiff had satisfied the court that the defence will fail’. This is logical as otherwise it becomes easier to secure a Mareva injunction before judgment than to restrain publication of alleged defamatory material before trial (see pp 208F-I and 209A); New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 followed and Lee Kuan Yew v Tan Liang Hong & other actions (No 1) [1997] 2 SLR 819 not followed. (4) Without any apparent proof that the alleged defamatory statement was obviously untrue, or being satisfied that the defences would fail, the plaintiffs failed to fulfill the first requirement for the Mareva injunction.With regard to the second condition, the plaintiffs had also failed to adduce any solid evidence to support the contention that the defendants had no assets or would be dissipating their only asset immediately upon receipt of the same (see pp 209F-I and 210A-B).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Pada 20 Mac 1997, defendan-defendan telah menulis sepucuk surat (‘surat tersebut’) kepada pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana, Dato’ Kamalanathan Ratnam (pada masa itu) yang merujuk kepada ||Page 203>> satu perintah persetujuan yang direkodkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana tersebut. Surat tersebut menjelaskan pelbagai perbuatan sewenang-wenang dan menyalahi undang-undang yang dilakukan oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam satu percubaan untuk melupuskan sebidang harta (‘tanah tersebut’) yang membentuk sebahagian daripada perkara subjek perintah persetujuan. Plaintif-plaintif telah berasa tersinggung terhadap kandungan surat tersebut dan mendakwa defendan-defendan untuk fitnah. Writ saman diiringi oleh satu saman dalam kamar meminta injunksi Mareva untuk menahan defendan-defendan daripada memindah mana-mana aset defendan-defendan dari bidang kuasa mahkamah, khususnya hasil jualan yang akan diterima oleh defendan-defendan daripada tanah tersebut. Defendan-defendan telah menguasai pelupusan tanah daripada plaintif-plaintif dan sedang dalam proses menamatkan jualan tanah tersebut kepada pihak ketiga yang akan membolehkan defendan-defendan mendapatkan sebahagian besar hasil jualan.

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Plaintif-plaintif menghujahkan bahawa defendan-defendan tidak mempunyai apa-apa aset lain dalam bidang kuasa kecuali hasil jualan dan akan mengambil langkah untuk melesapkan atau mengurangkan yang sama, justeru itu permohonan untuk satu injunksi Mareva. Defendan-defendan, antara lain, membangkitkan pembelaan berikut: (i) injunksi Mareva tidak terpakai kepada guaman fitnah; (ii) oleh kerana justifikasi diplidkan sebagai suatu pembelaan dalam guaman fitnah, permohonan untuk satu injunksi Mareva, yang bersifat interlokutori, tidak boleh diberikan; dan (iii) tiada keterangan kukuh telah dikemukakan bagi menyokong hujah bahawa defendan-defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang aset lain atau akan melesapkan aset-aset yang mereka akan menerima daripada jualan tanah tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan: (1) Kesangsian dalam kes Allen terhadap lanjutan satu injunksi Mareva dalam suatu kes kecederaan diri adalah berdasarkan taakulan bahawa plaintif dalam kes sedemikian mungkin tidak berada dalam kedudukan untuk memenuhi liabiliti yang boleh terakru di bawah akujanji tentang ganti rugi berbanding dengan transaksi merkantil. Begitu juga, kesangsian ini harus terpakai kepada kausa tindakan lain. Namun demikian, faktor keupayaan kewangan ini tidak boleh melebihi pertimbangan yang lebih asas bahawa keadilan patut dilakukan dan relief berbentuk injunksi Mareva harus dilanjutkan kepada semua jenis kes biarpun kontrak, kecederaan diri atau fitnah, seperti dalam kes ini (lihat ms 206C-G); Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors [1980] 2 All ER 502 diikut. (2) Dalam satu tindakan untuk injunksi Mareva, suatu ‘kes yang kukuh dan boleh dihujahkan’ mesti ditunjukkan manakala dalam tindakan libel, mahkamah berwaspada dalam mengeluarkan injunksi interim melainkan ternyata bahawa libel yang dikatakan adalah tidak benar. Perbezaan asas di antara dua saranan ini ||Page 204>> berkaitan dengan darjah membukti, iaitu, bahawa dalam suatu permohonan untuk injunksi interim bagi menahan penerbitan fitnah, satu darjah membukti yang lebih tinggi dikehendaki berbanding dengan satu permohonan untuk injunksi Mareva (lihat ms 207F dan 208A-C).

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(3) Apabila kepentingan membiarkan kebebasan bersuara tidak terbelenggu dipuja dengan begitu tinggi hinggakan prinsip mantap suatu injunksi interim seperti yang ditentukan dalam kes American Cyanamid tidak terpakai dalam guaman yang melibatkan fitnah di mana justifikasi, ulasan atau perlindungan tanpa syarat tanpa niat jahat diplidkan sebagai pembelaan, keutamaan yang sama ini mestilah juga diterima dalam pertimbangan injunksi Mareva berkenaan dengan kes fitnah di mana pembelaan yang sama diplidkan.Ujian untuk satu injunksi Mareva dengan itu mestilah ditukar kepada ‘di mana pernyataan adalah begitu palsu atau di mana plaintif telah memuaskan mahkamah bahawa pembelaan akan gagal’. Ini adalah wajar kerana jika tidak ia akan menjadikannya lebih mudah untuk menjamin satu injunksi Mareva sebelum penghakiman berbanding dengan menahan penerbitan material fitnah yang dikatakan sebelum perbicaraan (lihat ms 208F-I dan 209A); New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 diikut dan Lee Kuan Yew v Tan Liang Hong & other actions (No 1) [1997] 2 SLR 819 tidak diikut. (4) Tanpa sebarang bukti jelas bahawa kenyataan fitnah yang dikatakan adalah tidak benar, atau memenuhi bahawa pembelaan-pembelaan akan gagal, plaintif-plaintif telah gagal memenuhi keperluan pertama untuk injunksi Mareva.Berhubung dengan syarat kedua, plaintif-plaintif juga telah gagal mengemukakan sebarang keterangan kukuh bagi menyokong hujah bahawa defendan-defendan tidak mempunyai aset-aset atau akan melesapkan aset-aset mereka sebaik sahaja menerimanya (lihat ms 209F-I and 210A-B).]

Notes For cases on Mareva injunction, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 1662-1697. For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138-261.

Cases referred to Allen & Ors v Jambo Holdings Ltd & Ors [1980] 2 All ER 502 (folld)

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American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (refd) Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 259 (refd) Herbage v Pressdram Ltd & Ors [1984] 2 All ER 769 (refd) Lawrence Kwek v Lim Han Yong [1989] 3 MLJ 210 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Tan Liang Hong & other actions (No 1) [1997] 2 SLR 819 (not folld) ||Page 205>> New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v Airasia Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 36 (folld) Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 (refd) S & F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 (refd)

Joseph Yeo ( AJ Ariffin Yeo & Harpal) for the plaintiffs. V Ramanathan ( Rama Velu & Associates) for the defendants.

[1998] 3 MLJ 649 SKRINE & CO v MBF CAPITAL BHD & ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–03–27 OF 1998 GOPAL SRI RAM JCA, AHMAD FAIRUZ JCA AND HAIDAR JCA 18 JUNE 1998

Civil Procedure — Security for costs — Application for — Whether there was reason to award defendant security for costs against plaintiff company — Test to be applied — Companies Act 1965 s 351(1)

Civil Procedure — General damages — Quantification of damages — Whether plaintiff in

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defamation action may quantify his damages — Whether plaintiff could receive anything more than amount stipulated in his writ

Civil Procedure — Application for further and better particulars — Whether necessary to file affidavit in support — Whether court should allow application

Civil Procedure — Preliminary issue — Whether issue as to liability of partners in a partnership ought to be tried as a preliminary issue — Test to be applied — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 77 r 4(4)

Civil Procedure — Amendment of defence — Whether amendment would introduce a new plea — Whether discretion of trial judge to refuse amendment was exercised wrongly — Whether interrogatories pertaining to the amended defence ought to be allowed

There are ten appeals before the court. They arose out of same civil suit and involved a review of discretion exercised by the judge in the court below. The plaintiffs had claimed in the court below that the first defendant had defamed them and that the second defendant firm is vicariously liable for the alleged tort committed by the first defendant. Both in the indorsement in the writ and in the statement of claim, the plaintiffs quantified the damages for a total claim of RM60m against the first and second defendants.There were several applications made to the judge periodically seeking several types of interlocutory relief which form the subject matter of the appeals before this court. The appeals are against: (i) an order refusing applications requiring the plaintiffs to furnish security for costs; (ii) an order refusing to strike out the quantification of damages appearing at the foot of the writ and statement of claim; (iii) the judge’s refusal to order the plaintiffs to furnish particulars of their pleadings — there being no affidavit filed in support of the application for particulars; (iv) the judge’s orders declining to try preliminary issues, as to liability of a partner and of the firm respectively; (v) the judge’s refusal to allow amendments sought by the first defendant to his defence; and (vi) an order of the judge granting the plaintiffs leave to interrogate the first defendant in the action. ||Page 650>>

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Held: (1) Section 351(1) of the Companies Act 1965 provides for a two stage inquiry in the process of arriving at the conclusion as to whether security for costs should be awarded in a particular case in which the plaintiff is a company; ie the court has to determine (i) whether there is credible evidence; and (ii) whether that evidence, when found to be credible, supports the belief that the company will be unable to pay the costs of a successful defendant.In this case, the learned judge had applied the correct legal test to the evidence made available to him. Admission of further evidence would not, in this case, have the effect of creating a reason to believe that the first plaintiff will not be able to satisfy an order for costs in the event of it failing in the litigation in question. Therefore, the appeals that deal with the question of security for costs must fail (see pp 657I, 658A–B and 659E–H). (2) It is incorrect to say that there was once a practice of quantifying general damages but that it has since fallen into disuse and that it would be quite wrong to reinstate it. There is no rule of practice going either way. A plaintiff in a defamation action may quantify his damages, in which event he runs the risk of not receiving anything more than the amount stipulated in his writ. However, he is equally at liberty not to specify a sum in which event arguments may be addressed in the usual way at the conclusion of the trial upon that issue. In either case, it is the court that makes the determination (see p 661E–G).Moreover, the courts must keep in tandem with the legislature by permitting the quantification of damages and thereby stop in their tracks would be publishers of false information. Such deterrence is in keeping with the spirit and intendment of art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution and is not contrary to it (see p 662E) (3) Whilst it may be necessary in particular cases for an affidavit to be filed in support of an application for particulars, it is not a sine qua non. There may be cases where the particulars asked for are so obviously necessary that an affidavit may be superfluous. It all depends on the facts of each case. Therefore, it is not a universal rule that for every application for further and

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better particulars there must be an affidavit in support.Moreover, the learned judge had completely overlooked the fact that there was another affidavit by a partner of the firm, filed in opposition to an affidavit in reply by the plaintiffs. That affidavit certainly advanced sufficient reasons why the particulars sought for ought to be had. In this case, some of the particulars were patently necessary and relevant. Such particulars, as conceded by the plaintiffs, ought to be allowed. However, the particulars which relate to evidence and not to facts are disallowed (see p 663C, D, F–G). ||Page 651>> (4) Order 77 r 4(4) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 obviously reserves in a judge a discretion as to the manner and the time at which an issue upon a partner’s liability may be separately determined. The learned judge who heard the application is in the best position to determine how conveniently the trial should be proceeded with. It is a matter upon which individual judges may differ. It is wrong to think that the paramount consideration is the partner’s inconvenience. It is the inconvenience which would be caused to all parties that is relevant. Above all, it is for the trial judge to determine how and when issues ought to be tried; whether as preliminary matters or together with the main action. Therefore, this court is not inclined to disturb the decision of the judge. Indeed, it will be most inconvenient to have the trial conducted in bits and pieces (see p 670F, G). (5) The judge was wrong when he held that the amendments to the defence had introduced a new plea. They merely explain or expand within permitted limits the case already pleaded by the first defendant. Though this is an appeal against the exercise of discretion, this court opined that the discretion was wrongly exercised because the judge did not appreciate the true nature and scope of the proposed amendments. The appeal must be allowed (see pp 672A and 673B).Taking into account the amendments the court had permitted to the first defendant’s defence, the interrogatories sought are not only desirable but have become essential. The learned judge was correct in ordering them (see p 674D). Per curiam:

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It is not necessary that a company must be readily possessed of cash in order to satisfy a court that it is in a position to pay the costs of an action brought by it in the event of failure. Suffice that the court is satisfied upon credible testimony, that is to say evidence that instils belief in the mind of the court after critical examination of it, that a corporate plaintiff is in a position to satisfy an allocatur by attachment upon its assets (see pp 659I and 660A)

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Terdapat sepuluh rayuan di hadapan mahkamah yang timbul daripada guaman sivil yang sama dan melibatkan kajian semula budi bicara yang dilaksanakan oleh hakim di mahkamah bawah. Plaintif-plaintif telah menuntut di mahkamah bawah bahawa defendan pertama telah memfitnah mereka dan bahawa defendan kedua adalah bersalah secara vikarius untuk tort yang dikatakan dilakukan oleh defendan pertama. Dalam kedua-dua pengindorsan dalam writ dan pernyataan tuntutan, plaintif-plaintif menjumlahkan tuntutan sebanyak RM60 juta terhadap defendan pertama dan kedua. Terdapat beberapa ||Page 652>> permohonan yang dibuat kepada mahkamah secara berkala menuntut beberapa jenis relief interlokutori yang membentuk perkara subjek rayuan-rayuan di hadapan mahkamah ini. Rayuan-rayuan itu adalah terhadap: (i) perintah menolak permohonan yang menghendaki plaintif-plaintif menyediakan jaminan kos; (ii) perintah menolak untuk membatalkan penaksiran ganti rugi yang terdapat di nota kaki writ dan pernyataan tuntutan; (iii) penolakan hakim untuk memerintahkan plaintif menyediakan butir-butir pliding — tidak ada afidavit difailkan untuk menyokong permohonan untuk butir-butir; (iv) perintah hakim yang menolak untuk membicarakan isu-isu permulaan, berkenaan dengan liabiliti rakan kongsi dan firma masing-masing; (v) penolakan hakim untuk membenarkan pindaan yang dipohon oleh defendan pertama untuk meminda pembelaannya; dan (vi) perintah hakim membenarkan plaintif-plaintif menyoal siasat defendan pertama dalam tindakan itu.

Diputuskan: (1) Seksyen 351(1) Akta Syarikat 1965 memperuntukkan dua langkah penyiasatan dalam proses untuk mencapai kesimpulan sama ada jaminan kos patut

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diawardkan dalam kes tertentu di mana plaintif adalah sebuah syarikat; iaitu mahkamah perlu menentukan: (i) sama ada terdapat bukti yang boleh dipercayai; dan (ii) sama ada bukti itu, apabila didapati boleh dipercayai, menyokong kepercayaan bahawa syarikat tidak berupaya untuk membayar kos defendan yang berjaya.Dalam kes ini, hakim yang bijaksana telah menggunakan ujian undang-undang yang betul kepada keterangan yang terdapat di hadapannya. Penerimaan keterangan lanjut tidak akan, dalam kes ini, mempunyai kesan memberi alasan untuk mempercayai bahawa plaintif pertama tidak berupaya untuk mematuhi perintah untuk kos jika ia gagal dalam litigasi berkenaan. Oleh itu, rayuan-rayuan berkenaan dengan jaminan kos mesti gagal (lihat ms 657I, 658A–B dan 659E–H). (2) Adalah tidak betul untuk mengatakan terdapat amalan satu ketika dahulu yang menaksirkan ganti rugi umum tetapi sekarang ia telah tidak digunakan dan bahawa adalah salah untuk menggunakannya semula. Tiada peraturan amalan sedemikian yang digunakan. Plaintif dalam tindakan fitnah boleh menaksirkan ganti ruginya, dengan risiko tidak menerima apa-apa yang lebih daripada apa yang ditetapkan dalam writnya. Bagaimana pun, dia juga bebas untuk tidak menetapkan jumlah di mana hujah dikemukakan seperti biasa pada penamatan perbicaraan atas isu tersebut. Dalam mana-mana kes, mahkamah yang membuat penentuan (lihat ms 661E–G).Tambahan pula, mahkamah mesti berada seiring dengan badan perundangan dengan membenarkan penaksiran ganti rugi dan dengan itu pemberhentiannya secara tiba-tiba akan mengeluarkan maklumat salah. Pencegahan sedemikian adalah ||Page 653>> seiring dengan semangat dan hasrat perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan tidak bertentangan dengannya (lihat ms 662E). (3) Sementara dalam kes tertentu adalah perlu untuk memfailkan afidavit untuk menyokong permohonan untuk butir-butir, ianya bukan sine qua non. Mungkin terdapat kes-kes di mana butir-butir yang dipohon adalah dengan jelasnya perlu sehinggakan afidavit mungkin menjadi tidak perlu. Semuanya bergantung kepada fakta-fakta setiap kes. Oleh itu, bukannya peraturan umum bahawa setiap permohonan untuk butir-butir lanjut mesti terdapat afidavit sokongan.Tambahan pula, hakim yang bijaksana telah terlepas perhatian

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hakikat bahawa terdapat afidavit lain oleh rakan kongsi firma tersebut, yang difailkan menentang afidavit jawapan oleh plaintif-plaintif. Afidavit itu pastinya memberikan alasan-alasan yang mencukupi bahawa butir-butir yang dipohon mesti diberikan. Dalam kes ini, butir-butir itu adalah dengan jelasnya perlu dan relevan. Butir-butir sedemikian, seperti yang dipersetujui oleh plaintif-plaintif, patut dibenarkan. Bagaimana pun, butir-butir yang berkaitan dengan keterangan dan bukan fakta tidak dibenarkan (lihat ms 663C, D, F–G). (4) Aturan 77 k 4(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 dengan jelas memberikan budi bicara kepada hakim berkaitan dengan cara dan masa sesuatu isu berkenaan liabiliti rakan kongsi boleh ditentukan secara berasingan. Hakim yang bijaksana yang mendengar permohonan berada dalam kedudukan yang terbaik untuk menentukan bagaimana perbicaraan itu patut diteruskan dengan cara yang mudah. Ia adalah satu perkara di mana hakim-hakim secara individunya mempunyai pendapat yang berbeza. Adalah salah untuk mengatakan bahawa pertimbangan yang paling utama adalah kesusahan rakan kongsi. Apa yang relevan ialah kesusahan yang boleh disebabkan ke atas semua pihak. Yang paling utama ialah, hakim akan menentukan bagaimana dan bila isu-isu patut dibicarakan; sama ada sebagai perkara permulaan atau bersama dengan tindakan utama. Oleh itu, mahkamah ini tidak berhasrat untuk mengganggu keputusan hakim itu. Malahan, sangat menyusahkan untuk menjalankan perbicaraan secara berasingan (lihat ms 670F, G). (5) Hakim adalah salah apabila beliau memutuskan bahawa pindaan kepada pembelaan telah memperkenalkan pliding baru. Pindaan itu cuma menjelaskan atau melanjutkan dalam had yang dibenarkan kes yang telahpun diplidkan oleh defendan pertama. Walaupun ini adalah satu rayuan terhadap pelaksanaan budi bicara, mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa budi bicara dilaksanakan dengan salah kerana hakim tidak mengambil kira bentuk dan skop sebenar pindaan yang dicadangkan itu. Rayuan itu mesti dibenarkan (lihat ms 672A dan 673B). ||Page 654>> Mengambil kira pindaan kepada pembelaan defendan pertama yang mahkamah telah benarkan, soal siasat yang dipohon bukan sahaja perlu tapi penting. Hakim yang bijaksana adalah betul dalam membuat perintah itu (lihat ms 674D).

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Per curiam: Adalah tidak perlu bahawa sesebuah syarikat mesti mempunyai wang yang tersedia untuk memuaskan hati mahkamah bahawa ia boleh membayar kos tindakan yang dimulakan olehnya jika tindakan itu gagal. Adalah mencukupi bahawa mahkamah berpuas hati atas testimoni yang boleh dipercayai, iaitu keterangan yang memberikan kepercayaan dalam fikiran mahkamah selepas pemeriksaan yang kritikal, bahawa plaintif korporat adalah dalam kedudukan untuk memenuhi alokatur melalui penahanan ke atas aset-asetnya (lihat ms 659I dan 660A).]

Notes For cases on security for costs, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 1338–1369. For cases on general damages, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 1488–1491. For cases on further and better particulars, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3216–3227. For cases on preliminary issue, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 4926–4928. For cases on amendment of defence, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1998 Reissue) paras 3445–3455.

Cases referred to Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620 (refd) Carmen Proetta v Times Newspapers Limited (CA, 27 February 1991) Dalgleish v Lowther [1899] 2 QB 590 (refd) Edelman v Times Newspapers Limited & Anor (CA, 17 January 1991) Feeney v Rix [1968] Ch 693 (refd) Gula Perak Bhd v Agri-Projects (M) Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 MLJ 422 (refd)

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Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1996] 2 MLJ 57 (refd) Kalvin Cader Mackenzie v Business Magazines (UK) Ltd & Ors (CA, 18 January 1996) (refd) Ketteman & Ors v Hansel Properties Ltd & Ors [1987] AC 189 (refd) Palmos & Anor v Georgeson [1961] Qd R 186 (refd) Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd v Triplan Ltd [1973] QB 609 (refd) Thomas Michael Bower v Ian Robert Maxwell (CA, 8 May 1989) (refd) Turner v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 228 (refd) ||Page 655>>

Legislation referred to Companies Act 1965 s 351(1) Federal Constitution arts 10(1)(a), (2)(a) Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 s 8A Rules of the High Court 1980 O 77 r 4(4)

VK Lingam ( V Sivaparanjothi, W Satchithanandhan and R Thayalan with him) ( V Siva & Partners) for the plaintiffs. Raja Aziz Addruse ( Darryl SC Goon, Robyn Choi and Raja Eileen Soraya) ( Raja Darryl & Loh) for the first defendant. C Abraham ( RS Nathan and G Rajasingam with him) ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the second defendant. Porres Royan ( Zainur Zakaria and Eugene Jeyaraj with him) ( N Navaratnam & Co) for K Anantham.

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MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 410

[1998] 5 MLJ 523 THIRUCHELVASEGARAM A/L MANICKAVASEGAR v MAHADEVI A/P NADCHATIRAM

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–04 OF 1997 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM JC 1 OCTOBER 1997

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Interim injunction to restrain publication of defamatory remarks — Whether ought to be granted — Serious question to be tried — Balance of convenience

Tort — Defamation — Injunction — Interlocutory injunction to restrain publication — Defendant referred to as person of low character and reputation — Whether injunction ought to be granted

The parties were both advocates and solicitors and were related through marriage, the plaintiff having married the defendant’s sister. The plaintiff contended that the defendant wrote a false and malicious letter to the plaintiff which was faxed to the plaintiff’s firm. The plaintiff alleged that the letter indicated that the plaintiff committed incest with his daughter and was not fit to practise as an advocate and solicitor. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had on diverse occasions repeated the same defamatory remarks and conspired with his daughter and other members of the same family to defame and injure his standing with the sole purpose of forcing the plaintiff’s wife to withdraw several legal suits. On 7 May 1997, the court granted an injunction to restrain the defendant or her servants or agents from publishing the libel and slander as set out in the amended statement of claim or such similar libel pending the trial of the matter and further granted a Mareva injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing of several assets as listed until disposal of the suit. After the granting of the

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 411

said injunctive orders, the defendant applied for an injunction to prevent the plaintiff from slandering and using abusive words or making defamatory statements until the hearing of the suit. The defendant also sought a Mareva injunction and an Anton Piller order in aid of the Mareva injunction. The defendant contended that the plaintiff referred to her as a person of low character and reputation and that she was useless and a prostitute.

Held, granting the interim injunction: (1) The matters complained of by the defendant were of a serious nature if proven true and the plaintiff merely denied uttering such slander. At this stage, there was no requirement to go into the merits of the case and for the moment, the court was satisfied that the allegations raised showed that there were serious issues to be tried. On this ground alone, the injunction to restrain the publication of such or similar defamatory remarks pending the hearing of the suit ought to be granted. As the defendant had been restrained until trial from publishing any defamatory statements of the plaintiff, the balance of ||Page 524>> convenience also favoured the granting of a similar injunction to restrain the plaintiff. Moreover, on considering the balance of convenience, the granting of the interlocutory injunction would not cause the plaintiff to suffer any prejudice or hardship but in the event the injunction was not granted the defendant would suffer irreparable damage which could not be adequately compensated with costs (see pp 528I and 529A–C). (2) The only ground relied on for the Mareva injunction was based on the inference that the plaintiff had been persistently consistent in his utterance of the slander and this evinced an intention of not wanting to pay, if found liable and a further inference that the plaintiff would dissipate his assets out of the jurisdiction. This was a long shot at obtaining a Mareva, suggestive of a remote chance, such as hazarding a highly improbable guess. Therefore, the court refused the prayer for the Mareva injunction and consequently the order for Anton Piller (see p 529E–G).

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 412

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Pihak-pihak kedua-duanya peguambela dan peguamcara dan bersaudara melalui perkahwinan, di mana plaintif telah mengahwini adik defendan. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa defendan telah menulis sepucuk surat yang palsu dan berniat jahat kepada plaintif yang difakskan kepada firma plaintif. Plaintif mengatakan bahawa surat itu menunjukkan bahawa plaintif telah melakukan perbuatan sumbang muhrim dengan anak perempuannya dan tidak layak membuka praktik sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Plaintif seterusnya mengatakan bahawa defendan pada beberapa kali telah mengulang komen fitnah yang sama dan berkomplot dengan anak perempuannya dan ahli lain keluarga yang sama untuk memfitnah dan merosakkan kedudukannya dengan tujuan tunggal memaksa isteri plaintif menarik balik beberapa guaman undang-undang. Pada 7 Mei 1997, mahkamah membenarkan satu injunksi bagi menahan defendan atau pekerja atau ejennya daripada menerbitkan libel dan slander seperti yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan terpinda atau libel yang seumpamanya sementara menunggu perbicaraan hal itu dan selanjutnya membenarkan injunksi Mareva untuk menahan defendan daripada melupuskan pelbagai aset seperti yang disenaraikan sehingga penyelesaian guaman. Selepas membenarkan perintah-perintah injunksi tersebut, defendan memohon injunksi untuk menghalang plaintif daripada menslander dan menggunakan kata-kata kesat atau membuat pernyataan fitnah sehingga pembicaraan guaman. Defendan juga meminta injunksi Mareva dan satu perintah Anton Piller bagi membantu injunksi Mareva. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa plaintif merujuk kepadanya sebagai seorang yang mempunyai maruah dan reputasi rendah dan bahawa dia tidak berguna dan adalah seorang pelacur. ||Page 525>>

Diputuskan, membenarkan injunksi interim: (1) Hal yang diadu oleh defendan adalah bersifat serius sekiranya dibuktikan benar dan plaintif menafikan pernah melafazkan slander itu. Di peringkat ini, tiada keperluan untuk meneliti merit kes dan buat masa ini, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa pengataan yang dibangkitkan menunjukkan bahawa terdapat isu serius untuk dibicarakan. Atas alasan ini sahaja, injunksi untuk menahan penerbitan komen demikian atau yang serupa dengannya sementara menunggu

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pembicaraan guaman patut dibenarkan.Oleh kerana defendan telah ditahan sehingga perbicaraan daripada menerbitkan apa-apa pernyataan fitnah tentang plaintif, imbangan kemudahan juga memihak kepada pemberian injunksi yang serupa bagi menahan plaintif.Tambahan pula, dengan mempertimbangkan imbangan kemudahan, pemberian injunksi interlokutori tidak akan menyebabkan plaintif mengalami sebarang kemudaratan atau kesulitan tetapi andainya injunksi tidak diberikan defendan akan mengalami kerosakan yang tidak boleh dibaiki yang tidak boleh dipampas secukupnya dengan kos (lihat ms 528I dan 529A–C). (2) Satu-satunya alasan yang diharapkan untuk injunksi Mareva adalah berdasarkan inferens bahawa plaintif tetap konsisten dalam pelafazan slander dan ini membangkitkan hasrat tidak ingin membayar, andainya didapati bersalah dan inferens lanjut bahawa plaintif akan melupuskan aset-asetnya di luar bidang kuasa. Ini cumalah percubaan untuk mendapatkan Mareva, yang mencadangkan peluang yang sungguh tipis, bagaikan mencuba mengagak sesuatu yang tidak mungkin. Maka, mahkamah menolak permohonan untuk injunksi Mareva dan berikutnya perintah untuk Anton Piller (lihat ms 529E–G).]

Notes For cases on injunction, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 1425–1725. For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

RS Sodhi ( Mahadevi Nadchatiram and Shanti T with him) ( Mahadevi Nadchatiram & Partners) for the applicant/defendant. M Thiruchelvasegaram ( Syarikat M Segaram) for the respondent/plaintiff.

[1998] 5 MLJ 773

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 414

MOHD JALI BIN HAJI NGAH (T/A PERANAN PUSAT PENDIDIKAN DAN PEMULIHAN ANAK YATIM DAN CACAT TENGGARA ASIA) v THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (M) BHD & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S6–22–358 OF 1987 MOHD NOOR AHMAD J 10 FEBRUARY 1998

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Allegations that plaintiff was operating a banned and illegal society and obtaining money from the firms under false pretences — Test applicable

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Fair comment — Whether comments made were fair — Conditions to fair comment — Test applicable — Whether defendants required to prove every fact in the articles is true

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Qualified privilege — Whether comments made in good faith and without malice upon a matter of public interest

The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants for defamation in respect of two articles appearing in the Malay Mail and the New Straits Times. The plaintiff is and was at all material times the sole proprietor of and trading as Peranan Pusat Pendidikan dan Pemulihan Anak Yatim dan Cacat Tenggara Asia (‘the Pusat’). The first defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the New Straits Times and the second defendant was the editor of the two publications. The plaintiff contended that the articles in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood and taken to mean that, inter alia, the plaintiff was operating a banned and illegal society allegedly taking money from firms under false pretence and the plaintiff’s business was a bogus operation

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designed to deceive firms to advertise in his publication. The defendants denied that the words were understood to refer to or were capable of referring to or being understood to refer to the plaintiff. The defendants also denied that the words bore and were understood to bear any of the meaning as contended by the plaintiff. In the alternative, the defendants plead that the articles were fair comment made in good faith and without malice upon matter of public interest, or the articles were published on occasion of qualified privilege.

Held, dismissing the claim: (1) The test as to whether the impugned words were capable of being, or were in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff is: Whether such words were calculated to expose him to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of the reasonable man or would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally. If the words have such tendency, they could still be defamatory even if they did not really lower a plaintiff in ||Page 774>> the estimation of those to whom they were published (see p 778G–H); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 and Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed.Having scrutinized the words in the two articles, the court was satisfied that the impugned words were defamatory of the plaintiff. The gravamens of the complaint in the two articles lay in the allegations that the plaintiff was operating a banned and illegal society and obtaining money from the firms under false pretences (see p 778I). (2) Regarding the defence of fair comment, it is trite that the comment must be fair. It was clear that the facts stated in the articles were true and the comments were fair. The comments were made in good faith and without malice upon a matter of public interest. Furthermore, the defendant was entitled to the defence of qualified privilege because the defendant was under a legal and moral duty to inform the public about the activities of the Pusat. There is not an iota of evidence of malice on the part of the defendant. Also, by virtue of s 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, the defendants were not required to prove every fact in the articles was true to be entitled to the defence of fair comment. The court

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was satisfied that the comments expressed in the articles were fair having regard to the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as were proved (see pp 779A, F–H and 780E–G).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif menuntut ganti rugi terhadap defendan-defendan untuk fitnah berhubung dengan dua rencana yang diterbitkan dalam Malay Mail dan New Straits Times. Plaintif adalah dan pada semua masa peniaga tunggal dan berniaga sebagai ‘Peranan Pusat Pendidikan dan Pemulihan Anak Yatim dan Cacat Tenggara Asia’ (‘Pusat tersebut’). Defendan pertama adalah tuan punya dan penerbit New Straits Times dan defendan kedua adalah penyunting kedua-dua terbitan. Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa rencana-rencana tersebut dalam makna mereka yang semulajadi dan biasa bermakna dan difahamkan sebagai bermakna bahawa, antara lain, plaintif mengendali sebuah pertubuhan yang dilarang dan pertubuhan dikatakan mengambil wang daripada firma-firma di bawah dakwaan palsu dan perniagaan plaintif adalah suatu kegiatan palsu yang diwujudkan untuk menipu firma-firma supaya mengiklan dalam terbitannya. Defendan-defendan menafikan bahawa perkataan-perkataan itu difahamkan sebagai merujuk kepada atau berupaya untuk merujuk kepada plaintif. Defendan-defendan juga menafikan perkataan-perkataan itu membawa dan difahamkan membawa mana-mana makna seperti yang dihujahkan oleh plaintif. Sebagai alternatif, defendan menghujahkan bahawa rencana-rencana tersebut adalah komen berpatutan yang dibuat dengan suci hati dan tanpa niat jahat atas perkara yang berkepentingan awam, atau rencana-rencana diterbitkan di bawah perlindungan bersyarat. ||Page 775>>

Diputuskan, menolak tuntutan: (1) Ujian mengenai sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang dipersoalkan memfitnah plaintif adalah: Sama ada perkataan sedemikian dijangka mendedahkannya kepada kebencian, cemuhan atau penghinaan dalam minda orang yang munasabah atau mungkin akan menyebabkan ahli-ahli masyarakat pada amnya memandang rendah terhadap plaintif. Andainya perkataan-perkataan itu mempunyai kecenderungan demikian, mereka masih boleh memfitnah biarpun

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mereka tidak benar-benar menyebabkan ahli-ahli masyarakat memandang rendah terhadap plaintif (lihat ms 778G–H); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 dan Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut.Selepas meneliti perkataan-perkataan dalam dua rencana itu, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa perkataan-perkataan yang dipersoalkan memfitnah plaintif. Dasar aduan dalam kedua-dua rencana terletak dalam pengataan bahawa plaintif mengendali pertubuhan yang dilarang dan haram dan menerima wang daripada firma-firma di bawah dakwaan palsu (lihat ms 778I). (2) Mengenai pembelaan komen berpatutan, adalah mantap bahawa komen mestilah berpatutan. Adalah jelas bahawa fakta-fakta yang dinyatakan dalam rencana-rencana tersebut adalah benar dan komen adalah berpatutan. Komen-komen telah dibuat dengan suci hati dan tanpa niat jahat atas perkara yang berkepentingan awam. Tambahan pula, defendan berhak kepada pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat kerana defendan berada di bawah kewajipan undang-undang dan moral untuk memberitahu masyarakat awam tentang kegiatan Pusat tersebut. Tidak terdapat keterangan apa-apa pun mengenai niat jahat pada pihak defendan. Juga, disebabkan s 9 Akta Fitnah 1957, defendan-defendan tidak dikehendaki membuktikan setiap fakta dalam rencana-rencana adalah benar supaya berhak kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan. Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa komen-komen yang dinyatakan dalam rencana-rencana tersebut adalah berpatutan dengan mengambil kira fakta-fakta yang dikatakan atau yang dirujuk dalam perkataan-perkataan yang diadu seperti yang terbukti (lihat ms 779A, F–H dan 780E–G).]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165–230.

Cases referred to Capital and Counties Bank Ltd, The v George Henty & Sons (1881–82) 7 App Cas 741 (refd)

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JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 (folld) ||Page 776>> Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (refd) Kemsley v Foot & Ors [1952] 1 All ER 501 (refd) Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (folld) Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 9 Societies Act 1966

Wan Mohd Zam ( Prasad Abraham & Associates) for the plaintiff. Lorraine Cheah ( Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendant.

[1997] 3 MLJ 300 MBF CAPITAL BHD & ANOR v DATO’ PARAM CUMARASWAMY

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S3–23–68 OF 1996 ZAINUN ALI JC 28 JUNE 1997

Civil Procedure — Writ of summons — Striking out — Ground: Immunity from legal MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 419

process — Defamation proceedings — Whether court ought to determine question of probative status of documentary evidence at this stage — Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 s 22 — Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 art 12 — Diplomatic Privileges (Vienna Convention) Act 1966 — International Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Immunity of United Nations Special Rapporteur — Whether court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ action for defamation — Whether defendant was immune from legal process when he made the alleged defamatory statements — Whether it was shown that no matter what were the facts that the plaintiff would be able to establish relating to the subject matter of the dispute, the court would have no power to grant relief of the kind sought against the defendant

The plaintiffs, a public-listed company and a licensed stock-broking company respectively, instituted defamation proceedings against the defendant, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya, and the chief executive and partner of a firm of advocates and solicitors in Malaysia. The defendant was appointed as a UN Special Rapporteur for a three-year period commencing 2 April 1994. The action was in relation to an article (‘the article’) which appeared in the November 1995 issue of the International Commercial Litigation Magazine (‘the magazine’) under the caption ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. The defendant applied to set aside and/or strike out the plaintiffs’ writ on the basis that the statements attributed to the defendant were made in his capacity as a United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independance of judges and lawyers and that it was made in the course of his mission as such. The defendant claimed that he was immune from legal process of every kind and that this court had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ action. On behalf of the defendant, certificates issued by the Secretary-General to the United Nations and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were produced which explained the privileges and immunities granted to the defendant. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s mandate was a functional, limited and a qualified one in its scope and that for as long as he performed his duties and functions within the scope of his mandate,

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he enjoyed the privileges and immunites under s 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946. On the other hand, it was contended by the plaintiffs that by so making the alleged defamatory statement against ||Page 301>> the plaintiffs to a private commercial litigation magazine, the defendant had clearly acted outside his mandate and therefore was not entitled to immunity. The issues before the court were, inter alia: (i) how the court should view the certificates (especially the certificate issued by the Secretary-General) at this stage; and (ii) whether the defendant was excluded from the jurisdiction of the court.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) The court ought not be drawn at this stage into the question of the probative status of both the Secretary-General’s and the Minister’s certificates. In this case, the court ought to exercise judicial self-restraint. Therefore, the question as to whether the defendant’s act was or was not within the scope of his mandate was an elusive inquiry — to be answered only when matters of evidence was before the court. The court therefore would have to consider the whole context in which the claim against the defendant was made, with a view to deciding whether the relevant act upon which the plaintiffs’ claim was based should, in that connection, be contemplated as fairly within the area of activity of his mandate or otherwise (see p 313H–I). (2) For purposes of determining jurisdiction, it must be assumed that the allegation in the plaintiffs’ statement of claim was true and, since lack of jurisdiction has the consequence that the court has no right to enter upon the enquiry as to whether there exist a state of facts which would entitle the court to grant to the plaintiff the relief sought, the jurisdiction summons could succeed only if it is shown that no matter what were the facts that the plaintiff would be able to establish relating to the subject matter of the dispute, the court would have no power to grant relief of the kind sought against the defendant. In the circumstances, it could not be said that the defendant was absolutely protected by the immunity he claimed (see pp 315I and 316A–B); Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong[1970] AC 1136 followed.

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Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif-plaintif, iaitu syarikat awam dan syarikat broker saham berlesen masing-masing, memulakan prosiding fitnah terhadap defendan, seorang peguambela dan peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, dan ketua eksekutif dan rakan kongsi sebuah firma peguambela dan peguamcara di Malaysia. Defendan dilantik sebagai Pelapor Khas Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu untuk tempoh masa tiga tahun bermula daripada 2 April 1994. Tindakan itu adalah berkaitan dengan satu artikel (‘artikel tersebut’) yang disiarkan dalam keluaran November 1995 International Commercial Litigation Magazine (‘majalah tersebut’) di bawah tajuk ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. ||Page 302>> Defendan memohon untuk mengetepikan dan/atau membatalkan writ plaintif-plaintif atas alasan bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan berkenaan dengan defendan dibuat dalam keupayaannya sebagai Pelapor Khas Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu berkenaan dengan kebebasan hakim-hakim dan peguam-peguam dan bahawa ia dibuat semasa misinya yang sedemikian. Defendan mendakwa bahawa beliau adalah kebal daripada proses undang-undang dalam bentuk apa pun dan bahawa mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar tindakan plaintif-plaintif. Bagi pihak defendan, sijil-sijil yang dikeluarkan oleh Setiausaha Agung Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu dan Menteri Hal Ehwal Luar Negeri ditunjukkan yang menerangkan perlindungan dan kekebalan yang diberikan kepada defendan. Plaintif-plaintif menghujahkan bahawa mandat defendan adalah berfungsi, terhad dan terbatas dalam skopnya dan bahawa selagi beliau menjalankan tugas-tugas dan fungsi-fungsinya dalam skop mandatnya, beliau memperolehi perlindungan dan kekebalan di bawah s 22 Konvensyen Perlindungan dan Kekebalan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu 1946. Sebaliknya, adalah dihujahkan oleh plaintif-plaintif bahawa dengan membuat kenyataan fitnah yang dikatakan terhadap plaintif-plaintif kepada majalah litigasi komersial persendirian, defendan telah dengan jelasnya bertindak diluar mandatnya dan dengan itu tidak layak kepada kekebalan. Isu di hadapan mahkamah adalah, antara lain: (i) bagaimana mahkamah patut menimbangkan sijil-sijil itu (terutamanya sijil yang dikeluarkan oleh Setiausaha Agung) pada peringkat ini; dan (ii) sama ada defendan adalah dikecualikan daripada bidang kuasa mahkamah.

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Diputuskan, menolak permohonan: (1) Mahkamah tidak patut dibawa pada peringkat ini kepada persoalan status probatif sijil kedua-dua Setiausaha Agung dan Menteri. Dalam kes ini, mahkamah patut melaksanakan kehakiman yang terkawal. Oleh itu, persoalan sama ada tindakan defendan adalah dalam skop mandatnya adalah pertanyaan yang sukar — hanya perlu dijawab apabila perkara-perkara bukti berada di hadapan mahkamah. Mahkamah dengan itu perlu menimbangkan konteks keseluruhan dalam mana tuntutan terhadap defendan dibuat, dengan tujuan untuk memutuskan sama ada tindakan yang relevan di mana tuntutan plaintif-plaintif didasarkan patut, berhubung dengan perkara ini, dianggap sebagai secara wajarnya dalam lingkungan aktiviti mandatnya atau sebaliknya (lihat ms 313H–I). (2) Untuk tujuan menentukan bidang kuasa, mesti dianggap bahawa pengataan dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif adalah benar dan, oleh kerana ketiadaan bidang kuasa mempunyai akibat bahawa mahkamah tidak mempunyai hak untuk menentukan pertanyaan sama ada wujud keadaan fakta-fakta yang memberikan hak kepada mahkamah untuk memberikan kepada plaintif relief yang dipohon, saman bidang kuasa hanya boleh berjaya jika ||Page 303>> ianya ditunjukkan bahawa tidak kira apa jua fakta yang dapat dibuktikan oleh plaintif-plaintif berkaitan dengan perkara subjek pertikaian, mahkamah tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk memberikan relief seperti mana yang dipohon terhadap defendan. Dalam keadaan-keadaan itu, tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa defendan adalah dilindungi sepenuhnya oleh kekebalan seperti yang didakwa (lihat ms 315I dan 316A–B); Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong[1970] AC 1136 diikut.]

Notes For cases on striking out of writ of summons, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 3712–3723 and 2749–2753. For cases on jurisdiction, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras

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2092–2255.

Cases referred to Dickinson v Del Solar [1930] 1 KB 376 (refd) Duff Development Co Ltd v Government [1924] 797 AC (refd) Parlement Belge [1880] 5 PD 197 (refd) R v Madan [1961] 1 QB 1 (refd) Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1970] 1136 AC (folld) Engelke v Mussman [1928] 433 AC (refd) Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v Government of Pakistan [1975] 1 WLR 1485 (refd)

Legislation referred to Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946 s 22 Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 23 Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 art 12 Diplomatic Privileges (Vienna Convention) Act 1966 International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7

VK Lingam (V Sivaparanjothi, Satchithanandhan, Peter Raj and R Thayalan with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the plaintiffs. Cyrus Das (Nantha Balan and Trevor George De Silva with him) (Shook Lin & Bok) for the defendant.

[1997] 3 MLJ 403

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 424

MBF CAPITAL BHD & ANOR v TOMMY THOMAS & ANOR (NO 2)

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S2–23–52 OF 1996 KAMALANATHAN RATNAM JC 1 AUGUST 1997

Tort — Defamation — Libel and slander — Award of damages — Whether damages for defamation could be based on an award of damages for personal injury

Civil Procedure — Damages — General damages — Quantification of damages — General damages quantified in the indorsement to the writ of summons and in the statement of claim — Whether the Rules of the High Court 1980 or practice direction disbar the plaintiffs from affixing a figure to indicate their worth in the form of loss of reputation — Whether court ought to fetter the right of a litigant to tell the world at large what his reputation is worth

The plaintiffs, a public-listed company and a licensed stockbroking company respectively, sued the first defendant, an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and a partner in the second defendant, a long-established firm of advocates and solicitors in Malaysia. The claim was for damages including exemplary damages for slander and libel by the first defendant, acting on behalf of himself and/or on behalf of the second defendant in/or about September to November 1995 to representatives of the International Commercial Litigation Magazine (‘the magazine’), the words being subsequently published in the issue of the magazine for November 1995, which was distributed in Malaysia. Each of the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, a sum amounting to RM15m for slander and a further sum of RM15m for libel. Having filed his defence, the first defendant applied to strike out with costs, the words ‘amounting to RM15m’ appearing both in the indorsement to the writ of summons and in the body of the statement of claim. In

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 425

support of his application, the first defendant stated, in his affidavit, that neither the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) ||Page 404>> nor any practice direction issued so far, required the quantification or stipulation of a specific sum in respect of a claim for general damages. He further averred that exemplary damages clearly fell into the category of unliquidated damages and consequently ought not to be quantified until final adjudication of the claim, assuming one was successful. He was also of the view that as a matter of practice and/or tradition, prayers for general damages were never quantified in suits filed in Malaysia. In reply, the plaintiffs stated in their affidavit that neither the RHC nor any practice direction prohibited the quantification of the damages claimed. Counsel for the plaintiffs further argued that even the Defamation Act 1957 did not prohibit the quantification of damages. ||Page 405>>

Held, dismissing the application with costs: (1) Awards in personal injury cases and defamation actions serve different purposes, have different elements and different histories. The purposes of an award of aggravated compensatory damages in a defamation action are different from the purposes of an award of general damages in a personal injury action. Therefore, damages for defamation could not be based on an award of damages for personal injury (see p 411C–I); Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 577 and Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 followed. (2) There is no rule in the RHC nor in any practice direction to disbar the plaintiffs from affixing a figure to indicate their worth in the form of loss of reputation although what has been in practice is that the claimants in defamation suits have all along been adopting the procedure relating to accident cases where, rightly so, general damages ought not to be quantified in the statement of claim. No court ought to fetter the right of a litigant to tell the world at large what his reputation is worth. It is for the plaintiff to establish that claim by way of proof in court. To attempt to strike out the right of an indignant litigant who intends

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 426

to give fair notice to the other side of his claim is being unjust to him (see p 412D–F).

Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif-plaintif, sebuah syarikat awam dan sebuah syarikat broker saham berlesen masing-masing, mendakwa defendan pertama, seorang peguambela dan peguamcara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya dan rakan kongsi dalam defendan kedua, sebuah firma peguambela dan peguamcara yang telah lama bertapak di Malaysia. Tuntutan adalah untuk ganti rugi termasuk ganti rugi teladan bagi slander dan libel oleh defendan pertama, yang bertindak bagi pihak dirinya sendiri dan/atau bagi pihak defendan kedua pada atau sekitar September hingga November 1995 kepada wakil-wakil International Commercial Litigation Magazine (‘majalah tersebut’), perkataan-perkataan itu kemudiannya disiarkan dalam keluaran majalah tersebut bagi bulan November 1995, yang diedarkan di Malaysia. Setiap plaintif menuntut, antara lain, jumlah sebanyak RM15 juta untuk slander dan jumlah lanjut sebanyak RM15 juta untuk libel. Setelah memfailkan pembelaannya, defendan pertama memohon untuk membatalkan dengan kos perkataan-perkataan ‘berjumlah RM15 juta’ yang terdapat dalam kedua-dua pengindorsan kepada writ saman dan dalam isi pernyataan tuntutan. Sebagai menyokong permohonannya, defendan pertama menyatakan, dalam afidavitnya, bahawa baik Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) mahupun mana-mana arahan amalan yang dikeluarkan setakat ini tidak memerlukan pengiraan atau penetapan jumlah yang khusus berkaitan dengan tuntutan untuk ganti rugi am. Beliau selanjutnya ||Page 406>> menegaskan bahawa ganti rugi teladan dengan jelasnya termasuk dalam kategori ganti rugi jumlah tak tertentu dan dengan itu tidak patut dinyatakan kuantitinya sehingga penghakiman muktamad tuntutan, dengan anggapan seseorang itu berjaya. Beliau juga berpendapat bahawa sebagai satu perkara amalan dan/atau tradisi, tuntutan untuk ganti rugi am tidak pernah menyatakan kuantiti dalam guaman-guaman yang difailkan di Malaysia. Sebagai jawapannya, plaintif-plaintif menyatakan dalam afidavit mereka bahawa baik KMT mahupun mana-mana arahan amalan tidak melarang pengkuantitian ganti rugi yang dituntut. Peguam bagi pihak plaintif-plaintif selanjutnya berhujah bahawa Akta

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Fitnah 1957 pun tidak melarang pengiraan ganti rugi.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan dengan kos: (1) Award dalam kes-kes kecederaan diri dan tindakan-tindakan fitnah mempunyai tujuan-tujuan yang berbeza, mempunyai unsur-unsur yang berbeza dan sejarah yang berbeza. Tujuan-tujuan award ganti rugi pampasan dalam tindakan fitnah adalah berbeza daripada tujuan-tujuan award ganti rugi am dalam tindakan kecederaan diri. Oleh itu, ganti rugi untuk fitnah tidak boleh berdasarkan award ganti rugi untuk kecederaan diri (lihat ms 411C–I); Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 113 ALR 577 dan Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 diikut. (2) Tiada sebarang kaedah dalam KMT atau dalam mana-mana arahan amalan untuk menghalang plaintif-plaintif daripada meletakkan suatu angka untuk menunjukkan nilai mereka dalam bentuk kehilangan reputasi walaupun apa yang diamalkan adalah pihak menuntut dalam guaman-guaman fitnah telah selama ini menerima-pakai prosedur berkaitan dengan kes-kes kemalangan di mana, dengan betulnya, kuantiti ganti rugi am tidak patut dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan. Tiada mahkamah yang patut menghalang hak litigan untuk memberitahu masyarakat umum apa nilai reputasinya. Plaintif-plaintif mestilah membuktikan tuntutan itu dengan cara pembuktian di mahkamah. Percubaan untuk membatalkan hak litigan yang marah yang berhasrat memberikan notis yang wajar kepada pihak yang lain adalah tidak adil kepadanya (lihat ms 412D–F).]

Notes For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261. For cases on damages, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 1097–1103.

Cases referred to Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] 113 ALR 577 (folld)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 428

Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 (folld) ||Page 407>> Chattell v ‘Daily Mail’ Publishing Co (Ltd) [1901-02] 18 TLR 165 (refd) Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 (refd) Rustom K Karanjia & Anor v Krishnaraj MD Thackersey & Ors 1970 Bom AIR 424 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 22 r 1

Raja Aziz Addruse (Darryl Goon and HY Chooi with him) (Raja Darryl & Loh) for the applicant/first defendant. VK Lingam (V Sivaparanjothi and R Thayalan with him) (V Siva & Partners) for the respondents/plaintiffs.

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[1997] 3 MLJ 824 DATO’ PARAM CUMARASWAMY v MBF CAPITAL BHD & ANOR

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NO W–02–323 OF 1997 GOPAL SRI RAM, AHMAD FAIRUZ AND DENIS ONG JJCA 20 OCTOBER 1997

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 429

Civil Procedure — Writ of summons — Setting aside — Ground: Immunity from legal process — Defamation proceedings — Whether High Court entitled as a matter of law to defer the question of the defendant’s immunity until trial — Whether High Court ought to have done so on the facts of the case — Whether letter from Secretary General of the United Nation and certificate issued by Minister for Foreign Affairs provide conclusive evidence of immunity — Whether there were any serious questions that call for trial — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7 — Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ss 22 — Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 art 12 — International Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992

Civil Procedure — Appeal — Discretion exercised by trial judge — Interference by appellate court — Whether judicial commissioner took into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant considerations, or asked himself wrong question, or erred in point of principle or the order made would result in injustice

Tort — Defamation — Action against United Nations Special Rapporteur — Defence of immunity — Whether defendant exceeded the terms of his mandate — Whether defendant spoke the alleged defamatory words in his personal capacity — Whether it is for the Secretary General of the United Nations and/or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia to assert immunity on behalf of the defendant in respect of words uttered by him — Whether the terms of the defendant’s mandate had to be construed with reference to art 12 of the Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 and not s 22 of art VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7

The respondents (‘the plaintiffs’) instituted defamation proceedings against the appellant (‘the defendant’) in relation to an article which appeared in the International Commercial Litigation magazine under the caption ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. The defendant took out a summons under O 12 r 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’) to set aside the plaintiffs’ writ on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over his person because he was immune from suit. The defendant’s claim for immunity rested on the ground that he was, at the material time, the United Nations

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Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. In support of his claim, he relied, among other matters, on a letter written by the Secretary General of the United Nations (‘the Secretary General’) and a certificate issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia (‘the Minister’) which explained the privileges and immunities granted to the defendant. The judicial commissioner held that the defendant’s immunity was a matter that was not capable of resolution in a ||Page 825>> summary manner and dismissed the defendant’s summons (see [1997] 3 MLJ 300). The defendant appealed. The defendant submitted that the judicial commissioner erred in postponing her determination of the defendant’s immunity until the trial of the action. It was argued based on decided cases that there was no power in the High Court under O 12 r 7(1) of the RHC to postpone the determination of the question whether the court has jurisdiction over the person of a defendant. Alternatively, the defendant argued that even if O 12 r 7 permits a postponement of the immunity issue, the judicial commissioner was wrong in doing so because there was evidence before the judicial commissioner, which established conclusively the defendant’s immunity. It was submitted that there was no serious question to be tried on the issue of the defendant’s immunity. Since the Secretary General asserted immunity and the Minister had issued his certificate, there was no doubt that the plaintiffs could not implead the defendant. Further, it was for the Secretary General to decide whether the defendant had exceeded the terms of the mandate given him. The defendant referred to the relevant provisions in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (‘the General Convention’), the Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 (‘the 1949 Order’) and the International Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 (‘the Act’). The main issues before the court were whether: (i) the judicial commissioner was entitled, as a matter of law, to defer the question of the defendant’s immunity; and (ii) the judicial commissioner ought to have done so on the facts of the case.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The present appeal, unlike the cases cited by the defendant, fell well outside the scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The defendant in this case was

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not a foreign sovereign. Therefore, the immunity he claimed was not absolute and was circumscribed by the terms of the mandate conferred upon him.Moreover, if O 12 r 7 of the RHC receives the interpretation canvassed by the defendant, it would mean that in no case would the court be in a position to say whether a Special Rapporteur had acted within the scope of his mission. It would place the rule in a strait-jacket and afford no flexibility whatsoever to its application. This would produce an unjust result as it would prohibit the court from dealing with each case according to its peculiar facts when dealing with an application under O 12 r 7.Therefore, the judicial commissioner was not duty bound to decide the defendant’s application in a summary fashion. She was, if the facts merited further investigation, entitled, as a matter of law, to put off the determination of the defendant’s immunity until after she had had the benefit of viva voceevidence ||Page 826>> upon that issue (see pp 836G and 837B–F); Sim SeohBeng & Anor v Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 292 followed; Juan Ysmael & Co Inc v Government of the Republic of Indonesia [1954] 3 All ER 236 and United States of America v Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie, SA [1952] 1 All ER 572 distinguished. (2) As to the test that is to be applied in determining whether a postponement is proper in any given cases under O 12 r 7, the correct approach is to determine whether there are any serious questions that call for a trial.In the present case, the rival contentions between the parties regarding the issue of whether the defendant spoke and published the words complained of while on mission, ie in his capacity as a Special Rapporteur, amounted to a serious question. It would be patently unsafe to determine, in a summary fashion, the capacity in which the defendant uttered the impugned words. The issue under discussion was substantially an issue of fact. Like any other fact, it must be determined at trial, after hearing all the evidence led upon it and after a mature consideration of the submissions to be made on both sides. The affidavit evidence did raise a serious dispute as to the capacity in which the defendant was alleged to have spoken and published the words complained of. In the circumstances of the present case, the judicial commissioner was entirely correct in reserving her decision until after the trial of the action (see pp 838D and 840C–F).

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(3) The question whether the defendant exceeded the terms of his mandate is not a matter for the Secretary General to decide. It is a question that the court must determine according to the evidence presented at the trial. The opinion expressed by the Secretary General did not therefore bind the learned judicial commissioner.Accordingly, if the trial court finds that the defendant spoke the alleged defamatory words in his personal capacity, no question of immunity can arise. For, neither the Secretary General nor the Minister may assert immunity on behalf of the defendant in respect of words uttered by him in his capacity as advocate and solicitor. If the court comes to the conclusion that the defendant did in fact speak as Special Rapporteur, it must go on and decide whether he acted within the terms of his mandate. Clearly, these were matters that amount to serious questions calling for a trial of the action (see p 845D–G); Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433 distinguished.Further, it appeared that the Secretary General had asserted the defendant’s immunity in terms that clearly fell outside the scope of the General Convention and the 1949 Order. The Secretary General had, in his letter, taken the position that the defendant uttered the words complained of ‘in the course of his mission’ and was therefore immune from suit. The phrase employed by the Secretary General in his letter was of much ||Page 827>> wider import than that appearing in either the General Convention and the 1949 Order. For, a person may be ‘in the course of his mission’ and yet commit acts that are not ‘in the exercise of these functions’. Therefore, the Secretary General’s letter was not conclusive (see pp 845H and 846A–C). (4) The Minister’s certificate added nothing in the defendant’s favour. That certificate was, as s 7(2) of the Act declares, ‘evidence of the facts certified’. The Minister had not certified as a fact that the defendant spoke the words complained of in his capacity as Special Rapporteur. That fact was therefore still at large and must necessarily be determined by the judge at trial. The Minister’s certificate only reproduced the extent of the defendant’s immunity in general terms. It did not conclude the matter to the extent contended by the defendant (see p 844A–C).

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(5) The terms of the defendant’s mandate had to be construed with reference to art 12 of the 1949 Order and not s 22 of art VI of the General Convention because art 12 is clear and unambiguous in the provision it has made by its terms, and thus there was no necessity to have resort to s 22. The question of the independence of the defendant in the exercise of his functions as Special Rapporteur was a matter that must ex necessitate rei be determined with reference to the terms of his mandate. Accordingly, the question whether the defendant exceeded his mandate in the context of the immunity claimed by him under art 12 of the 1949 Order, as well as the construction of that article, were matters for the trial judge to decide. Indeed, they were serious questions to be tried (see pp 849B–D and 850B–C). (6) The defendant had failed to demonstrate that the judicial commissioner had committed an error that warrants appellate interference. She asked herself the right questions, took into account all relevant considerations and directed herself correctly on the applicable law. Above all, the order she made had not resulted in any injustice to the defendant. There had been no ruling against immunity, the judicial commissioner taking much care to leave that issue open to be decided at the trial of the action. The defendant is entitled, at the conclusion of the trial, to a verdict in his favour in the event he establishes his claim to immunity on the facts (see p 851C–D).

[Bahasa Malaysia summary Penentang-penentang (‘plaintif-plaintif’) telah memulakan prosiding fitnah terhadap perayu (defendan’) berkaitan dengan suatu rencana yang diterbitkan dalam majalah International Commercial Litigation di bawah tajuk ‘Malaysian Justice on Trial’. Defendan telah mengambil saman di bawah A 12 k 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 (‘KMT’) untuk mengetepikan writ plaintif-plaintif berdasarkan alasan bahawa mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atasnya kerana beliau adalah kebal daripada guaman. Tuntutan defendan untuk ||Page 828>> kekebalan adalah berdasarkan alasan bahawa pada masa material, beliau adalah Pelapor Khas Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu bagi kebebasan para hakim dan peguam. Sebagai menyokong tuntutannya, beliau bergantung, antara perkara lain, kepada

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sepucuk surat yang ditulis oleh Ketua Setiausaha Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (‘Ketua Setiausaha’) dan perakuan yang dikeluarkan oleh Menteri Hal Ehwal Asing Malaysia (‘Menteri’) yang menjelaskan keistimewaan dan kekebalan yang diberikan kepada defendan. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman memutuskan bahawa kekebalan defendan merupakan suatu perkara yang tidak dapat diselesaikan secara terus dan menolak saman defendan (lihat [1997] 3 MLJ 300). Defendan merayu. Defendan menghujahkan bahawa pesuruhjaya kehakiman terkhilaf dalam menunda keputusan beliau atas kekebalan defendan sehingga perbicaraan tindakan. Adalah dihujahkan berdasarkan kes-kes yang diputuskan bahawa tiada kuasa di Mahkamah Tinggi di bawah A 12 k 7(1) KMT untuk menunda keputusan tentang persoalan sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa ke atas diri defendan. Secara alternatif, defendan menghujahkan bahawa sekalipun A 12 k 7 membenarkan penundaan isu kekebalan, pesuruhjaya kehakiman adalah salah dalam berbuat demikian kerana terdapat keterangan di hadapan pesuruhjaya kehakiman, yang membuktikan kekebalan defendan secara muktamad. Adalah dihujahkan tiada persoalan serius untuk dibicarakan atas isu kekebalan defendan. Oleh kerana Ketua Setiausaha menegaskan kekebalan dan Menteri telah pun mengeluarkan perakuan beliau, tiada keraguan bahawa plaintif-plaintif tidak boleh memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan. Seterusnya, adalah untuk Ketua Setiausaha untuk memutuskan sama ada defendan telah melampaui terma mandat yang diberikan kepadanya. Defendan merujuk kepada peruntukan-peruntukan yang relevan dalam Konvensyen Keistimewaan dan Kekebalan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (‘Konvensyen Am’), Perintah Keistimewaan Diplomatik (Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu dan Mahkamah Keadilan Antarabangsa) 1949 (‘Perintah 1949’) dan Akta Organisasi Antarabangsa (Keistimewaan dan Kekebalan) 1992 (‘Akta tersebut’). Isu-isu utama di hadapan mahkamah adalah sama ada: (i) pesuruhjaya kehakiman adalah berhak, di sisi undang-undang, untuk menangguh persoalan kekebalan defendan; dan (ii) pesuruhjaya kehakiman sepatutnya telah berbuat demikian atas fakta-fakta kes.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan: (1) Rayuan ini, berbeza dengan kes-kes yang disebut oleh defendan, tidak

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dirangkumi oleh skop doktrin kekebalan pemerintah. Defendan dalam kes ini bukanlah seorang pemerintah asing. Maka, kekebalan yang dituntutnya tidak mutlak dan beliau adalah tertakluk kepada terma mandat yang dikurniakan ke atasnya.Tambahan pula, andainya A 12 k 7 KMT menerima tafsiran yang dibentangkan oleh defendan, ia akan bermakna bahawa dalam mana-mana kes mahkamah tidak berada dalam kedudukan ||Page 829>> untuk mengatakan sama ada seseorang Pelapor Khas telah bertindak dalam lingkungan misinya. Ia akan mengongkong kaedah ini tanpa sebarang kefleksibelan kepada pemakaiannya. Ini akan menghasilkan keputusan yang tidak adil kerana ia akan melarang mahkamah daripada menguruskan setiap kes menurut fakta-fakta khusus tersendiri ketika menguruskan suatu permohonan di bawah A 12 k 7.Maka, pesuruhjaya kehakiman tidak wajib membuat keputusan tentang permohonan defendan secara terus. Sekiranya fakta memerlukan siasatan lanjut, di sisi undang-undang beliau berhak menangguh keputusan atas kekebalan defendan sehingga selepas manfaat keterangan viva vocemengenai isu itu boleh didapati (lihat ms 836G dan 837B–F); Sim SeohBeng & Anor v Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 292 diikut; Juan Ysmael & Co Inc v Government of the Republic of Indonesia [1954] 3 All ER 236 dan United States of America v Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie, SA [1952] 1 All ER 572 dibeza. (2) Mengenai ujian yang harus dipakai dalam memutuskan sama ada suatu penundaan adalah betul dalam sebarang kes yang diberikan di bawah A 12 k 7, pendekatan yang betul adalah untuk memutuskan sama ada terdapat sebarang persoalan serius untuk dibicarakan.Dalam kes ini, hujah-hujah yang bersaingan di antara pihak-pihak tentang isu-isu sama ada defendan telah melafazkan dan menerbitkan kata-kata yang diadu sewaktu menjalankan misi, dalam keupayaan beliau sebagai seorang Pelapor Khas, adalah persoalan serius. Adalah tidak selamat untuk memutuskan keupayaan dalam mana defendan melafazkan kata-kata yang dipersoalkan secara terus. Isu yang dibincangkan pada dasarnya adalah isu fakta-fakta. Seperti mana-mana fakta lain, ia mesti diputuskan di perbicaraan, selepas mendengar segala keterangan yang diutarakan dan selepas pertimbangan penuh hujah-hujah yang dibuat pada kedua belah pihak. Keterangan afidavit memang membangkitkan pertikaian yang serius mengenai

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keupayaan dalam mana defendan dikatakan telah melafaz dan menerbitkan kata-kata yang diadu. Dalam keadaan kes ini, pesuruhjaya kehakiman secara keseluruhan dengan betulnya menangguhkan keputusan beliau sehingga selepas perbicaraan tindakan (lihat ms 838D dan 840C–F). (3) Persoalan sama ada defendan telah melampaui terma mandat beliau bukanlah suatu perkara untuk diputuskan oleh Ketua Setiausaha. Ia adalah persoalan yang mesti diputuskan oleh mahkamah menurut keterangan yang dikemukakan di perbicaraan. Pendapat yang dinyatakan oleh Ketua Setiausaha dengan itu tidak mengikat pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana.Oleh itu, sekiranya mahkamah perbicaraan mendapati bahawa defendan melafazkan kata-kata fitnah yang dikatakan dalam keupayaan peribadi, tiada persoalan tentang kekebalan boleh ||Page 830>> berbangkit kerana baik Ketua Setiausaha mahupun Menteri tidak boleh menegaskan kekebalan bagi pihak defendan berhubung dengan kata-kata yang dilafazkannya dalam keupayaan sebagai peguambela dan peguamcara. Sekiranya mahkamah mencapai kesimpulan bahawa defendan memang telah berucap sebagai Pelapor Khas, ia mesti terus memutuskan sama ada beliau telah bertindak mengikut terma mandatnya. Dengan jelasnya, ini adalah perkara-perkara yang merupakan persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan (lihat ms 845D–G); Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433 dibeza.Selanjutnya, nampaknya Ketua Setiausaha telah menegaskan kekebalan defendan dalam terma di luar skop Konvensyen Am dan Perintah 1949. Dalam suratnya, Ketua Setiausaha telah mengambil pandangan bahawa defendant melafazkan kata-kata yang diadu ‘sewaktu menjalankan misi’, dan dengan itu adalah kebal dari guaman. Ungkapan yang digunakan oleh Ketua Setiausaha dalam suratnya adalah lebih meluas berbanding dengan yang menonjol dalam Konvensyen Am atau Perintah 1949. Ini adalah kerana seseorang mungkin bertindak ‘sewaktu menjalankan misi’ dan namun begitu melakukan perbuatan yang bukan ‘dalam pelaksanaan fungsi-fungsi ini’. Oleh itu, surat Ketua Setiausaha tidak muktamad (lihat ms 845H dan 846A–C). (4) Perakuan Menteri tidak menambahkan apa-apa yang memihak kepada defendan. Perakuan itu adalah, sebagaimana yang diisytiharkan oleh s 7(2) Akta

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tersebut, ‘keterangan fakta-fakta yang disahkan’. Menteri tidak mengesahkan sebagai fakta bahawa defendan telah melafazkan kata-kata yang diadu dalam keupayaan beliau sebagai Pelapor Khas. Fakta itu masih belum ditentukan dan dengan itu perlu diputuskan oleh hakim di perbicaraan. Perakuan Menteri cuma menyatakan semula takat kekebalan defendan dalam terma am. Ia tidak menyimpulkan perkara itu setakat mana yang dihujahkan oleh defendan (lihat ms 844A–C). (5) Terma mandat defendan haruslah ditafsirkan dengan merujuk kepada perkara 12 Perintah 1949 dan bukannya s 22 perkara VI Konvensyen Am kerana perkara 12 adalah jelas dalam peruntukan yang dibuat atas termanya, dan justeru itu tiada keperluan untuk menggunakan s 22. Persoalan tentang kebebasan defendan dalam pelaksanaan fungsi-fungsinya sebagai Pelapor Khas adalah suatu perkara yang mestilah diputuskan secara ex necessitate rei dengan merujuk kepada terma mandat beliau. Oleh sebab itu, persoalan sama ada defendan telah melampaui mandat dalam konteks kekebalan yang dituntutnya di bawah perkara 12 Perintah 1949, serta tafsiran perkara tersebut, adalah hal-hal untuk diputuskan oleh hakim perbicaraan. Sudah tentu mereka adalah persoalan serius untuk dibicarakan (lihat ms 8459B–D dan 850B–C). (6) Defendan telah gagal menunjukkan bahawa pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah melakukan kesilapan yang memerlukan campur tangan kuasa rayuan. Beliau telah bertanya persoalan yang betul, mengambil kira kesemua pertimbangan relevan dan mengarah ||Page 831>> diri dengan betul atas undang-undang yang terpakai. Yang paling utamanya, perintah yang dibuatnya tidak mengakibatkan sebarang ketidakadilan kepada defendan. Tiada terdapat keputusan atas kekebalan, kerana pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah berhati-hati dalam membiarkan isu itu terbuka untuk diputuskan di perbicaraan tindakan. Defendan adalah berhak, apabila tamatnya perbicaraan, mendapatkan keputusan yang memihak kepadanya andainya ia membuktikan tuntutan kepada kekebalan atas fakta-fakta (lihat ms 851C–D).]

Notes For cases on appeal, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 259–699.

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For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 138–261.

Cases referred to Beard v London General Omnibus Co [1900] 2 QB 530 (refd) Corrinet v Ginns (Case No C 97–0142 FMS, 21 May 1997, unreported) (refd) Cristina, The [1938] AC 485 (refd) Engelke v Musmann [1928] AC 433 (distd) Haile Selassie v Cable & Wireless Ltd [1938] Ch 839 (refd) Hilton v Thomas Burton (Rhodes) Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 705 (refd) Ho Kean v Kong Lai Soo [1974] 2 MLJ 63 (refd) Juan Ysmael & Co Inc v Government of the Republic of Indonesia [1954] 3 All ER 236 (distd) Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade & Industry and related appeals [1989] 3 All ER 523 (refd) Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1970] AC 1136 (refd) Scaniainventor v Commissioner of Patents (1981) 36 ALR 101 (refd) Sim Seoh Beng & Anor v Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 292 (folld) United States v Melekh (1960) 190 F Supp 67 (distd) United States of America v Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie, SA [1952] 1 All ER 572 (refd)

Legislation referred to Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ss 22(b) and 23 of art VI Diplomatic Privileges (United Nations and International Court of Justice) Order 1949 art 12(b), Pt D

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International Organizations (Privileges and Immunities) Act 1992 s 7(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 O 12 r 7

Civil Suit No S3–23–68 of 1996 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur) ||Page 832>>

CV Das ( Porres P Royan, S Nantha Balan and Trevor George De Silva with him) ( Shook Lin & Bok) for the appellant. VK Lingam ( V Sivaparanjothi, Peter Raj, R Thayalan and W Satchithandham with him) ( V Siva & Partners) for the respondent.

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[1997] 4 MLJ 65 YING CHENG ANG v TARO IMANAKA

HIGH COURT (JOHOR BAHRU) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 12–11 OF 1995 HAIDAR J 5 DECEMBER 1996

Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction — Libel — Whether libel was published in Malaysia — Letter written and sent from Malaysia to person in Japan — Whether court in Malaysia had jurisdiction over the matter

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Libellous statement in letter — Whether there was publication to a third party — Whether there was libel

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The plaintiff filed an action in libel against the defendant at the sessions court. The defendant applied for the statement of claim to be struck out and for costs of the application on the grounds that (i) the alleged libel was committed outside Malaysia as it was addressed to one T Nagai, a citizen of Japan who resided in Japan at the material time; (ii) at the material time the defendant was residing in Singapore and if there was a libel, the alleged libel was communicated in Japan and/or Singapore; and (iii) there was no publication of the libel in Malaysia. The plaintiff opposed the application on two grounds, namely (i) that the publication of the libel was written and sent by the defendant from Johor Bahru and therefore the court had jurisdiction to hear the summons; (ii) if the court was of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction, then the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by (a) entering an unconditional appearance; (b) applying and obtaining an order from the court for the plaintiff to provide security for costs. The sessions court dismissed the defendant’s application. The defendant appealed and the issues for determination were questions of law, namely (i) jurisdiction; and (ii) forum non conveniens.

Held, allowing the defendant’s appeal: (1) In a defamation action, there must be publication to a third party. In this case the alleged letters were addressed to T Nagai in Japan. Clearly such letters could not possibly be publicized for the purpose of libel as the alleged letters were not published to a third party (see p 69C–F). The tort, if any, was committed in Japan where the publication took place, and not in Malaysia. It followed therefore that the court in Malaysia had no jurisdiction in this matter (see p 69I). (2) The application by the defendant for security for costs was not a submission to the jurisdiction of the court here. It was merely a step taken to ensure that the costs of the defendant were ensured and nothing more (see p 70C–E). (3) The forum non conveniens would be either in Japan or Singapore (see p 70G). ||Page 66>>

Bahasa Malaysia summary

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Plaintif telah memfailkan suatu tindakan dalam libel terhadap defendan di mahkamah sesyen. Defendan telah memohon supaya pernyataan tuntutan dibatalkan dan kos untuk permohonan tersebut atas dasar bahawa (i) libel tersebut telah dilakukan di luar Malaysia oleh kerana ianya telah dikemukakan kepada T Nagai, seorang warganegara Jepun yang bermastautin di Jepun pada masa yang berkenaan; (ii) pada masa yang berkenaan defendan sedang bermastautin di Singapura and jikalau terdapatnya suatu libel, maka libel tersebut telah dilakukan di Jepun dan/atau Singapura; dan (iii) tidak ada penerbitan libel itu di Malaysia. Plaintif telah membantah terhadap permohonan tersebut atas dua dasar, iaitu (i) bahawa penerbitan libel itu telah ditulis dan dihantar oleh defendan dari Johor Bahru dan oleh kerana itu mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar saman tersebut; (ii) jikalau mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ianya tidak ada bidang kuasa, maka defendan adalah tertakluk kepada biang kuasa mahkamah kerana ianya telah (a) memasukkan kehadiran tak bersyarat; (b) memohon dan telah mendapatkan perintah mahkamah supaya plaintif memperuntukkan sekuriti kos. Mahkamah sesyen telah menolak permohonan defendan. Defendan telah merayu dan isu untuk diputuskan adalah persoalan undang-undang, iaitu (i) bidang kuasa; dan (ii) forum non conveniens.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan defendan: (1) Dalam suatu tindakan fitnah, sepatutnya ada penerbitan kepada pihak ketiga. Dalam kes ini surat-surat telah dikemukakan kepada T Nagai di Jepun. Jelasnya surat-surat tersebut telah tidak diterbitkan untuk tujuan libel kerana surat-surat tersebut telah tidak diterbitkan kepada pihak ketiga (lihat ms 69C–F). Tort tersebut, jikalau ada, telah dilakukan di Jepun di mana penerbitannya telah berlaku, dan bukannya di Malaysia. Maka mahkamah di Malaysia tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam kes ini (lihat ms 69I). (2) Permohonan oleh defendan untuk sekuriti kos bukanlah penyerahan kepada bidang kuasa mahkamah di sini. Ianya hanyalah suatu langkah yang diambil untuk memastikan kos dari defendan dan tidak lebih daripada itu (lihat ms 70C–E). (3) Forum non conveniens adalah di Jepun ataupun Singapura (lihat ms 70G).

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Notes For a case on the publication of libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) para 206.

Cases referred to American Express Bank Ltd v Mohamed Toufic Al-Ozeir & Anor [1995] 1 AMR 253 (refd) ||Page 67>> Diamond v Bank of London & Montreal Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 561 (folld)

Legislation referred to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ss 65, 68 Subordinate Courts Act 1948 ss 65

Ibrahim bin Hashim (Hassan Ibrahim & Co) for the appellant. SP Soo Hoo (Arthur Lee & Co) for the respondent.

[1997] 4 MLJ 71 IN-COMIX FOOD INDUSTRIES SDN BHD v A CLOUET & CO (KL) SDN BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO D2–22–572–95 ABDUL AZIZ J 27 SEPTEMBER 1996

Civil Procedure — Injunction — Interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of

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statements slandering goods and inducing breach of contract — Whether injunction should be granted — Whether there were triable issues

Tort — Defamation — Slander of goods — Elements of the tort

Tort — Inducement of breach of contract — Whether terms of the contract proved — Elements of the tort

The defendants are manufacturers, producers and distributors of canned sardines under the trade mark ‘Ayam Brand’. The plaintiffs are the exclusive local distributors of canned sardines which the plaintiffs first marketed in March 1995 under a trade mark in the form of a device of a circle enclosing the words ‘Flying Man Brand’ and the representation of a winged boy in flight (‘the plaintiffs’ trade mark’). The marketing of the sardines bearing the plaintiffs’ trade mark was done in various parts of the country through retail outlets where the ‘Ayam Brand’ sardines also were on sale. The defendants were of the view that the get-up of the plaintiffs’ sardine cans was confusingly and deceptively similar to the get-up of their sardine cans. After threatening the plaintiffs with legal proceedings, the defendants applied ex parte and obtained an order under s 16 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1972 (‘the Act’) in respect of the plaintiffs trade mark. After the order was obtained, the defendants’ sales representatives went to various retail outlets where the plaintiffs’ sardines were sold and made certain statements concerning the plaintiffs’ sardines. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of these statements the outlets have returned their stock or ceased placing orders for the plaintiffs’ sardines or have ceased to sell the plaintiffs’ sardines. The plaintiffs instituted action claiming damages and an injunction to restrain further publication of the statements and further acts of inducing breach of contract or interfering in contractual relationship. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on two causes of action, namely (i) the tort of slander of goods or slander of title; and (ii) the tort of inducing breach of contract or interfering with contractual relationship with third parties. Pending trial, the plaintiffs applied inter partes for an interlocutory injunction in respect of publication of the statements.

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Held, dismissing the plaintiffs’ application and refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction: (1) The statements published were based on the trade description order and they were either true or were published with just cause ||Page 72>> or excuse and were therefore not malicious. As malice and falsehood were necessary to establish slander of goods or slander of title, there was therefore no triable issue for either tort in relation to those statements (see p 80C). (2) In relation to inducement to commit a breach of contract or interference in contractual relationship, the plaintiffs must first prove the terms of the contract. Unless the terms of the contract were known, it could not be established that there was a breach (see p 80D–G). Per curiam: (1) A trade description order is a declaration that the infringing trade mark or get-up is for the purposes of the Act a false trade description in its application to the goods that are specified in the order. The declaration is for the purposes of the Act, which is a penal statute that belongs to the realm of criminal law (see p 76E). (2) The person who qualifies to apply for a trade description order is a person who has an interest in a trade-mark or get-up. An interested person applies for a trade description order in order to move the machinery of criminal law to counter the infringement of his rights. The use of a trade description order is as conclusive proof that the infringing trade mark or get-up is a false trade description when applied to goods specified in the order. Its use is therefore for the purposes of the prosecution of offences under the Act (see p 76F–I).

Bahasa Malaysia summary Defendan adalah pembuat, penghasil dan pengedar sardin yang ditinkan di bawah tanda niaga ‘Ayam Brand’. Plaintif adalah pengedar tempatan eksklusif sardin tin yang dipasarkan oleh plaintif mulai Mac 1995 di bawah tanda niaga dalam bentuk bulatan yang mengelilingi perkataan ‘Flying Man Brand’ dan representasi seorang budak

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bersayap yang sedang terbang (‘tanda niaga plaintif’). Pemasaran sardin tersebut yang memperlihatkan tanda niaga plaintif telah dibuat di beberapa bahagian negara ini melalui kedai-kedai runcit di mana sardin ‘Ayam Brand’ juga telah dijual. Defendan telah berpendapat bahawa ‘get-up’ tin-tin sardin plaintif adalah hampir sama secara membingungkan dan memperdayakan dengan ‘get-up’ tin-tin sardin defendan. Setelah mengugut plaintif dengan prosiding undang-undang, defendan telah memohon ex parte dan telah mendapatkan suatu perintah di bawah s 16 Akta Perihal Dagangan 1972 (‘Akta tersebut’) berkenaan dengan tanda niaga plaintif. Setelah perintah itu didapati, wakil jualan defendan telah mengunjungi kedai-kedai runcit di mana sardin tin plaintif telah dijual dan telah membuat beberapa pernyataan berkenaan dengan sardin plaintif. ||Page 73>> Plaintif telah menuntut bahawa oleh sebab pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut, kedai-kedai runcit telah memulangkan stok ataupun telah berhenti membuat pesanan untuk sardin ataupun telah berhenti menjual sardin plaintif. Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan menuntut ganti rugi dan injunksi untuk menahan penerbitan selanjutnya pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut dan tindakan selanjutnya yang mendorong pemungkiran kontrak ataupun mengganggu hubungan kontraktual. Tuntutan plaintif adalah berdasarkan dua kausa tindakan, iaitu (i) tort slander barang-barang ataupun slander titel; dan (ii) tort mendorong pemungkiran kontrak ataupun mengganggu hubungan kontraktual dengan pihak ketiga. Sementara menantikan perbicaraan, plaintif telah memohon inter partes untuk injunksi interlokutori berkenaan dengan penerbi tan pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut.

Diputuskan, menolak permohonan plaintif dan tidak memberikan injunksi interlokutori: (1) Pernyataan-pernyataan yang diterbitkan adalah berdasarkan perintah perihal dagangan dan ianya adalah sama ada benar ataupun telah diterbitkan dengan sebab yang wajar dan adil dan maka ianya telah diterbitkan tanpa niat jahat. Oleh kerana niat jahat atau kepalsuan adalah perlu untuk mendirikan slander barang-barang ataupun slander titel, maka tidak ada isu boleh bicara untuk mana-mana tort itu berkenaan dengan pernyataan tersebut (lihat ms 80C). (2) Berkenaan dengan dorongan untuk melakukan pemungkiran kontrak ataupun gangguan hubungan kontraktual, plaintif mesti terlebih dahulu membuktikan

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terma-terma kontrak tersebut. Melainkan terma-terma kontrak itu diketahui, maka ianya tidak boleh dibuktikan bahawa terdapatnya suatu pemungkiran (lihat ms 80D–G). Per curiam: (1) Suatu perintah perihal dagangan adalah satu deklarasi bahawa tanda niaga ataupun ‘get-up’ yang melangggar hak lain adalah, untuk tujuan Akta tersebut, perihal dagangan yang palsu dalam pemakaiannya kepada barangan yang dinyatakan dalam perintah tersebut. Deklarasi itu adalah untuk tujuan Akta tersebut, yang merupakan statut jenayah yang termasuk dalam lingkungan undang-undang jenayah (lihat ms 76E). (2) Orang yang layak memohon perintah perihal dagangan adalah seseorang yang mempunyai kepentingan dalam sesuatu tanda niaga ataupun ‘get-up’. Orang yang berkepentingan akan memohon untuk perintah perihal dagangan untuk memulakan perjalanan undang-undang jenayah untuk menentang pelanggaran haknya. Penggunaan perintah perihal dagangan adalah sebagai bukti muktamad bahawa tanda niaga ataupun ‘get-up’ yang melanggar itu adalah perihal dagangan yang palsu bila dipakai kepada barang-barang yang disenaraikan dalam perintah tersebut. Maka kegunaannya adalah untuk tujuan pendakwaan kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut (lihat ms 76F–I). ||Page 74>>

Notes For a case on the elements of the tort of slander of goods, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) para 258. For a case on application for interlocutory injunction generally, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 1562.

Cases referred to Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Gardner [1968] 2 All ER 164 (refd)

Legislation referred to

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Rules of the High Court 1980 O 29 Trade Descriptions Act 1972 ss 3, 16, 26, 28, 28B

P Kandiah (Lee Ong & Kandiah) for the plaintiffs. VC Kandan and Stephen Jiew (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defendants.

[1997] 5 MLJ 523 LIM KIT SIANG v DATUK DR LING LIONG SIK & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S3–23–75–1993 CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL SUIT NO S2–22–520–1993 ZAINUN ALI JC 7 NOVEMBER 1996

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Whether actual words must be pleaded — Whether words attributed to first defendant capable of bearing defamatory meaning — Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action

The plaintiff, the leader of a political party, brought actions against the defendants. The first defendant was the leader of another political party while the second, third and fourth defendants were the editor, publisher and printer of a local daily newspaper respectively. The causes of action of both suits were based on a statement allegedly made by the first defendant in a speech which was later published by the second, third and fourth defendants. The alleged defamatory statements concerned funds collected by the plaintiff’s political party for the payment of quit rent of Bukit China in Melaka. The first defendant raised the preliminary issues of whether the words set out in the statement of claim were capable of bearing the defamatory meaning as alleged by the

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plaintiff and whether the statement as published could be defamatory in effect. The issues raised by the second, third and fourth defendants were whether the words published in both reports, read in their ordinary and natural meaning, were capable of being defamatory and whether the plaintiff’s allegations in his statement of claim disclosed a sufficient cause of action against them.

Held, striking out the plaintiff’s application with costs: (1) The alleged defamatory words as uttered must be reproduced in verbatim in the statement of claim and a certified translation must be tendered. To merely describe the substance, purpose or effect of the words was not sufficient. What was important was not the fact that the first defendant had used the defamatory expression but the fact of his having used those defamatory expressions as alleged. Since the alleged defamatory words as pleaded in the plaintiff’s statement of claim (even if it captured the essence of what the first defendant said) was based on the newspaper report and therefore the product of the reporter’s journalistic skills, the statement of claim did not disclose any cause of action against the first defendant (see pp 526D, H–I and 527D–E); Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 69, Harris v Warre (1879) 4 CPD 125, Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too [1975] 1 MLJ 47 and Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 followed. (2) With regard to the second, third and fourth defendants, from an objective point of view, the two reports read as a whole did not appear to be capable of bearing any defamatory meaning and thus the statement of claim did not disclose a sufficient cause of action against them (see p 529B–D). ||Page 524>> Per curiam Even if there was a valid cause of action against the first defendant, the statement as reported fell short of being defamatory because there was no identification of the part of the statement which was alleged to be defamatory. Further, a statement is not defamatory merely because it caused damage to the plaintiff. It must either contain the defamatory allegation or the statement itself is false. The alleged statement considered in its natural and ordinary meaning was not capable of being defamatory as alleged and

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based upon the plaintiff’s answers in the interrogatories, could not be said to be untrue. Thus in the light of this, the plaintiff’s claim would also fail (see pp 527E, H–I and 528A–D); Astaire v Campling & Anor [1965] 3 All ER 666 followed.

Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif, yang mengetuai suatu parti politik, telah memulakan tindakan terhadap defendan-defendan. Defendan pertama merupakan ketua sebuah lagi parti politik yang lain manakala defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat adalah penyunting, penerbit dan pencetak suatu suratkhabar harian tempatan masing-masing. Kausa tindakan kedua-dua guaman adalah berdasarkan kenyataan yang dikatakan dibuat oleh defendan pertama dalam ucapan yang kemudiannya diterbitkan oleh defendan-defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat. Kenyataan fitnah yang dikatakan adalah berkaitan dengan wang yang dikutip oleh parti politik plaintif untuk bayaran cukai tanah Bukit China di Melaka. Defendan pertama membangkitkan isu permulaan tentang sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan tuntutan berupaya membawa maksud fitnah seperti yang dikatakan oleh plaintif dan sama ada pernyataan seperti yang diterbitkan boleh memfitnah. Isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat adalah sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diterbit dalam kedua-dua laporan, yang dibaca dalam maksud biasa, boleh memfitnah dan sama ada pengataan plaintif dalam pernyataan tuntutan mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang memadai terhadap mereka.

Diputuskan, membatalkan permohonan plaintif dengan kos: (1) Perkataan-perkataan fitnah yang dikatakan mestilah dihasilkan semula kata demi kata dalam pernyataan tuntutan dan satu terjemahan yang diakui sah mestilah dikemukakan. Hanya menggambarkan isi, tujuan atau kesan perkataan-perkataan tidak mencukupi. Apa yang penting bukanlah fakta bahawa defendan pertama telah menggunakan ungkapan fitnah tetapi fakta tentang penggunaan ungkapan fitnah olehnya seperti yang dikatakan. Oleh kerana perkataan fitnah yang dikatakan seperti yang diplidkan dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif (jika pun ia mengabadikan intipati apa yang dikatakan oleh defendan pertama) adalah berdasarkan laporan suratkhabar dan maka itu hasil

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||Page 525>> kemahiran kewartawanan pemberita, pernyataan tuntutan tidak mendedahkan sebarang kausa tindakan terhadap defendan pertama (lihat ms 526D, H–I dan 527D–E); Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 69, Harris v Warre (1879) 4 CPD 125, Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too [1975] 1 MLJ 47 dan Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 diikut. (2) Berkenaan dengan defendan kedua, ketiga dan keempat, dari suatu pandangan objektif, kedua-dua laporan dibaca secara keseluruhan tidak kelihatan berupaya membawa apa-apa maksud fitnah dan justeru itu pernyataan tuntutan tidak mendedahkan suatu kausa tindakan yang mencukupi terhadap mereka (lihat ms 529B–D). Per curiam: Jika pun terdapat suatu kausa tindakan yang sah terhadap defendan pertama, pernyataan seperti yang dilaporkan tidak memfitnah kerana tiada pengenalpastian atas bahagian kenyataan yang dikatakan memfitnah. Selanjutnya, suatu kenyataan tidak memfitnah hanya kerana ia menyebabkan kerosakan kepada plaintif. Ia mestilah mengandungi pengataan fitnah atau kenyataan sendiri adalah palsu. Kenyataan yang dikatakan apabila dipertimbangkan dalam makna biasa tidak berupaya memfitnah seperti yang dikatakan dan berdasarkan jawapan plaintif dalam interogatori, tidak boleh dikatakan adalah tidak benar. Maka memandangkan keadaan ini, tuntutan plaintif juga akan gagal (lihat ms 527E, H–I dan 528A–D); Astaire v Campling & Anor [1965] 3 All ER 666 diikut.]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1996 Reissue) paras 165 –230.

Cases referred to Astaire v Campling & Anor [1965] 3 All ER 666 (folld) Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 (folld) Collins v Jones [1955] 2 All ER 145 (folld) Dr Jenni Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 (refd)

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Harris v Warre (1879) 4 CPD 125 (folld) The Straits Times Press (1975) Ltd v Workers’ Party & Anor [1987] 1 MLJ 186 (refd) Workers’ Party v Tay Boon Too [1975] 1 MLJ 47 (folld)

Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the plaintiff. RR Sethu (RR Sethu & Co) for the first defendant. Bhag Singh (Bhag Sulaiman & Co) for the second, third and fourth defendants.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case

[1996] 1 MLJ 393 TUN DATUK PATINGGI HAJI ABDUL–RAHMAN YA’KUB v BRE SDN BHD & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — CIVIL SUIT NO KG 400–1986 RICHARD MALANJUM J 28 FEBRUARY 1995

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether letter was capable of being and was in fact defamatory of plaintiff — Whether letter calculated to expose plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in mind of reasonable man or would tend to lower him in estimation of right-thinking members of society generally

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Justification — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether defendants could prove truth of defamatory imputations on balance of probabilities — Whether defendants could rely on general and specific wrong-doings of

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plaintiff — Defamation Act 1957 s 8

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Fair comment — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether defendants could prove publication was fair comment on balance of probabilities — Whether publication was a comment — Whether publication was a matter of public interest — Whether publication was fair — Whether fair-minded person could honestly make such comment without having any basic facts to rely upon

Tort — Defamation — Defence — Qualified privilege — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper during state by-election — Whether defendants could prove qualified privilege on balance of probabilities — Whether defendants had duty to publish letter — Whether publication was privileged as by-election generated public interest — Whether journalists, editors and newspapers in special positions which entitled them to defence of qualified privilege

Tort — Defamation — Malice — Meaning of — Inference of malice — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper without prior verification — Whether editor was reckless and not concerned with truth or falsity of letter — Whether such malice on editor’s part could be imputed to his employer

Tort — Defamation — Damages — Compensatory damages — Aggravated damages — Publication of defamatory letter in newspaper — Whether compensatory damages could include aggravated damages — Whether award of damages was fair and adequate to vindicate plaintiff and to console him for wrong done

The plaintiff, the former Chief Minister and Governor of Sarawak, claimed damages and an injunction against the defendants for libel published in an article of a local daily newspaper (‘the article’). The first defendant was the publisher of the newspaper while the second and the third defendants were the printer and the editor of the newspaper respectively. The article concerned a letter to the third defendant as the editor of the newspaper regarding a state constituency by-election where the plaintiff accompanied an independent candidate to the nomination centre on the nomination day. The

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defendants ||Page 394>> contended that the words complained of in the article were not defamatory of the plaintiff. The defendants further argued that even if such words were defamatory of the plaintiff, they could rely on the defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege. To support the defence of justification, the defendants pleaded general and specific wrongdoings of the plaintiff. In respect of the defence of qualified privilege, the defendants claimed that they had a duty to the people of Sarawak to publish the article and the latter had a corresponding duty to receive such publication. The defendants further claimed that the by-election had generated public interest. The third defendant testified, inter alia, thatbefore he published the article, he did not verify the contents of the article and the article was published in toto.

Held, allowing the claim: (1) The test whether the words complained of in the article were capable of being, and were in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff was, whether such words were calculated to expose him to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. The words complained of in the article were capable of being, and were in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff (see pp 402H and 403C); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 and Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 followed. (2) In respect of the defence of justification, the burden was on the defendants to establish the truth of the specific imputations against the plaintiff, considering s 8 the Defamation Act 1957. The defendants were not entitled to rely on general or specific charges of the plaintiff’s wrongdoings which were not relevant to the specific imputations. The defendants had failed to establish the truth of the defamatory statements on the balance of probabilities (see p 406E); Bookbinder v Tebbitt [1989] 1 All ER 1169; Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448; Plato Films Ltd & Ors v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 and Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 followed.

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(3) Regarding the defence of fair comment, the words complained of were not capable of being comments. Alternatively, such words were not made on a matter of public interest because the mere presence of the plaintiff during nomination day was not a matter of public interest. Even if such words qualified to be comments, such words were not fair in the sense that a fair-minded person could not honestly make them without having any basic facts to rely upon. Accordingly, on the balance of probabilities the defence of fair comment failed (see pp 408H, 409E–G and 410G); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 , Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 , Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 4 All ER 817 and Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 followed; Odger v Mortimer (1873) 28 LT 472 distinguished. ||Page 395>> (4) The defendants had not established that they owed a duty to the people of Sarawak to publish the article. Although the by-election had generated a lot of public interest, such an event did not per se evolve itself into a privileged one. Journalists, editors and newspapers did not have any special positions so as to entitle them to rely on the defence of qualified privilege on any matters which they may publish. The defence of qualified privilege therefore failed on the balance of probabilities (see p 411E–I); Blackshaw v Lord [1983] 2 All ER 311; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 and Arnold v King Emperor (1914) 30 TLR 462 followed. (5) In publishing the article, the third defendant took no precaution, was reckless and was not concerned with its truth or falsity thereby evidencing malice on his part. The existence of malice on the third defendant’s part would be imputed to the first defendant who was his employer. But since it was not established by evidence that the third defendant was the employee or agent of the second defendant, the plaintiff had not established malice on the second defendant’s part. Accordingly, in respect of the first and third defendants, their defences of fair comment and qualified privilege would have been defeated by the existence of malice (see pp 415D–I and 416A); Guise v Kouvelis (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 419 not followed.

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(6) In a libel action, the general rule is that damages are assessed on a compensatory basis. Compensatory damages may include aggravated damages if aggravating circumstances exist. In this case, having considered the aggravating factors, the sum of RM100,000 as compensatory damages should be fair and adequate to vindicate the plaintiff to the public and to console him for the wrong done. No order of apportionment was made since no application for separate assessment was made by the defendants (see pp 416F–I, 419E–F and 420A); Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 and Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 followed.

[ [Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif, bekas Ketua Menteri dan Gabenor Sarawak, telah menuntut ganti rugi dan suatu injunksi terhadap defendan-defendan untuk libel yang disiarkan dalam suatu artikel suratkhabar harian tempatan (‘artikel tersebut’). Defendan pertama merupakan penyiar suratkhabar tersebut manakala defendan-defendan kedua dan ketiga adalah masing-masing pencetak dan penyunting suratkhabar tersebut. Artikel tersebut adalah mengenai sepucuk surat kepada defendan ketiga selaku penyunting suratkhabar tersebut, dan ia adalah berkenaan dengan suatu pilihanraya kecil kawasan pilihanraya negeri di mana plaintif mengiringi seorang calon bebas ke pusat pencalonan pada hari pencalonan. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa perkataan- ||Page 396>> perkataan yang didakwa dalam artikel tersebut tidak memfitnahkan plaintif. Defendan-defendan seterusnya berhujah bahawa sekalipun perkataan-perkataan sedemikian memfitnahkan plaintif, mereka boleh bergantung kepada pembelaan justifikasi, komen berpatutan dan perlindungan bersyarat. Untuk menyokong pembelaan justifikasi, defendan-defendan menyatakan dalam plidingnya tentang perbuatan salah am dan khusus yang dilakukan oleh plaintif. Berkenaan dengan pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat, defendan-defendan menuntut bahawa mereka mempunyai kewajipan terhadap rakyat Sarawak untuk menyiarkan artikel tersebut dan rakyat Sarawak juga mempunyai kewajipan yang sama untuk menerima penyiaran tersebut. Defendan-defendan seterusnya menuntut bahawa pilihanraya kecil tersebut

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telah menimbulkan kepentingan awam. Defendan ketiga telah memberi keterangan, antara lain, bahawa dia tidak menentusahkan isi kandungan artikel tersebut sebelum menyiarkannya dan artikel tersebut telah disiarkan secara keseluruhannya.

Diputuskan, membenarkan tuntutan itu: (1) Ujian sama ada perkataan-perkataan yang diadu dalam artikel tersebut adalah berkeupayaan untuk memfitnah dan sebenarnya telah memfitnah plaintif, adalah sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah diperhitungkan untuk mengakibatkan plaintif dibenci, dipersenda atau dihina dalam minda seorang yang munasabah atau sama ada perkataan-perkataan tersebut berkecenderungan untuk merendahkan plaintif dalam pandangan ahli-ahli masyarakat yang berfikiran waras secara amnya. Perkataan-perkataan yang diadu dalam artikel tersebut adalah berkeupayaan untuk memfitnah dan sebenarnya telah memfitnah plaintif (lihat ms 402H dan 403C); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 dan Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 diikut. (2) Berkenaan dengan pembelaan justifikasi, beban adalah atas defendan-defendan untuk membukti kebenaran tohmahan khusus terhadap plaintif dengan berpandu kepada s 8 Akta Fitnah 1957. Defendan-defendan tidak berhak untuk bergantung kepada pertuduhan am atau khusus berkenaan dengan perbuatan salah plaintif yang tidak relevan kepada tohmahan khusus yang memfitnah plaintif dalam kes ini. Defendan-defendan telah gagal membuktikan kebenaran kenyataan yang memfitnah plaintif atas imbangan kebarangkalian (lihat ms 406E); Bookbinder v Tebbitt[1989] 1 All ER 1169; Templeton v Jones[1984] 1 NZLR 448; Plato Films Ltd & Ors v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 dan Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 diikut. (3) Berkaitan dengan pembelaan komen berpatutan, perkataan-perkataan yang diadu itu tidak merupakan komen. Secara alternatif, perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah tidak dibuat atas ||Page 397>> perkara yang berkepentingan awam kerana kehadiran plaintif pada hari pencalonan semata-mata tidak merupakan perkara yang berkepentingan awam. Jikapun perkataan-perkataan tersebut layak menjadi

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komen, perkataan-perkataan tersebut adalah tidak berpatutan, dari segi bahawa seseorang yang bersikap adil tidak akan membuatnya secara jujur tanpa berdasarkan apa-apa fakta asas. Oleh yang demikian, pembelaan komen berpatutan gagal atas imbangan kebarangkalian (lihat ms 408H, 409E–G dan 410G); JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 , Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 , Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 4 All ER 817 dan Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 diikut. Odger v Mortimer (1873) 28 LT 472 dibezakan. (4) Defendan-defendan tidak dapat membuktikan bahawa mereka mempunyai kewajipan untuk menyiarkan artikel tersebut kepada rakyat Sarawak. Walaupun pilihanraya kecil tersebut telah menimbulkan banyak kepentingan awam, tetapi peristiwa yang sedemikian, dengan sendirinya, tidak menjadikannya sesuatu yang terlindung. Wartawan, penyunting dan suratkhabar tidak mempunyai kedudukan yang istimewa yang membolehkan mereka bergantung kepada perlindungan bersyarat atas perkara-perkara yang disiarkan oleg mereka. Justeru itu, pembelaan perlindungan bersyarat gagal atas imbangan kebarangkalian (lihat ms 411E–I); Blackshaw v Lord[1983] 2 All ER 311; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 dan Arnold v King Emperor (1914) 30 TLR 462 diikut. (5) Apabila menyiarkan artikel tersebut, defendan ketiga tidak mengambil apa-apa tindakan berjaga-jaga, bersikap tidak peduli dan tidak prihatin tentang kebenaran atau kepalsuan artikel tersebut. Kesemua ini membuktikan niat jahatnya. Niat jahat defendan ketiga boleh dikaitkan dengan defendan pertama yang merupakan majikannya. Tetapi, oleh kerana tidak terdapat keterangan bahawa defendan ketiga adalah pekerja atau ejen defendan kedua, plaintif telah gagal membuktikan niat jahat defendan kedua. Oleh yang demikian, pembelaan-pembelaan komen berpatutan dan perlindungan bersyarat bagi defendan-defendan pertama dan ketiga akan gagal kerana kewujudan niat jahat (lihat ms 415D–I dan 416A); Guise v Kouvelis (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 419 tidak diikut. (6) Dalam tindakan libel, atas peraturan am, ganti rugi adalah ditaksirkan atas dasar pampasan. Ganti rugi bersifat pampasan boleh termasuk ganti rugi teruk

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(aggravated damages) sekiranya keadaan yang teruk wujud. Dalam kes ini, selepas mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor yang teruk, jumlah RM100,000 sebagai ganti rugi bersifat pampasan adalah dianggap adil dan memadai untuk memulihkan nama baik plaintif dalam masyarakat di samping memberi pampasan kepada beliau akibat kesalahan ||Page 398>> yang dilakukan terhadap beliau. Perintah pengagihan tidak dibuat oleh kerana tidak terdapat permohonan untuk taksiran berasingan oleh defendan-defendan (lihat ms 416F–I, 419E–F dan 420A); Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 dan Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 diikut.]

Notes For cases on libel, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 89–96; [1989] Mallal’s Digest 1493; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 1946; [1992] Mallal’s Digest 1644–1647; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 1272–1275; [1994] Mallal’s Digest 2112. For cases on libel in newspapers, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 99–101. For cases on justification, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) para 101; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 1275; [1994] Mallal’s Digest 2111. For cases on fair comment, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) para 84; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1173; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 1943; [1992] Mallal’s Digest 1645; [1994] Mallal’s Digest 2110. For cases on qualified privilege, see [1989] Mallal’s Digest 1493; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1175; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 1948; [1992] Mallal’s Digest 1646; [1994] Mallal’s Digest 2115. For cases on malice, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) para 112; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1174. For cases on damages, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 124–125; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1176; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 1275.

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Cases referred to Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] MLJ 142 Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 Arnold v The King Emperor [1914] 30 TLR 462 Blackshaw v Lord [1983] 2 All ER 311 Bookbinder v Tebbitt [1989] 1 All ER 1169 Capital & Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 Datuk Harris bin Mohamed Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 97 Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 Grubb v Bristol United Press Ltd [1963] 1 QB 309 Guise v Kouvelis (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 419 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 ||Page 399>> Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 408 JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334 Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 Kemsley v Foot [1952] 1 All ER 501 Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 Maidstone Pte Ltd v Takenaka Corp [1992] 1 SLR 772 Odger v Mortimer (1873) 28 LT 472 Plato Films Ltd & Ors v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45

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Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 2 MLJ 173 Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1991] 4 All ER 817 Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 8 Rules of the High Court 1980 0 78 r 3(2)

Chong Siew Chiang (Cheng Hui Hong with him) (Cheng & Cheng Adv) for the plaintiff. Sim Hui Cheng (Leonard Shim with him) (Reddi & Co) for the defendants.

Case Citator: Click here for the cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case

[1995] 1 MLJ 39 TAN SRI DATO VINCENT TAN CHEE YIOUN v HAJI HASAN BIN HAMZAH & ORS

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — GUAMAN SIVIL NO S5–23–23–94 MOKHTAR SIDIN J 5 DECEMBER 1994

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Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defence — Failure to file defence — Whether defendant deemed to admit averments pleaded in statement of claim — Whether defendant could give evidence in court as to defence — Effect of evidence

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defence — Failure to adduce evidence of pleaded defence — Whether defence deemed to be abandoned

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Whether natural and ordinary meaning of words or innuendo used in articles were defamatory — Whether intention of defamer relevant

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Words published not what was written — Whether writer should ensure what is published is what was written — Steps to take

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Apology — Effect — Whether apology a full and frank withdrawal — Whether unqualified — Whether mitigating factor in assessing damages

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Justification — Fair comment — Burden of proof — Whether basic facts upon which article was based were true

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defences — Innocent publication — Whether printer of magazine could be said to have innocently published defamatory articles as articles plainly referred to plaintiff — Whether magazine had made offer of amends to plaintiff — Defamation Act 1957 s 7

Tort — Conspiracy to defame — Whether there was concerted agreement among writers, editor, publisher and printer of articles together with proprietor of magazine — Whether torts of conspiracy and defamation merged

Tort — Damages — Defamation — Quantum — Whether damages for defamation merged with damages for conspiracy — Whether award should act as full vindication of plaintiff’s reputation

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Tort — Damages — Defamation — Aggravated damages — Failure to prove justification or fair comment — Libel repeated when giving evidence in court

The plaintiff was, inter alia, the group chief executive officer of Berjaya Group Bhd, a public-listed company. The plaintiff claimed damages for the torts of libel and conspiracy against seven defendants in respect of four articles (‘the articles’) published in three issues of the Malaysian Industry (‘the magazine’). The first defendant was the editor-in-chief of the magazine and the second to fifth defendants wrote the articles. The sixth defendant was the publisher and proprietor of the magazine while the seventh defendant was the printer of three of the articles. The plaintiff alleged that the articles were defamatory of him and that each of the defendants had either ||Page 40>> between themselves and/or in combination with others conspired by way of a systematic publication of defamatory articles to destroy his reputation and business career. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from further publication of the alleged libel. The first to sixth defendants did not file their defences and, furthermore, the fourth defendant did not appear in court. The second and fifth defendants testified that what was printed was not what they had written. The fifth defendant informed the court that he had asked the first defendant to offer an unqualified apology to the plaintiff, which was published in the magazine. The fifth defendant also apologized to the plaintiff in open court. The third defendant alleged that what he had written was true and also relied on the defence of fair comment. He, however, refused to prove the allegations in his article. The first defendant testified on behalf of himself and the sixth defendant and admitted that the articles were libellous of the plaintiff but stated that he had left the responsibility of editing the articles to the editor of the magazine. The first defendant claimed that on discovering the articles were libellous, he had apologized to the plaintiff in the magazine. The seventh defendant’s statement of defence pleaded innocent publication, justification, fair comment and privileged publication. However, the seventh defendant’s managing director testified only on innocent publication.

Held, awarding the plaintiff a total of RM10m in damages against the defendants:

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(1) Since no defence had been filed by the first to sixth defendants, they were deemed to admit the averments pleaded by thE plaintiff. The first, second, third, fifth and sixth defendants were allowed to give evidence in court only for the purpose of mitigating the damages against them and not as evidence as to their defences. Accordingly, the third defendant’s evidence on his defence of justification and fair comment, came to nought. (2) It was a question of law for the court to decide whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the articles were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning of and concerning the plaintiff. Libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer but on the fact of defamation and it was irrelevant to consider the meaning the writer and publisher intended to convey. The question was to be determined by an objective test. (3) The articles in their natural and ordinary meaning and/or by way of innuendo, were defamatory of the plaintiff. They carried the innuendo that the plaintiff was an unscrupulous and unprincipled businessman and were calculated to disparage and discredit the plaintiff personally and in his trade. The articles had lowered the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally and brought him into contempt, hatred and public ridicule. ||Page 41>> (4) The second and fifth defendants should have taken steps to ensure that what had been published was what they had written. Although they had read the articles soon after they were published, they did not take any steps to either correct the articles or tender an unqualified public apology to the plaintiff. (5) The apology published in the magazine was not a full and frank withdrawal of the libel and was not a complete and unqualified apology or a fair retraction. The apology in open court came too late and the fifth defendant was still liable for libel although it would mitigate the damages to be awarded against him. (6) Even if the third defendant had filed his defence of justification and fair comment, he bore the onus of proving what was written by him was true and a fair comment. In view of the third defendant’s failure to substantiate his defamatory allegations, the allegations remained unproved and untrue and his

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defence of justification failed. Similarly, since the basic facts upon which his comments were based were not true, his defence of fair comment would also not succeed. (7) Since the seventh defendant’s managing director did not give evidence on the defences of justification, fair comment and privileged publication, it was held to have abandoned them. (8) The defence of innocent publication is provided in s 7 of the Defamation Act 1957 (‘the DA’). The seventh defendant’s defence of innocent publication must fail because two conditions had not been met, ie first, it could not be said that the seventh defendant had published the articles innocently when the articles plainly referred to the plaintiff and secondly, the seventh defendant had not made an offer of amends as required under s 7(2) of the DA. (9) There appeared to be a concerted agreement between and among the defendants to injure the plaintiff’s personal and commercial reputation by the publication of the articles and they were jointly and severally liable for the libel. (10) For the purpose of assessing the amount of damages, the tort of conspiracy merged with the tort of defamation. (11) In this case, the defendants calculated that the prospects of material advantage from publishing the articles outweighed the prospects of material loss. The award of damages must be sufficient to convince any person of the baselessness of the libel and act as a signal to the public of the full vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. (12) Aggravated damages were awarded against the third defendant because he had relied on justification and fair comment which he failed to establish and he had further repeated the libel in court. ||Page 42>> (13) As against the seventh defendant, the court took into account the fact that it had pleaded justification and fair comment without any evidence whatsoever. Accordingly, where a plea of justification fails, damages which would be modest would become colossal. (14) An injunction was also granted, inter alia, to restrain all the defendants from

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further publication of similar libel of the plaintiff.

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif adalah, antara lainnya, pegawai eksekutif tertinggi kumpulan bagi Kumpulan Berjaya Bhd, sebuah syarikat awam yang disenaraikan. Plaintif telah menuntut gantirugi untuk tort libel dan komplot terhadap tujuh orang defendan berkenaan dengan empat buah rencana (‘rencana-rencana itu’) yang telah diterbitkan di dalam tiga naskah Malaysian Industry(‘majalah itu’). Defendan pertama adalah ketua penyunting majalah itu dan defendan-defendan kedua hingga kelima telah menulis rencana-rencana itu. Defendan keenam pula adalah penerbit dan tuanpunya majalah itu sementara defendan ketujuh adalah pencetak tiga daripada rencana itu. Plaintif mendakwa bahawa rencana-rencana itu telah memfitnahnya dan setiap defendan sama ada antara mereka sendiri dan/atau bersama orang lain telah berkomplot melalui penerbitan sistematik rencara-rencana fitnah untuk merosakkan reputasi dan kerjaya perniagaannya. Plaintif juga memohon satu injunksi untuk menghalang defendan-defendan daripada terus menerbitkan libel yang didakwa itu. Defendan pertama hingga keenam tidak memfailkan pembelaan mereka dan, lebih-lebih lagi, defendan keempat tidak hadir di mahkamah. Defendan kedua hingga kelima memberi keterangan bahawa apa yang dicetak itu bukanlah apa yang telah ditulis oleh mereka. Defendan kelima memberitahu mahkamah bahawa beliau telah menyuruh defendan pertama meminta maaf secara tidak bersyarat kepada plaintif, yang telah diterbitkan di dalam majalah itu. Defendan kelima juga telah meminta maaf kepada plaintif di mahkamah terbuka. Defendan ketiga menegaskan bahawa apa yang telah ditulisnya adalah benar dan beliau juga bergantung kepada pembelaan komen berpatutan. Beliau, walau bagaimanapun, enggan membuktikan dakwaan di dalam rencananya. Defendan pertama memberi keterangan bagi pihaknya sendiri dan defendan keenam dan mengaku bahawa rencana-rencana itu telah memfitnah plaintif tetapi menyatakan bahawa beliau telah meninggalkan tanggungjawab menyunting rencana-rencana itu kepad a penyunting majalah itu. Defendan pertama mengatakan bahawa sebaik sahaja beliau mendapat tahu bahawa rencana-rencana itu bersifat libel, beliau telah meminta maaf kepada plaintif di dalam majalah itu. Pernyataan pembelaan defendan ketujuh membuat pli penerbitan ikhlas (‘innocent publication’), justifikasi, komen berpatutan dan penerbitan terlindung

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(‘privileged publication’). Namun demikian, pengarah urusan ||Page 43>> defendan ketujuh cuma memberi keterangan mengenai pli penerbitan ikhlas.

Diputuskan, memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM10 juta kepada plaintif: (1) Memandangkan bahawa pembelaan tidak difailkan oleh defendan pertama hingga keenam, mereka dianggap sebagai telah mengaku penegasan yang dijadikan pli oleh plaintif. Defendan pertama, kedua, ketiga, kelima dan keenam telah dibenarkan memberi keterangan di mahkamah cuma untuk tujuan meringankan jumlah ganti rugi terhadap mereka dan bukan untuk mendirikan pembelaan mereka. Oleh itu, keterangan defendan ketiga atas pembelaan justifikasi dan komen berpatutan sia-sia sahaja. (2) Adalah menjadi soalan undang-undang untuk keputusan mahkamah sama ada makna semula jadi dan biasa perkataan yang digunakan di dalam rencana-rencana itu boleh menyampaikan makna yang memfitnah tentang plaitif. Libel tidak bergantung kepada tujuan orang yang memfitnah tetapi kepada hakikat pemfitnahan dan oleh itu adalah tidak relevan untuk mempertimbangkan makna yang hendak disampaikan oleh penulis dan penerbit. Soalan itu mesti diputuskan dengan menggunakan satu ujian objektif. (3) Rencana-rencana itu dalam makna semula jadi dan biasa mereka dan/atau melalui sindiran, telah memfitnah plaintif. Mereka membawa sindiran bahawa plaintif adalah seorang ahli perniagaan yang tidak berprinsip dan terhitung untuk merendah-rendah dan mencemarkan plaintif secara peribadi dan di dalam perniagaannya. Rencana-rencana itu telah merendahkan plaintif dalam pandangan ahli-ahli masyarakat yang berfikiran waras secara am dan membuatnya menghadapi penghinaan, kebencian dan cemuhan awam. (4) Defendan kedua dan kelima seharusnya mengambil langkah untuk memastikan bahawa apa yang diterbitkan itu adalah apa yang telah ditulis oleh mereka. Walaupun mereka telah membaca rencana-rencana itu sejurus sahaja selepas mereka diterbitkan, mereka tidak mengambil langkah sama ada untuk membetulkan rencana-rencana itu atau meminta maaf di khalayak awam secara tidak bersyarat kepada plaintif.

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(5) Nota meminta maaf yang telah diterbitkan di dalam majalah itu bukanlah satu penarikan balik libel itu secara penuh dan terus-terang. Ianya bukanlah nota meminta maaf yang penuh dan tidak bersyarat atau satu penarikan balik yang berpatutan. Permintaan maaf di mahkamah terbuka telah dilakukan terlalu lewat dan defendan kelima masih bertanggungan untuk libel itu walaupun ianya akan meringankan ganti rugi yang bakal diawardkan terhadapnya. ||Page 44>> (6) Biarpun jika defendan ketiga telah memfailkan pembelaan justifikasi dan komen berpatutan, beliau masih memikul beban membuktikan bahawa apa yang telah ditulis olehnya adalah benar dan merupakan komen berpatutan. Memandangkan kegagalan defendan ketiga menyokong dakwaannya yang memfitnah, dakwaan itu terus tidak dibuktikan dan tidak benar dan pembelaan justifikasinya gagal. Secara sama, oleh kerana fakta asas yang menjadi dasar komennya adalah tidak benar, pembelaan komen berpatutan yang dikemukakan olehnya juga tidak berjaya. (7) Oleh kerana pengarah urusan defendan ketujuh tidak memberi keterangan tentang pembelaan justifikasi, komen berpatutan dan penerbitan terlindung, defendan ketujuh dianggap sebagai telah melepaskan pembelaan-pembelaan itu. (8) Pembelaan penerbitan ikhlas diperuntukkan di dalam s 7 Akta Fitnah 1957 (‘Akta itu’). Pembelaan penerbitan ikhlas yang dikemukakan oleh defendan ketujuh semestinya gagal kerana dua syarat tidak dipenuhi, iaitu pertamanya, tidaklah boleh dikatakan bahawa defendan ketujuh telah menerbitkan rencana-rencana itu secara ikhlas apabila rencana-rencana itu dengan jelas merujuk kepada plaintif dan keduanya, defendan ketujuh tidak membuat tawaran untuk menebus tindakannya (‘offer of amends’) di bawah s 7(2) Akta itu. (9) Nampaknya terdapat persetujuan yang dirancang di antara defendan-defendan untuk merosakkan reputasi peribadi dan perniagaan plaintif melalui penerbitan rencana-rencana itu dan mereka bertanggungan untuk libel itu secara bersesama dan berasingan. (10) Untuk tujuan mentaksirkan jumlah gantirugi, tort komplot bercantum dengan

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tort fitnah. (11) Di dalam kes ini, defendan-defendan telah membuat kiraan bahawa prospek mendapat keuntungan kebendaan daripada menerbitkan rencana-rencana itu melebihi prospek kerugian kebendaan. Award ganti rugi mestilah mencukupi untuk meyakinkan mana-mana orang tentang bagaimana tidak berasasnya libel itu dan bertindak sebagai suatu isyarat kepada orang ramai tentang pembersihan penuh reputasi plaintif. (12) Gantirugi tambahan (‘aggravated damages’) telah diawardkan terhadap defendan ketiga kerana beliau telah bergantung kepada justifikasi dan komen berpatutan yang gagal didirikan oleh beliau dan beliau juga telah mengulang libel itu di mahkamah. (13) Berkenaan defendan ketujuh pula, mahkamah mengambil kira hakikat bahawa ianya telah membuat pli justifikasi dan komen berpatutan tanpa sebarang keterangan sama sekali. Dengan itu, apabila suatu pli justifikasi gagal, ganti rugi yang mungkin jumlahnya akan menjadi besar. ||Page 45>> (14) Suatu injunksi juga telah diberikan, antara lainnya, untuk menyekat kesemua defendan daripada selanjutnya menerbitkan libel yang sama tentang plaintif. [ Editorial Note: The seventh defendant has appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Civil Appeal No

Notes For cases on damages for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 42–51; [1989] Mallal’s Digest 646–647; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 481, 491; Mallal’s Digest For cases on defamation, see 12 (4th Ed) paras 64–139; [1989] Mallal’s Digest 1490–1493; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1172–1177; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 1941–1947; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 1272–1276. For cases on the defence, see 2 (4th Ed) paras 1715–1722; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 390; [1992] Mallal’s Digest 321; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 248.

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Cases referred to Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (folld) Associated Leisure Ltd (Phonographic Equipment Co Ltd) & Ors v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1970] 2 QB 450; [1970] 2 All ER 754; [1970] 3 WLR 101 (folld) Associated Newspapers v Dingle [1964] 371 AC 371; [1962] 2 All ER 737; [1962] 3 WLR 229 (folld) Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] 113 ALR 577 (folld) Cassell & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 1 All ER 801; [1972] 2 WLR 645 (refd) Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331 (folld) Cooper v Warburton [1931] 44 BCR 328 (folld) Digby v Financial News Ltd [1907] 1 KB 502 (folld) Hoste v Victoria Times Publishing Co [1889] 1 BCR 365 (folld) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952; [1963] 63 SR (NSW) 644 (folld) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Thong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (folld) Lee v Wilson and MacKinnon (1934) 51 CLR 276 (folld) Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; [1963] 2 All ER 151; [1963] 2 WLR 1063 (folld) Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384 (refd) McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1965] 2 QB 86; [1964] 3 All ER 947; [1965] 2 WLR 45 (refd) Neeld v Western Broadcasting Co [1976] 65 DLR (3d) 574 (folld) ||Page 46>> Pervan v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd & Anor [1993] 117 ALR 569 (folld) Ward v Lewis [1955] 1 All ER 55; [1955] 1 WLR 9 (folld)

Legislation referred to

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Defamation Act 1957 s 7

VK Lingam (Adam Bachek and W Satchithanandhan with him) (VK Lingam & Co and Adam Bachek & Associates) for the plaintiff. Noor Zilan Mohamed Noor (AJ Hamzah & Co) for the first and sixth defendants. Karpal Singh (M Manoharan with him) (Karpal Singh & Co) for the third defendant. Ram Dhari (KC Yap Kamaluddin & Partners) for the seventh defendant.

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[1995] 1 MLJ 551 CHONG SIEW CHIANG v CHUA CHING GEH & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUCHING) — SUIT NO KG150 OF 1985 RICHARD MALANJUM J 16 NOVEMBER 1994

Tort — Damages — Defamation — Libel in newspaper — Assessment of damages — Plaintiff a politician and a lawyer — Whether exemplary damages should be awarded — When award of exemplary damages appropriate — Factors to be considered

Civil Procedure — Interest — Interest after judgment — Parties agreeing to defer assessment of damages after liability established — Whether interest should be awarded from date of liability judgment

Tort — Damages — Defamation — Evidence in mitigation — Justification not pleaded —

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Whether evidence about circumstances under which libel was published may be given — Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 7

Tort — Defamation — Libel in newspaper — Photograph of defendant published together with article containing libel — Whether libel made sensational

The plaintiff sued the defendants for libel following the issue of an allegedly libellous statement by the first defendant which was later published by the Borneo Post, of which the second defendant was the publisher. The plaintiff is a politician and a lawyer and had been engaged as counsel by the Kuching Tenants’ Association over the issue of the Sarawak Rent Control (Repealed) Ordinance 1984. The first defendant was sued in his personal capacity as well as in his capacity as an officer of the Sarawak United People’s Party. The court had earlier held the defendants liable and the present hearing was for the purpose of assessment of damages. In the earlier trial, the defence of justification was not raised by the defendants. The plaintiff contended the court should award both compensatory as well as exemplary damages as his political career had been affected by the libel, which fact was not challenged by the defendants. It was also alleged that the appearance of the photograph of the first defendant and his colleagues accompanying the libel sensationalized it and affected the plaintiff adversely. Further, there was no apology; instead the first defendant issued another statement which aggravated the situation. The plaintiff, however, admitted that his law practice had not been affected by the libel. The defendants submitted that only nominal damages should be awarded and urged the court to consider several mitigating factors. The first respondent contended that no exemplary damages should be awarded as the plaintiff had failed to make out a case for such damages and the statement made was honestly believed to be a necessary response to what the plaintiff had said during the extraordinary general meeting of the Kuching Tenants’ Association. The second defendant submitted, inter alia, that it had not been shown that the libel had been published in a sensational ||Page 552>> manner or that the second defendant knew or must have known the libel to be untrue. Neither was there any malice and thus, the second defendant contended that exemplary damages was unjustified. The second defendant’s counsel called the

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reporter responsible for the writing of the article which contained the libel who testified about the precautions he took in the writing of the article.

Held, awarding RM30,000 in compensatory damages: (1) In a libel action, the general rule is that damages are assessed on a compensatory basis. However, in certain circumstances, exemplary damages may be awarded. Compensatory damages may include special damages and if aggravating circumstances exist, aggravated damages can also be awarded. (2) Before considering any exemplary damages, it must be considered first whether the sum in mind for compensatory damages would be adequate. In the present case, exemplary damages may only be awarded if the libel had been done with guilty knowledge, with the motive that the chances of economic advantage outweigh the chances of economic penalty. (3) The damage sustained by a plaintiff must depend substantially on the estimation in which he was previously held in the opinion of others unaffected by the libel. It is his reputation and not his character that is relevant in assessing damages. (4) In this case where the defendants had not pleaded justification, they were not entitled to give evidence in mitigation about circumstances under which the libel was published, because the requirements of O 78 r 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 had not been complied with. (5) The court found several aggravating elements in this case. There was no apology and the conduct of the trial could be considered as protracted and oppressive. The second statement made by the first defendant indicated not only a total lack of remorse but rather a defiance, completely disregarding the clarifications of the plaintiff and the Kuching Tenants’ Association, and this evidenced malice. Further, there was an element of recklessness in the publication of the libel. (6) The photograph of the first defendant which accompanied the libel might have attracted the attention of readers but did not necessarily make the publication of the libel sensational. It is the words or style adopted in a publication which should determine whether or not an article has been published in a sensational

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manner. (7) Exemplary damages should not be granted. The court was not satisfied that the defendants published the libel with full knowledge of undue benefits either financially or otherwise. ||Page 553>> There was also no evidence adduced that the second defendant unduly gained financially from the publication of the libel. (8) The plaintiff testified that if the defendants had apologized, the matter would have ended. It could thus be inferred that the initial damage or humiliation the plaintiff might have suffered could not have been that severe. (9) Since the parties agreed to have the assessment of damages done at a later date, it was only fair that no order for the payment of interest was made from the date of the liability judgment.

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif telah mendakwa defendan-defendan atas libel berikutan daripada pengeluaran suatu kenyataan oleh defendan pertama yang dikatakan bersifat libel yang kemudiannya telah diterbitkan oleh Borneo Post, suatu penerbitan defendan kedua. Plaintif adalah seorang ahli politik dan seorang peguam dan telah diambil khidmat sebagai peguambela oleh Persatuan Penyewa Kuching atas isu Sarawak Rent Control (Repealed) Ordinance 1984. Defendan pertama telah didakwa dalam keupayaan peribadinya serta dalam keupayaannya sebagai seorang pegawai Sarawak United People’s Party. Mahkamah terlebih dahulu telah memutuskan bahawa defendan bersalah dan pembicaraan ini cumalah untuk tujuan pentaksiran ganti rugi. Ketika perbicaraan yang lebih awal itu, pembelaan justifikasi tidak ditimbulkan oleh defendan. Plaintif berhujah bahawa mahkamah patut memberi award ganti rugi pampasan dan teladan kerana kerjaya politiknya telah terjejas oleh libel itu. Hakikat ini tidak dicabar oleh defendan. Juga didakwa bahawa penerbitan gambar foto defendan pertama bersama dengan rakan-rakannya yang mengiringi libel itu telah memberi kesan sensasi kepada libel itu dan telah membawa kesan buruk kepada plaintif. Lagipun, tiada permintaan maaf dibuat; sebaliknya defendan pertama telah membuat satu kenyataan yang lain yang telah memburukkan lagi keadaan. Plaintif, walau bagaimanapun, mengaku bahawa kerjaya guamannya tidak terjejas oleh libel itu. Defendan-defendan berhujah bahawa

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cuma ganti rugi nominal patut diberikan dan menggesa mahkamah untuk mempertimbangkan beberapa faktor yang bakal mengurangkan ganti rugi. Defendan pertama berhujah bahawa ganti rugi teladan tidak patut diberikan kerana plaintiff telah gagal mendirikan satu kes untuk ganti rugi sedemikian dan defendan pertama mempercayai dengan ikhlas bahawa kenyataan itu adalah jawapan yang perlu diberikan kepada apa yang telah dikatakan oleh plaintif pada mesyuarat agung luarbiasa Persatuan Penyawa Kuching. Defendan kedua berhujah, antara lainnya, bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa yang menunjukkan bahawa libel itu telah diterbitkan dalam cara yang menimbulkan sensasi atau bahawa defendan kedua tahu atau sepatutnya tahu bahawa libel itu adalah tidak benar. Juga tidak ada sebarang niat jahat dan oleh itu defendan kedua menekankan ||Page 554>> bahawa ganti rugi teladan tidak berasas. Peguambela defendan kedua telah memanggil wartawan yang bertanggungjawab untuk penulisan rencana yang mengandungi libel itu dan beliau telah memberi keterangan tentang langkah-langkah bercermat yang telah diambilnya ketika menulis rencana itu.

Diputuskan, memberikan RM30,000 sebagai ganti rugi pampasan: (1) Di dalam sesuatu tindakan libel, rukun am ialah ganti rugi ditaksirkan atas dasar pampasan. Walau bagaimanapun, di dalam keadaan-keadaan tertentu, ganti rugi teladan boleh diberikan. Ganti rugi pampasan boleh merangkumi ganti rugi khas dan jika keadaan yang menerukkan kes wujud, ganti rugi tambahan juga boleh diberikan. (2) Sebelum mempertimbangkan sebarang ganti rugi teladan, perlu dipertimbangkan terlebih dahulu sama ada jumlah yang difikirkan untuk ganti rugi pampasan adalah mencukupi. Di dalam kes ini, ganti rugi teladan cuma boleh diberikan jika libel itu telah dilakukan dengan pengetahuan salah, dengan niat bahawa kemungkinan mendapat kelebihan ekonomik melebihi kemungkinan mendapat penalti ekonomik. (3) Kerosakan yang dialami oleh plaintif mestilah bergantung sebahagian besarnya kepada bagaimana beliau dahulunya dipandang oleh orang lain yang tidak dipengaruhi oleh libel itu. Apa yang relevan dalam mentaksirkan ganti rugi adalah reputasinya dan bukan wataknya.

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(4) Di dalam kes ini, di mana defendan-defendan tidak membuat pli justifikasi, mereka tidak berhak mengemukakan keterangan tentang keadaan di mana libel itu telah diterbitkan untuk mengurangkan ganti rugi. Ini adalah kerana keperluan A 78 k 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 tidak dipatuhi. (5) Mahkamah telah mendapati beberapa unsur yang menerukkan kes ini. Tidak terdapat permintaan maaf dan pengendalian perbicaraan ini boleh dikatakan sebagai melengahkan masa dan bersifat menindas. Kenyataan kedua yang dibuat oleh defendan pertama menunjukkan bukan sahaja ketiadaan kekesalan malah satu keingkaran. Beliau telah tidak mengendahkan sama sekali penerangan yang diberikan oleh plaintif dan Persatuan Penyewa Kuching, dan ini membuktikan jiat jahat. Lagipun, terdapat unsur tindakan melulu dalam penerbitan libel itu. (6) Gambar foto defendan pertama yang mengiringi libel itu mungkin telah menarik perhatian pembaca tetapi tidak semestinya membuat penerbitan libel itu satu sensasi. Apa yang patut menentukan sama ada sesuatu rencana itu telah diterbitkan dalam cara yang menimbulkan sensasi adalah perkataan atau gaya yang digunakan. ||Page 555>> (7) Ganti rugi teladan tidak patut diberikan. Mahkamah tidak berpuas hati bahawa defendan-defendan telah menerbitkan libel itu dengan pengetahuan yang penuh tentang faedah yang tidak berpatutan sama ada dari segi kewangan atau sebaliknya. Juga tidak terdapat keterangan yang dikemukan bahawa defendan kedua telah memperolehi faedah kewangan secara tidak berpatutan daripada penerbitan libel itu. (8) Plantif telah memberi keterangan bahawa sekiranya defendan telah meminta maaf, perkara ini mungkin telah tamat. Oleh itu bolehlah disimpulkan bahawa kerosakan awal atau perasaan malu yang mungkin telah dialami oleh plaintif mungkin tidak begitu teruk. (9) Oleh kerana pihak-pihak yang berkenaan telah bersetuju bahawa pentaksiran ganti rugi dijalankan pada satu tarikh yang lebih lewat, adalah adil bahawa tiada perintah dibuat untuk pembayaran faedah dari tarikh penghakiman tentang

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liabiliti.] Notes

Notes For cases on interest after judgment, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 1747. For cases on damages for defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest(4th Ed) paras 42–51; [1989] Mallal’s Digest 646–647; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 481, 491.

Cases referred to CS Wu v Wong Look Fung & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 178 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohamad Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Ano [1984] 1 MLJ 97 r (refd) Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 (folld) John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Carson & Slee; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Carson (1991) 24 NSWLR 259 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Seow Khee Leng [1991] 1 MLJ 177 (refd) McCartney & Boal v Sunday World (The Times, 22 October 1988) (refd) Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the High Court 1980 O 78 r 7 Sarawak Rent Control (Repealed) Ordinance 1984

George Lo (Arthur Lee with him) (Arthur Lee & Co) for the plaintiff. Ting Sing Chuan (Yong & Wong) for the first defendant. Anthony Phua (Yong & Co) for the first defendant.

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[1995] 2 MLJ 493 MGG PILLAI v TAN SRI DATO VINCENT TAN CHEE YIOUN & OTHER APPEALS

COURT OF APPEAL (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL APPEAL NOS W–02–221–94, W–02–222–94 AND W–02–223–94 LAMIN PCA, GOPAL SRI RAM AND ABU MANSOR JJCA 22 MAY, 14 JUNE 1995, 19 JUNE 1995

Civil Procedure — Trial — Conduct of proceedings — Judge proceeding beyond period originally set so as to complete trial — Whether desirable — When appellate court should interfere with trial judge’s discretion not to grant adjournment

Tort — Defamation — Practice and procedure — No defence served — Whether defendant can question trial judge’s finding as to his liability — Whether only confined to challenging measure of damages

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — General damages for libel — Whether must be specifically pleaded and proved

Evidence — Proof of — Libel — Plaintiff only witness called to support his case — Whether evidence adequate — Whether harm proved

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Tort — Damages — Defamation — Assessment of damages for libel — Whether there are comparables on quantum of damages — Whether there should be distinction between damages for libel and damages for personal injuries — Effect of pleading justification without proof — Effect of readership and popularity of journalist defendant — Conduct of defendant — Whether judge may have regard to guidelines on assessment given in non-jury jurisdictions

Tort — Defamation — Libel in magazine — Apology — Whether sufficient and unqualified apology — Whether merely conditional apology

Tort — Damages — Defamation — Apportionment of damages — Defendants severally liable — Whether damages may be awarded separately against each defendant — Defamation Act 1957 s 18

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Defence — Failure to file defence to libel action — Whether plaintiff bound to enter default judgment — Whether may proceed to set matter down for trial

Evidence — Conspiracy — Whether must be proved only by direct evidence — Whether circumstantial evidence sufficient

The respondent, a well-known and successful businessman in Malaysia and internationally, brought an action against the appellants and other persons claiming damages for defamation and for conspiracy to defame. His complaint was in respect of a series of articles (‘the articles’) appearing in a magazine called Malaysian Industry(‘the magazine’). At all material times, the third appellant was its editor- ||Page 494>> in-chief, while the first appellant authored one of the articles complained of. The second and fourth appellants were the printer and publisher, respectively, of the magazine in question. Prior to the commencement of the action, the third and fourth appellants published an apology, without first sending a draft thereof to the respondent’s solicitors for approval, in a later issue of the magazine which, inter alia, stated that ‘we further apologize if the said articles tarnished the reputation of the

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[respondent]’. The writ in these proceedings was served on 28 February 1994. Amongst the appellants, only the second delivered a defence to the action. The court then made an order on 22 August 1994, pursuant to a summons for directions, setting the action down for trial which commenced on 10 October 1994. The trial then went on from day to day, even exceeding the period originally assigned to it, until its conclusion. After reserving judgment for a few days, the High Court judge found the appellants and the other defendants liable and awarded separate sums of general damages against them. [See [1995] 1 MLJ 39 .] The appellants then appealed to the Court of Appeal. At the appeal, counsel for the first and second appellants argued that: (a) the trial had proceeded with undue haste; (b) the damages claimed had not been proved; and (c) the award made by the trial judge was too high and out of line with the usual trend of awards for plaintiffs in defamation actions. Counsel for the third and fourth appellants contended that: (a) the trial judge was wrong in finding the third and fourth appellants liable; (b) the award made was too high; (c) the trial judge failed to take into account the apology published by the third and fourth appellants which should have reduced the award made against them; and (d) the trial judge erred in making separate awards against each app ellant.

Held, dismissing the appeals: (1) (Per Lamin PCA) Where a person’s character was being assailed and the facts were so fresh in everyone’s mind, justice could not have been better served than with the judge making an immediate assessment of the evidence and delivering his findings without delay. (2) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) A judge who had scheduled a case for a limited number of days was entitled to proceed beyond the period to complete the trial. Indeed, it was desirable that such a course be adopted in all cases. To avoid problems, inter alia, of recalling the evidence and exhibits, it was best that trials be proceeded with to their conclusion instead of being adjourned midstream. (3) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) The grant or refusal of an adjournment was a matter within the discretion of a judge and an appellate court ought not to interfere with such a decision unless it could be demonstrated that the refusal resulted in the

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||Page 495>> deprivation of essential justice from an appellant. The only legitimate expectation which a plaintiff or a defendant had was that he would obtain justice according to law. Applying this principle, it was clear that the trial judge had acted correctly in directing the trial to proceed to completion, in handing down an early decision and in making available his written reasons shortly thereafter. (4) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) The contention that the trial judge was wrong in finding the third and fourth appellants liable was baseless considering that they had not delivered a defence. It was well-settled practice that a defendant who elected not to plead to a statement of claim in a libel action was confined only to challenging the measure of damages which the plaintiff ought to receive. (5) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) Libel is a tort actionable per se, ie without proof of actual harm. The law presumes that when a man’s reputation is assailed, some damage must result. While a claim for special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved, the claim by the respondent was only for general damages which need not be so pleaded and proved. Although the respondent was the only witness called to prove his case ,when considering the quality of evidence, each case depended upon its own facts. In the present case, the venom with which the respondent was attacked by the first appellant in his article coupled with the respondent’s status in society were sufficient indicia of the extent of harm suffered. The trial judge had correctly accepted the respondent’s evidence. Thus the argument that the damages claimed had not been proved could not succeed. (6) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) There are certainly no comparables as regards quantum of damages in libel actions in Malaysia unlike those which exist in personal injury cases. Thus it could not be argued that the award in the present case was out of line with the trend of damages usually awarded in libel actions. (7) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) In assessing damages, there is no basis for any judicial policy that is directed at awarding very low damages for defamation. Injury to a person’s reputation may occasion him at least as much, if not greater, harm than may injury to his or her physical self. (8) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) In appropriate cases, the profession or standing of MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 481

a defendant in society is a relevant factor to take into account when a court considers what damages to award against a defendant. In the absence of any special or exceptional circumstances, it will be proper for a court to award substantial damages against a journalist who has, without any or any sufficient basis, taken a plea of justification. Further, the wider his readership or popularity, the greater should be the award. ||Page 496>> (9) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) A court is entitled and should have regard to the conduct of a defendant in a libel action. Such conduct will have a bearing on the making of an award for exemplary damages. (10) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) The second appellant expressly placed a plea of justification on record with no material in support. The first appellant, while he did not deliver a defence, conducted a cross-examination of the respondent on the footing that the facts appearing in his article were true. As damages multiplied when justification failed, and having regard to the facts of the case, the trial judge’s awards against the first and second appellants were neither excessive nor exorbitant. The Court of Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion upon a matter where opinions could, and did, vary quite widely. Similarly, the awards against the third and fourth appellants were not too high and should not be interfered with. (11) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) An apology, although not exonerating a defendant, has the effect of reducing the quantum of damages, in some cases substantitally so. In the present case, the apology published by the third and fourth appellants was conditional and was not a full and frank withdrawal of the libel contained in the articles and neither was it a complete and unqualified apology or a fair retraction. Thus it could not be argued that the apology should have reduced the awards made against the third and fourth appellants. (12) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) The appellants together with the other defendants were sued and found liable as several and not as joint tortfeasors. Thus the trial judge could make separate awards against each appellant.

Cases referred to

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Allsop v Church of England Newspaper Ltd [1972] 2 QB 161; [1972] 2 All ER 26; [1972] 2 WLR 600 (refd) Ashmore v Corp of Lloyd’s [1992] 2 All ER 486; [1992] 1 WLR 446 (folld) Associated Leisure Ltd v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1970] 2 QB 450; [1970] 3 WLR 101 (folld) Barindra Kumar Ghose & Ors v The Emperor [1909] 14 CWN 1114 (refd) Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 (refd) Calvet v Tomkies [1963] 3 All ER 610; [1963] 1 WLR 1397 (distd) Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] 113 ALR 577 (refd) Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 1 All ER 801; [1972] 2 WLR 645 (refd) Gill v Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch D 707 (refd) ||Page 497>> Great One Coconut Products Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 469 (refd) John v Dharmaratnam [1962] MLJ 187 (distd) Khair-ud-Din v Tara Singh AIR [1927] Lah 20 (folld) Lachman v Pyarchand AIR [1959] Rai 169 (folld) Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 (distd) Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1962] 2 All ER 698 (distd) Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd (sub nom Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd) [1964] AC 234; [1963] 2 All ER 151; [1963] 2 WLR 1063 (refd) Montagu v Land Corp (1887) 56 LT 730 (refd) Nagy v Co-operative Press Ltd [1949] 2 KB 188; [1949] 1 All ER 1019 (refd) Neeld & Ors v Western Broadcasting Co Ltd (1976) 65 DLR 574 (refd) Ng Cheng Kiat v Overseas Union Bank [1984] 2 MLJ 140 (refd) Ram August Tewari & Ors v Bindeshwari Tewari & Ors [1972] AIR Pat 142 (refd)

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Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 1 All ER 367; [1964] 2 WLR 269 (refd) Sadasiba Panda v Bansidhar Sahu AIR [1962] Orissa 115 (refd) Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777 (refd) Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614 (refd) Wan Abdul Rashid v S Sivasubramanian [1984] 1 MLJ 385 (refd) Per curiam: (1) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) A plaintiff in a libel action was not bound by O 19 r 7 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 to enter default judgment following the failure of a defendant to serve a defence. He was entitled to proceed and set the action down for hearing for the purpose of vindicating his reputation and to have damages assessed. (2) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) Conspiracy is a tort that is not always capable of proof by direct evidence. An agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means may be established by evidence of circumstances from which such an agreement may be inferred. However, there must be proof and not mere conjecture. (3) (Per Gopal Sri Ram JCA) While it is settled law and practice in libel actions tried with a jury that a judge does not give any direction or guidelines as to assessment of quantum of damages, actions for defamation in Malaysia are tried by a judge alone who is obliged to provide reasons for every decision which he hands down. Thus there is warrant to rely on guidelines for assessment of damages appearing in non-jury jurisdictions such as India and ||Page 498>> Singapore, although this is a matter upon which our courts must evolve their own criteria based upon our own values and conditions that prevail here. (4) (Per Abu Mansor JCA) It is trite law that no special damage need be pleaded and proved if the defamatory matter speaks of a plaintiff in the way of his profession, office or calling and the plaintiff only claims general and not special damages.

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(5) (Per Abu Mansor JCA) I think the court has to take a stand and deliver the message to all journalists and the media alike that they must act responsibly. They ought to know that they have a large following and that the reading public holds them in high esteem and has the tendency to accept what is written as gospel truth. They should, therefore, act with responsibility.

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary Responden, seorang ahli perniagaan yang terkemuka dan berjaya di Malaysia dan di luar negara, telah membawa satu tindakan terhadap perayu-perayu dan orang-orang lain menuntut ganti rugi untuk fitnah dan untuk komplot memfitnah. Aduannya adalah berkenaan dengan satu siri rencana-rencana (‘rencana-rencana itu’) yang diterbitkan di dalam satu majalah yang bernama Malaysian Industry (‘majalah itu’). Pada semua masa yang penting, perayu ketiga adalah ketua penyunting majalah itu, sementara perayu pertama telah menulis satu daripada rencana-rencana itu terhadap mana aduan dibuat oleh responden. Perayu-perayu kedua dan ketiga masing-masing adalah pencetak dan penerbit majalah itu. Sebelum permulaan tindakan itu, perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat telah menerbitkan satu nota meminta maaf, tanpa terlebih dahulu menghantar satu deraf nota itu kepada peguamcara responden untuk kelulusan, di dalam satu jilid terkemudian majalah itu yang, antara lainnya, menyatakan bahawa ‘kami seterusnya meminta maaf jika rencana-rencana yang dikatakan itu telah merosakkan reputasi [responden] itu’. Writ di dalam prosiding ini telah disampaikan pada 28 Februari 1994. Di antara perayu-perayu, cuma perayu kedua yang telah menyampaikan satu pembelaan kepada tindakan itu. Mahkamah kemudiannya membuat satu perintah pada 22 Ogos 1994, mengikut satu saman untuk arahan, menetapkan tindakan itu untuk perbicaraan yang telah bermula pada 10 Oktober 1994. Perbicaraan itu kemudiannya diteruskan dari sehari ke sehari, biarpun melampaui tempoh yang mula-mula ditetapkan untuknya, sehingga penyelesaiannya. Selepas merizabkan penghakiman untuk beberapa hari, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati perayu-perayu dan defendan lain itu bertanggungan dan membuat award jumlah ganti rugi am yang berasingan terhadap mereka. [ Lihat [1995] 1 MLJ 39 .] Perayu-perayu selepas itu membuat rayuan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Di perbicaraan rayuan itu, peguambela untuk perayu-perayu pertama dan kedua telah berhujah bahawa:

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||Page 499>> (a) perbicaraan itu telah berjalan dengan kepantasan yang tidak munasabah; (b) ganti rugi yang dituntut tidak dibuktikan; dan (c) award yang dibuat oleh hakim perbicaraan itu adalah terlalu tinggi dan terkeluar daripada arah aliran award untuk plaintif-plaintif di dalam tindakan fitnah. Peguambela untuk perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat telah berhujah bahawa: (a) hakim perbicaraan adalah salah ketika membuat keputusan bahawa perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat bertanggungan; (b) award yang dibuat adalah terlalu tinggi; (c) hakim perbicaraan gagal mengambil kira nota meminta maaf yang diterbitkan oleh perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat yang sepatutnya mengurangkan award yang dibuat terhadap mereka; dan (d) hakim perbicaraan adalah salah ketika membuat award yang berasingan terhadap setiap perayu.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan-rayuan itu: (1) (Oleh Lamin PMR) Di mana nama baik seseorang itu diserang dan fakta-fakta yang berkaitan dengannya itu begitu segar di dalam fikiran setiap orang, tiada cara yang lebih baik untuk mencapai keadilan melainkan seorang hakim itu membuat pentaksiran serta-merta keterangan yang ada dan memberikan dapatannya tanpa kelengahan. (2) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Seorang hakim yang telah menjadualkan satu kes untuk beberapa hari yang terhad adalah berhak meneruskan kes itu melampaui tempoh itu untuk menyelesaikan perbicaraan itu. Sememangnya, adalah elok jika pendekatan sedemikian diikuti di dalam semua kes. Untuk mengelakkan masalah-masalah, antara lainnya, mengingati kembali keterangan dan ekshibit, adalah paling baik bahawa perbicaraan diteruskan sehingga kesudahannya tanpa penangguhan di tengah jalan. (3) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Pemberian atau keengganan memberikan satu penangguhan adalah satu perkara yang jatuh di dalam linkungan budi bicara seorang hakim dan sebuah mahkamah rayuan tidak patut bercampur tangan dalam keputusan sedemikian melainkan ianya boleh ditunjukkan bahawa keengganan itu telah menyebabkan perayu tidak mendapat keadilan yang perlu. Jangkaan sah yang tunggal yang dipunyai oleh seorang plaintif atau seorang

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defendan adalah bahawa beliau akan mendapat keadilan mengikut undang-undang. Dengan memakai prinsip ini, adalah jelas bahawa hakim perbicaraan telah bertindak secara betul dalam mengarahkan supaya perbicaraan diteruskan sehingga kesudahannya, dalam memberikan satu keputusan yang awal dan dalam menyediakan alasan bertulisnya tidak lama kemudian. (4) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Hujah bahawa hakim perbicaraan salah dalam membuat keputusan bahawa perayu-perayu ketiga ||Page 500>> dan keempat bertanggungan tidak berasas memandangkan bahawa mereka tidak menyampaikan satu pembelaan. Adalah menjadi amalan yang mantap bahawa seseorang defendan yang memilih supaya tidak membuat pli kepada suatu pernyataan tuntutan di dalam satu tindakan libel adalah dihadkan hanya untuk mencabar terhadap jumlah ganti rugi yang patut diterima oleh plaintif itu. (5) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Libel adalah satu tort yang boleh mengasaskan satu tindakan secara sendirinya, iaitu tanpa bukti kerosakan sebenar. Undang-undang membuat anggapan bahawa apabila reputasi seseorang diserang, kerosakan tentunya berlaku. Sedangkan satu tuntutan untuk ganti rugi khas mesti dijadikan pli secara spesifik dan mesti dibuktikan, tuntutan yang dibuat oleh responden cumalah untuk ganti rugi am yang tidak perlu dibuat pli dan dibuktikan sedemikian. Walaupun responden adalah saksi tunggal yang dipanggil untuk membuktikan kesnya, setiap kes itu bergantung pada fakta-faktanya yang tersendiri. Di dalam kes ini, bisa yang digunakan oleh perayu pertama di dalam rencananya untuk menyerang responden bersama dengan kedudukan responden di dalam masyarakat adalah ukuran yang mencukupi untuk menunjukkan takat kerosakan yang telah dialami. Hakim perbicaraan dengan betulnya telah menerima keterangan responden. Lantaran itu hujah bahawa ganti rugi yang dituntut tidak dibuktikan tidak boleh berjaya. (6) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Memang tentu sekali tidak terdapat bandingan-bandingan berkenaan dengan jumlah ganti rugi di dalam tindakan libel di Malaysia berbeza daripada bandingan-bandingan yang wujud di dalam kes-kes kecederaan diri. Oleh itu tidaklah boleh dihujahkan bahawa award di

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 487

dalam kes ini adalah terkeluar daripada arah aliran ganti rugi yang biasanya diawardkan di dalam tindakan-tindakan libel. (7) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Dalam mentaksirkan ganti rugi, tidak terdapat asas untuk sebarang polisi kehakiman yang diarahkan terhadap membuat award ganti rugi yang sangat rendah untuk fitnah. Kecederaan kepada reputasi seseorang boleh mendatangkan kepadanya setidak-tidaknya kerosakan yang sama teruk dengan, jika bukan kerosakan yang lebih teruk daripada yang boleh didatangkan oleh kecederaan kepada diri fizikalnya. (8) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Dalam kes-kes yang sesuai, profesyen atau kedudukan seseorang defendan di dalam masyarakat adalah satu faktor yang relevan untuk diambil kira apabila mahkamah mempertimbangkan apakah ganti rugi yang patut diaward terhadap seorang defendan itu. Dengan ketiadaan apa-apa keadaan yang khas atau luar biasa, adalah berpatutan untuk sebuah mahkamah membuat award ganti rugi yang besar terhadap seorang wartawan yang telah, tanpa sebarang asas atau sebarang asas yang mencukupi, membuat pli justifikasi. ||Page 501>> Tambahan pula, semakin ramai orang yang membaca hasil tulisannya atau semakin tinggi kepopularannya, semakin besarlah award yang patut dibuat. (9) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Mahkamah berhak dan patut mengambil kira kelakuan seorang defendan di dalam satu tindakan libel. Kelakuan sedemikian akan mempunyai kesan di dalam pemberian award ganti rugi teladan. (10) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Perayu kedua telah secara nyata meletakkan satu pli justifikasi di atas rekod tanpa fakta sokongan. Perayu pertama, walaupun beliau tidak menyampaikan satu pembelaan, telah menjalankan pemeriksaan balas terhadap responden atas dasar bahawa fakta-fakta yang timbul di dalam rencananya itu adalah benar. Oleh kerana ganti rugi berganda apabila justifikasi gagal, dan memandangkan fakta-fakta kes ini, award yang dibuat oleh hakim perbicaraan terhadap perayu-perayu pertama dan kedua tidak keterlaluan atau sangat tinggi. Mahkamah Rayuan tidak patut bercampur tangan dengan penggunaan budi bicara hakim perbicaraan atas satu perkara di mana pendapat-pendapat boleh, dan sememangnya, berbeza dengan agak banyak.

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Dengan begitu juga, award terhadap perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat juga tidak terlalu tinggi dan tidak patut mengalami campur tangan. (11) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Suatu permintaan maaf, walaupun tidak melepaskan seorang defendan daripada tanggungan, mempunyai kesan mengurangkan jumlah gantirugi, dan di dalam setengah-setengah kes mengurangkannya dengan banyak. Di dalam kes ini, nota permintaan maaf yang diterbitkan oleh perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat adalah bersyarat dan bukanlah satu penarikan balik libel yang terkandung di dalam rencana-rencana itu yang penuh dan terus-terang. Begitu juga ianya bukan satu permintaan maaf yang penuh dan tidak bersyarat atau satu penarikan balik yang berpatutan. Lantaran itu tidaklah boleh dihujah bahawa permintaan maaf itu sepatutnya mengurangkan award yang dibuat terhadap perayu-perayu ketiga dan keempat. (12) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Perayu-perayu bersama dengan defendan lain telah didakwa dan didapati bertanggungan sebagai pelaku tort berasingan dan bukan sebagai pelaku tort bersama. Oleh itu, hakim perbicaraan boleh membuat award-award berasingan terhadap setiap perayu. Per curiam: (1) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Seorang plaintif di dalam suatu tindakan libel tidak diikat oleh A 19 k 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 untuk mencatatkan penghakiman ingkar berikutan daripada kegagalan seorang defendan untuk menyampaikan satu pembelaan. Beliau berhak meneruskan dan ||Page 502>> menetapkan tindakan untuk pembicaraan bagi tujuan menyangkal tuduhan yang dibuat terhadap reputasinya dan bagi mentaksirkan ganti rugi. (2) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Komplot adalah satu tort yang bukan selalunya boleh dibuktikan dengan keterangan langsung. Suatu persetujuan untuk melakukan satu tindakan yang menyalahi undang-undang atau satu tindakan yang sah melalui cara yang menyalahi undang-undang boleh dibuktikan oleh keterangan tentang keadaan berdasarkan mana inferens tentang persetujuan sedemikian boleh dibuat. Namun demikian, mestilah terdapat bukti dan bukan tekaan semata-mata. (3) (Oleh Gopal Sri Ram HMR) Sedangkan ianya undang-undang dan amalan

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 489

yang mantap di dalam tindakan libel yang dibicarakan dengan satu juri bahawa seorang hakim tidak memberikan sebarang arahan atau garis panduan berkenaan dengan pentaksiran jumlah gantirugi, tindakan untuk fitnah di Malaysia dibicarakan oleh hakim sendiri yang dikehendaki memberikan alasan untuk setiap keputusan yang diberikannya. Oleh itu terdapat alasan untuk bergantung pada garis panduan tentang pentaksiran gantirugi yang muncul di bidang kuasa tanpa juri seperti India dan Singapura, walaupun ini adalah satu perkara di mana mahkamah kita patut mengembangkan kriteria mereka sendiri berdasarkan nilai kita sendiri dan keadaan-keadaan yang wujud di sini. (4) (Oleh Abu Mansor HMR) Adalah undang-undang biasa bahawa ganti rugi khas tidak perlu dijadikan pli dan dibuktikan jika perkara yang memfitnah itu menyentuh plantif dari segi profesyen, jawatan atau kerjayanya dan plaintif cuma menuntut ganti rugi am dan bukan khas. (5) (Oleh Abu Mansor HMR) Saya fikir mahkamah mesti mengambil satu pendirian dan menyampaikan mesej kepada semua wartawan dan media massa bahawa mereka mesti bertindak secara bertanggungjawab. Mereka patut tahu bahawa mereka mempunyai ramai pembaca dan bahawa khalayak am yang membaca memandang tinggi terhadap mereka dan mempunyai kecenderungan menerima apa-apa yang ditulis sebagai kebenaran gospel. Oleh itu mereka mesti bertindak secara bertanggungjawab.] [ Editorial Note: The appellants in Civil Appeals No 02–221–94 and No 02–223–94 have applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court vide Civil Applications No 08–35–95 and No 08–34–95, respectively.

Notes For a case on pleadings on general damages, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 2594. ||Page 503>> For a case on the failure to file a defence in a civil case, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) para 2564. For cases on conduct of civil proceedings, see 2 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994

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Reissue) paras 3599–3600. For cases on defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 64–139, [1989] Mallal’s Digest 1490–1493; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 1172–1177; [1991] Mallal’s Digest 1941–1948; [1992] Mallal’s Digest 1644–1647; [1993] Mallal’s Digest 1272–1276. For cases on damages in defamation, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed) paras 42–51; [1989] Mallal’s Digest 646–647; [1990] Mallal’s Digest 481, 491. For cases on conspiracy, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 1994 Reissue) paras 522–525.

Cases referred to Allsop v Church of England Newspaper Ltd [1972] 2 QB 161; [1972] 2 All ER 26; [1972] 2 WLR 600 Ashmore v Corp of Lloyd’s [1992] 2 All ER 486; [1992] 1 WLR 446 Associated Leisure Ltd v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1970] 2 QB 450; [1970] 3 WLR 101 Barindra Kumar Ghose & Ors v The Emperor [1909] 14 CWN 1114 Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 (refd) Calvet v Tomkies [1963] 3 All ER 610; [1963] 1 WLR 1397 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] 113 ALR 577 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027; [1972] 1 All ER 801; [1972] 2 WLR 645 Gill v Woodfin (1884) 25 Ch D 707 Great One Coconut Products Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 469 John v Dharmaratnam [1962] MLJ 187 Khair-ud-Din v Tara Singh AIR [1927] Lah 20 Lachman v Pyarchand AIR [1959] Rai 169 Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1962] 2 All ER 698

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Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd (sub nom Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd) [1964] AC 234; [1963] 2 All ER 151; [1963] 2 WLR 1063 Montagu v Land Corp (1887) 56 LT 730 Nagy v Co-operative Press Ltd [1949] 2 KB 188; [1949] 1 All ER 1019 Neeld & Ors v Western Broadcasting Co Ltd (1976) 65 DLR 574 Ng Cheng Kiat v Overseas Union Bank [1984] 2 MLJ 140 Ram August Tewari & Ors v Bindeshwari Tewari & Ors [1972] AIR Pat 142 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; [1964] 1 All ER 367; [1964] 2 WLR 269 ||Page 504>> Sadasiba Panda v Bansidhar Sahu AIR [1962] Orissa 115 Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777 Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614 Wan Abdul Rashid v S Sivasubramanian [1984] 1 MLJ 385

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 s 18 Evidence Act 1950 s 134 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 19 r 7 Evidence Act 1872 s 134 [Ind]

Suit No S5–23–23 of 1994 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

Karpal Singh (Karpal Singh & Co) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–221–94. Karpal Singh (J Ramdhari with him) (KC Yap, Kamaludin & Partners) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–222–94. Shamsul-Baharain (Chan Chong Choon with him) (Skrine & Co) for the appellant in Civil Appeal No W–02–223–94.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 492

VK Lingam (W Satchithanadhan, V Sivaparanjothi and Adam Bachek with him) (Adam Bachek & Associates) for the respondent.

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[1993] 1 MLJ 408 INSTITUTE OF COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT UNITED KINGDOM v NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (MALAYSIA) BHD

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO P696 OF 1985 LIM BENG CHOON J 30 DECEMBER 1992

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Ordinary and natural meaning of words complained of — Whether words defamatory

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Defence of justification — What defendants must prove — Defamation Act 1957 s 8

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Fair comment — Honest expression of opinion — Test of fair comment — Defamation Act 1957 s 9

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Malice — Whether defendants deliberately or recklessly abstained from proper enquiries

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 493

The plaintiffs (‘ICM’) claimed against the defendants for damages for libel in respect of the words contained in an article entitled ‘British “ diploma mills ”step up sales racket’ published by the defendants in the New Straits Times dated 29 April 1985. The issues involved in this action concerned: (i) the very important issue as to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words complained of; (ii) whether the defence of justification was available to the defen; (iii) whether the defence of fair comment on matters of public intewas available to the defendants; and (iv) whether the defendants were actuated by malice. This issue will only arise if the third issue is in the affirmative as the defence of fair comment on matters of public interest is of no avail when it is shown that the defendants were actuated by malice when publishing the article. ICM alleged that by the words published in the article in their natural and ordinary meaning or by innuendo, the defendants meant and were understood and taken to mean that ICM was advertising actively in Malaysia to sell bogus qualifications and that ICM was a bogus educational institution. ICM also alleged that the said words were calculated to injure and disparage ICM in its trade as an educational establishment and examining body. The defendants, whilst admitting that they did publish the article in question, categorically denied that they printed the article falsely and maliciously of the plaintiffs. They averred that the headline ‘British “ diploma mills” step up sales racket’ and the first to the sixth paragraphs of the article did not refer to the plaintiffs or were not understood to refer to or were or ever capable of referring to the plaintiffs. The defendants then went on to aver that ||Page 409>> the said words in the article were fair comment and made without malice upon a matter of public interest, namely, that ICM was providing a course of study which ICM alleged leads up to the conferment of qualifications which entitle students to gain admission to institutions of higher learning. In their defence of fair comment, the defendants relied on the fact that ICM were incorporated in Ireland and that ICM’s qualifications were not sufficient to gain entry into 34 higher learning institutions in the UK.

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Held, giving judgment for the plaintiffs and awarding damages: (1) It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published ‘of the plaintiff’. The test which the plaintiff has to furnish an answer to satisfy the court is whether the words would reasonably in the circumstances lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to. In considering the question of identity, paras 7, 8 and 9 of the article cannot be read in isolation. They must be read in the proper context in which they were set out. The gist of the article is that certain organizations based in England were advertising actively in Malaysia to sell their bogus qualifications. Having said all these, the author went on to draw the attention of readers to an advertisement placed by ICM which was offering a diploma in business studies course through a local educational institution. Under the circumstances, the court has no doubt whatsoever that the article sets out as clearly as possible that ICM was one of those organizations referred to in the article. Having arrived at the conclusion that ICM was linked by the author of the article to other English organizations which operated ‘diploma mills’ to sell their bogus qualifications, the inevitable conclusion which any reasonable reader of the article could only arrive at is that the article is certainly defamatory to the plaintiffs. (2) On the second issue, it is a complete defence to an action of libel, and slander that the defamatory imputation is true. The defendant must prove the truth of the very imputation complained of. From the evidence there is no doubt firstly, that ICM is registered in the Republic of Ireland. But ICM is also registered in the UK as a foreign company. The mention of this was omitted in the article. By this omission, it is clear to the court that the author of the article was at the material time trying to emphasize in his article when read as a whole that ICM had no standing whatsoever in England. There is equally no doubt in the court’s view that the author had succeeded in creating doubts in the mind of an ordinary reasonable reader of the article regarding the authenticity of any degree conferred by ICM. The issue of registration therefore, gives additional strength to the imputations made against the plaintiffs in the article. As regards

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to the defendants’ contention that the qualifications conferred by the plaintiffs are not sufficient to gain entry into some 34 educational institutions even ||Page 410>> if it is true, such a contention per se does not warrant the imputation that ICM is a diploma mill and/or a bogus educational institution. The most that could be said for the defendants would be that they must have succeeded in sowing that there was a ‘ possibility’ that the ICM qualifications might well be insufficient to gain entry into the majority of the educational institutions, such a ‘ possibility’ is not sufficient in law for the court to hold that the defendants have succeeded on the balance of probabilities in establishing that the qualifications of ICM are not sufficient to gain entry into the educational bodies. As regards to the allegation in the article that ‘ ICM had no standing and no status whatsoever with the United Kingdom Examination Board’ there is no doubt that this allegation is totally untrue. (3) The law is not concerned with the motive or intention of the author of the article. What the law is and should be concerned with is the tendency and consequences of the publication which in the present case are clearly defamatory of the plaintiffs in that imputations of operating a diploma mill to sell ICM qualifications were made against them. On the evidence adduced at the trial, ICM have satisfied the court that the author and/or the defendants had at the material time acted maliciously in making and publishing the article complained of. The court had no hesitation at all in holding that the defence of justification relied on by the defendants was wholly without any merits. (4) On the third issue, there is no doubt that it is a defence to an action of libel that the words complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest. The court had no hesitation in holding that the article complained of comprised of: (i) bare statements of fact or (ii) the said statements contained in the article were capable of being considered as bare statements of fact. None of the said statements could be classified as comments. No ordinary reasonable reader could construe any of the statements as an expression of comment or opinion of the author. In the court’s view, the bona fide of the author in making the statement was highly questionable. (5) The court does not have the slightest doubt that the defendants deliberately or

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at least recklessly abstained from availing themselves of means of information which lay at hand when the sligh test inquiry would have shown that the imputation appearing in the article complained of were groundless. ICM have succeeded in proving express malice on the part of the author of the article complained of as well as on the part of the defendants. (6) In calculating the amount of damages, ICM, as a corporation, can only be damaged in its pocket so that it can only be compensated for loss of goodwill and loss of income. The court must also take into account that cor poration tax should have been payable on the income loss. Taking all the factors into consideration, the court awarded a sum of RM100,000 as compensatory damages with interest at the rate of 8%pa from the date of judgment till ||Page 411>> date of realization. The court also awarded a sum of RM12,795.66 as special damages which sum shall carry interest at the rate of 4%pa from the date of filing to date of judgment. The claims for examplary or punitive damages in addition to aggravated compensatory damages were dismis sed. Per curiam: Although in the publication of defamatory matters, malice is presumed but if it is sought to destroy the defence of fair comment on matters of public interest by an allegation that the defendant was actuated by express malice, particulars of the facts and matters from which such express malice is to be inferred must be pleaded.

[ Bahasa Malaysia summary Plaintif (‘ICM’) menuntut terhadap defendan ganti rugi kerana libel berhubung dengan perkataan yang terkandung di dalam suatu rencana yang bertajuk ‘British “diploma mills” step up sales racket’ yang diterbitkan oleh defendan di dalam New Straits Times bertarikh 29 April 1985. Isu yang terlibat dalam tindakan ini berkenaan: (i) isu yang sangat penting tentang makna biasa perkataan yang di; (ii) sama ada pembelaan justifikasi terbuka kepada defendan; (iii) sama ada pembelaan komen berpatutan atas perkara yang menarik perhatian

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 497

orang ramai terbuka kepada defendan; dan (iv) sama ada defendan didorong oleh niat-jahat. Isu ini hanya akan timbul jika isu ketiga diiakan kerana pembelaan komen berpatutan atas perkara yang menarik perhatian orang ramai tidak berguna jika ditunjukkan bahawa defendan didorong oleh ni at-jahat apabila menerbitkan rencana itu. ICM mengatakan bahawa dengan menggunakan perkataan yang diterbitdi dalam rencana itu dalam maksud biasanya atau meng ikut sindiran, defendan bermaksud dan difahamkan serta dianggap bermaksud bahawa ICM mengiklan dengan giat di Malaysia untuk menjual kelulusan palsu dan bahawa ICM adalah institusi pendidikan yang palsu. ICM juga mengatakan bahawa perkataan tersebut dimaksuduntuk mencela dan memperkecilkan ICM dalam per nya sebagai suatu institusi pendidikan dan badan pemeriksaan. Walaupun defendan mengaku yang mereka telah menerbitkan rencana yang dipersoalkan itu, mereka menafikan tanpa syarat yang mereka telah salah menerbitkan rencana itu dan dengan berniat-jahat terhadap plaintif. Mereka menegaskan bahawa tajuk rencana itu ‘British “diploma mills” step up sales racket’ dan perenggan pertama hingga keenam rencana itu tidak merujuk kepada plaintif atau tidak dimaksudkan untuk merujuk kepada plaintif atau boleh pernah merujuk kepada plaintif. Defendan kemudian menegaskan bahawa perkataan dalam rencana itu adalah komen berpatutan dan dibuat tanpa niat-jahat atas perkara yang menarik perhatian orang ramai, iaitu, bahawa ICM ||Page 412>> memkursus pengajian yang ICM mengatakan membawa kepada penganugerahan kelulusan yang membolehkan penuntut memasuki institusi pendidikan yang lebih tinggi. Dalam pembelaan komen ber patutan mereka, defendan bergantung pada fakta bahawa ICM didi Ireland dan bahawa kelulusan ICM tidak mencukupi untuk mendapat masuk ke dalam 34 institusi pendidikan yang lebih tinggi di UK.

Diputuskan, memberi penghakiman kepada plaintif dan mengaward ganti rugi: (1) Adalah suatu unsur penting kausa tindakan fitnah bahawa perkataan yang diadukan itu harus diterbitkan mengenai plaintif. Ujian yang plaintif harus memberi jawapan untuk memuaskan hati mahkamah ialah sama ada perkataan itu akan secara muna dalam keadaan yang ada menyebabkan orang ramai yang mengenali plaintif mempercayai bahawa dialah orang yang dirujuk nya. Dalam

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 498

mempertimbangkan soalan identiti, perenggan 7, 8 dan 9 rencana itu tidak boleh dibaca secara berasingan. Mereka harus dibaca dalam konteks yang betul dalam mana mereka dibentang kan. Inti rencana itu ialah bahawa organisasi tertentu yang mempunyai pusat operasi di England mengiklan dengan giat di Malaysia untuk menjual kelulusan palsu mereka. Setelah menyatakan semua ini, penulis it u seterusnya menarik perhatian pembaca kepada suatu iklan yang ditempatkan oleh ICM yang menawarkan diploma dalam kursus pengajian perniagaan melalui suatu institusi pendidikan tempatan. Dalam keadaan demikian, mahkamah tidak syak lagi bahawa rencana itu membentangkan dengan seberapa jelasnya bahawa ICM adalah satu daripada organisasi yang dirujuk dalam rencana itu. Dengan membuat kesimpulan bahawa ICM dihubungkan oleh penulis rencana itu dengan organisasi Inggeris yang lain yang menguruskan ‘diploma mills’ untuk menjual kelulusan palsu mereka, kesimpulan tunggal yang tidak boleh dielak yang seseorang pembaca waras rencana itu akan membuat ialah bahawa rencana itu sudah pasti memfitnah plaintif. (2) Mengenai isu kedua, adalah pembelaan sempurna dal am suatu tindakan libel dan slander bahawa tohmah fitnah itu memang benar. Defendan mesti membuktikan kebenaran tohmah yang diadukan itu. Daripada keterangan tidak syak lagi pertamanya, bahawa ICM didaftarkan di Republik Ireland. Tetapi ICM juga didaftarkan di UK sebagai syarikat asing. Fakta ini tidak disebutkan di dalam rencana itu. Dengan peninggalan ini, adalah jelas pada mahkamah bahawa penulis rencana itu pada masa material itu cuba menekankan di dalam rencana itu apabila dibaca seluruhnya bahawa ICM tidak mempunyai kedudukan apa pun di England. Pada masa yang sama, tiada syak lagi pada pendapat mahkamah bahawa penulis itu telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan dalam fikiran seseorang pembaca waras rencana itu tentang ketulenan sebarang kelulusan yang dianugerahkan oleh ICM. Isu pendaftaran ||Page 413>> oleh demikian memberi kekuatan tambahan kepada tohmah yang dibuat terhadap plaintif di dalam rencana itu. Berhubung dengan dakwaan defendan bahawa kelulusan yang dianugerahkan oleh plaintif tidak mencukupi untuk mendapat masuk ke dalam 34 institusi pendidikan walaupun ia benar, dakwaan seperti itu dengan sendirinya tidak mewajarkan tohmah yang ICM

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ialah sebuah ‘diploma mill’ dan/atau suatu institusi pendidikan palsu. Setinggi-tingginya yang boleh dikatakan untuk defendan ialah bahawa mereka pasti telah berjaya memupuk kemungkinan yang kelulusan ICM boleh jadi tidak mencukupi untuk mendapat masuk ke dalam kebanyakan institusi pendidikan, kemungkinan seperti itu tidak mencukupi dari segi undang-undang untuk mahkamah me mutuskan bahawa defendan telah berjaya atas imbangan kebarang kalian menunjukkan yang kelulusan ICM tidak mencukupi untuk mendapat masuk ke dalam institusi pendidikan itu. Mengenai tuduhan di dalam rencana itu bahawa ICM tidak mempunyai kedudukan atau status a pa pun dengan Lembaga Pemeriksaan United Kingdom tiada syak lagi bahawa tuduhan ini memang tidak benar. (3) Undang-undang tidak menaruh perhatian kepada motif atau niat penulis rencana itu. Undang-undang harus menaruh perhatian kepada kecenderung an dan akibat penerbitan yang dalam kes ini dengan jelas memfitnah plaintif, iaitu tohmah menguruskan ‘diploma mill’ untuk menjual kelulusan ICM dibuat terhadap mereka. Atas keterangan yang dikemukakan di perbicaraan, ICM telah memuaskan hati mahkamah bah awa penulis dan/atau defendan pada masa material itu telah bertindak dengan niat-jahat dalam membuat dan menerbitkan rencana yang diadukan itu. Mahkamah tanpa apa-apa keraguan memutuskan bahawa pembelaan justifikasi pada mana defendan bergantung tidak mempunyai merit sama sekali. (4) Mengenai isu ketiga, tidak syak lagi bahawa ia adalah pembelaan kepada suatu tindakan libel bahawa perkataan yang diadukan itu merupakan komen berpatutan atas perkara yang menarik perhatian orang ramai. Mahkamah tiada apa-apa keraguan dalam memutus kan bahawa rencana yang diadukan itu terdiri daripada: (i) perfakta sahaja atau (ii) pernyataan tersebut yang terkandung di dalam rencana itu boleh dianggap sebagai pernyataan fakta sahaja. Tidak satu daripada perny ataan itu boleh dikelaskan sebagai komen. Tiada pembaca waras biasa boleh mentafsir sebarang peritu sebagai suatu penyataan komen atau pendapat penulis. Dalam pendapat mahkamah, bona fide penulis membuat pernyataan itu boleh sangat dipersoalkan. (5) Mahkamah tidak syak sama sekali bahawa defendan dengan sengaja atau

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sekurang-kurangnya dengan melulu menahan diri daripada menggunakan sumber maklumat yang sentiasa ada sedangkan siasatan sedikit pun akan menunjukkan bahawa tohmah yang wujud dalam rencana yang diadukan itu adalah tidak berasas. ICM telah berjaya membuktikan niat-jahat yang nyata pada ||Page 414>> pihak penulis rencana yang diadukan itu dan juga pada pihak defendan. (6) Dalam mengira amaun ganti rugi, ICM, sebagai suatu perbadanan, hanya boleh dirugikan dari segi kewangan jadi ia hanya boleh diberi pampasan bagi kehilangan nama baik dan kehilangan pen dapatan. Mahkamah mesti juga mempertimbangkan yang cukai perbadanan seharusnya kena dibayar atas pendapatan yang hilang. Dengan mempertimbangkan semua faktor, mahkamah meng-award jumlah RM100,000 sebagai ganti rugi pampasan bersama faedah pada kadar 8% setiap tahun daripada tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penghasilan. Mahkamah juga mengaward jumlah RM12,795.66 sebagai ganti rugi khas dan jumlah ini akan membawa faedah pada kadar 4% setiap tahun daripada tarikh pemfailan hingga tarikh penghakiman. Tuntutan untuk ganti rugi teladan atau punitif sebagai tambahan kepada ganti rugi pampasan yang lebih berat ditolak. Per curiam: Walaupun dalam penerbitan perkara fitnah, niat-jahat diduga tetapi jika dimaksudkan untuk memusnahkan pembelaan komen berpatutan atas perkara yang menarik perhatian orang ramai dengan pengataan bahawa defendan didorong oleh niat-jahat yang ny ata, butir-butir fakta dan perkara daripada mana inferens niat-jahat yang nyata boleh dibuat mesti dijadikan pli.] [ Editorial Note: The defendants have appealed to the Supreme Court vide Civil Appeal No 02– 9 of 1993.]

Cases referred to David Syme v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234 (folld) Le Fanu v Malcolmson (1848) 1 HL Cas 637; [1843-60] All ER Rep 152 (folld)

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Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (folld) AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 226 (folld) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 (refd) Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB 507 (refd) Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 (refd) Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66 (refd) Hunt v Star Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] 2 KB 319 (folld) Kemsley v Foot & Ors [1952] 1 All ER 501; [1952] AC 345 (folld) Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 (folld) Turner v Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pictures Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 449 (refd) London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (refd) Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 (refd) Subramaniam v PP [1956] 2 PCC 55 (refd) Clark v Moly News (1877) 3 QBD 248 (refd) Datuk Harris bin Mohd Salleh v Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 97 (folld) Cassel v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (refd) Praed v Graham (1889) 24 QBD 53 (refd) Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (refd) ||Page 415>>

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957 ss 8, 9

Wee Choo Keong (Wee Choo Keong & Faaiz) for the plaintiffs. C Abraham and N Navaratnam (Shearn Delamore & Co) for the defen.

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[1991] 2 MLJ 505 (also [1991] SLR 486) BANK OF CHINA v ASIAWEEK LTD

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 1206 OF 1989 THEAN J 30 JANUARY 1991

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Striking out — Defamation action — Whether filing of defence is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court — Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, O 18 r 19

Tort — Defamation — Whether words complained off were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning — Whether an apology amounts to admission of defamation — Statutory defence — Whether requirements fulfilled — Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Ed), s 7

On 18 June 1989, the defendant published a statement in a magazine stating that as a result of political repression in China, the Singaporean Chinese had made a run on the Bank of China’s Singapore branch, and quoted the deputy general manager as saying that ‘Up to last Thursday, a total of about US$75m was withdrawn, leaving the bank no alternative but to suspend business temporarily.’ The plaintiff complained that the quoted words were defamatory, and on 23 July 1989 the defendant published an apology. When no settlement was reached on making amends, the plaintiff commenced an action in defamation against the defendant. Two defences were raised: firstly a bare denial that the words complained of were defamatory to the plaintiff or were understood to bear the meanings as alleged by the plaintiff or any other meaning

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defamatory of the plaintiff; and secondly, the statutory defence under s 7 of the Defamation Act. The plaintiff then applied to strike out the defence and enter judgment under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The registrar granted the application and gave the plaintiff leave to enter interlocutory judgment. The defendant appealed against this decision.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) Striking out the whole of a defence to a claim for libel is an extraordinary step and is only allowed in plain and obvious cases. The present case is a plain and obvious case. The question whether a point is plain and obvious does not depend upon the length of time it takes to argue. Rather the question is whether, when the point has been argued, it has become plain and obvious that there can be but one result. There is not the slightest doubt here that the defence is wholly unsound and unsustainable, and striking it out will obviate the necessity for a trial. (2) Of the two defences raised, on a careful examination of the pleadings and other documents, both these defences are manifestly unsustainable, frivolous and vexatious and a sham, and the raising of these defences appears to be a delaying strategy and in effect amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. (3) As to whether the words were defamatory to the plaintiff, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words is to be determined by the court. The question is one purely of construction of the words, and the approach to be adopted in construing these words is to consider what meaning the words would convey to ordinary reasonable persons using their general knowledge and common sense. Such meaning is not confined to a literal or strict meaning of the words but includes any inferences or implications which could reasonably be drawn by such persons. ||Page 506>> (4) The words alleged to be defamatory in particular convey the meaning that the plaintiff’s branch in Singapore, after a total withdrawal of US$75,000,000 by its depositors, had no funds or financial resources to meet further withdrawal by its depositors and had become temporarily insolvent. There is not the

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slightest doubt that these words are defamatory of the plaintiff. They impute an inability to discharge its obligations as a bank to its depositors, insolvency and lack of financial resources on the part of the plaintiff as a bank; they tend to injure the credit of the plaintiff as a bank, they tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally. (5) In 1989, the defendant had made a material admission in admitting that the report about the plaintiff suspending business temporarily was incorrect, apologizing to the plaintiff, agreeing to withdraw the report, and further admitting that the report ‘cast a bad light on the reputation and position of the Bank of China’. In the circumstances, it is impossible to see how it can be maintained that the words complained of are not libellous. (6) As to the second defence, this is a statutory defence, the success of which depends on whether the defendant has satisfied the requirements under s 7 of the Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Ed) (‘the Act’). On the evidence, the words complained of were not published innocently in relation to the plaintiff, and an offer of amends was not made as soon as practicable after the defendant received notice that the words complained of were or might be defamatory to the plaintiff. The purported offer of amends has not complied with the provisions of s 7(3)(b) of the Act as it did not contain an offer to take such steps as reasonably practicable on the part of the defendant to notify persons to whom copies had been distributed that the words were alleged to be defamatory of the plaintiff. Plainly the defendant has not complied with the several requirements under s 7 of the Act and even if there was, it was not made within the time frame prescribed in that section. The statutory defence therefore cannot succeed, now or at a trial.

Cases referred to Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association & Ors [1970] 1 WLR 688; [1970] 1 All ER 1094 (folld) Williams and Humbert v W & H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] 1 AC 368 (folld) Slim & Ors v Daily Telegraph Ltd & Ors [1968] 2 QB 157 (folld)

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Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (folld) Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (folld) Forster & Ors v Lawson (1826) 3 Bing 451; 130 ER 587 (folld) Mclaren v Davies (1890) 6 TLR 372 (folld) Sandison v Malayan Times Ltd & Ors [1964] MLJ 332 (folld)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Ed) s 7 Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 O 18 r 19

VK Rajah for the plaintiff. Imran H Khwaja for the defendant.

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[1991] 2 MLJ 517 (also [1991] SLR 436) ROBIN v SUNRISE INVESTMENTS (PTE) LTD &ANOR

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 6585 OF 1983 CHAO HICK TIN J 24 JANUARY 1991

Tort — Malicious prosecution — Elements of action Proof of malice — Effect of acquittal — Meaning of reasonable and probable cause — Effect of reasonable and probable cause Sufficiency of evidence

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Tort — Defamation — Qualified privilege — Proof of malice

The second defendant was the plaintiff’s accountant. He was also a shareholder and agent for the first defendant. The plaintiff was a permanent resident in Australia but still had business interests in Singapore. He visited the second defendant to sort out his tax matters. In the course of the meeting, the plaintiff indicated that he was looking for business opportunities in Australia, especially in jewellery and stones. The second defendant showed the plaintiff some emeralds belonging to the first defendant. The plaintiff then left, probably placing the emeralds on the table. On his departure the second defendant could not find the emeralds. He believed that the plaintiff had taken the emeralds and tried calling him on the telephone to demand their return. The plaintiff denied taking the emeralds. The second defendant then lodged a police report to the effect that the plaintiff had received the emeralds for his decision as to whether to purchase them or not and had absconded with them. He further reported that the plaintiff was expected to leave for Australia soon. The report accused the plaintiff of committing breach of trust or cheating. The second defendant also wrote letters to Changi Airport Police, immigration officer at Changi Airport, public prosecutor’s office and the commercial attache to the Australian High Commission. These letters were not sent but given to the investigating officer. The plaintiff was arrested and released on bail. He was charged in court. The parties tried to reach a settlement through their respective solicitors without success. On the petition of the plaintiff, the public prosecutor decided to withdraw charges against the plaintiff and he was given a discharge amounting to an acquittal. The plaintiff now sues the defendants for malicious prosecution and defamation. The defendants counterclaim for the return of the emeralds.

Held, dismissing both the claims and the counterclaim: (1) To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove (i) the prosecution by the defendant of a criminal charge against the plaintiff before a tribunal into whose proceedings the criminal courts are competent to inquire; (ii) that the proceedings terminated in the plaintiffs favour; (iii) that the

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defendant instituted or carried on the proceedings maliciously; (iv) that there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the proceedings; and (v) that the plaintiff has suffered damage. In the present case only (iii) and (iv) were in dispute. (2) Mere acquittal does not mean that the criminal proceedings were without reasonable and probable cause. It is a question of fact dependent on all the circumstances. (3) If reasonable cause is established, it does not matter whether there was malice or not. Looking at the police report, it could not be reasonably construed to suggest any improper intention or motive. The letters did not indicate malice but a desire to try and recover his property. (4) Reasonable and probable cause is an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a certain set of circumstances, which, if true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man in the position of the defendant to the conclusion that the accused was probably guilty of the crime imputed. On this basis there was in this case probable cause for the defendant to have lodged the report. (5) With respect to the claim for defamation, the letter and reports were written on an occasion of qualified privilege. To succeed the plaintiff had to show that there was express malice. No malice is shown. (6) With respect to the counterclaim, the burden of proof is on the defendants to show that the plaintiff had taken the emeralds and they had not discharged this burden.

Cases referred to Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440 (folld) Willans v Taylor (1829) 6 Bing 182; 130 ER 1250 (folld) Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KB 130 (folld) Hicks v Faulkner (1878) 8 QBD 167 (folld)

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Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305 (folld) Collins v Cooper (1902) 19 TLR 118 (folld) Bowles v Armstrong (1913) 32 NZLR 409 (folld)

Harry Elias ( Francis Joan Madelene with him) for the plaintiff. Cheng Tim Pin ( Lo Wai Ping with him) for the defendants.

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[1991] 3 MLJ 12 (also [1991] SLR 458) WRIGHT v TIMES BUSINESS PUBLICATIONS LTD & ANOR

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 98 OF 1988 KARTHIGESU J 25 JANUARY 1991

Civil Procedure — Summons for directions — Discovery — Relevancy of documents — Application refused in related proceedings — Relevancy tested by pleadings — Related better further and better particulars of defence — Interrogatories — Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, O 24 rr 3 & 7

Tort — Defamation — Defences — Denial — Qualified privilege and justification

Words and Phrases — ‘Unfounded’

In 1987, Business Times (‘BT’) published articles regarding OCBC’s attempts to

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recruit four top bankers and methods of recruiting executives. Norman Wright (‘NW’) subsequently in a letter addressed to the editor of BT, responded to the aforementioned articles and concluded that ‘there is a prima facie case of amateurism or carelessness of OCBC to have allowed such a breach of confidentiality to happen’. OCBC contended that the words were libellous and demanded an apology. BT printed an unreserved apology that NW’s allegations were ‘unfounded’. NW refused to apologize and OCBC commenced proceedings against NW (‘1987 proceedings’). NW alleged that the words in the apology were libellous and meant that NW had made statements which were wholly unfounded and without basis and by innuendo that he was ‘irresponsible, reckless and given to making statements which are wholly unfounded and without any basis’. OCBC refused to apologize and NW commenced these proceedings against OCBC and BT (‘1988 proceedings’). OCBC’s defences were that the words complained of could not bear the meanings claimed by NW, qualified privilege and justification. NW requested for further and better particulars of OCBC’s defence and discovery of all correspondence and memoranda of discussion, relating to the BT article and the persons named, ||Page 13>> and OCBC’s recruitment procedure and directives on maintaining confidentiality. A similar application made by NW in the 1987 proceedings where he raised defences denying defamation and fair comment, had been refused. The assistant registrar in the 1988 proceedings allowed discovery of particular classes of documents. OCBC appealed against the assistant registrar’s order on the grounds that: (1) the specified class of documents were not relevant to the 1988 proceedings based on the issue raised by the pleadings and particulars; (2) to allow discovery was tantamount to allowing NW to circumvent the refusal of the court to allow a similar application in the 1987 proceedings. OCBC alleged that ‘the sting’ which OCBC seeks to justify and rely on to support the charge of recklessness/ irresponsibility/mischievousness is NW’s failure to make checks. NW’s application for:

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(1) better further and better particulars of OCBC’s defence of justification covering the same grounds as those that could be covered by the documents named in the request for discovery; and (2) interrogatories regarding the drafting of, the investigation into the truth of the allegation, and OCBC’s knowledge regarding communication between BT and NW regarding the apology also were before the court.

Held, allowing OCBC’s appeal and NW’s application (in part): (1) Whether discovery of the documents should be ordered depends on the issues raised by the pleadings and particulars supplied and the relevance of the documents towards proving or disproving those issues. (2) The issue arising from OCBC’s plea of justification is whether NW was reckless, irresponsible or mischievous in not having checked out the conclusion he made in his letter to BT. Had NW pleaded justification in the 1987 proceedings, the truth or falsity of these allegations would be relevant. As such, the documents requested for were not relevant. (3) The word ‘unfounded’ is capable of many different meanings. In the context of these proceedings, the word means ‘groundless’. It cannot be a libel to say that what another has said is unfounded. The statement is nothing but a bare denial. (4) Since the appeal in respect of the 1987 proceedings was pending and a similar application had been refused in the 1987 proceedings, even if the documents were relevant to the 1988 proceedings, it was not desirable to grant the application for discovery due to the close connection between the 1987 and 1988 proceedings. Although there is an implied undertaking not to use the information obtained from the documents obtained in the 1988 proceedings, there is always the risk that some information may be unwittingly used in the 1987 proceedings. (5) As the better further and better particulars sought were in reality in the nature of interrogatories and they covered the same grounds as the documents in the application for discovery would have covered, the request for better further and

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better particulars must be similarly refused. The court will not order particulars of evidence. (6) Interrogatories pertaining to OCBC’s knowledge regarding absence of: (a) BT’s investigation into the truth of allegations in the apology; and (b) communications between NW and BT regarding the apology, were allowed against OCBC. Editorial Note The respondent/plaintiff has appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Civil Appeal No 27 of 1991.

Cases referred to OCBC v Norman Wright & Ors [1989] 3 MLJ 73 (refd) Compagnie Financiere Et Commerciale Du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 (folld) Alterskye v Scott [1948] 1 All ER 469 (refd) Crest Homes plc v Marks & Ors [1987] 2 All ER 1074 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 O 24 rr 7(1), 8 Rules of Supreme Court 1875 [UK] O XXX1 r 12

Charles Gray QC ( Gill Sarjit Singh with him) for the appellants/second defendants. Patrick Milmo QC ( Tan Woon Tiang with him) for the respondent/plaintiff.

[1991] 3 MLJ 494 LEE KUAN YEW v CHIN VUI KHEN & ANOR

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HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — SUIT NO S6-25-235-87 SITI NORMA YAAKOB J 6 JULY 1989

Civil Procedure — Further and better particulars — Striking out of — Principles applicable

Tort — Defamation — Pleading of — Particulars to be provided

Tort — Defamation — Whether consistent with constitutional right of freedom of speech

Constitutional Law — Freedom of speech and expression — Restrictions imposed by law

The defendants published two articles in the Sunday Star, an English language newspaper widely circulated in Malaysia, commenting on the suicide of Mr Teh Cheang Wan, the then Minister of National Development in Singapore and the collapse of the National Bank of Brunei. These articles in particular commented on the effect of these incidents on the image of Singapore and on the plaintiff, then the Prime Minister of Singapore. The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation. In their defence, the defendants pleaded, inter alia, justification, fair comment and the protection of art 10 of the Federal Constitution (right to freedom of speech and expression). The plaintiff successfully applied for the defendants to give further particulars of the defences of justification and fair comment. The defendants accordingly filed further and better particulars. The plaintiff was not satisfied with the manner the particulars were filed and applied to have them struck out. He also applied to strike out the defence based on art 10. The court first dealt with the application to strike out the particulars. After hearing arguments, the court ordered the defendants to restate their further and better particulars. Pursuant to this, the defendants supplied the second set of further and

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better particulars. The defendants listed out extracts of the articles, described them as ‘comment’, ‘statement of fact’ etc and then listed particulars. The plaintiffs applied again to strike out the particulars as well as the defence based on the Federal Constitution.

Held, granting the application: (1) Reference to documents alone cannot be regarded as the particulars of the fact that the defendants have been ordered to furnish; such reference points more to the nature of the evidence which the defendants intend to produce at the trial. (2) When the words complained of allude to general charges, a defendant who pleads justification must state some specific acts and instances of misconduct imputed to the plaintiff supported by precise particulars of fact as tending to show the truth of such misconduct. (3) In this case, the particulars supplied by the defendants are too general as to embarrass the plaintiff as he does not know the precise acts he is alleged to have done which justify the charges against him. (4) The defendants have pleaded justification and fair comment separately, and thus are relying on them as two distinct and separate defences. Thus pleading the general particulars as the defendants have done is quite unnecessary and redundant. ||Page 495>> (5) The conduct of the defendants, their reluctance to supply sufficient and material particulars, and the substance of the particulars that they have supplied, lead to the conclusion that they do not have the material facts on which they can justify the defamatory meanings of the words that they have published or on which their comments are based. The relevant paragraphs of the defence are accordingly struck out. (6) The previous decisions of the Malaysian courts show that the rights conferred by art 10 of the Federal Constitution are not absolute but are subject to restrictions imposed by law under art 10(2)(a). (7) Although Parliament has not, under art 10(2)(a), enacted any law against

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defamation, the court considers that Parliament need not do so as at Merdeka Day, there were already laws in existence against defamation. These laws are to be found in s 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 as modified by the Defamation Act 1957, which continues to have the force of law to this day as Parliament has not repealed it. Read with art 162(1), art 10(2)(a) does not have the effect of eliminating the existing laws in operation prior to Merdeka Day. (8) In terms and expression, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America is totally and radically different from art 10 and the American case law is not of any persuasive value. (9) Article 10 does not prohibit the plaintiff from pursuing his rights under the law of defamation. The Defamation Act 1957 restricts the defendants’ right to free speech and expression and the only known defences in any action for libel are those stated in the Act which does not include art 10. Accordingly the relevant paragraph of the statement of defence is struck out as being frivolous and vexatious.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Defendan menerbitkan dua buah rencana dalam Sunday Star, sebuah akhbar Inggeris yang diedar secara luas dalam Malaysia, dan berkomen tentang pembunuhan Encik Teh Cheang Wan, Menteri Pembangunan Nasional dalam Singapura pada ketika itu dan kerobohan Bank Nasional Brunei. Rencana-rencana ini secara khususnya berkomen atas kesan kejadian-kejadian ini atas imej Singapura dan atas plaintif, Perdana Menteri Singapura ketika itu. Plaintif menuntut defendan atas fitnah. Dalam pembelaan mereka, defendan-defendan pli antara lainnya, justifikasi, komen berpatutan dan perlindungan perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan (hak untuk kebebasan berucap dan ungkapan). Plaintif telah dengan berjayanya memohon supaya defendan-defendan memberi butir-butir lanjut dan jelas pembelaan-pembelaan justifikasi dan komen perpatutan. Defendan-defendan pun menfail butir-butir lanjut dan jelas. Plaintif tidak berpuashati dengan butir-butir yang difail dan memohon supaya ianya dibatalkan. Beliau juga memohon untuk

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membatalkan pembelaan-pembelaan berdasarkan perkara 10. Mahkamah pada mulanya berurus dengan permohonan untuk membatalkan butir. Selepas mendengar hujah-hujah, mahkamah mengarah supaya defendan-defendan menyatakan semula butir-butir lanjut dan jelas mereka. Berlanjutan daripada ini, defendan-defendan menyediakan set kedua butir-butir lanjut dan jelas. Defendan-defendan menyenaraikan petikan-petikan rencana, menghuraikan mereka sebagai ‘komen’ ‘kenyataan fakta’ dan lain-lain dan kemudiannya menyenaraikan butir-butir. Plaintif memohon semula untuk membatalkan butir-butir bersama dengan pembelaan berdasarkan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan: (1) Rujukan kepada dokumen-dokumen sahaja tidak boleh dianggap sama seperti butir-butir fakta yang defendan telah diarahkan memberi, rujukan seperti itu menunjukkan kepada jenis keterangan yang defendan ingin membawa ke perbicaraan. (2) Apabila perkataan-perkataan yang diadu membayangkan tuduhan-tuduhan am, seseorang defendan yang pli justifikasi mesti menyatakan beberapa tindakan tertentu dan contoh-contoh kelakukan pengurusan yang tidak cekap yang dianggap sebagai perbuatan plaintif dan disokong oleh butir-butir fakta yang tepat yang cenderung kearah menunjukkan bahawa kelakuan salah itu telah berlaku. (3) Dalam kes ini, butir-butir yang dibekalkan oleh defendan-defendan adalah terlalu am sehingga memalukan plaintif kerana beliau tidak tahu tindakan-tindakan tertentu yang didakwa telah dilakukan oleh beliau yang mengalaskan dakwaan terhadapnya. (7) Defendan-defendan telah pli justifikasi dan komen berpatutan secara berasingan, dan oleh itu adalah bergantung pada mereka sebagai dua pembelaan yang berasingan dan tersendiri. Oleh itu, pli butir-butir yang am seperti defendan telah dibuat adalah tidak perlu dan berlebihan. (8) Kelakuan defendan-defendan, keengganan mereka untuk membekalkan butir-butir yang mencukupi dan material, dan isi kandungan butir-butir yang

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mereka telah beri, menimbulkan kesimpulan bahawa mereka tidak ada fakta-fakta material di atas mana mereka boleh mempertahankan makna-makna fitnah perkataan-perkataan yang mereka telah terbitkan atau atas mana komen-komen mereka didasarkan. Perenggan-perenggan relevan pembelaan adalah perlu dibatalkan. (9) Keputusan-keputusan mahkamah Malaysia yang lalu menunjukkan bahawa hak-hak yang deberi oleh perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan adalah tidak mutlak tetapi adalah tertakluk kepada had-had yang dikenakan oleh undang-undang di bawah per 10(2)(a). (10) Walaupun Parlimen tidak, di bawah per 10(2)(a), menegakkan sebarang undang-undang terhadap fitnah, mahkamah menganggap bahawa Parlimen tidak perlu berbuat demikian setakat Hari Merdeka, kerana telahpun terdapat undang-undang yang ada terhadap fitnah. Undang-undang ini adalah didapati dalam seksyen 3(1) Akta Sivil 1956 seperti diubah oleh Akta Fitnah 1957, yang masih berkuatkuasa undang-undang sehingga hari ini kerana Parlimen belum memansuhkannya. Berbaca bersama per 162(1), per 10(2)(a) tidak mempunyai kesan menanggalkan undang-undang yang kini beroperasi sebelum Hari Merdeka. (11) Dalam terma dan ungkapan, Pindaan Pertama kepada Perlembagaan United States of America adalah sama sekali dan secara radikal berbeza daripada per 10 dan kes undang-undang Amerika adalah tidak ada sebarang nilai pemujuk langsung. (12) Perkara 10 tidak menghalang plaintif daripada mengejar hak-haknya di bawah undang-undang fitnah. Akta Fitnah 1957 menghadkan hak defendan kepada ucapan bebas dan ungkapan dan pembelaan yang hanya diketahui dalam sebarang tindakan untuk libel adalah seperti dinyatakan dalam Akta yang tidak termasuk per 10. Oleh yang demikian perenggan relevan pernyataan pembelaan adalah dibatalkan kerana remeh dan menyusahkan. Editorial Note The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court vide Civil Appeal No 02-262 of 1989 and the court (comprising

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||Page 496>> LP, Mohamed Azmi and Gunn Chit Tuan SCJJ) dismissed the appeal on 25 June 1990.

Cases referred to Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147; [1986] 1 All ER 177 (folld) Zierenberg & Anor v Labouchere [1893] 2 QB 183 (folld) Madhavan Nair & Anor v PP [1975] 2 MLJ 264 (refd) Lau Dak Kee v PP [1976] 2 MLJ 229 (refd) PP v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 108 (refd) PP v Param Cumaraswamy (No 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518 (refd) Santokh Singh v Delhi Administration AIR 1973 SC 109 (refd) Purshottam Lal v Prem Shanker AIR 1966 All 377 (refd)

Legislation referred to Civil Law Act 1956 s 3(1) Defamation Act 1957 Federal Constitution arts 10, 160, 162 Rules of the High Court 1980 O 18, O 78 r 3(2), O 32 r 2, O 33 r 2 Constitution of India 1949 art 19 Constitution of the United States of America First Amendment

C Abraham ( N Navaratnam with him) for the plaintiff.

DJ Puthucheary ( A Sreenevasan and Iain Sedgley with him) for the defenda

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[1990] 1 MLJ 390 (also [1989] SLR 1063) LEE KUAN YEW v DEREK GWYN DAVIES & ORS

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 3336 OF 1987 THEAN J 30 NOVEMBER 1989

Tort — Defamation — Whether words referred to plaintiff — Whether words defamatory — Use of word ‘attack’ as regards church — Construction of words — Defences — Qualified privilege — Fair comment — Fair-minded man — Prejudice and exaggeration of such person — Malice — State of mind of defendants — Right of reply to attack — Public interest — Damages — Aggravated damages — Factors to be considered — Damages against joint defendants — Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Ed), s 8 — Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, art 14(1)(a)

In this action, the plaintiff claims against the defendants damages for libel in respect of statements contained in an article, published in the Far Eastern Economic Review (‘the Review’). The plaintiff is the Prime Minister of Singapore, and the first defendant is the editor of the Review; the second defendant is the author of the article complained of, and the third and fourth defendants are publishers and printers respectively of the Review. The first, second and third defendants are not resident in Singapore. On 21 May 1987, the Internal Security Department (‘ISD’) arrested and detained 16 persons in connection with a clandestine communist network. Of the 16 detainees, four were fulltime workers of the Catholic Church and six were voluntary workers in the

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Church’s organizations. As a result of press statements made by two priests on the arrests, a meeting took place between a team of officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Archbishop. The Permanent Secretary informed the Archbishop that his priests should not make any statements and drew his attention to Father Patrick Goh’s and Father Edgar D’Souza’s public statements. He added that the arrests of the 16 persons were not aimed at the Church. The Archbishop was asked to restrain his priests from making statements to the press without knowing the facts. The plaintiff, who had read reports of the meetings between the officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Archbishop and the joint statement of the Archbishop and his priests, and the accompanying letter of Father D’Souza, considered that the conduct of these priests would lead to a situation of a collision between the Church and the government. He therefore decided that the best course would be to meet lay leaders of the Church in order to convince them that the arrest of the 16 detainees was not an action against the Church and that the government was not against the Church. The Church delegation met the plaintiff at the Istana on 2 June 1987, with him were the minister, the Permanent Secretary and the director of the ISD. The minister in Parliament, in answer to questions, made a lengthy statement on D’Souza and, in particular, disclosed the latter’s association with a lady lawyer. The Singapore newspapers reported the statements of the minister, and these reports led to D’Souza issuing another press statement. He faxed this second statement to the Review for the attention of Margaret Scott or Michael Malik, the second defendant. Accompanying the press statement were two additional documents: the first was headed ‘A background to the detention without trial of community and church workers in Singapore by Edgar Kenneth D’Souza’, second was a copy of p 11 of a letter written to the Vatican by the Archbishop. It was from these three documents that the second defendant wrote the article complained of (‘the article’). It bore a prominent heading, ‘New light on detentions’, under which was a sub-heading ‘Catholic priest answers Jayakumar’s allegations’. The article dealt with the following topics; first, a reply by D’Souza to the minister’s statements of him in Parliament, secondly, a report alleged to have been given by the Archbishop of the meeting of 2 June 1987 between the plaintiff and the Church delegation; thirdly, an account of the meeting of 3 June 1987 between the Archbishop and members of his delegation and three of the four priests, and, fourthly, the aftermath of the two meetings. In the article, there were two paragraphs to which

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the plaintiff took exception, which are as follows: (1) ‘De Souza reported: ‘A member of the Church delegation said that it was hard to believe this was not an attack against the Church. The real target seemed not to be the 16 [detainees] who were merely scapegoats, but rather the four priests’.’ (2) ‘Yong also told the priests that as he was leaving the meeting accompanied by Lee, he was shown into a room where a press conference had been called without his knowledge. He reported that he felt ‘cornered’ and confirmed before television cameras that he had no way to disprove the statement signed by Cheng. But he also said that he had added: ‘I will take things at their face value for now.’ This sentence, however, was omitted from the statement as shown on state-run television and published in the Straits Times. The court would refer to the first paragraph as para 9 and the second as para 11. The plaintiff complained that these two paragraphs were defamatory of him and instituted this action against the defendants claiming damages for libel. By the statement of claim, the plaintiff claims that the defendants falsely and maliciously published, of and concerning him as a person and of and concerning him as Prime Minister of Singapore and in relation to his conduct therein, the words complained of in the article which were defamatory of him and that the words viewed in the context of the article were understood to refer to him. He ascribes to each paragraph a natural and ordinary meaning of the words in the context of the article. By their defence, the defendants deny that the words in both paragraphs referred to the plaintiff, bore the meanings respectively as alleged or any meanings defamatory of the plaintiff. In the alternative, they raise the defences of justification and fair comment. In the further alternative, they raise the defence of qualified privilege on the following basis: first, the exercise of the right of reply by D’Souza through the medium of the Review to the attack on him made by the minister in Parliament and, secondly, in the alternative, the duty of the defendants to provide information which the public of Singapore were entitled to receive on a matter concerning the relations between the government of Singapore and the Catholic Church. By his reply, the plaintiff joined issue with the defendants and averred that the defendants were actuated by express malice.

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Held, giving judgment to the plaintiff and awarding damages, including aggravated damages: (1) On the issue of identity, as the plaintiff’s case is that an ordinary reader reading the article would reasonably understand the words to refer to him, the question is whether an ordinary reader reading the article would reasonably come to that conclusion. The test is an objective one. The ordinary reader must be fair-minded and not avid for scandal. He must not be duly suspicious. The ordinary reader must have rational grounds for his belief that the words refer to the plaintiff. In considering this question, para 9 cannot be read in isolation and must be read in ||Page 391>> context. An ordinary reasonable reader would note that the surrounding paragraphs refer specifically to the plaintiff. The reader would have ample grounds, and ‘rational grounds’, for such a conclusion, ie that the words referred to the plaintiff. Imputations which refer to him as the Prime Minister refer to him also as a person. (2) The issue concerning the words complained of in para 9 is purely one of construction of the words. The proper approach is to consider what meaning the words would convey to ordinary reasonable persons using their general knowledge and common sense. Such meaning is not confined to a literal or strict meaning of the words but includes any inferences or implications which could reasonably be drawn by such persons. The words complained of must also be read in the context of the whole article, and in particular the paragraphs immediately before and after para 9. The ordinary and natural meaning of para 9 conveyed to the ordinary reader is that the plaintiff had threatened to use the ISA powers against the four priests, and that threat was directed against the Catholic Church and, in particular, the four priests, and they are the real targets and not the 16 detainees who were merely used as scapegoats. The inferences the reader draws from these words are that the plaintiff was against the Catholic Church. (3) The next question is whether the words are defamatory of the plaintiff. In the natural and ordinary meaning, the words impute dishonourable and

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discreditable conduct and motive on the part of the plaintiff; they impute an attack on the Catholic Church and a dishonourable and improper use by him of the powers under the Internal Security Act. Such imputations tend to bring the plaintiff into public odium and contempt and lower him in the estimation of right-thinking people in Singapore. This is especially so in Singapore which is a multi-racial and multi-religious society, where there is toleration of all forms of religious belief and worship. The words are plainly defamatory of him, both as a person and as the Prime Minister. (4) The defendants sought to justify the meaning, namely, that the impression that the plaintiff had created was that the real target was not the persons detained, but rather the four priests. That is different from the sense and meaning in the second sentence, which is that the 16 detainees were merely scapegoats for the four priests who were the real targets. To a reasonable reader, the second sentence in para 9 conveys a much stronger meaning than that contended by the defendants. The defendants’ plea of justification fails. (5) A defendant in a defamation action is not obliged to ascribe a meaning to the words complained of. If he pleads justification, then he must show in his pleadings, either in a specific averment or in the particulars relied on, the meaning he seeks to justify. On the authorities, the court was of the view that the defendants are bound by their pleadings, and for this reason the court disallowed their counsel from cross-examining the plaintiff on matters with a view to establishing justification of a meaning distinct from that they had pleaded. (6) As regards para 9, the next question, whether the words are a statement of fact or a comment, is one of fact, the answer to which depends on the nature of the imputation conveyed thereby and the context and circumstances in which the words were published. The test is whether an ordinary reasonable reader on reading the whole article would understand the words as a comment or a statement of fact. In the court’s opinion, the words in para 9 stand out clearly as a comment. There is sufficient substratum of fact stated or indicated in the article to found the comment made in para 9. (7) The last question is whether the comment is one made on a matter of public

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interest. The court had not the slightest doubt that the matter is one of public interest. Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at what is going on, or what may happen to them or to others, then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment. (8) It is clear to the court that on the evidence, Father Kang did not say the words as set out in para 9 which D’Souza reported that he said. What he said at the meeting was different from what was reported by D’Souza in para 9 in at least two material particulars: he did not refer to the threat by the plaintiff of the use of the powers under the Internal Security Act as ‘an attack against the Church’; nor did he refer to the 16 detainees as ‘scapegoats’. These words are crucial. In them lies the sting of the libel. (9) In the circumstances, the immediate question is whether the defence of fair comment is still available to the defendants. The court adopted the objective test, ie could a fair-minded man honestly express the opinion on the proved facts? The essential element is the honest opinion of a fair-minded man, and in this connection every allowance or latitude is to be given for any prejudice and exaggeration entertained by such a fair-minded man. In applying the objective test in this case, it is necessary, first, to examine the material facts proved before the court and, secondly, to consider whether on those proved facts, a fair-minded man could honestly make the comment that was made. (10) Having regard to the context in which the statement was made and the overwhelming countervailing facts, which have been proved, the court did not think that such a fair-minded man could honestly entertain the view or hold the belief that the statement the plaintiff uttered was ‘an attack against the Church’ and that ‘the real target seemed not to be the 16 [detainees] who were merely scapegoats, but rather the four priests’. In the court’s judgment, a fair-minded man could not honestly hold the opinion and express the comment as set out in para 9. The comment therefore fails to satisfy the objective test as a fair comment. (11) An essential requirement to the success of the defence is that the facts on which the comment is made must be truly stated so that readers may judge for

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themselves whether the comment was well founded. An examination of the facts proved in this case demonstrates clearly that the facts on which the comments were made were not truly stated in the article. There was no ‘confrontation’ between the Archbishop and the plaintiff. The meeting was not ‘stormy’; and the signed statement by Vincent Cheng was not ‘read’ to the Archbishop. It is apparent that the facts stated in the article were culled from the documents faxed to the second defendant by D’Souza, that in writing the article the second defendant merely assumed that they were true. (12) As for para 11, an ordinary reasonable reader in reading that paragraph would note the facts in the preceding paragraphs and as alleged in para 11. The word ‘cornered’ in the context of this paragraph connotes that the Archbishop was improperly pressurized and had been tricked into attending the press conferences. The words in para. 11, excluding the last sentence, are defamatory of the plaintiff. (13) As regards the justification of para 11, the defendants have not succeeded in proving justification of the allegations contained in their plea. They have not called the Archbishop to substantiate their allegations. There is also no evidence that the plaintiff had resorted to any trickery or improper pressure to ||Page 392>> cause the Archbishop to attend the conference and make the statement which he made. Their defence of justification fails. (14) As for fair comment, in the context of the article, an ordinary reasonable reader would have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that that part of the paragraph was an imputation of fact and was not a comment. There was no sufficient substratum of facts on which to base the comment. (15) A person who has been publicly defamed is entitled to reply to the defamation publicly, and such reply may be made through the press and is privileged. This privilege extends also to protect a newspaper which publishes the reply of the person. defamed. The protection of a privileged occasion does not extend to statements which have no relevance to a reply to the attack or which are not in any way appropriate to the occasion. Paragraphs 9 and 11 are certainly not within the limits of what could be regarded as reasonable and necessary to enable D’Souza to defend himself against or to rebut the attack or any part

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thereof made on him by the minister. These paragraphs, in the court’s opinion, contain extraneous and ‘foreign’ matters and are not covered by qualified privilege, and the words complained of are not protected. (16) As regards qualified privilege based on the duty to provide information, it is now the general rule that the law does not recognize an interest in the public strong enough to give rise to a duty to communicate in the press. Privilege for publication in the press of information of general public interest is confined to cases where the publisher has a legal, social or moral duty to communicate it to the general public but does not cover information on matters of public interest where there is no such duty to publish. On the facts of this case, there is certainly no duty to communicate information of the kind contained in the article. The Review was reporting a hearsay account given at a private and confidential meeting between the Archbishop and members of the delegation. The matters which the Review reported in the article were also more than six months old. (17) The court was entitled to look at events both before and after the publication to see if any or more of them cast any light on the issue. The defendants must have realized that D’Souza had a deep grievance against the government; that these documents were sent to them with a view to their writing and publishing a counter-attack on the government, and that the accounts given by him in the documents would not be objective or impartial and might well be materially untrue or inaccurate. No attempt, however, was made by either the first or the second defendant or anyone on behalf of the third defendants to verify any of the facts or matters provided by D’Souza. Both the first and second defendants accepted the documents at their face value; the second defendant composed and wrote the article, and the first defendant approved it and its publication. In this, they acted recklessly. In the court’s judgment, the conduct of the first and second defendants is evidence of malice on their part. (18) The court also found that there was a slant in the article against the plaintiff. Neither the first defendant nor the second defendant — particularly the latter — has come forward to explain why the article came to be written in the way it was written. In the absence of such evidence, the court can only say that their

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motive or intention was to make the article more anti-plaintiff and more adverse to and critical of him. Two days before the commencement of the trial, the third defendants also published a press release which repeated the libel two days before the trial. This publication reinforces the court’s finding that the first and second defendants were actuated by express malice at the time of publication of the article. (19) The fourth defendants are the printers and were not involved in writing or editing the article. They printed the article without verifying whether the contents thereof were true or false. There was an agreement subsisting between the third and fourth defendants whereby, amongst other things, the former would indemnify the latter against all liabilities arising from printing the Review. In effect, they have by agreement abandoned any attempt to exercise control on what they print. They are equated with a publisher who publishes materials or articles without considering or caring whether they are true or false. In that sense, they acted recklessly. In the court’s judgment, the fourth defendants were also actuated or affected by express malice. (20) In calculating the amount of damages, the court was entitled to take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff, his position and standing, the nature of the libel, the mode and extent of publication, the absence or refusal of any retraction or apology, and ‘the whole conduct of the defendant from the time when the libel was published down to the very moment of their verdict’. (21) Both paras 9 and 11 are grave libels on the plaintiff and cast serious imputations on him as a man and as the Prime Minister of Singapore. The libels appeared in a reputable and influential publication with worldwide circulation. There has been no apology for or retraction of either of the offending paragraphs. In view of the court’s finding of express malice, the plaintiff is entitled to aggravated damages. The other relevant aggravating factor is the conduct of the defendants through their counsel in repeatedly attempting in the cross-examination to put to the plaintiff matters which have no relevance to the issues. (22) The sum must represent the highest common factor, that is, the lowest sum for which any of the defendants can be held liable on this score. Having taken into

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account all the relevant matters, including the aggravating factors, the court held that a fair and reasonable sum as damages for the plaintiff is $230,000. Editorial Note The defendants have appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Civil Appeal No 139 of 1989.

Cases referred to Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (folld) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (folld) Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 (folld) Lucas-Box v Associated Newspapers Group plc [1986] 1 WLR 147 (refd) Viscount De L’isle v Times Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 49 (refd) Prager v Times Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 77 (folld) Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 (folld) London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] 1 WLR 607 (refd) Lyon & Anor v The Daily Telegraph Ltd [1943] 1 KB 747 (folld) Cherneskey v Armadale Publishers Ltd (1978) 90 DLR (3d) 321 (not folld) Merivale v Carson (1888) LR 20 QB 275 (folld) Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743 (folld) Joynt v Cycle Trade Publishing Co [1904] 2 KB 292 (refd) Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 (folld) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Blackshaw v Lord & Anor [1983] 3 WLR 283 (folld) Arnold v The King-Emperor (1914) 41 IA 149 (folld) ||Page 393>> Camporese v Parton (1983) 150 DLR (3d) 208 (distd) Egger v Viscount Chelmsford & Ors [1965] 1 QB 248 (folld)

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Pearson v Lemaitre (1843) 5 M & G 700; 134 ER 742 (folld) Macleod v Wakley (1828) 3 C & P 311; 172 ER 435 (folld) Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 (folld) Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (folld) JB Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew [1971] 2 MLJ 282 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Seow Khee Leng [1989] 1 MLJ 172 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1975 Ed) s 8 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art 14(1)(a)

John Previte QC ( Tan Kok Quan with him) for the plaintiff. Geoffrey Robertson QC ( Howard Cashin with him) for the defendants.

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[1990] 3 MLJ 322 (also [1990] SLR 688) LEE KUAN YEW v JEYARETNAM JOSHUA BENJAMIN

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 1754 OF 1988 LAI KEW CHAI J 3 AUGUST 1990

Tort — Defamation — Fair comment — Constitutional privilege — Factors in assessing damages — Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, art 14

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 529

The plaintiff was the Prime Minister of Singapore for the relevant period. At the 1988 general elections, the defendant, who was not himself a candidate, ran the election campaign for the Workers’ Party, an opposition party, and spoke in their election rallies. At one of these rallies on 26 August 1988 (‘the rally’), the defendant made statements referring to the suicide of Mr Teh Cheang Wan, then the Minister for National Development (‘the speech’). The plaintiff contended that by those statements, the defendant had imputed that the plaintiff was unfit for the office of Prime Minister in that he had advised Mr Teh to commit suicide in order that the latter could avoid investigations into his conduct and thereby escape responsibility, and that he was guilty of criminal misconduct in that he abetted Mr Teh’s suicide. In this action for defamation, started in respect of the speech, the defendant pleaded the defence of fair comment and constitutional privilege. The last defence was based on an American doctrine that a defendant who unwittingly defamed a politician or public figure would not be liable unless the plaintiff proved actual malice.

Held, giving judgment to the plaintiff: (1) The court first had to ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the speech. The aim of this was to elicit the meaning of the speech to find out what a fair-minded person in Singapore listening to it using his general knowledge and common sense would understand by the words spoken in context and according to the tone and mode of delivery. (2) After viewing video tapes of the speech, the court found that the defendant was obviously suggesting that the plaintiff had encouraged the suicide of Mr Teh for the improper purpose of covering what, in a full trial, would be a most embarrassing scandal to the government and the plaintiff’s political party. ||Page 323>> (3) The defendant’s defence of fair comment failed because he had not set out any lesser defamatory meaning to which his defence of fair comment would attach. This was because the speech was not capable of bearing any lesser defamatory meaning. In addition, the allegations were factual in character.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 530

(4) As regards the constitutional privilege argument, English and Singapore law never extended privilege to any statements except those made in the course of a legal, social or oral duty. There was nothing in the case law of these countries to suggest that public figures fell within a special category so that anything can be said about them unless the potential plaintiff can prove malice. (5) The defendant’s speech was made to a large number of persons. It alleged that the plaintiff was implicated in the unlawful taking of a human life for a sinister purpose. It was wicked since the government’s commission of inquiry had cleared the plaintiff of any wrongdoing. The award of damages must be commensurate with the gravity of the allegations to serve as a full and sufficient vindication. The defendant had made a public apology which was done in a way which made the listener think that the defendant was reaffirming his allegations. The plaintiff had also to pursue the litigation for two years. An award of $260,000 with interest at 6% was therefore granted. An injunction would also be granted against the repetition of the slander. Editorial Note The defendant has appealed to the Court of Appeal vide Civil Appeal No 65 of 1990.

Cases referred to Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 147 (refd) Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (folld) Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 (refd) Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 497 (refd) Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (folld) Control Risks Ltd & Ors v New English Library Ltd & Anor [1989] 3 All ER 577 (refd) Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 (refd) New York Times Co v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254 (not folld) Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pte Ltd & Ors v Union of India & Ors AIR

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 531

1986 SC 515 (refd) Lingens v Austria (1986) 5 EHRR 407 (refd) Texas v Gregory Lee Johnson (1989) 57 LW 4770 (refd) Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044 (refd) Adam v Ward 31 TLR 299 (refd) London Artists Ltd v Littler [1968] 1 WLR 607 (refd) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (refd) Blackshaw v Lord [1984] 1 QB 1 (refd) Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies [1990] 1 MLJ 390 (refd) Sutcliffe v Pressdram [1990] 1 All ER 269 (refd) Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (folld) Lee Kuan Yew v Seow Khee Leng [1989] 1 MLJ 172 (refd) Smith v Harrison (1856) 1 F & F 565; 175 ER 854 (refd)

Legislation referred to Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art 14 Constitution of India art 19(1) Constitution of the United States of America Amendments I, XIV

David Eady QC ( Tan Kok Quan with him) for the plaintiff. Donald Martin Thomas QC ( JB Jeyaretnam with him) for the defendant.

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[1990] 3 MLJ 452 (also [1990] SLR 779) LEE KUAN YEW v DEVAN NAIR

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 532

HIGH COURT SINGAPORE — SUIT NO 1042 OF 1988 WEE CHONG JIN CJ 3 SEPTEMBER 1990

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Particulars of defence — Striking out — Defamation — Defences of fair comment and justification — Whether particulars relevant — Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, O 18 r 19

This was a libel action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant stated that the plaintiff had collaborated with foreign powers in their plans to interfere in the internal affairs of Malaysia. The defendant pleaded, inter alia, the defences of fair comment and justification and gave particulars common to both pleas. Further and better particulars were then ordered. Following this, the registrar ordered that part of the particulars and the defence be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The defendant appealed.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) The defendant, in giving particulars of the facts on which he relies in support of his plea of fair comment, must clearly confine such particulars to those relevant to the issues on the pleadings. (2) Here the defendant had set out a list of the names of the dissidents who were detained and gave statutory declarations and the types of psychological pressures against them. These particulars had no bearing on the defences against the alleged libel at all. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Cases referred to Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 533

S & K Holdings Ltd v Throgmorton Publications Ltd [1972] 3 All ER 497 (refd) Polly Peck (Holdings) plc v Trelford [1986] 2 All ER 84 (refd) Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1961] 2 All ER 758 (refd)

Tan Kok Quan ( Lee Han Tiong with him) for the plaintiff. Steven Ang ( Loh Boon Huat and Thio Ying Ying ( Mrs) with him) for the defendant.

[1989] 1 MLJ 52 DATO SERI DR MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD v DEREK DAVIES & ANOR

HIGH COURT (KUALA LUMPUR) — CIVIL SUIT NO S7-22-296-87 AJAIB SINGH J 8 APRIL 1988

Tort — Defamation — Libellous articles suggesting sale of Malaysian territory to Brunei — Whether government of Malaysia had indirectly consented to publication of articles by allowing release of journal for distribution — Whether government had duty to inquire and investigate whether articles were libellous before releasing journal for distribution — Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, ss 2 & 9 — Newspapers — Libellous articles suggesting sale of Malaysian territory to Brunei — Whether government of Malaysia had indirectly consented to publication of articles by allowing release of journal for distribution — Whether government had duty to inquire and investigate whether articles were libellous before releasing journal for distribution — Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, ss 2 & 9

The plaintiff (the Prime Minister of Malaysia) sued the defendants for libel over two articles published in the Far Eastern Economic Review which suggested that the main

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 534

reason for the plaintiff’s visit to Brunei was the proposal to sell Limbang to Brunei. Pending the hearing of the suit, the defendants applied for leave to bring in the Minister for Home Affairs and the government of Malaysia as third parties on the grounds that: (a) by allowing the release of the publications the Minister for Home Affairs and the government of Malaysia had indirectly authorized and consented to the publications; (b) their officers were negligent and in breach of their statutory duties under s 9 of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 for not inquiring into and investigating the articles to see that they did not contravene any law, including the law of defamation.

Held, dismissing the application: (1) Section 9 of the Act is designed to prohibit the importation of undesirable publications into Malaysia. The officers authorized to implement the provisions of s 9 are empowered to withhold delivery or to return to the sender of any publication outside Malaysia if the officers concerned are satisfied that the publication contains any article which is likely to be prejudicial to public order, morality, security, the relationship with any foreign country or government or which is likely to be contrary to any law or is otherwise prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to public or national interest. (2) It is not the duty of any senior authorized officer to inquire into or investigate an article which does not appear to contravene s 9 of the Act and which is not on the face of it contrary to any law. There is nothing in the two articles published in the Far Eastern Economic Review to indicate that their contents contravene s 9. (3) The Minister for Home Affairs and the government of Malaysia cannot be brought in as third parties as there is no nexus between them and the plaintiff. The defendants’ application is clearly an attempt to embarrass the plaintiff and prejudice the fair trial of his suit which he has brought against the defendants.

Legislation referred to Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 ss 2, 9

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 535

T Selvanthiranathan (Senior Federal Counsel) for the plaintiff. Muhammad Shafee bin Abdullah (Miss Christina Kow with him) for the defendants.

[1989] 1 MLJ 315 AYOB BIN SAUD v TS SAMBANTHAMURTHI

HIGH COURT (PENANG) — CIVIL SUIT NO 274 OF 1979 MOHAMED DZAIDDIN J 20 SEPTEMBER 1988

Tort — Defamation — Libel — Dispute on professional fees charged by plaintiff — Whether defendant’s letter to third party constituted libel — Whether ‘daylight robbery’ and alleged innuendo bore a meaning defamatory of plaintiff

The plaintiff was a land surveyor who was appointed by the defendant to carry out certain survey work on the defendant’s piece of property. After the completion of his assignment, the plaintiff submitted his bill for the professional services rendered. Subsequently, the plaintiff received a copy of a letter written by the defendant to one C containing the following paragraph: ‘I am surprised that a Chinese surveyor has charged $1,450 whereas a Bumiputra asks for $4,480 which is daylight robbery …’ On the basis of the above letter, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for libel. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff averred, inter alia, that the paragraph complained of, in its natural and ordinary meaning, meant and was understood to mean that the plaintiff was a dishonest person, that he acted in a manner unbecoming of a licensed land surveyor and that he failed to have regard to the proper fees chargeable for the simple work undertaken and that he could be compared to and equated with robbers

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 536

Held, dismissing the claim: (1) The law of libel is governed by the Defamation Act 1957 and the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show: (a) the words are defamatory; (b) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (c) the words were published. (2) It is plain and obvious that the words in the letter were written about the plaintiff. Upon the evidence, the court was also satisfied that there was sufficient publication to a third person, as the letter was opened and read by the plaintiff’s clerk in the course of her secretarial duties and as the letter was also sent to the defendant’s agent. (3) However, in the context of the whole paragraph (para 3 in the letter), the expression ‘daylight robbery’ and the alleged innuendo, ie the comparison between a Chinese and a Bumiputra surveyor, merely conveyed to all and sundry that the professional fees charged by the plaintiff were exorbitant. These words were used to emphasize the defendant’s utter disgust with respect to the plaintiff’s bill and they were used as words of general abuse. The paragraph complained of, in its natural and ordinary meaning, does not have the meaning ascribed to them by the plaintiff either in his pleading or in his evidence. It is not reasonably capable of bearing a meaning defamatory of the plaintiff. Editorial Note The plaintiff has appealed to the Supreme Court vide Civil Apeal No 435 of 1988.

Cases referred to Rajagopal v Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 (refd) Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 (refd)

Legislation referred to Defamation Act 1957

Ghazi bin Ishak for the plaintiff. Shahul Hamid for the defendant.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 537

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[1989] 3 MLJ 1 (also [1989] SLR 4) JOSHUA BENJAMIN JEYARETNAM v GOH CHOK TONG

PRIVY COUNCIL (ON APPEAL FROM SINGAPORE) — PRIVY COUNCIL APPEAL NO 27 OF 1987 LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH, LORD ACKNER, LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY, LORD JAUNCEY OF TULLICHETTLE AND LORD LOWRY 25 JULY 1989

Defamation — Whether words defamatory — Whether calculated to disparage person in his office — Defence of fair comment — Facts on which comment was based — Judge’s findings on facts not totally accurate — Whether finding affected by this — Whether speaker motivated by malice — Test of the fair-minded speaker — Whether trial judge justified in his conclusions — Defamation Act (Cap 32, 1985 Ed), ss 5 & 9

Civil Procedure — Appeal from trial judge’s findings in defamation suit — Whether trial judge justified in conclusions

The Singapore Democratic Party (‘SDP’) an opposition political party, held its inaugural meeting at which the appellant, the leader of another opposition political party, was invited to as the main speaker. After his speech, the appellant left the meeting, as did a large number of the spectators. Later, the respondent, who was at all material times the Minister for Defence and Second Minister for Health and organizing secretary of the People’s Action Party (‘PAP’) held a press conference where he spoke about the events that had occurred at the SDP’s inaugural meeting, and went on to say

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 538

that the mass exodus of spectators leaving after the appellant had spoken was contrived by the appellant to show the SDP that the appellant was the leader of the opposition, and the secretary-general of the SDP ‘cannot take that trick lightly.’ The appellant issued a writ claiming damages for slander and in his statement of claim alleged that the words of the respondent at the press conference (‘the statement’) were both defamatory and calculated to injure him in his office as leader of a political party. In his defence, the respondent denied both that the words were defamatory and that they were calculated to disparage the appellant in his office as leader of another opposition party. The responded also claimed the defence of fair comment and that the words were subject to qualified privilege. The trial judge found that the statement had words that were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning. The defence of qualified privilege was also rejected. The suit was however dismissed because it was found that the statement was not calculated to disparage the appellant in his office as it did not impute any want of integrity or corrupt or dishonest conduct or any other misconduct in the discharge of that office. The appellant also did not prove any special damage. The respondent was also able to establish his defence of fair comment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the judgment of the trial judge and confirmed the trial judge’s findings. The appellant then appealed to the present court.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) A comment is a statement of opinion on facts. If a statement is capable of being a comment, whether or not it is a comment or a statement of fact, must be a matter for a judge, properly directing himself, to decide. (2) The respondent’s repetition of the events that had occurred at the SDP meeting were clearly statements of fact. It was clearly open to the trial judge to take the view that the observations that followed (the statement) were expressions of opinion or conclusions or inferences drawn from those facts and therefore capable of being comment. (3) It is well established that a writer may not suggest or invent facts and then comment upon them on the assumption that they are true. Since the respondent was not present at the SDP meeting, he relied on persons who were present to

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 539

establish the facts. (4) Although the trial judge was not totally accurate in his findings regarding the events that occurred at the SDP meeting, the pith and substance of the matter was that after the appellant had spoken, he left the meeting and was followed by a substantial number of the audience. By virtue of s 9 of the Defamation Act, there could be no valid complaint of the judgment. (5) The judge decided that the statement was one that a fair-minded person on the sense used by Diplock J (as he then was) in Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 1 WLR 743 could have arrived at. The judge had properly directed himself on the law and there was clearly material which could justify the decision. It would be wrong of the appellant court to interfere. (6) The appellant sought to establish that the respondent in making the statement was actuated by malice. The judge had the advantage of hearing the prolonged cross-examination of the respondent and came to the conclusion that there was no ground for believing that the respondent had an honest belief in his statement. (7) The judge had properly directed himself as to the legal principles which he had to apply, and there was material which could justify his decision. For these reasons, the judge was also entitled to find that the defence of fair comment had been fully established. This was a complete defence to the appellant’s claim of damages for slander. The appellant’s appeal was therefore dismissed.

Cases referred to London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (folld) Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 1 WLR 743 (folld) ||Page 2>>

Legislation referred to Defamation Act (Cap 32, 1985 Ed) ss 5, 9

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 540

Lord Hooson QC and Robert Britton for the appellant. Lord Alexander of Weedon QC, John Previte QC and G Pannirselvam for the respondents.

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[1988] 1 MLJ 522 LYE MUN FOH v ONG CHEOW ENG

ACJ PENANG — CIVIL APPEAL NO 96 OF 1984 MOHAMED DZAIDDIN J 30 SEPTEMBER 19879 NOVEMBER 1987

Civil Procedure — Summons and statement of claim — Striking off — Application for — Whether dispute should be arbitrated first — Different types of disputes — Nature of defamation as a cause of action — National Union of the Teaching Profession Peninsular Malaysia Rules, r 27 — Trade Unions Ordinance 1959, s 44

The defendant applied under Order 14 rule 21(1) of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 to strike out the plaintiff’s summons and the statement of claim as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. The learned President granted the application. The plaintiff appealed. In his judgment, the learned President had concluded that the action commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant was premature as the plaintiff’s claim comes within a dispute between a member and an officer of a trade union and ought to be adjudicated in the manner provided for by section 44 of the Trade Unions Ordinance 1959 and rule 27 of the Rules of the National Union of the Teaching Profession Peninsular Malaysia.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 541

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) although the learned President was correct in stating that rule 27 did not apply to all disputes between members of the Union, he ran foul in failing to distinguish the classes of disputes under rule 27 and the plaintiff’s cause of action, i.e. defamation; (2) there must be a clear distinction between “disputes” as envisaged in rule 27 and defamatory action affecting personal character of the plaintiff. In matters involving a reputation of a person, it ought to be excluded from the classes of disputes under rule 27; (3) the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed with his claim in the action without waiting for the matter to be decided by reference to arbitration; (4) the learned President had erred in the exercise of his discretion in striking out the plaintiff’s summons and the statement of claim. It was indeed wrong for the learned President to have come to the finding that the plaintiff’s action was so obviously unsustainable in law that to put it forward would be an abuse of the process of the court; (5) the action should be reinstated.

Cases referred to Radford v Hair & Ors [1971] Ch 758 Turner v Fenton And Others [1982] 1 WLR 52 Williams & Humbert v W & H Trade Marks [1986] AC 368, 411 AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Ry [1892] 3 Ch 274 at p 277

CIVIL APPEAL

R Manecksha for the appellant. V Shanmugam for the respondent.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 542

[1988] 2 MLJ 173 S PAKIANATHAN v JENNI IBRAHIM

SC KUALA LUMPUR — SUPREME COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 25 OF 1986 SEAH, HASHIM YEOP A SANI & WAN HAMZAH SCJJ 26 SEPTEMBER 198612 JANUARY 198713 JANUARY 198711 MARCH 1988

Tort — Libel — Alleged defamation in letters written by chairman of company regarding a director of the company and in respect of her occupation as a director — Whether letters defamatory — Publication — Justification — Qualified privilege — Malice — Damages

In this case, the respondent had sued the appellant for damages for libel. The respondent alleged that the appellant had falsely written and published defamatory words of her and of her in the way of her occupation as a director of the Pusat Pertolongan Berhad, a company limited by guarantee, and in relation to her conduct therein to certain persons in three letters dated 7 September 1981, 1 October 1981 and 2 October 1981 respectively, and in another letter dated 13 October 1981 with a list of proposed resolutions attached to it. Ajaib Singh J. gave judgment for the respondent and awarded damages in the sum of $30,000 — see [1986] 2 MLJ 154. The appellant appealed.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) the letter of 7 September 1981 contained nothing which could be understood as alleging that the respondent had converted any money for her own use or had committed criminal breach of trust or any other criminal offence. All the letter conveyed was information about certain irregularities in the keeping of accounts and a request to investigate. It was addressed to the Chief Police

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 543

Officer and the complaint or information given for the purpose of investigation and discovery of the offender was privileged; (2) the letter of 1 October 1981 also contained nothing which could be understood as alleging that the respondent had converted the money for her own use or committed criminal breach of trust or any other criminal offence; (3) the third letter of 2 October 1981 was defamatory but there was no allegation that it was published to anyone other than the respondent; (4) there was a defamatory accusation in the resolution attached to the fourth letter of 13 October 1981. The appellant pleaded justification but at the trial, he did not make a serious attempt to prove it. The plea of justification failed; (5) in regard to the plea of qualified privilege, the appellant would have an interest and duty to send to the members any complaint of breach of trust of money belonging to the Pusat and they also had an interest and duty to receive it for the purpose of discussing it at their meeting. Even the publication to the Director of Social Welfare would be similarly protected because he was also sometimes required to take part in the deliberations of the board. However, it was not shown that the Director of Companies had any interest or duty to receive the proposed resolution and therefore the publication to the Director of Companies was libellous; (6) the appellant’s claim of privilege in respect of the publication contained in the proposed resolution was defeated by proof of his malice. The learned trial judge had found that the appellant was vindictive and malicious; (7) as it was shown that there was libel on one occasion only, the amount of damages should be reduced to $15,000.

Cases referred to Shufflebottom v Allday (1857) 5 WR 315; 21 JP 263 (folld) Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635 (folld) Barham v Lord Huntingfield [1913] 2 KB 193 (CA) (folld) Belt v Lawes (1882) 51 LJQB 359, 361 (folld)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 544

Peters v Bradlaugh (1884) 4 TLR 467 (folld) Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 (folld) Harrison v Bush (1885) 5 E & B 344; 119 ER 509 (folld) Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309, 334 (folld) Pittard v Oliver [1891] 1 QB 474 (folld) Lee v Ritchie (1904) 6 F (Ct of Sess) 642 (folld)

SUPREME COURT

Chan Kok Keong for the appellant. G Moganasundram for the respondent.

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[1988] 3 MLJ 1 (also [1988] SLR 599) TIMES PUBLISHING BHD & ORS v S SIVADAS

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 5888 OF 1984 GRIMBERG JC 4 JULY 1988

Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — Written representations submitted on Companies (Amendment) Bill — Defamatory statements made — Defendant not asked to give oral evidence before Select Committee — Whether written representations formed part of the parliamentary process — Whether defence of absolute privilege available — Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 49, 1970 Ed), ss 4, 5(2) & 17(1)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 545

Tort — Defamation — Written representations on Bill submitted to Select Committee — Defamatory statements made — Parliamentary privilege — Absolute — Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 49, 1970 Ed), ss 4, 5(2) & 17(1)

Words and Phrases — ‘Person’ — Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 49, 1970 Ed), s 5(2)

The defendant submitted written representations to the Clerk of Parliament in response to a notice made by the Clerk inviting representations on the Companies (Amendment) Bill from the public, for the consideration of the Select Committee. The defendant was not invited to give oral evidence before the Select Committee. The plaintiffs took the view that they had been gravely defamed by certain of the statements which formed part of the defendant’s representations and issued a writ against him claiming damages for defamation and an injunction to restrain the defendant from further publishing the statements. The defendant raised the defence of absolute privilege and subsequently applied for the following preliminary issue to be determined by the court, ie whether the defence of absolute privilege is as a matter of law available to the defendant.

Held: (1) The act of the defendant in submitting written representations was so ancillary to, and connected with, proceedings in Parliament as to become part of those proceedings. They were part of the parliamentary process by which the House reached its decision on the Bill laid before it. (2) The fact that the defendant was not invited to attend before the Select Committee in order to give evidence in support of his representations should not affect the character of the representations he made, in the sense of clothing them with absolute privilege if he gave evidence in support of them and depriving them of privilege if he did not. (3) The word ‘person’ in s 5(2) of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act means any person and includes strangers. Both the Clerk of

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 546

Parliament and the defendant, the one by inviting representations and the other by responding to his invitation, were performing acts under the authority of Parliament by virtue of Standing Order 75. It follows that the defendant is entitled to the immunity provided by s 5(2) of the Act. (4) There is no conflict between the provisions of ss 4, 5(2) and 17(1) of the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act. Section 4 is a general statement which reflects art 9 of the UK Bill of Rights; s 5(2) deals with the acts of all persons done under the authority of Parliament and s 17(1) confers immunity on all persons who appear and give evidence in person. The facts of the present case have resulted in an overlap in the provisions of ss 5(2) and 17(1) but that is not an uncommon result of the proper construction of a statute. (5) There was nothing before the court to suggest that in Singapore, written representations to the Select Committee have been regarded by representors as charters to defame under the cloak of absolute privilege. Were that to happen, it would be reasonable to expect Parliament to enact legislation to define proceedings in Parliament so as to exclude written representations to the Select Committee in cases where the representor does not attend and give evidence in person. Unless and until such legislation is passed into law in Singapore, it remains in the overriding public interest that written representations to Parliament should attract absolute privilege so that persons making them in the discharge of their rights should feel free to do so without being threatened with, or vexed by, proceedings whether they be civil or criminal.

Cases referred to Times Publishing Bhd & Ors v S Sivadas [1986] 1 MLJ 372 (refd) Lake v King (1667) 1 Wms Saund 131; 85 ER 137 (folld) Goffin v Donelly (1881) 6 QBD 307 (refd) Rivlin v Bilainkin [1953] 1 QB 485 (refd) Re Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 [1958] AC 331 (refd) Church of Scientology of California v Johnson Smith [1972] 1 All ER 378 (refd)

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 547

R v Secretary of State, ex parte Anderson Strathclyde Plc [1983] 2 All ER 233 (refd) R v Murphy 64 ALR 498 (refd) Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 (refd) Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271 (refd)

Legislation referred to Australian Constitution art 49 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 49, 1970 Ed) ss 3(1), (2), 4, 5, 17, 20(2) UK Bill of Rights 1688 art 9 ||Page 2>>

Lord Irvine Lairg QC (AP Godwin with him) for the plaintiffs. Wong Meng Meng ( Annabelle Yip (Miss) with him) for the defendant.

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[1988] 3 MLJ 134 (also [1988] SLR 614) COOPERS & LYBRAND v SINGAPORE SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTANTS & ORS

HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE) — SUIT NO 1241 OF 1987 CHAO HICK TIN JC 8 JULY 1988

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 548

Civil Procedure — Defamation action — Disclosure of entire report relating to audited accounts of company and subsidiaries — Application for — Whether parts of report not relating to subsidiaries within plaintiffs’ audit need be disclosed by defendant — Whether disclosure would subject defendant to possible civil or criminal action — Acts done in compliance with court order absolutely privileged — Rules of the Supreme Court 1970, O 24 rr 10, 13(1)

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages for libel as a result of a press statement issued by the defendants regarding the plaintiffs’ audit of the accounts of a certain company and its subsidiaries. The press statement was based on a report of investigators who were appointed by the first defendant to investigate the accounts of the companies. The plaintiffs applied, by summons-in-chambers, for the production of the complete report of the investigators and an order that the plaintiffs be at liberty to inspect the documents. The defendants objected to the production of the full report on the grounds that two parts of the report related to audits done on other subsidiary companies which the plaintiffs had no responsibility for and were therefore not relevant to the present action of defamation. Furthermore, the defendants contended that by releasing the entire report, they may be subject to a civil action under s 499 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Ed). The assistant registrar made no order on the plaintiffs’ application to produce the entire report and the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court

Held, allowing the appeal: (1) Having regard to the nature of the present action and the clear link between the accounts of a subsidiary company with those of its holding company, the entire report is relevant to the action and the production of the full report is necessary for disposing fairly of this case. (2) No authority was cited to show that compliance by a party with an order of court to produce constituted publication which could form a basis for an action in tort or a basis for criminal action under s 499 of the Penal Code. On the contrary, it is settled law that statements contained in documents made in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. However a party who obtains

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 549

documents by process of court can only use them for the purposes of those proceedings and nothing else.

Cases referred to Law v Llewellyn [1906] 1 KB 487 (refd) R v Rule [1937] 2 KB 375 (refd) R v Munslow [1895] 1 QB 758 (refd) Harman v Home Office [1983] 1 AC 280 (refd) Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 (refd)

Legislation referred to Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 O 24 rr 10(1), (2), 13(1) Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Ed) s 449 Companies Act (Cap 50, 1985 Ed) ss 207, 401(2)

Loh Boon Huat for the plaintiffs. KS Chung ( Susan Leong ( Miss) with him) for the defendants.

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[1987] 1 MLJ 82 ATIP BIN ALI v JOSEPHINE DORIS NUNIS & ANOR

OCJ — CIVIL SUIT NO 425 OF 1985 WAN YAHYA J

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 550

13 FEBRUARY 1986

Practice and Procedure — Libel — Right in personam — Whether representative action can be maintained by plaintiff — Application to strike out — No cause of action — RHC 1980, O 18 r 19 & O 59 r 8

Defamation — Libel — Right in personam — Whether representative action can be maintained — Close relationship

Datuk Seri Abdul Rahim Tamby Cik, the Chief Minister of Malacca at all material times, was sued by a waitress, Josephine Doris Nunis, in Malacca High Court Civil Suit No. 297/85 (“original writ”). She is the first defendant in the present Civil Suit No. 425/85 filed by Atip bin Ali, while the second defendant is Mr. Karpal Singh, an advocate and solicitor, who filed the original writ on behalf of the first defendant. It was alleged in the original writ that the said Datuk Seri had befriended the first defendant and that he had showered gifts on her. She claimed that as a result of the asseveration of marriage made by this person, she had on various occasions rendered him sexual favours at several named places. She claimed that she had given up her job as waitress at his request and that as a result of his subsequent unreasonable conduct in breaking off their association she had suffered mental anguish and humiliation. On September 17, 1985, she finally discontinued the action before service of the writ could be effected on the said Datuk Seri. In the present suit, the plaintiff claimed that the publication of the contents of this writ had jointly and severally depicted both U.M.N.O. members and the plaintiff as persons of immoral and un-Islamic principles and accordingly had brought them into hatred, ridicule, disrepute and public odium and contempt and subjected the plaintiff and U.M.N.O. members to low and lewd remarks from the public and members of opposition parties like the Democratic Action Party (D.A.P.) and Party Islam Malaysia (P.A.S.). The present application by Mr. Karpal Singh, the second defendant, is to set aside the libel suit against him. ||Page 83>>

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Held: (1) the original writ was issued in the name of “Datuk Seri Abdul Rahim Tamby Cik” and not against the “Chief Minister.” The term U.M.N.O. was never used by the applicant (the second defendant) in that suit. Since there is no nexus in the original writ between Datuk Seri Abdul Rahim and the plaintiff, Atip bin Ali or any member of the Alai Branch of U.M.N.O. obviously cannot succeed in his or their claim; (2) even on the assumption that there exists sufficient nexus between the plaintiff and the applicant herein, the plaintiff nevertheless cannot maintain this libel suit against the applicant. Defamation is a personal action maintainable by the person defamed and not by individuals who are remotely related to him. There is yet a further requirement which the plaintiff must, and in this case failed to prove, namely the words were published about him; (3) if there was anybody defamed at all by this alleged publication that person is Datuk Seri Abdul Rahim Tamby Cik and certainly not any member of the U.M.N.O. Alai Branch individually or collectively. Defamation involves a right in personam and close relationship with the person defamed alone will not give rise to the right on the part of other persons to sue the defendant; (4) the plaintiff/respondent has no cause of action against the second defendant/applicant and that the plaintiff’s suit is conspicuously unmaintainable. The claim by the plaintiff against the second defendant is struck out with costs.

Cases referred to Drummond-Jackson v BMA [1970] 1 WLR 688, 693 Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 385, 386 Golden Century Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Gan Hoe & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 86, p 87 Attorney-General Malaysia v Chiow Thiam Guan [1983] 1 MLJ 51 Sadgrove v Hole quoted from Duncan and Neill Defamation 2nd edn page 22 Bruce v Odhams Press Limited [1936] 1 KB 697

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 552

Knupper v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] 1 All ER 495 Daya v Param Sukh (1888) ILR 11 All 104, 107 Brahmanna v Ramakrishnama (1894) Indian Law Reports 18 Madras page 250 Luckumsey Rowji v Hurbun Nursey and Ors (1881) ILR 5 Bom 580 Subbaiyar v Kristnaiyar and Anor (1878) ILR 1 Madras 383 Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021 Mitra & Co v Thevar & Anor [1960] MLJ 79

APPLICATION

Karam Singh Veriah for the plaintiff. Karpal Singh in person.

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[1987] 1 MLJ 176 (also [1986] SLR 106) JB JEYARETNAM v GOH CHOK TONG

CA SINGAPORE — CIVIL APPEAL NO 90 OF 1984] WEE CHONG JIN CJ, LAI KEW CHAI & CHUA JJ 19 AUGUST 1986

Defamation — Slander — Press conference — Words uttered at — Whether defamatory of plaintif — Distinction between office of profit and office of honour — Fair comment — Defamation Act (Cap 32), s 5

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 553

Evidence — Defamation — Proof of special damage

Practice and Procedure — Appellate Court — Findings of fact by trial judge — To accord respect to

In the course of directing his party’s political campaign to retain the Anson seat in a parliamentary by-election, the defendant held a conference with the media at which he said, inter alia, that he was “inclined to believe” that the plaintiff, an opposition candidate in the by-election, had engineered an exodus of some two-thirds of the audience who had attended the inauguration of the Singapore Democratic Party (“SDP”), a political party which was friendly to the plaintiff and which had invited the plaintiff as its guest speaker. In a claim in the High Court for damages and an injunction arising out of the slander, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with costs (see [1985] 1 MLJ 334). The plaintiff appealed against the decision of the High Court. Although the defendant did not file a cross-appeal, the defendant filed a Respondent’s Notice wherein he contended that if the learned trial Judge had erred in holding that the words complained of were not calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office as Secretary-General of Workers’ Party, the defendant would further contend that the learned trial Judge had correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for damages for slander because the plaintiff’s said office was an office of honour or credit and not an office of profit and the particular words complained of by the plaintiff were not actionable without proof of special damage and that there was no such proof in this case. The issues whether the words spoken were defamatory and whether they were spoken on an occasion of qualified privilege were no longer in contention.

Held, dismissing the appeal: (1) the learned trial Judge was correct in finding that quite apart from not being calculated to disparage the plaintiff in his office, the words were not actionable because they did not impute to the plaintiff the kind or quality of misconduct which would have rendered the words actionable without proof of special

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 554

damage. Therefore the plaintiff had failed to establish that the words complained of was actionable without proof of special damage; (2) the plaintiff had not proved any special damage to his office of honour; (3) the defendant had succeeded in establishing his defence of fair comment; (4) the plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of roving that the defendant was actuated by express malice when he uttered the words complained of; (5) an appellate court must give the greatest respect to the findings of facts of a trial Judge and ought not to ||Page 177>> disturb them unless the appellate court is satisfied that the trial Judge had reached a wrong decision.

Cases referred to Robinson v Ward (1958) 108 LJ 491 Alexander v Jenkins [1892] 1 QB 797 Onslow v Home 2 WB1 750; 96 ER 439 Merivale v Carson (1888) LR 20 QBD 275, 280 Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 516 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 Thomas v Thomas 1947 SC (HL) 45, 54 Watt (or Thomas) v Thomas [1947] AC 484, 488 Khoo Sit Hob v Lim Thean Tong [1912] AC 323; 2 BLSS 331 Chow Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978] 2 MLJ 41 Muthusamy v Ang Nam Cheow [1979] 2 MLJ 271

COURT OF APPEAL

JB Jeyaretnam in person. Joe Grimberg for the respondent.

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 555

[1987] 1 MLJ 186 (also [1986] SLR 253) THE STRAITS TIME PRESS (1975) LTD v THE WORKERS’ PARTY & ANOR

OCJ SINGAPORE — SUIT NO 745 OF 1982 THEAN J 24 APRIL 1986

Defamation — Libel — Press release made by first defendant signed by second defendant — Whether words complained in press release were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning — Fair comment — Defendants bearing part of costs

In this case, the plaintiffs, proprietors and publishers of “The Straits Times”, brought an action for defamation against the first defendant, a political party and the second defendant, J.B. Jeyaretnam, who was and is the Secretary General of the first defendant. ||Page 187>> The action arose out of the speech made by Mr. S. Rajaratnam the second Deputy Prime Minister, at a dinner function in Singapore and The Straits Times carried the report of the speech. The report said among other things: “Mr. Rajaratnam said one WP candidate in the last general elections was later discovered to be a bicycle thief.” The defendant was incensed at this report and immediately called a press conference on January 18, 1982. The second defendant threatened to take legal action for defamation against the plaintiffs if they failed to publish an apology in the form of and on the terms then demanded. Accordingly, on the following day, the plaintiffs caused a correction and an apology to be published in The Straits Times. On the same day the first defendant issued a press release signed by the second defendant in the following

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 556

terms: “The Workers’ Party notes that the Second Deputy Prime Minister Mr. S. Rajaratnam has failed to respond to the challenge by the Party and has sought refuge behind the Straits Times who has attempted to go to his rescue by a statement that he was reported incorrectly. The Party is now proceeding to commence proceedings against both Mr. S. Rajaratnam and The Straits Times for defamation.” The plaintiffs took exception to this press release and eventually took out a writ against the defendants claiming damages and libel contained in the press release. Two issues arose in the action namely (a) whether the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meaning have the meanings attributed to them by the plaintiffs and are defamatory of the plaintiffs and (b) whether the words complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Held: (1) the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meaning were not defamatory of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ claim therefore failed and the action should be dismissed; (2) the defendant’s defence, that the words complained of were fair and made without malice on the matter of public interest, failed. The words complained of were clearly not comment but a statement of fact, nor were they comment based on any fact at all.; (3) the plaintiffs should pay the defendants only two-third of the costs of this action. Only one set of the costs is allowed to the defendants.

Cases referred to Rubber Improvement Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 258 Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952, 958 The Capital And Counties Bank Ltd v George Henry & Sons (1882) 7 App Cas 741, 745 Nevill v Fine Art And General Insurance Company [1897] AC 68, 73 Australian Newspaper Co Ltd v Bennett [1894] AC 284, 287–288

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 557

JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334, 338

CIVIL SUIT

AP Godwin ( Dora YS Cheok (Miss) with him) for the plaintiffs. JB Jeyaretnam for the first defendant. Subhas Anandan for the second defendant.

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MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES. DEFAMATION 558

Endnotes 1 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Tan Chong & Son Motor Co Sdn Bhd v Borneo Motors (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2001] 3 MLJ 140 2 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Re Geoffrey Robertson Qc [2001] 4 MLJ 257 3 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 K Magathevan v Shafie bin Hj Kassim [2001] 3 MLJ 86 Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v Dp Vijandran [2001] 4 MLJ 161 Mohamed Azwan bin Haji Ali v Sistem Televisyen (M) Bhd & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 120 4 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1 5 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Ummi Hafilda bte Ali & Anor v Karangkraf Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [2000] 6 MLJ 532 6 (Popup - Cases on this CD-ROM which cite this case)

Chua Jui Meng v Hoo Kok Wing & Anor [2000] 3 MLJ 1

MARCEL JUDE TECHNOLOGIES.