Right–Wing Populist Parties in the Eu – the Case Study of Hungary from 2009 to 2019

UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE SARAJEVO

RIGHT–WING POPULIST PARTIES IN THE EU – THE CASE STUDY OF HUNGARY FROM 2009 TO 2019

MASTER THESIS

Mentor: Prof. dr. Kapidzic Damir Student: Leila Lizde Index:1013/ II – PIR Department: Politology Stream: International relations and diplomacy

Sarajevo, September 2020

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 6 2 THEORETICAL–METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ...... 7 2.1 Research problem ...... 7 2.2 Research subject ...... 8 2.3 Research objectives ...... 10 2.3.1 Scientific research objectives ...... 10 2.3.2 Social research objectives ...... 10 2.4 System hypothesis ...... 11 2.4.1 General Research Hypothesis ...... 11 2.4.2 Specific hypotheses of research ...... 11 2.5 Method of research ...... 11 3 POLITICAL POPULISM IN EUROPE ...... 12 3.1 Populism a historical overview and definitions ...... 12 3.1.1 Cas Mudde – the ideational approach to populism ...... 14 3.1.2 Kurt Weyland – a political–strategic approach ...... 15 3.1.3 Pierre Ostiguy – a socio–cultural approach ...... 16 3.2 Populism in west, east, south and north Europe – present situation ...... 19 4 RISE OF THE DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY AND OVERVIEW OF ITS MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL PARTIES ...... 25 4.1 Key elements in Hungary’s past that shaped its democracy in 1990s ...... 25 4.1.1 Treaty of Trianon ...... 27 4.1.2 Hungary and Germany in the Second World War ...... 28 4.1.3 Hungary and SSSR ...... 30 4.2 Hungary`s transition to democracy ...... 32 4.2.1 Political happenings in the last decade of 20th century ...... 35 4.2.2 Political happenings in the first decade of the 21th century...... 44 5 CASE STUDY – HUNGARY UNDER FIDESZ, FROM 2010 TO 2019 ...... 48 6 EU AND HUNGARY RELATIONSHIP FROM 2009 TO THE 2019 ...... 72 6.1 The second Orbán`s government 2010 – 2014 and EU ...... 72 6.2 The third Orbán`s government 2014 – 2018 and EU ...... 75 6.3 The forth Orban`s government 2018 – 2022 and EU ...... 77 7 FINAL REMARKS ...... 82 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 87

1 INTRODUCTION

In the last 20 years we can see a steady growth in the support for the European populist parties, particularly far right populist parties. The recent analysis that has been done in 2018 by the Guardian has revealed that the populist parties have more than tripled their support in Europe, and from 1998 the number of Europeans ruled by a government with at least one populist in the cabinet has increased from 12.5 million to 170 million and in the most recent national elections, one in four votes cast was for the populist party. The aim of the master thesis is to explore the rise of right wing populism in EU with focus on a Hungary, the first country to have more than two–thirds of MEPs backing censure motion in 2018 when the European Parliament voted to pursue unprecedented disciplinary action against Hungary over alleged breaches of the EU's core values (respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law) accusing the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government on the attacks on the media, minorities, and the rule of law. In the beginning of the paper the rise of populism, nation centric public opinion and strengthening of right wing parties in the former communist countries now members of EU will be briefly presented. Since the focus of the thesis is Hungary, the communist past, rise of democracy from 1989 – elections held in 1990s and 2000s, parties that emerged, EU aspirations and influence of media, FDIs and NGOs in early 2000s will be as well discussed. How a country that was once the star of the post–1989 transition in economic (They had the largest inward flow of foreign direct investment in post–communist Europe and one of the least chaotic economic transitions) but mostly an example of how democracy should be done (They were the first who rewrote constitution in order to embrace democratic values, had a free and fair elections from 1990s till 2010 with government alternation from right to left and most NGOs East–Central European headquarters in Budapest) could become the latest critique of the system.

The central part of the thesis will be focusing on the last ten years of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government, concluding with the December of 2019, in which the increasingly prominent authoritarian, anti–European and anti–liberal attitude of Hungarian government and its effect on its relationship with the EU institutions and the transformation of Hungarian society by strengthening of nationalistic movements, use of the communist legacy, nation– building, populism, anti–immigrant mindset, changing of immigration and FDI laws will be examined. In the last ten years these happenings in Hungary were mostly explained, compared to the other CEE countries, discussed and criticized in the research articles by non–Hungarian publishers like the Journal of Contemporary European Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics, Comparative Political Studies Amnesty International Netherlands,

East European Politics and Societies, Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Friedrich–Ebert–Stiftung who talked about Hungary`s decline of democracy, (non)participative political culture, authoritarian government, social protection party elite loyalty, party systems, regime–building politics, euro skepticism. The final part will be dealing with the publications that are concerning Hungarian political situation, how not being able to have freedom of expression led to citizen's behavior seen in the last two years in anti–government demonstrations, about the anti–Orbán opposition parties, the emergence of new movements and can the fall of the right wing populist parties and Orbán’s regime can be expected and who are going to be the new players ( will there be any ) in the arena and what can we expect from Hungary in the future, its influence in Central Europe and EU. At the end of the thesis, hopefully, one question will probably be answered: are right wing populist parties’ threat to the countries stability and EU existence or not?

2 THEORETICAL–METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

2.1 Research problem

The twenty first century is a century in which information is two clicks away for the 60% of mobile phone users (HostingFacts, 2018). The one who controls it influences public opinion. Information as a tool is used by brands, companies, touristic agencies, actors, singers, but mostly by political parties. Since 1990s there is a global increase of countries that have democratically elected leaders. As a consequence of democratization and thanks to the globalization, political parties are now competing with each other in order to obtain and maintain the attention of voting force by influencing their source of information and using all available corresponding resources to get more attention locally but also worldwide.

In Europe, nowadays, there is a distant and increasingly alien political class who lost touch with their traditional supporters, the mass of ordinary voters and is constantly losing its influence. This gap between the worldview of Europe's elites and the values of Europe's voters is used by the populist parties who use themes like immigration, opposition to Brussels governance, government measures connected to public expenditures to prove that existing political establishment is no longer representing the people.

Many populist parties are not that easily classified using the political terminology of the 20th century. By the research done in 2015 by The Economist Intelligence Unit for the BBC’s Democracy day it represents a broader moral, social and cultural challenge to the old established parties, that gives an alternative between the two ways of life – one that expresses the 7 technocratic, metropolitan values of the political elites and one that gives due consideration to the concerns, values and traditions that ordinary people hold dear.

In Europe in the last two decades we have witness the rise of the right–wing populist parties which in the last European elections together with the nationalist parties gained a sizeable number of seats in the European Parliament, in some countries like Italy, France, Poland and Hungary they were in the majority. They have a broad consensus on the need to strengthen nation–states, the need to reform the EU and to limit its competences as much as possible. Pro– European forces in 2019 still have a clear majority in the European Parliament but reaching unanimity ( a decision that has been reached by everyone on a particular course of action) may become more complicated in the future. The political groups in the Parliament EAPN (now Identity and Democracy) and the ECR may hamper majority voting on issues such are security and trade policy, while in the Council individual states can bloc a decision with a simple veto, for example asylum policies. Now more than ever more attention needs to be attached not only to the right–wing alliances in the European Parliament, but also on the electoral victories of national populist parties in EU member states.

At the beginning the paper will examine the political populism in Europe by a historical overview and a brief explanation of the differences between the west and east European populism. Then it will explain the east European populism on a case study of Hungary, its communist background and rise of democracy and what tools parties used for promotion of the democracy and what right wing populist parties emerged. At the end the focus will be on the last ten years of Fidesz leadership in Hungary, its growth, how it still remains in the power and why it remains there. Hungarians relationship with EU will be discuses discussed, former communist parties, nationalistic movements, and in general influence of the right wing parties on democratic processes in the country and in EU.

2.2 Research subject

The aim of the master thesis is to explore the rise of right wing populism in EU by focusing on a Hungary, the first country to have more than two–thirds of MEPs backing censure motion in 2018 when the European Parliament voted to pursue unprecedented disciplinary action against Hungary over alleged breaches of the EU's core values – article 7 of TEU (respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law) accusing the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government on attacks on the media, minorities, and the rule of law. Also it is a country that word wide media had focus on in 2015, due to its government decision to shut the main land route for migrants into the European Union where they said: “Anyone seeking asylum on its southern border with Serbia, the EU’s external frontier, would 8 automatically be turned back, and anyone trying to sneak through would face jail” (Reuters, 2015)

The focus of the writing will be on the right wing parties in Hungary and how the populist behavior of its right wing party Fidesz got that party to power and helped it remain in the power in the last ten years. Actions that they have taken like the use of the parliamentary majority to capture regulators, dominate business, control the courts, buy the media and manipulate the rules for elections will be explained and discussed. The affects of Hungarian relationship with EU will be examined; does their actions have influence on the EU and its international relations especially when Ursula Von Der Leyen, president of the European Commission, announced on a press conference in Brussels on 10th September 2019 that she nominates Hungary’s Laszlo Trocsanyi as a new Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Policy. Laszlo Trocsanyi served as Minister of Justice and a member of the Constitutional Court during the rule of Victor Orbán and was behind the laws against NGOs working with the refugees and asylum–seekers, as well as legal provisions that caused the closure of Budapest’s Central European University. Considering his nomination, Trocsany on Twitter stated his interest in “working to the benefit” of the EU neighborhood, but did not mention EU tendencies of enlargement that are priority for most Western Balkan countries (Balkaninsight, 2019). In the October European Parliament rejected the László Trócsányi, Hungary nominated its ambassador to the EU, Olivér Várhelyi a lawyer and a diplomat. He was elected as a new Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Policy on European Parliament's plenary on November 27. 2019 (europa.ba, 2019) after he provided a written guarantees that he will be independent from his government – “I will neither be bound nor influenced by any statement or position of any Prime Minister of any country or any other representatives of any government.” to the members of the European Parliament who in mid November 2 raised concerns about the candidate's independence and refused to give him green light in mid November 2019; some MEPs said they were concerned about a speech made by Orbán in Azerbaijan last month, where he appeared to pledge Várhelyi’s assistance to the Hungarian government's Turkish and Azerbaijani allies, while other critics accuse Orbán of meddling in the Balkans and maintaining an overly close relationship to Russian President Vladimir Putin (politico.eu, 2019). Also the future of Hungary and Fidesz will be discussed, what holds the future when the Victor Orbán got reelected as a president of Fidesz and on a local elections on 13th October 2019 Fidesz party sustained heavy losses; “opposition candidates won the mayoral race in Budapest, the capital, and were also projected to win in 10 of the country's 23 largest cities” (Telegraph-UK, 2019).

Is populism bad or not for the citizens of a certain country and world in general I will try not to discuss in my master thesis.I will use some sociological reports on it but if I go on that path I would start analyzing it from psychological, anthropological, philosophical side and I as an economists/politologist am not competent enough to write nonbiased opinion about it. Either way anyone who reads it will form an opinion and I am letting it to that person to conclude is populism worth discussing, is it bad or not – even better question for who is it bad?

2.3 Research objectives

We distinct two types of research objectives: scientific and social

2.3.1 Scientific research objectives

The scientific objectives of this research are to find out more about populism. Aim of the research is to investigate more populism its concept, connection with democracy and its use by mostly right wing parties. Throughout the relevant literature I will explain how the parties use it; what are the consequences of populism on the country's citizens and its international relations. As focus of my master thesis is Hungary I will use available literature to understand how right wing parties used populism to gain power in last 10 years in Hungary how are they maintaining it and is there democracy in Hungarian society and does it influence its international relations.

2.3.2 Social research objectives

The social research objectives of this research are to inform those who are interested in populism about its characteristics and populist tools political parties use so they are going to be able to pay attention to them in behaviors of political parties. Also this work can help other students of political sciences in their researches on the political parties, especially right wing one. It can benefit the locals to know more about the political situation of a country who is EU member state and our first non ex - Yugoslav EU neighbor who was under communism as we did. Especially know when a Hungary has influence on EUs foreign policy, as I previously mention a Hungarian was nominated as an EU Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Policy in September 2019 and elected in November 2019.

2.4 System hypothesis

2.4.1 General Research Hypothesis

Right wing populist parties are becoming more influential in the EUs decision making processes and are becoming a threat to the EU and its own country democracy.

2.4.2 Specific hypotheses of research

1. Right wing parties use/misuse democratic tools for populist agenda ( e.g. rule of law, elections, independent institutions, human rights) 2. Citizens of Hungary are oblivious to the populist propaganda of its current government because they are used to the similar one from their communist era. 3. Strong right wing party on power make citizens of that country more focused on their nationality rather than on problems of their own country and is leading a country from democracy to the autocracy 4. EU institutions are aware of the right wing populist parties influence on the EU institutions but still do not have proper tools to manage them.

2.5 Method of research

Methods that are going to be used in this final paper are:

1. Case study 2. Mixed methods analysis 3. Historical analysis

All the relevant literature (textbooks, political analysis, monographs, articles, encyclopedias as well as university lectures, interviews done on TV and post from social media) covering the field of the political parties, right and left wing parties, political PR, propaganda, protests, democracy, communism, EU, elections in Hungary, EU and publications available about the Hungarian political situation will be used to properly address the title of the thesis and explain the current situation to the readers. Case study analysis of a Hungary from 2009 to 2019 will be performed to show the main factors right wing populist parties’ use in their political propaganda. Data will be retrieved from the European Social Survey data for voting for right– wing populist parties, the data of the Authoritarian Populism Index and the Democracy Index and they will be cross–checked analyzed and graphically presented.

3 POLITICAL POPULISM IN EUROPE

3.1 Populism a historical overview and definitions

In order to understand recent success of the populist parties in Europe one needs to understand what is the political populism. While investigating about the populism for my master thesis I have found a numerous articles and books published in last decade that differently define the term populism. The empirical work is always focused on a region: Latin America, USA and Europe in the last 150 years and it trys to find out a theory that can be valid for a certain world region. Nowadays the term populism alludes differently from region to region for example in Europe a term being populistic sometimes is equalized with xenophobia1, while in Latin America to clienteles2 and economic mismanagement.

First record of the term populism was reported in the US newspapers in the end of 19th century where it was used to describe members of the US Peoples Party –it was a “Southern and Western movement based on the hostility to the establishment of the railroads and banks, as well as to the politicians in Washington” (Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017). In the Europe term populism has been used to describe movement of the idealistic, revolutionary students in the 1860s and 1870s in Russia called narodniki – “going to the people”, where the students from the cities in the “1860s and early 1870s attempted to stir the peasantry in the countryside into over – throwing the Tsarist regime” (Venturi, 1960) and for a case of the General Geogres Boulagism in France who during the Third French Republic in the 1880s supported the workers and a “resurgent nationalism and campaigned against the parliamentary regime, looking to overturn it in favor of a radical plebiscitary republicanism” (Passmore, 2012.) All three cases share a common feature of populism that there are “the people” who are disadvantaged and there is an established ruling force that needs to be conducted differently and be closer to the people.

Although populism was used as a term in 19th century the first modern schools of populism developed in 1950s focused mostly on Europe and the emerging populist movements in Latin America. While investigating for the topic I noticed that the expansion of the academic studies

1 The Cambridge dictionary defines xenophobia as extreme dislike or fear of foreigners, their customs, their religions, etc.

2 Cas Mudde (2017) – Clientelism is best understood as a particular mode of exchange between electoral constituencies and politicians, in which voters obtain goods (e.g., direct payments or privileged access to employment, goods, and services) conditioned on their support for a patron or party; used as a strategy by Latin American populist leaders to win elections and remain in power 12 on populism from the 1990s. The analysis of the editors of the Oxford handbooks on populism3 on articles on populism published in political science journals since 1990s reviled that ideological and strategic approaches have a relative degree of dominance within the field and that qualitative and quantitative approaches are used with the same frequency 35% , while conceptual and/or theoretical debates are used 22 %, the regions that got most attention are Western Europe and Latin America.

Different social sciences showed the academic interest in populism by working on different world regions and with diverse theoretical backgrounds – anthropology, economy, history, philosophy, sociology and only in the last two decades political science community began to take ownership of this topic (Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017, str. 23). In their article’s scholars disagree about the concept of populism. The unique across regions and historical times world`s definition of populism still do not exist, in my opinion it never will, but over the decades three conceptual approaches to populism emerged and when discussing populism all three need to be taken in consideration. In the next sections I will explain them briefly:

• the ideational approach to populism explained by Cas Mudde4, • organizational approach ( political – strategic approach) by Kurt Weyland5 and • performative or cultural approach (a socio – cultural approach) by Pierre Ostiguy6.

3 They constructed a database that includes all the articles published on populism in fourteen selected journals ( listed in alphabetical order): American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, European Journal of Political Research, Government and Opposition, Journal of Politics, Latin American Research Review, Latin American Politics and Society, Party Politics, Political Studies, West European Politics, and World Politics ) from 1990 to 2015 and opted for a very restrictive criterion for selecting the papers included in the database by using only those articles in which the word “populism” or “populist” appears in the title and/or in the abstract. Based on this criterion, the total number of articles considered in the database is 158.

4 Cas Mudde is a Dutch political scientist who from 2002 wrote several books and researches that focuses on political extremism and populism in Europe and the United States as well as on of extremism, political parties, civil society, democracy, and European politics.

5 Kurt Weyland finished his MA in Germany and PHD on Stanford, from 1990s writes and has done numerous researches that focus on the democratization and authoritarian rule, social policy and policy diffusion, and on populism in Latin America and Europe. In his work he uses insights from the cognitive psychology, and has done extensive field research in Latin America

6 Pierre Ostiguy,a Canadian, with PHD from Berkley is an expert in South American politics. He studies party systems, populism, political appeals, and political identity, with empirical research on Peronism and anti–Peronism in Argentina, and Chavismo and anti Chavismo in Venezuela. Ostiguy’s work develops a “spatial analysis” of politics and party systems focusing on the “appeals of parties and candidates (as well as their reception) rather than policies and issues alone”.

3.1.1 Cas Mudde – the ideational approach to populism

Cas Mudde defines populism within the context of the liberal democracy7 because he says empirically populist actors exist in the systems that are in liberal democracy or aspire to be one. He defines populism as:

“a thin–centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”

This ideational definition of populism is used by numerous scholars in the analysis of populism all around the world in both qualitative and quantitative methods as well as in researches of the demand–side and the supply–side of populist politics. That is why in the next section it`s four “core concepts”: thin–centered ideology, the people, the elite, and general will are going to be discussed in more details.

⎯ Thin – centered ideology simply means populism is an ideology that has a more limited ambition and scope than thick ideology. It is narrow and rarely exists by itself and depending from a populist actor is combined with other ideology like nationalism – mostly present in the populist radical right parties in Europe, socialism in left wing populist actors in Latin America in 2000s (Venezuela – Hugo Chavez) , neoliberal economics in 1990s – Peru or with other adjectives like civic populism8 or authoritarian populism9. ⎯ The people are defined by a populist actor himself and have a key feature of a self– identification of the targeted community e.g. the working class, the common people. They are a homogeneous category whose main distinction is that they are “pure” but not in the ethnic or racial terms, but in the moral terms – meaning doing what is right for all the people and represent “an idealized conception of the community” (Taggart, 2004).

7 In his book Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (published in 1999 by Oxford) Harpin, Russell says that it is ” a democracy characterized by elections between multiple distinct political parties, a separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society, a market economy with private property and the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties and political freedoms for all people”.

8 Civic populism focuses on “public dimensions of work, both the productive and the distributive sides of politics as a crucial resources for citizen empowerment” reflected in widespread practices of citizen participation (Boyte, 2003)

9 In their article Authoritarian Populism, 'Two Nations' and Thatcherism Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley and Tom Ling said this term was first used by Hall to describe Tascherism and is described as an ideology ‘authoritarian’ because it “calls for a strong state and social discipline and in the same time addresses issues popular by the Britich citizens” in 1970s – nationalistic over sectional interest 14

⎯ The elite represents the opposite of the people, they came from the same group as the people, but have chosen to betray them, by putting the special interests and inauthentic morals of the elite over those of the people (The Oxford handbook of populism, 2017) ⎯ The general will is “the result of the honest and logical priorities of the (common) people” who are represented by the populist who gives a “common sense solutions” to complex problems and represents a voice of the people unlike the elite who creates a problem and is out of the touch with the people (Taggart, 2004), (The Oxford handbook of populism, 2017).

In my master thesis the populism is going to be seen and defined mostly from an ideational point of view because, unlike other approaches, it sets clear boundaries – there is a non– populism, it can be applied to the different levels of analysis and can be used cross–nationally, also this approach is mostly used in the analyses, reports and writings I’ve found out while investigating populism in Europe.

3.1.2 Kurt Weyland – a political–strategic approach

Weyland defines populism:

“as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from a large number of the mostly unorganized followers.”

A Political–Strategic Approach of populism uses the core concept of the Mudde`s ideational approach, the people and general will, but focuses on a different actor – the populist action–er himself.

This approach focuses not on what he/she says but on what he/she does and defines two central components of the political strategy:

⎯ “namely the type of political actor that seeks and exercises power; and ⎯ the principal power capability which that political actor mobilizes as support basis” (Weyland, Kurt, 2001 ).

In his writings Weyland writes how populist serves as an outstanding leader who provides direction and mobilizes followers for the goal’s leader identified as the will of the people.

The populist leader forms quasi direct relationship with the followers and mobilize them throughout mass relies, TV, social medias for a heroic mission’s mission such as re–shaping

15 the country and combating dangerous enemies. He makes a community of his followers, so they feel welcomed, safe in the ways of making a community in which the people who crave for a sense of belonging could feel welcome. In many cases those leaders are very charismatic, and their death is followed by uncontrolled mass grief e.g. Hugo Chavez’s death.

Unlike fascism and national social who are also characterized by a charismatic leader, a populist leader does not want to mold people via imposing ideological homogeneity and force all his followers to be part of mass organization (Eatwell, 1996) – he is some kind of a hybrid zone between democracy and a competitive authorianism. (Kessel, 2014)

Mudde, Weyland and other scholars who write about populism agree it is only possible in semi democratic – democratic societies. This approach discus how a populist use societies democratic elements namely electoral competition and government alternation among political parties in his advance by presenting himself as a better more truthful, real voice of the people, than competing parties and their leaders with the massive victories at the pools and catchy slogans like the still well remembered in Latin America “Chávez is the people, and the people is Chávez.” In his explanations of populism as a political–strategic approach Weyland uses the (Novaro, 2011) findings on the populist presidents in the Latin America, in his research he wrote that these presidents are not committed to a systematic ideology or have a clear program, because that can lead to a leader who is not able to win support from a broad cross–section of the people, instead their career is characterized by numerous sudden ideas who often include grand proclamations and generous promises.

At the end, this approach concludes that a populist govern as they see fit as long as they can remain in power and as they get better in enhancing their autonomy the thorough program elaborations and careful systematic implementation of a grand and generous promises they made in the beginning of their campaign are more and more missing.

3.1.3 Pierre Ostiguy – a socio–cultural approach

Populism is, in many ways a spectacle, a show, a performance; it is for the voters a political performance, they enjoy being spectators unlike the dull bureaucracies and self–enclosed administrations it mostly is. Populism carries an emotional charge, which is highlighted by (Canovan, 1999) in Trust the People! and Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, there she covers the spectrum from the negative resentment of the laissés pour compte (left behind) to the positive extreme of the fusional love with the leader. This approach takes appeals in politics seriously and does not limit itself to the ideas of a programee . A Socio–Cultural

Approach understands populism as an ordinal category10, rather than a nominal one11. It defines populism in the high–low dimension as the “flaunting of the ‘low’ ”.

The high–low axis involve different criteria for judging what is likeable and morally acceptable in a candidate, it does not look only at style of a populist actor it goes more deeply into society’s history, existing group differences, identities, resentments and how is all of that used by a populist leader in his relation to the people from the accents used to the levels of language, body language, gestures, and ways of dressing and how it all appeals to the public (The Oxford handbook of populism, 2017).

The high–low axis (graph bellow) consists theoretically and conceptually of two closely related sub–dimensions or components (Ostiguy, 2009) :

⎯ the social–cultural and ⎯ the political cultural.

The social–cultural is a first component of a socio–cultural high–low axis. Characteristics of the people who can be find

⎯ on the high social–cultural people publicly present as well behaved, proper, composed, “well–mannered, bookish and in their language use either a rationalist (at times replete with jargon) or ethically oriented discourse”. They also can appear as stiff, rigid, serious, colorless, somewhat distant, and boring. The high have a tendency to justify its concerns

10 Ordinal data is a categorical, statistical data type where the variables have natural, ordered categories and the distances between the categories is not known.

11 A nominal category or a nominal group is a group of objects or ideas that can be collectively grouped on the basis of a particular characteristic—a qualitative property. 17

in a more abstract phrases and “terms and to convey them through a more universalizing, less culturally localized language”.

⎯ On the low social–cultural people in their behavior use more demonstrative facial expressions and body language also they display more culturally popular tastes, often the raw one. In their language they use culturally localized language, it often includes slang, metaphors and expressions that fit in folklore of its audience. (Ostiguy, 2009)

The second component of the high–low axis of appeals in politics is political cultural that represent what modes of decision making prefer or advocate different forms of political leadership.

⎯ On the high political cultural: political appeals consist of claims to favor formal, impersonal, legalistic, institutionally mediated models of authority. The high is definitely more abstract and restrained, claiming to be more proper, whether in manners or in procedures. ⎯ On the low political cultural: “political appeals emphasize very personalistic, strong (often male) leadership” that is more concrete, into immediacy and institutionally less mediated. The low generally does not worry are they gonna appear as “improper in the eyes of the international community, at times they even enjoy it” (Ostiguy, 2009).

Historically speaking most intellectuals have preferred and have been located on the high, while poorer and less educated people preferred politicians on low who use in both political and social cultural more performative and less sublimated cultural expressions as well as behave in more direct way.

Ostiguy is one of the rare scholars who studies populism in the low–high axes and not on the left right, due to the fact it is still mostly consider from right left perspective the wheel of axes (figure 2 bellow) of political polarization is made and in it the populism as flaunting of the ‘low’ is graphically presented thus easier for understanding also it shows characteristic of populism on left who are not discussed in details that much as the one on the right. On the wheel going from left the

18 low starts from the generically left to the socio economic left characterized by economic distribution to the socio cultural law where politicians are characterized by usage of the culturally localized language – use a card “from here” and among other demonstrative body language, on the right – low part wheel starts with the politico cultural low where its representatives are known as personalistic and provocative with a strong forceful direct authority, between it and generic right is politico cultural right (The Oxford handbook of populism, 2017)

The three specific approaches I presented above share a significant similarities, for example the personalim who is central in Weyland’s approach in Otsguy’s is a part of the definition of the low pole of the politico–cultural dimension, than most populist actors defined by the Mudde`s ideational approach fit to the low pole of politics on both political and social dimensions axis but not always (e.g. Pim Fortuyn on the political–cultural dimension), also it gives more importance to the extreme right appeals to “the people “ and is a European approach to populism, it cannot be applied to all cases in Latin America.

3.2 Populism in west, east, south and north Europe – present situation

The three scholars’ definitions that I have explained above are investigating and publishing opinions about populism for merely three decades. They focus on Europe and America (the writings about populism in Asia and Africa are rare one but evidence show it also exists there and can become threat like in Europe); what I have noticed from their early writing is that the populist parties were at the beginning local and not a world phenomenon – also they did not possess that much power, they were a very stubborn opposition, now things are changing and they are gaining more and more political power.

As I have already stated in my readings on populism I’ve tried to focus only on Europe – namely EU and populist parties in it. The biggest evidence of it needing to be one of the top topic in EU institutions is that “ in Europe from 1998 to the 2018 the number of people who live under the governments with a populist in cabinet has increased by 13 times from the 12,5 million to the 170,24 million citizens ( in 1998 only Switzerland and Slovakia had populists in government) ”, thus having now “one in four Europeans voting for a populist” (Paul Lewis, Seán Clarke, Caelainn Barr, Josh Holder and Niko Kommenda, 2018).

The Council of Europe’s Democratic World Forum in Strasburg had it in 2017 as a theme – “Is Populism a problem?12 ”, also in December 2019 speaking at an event in Strasbourg to mark the 30th anniversary of Lisbon´s North–South Centre, Council of Europe Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić called on states from Europe and its neighboring regions to: ” join the Council of Europe’s North–South Centre to better tackle global challenges firstly mentioning populism and later radicalization, climate change, conflict and instability and resulting migrant flows” (Council of Europe, 2019) .

Seeing how common it is, in this chapter I will give an over view of populism and its presents in whole Europe – west, east, south and north in last 20 –30 years explaining briefly reports, findings and databases done by the political experts from Tony Blair Institute and the The PopuList 13 .

From all the publications I have found, newspaper articles, videos and interviews I have seen and conversation I had had with students, politicians, professors and diplomats from EU the simplest and easiest representation of populism trends in Europe from 2000 till the 2017 is shown, in my opinion, by the political scientists Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk, and Limor Goultchin of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change in their article “European populism trends threats and future prospects”. They did analysis in their report based on a database that tracks electoral results of 102 populist parties in 39 European countries. The thing I like about this report is that they have shown their findings throw an interactive map in which you can see from 2000 to 2017 which populist parties in Europe were in power, in a coalition and how many voters from a country in percentages voted for a populist option and who are those parties (bellow is a figure one a screen shot of situation in 2000s, 2009 (after the crisis) and in the 2017 ).

12 Among other things the panelist and participants of a forum concluded that it is a problem and that “the response to populism cannot just be an institutional one, it should be political and occupy a stage in the media, including social media and that globally there needs to be a response to the insecurities, both cultural and economic, that make people more receptive to populist muses”; they gave recommendations to the pol. parties, media, national and regional authorities and to the civil society ( Council of Europe, 2017)

13 “The PopuList offers academics and journalists an overview of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties in Europe since 1998. The PopuList is supported by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, The Guardian, and the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy and has most recent visual representation of parties in EU classified along four dimensions far left, populist, euro–sceptic, far right” (The popuList, 2019) 20

Figure 1 – map populists in Europe 2000–2017

As can be seen from the maps above in last two decades populist parties steadily increased and many from the opposition came to power, also they now cover a really big and strategically important stretch in Central and Eastern Europe, from the Baltic Sea all the way to the Mediterranean sea including recent EU member states and former communist one (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia...) and the one who have an aspiration to become its members (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia...). The study done by the Munich–based IFO Institute for Economic Research shows that after the financial crises the biggest political beneficiaries are extreme and populist right–wing parties – The Sweden Democrats took 5.7% of the vote in 2010, up from 2.9% in 2006.The Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) similarly increased from 5.9% to 15.5% in 2010, and the National Front, in France, increased its share of the vote by 10% in 2011 (Sarmadi, 2015). The same study investigated populism effect on economic policy and find out that up to now it has only been moderate, in general the effects of populism are increasing short–term spending and re–distributive policies (Dorine, 2017 ).

The interesting fact I’ve realized while studding the maps deeper is that:

⎯ in last decade by the populist votes that populism is stronger in former communist regions , ⎯ nearly all the populist parties embrace elements of direct democracy like referendums and advocate highly restrictive immigration policies and protectionist economic policies, the right wing one embrace nationalistic ideologies ⎯ there is more right–wing populist parties than the left one and ⎯ that the social democratic parties were hit hardest by rising populism in Europe.

Germaine’s SDP for example won 14% in the polls, while the French Socialist party scored just 7.4% in 2016’s parliamentary elections, and in the Dutch Labour party won just 5.7%. As I was attendee of a political conference organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 14 I had opportunity to talk with its representative about the reasons of a decline of trust by German voters in SDP and societies rising interest in the populist parties, and one of the reason why that is happening is the fact immigration was the number one election issue and that Alternative for Germany (AfD) had as voters citizens that had not voted for it before. In the 2017 Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 12.6% and became the second–strongest party in parts of Bavaria and much of East Germany and with the left–leaning Die Linke, populists now make up about one quarter of the Bundestag. On the last state elections in Germany in 2019 situation did not change that much as again AfD mobilized voters who did not vote before and manage to be second in Saxony and Brandenburg using in their campaign rhetoric’s used by other populist parties in region and practically visible Mudde`s us (people) versus them (elite) : “Vollende die Wende”, or “complete the transition” – promising to rectify the mistakes of the mainstream parties after German reunification almost three decades ago and to address the inequalities between citizens of the former east and west (Connolly, 2019).

Even though it is spreading across the continent its characteristics are different from the region to the region. In the west populist parties exist on the left and on the right and are focusing more on the issues that mobile voters and citizens and their populism is attached to the parties’ ideology. In the governments of Austria, Greece, Italy, Germany they form a government and they were vital to the survival of certain governments e.g. Netherlands and Denmark. In order to stay longer in life populist parties tend to shift from their primary emphasized issue, e.g. from a critique of the welfare state in 1980s to that of multiculturalism in 2000s. As I already stated they use democratic policies and nevertheless they being backed by the majority of people they

14 The Friedrich Ebert Foundation ( German: Friedrich–Ebert–Stiftung; Abbreviation: FES) is a German political foundation established in 1925 associated with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), yet independent of it. 22 violate the basic rights of unpopular minorities, for example the right to free worship; in my opinion an excellent example of it was the Swiss referendum on the minaret in 2009 that was put forward in the parliament by the Swiss right wing populist People's Party where “57% of voters and 22 out of 26 cantons – or provinces – voted in favor of the ban no longer permitting the construction of new minarets in Switzerland” (Cumming-Bruce & Erlanger, 2009).

In his chapter on populist in Western Europe (Taggart, 2019) suggest “four touchstones for contemporary Western Europe populism”:

⎯ immigration, ⎯ regionalism, ⎯ corruption, and ⎯ European integration.

In France Marine Le Pen party had a strong emphasis on French national identity, opposed to the immigration and pursue policy of national preference designed to oppose multiculturalism, in Netherlands the most famous populist example was Pim Fortuyn, a gay sociology professor, who with his party List critiqued Islamic immigration and stated it was “at odds with the social liberalism of Dutch society”. In the Nordic countries the anti–immigrant Sweden Democrats are now the country’s third largest party, the right–populist Danish People’s Party has already become the country’s second largest and populists are also well–represented in multi–party governments in Finland and Norway. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have regularly been governed with populist participation. There are populist parties who do not concern with immigration – the Five Star Movement in Italy or Podemos in Spain whose main concern is issue of institutional – the mafia and corruption of “la caste” .The Euroscepticism is common in donor states like Germany (Alternative for Germany that advocates withdrawal from the Euro) and recipient states like Greece and Spain.

Right–wing populist parties are much more influential than left–wing populists (figure 2 bellow). In 2017, populist parties across Europe had a vote share of 24.1%; of which 17.7% went to right–wing populist parties. In Eastern Europe, “five of every six populist votes went to the far–right”, while populist parties in Southern Europe tend to be ideologically left–leaning, most likely due to the fact that countries in this part of Europe comparing to the West Europe have much stronger economies than their southern European neighbors (Rooduijn, 2018). These parties focused their defense of “the people” on campaigns against privatization, national political elites, advocated for stronger fiscal transfers within the European Union, and promised

23 to expand the welfare state and in some have taken a nationalist turn: rooted in notions of economic sovereignty and self–determination.

Figure 2 left right distribution of parties in 2017 in Europe

Right populists are strongest in Eastern Europe. All four so–called Visegrád countries are governed by populist parties including Social Democracy in Slovakia (commonly known as SMER), the strongest left populist party in region and right wing Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary – where populist parties secured 63% of the vote in this year’s elections – and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice in Poland who now attacks core liberal institutions such as the independent judiciary and free press, the characteristic of right wing parties is that they increasingly define national identities in terms of ethnicity and religion.

In his chapter in Oxford handbook on populism (Stanley, 2019) describes two opinions on rise of populism in these regions:

⎯ first is the one of “radical theory that says populism consist in a backlash against the liberal politics of post–communist transition and the elites responsible for implementing these reforms”, while ⎯ the centrist theory says “populists largely exploit dissatisfaction with corrupt and incompetent leaders, rather than rejecting the politics of transition.”

In this region over the last 20 year the populism fluctuates rather than accumulates and still is the subject to laws of party competition. Only in Hungary the situation is different, it descended into quasi–authoritarianism and even though everything works – elections are held, state institutions like courts and electoral commissions are firmly in the hand of government loyalists, independent media under constant attack and critical institutions including universities threatened with closure. The problem with Hungary’s populism is that it practically shows us

24 what happens if the right wing populist are in power, in as of universities – CEU university in Budapest its professors were never jailed and it was not ordered o the university to be closed by the government decree, instead, the Orbán government quietly changed the rules under which all foreign universities operate, allowing PM Orbán to defend its treatment of CEU as a merely technical decision, rather than an attack on academic freedom.

Because of all above mention in the next chapters of my thesis I am going to discuss Hungary, its rode from democracy and explain why it happened there, how is it developing and does right wing populist parties really do have power to turn EUs democracy upside down and as one of the suggested scenarios15 of its future says “become the new normal” because as evidence show populist on east and west of Europe are using “fake news” or the “lying press” as a standard part of their populist repertoire as attempt to score political points with attacks on parliaments, on the press, and on the judiciary.

4 RISE OF THE DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY AND OVERVIEW OF ITS MOST PROMINENT POLITICAL PARTIES

4.1 Key elements in Hungary’s past that shaped its democracy in 1990s

In order to discuss Hungary’s present a person first needs to be familiar with its past. While living in Hungary16 I noticed three things considering Hungary’s past:

⎯ you can talk about all parts of it, but ⎯ some parts of it will not be discussed with you and that ⎯ its citizens have strong belief about certain events, and it is unlikely they will ever change it

Professors from the university in Pecs and the former Foreign Minister of Hungary ( 2009– 2010) I had opportunity to have an interview with on the Regional youth forum in Novi Sad in November 2019 professor Peter Balazs, the professor at the CEU university, told me a person needs to be familiar with the historic events listed below, its causes and consequences and influence they had in the arrival and shaping of Hungarian democracy in the late 1980s and 1990s in order to properly understand Hungary’s present 2015 onward situation, because these

15 The three possible basic scenarios for the future of populism in Europe suggested in the report European populism trends threats and future prospects are: “populists might prove to be a mostly innocuous interlude, it could represent the new normal and it could be a harbinger of democratic deconsolidation” (Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk, and Limor Goultchin, 2017).

16 I studdied in the winter semester international relations at Universty of Pecs – Faculty of humanities, as an Erasmus student in school year 2018/2019

25 events (emotional baggage they possess) are still used in political propaganda and daily life of citizens of Hungary; those events are:

⎯ Arrival of Hungarian ancestors 1100 years ago on the Carpathian Basin ⎯ Battle of Mohács ⎯ Treaty of Trianon ⎯ Hungary and Germany in the Second World War ⎯ Hungarian and SSSR – the revolution 23 October 1956 ⎯ Hungary in 1989 – the „triangular table” talks, ceremonial funeral of Imre Nagy in Budapest, establishment of the multiparty system in October, negotiated revolution …

I am going to sum them up briefly in the next sections, the information I am going to write are from numerous videos, interviews I was able to watch and documents, newspapers, and articles17 I had opportunity to read in Pecs local library.

The arrival of Hungarian ancestors 1100 years ago become a top topic 100ish years ago when it was first celebrated in 1896 with the Arrival of the Hungarians in 895 (Hungarian: A magyarok bejövetele ) a large cyclorama – a circular panoramic painting done by the Hungarian painter Árpád Feszty (Ópusztaszer National Heritage Park); its celebration goes hand in hand with the Magyarization (english Hungarization)18 and actions of the 19th centuries Hungarian politicians and intellectuals in the Austro–Hungarian empire who empathized them ethnical Hungarians having a long–lasting state in the Carpathian Basin – six centuries of independent statehood from the 896 when their ancestors led by the Chief Árpád, the Duke of the Magyars crossed the Carpathian mountains ( “he with his chieftains ( his leading men) pitched up their tents, and codified the common laws of their new country Principality of Hungary”, that was succeeded by the Christian Kingdom of Hungary with the coronation of St Stephen I in year 1000 ...) till the 1526 and battle of Mohács19 where they were defeated by the Ottoman empire (Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák, 1994).

The defeated at Mohacs is still present in the mindset of now days Hungarian and for moments of bad luck they say “Több is veszett Mohácsnál ( on English "more was lost at Mohács" )”, the expression is used because in the next almost 400 years it was under some

17 Links available in the bibliography section of the thesis

18 “Magyarization is a process by which non–Hungarian nationals came to adopt the Hungarian culture and language, either voluntarily or due to social pressure, often in the form of a coercive policy” (Britannica, 2019)

19 The battle happened on the 29 August 1526 near Mohács . It was led by the Louis II - the Kingdom of Hungary and Suleiman the Magnificent - Ottoman Empire , the victory of the Ottoman empire in this battle marked the end of the Kingdom of Hungary and its Middle Ages. It was not only consequential for the Hungary but for the whole Central Europe. 26 foreign power, they were under the Ottomans till the 1686, the Holy Roman Empire till the 1804 and then they were under the Austrian Empire till the 1867 when they by the Austro– Hungarian Compromise partially re–establish its former sovereignty by being no longer subject to the Austrian Empire even though they remain part of it – now called the Austro–Hungarian Empire (Lendvai, 2004). This compromise led to the signing of the Hungarian Nationalities Law in 1868 that ensured that “all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary no matter their nationality, constitute a politically single nation, the indivisible, unitary Hungarian nation and that there is no differentiation between them except in the respect of the official use of the current languages and then only in so far as necessitated by a practical considerations” (Britannica, 2019). In practice, Hungarian language was mandatory in the primary schools, almost all the secondary education was in Hungarian and in the public administration and justice system minority languages were banished (Hitchin, 2016).

4.1.1 Treaty of Trianon

The First World War was fought from the 1914 until the 1918 between the Allies (France, Russia, Great Britain, Japan, Italy and the United States) and a group of European countries known as the Central Powers (Germany, the Austro–Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria). The Allies won and great empires the Ottoman and Austro–Hungarian ceased to exist. They signed two separate peace treaties with now separate and independent states; with “Austria the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 and with Hungary the Treaty of Trianon in 1920”, it was signed on the 4th June at the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles France, it regulated the status and borders of now independent Kingdom of Hungary (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2019) . The most important points of the Treaty of Trianon were:

⎯ Loss of territory: o The newly created Czechoslovakia got the regions of Slovakia, Pressburg (Bratislava), Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and other smaller territories o Austria received the western part of Hungary (i.e., most of Burgenland). o While Yugoslavia (composed of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) took Croatia–Slavonia and part of the Banat. o Romania received most of the Banat region and all of Transylvania o Italy stayed with Fiume ( Rijeka) o It only had 38% of the rail lines that had existed in the pre–war Austro– Hungarian Empire and there was a restriction on its building – no railway would be built with more than one track

⎯ Loss of population: o it had a population of 7,6 million, only 36% of the pre–war population of 20,9 million citizens o the doctrine of "self–determination of peoples" was introduced and non– Hungarians could choose their nation o approximately “3 million of ethnical Hungarians were left outside of post– Trianon Hungary – nearly 900,000 living in the new Czechoslovakia, 1.6 million in the Transylvania region of Romania and 420,000 in Serbia”

The armed forces of the Hungary could not use airplanes; they were restricted to only 35,000 men, who could carry only light weapons and this armament could only be used to maintain the internal order and protect the borders. Also by the Trianon treaty Hungary had to pay war reparations to its neighbors (the amount of reparations would be determined and imposed later) (Zeidler, 2014).

The Hungary, same as anyone who lost any war in history, needed to obey everything demanded by those who won. This treaty divided it in this way and left it economically20 and politically wounded so it would not become a danger to the world peace again, but precisely because of those economic ruins and due to the Great depression they increased trade with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1930s.

4.1.2 Hungary and Germany in the Second World War

As I said in 1930s Kingdom of Hungary traded with Germany, they did it with the treaty that they signed in 1934 ( signed from Hungarian side by the Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös) making them dependant to Germany`s raw materials and export revenues, in 1935 the fascist party the Arrow cross party was founded and they pass the First Jewish Law, which “set quotas limiting Jews to 20% of positions in several professions” in 1939 the Second Jewish Law was made, which “cut the quotas on Jews permitted in the professions and in business and defined Jews by race instead of just religion”, also the forced labor service system was introduced, it primarily affected the Jewish population, but many other who belonged to the minorities like

20 Also due to the procidings in the Treaty of Trianon “Hungary produced 500% more agricultural goods than it needed for itself, the mills around Budapest operated at 20% level; in addition, 61% of arable land, 74% of public roads, 65% of canals, 62% of railroads, 64% of hard surface roads, 83% of pig iron output, 55% of industrial plants, and 67% of credit and banking institutions of the former Kingdom of Hungary“ lay within the territory of Hungary's neighbors“ (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2019)

28 the sectarians, leftists and Roma were also inducted (Loránt, 1967). In 1930s Adolf Hitler gave promises to return the territories and threats of military intervention and economic pressure if the Hungarian Government support the policies and goals of the Nazi Germany, in 1938 he did it by the First Vienna Award that “transferred to Hungary parts of southern Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, an area amounting to 11,927 km² and a population of 869,299 (86.5% of which were Hungarians)”. Between 5th and 10th November, Hungarian armed forces occupied the newly transferred territories and the Second Vienna Award “transferred to Hungary the northern half of Transylvania, with a total area of 43,492 km² and a total population of 2,578,100 divided more or less evenly between Hungarians and Romanians”(Romsics, 2019) , (Kertesz, 1953).

In the 1940, Hungary joined the Axis powers. In the 1941 they helped them invade Yugoslavia – “Hungary annexed sections of Baranja, Bačka, Međimurje, and Prekmurje” those “returned territories, 11417 km², had a population of 1,025,508 persons that comprised of the 36.6 % Hungarians, 19 % Germans, 16% Serbs and 28.4% others”. They also helped Nazis in the Operation Barbarossa - invasion of the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Army ranged from mountain troops and tank units to horse cavalry and specialist infantry (Thomas, 2008). Their participation was noted by the German observers for its “particular cruelty, with the occupied people subjected to the arbitrary violence; the Hungarian volunteers were sometimes referred to as the one who were engaged in the murder tourism” (Ungváry, 2007).

In the 1944 Soviet forces started to threaten Hungary so they engaged in the in armistice negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Hitler found out about it and managed to force revoking of the armistice ( by kidnapping the Regent Miklos Horthy`s son) and occupied Hungary in the 1944. The deportation of the Jews and Roma started immediately and many were deported to the Auschwitz concentration camp; “between 450,000 and 606,000 Hungarian Jews and an estimated 28,000 Hungarian Roma died”. Hungarian and German forces in Hungary were defeated by the advancing Soviet armies in 1945 and borders of Hungary were returned to the one before the Vienna awards (Piahanau, 2019) .

4.1.3 Hungary and SSSR

Based on the 1944 Moscow Conference21 Hungary was after the war under the Soviet sphere of influence. Evendou Soviet forces were on Hungarian territory the first ever democratic parliamentary elections were held in 1945. On the elections Independent Smallholders Party won 57% of votes, in the elections “pre–war right–wing parties were excluded and were not allowed to compete and their leaders” just like the SS volunteers were banned from elections. In the 1946 the National Assembly passed the Law No. I on the form of Government of Hungary, this law included the basic elements of constitution but was not regarded as such. On the elections in the 1945 the communist party had won 17% of votes and in next two three years they as opposition influenced parliament and it adopted in 1949 a constitution as an Law No. XX of 1949; by it “Hungary became a people's republic”, which was "the state of the workers and working peasants". In the next decades numerous amendments to constitution were enacted and they went in line with the then reforms and plans of communists from the administration regulation to the extension of elective terms of local councils (Simons, William B. (ed.), 1980).

In the 1949 the Hungarian People's Republic was founded, “a one party socialist republic governed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party”, its Prime minister was Mátyás Rákosi, known as an authoritarian and a close friend of Joseph Stalin. From the 1949 till the 1956 numerous Hungarians were arrested, jailed and killed on accusations of ” being the enemies of the party”. All of the arrests were done by “the secret police ÁVH – the State Protection Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság on Hungarian or ÁVH), the arrested were not subject to any judicial review and AVH questioning process included “extensive periods of torture (lasting between 3 and 18 months) and imprisonment in the concentration camps” (Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 2019). Economically country suffered a destruction of the infrastructure in the war, they were part of the Soviet–sponsored COMECON (Council Of Mutual Economic Assistance) so they could not trade with the West or receive Marshall Plan aid, due to all of that Hungary had a low production of consumer goods and started developing heavy industry. Prime Minister Rákosi also expanded the education system giving more opportunities to the working– class children and in general increased literacy, religion was gradually eliminated from schools and communist ideology was disseminated in schools and universities – learning Russian language was mandatory (Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 2019), (Kertesz, 1953).

21 It was a meeting in Moscow between Churchill and Stalin from 9 October to 19 October 1944 where Churchill made a secret proposal on a scrap of paper dividing post–war Europe into Western and Soviet spheres of influence. (Simons, William B. (ed.), 1980)

In 1952 Joseph Stalin died and Mátyás Rákosi was replaced as a prime minister by Imre Nagy who among the other things released Rákosi's political prisoners, promised to increase the production and distribution of consumer goods, encouraged public discussion on the changes to the political system and liberalizing the economy and removed the state control of the mass media. The common people, intellectuals and writers saw him as an icon of reform against the hard–line elements in the Soviet–backed regime. In 1955 he was accused “on rightist deviation” and Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party dismissed him from his post of prime minister making Rákosi again the leader of Hungary (Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 2019).

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 began on 23 October 1956 and lasted less than three weeks until the 10th November. It began as a peaceful demonstration of the students in Budapest who before the march posted–up stenciled copies of their 16–point manifesto on every available lamp post, tree or shop front. There were 200 000 demonstrators who consisted of thousands of students, shop assistants, office workers, factory workers and even soldiers, people from nearby towns who carried banners and placards bearing anti–government and anti–Soviet slogans, they flew the Hungarian flag with its central Soviet emblem torn out and shouted ‘Russians go home!’, during the next days “thousands of citizens organized and started battling ÁVH and Soviet troops” (Budapestbeacon, 2016). At the end of October government fell, the new government, with Imre Nagy as a prime minister disabled state security police AVH, pledged for reestablishment of the free elections and declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact also they released many political prisoners and stressed that Hungary needs to be neutral and multiparty social democracy (Bekes, 2002), (Colley, 2016). On the 4th November large Soviet forces invaded Budapest and killed thousands of civilians– estimations are 30 000. On the 10th of November resistance of Hungarians ceased and mass arrests began. The Prime Minister Imre Nagy was put on a trial, executed and buried in an unmarked grave. Soviet rule was reestablished by the mid November 1956 and János Kádár was put as head, General Secretary, of the newly formed Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt) and a premier of Hungary. In the beginning of 1957 all public opposition was suppressed and “almost 200 000 Hungarians fled to the west as refugees, 26,000 were put on trial by the Kádár government, and of those 13,000 were imprisoned and estimated 350 were executed” (Bekes, 2002).

In 1960s Kádár announced a new policy under the motto "He who is not against us is with us" - the relatively liberal cultural and general amnesty were introduced. In 1966, the Central Committee approved the "New Economic Mechanism” – NEM. This represented a major shift 31 to the decentralization in an attempt to overcome the inefficiencies of central planning22,it created the market relationships among the firms, made the firms respond to the prices to maximize profits, and use the profits to the budget new investments it also pursued a foreign policy which encouraged more trade with the West (Balassa, 1985). The Kádár regime, also known as goulash communism, “the happiest barracks of the eastern bloc”, was characterized by the steadily rising living standards, education and health care that were for “free” and state that provided pensions for everybody. In 1988 János Kádár was replaced as a General Secretary of the Socialist Party (MSZMP) in 1988, in 1989 at age of 77 he died from cancer.

4.2 Hungary`s transition to democracy

The memories of the repressions of the 1956 revolution were still vivid in the memories of Hungarians in 1960s and 1970s but in 1980s due to the economic reforms NEM who improved the living standards and policies of Gorbachev “perestroika and glasnost” in Hungary in the mid 1980s opposition groups emerged and the first independent newspapers were published. In 1988 on 15th march the first mass demonstrations of opposition were organized and sometimes the government tolerated the gatherings sometimes they did not. The main opposition groups, of whom the majority participated in “the first mass demonstrations of opposition” in March 1988 were: “the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum), founded in October 1987, the Fidesz (an acronym of Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Alliance of Young Democrats), established in March 1988, and the Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége), set up in November 1988” (Institute of National Remembrance, 2019). When you compare all other countries from the Eastern bloc, the Hungary’s transition to the western democracy was the smoothest one. It is the most interesting one because it started in party itself from the party members in 1988 who put Károly Grósz, considered a liberal, as a new Secretary General of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party after the Kádár resignation, and another reformer, Miklós Németh, as a Prime Minister . The scholars in 1990 called the emergence of democratic regime in Hungary as an evolutionary “simple change” of system initiated by the reform–minded communists (Riishøj, 2007).

In 1989 several important events happened preceding the change of name of the state from the „People’s Republic of Hungary” to the „Republic of Hungary” on the 23th October 1989:

⎯ On the 11th February 1989 new prime minister and secretary general of Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party approved the reconstruction of the multiparty system and

22 The central planning was “characterized by 'physical planning' and persuasion of the production targets, material–intensive commodities were produced, and users had no choice among suppliers”. (Balassa, 1985). 32

changed evaluation of the events of 1956; now it was considered as a national uprising. At the end of March 1989 on the Round Table of the Opposition a common stance on the most vital issues and an uniform policy towards the government was established. ⎯ In May 1989, the removal of border guards on the Austrian frontier began and in September the frontier was fully open ⎯ On the 13 June, 1989, the „triangular table/roundtable talks”were started among the government, the opposition and representatives of social organizations and trade unions. Negotiations were finished on 18 September. The most important element of the concluded agreement was the announcement of free parliamentary elections (András Bozóki (ed), 2002).

⎯ On the 16th June about 25,000 people in Budapest participated in government–approved ceremonial funeral (reburial) of Imre Nagy and his associates who had been arrested and executed in the wake of the 1956 Revolution ( Csaba Békés; Melinda Kalmár, 2001). He was formally rehabilitated on 6 July. János Kádár died on the same day.

⎯ On 7 October 1989 “the MSzMP was dissolved and re–founded as the Hungarian Socialist Party”, a Western–style social democratic party.

⎯ In October 1989 a radical revision of the 1949 constitution was done. It included more than 100 changes, “an introduction of a multiparty parliamentary system of the representative democracy and free elections, creation of an independent judicial system and separation of the legislative and executive branches of the government”. The revision also established a Constitutional Court that is elected by the Parliament, “which reviews the constitutionality of legislation and may annul laws. Also an “ombudsman for the protection of constitutional civil rights and ombudsmen’s’ groups for the protection of national and ethnic minority rights” were introduced (Britannica, 2019)

⎯ The National Assembly of Hungary adopted “The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary on the 18th of October 1989 by the Act XXXI of 1989 that changed almost 100 provisions of its 1949 Constitution”; making Hungary the only country from former SSSR that did not had completely new constitution when it became democratic. These amendments enter into force on 23 October 1989 making Hungary “officially democratic independent constitutional republic”. (Institute of National Remembrance, 2019), (Bartlett, 1997) (Brown, J. F., 1991).

The new constitution was adopted from the old communist one and it used a model of consensual democracy and a government that assumed more than two parties in the parliament

– a coalition government – among 100 new acts were the one who required it, sometimes also involved, “a two–third of majority” hence the opposition support was needed for all the questions concerning the structure of the government and fundamental rights. Having a two thirds quorum meant Hungary rejected semi or full presidential regime and gave more power to the parliament whose term was shortened from 5 to 4 years, it has strong oversight power and it elected the constitutional court members who had extremely broad powers – they could annul laws declared unconstitutional. Besides these changes in the constitution everything with the prefix socialist was taken out and limitations on the authority of the prime minister, provisions for referendums and an independent judiciary were introduced, economy needed to be a social market one, both public and private properties enjoyed the equal protection, the parties functioned freely, the people are sovereign and the overall human rights were strongly emphasized. (Halmai, 2019) (Harmathy, Attila (ed.), 1998).

In my opinion the most important thing in Hungarian change of the regime is that it was not decided on the streets, the communist regime in this country did not collapsed under the mass movements, or pressure of the uprisings like it did in Romania, Poland or then Czechoslovakia – there were protests but regime was changed internally by the reformists in the communist party and by the political opposition that used favorable changes inside and outside of the country for change of the power balance in Hungary. The Hungarian citizens were in this process a passive observers, bystanders who were agreeing on this change done by the elite, this passivity and lack of active involvement in democratic processes was common in Hungary `s transition years . It was followed by the lack of any citizen initiate mass mobilization – referendums could be initiated by collection of the 100 000 signatures from citizens but in 1990s if held, they were initiated by government. Also low levels of party membership and organization as well as low vote turnover were characteristic of this period and are explained in details in chapter bellow about the three parliament elections held in 1990s.

4.2.1 Political happenings in the last decade of 20th century

In the next decade three parliamentary elections – in 1990, 1994 and 1998 and three referendums were held. In the next sections I will briefly explain elections results, changes in parliament structure that happened in the 1990, 1994 and 1998, the need for the referendums, its election consequences, parties23 involved in them and in general changes that happen in Hungary in last decade of 20th century. The first democratic event Hungarians participated was a “four yeses” referendum whose questions24 were closely related to the important political issues of the transition and democracy–building (Pozsdr-Szentmikl6sy, 2017). It was held on the 26th November 1989 and had a turnout of 58.0%. (Goodman, 1989).

The first completely free and competitive democratic parliamentary elections in Hungary were held in 1990. These elections decided what approach the country would take toward reform to the democratic system and what will be the pace of these reforms. In the elections the very complicated election process created during the Hungarian roundtable was used, its complex procedures were based on the four sub–systems: individual districts, territorial lists, national list and minority representation not based on elections for whom every 18 years and older Hungarian could vote and had additional sub rules like the individual district nomination system requiring 750 authorized signatures by voters, different percentage of majority of votes a candidate would need to obtain in local and territorial constituencies and a 5% party threshold for obtaining a seat in the parliament (Siaroff, 2000). The electoral law was very complex, the election of members of parliament through both individual districts and proportional representation was not comprehendible to average voter, as they were not able to foresee what will happen to his votes, that among other things led to low voter turnout by the western standards – In the first round election, 65% of eligible voter (7,8 million three quarters of total population of Hungary in 1990) voted for the individual district candidates and 63.15 % for the county (party) lists and in the second round only 45% voted (Martis, K. C., Kovacs, Z., Kovacs, D., & Peter, S., 1992), either way it led to first democratically elected parliament in Eastern Europe where 1623 candidates (including 199 independents) ran for the 176 seats of single– member constituencies in the first ballot, and 496 in the second and only 12 of more than 50

23 In the next part of this chapter I will also briefly mention FIDESZ but it will be in focus in the next chapter where I will focus more on how this party using among other populist means and democratic civil society gradually managed to “own” the parliament.

24 The first question they were asked was whether the President should be elected after parliamentary elections – “the 50.1% of voters said yes, on other three questions the 95% of voters said yes; the questions were: whether organizations related to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party should be banned from workplaces, whether the party should account for properties owned or managed by it, and whether the Workers' Militia should be dissolved” ( Florian Grotz, László Hubai, 2010).

35 parties and associations established prior to the polling engaged in competition to attain the National Assembly seats (386 seats) at the national level and only six of them forming the parliament: ⎯ Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), ⎯ Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), ⎯ Independent Smallholders and Citizens Party (FKGP) ⎯ Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), ⎯ Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) and ⎯ Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)

A coalition government with the Hungarian Democratic Forum–MDF and Christian Democratic People's Party–KDNP and Independent Smallholders' Party–FKGP was formed having MDFs leader József Antall as a prime minister and Árpád Göncz a founding member of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) took office as the President. In these elections “democratic parties gain majority of seats and successors of communist party were removed from power – they won 14.6 % of the vote and 8.5 % of the seats in parliament” (Racz, 1991). The parties that formed 1990 government were all nationalistic and had somewhat anti-minority attitudes, the KDNP and MDF are Christian conservatives, pro–Western and support a more cautious program of reform. Due to its rural base support the FKgP was included even though it has anti–Western standings.

The Hungarian presidential election referendum was held four months after the parliamentary election, but due to “voters turnout of 14% was declared invalid” and had as a result continuation of an election of the president by the National Assembly ( Florian Grotz, László Hubai, 2010). So it stayed that he is elected by the Parliament that elects him by secret ballot for a 5 year term and that he has an oversight rule – must sign all laws except those considered constitutionally doubtful and they are refer to by the constitution of Hungary to the Constitutional Court for a ruling. Many analysis of the 1990 elections were done and numerous statically data were published by the government and other independent watchers and scholars, the most interesting one and in my opinion pivotal for the Hungarian democracy are that of 386 seats majority were held by men – 358 of them, according to age majority of seats was held by people from 30 to 60 – 321 seats, considering the profession it was consisted of 100 teachers, 77 lawyers, 49 economists, 48 doctors/pharmacist/veterinarians and 40 engineers (Inter- Parliamentary Union, 2008).

The parties that formed the parliament in 1990s had a short existence legally and organizationally. In their programmes and campaigns they showed that they are all anti communist, some anti Soviet, they were all backward looking, had a catch all parties appeal trying to be for everyone in all respects, they lack a pragmatic programme on how to lead economy from a centralized to a market system and it was very hard to define an ideological profile of these parties at the beginning of the 1990s. These six parties (explained in detail bellow) were the one who had a majority of seats in the parliament on the 1994 and 1998 election with different percentage share (figure 3, 4 and 5 in this master thesis ) and eventually led Hungary to the EU, they also changed their political ideologies throw out the decade; that is way below I shortly summed up their outline25 on the 1990 elections.

Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum – MDF) was a party that won most seats in 1990 parliamentary election. It was first organized as an anti–Communist pro–democratic movement in 1987 that occupied a centrist position between the communists and the radical opposition. They transformed to a party in 1989 and as the oldest opposition force in Hungary were well known to voters. The party members were intellectuals, writers, philosophers and senior figures in education; they included populist and liberal traditions as well as Christian democratic views. In their programme they defined themselves as a centre party but after the 1990 elections claimed to be 'centre–right of centre, they wanted to represent the entire national community promising protection for Hungarian minorities elsewhere, they advocated for some state control over aspects of public political expression, advocated a gradual approach to the agricultural question, were for a social market economy but wanted reforms at a slower pace. The focus of their campaign was a ‘third–path’ development program in which they emphasized that Hungarians should not be ‘sold out’ to West–European interests, nevertheless in foreign policy had a balanced view, suggesting correct relations with all neighbors including the Soviet union and as a long goal had neutrality and integration into the European community. Their voters came mostly from the central and southeastern parts of the country and were from lower middle service class and rural intelligence.

Christian Democratic People's Party (Hungarian: Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt – KDNP) programme used 'Christian Philosophy' as a “the guideline for the solution of all social problems” and has in the centre of its aspirations individual freedom and stresses importance of family. It has ties to the old party; they claimed to be the “revival of the Popular

25 Information about party programs were taken from the articles (Racz, 1991) (Martis, K. C., Kovacs, Z., Kovacs, D., & Peter, S., 1992) (Siaroff, 2000) and (Riishøj, 2007).

Democratic Party” (a leading opposition party during a post World War II period that is considered “the most conservative major party in Hungary” ). They support for a freedom of the religious expression are somewhat moderated by support for a protective social–welfare policy and a mixed ownership. They are strongly pro–Hungarian, support some restrictions on the free speech, and have some policies that are either anti–Jewish or anti–Gypsy. In their economic program focus was on the agriculture where they called for small private farms who had limitations of the size and the transformation of the cooperatives on a voluntary basis and are for a market economy Their foreign policy programme was very general and emphasized peaceful relations with all. Their voter support is predominately from the countryside, mainly Transdanubia.

Independent Smallholders' Party (Független Kisgazdapárt FKGP) is a party who was founded in 1930 and had a governing role between 1945 and 1947. It consisted of the old– time politicians, during the campaign they pursued a progressively more radical programme, that focused on a primacy of private property, returning to the 1945–47 property status, return of the confiscated property and dismantling the large–scale agricultural production units, promoted itself as “the party for all small merchants and independent businessmen” and had an aggressive and hostile tone towards the Soviet Union and everyone who was involved over the last 40 years in its politics and management. They are strongly pro–Hungarian and have been accused of being anti–Jewish and anti–Gypsy. In their foreign policy they pursue neutrality as well as ”political representation of all Hungarians in the Karpat basin” and unlike the MDF and the KDNP are anti–Western. Their voters are mostly small business, farmer and agricultural workers who come from the southern and eastern parts of a country where agricultural sector still dominates.

Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt, SZDSZ) defined itself as “left of centre, 'social–liberal', and inheritor of the ideas of European social democracy”. Their members are dissident intellectuals and human rights activists that were first formed in 1988 as the Network of Free Initiatives. Later when they formed as a party they included former communists and had mostly educated members. Before elections they had radical anti–regime policies, promoted different social elements stressed the danger of anti–gypsy and anti–Semitic traits in society and emphasized voluntary associations as social problems solvers not the state. In 1989 they had “a strong and successful campaign to block the presidential elections on a referendum”; some scholars said this led to them having second best position on elections. They advocated a quick transformation to a market economy – that included “privatization of the state holdings and encouragement of entrepreneurship and

38 foreign capital investment”, and in foreign policy pressed for “the revision of Warsaw Pact membership”, they were pro–Western in orientation. They won most of their votes in Budapest and other towns from urban middle class and upper–middle class from the western region of Hungary where the economic development and urbanization is higher.

Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP) was a legal successors of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) the ruling party in Hungary from 1956 to the 1989, they had experienced leadership and established organizational structure and thought of themselves as heir of Hungarian progressive thinking and reform communism with the objective of democratic socialism. It their 1990 campaign they called for a comprehensive reforms of all social, political and economic institutions but with the perseverance of “positive socialist and communist values” and continuation of the social– welfare system (such as education, health care and pensions) that was developed under the Communist regime. They proposes a slow transition to a mixed economy with the protection of ‘the traditions of the working–class movement. Their foreign policy programme stressed importance of the international and European integration, called for correct relations with the Soviet Union; it does not press for separation from the Warsaw Pact and has neutrality as only a long–range goal. Scholars in 1990 said their “loss on these election happened because they had a partial solutions for everything, were halfway between the communist party and a Western socialist or social democratic party and as a successor of old regime lost trust of Hungarians”; during the 1989 and 1990 there was a strong campaign from other parties that everything bad that a is happening know happened and was due to the socialism and former regime.

Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – FIDESZ) developed in 1988 as an alternative to the official communist youth organization (KISZ) and demanded “free speech and organization and opposed the ruling communist party”. Its members26 were the first–generation intellectuals born in rural towns that grow under the late Kadar regime and did not had experience of the repression of the earlier periods. As a party they saw themselves as a key player in the replacement of the regime. They were one of the main speakers on the “Opposition Round Table” and had been known to society due to speech of its member 25 years old Viktor Orbán who on ceremony in Heroes Square on the reburial of Imre Nagy spoke on behalf of Hungary’s youth and called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The party defines

26 All of its founding members participated in summer camp in southeast part of a country in 1985, it was held without official authorization and had as debated topics sensitive political issues like democracy and the rule of law, modernization and technological backwardness, the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, and the problems of poverty and the environment (Lomax, 1999) 39 itself as left of centre, supports a free market system with a minimal role for the state but an extensive social welfare provisions, enterprise privatization with limited attention to social policy and the predominance of the private. Its foreign policy emphasized a quick separation from the Warsaw Pact, Hungarian neutrality, European integration, as well as high priority to protection of the Hungarian minority abroad. During the elections in 1990 they had an upper age limit 35 years for party membership (although they were looking for the electoral support from all the voters, no matter their age). Their biggest support came from the university and college towns and larger urban centers. It was interesting for me that in 1990s party had a strong support among elderly women that liked the name and wanted to support “the future of their grandchildren”, also elderly thought of the party of youth as the only fresh and trustworthy movement not tainted by old politicians and the past.

The early transition years for Hungarian citizens were hard for them philologically and economically, despite their country being the one who received more than half of the western investment to Eastern Europe many of them were unemployed; the companies they worked in went bankrupt or were badly privatized, these questions of unemployment as well as questions of nationalist and ethnic minorities surfaced on every elections. The disappointment in the leaders dealing with the transition process is best seen in voter’s preferences and voter turnout on elections in 1994 and 1998 that show changes in the government every four years and also proves that Hungarian democracy is working – all government changes went peacefully. During early 1990s Hungary joined the “Visegrad Association made up of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia”, became one of the new members of OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), a member of the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE - renamed in 1994 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)) , applied for membership in the European Union, signed the Geneva Convention on Refugees and elaborating bilateral protocols and led many international organizations sponsor programmes that assisted former socialist countries (Zoltan Kovacs, Alan Dingsdale, 1998).

The preferences of voters are best represented via parliament diagrams ( figure 3, 4 and 5 below) that show results of the Hungarian general elections in 1990, 1994 and 1998 visually representing seats parties held in the parliament ( Florian Grotz, László Hubai, 2010). There it is visible that in 8 years parties who led Hungary from the communism lost trust of its voters and the one in opposition were at the end of a century a majority, MDF lost it even before on 1994 elections when its seats share declined from 165 to the 38, and the MSZPs increased from

33 to the 209, and then declined to 134 in 1998, while Fidesz had a big increase in 1998 election when its share of seats rose from 22 and 20 on the elections in 1990, 1994 to the 148 in 1998.

MSZP 33 Agrarian Aliance 1 SZDSZ 94 Fidesz 22 Independents 6 MDF 165 a coalition KDNP 14 government FKgP 44 Figure 3 Hungarian parliamentary election in 1990

MSZP 209 a coalition SZDSZ 69 government Agrarian Alliance 1 Fidesz 20 VP 1 MDF 38 KDNP 22 FKgP 26

Figure 4 Hungarian parliamentary election in 1994

MSZP 134 SZDSZ 24 Independents 1

Fidesz 148 a coalition MDF 17 government FKgP 48 MIEP 14

Figure 5 Hungarian parliamentary election in 1998

The main problem of the Hungarians prior to the 1994 election were general unhappiness with the pace and direction reforms had taken and how transition dropped living standards of majority of population thus evoking the sense of nostalgia of the “good old days” of “Goulash communism” of the late 1980s (Siaroff, 2000).

The 1994 elections were held and as a winner had MSZP – 209 MPs that with SZDSZ – 69MPs formed a new coalition (parliamentary diagram – figure 4) that had a two–thirds majority in parliament (Zoltan Kovacs, Alan Dingsdale, 1998), both parties in their campaign had pro–Western platform. The new parliament consisted of the highly educated lawyers, 41 economists and academics, having only 5,18% of deputies with high school diplomas, also it had 150 deputies aged below 45 years of age (38.86%) while previously parliaments deputies average age was 45. These elections even do social democrats won a majority showed that society in Hungary is divided between three major forces roughly evenly: the list votes show the left with 32.99%, the liberal parties with 26.76% and the right–of–centre conservative forces with 27.59% social support (Barnabas Racz,Istvan Kukorelli, 1995) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008).

In their papers about the 1994 elections in Hungary (Barnabas Racz,Istvan Kukorelli, 1995) and (Zoltan Kovacs, Alan Dingsdale, 1998) the sharp decline of MDF (clearly visible in the parliament diagram figure 4 above) is attributed to the weakening of their coalition in parliament and having damaged image in the public eye due to the tensions in their own ranks, unofficial participation in “the re–burial of Admiral Horthy's (the authoritarian inter–war Regent) in 1993”, their actions to control media, being involved in a series of real estate financial scandals, having “indifference leaders” and not being able to deal with the key issues of social inequality (GDP fell by 20%, agricultural production declined by 40%t and industrial production by 33%) and unemployment that rose from 24 000 Hungarians being unemployed in 1990 to 580 000 of them being jobless in the 1994. These disappointments of voters in a centre–right coalition government contributed to the rise of Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP that during its four years as opposition reached out to various platforms and organizations and made close ties with the largest labor organization, the National Federation of Hungarian Unions and incorporated in their election programme long range strategy of improving economy by “setting targets of two years to arrest decline and at least four to achieve a modest improvement in economic performance” (Korosenyi, 1999). In a foreign affairs they supported Hungary’s full membership in the European Union and NATO. In the same time other parties had internal fragmentations27 and MSZP strengthen their party foundations, showed as stable in public eyes and established them self as a social–democratic party by receiving associate membership in the Socialist International. How their democratic standing was accepted by the voters is best seen in a fact that there was no panic or demonstrations in any of the major cities that former communists won elections and that MDFs anticommunist campaign hurt only MDF position and not MSzP.

The MSZP–SZDSZ government introduced new economic measures called Bokros package in 1995 that included onetime 9% devaluation of the forint, limitation of growth of wages in the

27 For example Fidesz was in process of redefining itself had in 1993 Gabor Fodor, deputy chairman and group of other party and parliamentary leaders leaving the party and joining the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) that was second on these elections.

42 public sector welfare cutbacks, including abolition of free higher education and dental service, reduced family allowances, child–care benefits, and maternity payments depending on income and wealth; lowering subsidies of pharmaceuticals, and raising retirement age as well as 8% additional customs duty on all goods except for the energy sources and simplified and accelerated privatization, these measures were welcomed by the World bank and IMF but not by the Hungarian population. In the 1996 the new pension system was introduced that was not based fully by state as the previous one, this one was 50% security based and 50% fund ( International Busines Publications USA, 2016). In the 1997 there was a rise in the investment, production (80% of it was produced in private sector), real wages and consumption levels, and a decline of levels of unemployment and inflation. The foreign policy consisted of signing agreements considering the situation of Hungarian minorities living in the neighbor countries and opening negotiation talks with NATO and EU. During this coalition third referendum happened, the one on joining NATO, it was held on 16 November 1997, had a voter turnout of 49.2% and proposal was approved by 85.3% of voters. At the end of their term on March 1998 The European Union opened membership talks with Hungary.

Even though this government was seen by the foreign opinion as the one who brought stability to the country and region its citizens were dissatisfied by this government dealing with education, transport and crime28 and corruption in public life29. Prime Minister Horn blamed Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) for these problems as they were responsible for those ministries (Lomax, 1999). Nevertheless the MSZP as well as foreign opinion expected the re– election of the socialist–liberal government, but it did not happen.

Elections were held in May 1998 and were characterized again by a low voter turnout of 56–57% in both rounds. The 1998 election campaign programs of political parties concerned three main issues : family related issues, economic issues and security (both physical and financial). The characteristic of these elections was that media landscape changed due to the 1996 law on the electronic media and the subsequent licensing of private electronic media as a result had emergence of numerous private TV stations30 , that right–wing and ultra–nationalist

28 The police forces were unable to stop a series of terrorist bombings, in 1997 there was 17 separate instances of terrorism– related behavior

29 Tocsik Affair in 1996 brought to public by popular Fidesz MP who brought to attention payment of 4 million US dollars to a lawyer Marta Tocsik for her services in negotiating the sell–off of assets belonging to local councils, that arose suspicions of involvement of both governing parties and nevertheless corruption allegations were never proven the distrust of voters stayed.

30 Nevertheless two private nation–wide terrestrial TV stations (RTL Klub and TV2) refused to run political ads, but national public broadcasters were obliged to publish advertisement of parties with national lists free of charge at least once before elections and all information provided by broadcasters must be objective and balanced and may not serve any particular party or political movement

Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) won over the 5% of votes and with 14MPs entered the Parliament and that government that was formed after the elections was the first that had its roots in the movements of opposition to the former communist regime (Lomax, 1999). The party Fidesz won the largest number of National Assembly seats – 148, while the coalition government of 1994 elections had a decrease MSZP from 209 to 134 SZDSZ from 69 to the 24 deputies (parliamentary diagram – figure 5). The leader of Fidesz aged 35 became the youngest Prime minister in Hungary in 20 century and in July he formed a coalition government with the parties who on 1990 elections formed government coalition – the center–right parties MDF and FKgP , thus having 213 seats in the parliament. The parliament average age of deputies was 50 years, half of them have law degrees31 and almost half of cabinet ministers were once members of the former ruling party – the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, but the key positions were held by a small and tightly–knit group of close group of friends who had been together both at Szarvas in 1985 and at the foundation of Fidesz in 1988.

4.2.2 Political happenings in the first decade of the 21th century

During the 1998 – 2002 period Fidesz tune become increasingly nationalist and focused more attention to Hungarian minorities abroad and emphasized protecting Hungarian interests and values, they were focused more on the social issues and ambiguous considering the economic policy – they did however initiate in 2001 economic development plan known as Sze´chenyi Plan that included promotion of SMEs. Their 2002 election campaign was very populist and included promises such as subventions and tax relief for families having children or taking out home loans and announcing plans to build more bridges, motorways and dams. The majority in opposition party MSZP claimed they are the one who will repair the split in society and create equal opportunity, a predictable social security system and improve health care also they stressed opposition need for a freedom of speech and said in their campaign speech that if they win it will be possible to speak freely and to criticize the government. This turn of the events is very interesting because more than decade ago students that later formed Fidesz fought for the freedom of speech and possibility to critic government (Benoit, 2002).

Over the year’s number of candidates and parties competing in the elections in Hungary declined from 1,876 in 1994 to the 1,606 in 1998 and 1,250 in 2002 candidates that competed in the single mandate constituencies. The elections in 2002 were the record one considering the voter turnout – the 71% voters in the first round and 73.47% in the second round and voters

31 Orbán declared that anyone who wants to be a member of government needs to have a university degree 44 preference become more clear and were divided on two major political blocs the Socialists – MSZP won 42.1% and the coalition government (Fidesz, Hungarian Civic Party and Hungarian Democratic Forum) of 1998 elections won 41.1% in the first round, the other party that managed to have more than 5% threshold to enter the parliament was the Liberal Aliance of Free Democrats – SZDSZ. The majority of seats in parliament (figure 6 bellow) were won by the FIDESZ but they did not have coalition partners and could not form a major government, it was formed by the MSZP nad SZDSZ who were part of coalition government formed on 1994 elections. The than president Ferenc Madl appointed Socialist Party candidate Peter Medgyessy for Prime Minister (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008).

MSZP 178 a coalition SZDSZ 20 government Fidesz 164 MDF 24

Figure 6 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2002

In their campaigns both parties – Fidesz and MSZP agreed on states path to EU and consider it beneficial to its future but they were perceived differently in the Brussels – the Socialist one as the more pro market and less nationalist, than EU Enlargment Comisioner welcomed the Socialist win and looked forward to collaborate with them stating in his statement after the elections that Hungary rejected the temptation of extremist, xenophobic, anti–European and anti–democratic forces already in the first round (Euractiv, 2002).

On April 2003 there was a referendum32 on joining the European Union the 83.8% of voters said yes; a voter turnout was 45.6%. The EU Treaty of Accession was signed on 16 April 2003 and the first round of negotiations were launched in July 2003 under them it was planned for Hungary to receive 2 billion euro under the EU Structural Funds 1,12 billion euro under the Cohesion Fund that will be used for transport and environmental infrastructure projects, business infrastructure, human resource development, agriculture and rural development and regional development (Euroactive, 2003). It became a full member of the European Union on 1st May 2004 and in June 2014 the citizens of the 25 EU member states participated in the election of their representatives to the EU Parliament. The Hungarian parties

32 The question was „Egyetért-e azzal, hogy a Magyar Köztársaság az Európai Unió tagjává váljon? - Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should become a member of the European Union ?”. 45 that participated in elections were not interested in EU affairs that much and only Fidesz had published a Euro manifesto but Brussels commentators about it said it is better to call it a leaflet than a programme. The Hungary voters’ turnout was 38.5 % and they elected their representatives – the 24 of them; 11 seats were won by the ruling coalition – 9 socialists and 2 liberal democrats, and 13 seats by the two opposition parties – 12 Fidesz representatives and 1 MDF (European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 2009).

In August 2004 Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy resigned from the position due to a dispute with the coalition partner SZDSZ and in September Socialist Ferenc Gyurscany, a 43 year–old old charismatic millionaire, was elected as a new Prime Minister. He announced plans to reform health care, to trim several governments programs and adopt euro by 2010 (Euroactiv, 2004). In December 2004 there was a two question33 referendum considering giving citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad and the privatization of health services and. The both questions were approved by the voters but it was declared invalid due to low voter turnout of 37,5%. The government was campaigning for the privatization of health services saying it will bring funds for its improvement and against giving passports to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, while opposition campaigned for giving the citizenships stating it to be an excellent way of reuniting the nation without changing the borders and against the privatization as it will increase cost of health care and will make in unaffordable to poorer citizens (BBC News, 2004).

The two blocs of party’s socialist (the governing MSzP–SzDSz coalition) and conservative opposition (FIDESz and KDNP) that were formed on 2002 election continued with their campaign on the first election that happened after Hungary become part of EU. During these 2006 April elections economic issues became crucial as country was in a budget deficit – the 8% of GDP, than the largest in EU. In order to battle the deficit and slowing economy in 2005 then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány announced a 100 step program that included 100 reform measures in the field of work, welfare services, broad areas of public services and economic regulation (Balogh, Eszter ; Tóth, András, 2005).

Although four parties manage to have a 5% threshold and run for parliament in most constituency’s voters were voting for MszP or for the Fidesz. In their election campaign government coalition said they would continue with policies that aimed at achieving the

33 Do you agree with the notion that public health service institutions and hospitals should remain state or local government property, and, in accordance with that, the Parliament should repeal the contradictory law?

Do you want the Parliament to pass a law that enables ethnic Hungarians with non-Hungarian citizenship and residence, who affirm their Hungarian nationality, either with a Hungarian identity card described in Par. 19 of Act LXII/2001, or in a way specified in the forthcoming law, to apply for and be granted Hungarian citizenship

Maastricht criteria by 2008 and Euro accession by 2010 and that economic competitiveness and efficiency are vital for the countries transformation into a middle European power. In his speeches the Prime minister said Hungary need to prosper from competitors as it cannot hide from it and that they need to be competitive but maintain solidarity. In their electoral campaign they stressed importance of courage, security and justice in society (Korkut, 2007). On other hand Fidesz foster anti–privatization rhetoric34, presented itself as a voice of the provinces against the corrupt capital and foster family and raising a family with children was presented as a national duty. In his speeches prior to elections Orbán stated that EU enlargement had harmed Hungary as they are unable to compete with strong competitions and due to that small schools in small settlements disappear, entrepreneurs living off the land disappear, also he talked about strengthening the nation stating it is needed for strong republic and advanced country (Korkut, 2007).

The 2006 election had decrease in voter turnout comparing to elections in 2002; in the first poll it was 67.57 % and in the second 64.39%, the governing coalition held an advantage trout the elections and in the end were re–elected35 as they won 210 of the 386 parliamentary seats (figure 7 bellow), while Fidesz–KDNP had 164 seats. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008).

MSZP 190 a coalition SZDSZ 20 government Fidesz 141 KDNP: 23 MDF 11

Figure 7 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2006

After elections the reelected government introduced a fiscal austerity programme that involved cutting down on social spending and increasing taxes. The initiatives involved significant changes in education, healthcare and public administration36 and were particularly unpopular with the public and/or the professions affected and with the leakage on Sunday 17th September 2006 of a Prime minister confidential speech37 delivered on the Hungarian Socialist Party's

34The party prior to the election initiated a “nemzeti vagyonszerzo´´de´s (national property agreement)” for prevention of the privatization of the Hungarian railways, postal services, the bus company, the airport and highways.

35 they were the first government to be returned to office since the collapse of the communist regime

36 The initiatives included a general reduction of number of public sector employees, liberalization of the pharmacies market, introduction of small fees for visits to general practitioners, introduction of partial tuition fees and mandatory hours for teachers

37 "Evidently, we lied throughout the last year-and-a-half, two years. It was totally clear that what we are saying is not true. 47

2006 party congress in May in Lake Balaton made citizens even less pleased with the elected government and destroyed the prime minister’s credibility (A. Batory; N. Sitter, 2006), In his speech he said they lied to win the elections, that coalition government had failed to introduce any real policies and that now a tougher economic reforms are needed. The speech led to wide– scale political protestations, the same day and the next days , they included thousands of citizens in front of Parliament who demanded resignation of Gyurcsány and his government (Lendvai, Orbán: Hungary's Strongman, 2017), (Matonyte & Varnagy, 2007). Later right–wing extremists, skinheads known football hooligans, far–right groups and anti–Semitic Hungarian Life and Justice Party (MIEP) and The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) joined protests and encouraged their supporters across Hungary to join the rally in Budapest against Gyurcsany. In the days that followed they had clashed with police many times and it resulted in more than 200 people insured prior to the local elections in October (McLaughlin, 2006), (Guardian, 2006). The demonstrators also advised people not to vote on local elections for the MSZP candidates.

The local elections on 1th October had a highest voter turnout – 53% since communism ended and as a winner had opposition that won 18 out of 19 counties, and 19 of the 23 cities, but post of mayor was won for the fifth time by the SZDSZ Gábor Demszky (A. Batory; N. Sitter, 2006). After the elections Orbán gave the governing parties a seventy – two – hour ultimatum to remove the head of government but Gyurcsány, call a parliamentary vote of confidence and won the vote by 207 to 165. After that Orbán embarked upon an all–out campaign saying ‘illegitimate dictatorial’ government must go away and had thousands of people joined to hear his speeches. Protest demonstrations and clashes peaked on 23 October38 2006, that day there was a total chaos fallowed by brutality of the police; 326 civilians were injured, as were 399 police officers; the demonstrations in the fall of 2006 caused damage amounting to €37 million (Lendvai, Orbán: Hungary's Strongman, 2017).

5 CASE STUDY – HUNGARY UNDER FIDESZ, FROM 2010 TO 2019

The leakage of the Prime minister speech was one of the factors that led to Fidesz victory on the 2010 elections, the other two were Fidesz`s promptly usage of the political domestic situation (the party in power had internal clashes) and that they were not the governing party

"You cannot quote any significant government measure we can be proud of, other than at the end we managed to bring the government back from the brink. Nothing. If we have to give account to the country about what we did for four years, then what do we say?"… "We lied in the morning, we lied in the evening."

38 A National Holiday dedicated to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 1956 revolution

48 during the 2008 world economic crisis – they were not the one who implemented post crisis painful recovery programme.

From 2006 to the 2010 elections Fidesz pursue propaganda hostile to the Socialist–Free Democrat coalition using media that as owners had people close to Orbán or were Fidesz`s sympathizers39 and used governing coalition internal problems40 to present them trustworthy, present in everyday life of Hungarians and internally unified under the strong Orbán`s leadership. They gain more of the public trust and supporters when they in March 2008 initiated a referendum for abolishment of the government reforms that increased medical and tuition fees41. It was a highly successful referendum as it needed voter turnout of 25 % in favor for one option and it has had a 50% of voter turnout and an average of 80% yes votes on all three questions. The referendum results led to all Free Democrat (SZDSZ) ministers quitting the government and in May 2008 having Gyurcsány leading a minority government; he could count on majority of Free Democrat MPs in important votes (Lendvai, Orbán: Hungary's Strongman, 2017).

The world economic crisis in September 2008 also affected Hungary as it has high external debt, wide current account deficit, large external financing requirement, still excessive fiscal deficit and numerous citizens owning a foreign currency denominated credit loans as they had lower interest rates than the one in forints. The Hungarian government was not able to cure its financial system and in a same time provide stability to the public so they turned to the IMF and the EU as a last resort42 (Horvath, 2009). Crisis damaged the country’s export–oriented sectors, industrial production fell by 18 percent, construction industry was hit hard and 25 thousand people lost their jobs in the automotive industry, there was a 3.5% fall in consumption and a reduction of 2.5% in real wages (Horvath, 2009), (Egedy, 2012) .

The new budgetary cuts43 implemented in 2009 by the new Prime minister a forty–one–year– old economics expert Gordon Bajnai, as Gyurcsány resigned in March 2019, saved Hungary

39 Two daily newspapers, two weeklies, numerous web pages, a free newspaper on the Budapest Metro, two TV and two radio stations. In their communication with citizens they used two factors every Hungarian fall for: everything was better before fact with strong nationalistic tendencies, mentioning of a national tragedy of Trianon and (sustained rise in living standards of worker and middle class during the Kádár era)

40 They had very public rifts about their education and health policies.

41 The electorate was asked three simple questions: should the charge of 300 forints (about €1) per visit to the doctor, the same charge for every day spent in hospital, and university tuition fees (about 100,000 forints annually) all be abolished?

42 IMF has approved a $15.7 billion loan for Hungary, the European Union has committed $8.4 billion and the World Bank $1.3 billion and the European Central Bank had given out €5 billion.

43 They included cancelation of the thirteenth monthly salary of state employees e.g. civil servants, teachers, railway workers etc., the raising of the retirement age from sixty – two to sixty – five, the reduction in numerous welfare payments and an increase in VAT from 20 to 25 per cent.

49 from even bigger financial loss44 but destroyed the electoral prospects for both Socialists and the Free Democrats on June`s 2009 European Parliament election and on the 2010 domestic parliamentary elections.

The European Parliament elections were held on 7th June 2009 and voters, whose turnout was 36%, could chose from the list of candidates45 the 22 of them who would represent Hungary as EU parliamentarians. On these elections major winners were Fidesz (won 14 seats; part of the EPP – Group of the European People's Party – Christian Democrats) and extreme right Jobbik party46 (secured 3 MPEs and as they are not part of any already formed group in parliament, were part of NI – the Non – attached Members), together they secured over 70% of the votes47, while the governing Socialist Party’s share of the votes drastically reduced (won 4 seats; part of the S&D – Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament), 0,5 million comparing to the 1,6 million Fidesz votes; Democratic Forum (MDF) secured only one place; part of the ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists Group) (Batory, 2009). Citizens dissatisfaction with current government were widely shown prior to elections in May 2009 Median opinion poll; it showed how citizens are ill–informed about the EP and how European issues did not matter for party choice as campaigns were domestically oriented and their voting preferences were an answer to the current government – e.g. government sympathizers stayed at home and did not vote, while the majority of right wing one did.

Prior to the 2010 April parliamentary elections the Orbán speech from a private party, held in September in 2009, was published in Fidesz’s magazine Nagyító on 17 February 2010 (Lendvai, 2017) in it Orbán said that he wanted to create “a central political force field” that would allow conservatives to rule for “the coming 15 to 20 years.”, saying in another speech, “We have only to win once, but then properly.” (Foer, 2019) . In the articles I read about the 2010 Hungarian elections the leakage of this speech was rarely or not at all mentioned but in

44 He and his colleagues succeeded in winning back the confidence of international investors and in making savings of 5% of GDP. In his inaugural speech in parliament said he is no one’s rival and that he has only one task and that is management of a crisis – this new one year term interim government got a name “government of experts”

45 Parliamentary parties and the militant extreme right Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), the leftist – green ‘Politics Can Be Different’ (PCBD – running on a joint list with the tiny Humanist Party), the old style communist Workers’ Party – all three were an Eurosceptic protest parties standing in opposition to the club of parliamentary parties and the Romani Unity – Forum of Hungarian Roma Organizations field candidates

46 Their campaign slogan was ‘Hungary for the Hungarians’, and their main message was to mobilize ” real Hungarians” against traitors within the nation’s body, multi – nationals, and the Roma – who they said were guilty for all the bad happenings in a country

50 the articles, books and newspaper opinions published from 2017 on it is heavily mentioned as a reminder of Orbáns long – term plans to retain power coming from his days in opposition.

The 2010 April parliament elections had a 64.38 % of the 8 million registered voters turned out at the first poll and 46.66% on the second one ( Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). These elections got named earthquake election’ as they were the first one that had from the six 1990 parliamentary parties only two wining above the electoral threshold ( FIDESZ and MSZP) and two new protest parties Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) – a right wing party founded in 2003 and Politics Can Be Different (LMP) – a green liberal party founded in 2009 wining the seats (Sitter, 2011).

The Jobbik campaign of 2010 elections consisted of hostility to European integration, globalization, foreign capital and the market, anti Semitism and references to ‘Gypsy crime’; had as main enemy Socialist with poster slogans: Gyurcsany to prison, Tax the multinationals, Hungary belongs to the Hungarians. In their campaign they attacked Fidesz for having lack of courage to confront pressing social issues and present themselves as the only party who stands for interest of people with manifesto entitled ‘Radical change for national self – determination and social justice’ in which they questioned Hungary’s relationship with the EU saying its future cannot be imagined within framework of the EU’s current development trajectories, also they rejected the Lisbon treaty and called for a more decisive, hard representation of the national interest in the EU (Batory, 2010).

LMP 2010 campaign portrayed them self as someone who has a different political style, more consultative one closer to its supporters, said that public lost confidence in democracy do to the : corruption, clientelism and inequality and that they have a strategy of sustainable future. In their manifesto they called for democratizing EU decision making, and both ‘strengthening the self – determination of member states’ describing it as valuable in many aspects and themselves ready to participate in ‘political integration’ in the EU. The LMP`s founding members had a background in environment NGOs, their programee focused on the environment, tolerance and inclusion was youth oriented thus attracting young (especially first – time) voters (Batory, 2010). The 2006 winner MSZP won only 59 seats while FIDESZ – KDNP with his slogan “The time has come! (Itt az ido!) “ won 263 seats in the 386 member National Assembly (figure 8 parliamentary diagram 2010 elections bellow) and as a first party in democratic history that has won a two – thirds majority could govern without forming an alliance. These elections as a clear winner had right or far right parties as 75% of the Hungarian electorate voted for them.

MSZP 59 LMP 16 a coalition Fidesz 227 government KDNP 36

Jobbik 47 Figure 8 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2010

Fidesz said they do not want to form a coalition with the Jobbik and in May after the President László Sólyom proposition to the National Assembly Mr. Viktor Orbán was elected as a new Prime Minister (Sitter, 2011), (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015).

On the October 2010 local elections, that had a 47% voter turnout, Fidesz also dominated and manage to secure key local post in numerous administrative units; they had control of almost all country councils, and for the fist time ever the position of major of Budapest ,that was from 1990s held by a SZDSZ politician, was won by a Fidesz candidate who got of 53.37 % votes (Thompson, 2013)

From the 1th January to 30th June 2011 citizens of Hungary witnessed its country first EU presidency48 During the presidency Hungarian officials presided over monthly meetings of ministers of agriculture, energy, environment, employment and, finances that included launching of sensitive talks on the EU’s 2014 – 2020 budget (Than & Grajewski, 2010). They ran a low profile presidency and at the end surpassed the initial expectations of Brussels – they were able to conclude over 100 legislative files and the Danube Strategy and the Roma Strategy were adopted during their term also there was a progress in negotiations with Iceland, progress on the European Patent and on the Single Market Act and they cooperated with the High Representative on issues in the Western Balkans and many say the most important legacy of this presidency is that on the last of presidency the Croatia accession negotiations to the EU have been officially closed (Kaczyński, 2013).

During the presidency European press criticized country for its domestic politics, mainly the new media law regulations and constitution changes. As Fidesz had two thirds majority in parliament it besides electing his member as a president of state49 and a speaker of parliament

48 Hungary has hold six–month rotating Presidency of the European Union in a close coordination with EU Presidency of Spain (January–June 2010) and Belgium (July–December 2010) (Traynor, 2011). Their main task under the rotating presidency by the Lisbon Treaty was to take care (within the Council and with the European Parliament) of ongoing legislation in the new institutional system of the European Union.

49 The president can use a veto to send law on revision to parliament or to the Constitutional Court and for this position by absolute majority in a parliament a former Fidesz vice–chair Pál Schmitt was chosen (Bozoki, 2011). 52 could change a constitution without obstructions; in the first two years of governing the Fidesz majority parliament amend the 1990 constitution twelve times and changed more than fifty separate provisions; in February 2011 it was announced that a new constitution will be called the ‘Fundamental Law of Hungary” (Bozoki, 2011) (Lendvai, 2017).

The Fidesz implemented all the changes very fast, but step by step, taking all the necessary prerequisites to not be stopped by anything or anyone who could dissolve it enacting a new constitution.

⎯ First they weaken legal checks on its authority by having a parliament majority amend the 1990 constitution to allow the governing party to nominate constitutional judges, later in a same way parliament restricted the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by not allowing it to review budget or tax laws and removed it`s right to strike out any laws that have already been enshrined in the constitution. Also they limited ordinary citizen to initiate constitutional reviews by actio popularis and in a same first year of government Fidesz strengthen its control over the court by amending the old constitution to increase the number of judges thus giving the party possibility to name seven of fifteen judges ( Human Rights Watch, 2013).

⎯ Secondly they managed to have the Election Commission under its control by filling all non–delegate seats with its members (the rule before was that of ten seats five seats were filled with delegates from each parliamentary party and rest were to be filled by a mutual agreement between the governing and opposition parties). Also they got control over the referendum proposals because they are under the electoral commission control (Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele, 2015). The electoral commission decisions can be appealed to the Constitutional Court but now by having it under their influence Fidesz managed to doom attempts of civil society groups to use referendums to “disturb” ongoing government’s program of change.

⎯ Thirdly they reformed mass media by first they adopted a Media Constitution and a Multimedia Act that regulate all mass media, on all platforms, including radio, print press, television and the Internet and established a new supervisory body the National Media and Telecommunications Authority (NMHH)50 managed by Media Council (whose four members and a Chair Annamária Szalai nominated an delegated by Fidesz for a nine–year term) that had a power to levy a fines with penalties high up to

50 For example the NMHH was in charge to distribute radio frequencies and in the first year and a half of government they from 35 local distributed frequencies granted eighteen of them to the pro government radio stations while they refused to renew the frequency concession to the left – liberal Club Radio.

€700,000,on all media outlets that breached some of the 2010 media laws51, that were undefined, had unclear regulations and inconsistent enforcement, that they were able to completely silence a media outlet (Bozoki, 2011), (Bajomi-Lázár, 2012), ( Human Rights Watch, 2013). By the new regulations the production and programming of public service broadcasters were outsourced to the Media Fund that manages the funding of the public service broadcasters and as director had a chair of Media Council. This change resulted to the situation where in interviews with the prime minister his press chief determines what issues will be raised, also a culture that discourages tough questioning is created and all of that led to reduction of employees in three public service broadcasters’ and hiring a number of pro – Fidesz journalists. Also these public broadcasters had advertisements and shows produced by companies close to Fidesz party52 and in mid 2001 almost 74% of all news covered either the government or Fidesz and the Christian Democrats while other 26% was left to the opposition parties (Bajomi- Lázár, 2012). In his book (Orbán: Hungary's Strongman) Lendvai states that: “ two out of three reports trumpet government triumphs, whilst two thirds of the news about the opposition deals with its failures or internal disputes”. The demonstrations in Budapest on Kossuth Lajos square in front of the parliament that demanded the government withdrawal of the legislation as well as criticism from leading western newspapers and diplomats (Than, 2011) did not had a big effect on the new laws as they did not change. In the first two years all the mainstream media were increasingly exposed to Fidesz`s interference who did not only manage to suppress critical voices and gain a favorable coverage but they also managed to paralyze their rivals and indirectly increase finances of their supporters by controlling the redistribution of the various media resources.

51 One of the a requirement was that in a radio broadcasting “60% of the program content should be music” – this limited political radio shows

52 For example a firm owned by Simicska, a former Director of Finances of the Fidesz party, got commissioned to produce a quiz show Hungary, I Love You for 19 million forints (68,050 Euros) per episode, than commission was done to the company partly owned by his wife to do a an outdoor advertising campaign for MTV for more than 104 million forints (372,480 Euros), a soap opera Martians was bought from a company whose owner is a brother of Prime Minister Orbán’s chief communication advisor and so on (Bajomi-Lázár, 2012) . 54

The laws and changes Fidesz made in its early governing of its second government secured it being elected in parliament on the next elections and, as I will in details describe in rest of this chapter, in it having an absolute majority in parliament for a next decade. The most important one that secured it, in my opinion are the one who invoked a national pride; namely the one made in May 2010 – the law of “national unification” that granted citizenship to all Hungarians living abroad (figure 9) even if they did not have a permanent residence in Hungary53 and the second one by which government designated 4th June, the day the Treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920, as the ‘Day of National Solidarity Hungarians (Bozoki, 2011). These laws also served to switch Jobbik sympathizers to Fidesz as both parties had strong nationalistic propaganda.

The new Constitution was entered into force in January 2012, thus replacing the one drafted in 1989 and in march 2013 an additional package of constitutional changes proposed by the ruling Fidesz party were adopted by the parliament. All of these changes dramatically altered Hungarian legal, social54, and political infrastructure; they systematically rebuild public legal system and state administration55, influenced civil liberties, education56, domestic media and cultural institutions57; in its structuring or implementation there were no adequate consultations with civil society or time for a proper debate with the rest of parties in the parliament. European institutions, Council of Europe, US government, several United Nations Committees and human rights organizations such as, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch expressed

53 Besides having domestic implications the law greatly influenced its relations with neighbors for example Slovakia made it impossible by having a law that does not allow for the double citizenship – they have 10% Hungarians as minority living in a country

54 Fidesz had traditional family in focus so in constitution it was stated a family is based on marriage between a man and a woman and the parent-child relationship. Also child support for new mothers who temporarily left the job market to remain at home were increased, tax benefits were granted to families of working parents with children while social spending for unemployed has been decreased and being homeless became a crime and leading to fines and prison as living in certain parts of public area was prohibited

55 The retirement age for judges was lowered from 70 to 62 years thus 274 judges were forced to retire from January 1, 2012; all public institutions have been renamed “government” institutions.

56 Public education is managed and controlled by the central government that also homogenized the curriculum of public schools, reduced the age of attendance 18 to 16 years. Considering the university education - students who received a state grant needed to stay and work in Hungary after graduation for a certain time period, or else reimburse the state for their tuition costs

57 The election campaign was restricted to broadcasts only on state media. All theater directors across Hungary were replaced with Fidesz members or relatives of the Fidesz clientele and the public foundation for film were stopped. Also international achievements of Hungarians whose actions were “not approved” by Fidesz were not broadcasted on the state media, for example film director Béla Tarr wining the Jury Grand Prix in 2011 Berlinale was not covered by the media because he has with Ádám Fischer and the pianist Sir András Schiff signed an ‘open letter to the artists of Europe and the entire world’ with an appeal to act against the media law, as well as against the growing anti-Semitism and nationalism in Hungary (Lendvai, 2017)

55 concern over the changes saying they undermine human rights58 in the country. In the next chapter I will in more detail discus EU`s relationship with Hungary and Constitutional changes from 2010 to 2013 are one of the discussed topics.

The Second Orbán`s government was full of firsts, from the EU presidency, new constitution to the first president resignation. On the 02 April 2012 Pal Schmitt announced his resignation to the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest saying "In this situation, when my personal issue splits my beloved country instead of uniting it, I feel it is my duty to end my service and to resign” – he did it after the Semmelweis University in Budapest withdraw his 1992 doctorate due to the investigation that showed large parts of his work were plagiarized (Facsar, 2012). He was succeeded by a lawyer János Áder, a Fidesz member and European Parliament deputy chairman of Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, for who 262 of MPs voted. The reporter from Budapest said it is unlikely that new president will use his power to dissolve parliament or send back laws to the parliament or to the country’s top constitutional court as he is loyal Fidesz member who publically defended new Constitution in parliament by saying: “It is my belief that our new constitution provides from all aspects an adequate direction and framework to find the right solutions to the fundamental issues and challenges of the 21st century.” (Peto, 2012). He got a five year term till the 2017, later his term was prolonged for an additional five years – till the 2021.

In order to understand Fidesz success it is important to pay attention to all aspects of his governing, as I have undergraduate diploma in financial management I took a closer look at economic measures that were imposed during majority Fidesz government and notice that they are also populist in that field; they pursue economic measures that satisfy their electorate ( Orbán governs as a businessman he sees government as one of the party products and citizens as customers so as any good salesmen he gives a solution to their problem) like state interference in setting utility prices (the power companies were forced to cut customers’ energy bills) and forcing loss making banks to pay 3 billion Euros in compensation to a bank customers who took out foreign currency mortgages. The changes that as a goal had reduction of budget

58 For example private pension insurance system was nationalized; UN Committee on Rights of Persons with Disabilities expressed serious concerns about the provisions that exclude those with “limited mental capacity” from exercising the right to vote and Women’s rights organizations in Hungary said a provision that excluded those with “limited mental capacity” from exercising the right to vote-constitutional article 2 stating “…embryonic and foetal life shall be subject to protection from the moment of conception” restricted women’s reproductive rights and right to abortion. The observers said religious freedoms are in danger as Parliament has a sole right to decide which religious organizations can be registered as church; by the law group in order to be registered had to have an existence for at least 100 years internationally or in an organized manner as an association in Hungary for at least 20 years and from 2013 a minimum of 10,000 members for registration. Alternatively it can be register as a religious association, but that it would not benefit from access to state funds as churches do, so numerous religious groups were not able to continue social work that mainly included homeless and members of the Roma minority.

56 deficit by transferring money from private sector to consumers and to the public sector were visible very soon in normal daily Hungarian life as they comparing to the 2010 paid 25% less for utilities in 2014 and now were able to save money. This process in foreign media was named “Orbánomics” and it with the measures mentioned above also included a crisis taxes on telecom, energy, media, supermarket companies and financial sectors, introduction of a flat– rate 16 per cent income tax and in led to paing off IMF loans in 2013 (Byrne, 2015).

The Fundamental Law of Hungary with additional 32 “cardinal laws”(can be modified in future only with a parliament two – thirds majority) that were passed from 2010 till 2014 cover crucial aspects of Hungarian life modifying it and made Hungary take a U – turn Retreating59 from democracy by a systematic destruction of the fundamental democratic institutions (Kornai, 2015).

Electoral system reform is also one of them; on a press conference in January 2014 Minister of State Bence Rétvári said when asked about changes of electoral rules that: “cheaper and more transparent system” was made with the MPs who will be more focus on parliamentary work as from now on: “No one can be a MP now who bears an office as a mayor or a member of the municipality board“ (Schackow, 2014). Opposition as well as foreign media reporters and observers like OSCE agree that electoral system from 1990s needed to change as it was too complex, even thought this new lowered number of recommendations needed for presenting individual candidates from 750 to 500, allowed citizens to vote for as many candidates as they wish (oppose to only one by the old system) (Magyar, 2014) they all agreed it favorers Fidesz with changes that include:

⎯ a right for minorities abroad to register by mail in order to take part in the elections (they may vote only for candidates on national lists after registering), ⎯ the abolishment of a second – round elections – by this a candidate needed less voters to win a mandate60, ⎯ these was a change in a district size – the new law allows no more than 15 percent difference in district size (the foreign observers say this increased votes left parties need to obtain in order to have a majority in parliament as districts with majority of left voters were enlarged or split and incorporated into districts that have a majority of right voters), merging regional and national party lists into one;

59 A description first made in 2015 by a János Kornai in his article Hungary’s U-Turn: Retreating from Democracy in Journal of Democracy

60 before he needed to win a 50% votes in district and due to these changes on 2014 election a mandate was won by a MP who obtained 31,39% votes 57

⎯ introduction of a minority spokesmen for a minority groups who are not able to reach the 5% threshold ( they have been given a right to speak in the parliament but not to vote) (Schackow, 2014), (Hunyadi, 2014).

The most visible change was a reduction in parliament to no more than 200 representatives – 106 seats are elected as single – member districts61 the remaining 93 by a regional list vote with a national threshold of 5%. Reform also had a major effect on representation, Hungary has a combined electoral system – a voter cast one vote in a local constituency and another one for a party list; by the new system winner candidate in an individual constituency can add difference between the number of votes they received and the number of vote received by the second place candidate to the totals for their party lists for use in calculating party list mandates; thus winner gets a double reward ( Republikon institute, 2014).

It is also important to mention Orbán`s international talk about social democrats and greens; in his discussion for a Chatham House in October 2013 on “The Role of Traditional Values in Europe's Future” he considering the concept of nations said it still remains relevant but that he thinks there is “an absolutely open red and green attack against traditional values: against the church, against family, against the nation”62 (Chatam_House, 2013). In March 2014 at EPP Congres in Dublin Victor he praised EPP for saving Euro tanking José Manuel Barroso and stated: “if Europe was led my socialist or greens there would be no Euro “63, also he expressed his gratitude: “to those who supported Hungary during the last tough years when we will still fitting against communist heritage the economic crisis and those international actors who attracted us on a constant basis “ ( EPP Congress in Dublin, 2014).

In 2014 three elections happen in Hungary; in April a parliamentary elections, May European parliament elections and in the October local elections. In next section I will show a brief analyze of all three of them in order to shows citizens opinion on second Fidesz government, foreign influences on Hungary, better saying does Hungary takes world elite attention or not

61 by this throw single member district list a 53% of seats are won, by the old system out of 386 mandates 176 seats - 46% of all the seats could be obtained

62 he also said that a concept of welfare state is over and that :we should try to build up workfare states and replace entitlements with a merit-based society” and that a restructuring of major system his government is currently implementing is renewing the country stating: “we have decreased the state debt, we have improved our competitiveness and we have been able to maintain social and political stability. When we came to office, there were 1.8 million people paying tax ... now we have 4 million taxpayers

63 In a rest of a speech he said EPP needs to have a clear stand point on issue in Ukraine and that Europe needs to stand for democratic values after Ukrainian elections, he also praised EPP for saving Euro tanking José Manuel Barrosoand, he stressed EU competitiveness globally is decreasing and ended the speech that new innovative strategy is needed as well as leaders who can make respect for Europe and their political family

58 and most importantly how the new Constitution and laws made from 2010 to 2014 guarantee to Fidesz a two third majority in parliament ( they had 96 out of 106 seats from electoral districts even though they won only 45% of the votes on single – member districts list).

The parliament election happen on 06th April, had a voter turnout of 62% turnout64 and Fidesz – KDNP wining 44.87%, MSZP – Együtt – PM – DK – Liberálisok 25.57%, Jobbik 20.22% and LMP 5.34% of votes, by the new electoral law that converted to parliamentary seats (figure 9 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2014) in a way that Fidesz – KDNP party alliance had 133 parliamentary seats, the five – party left – wing alliance Unity (MSZP – Együtt – PM – DK – Liberálisok) had 38, 23 parliamentary seats were represented by Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) and by LMP (Politics Can Be Different).

MSZP 29 Unity PM,DK,MLP, Együtt 9 LMP 5

Fidesz 117 a coalition KDNP 16 government

Jobbik 23

Figure 9 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2014

The main opposition parties were a new coalition of left–wing parties65, LPM66 that did not want to form coalition with them and right wing Jobbik67 for whom 1 million Hungarians voted. These elections showed that Fidesz dominant power is not a result of being popular among citizens (comparing to the 2010 elections they lost 570000 voters – a drop of 8,2% and only 40% of population went and voted on elections) but as Mudde says, in his article “The 2014 Hungarian parliamentary elections, or how to craft a constitutional majority” in Washington post, a consequence of their political craftsmanship – the increased electorate and an unfair electoral system. An analyze of the elections done by the local and foreign political think tanks, foundations and observers showed that thanks to the electoral law change – winner

64 it was lower in all counties comparing to the 2010 elections – it was less than 64% in north-western counties and 57-59% in eastern counties, while Budapest had a turnout of almost 70%

65 They did not had a promising alternative and did not present them self as united and strong

66 Its main support base is made up of higher educated professionals in urban settings, most notably the capital Budapest

67 In their programme for 2014 elections they promised economically unjustified social improvements and promoted anti- Semitic, racist and anti-European values with calling for the "chemical castration of perpetrators of sexual violence", restoration of the pre-war constabulary "to combat Gypsy criminality" and reintroduction of the death penalty

59 compensation system and over the – border’ votes68 added respectively 6 and 1.5 seats to Fidesz list. In their report about Hungarian elections OSCE observers described whole election process, in my opinion as overly unfair, listing in their report as crucial biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State, restrictive campaign regulations, that campaign was almost indiscernible in rural areas and that it is concerning that limited voter education was provided as well as late publication of guidelines on important electoral aspects; also they point that there is no legal requirements aimed at enhancing the participation of women in political life and that their representation remains less than 10% (OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). Considering the world elites as I noticed in media coverage they were not that much focused on happenings in Hungary, USA was focused on happenings in Ukraine, while EU was focused on their elections planned for May.

The 2014 European parliament elections were held from 22 to 25 May, on them Hungarian citizens could elect a candidate from 8 parties as one of the 21 representatives, the turnout was lower than on 2009 and 2004 elections 29% comparing to 36% and 38,5%; winner of these elections as had been predicted was Fidesz that won 51.48% of the votes, they also belong to a group that won most voices 29,43% – EEP that had 221 MPs comparing to the second runner S&D that won 25,43% of votes and had 191 MP . They won 12 seats (are part of Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) – EEP), Jobbik 3 (does not belong to any political group – NI)), MSZP and DK each got 2 representatives (are part of Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament – S&D) and Együtt–PM LMP had each one MP (are part of The Greens/European Free Alliance) ( European Parliament, 2014).

Between two elections, the EU and local one, Hungary managed again to be criticized and its Prime Minister Viktor Orbán made European headlines:

⎯ firstly in June 2014 due to its relationship with civil society – they accused Norwegian government for interfering in Hungarian political affairs through funding Hungarian civil society organizations69 – the list of 13 NGOs that receive funding from the Grants were discredited as “left–leaning” and “problematic” by the Hungarian Prime Minister’s

68 Of 500,000 new citizens, around 200,000 have registered to vote and about 90,000 voted; a 95,5%of them voted for Fidesz- KDNP; that 1,5 seat they got amounts exactly to the difference between a large majority of 132 seats (66%) and a constitutional majority of 133 seats (67%) as Orbán admited in his 2014 summer speach in Romania :..“. that our two-thirds majority were to come about thanks to the votes of precisely those cross-border Hungarians”

69 In 2016 city prosecutor investigation against organizations, that were reported by the Government Audit Office (KEHI), concluded that the organizations involved in the distribution of civil funds operated lawfully 60

Office, police raids were launched against NGOs, the organizations were threatened with revocation of their tax ID numbers (Gall, 2014) (Novak, 2017) .

⎯ secondly in July 2014 over his speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp in Romania, where he announced that : “We want to organize a work– based society that ... is not liberal in character... we are constructing in Hungary an illiberal state, a non–liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central element of state organization, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.” . He also mentioned the obstacles they need to overcome to make it a reality emphasizing the relationship with:

o Non–governmental organizations for which he said : “those organizations which are regularly in the public gaze... I see is that we are dealing with paid political activists ...who are being paid by foreigners ... that wish to use this system of instruments to apply influence on Hungarian political life with regard to a given issue at a given moment” and

o A way EU supervises in Hungary distribution of its funds – particularly the differences between salaries their employees have vs. employees of Hungarian public administration stating that: “ the Government has come to a decision according to... this illiberal state concept, those who are in charge of distributing European Union funds must be under the employment of the Hungarian state ... in exchange for their work they can receive no more than someone working in a similar position in the Hungarian public administration system would receive” (Orbán, 2014)

The new Constitution and numerous laws implemented also changed roles of local authorities, they got lower considering education and health care, while the mayors of municipalities got more authority in making decisions in the board of deputies and on certain local issues like the right to decide who gets to participate in the public work program that is a condition for receiving social benefits for the unemployed. The local elections in October 2014 had due to the changes in the electoral law a change in way how citizens vote – in the cities voters received two ballots: one for candidates running for mayor and one for candidates running for deputy position while the citizens that to not live in 23 towns got in addition a third one for the county lists of the parties; as a result from 8 million inhabitants only 5 million of them that does not live in larger towns had possibility

to explicitly support a given party – as they can vote on county lists (Juhász, 2014). The local elections as predicted had as winner Fidesz–KDNP, there was a decrease in votes, their majority was reduced, but also the voter turnout was the lowest since 1990 – 44%. Nevertheless they maintained a majority, the Budapest Fidesz major was reelected – they retained mayoral seats in 20 towns – lost comparing to 2010 two cities: Békéscsaba and Salgótarján, they also managed to keep an absolute majority in county councils. Considering opposition their situation did not improved significantly when comparing to the 2010 elections, they did get more votes, left wing parties managed to win 2 more districts than in 2010, LMP’s secured only a mayoral seat in one district and Jobbik had an increase in deputies in the county councils from 34 to 40, in 23 cities with country rights they gained ground in 20 localities and position itself better the western half of a country (Juhász, 2014), (Győri, 2015).

Around the 20th Octobar 2014 the anti–government protest that included 30–40 000 participants began in Budapest due to the government announcement to include in the Taxation law the taxation of the internet usage70 (Guardian, 2014), the law was canceled on 31th October Prime Minister Viktor Orban said explained governments decision by stating that tax " in its current form cannot be introduced", (BBC, 2014).

In 2015 movement of migrants through Balkan route and then rest of the Europe was the most spoken topic in Hungary. In January Orbán described migration as a threat to the European way of life, state funded anti–migrant billboard campaigns were present in the country ( the one of the titles was: If you come to Hungary you cannot take the Hungarians` jobs”) in May the government had a “national consultations” on migration71, in summer more than “390,000 asylum seekers crossed the Serbian–Hungarian border” passing through Hungary and heading for the Western Europe, in June a building of fence along the Serbia border began (Thorpe, 2019). On the 1st August 2015 the Hungarian Asylum Act 72 was entered into the force, in

70 Government proposed it on 16th October before any consultations with industry groups stating the law complement a tax on phone calls and its revenues will be used for improvement of the internet access in rural areas” - the law firstly set a levy at 150 forints (£0.40; 0.50 euros; $0.60) per gigabyte of data traffic, after the protest began they changed proposal of a tax, if implemented it would force internet service providers to pay 700 forints (£1.80) per individual subscriber a month and 5,000 forints per business subscriber

71 In May 2015 the questionnaires containing 12 questions (concerning immigration, economic immigration and terrorism) and a letter from the Prime Minister have been mailed to all citizens aged over 18—altogether 8 million people with a deadline of returning 1 July 2015 (EWSI, 2015).

72 It explains what needs to be done in order to be eligible for asylum in Hungary one of the procurers it has is a list of safe countries on them is Serbia – that means the asylum in Hungary is rejected for a person that comes to it via Serbian- Hungarian border. This was criticized by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein who said measures are: ” incompatible with the human rights commitments binding on Hungary, (…) This is an entirely unacceptable infringement of the human rights of refugees and migrants”

September 2015 Hungarian parliament amended its Criminal Code making unauthorized crossing of the border, damaging of its fence and obstruction of the construction works related to the border closure punishable by three to ten years imprisonment (Piazza-Georgi, 2016) (Goździak, 2019) On the televised and radio interviews the government officials continually spoke about ongoing and direct threat from the migrants, while Orbán in his interviews73 and speeches undermined EU strength and power to deal with the incoming migrants and constantly emphasized that his government is doing what is best for Hungary, protecting its people and their values (Hajnal, 2015), (C. Cantant & P. K. Rajaram, 2018).

In 2016 in Hungary, due to the build fences on borders, number of migrants decreased, nevertheless in March a national state of emergency in the name of the “crisis” and countering potential terror threats was declared. In spring Pew Research Centre survey was conducted and the results showed that Hungarians have exclusionary views on national identity, agree on importance of democratic values but are less tolerant comparing to other EU members to refugees and minorities74 (Manevich, 2016) . In June 2016 counterterrorism legislative package was adopted and in October there was a referendum that asked citizens: “Do you want the European Union to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non–Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?” – the referendum was not valid under the Hungarian law as it has 39% of voter turnout and by the law 50% of voters need to participate, but Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated it result as a victory for his government (Piazza-Georgi, 2016), and in December 2016 most of the refugee camps, some of them operated since 1990s, were close and all benefits specific to refugees were cut (C. Cantant & P. K. Rajaram, 2018). On the 5th September 2017 President of the European Commission denied Hungarian request to refund half of the border barrier costs (€400 million) and on the 6th September the Court of Justice of the European Union dismissed Hungary and Slovakia's claims from 2015 to annul the EU decision to relocate migrants (Heath, 2017), (Kroet, 2017).

73 In speeches to the Parliament he talked about its country handling migration crisis and how EU is dealing with it. In September 2015 he said to the Parliament in Budapest: The issue of illegal migration has burst into our lives with such force... the migrants are not only pounding on the door, but are breaking them down on top of us... it is the most natural thing in the world to want to protect one’s own family ... when we protect the borders of Hungary, we also protect Europe... this is what our people expect us to do... we only have one country, and it is the duty of us all to protect it. In November he said there is need for a new European policy that will protect European borders, culture and economic interests and that a right to people: to have a say in European decisions” must be given:” because the European Union must be based on democratic foundations” (Orbán, 2015).

74 Comparing to the EU median of 50% when asked are refugees a burden on their country because they take jobs and social benefits 82% Hungarians said yes, that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in Hungary 76% said yes, they had unfavorable view on Muslims 72% comparing the 43% EU median, and when asked about Roma and Jews unfavorable views were 64% and 32% comparing to 48% and 13% EU median (Manevich, 2016)

Hungarian response to migration crisis, most visual one – building hundreds of kilometers of barbed wire fence on border with Serbia, become widely covered by all the global media and managed to have Hungary and its prime minister in headlines of not only EU` but also Bosnian Herzegovinian’s75 media outlets. It was internationally criticized (several European governments declared Hungarian authorities did not respect European values in their reception of migrants) and questions of EU strengths over its member’s state and vice versa and their will (necessity) to protect these in need were raised.

Up to the 2018 election and later the threat represented by the migrants and by the external forces that are influencing Hungary remained one of the most outspoken topic of Orbán and his government – in 2017 the parliament passed a law that required from the NGOs to register as “foreign–supported” and disclose their foreign donors if they receive over 24,000 Euros in a foreign funding annually, in same time anti Soros76 campaign started – he was accused by government for working “to settle millions from Africa and the Middle East” in Europe, for encouraging asylum seekers to come to Hungary to "Muslimise" the country and organizations related to him like Central European University (CEU)77 and Open Society Foundation, Transparency International, Helsinki Committee and other NGOs have been targeted by Hungarian government (Strickland, 2017) (Aljazeera, 2018). The response from civil society, international organizations and citizens that are not Fidesz sympathizers was the #istandwithCEU78 movement that led to” the public protests in Budapest in the beginning of April 2017” where 80 000 people protested in a support of the academic freedom in Hungary; Hungarian intellectuals, business people, and sports figures spoke out in favor of CEU and in defense of democratic freedoms. On the 26th of April European Commission concluded the law was not compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and announced infringement proceedings against Hungary; on 23th May US Department of State again urges Hungary to “suspend implementation of its amended higher education law” and on the 23th May Hungarian government responds to the European

75 It was as I remember first time bh citizens become aware of Hungarian domestic politics and how it does have some effect on happenings in Balkan and may influence EU, as it was before perceived as a land of cheap butter and still is in the minds of these born in 1930s,40s,50s,60s in Bosnia and Herzegovina

76 George Soros is a Hungarian-born US investor, Holocaust survivor, philanthropist who through his Open Society Foundation promotes liberal democracy, social justice and human rights primarily in the post-communist countries, later in the rest of the world (Lendvai, 2017). Irony is that 30 years before in October 1989 Orban went to a Pembroke College, Oxford, on a Soros scholarship.

77 In March leader of the Fidesz parliamentary group accused CEU of being “a phantom university” and on 10th April 2017 new amendments to Hungary’s Higher Education Law that make impossible for CEU to offer American-accredited master’s and doctoral degrees were signed by the president Janos Ader (CEU, 2018)

78 The law was critiqued domestically (on 2nd April 10,000 persons participated in a protest in support of academic freedom in Hungary and internationally ( a Petition protesting legislative amendment signed by 30,000 from 134 countries was submitted to Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly on 4th April) 64

Commission’s infringement proceedings and said it will not comply with the requests of the Commission to repeal or modify the law (CEU, 2018).

In spring same year ,prior to the April parliamentary elections citizens were called by the Fidesz to join “residents’ forums” to discuss how to “defend the nation.” (C. Cantant & P. K. Rajaram, 2018). On a peace march that was held in March on a national holiday, that commemorates the 1848 uprising against Habsburg rule, Orbán said to the tens of thousands participants of march, who waved with Hungarian flags and had a placards that supported Fidesz, that Hungary had kicked out the Ottomans, Habsburgs and Soviets over the centuries and would kick out “Uncle George” stating that they are : “... fighting an enemy that is different from us. Not open, but hiding; not straightforward but crafty; not honest but base; not national but international...“; considering migration he said: “Europe is under invasion already...“ and “We don’t want to win an election, we want to win our futures” (Walker, 2018).

The election campaign for 2018 parliamentary elections of Fidesz party along with its focus of stopping immigration and stating that there is a threat from migrants (in his rally speech prior to elections he said:” Migration is like rust that slowly but surely would consume Hungary” and called voters to "save Hungary") consisted also of the promises of cutting income taxes and passing pro–growth economic policies and Orban who refused to publicly debate with his opponents or to speak to the independent media – he only spoke at his party rallies ( BBC News, 2018). The political life prior to the April elections was also characterized by fractured opposition that was divided on the far right and highly fragmented left that did not have a single centre–left party that could position itself to Fidesz’s centre – right position. Up to the elections opposition, anticorruption advocacy groups and other international organizations criticized Orban for destroying the constitutional order, vowing revenge on political enemies and demonizing immigrants, OSCE accused in their report Fidesz for using government resources for the electoral campaign and declared elections as free but not fair79 (Győr, Bíró-Nagy, & Sebők, 2019); Orban`s remarks were called racist by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al–Hussein, and he was accused for using nationalistic sentiments by portraying officials in Brussels as meddling bureaucrats who are a threat to Hungary’s sovereignty by the Gergely Karacsony, the mayor of a district in Budapest who was a head of an alliance between two left–wing groups — the Socialist Party and a Green party, and Edit Zgut, a foreign–policy analyst at Political Capital, said Prime minister Orban proved as effective in channeling public anger by attacking Soros, EU and UN as the enemy of the

79 Voters had possibility to vote for whomever they wanted, but numerous factors that favored government were “in game” – the constitutional changes from last elections, biased media coverage, State Audit Office fines on opposition parties and etc.

65 state repeating the clash is due to migration thus leading to the voters who : „might consider the E.U.’s criticisms of the government as part of a broader conspiracy that questions the sovereign decisions of Hungarians” (Santora, 2018).

The foreign observers said competition between left–wing and liberal parties over who would dominate the left in the future and their lack of an organizational structure in the countryside were one of the factors80 behind Orbán’s victory on the parliamentary elections on 8th of the April (Győr, Bíró-Nagy, & Sebők, 2019).These elections had a highest voter turnout since 2000s – 70%, of them 49% voted for Fidesz that along with its ally the Christian Democrats party secured a two–thirds supermajority in parliament. Jobbik party was second with 20% of the vote, thirst were Socialist who won 12%, Greens – LPMP was forth with 7,6 % of the votes and Democratic coalition was fifth with 7,1% (figure 11 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2018 ). Fidesz mostly won in the rural constituencies and in provincial towns while in Budapest majority of seats were taken by the opposition parties – the left oriented candidate was re– elected in Szeged, and a mandate was won in Pécs by independent candidate Tamás Mellár (Juhász, 2018) (Lendvai, 2017)

MSZP 20 DK 9 German minority 1 Others Independent 1 LMP 8 Fidesz–KDNP 133 Jobbik 26 Figure 11 Hungarian parliamentary election in 2018

After election defeat chairman of Jobbik Vona resigned and did not accept his mandate in the National Assembly as well as the Socialists leaders who said: "We regard ourselves responsible for what happened, [and] we have acknowledged the decision of voters" (Aljazeera, 2018), (Juhász, 2018). German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz congratulated Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on his election victory; commenting his victory Joerg Meuthen, co–leader of German nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD), said Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had won a “truly resounding victory” with an agenda defined by “the interests of his people”, Matteo Salvini from the Italy’s centrist right Liga party on twitter said “Hungarians have voted with their hearts and minds, not heeding Brussels’ threats and Soros’s billions” and a head of the

80 along with the anti immigration campaign and laws that favored Fidesz 66

Russian upper house’s foreign affairs committee commented the victory saying it reflects “citizens’ responsible and pragmatic take on the protection of national interests, as opposed to “obligations towards the European Union and NATO.” (Hungary today, 2018). In May Victor Orban was recommended by president of Hungary for re–election as Prime Minister, as he was taking an oath in Parliament 15 000 protested in Budapest against, as they say, “Orban's growing authoritarianism, and widespread corruption” (protest included signs like” no more Victatorship”) – in the Video report by ITV News Europe Editor James Mates asked participates of protests and representatives of NGOs about media freedom and several of them said domestic media are controlled by people close to Orban and that information’s about protest in Budapest do not come to citizens whose only source of information’s are domestic medias, also they said NGO workers are constantly threatened and represented as foreign agents81 (ITV News Europe, 2018).

Re–elected Prime Minister Orbán said the priorities of the 2018–2022 government are:

⎯ continuation of strengthening of defense capabilities and guarding of borders as “migration will remain a threat for Europe in the years to come” as well as ⎯ safeguarding those ways of life that “spring from Christian articles of faith, therefore defending human dignity, the family, faith communities and the nation”.

He introduced the rest of his government only one of the ministries is women82, in the end of May, saying they are all professionals who were selected “to serve together with people who all believe that the greatest thing in our lives is that we were born Hungarian.” continuing by saying that for this government Hungary comes first, but throughout their work Europe will be also strengthen (Kovács, 2018).

The rest of the 2018, the first six months of the forth Orban government continued to be highly observed by the international observers as it involved two highly criticized laws ( “Stop Soros” law and the “Slave law”) and by some to late answer from the EU (in September against Hungary the Article 7 procedure83 of the Treaty on the European Union was initiated by the European parliament);

81 In April 2018 a pro-Government newspapers published a blacklist containing 200 names of persons (list included investigative journalists, CEU professors, employees of civil organizations),, who are, according to them, the "mercenaries of Soros" and therefore a threat to the national security

82 Andrea Bártfai-Mager, an economist, as the minister without portfolio for national wealth

83 Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty is a mechanism triggered when one of the bloc's members violates the values "human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” or when there is "a clear risk" of an EU member state breaching them. 67

⎯ The so–called “Stop Soros” law package was passed in June (by it any kind of the assisting of refugees became a criminal offence; “facilitating illegal immigration” may lead to a year prison, also this law restricted asylum to anyone who enters Hungary from a third country where they are not directly threatened with persecution (Gőbl, 2018), (Beauchamp, 2018). The implementation of this law led to Hungary being referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for "non–compliance" with EU legislation in July 2018 (BBC News, 2018). The law tax has also been adopted and changes were put into force at the end of August 2018 – the 25% tax is from now on charged on the “propaganda activity that portrays immigration in a positive light” and other related activities such as “participating in a media campaign”, “building and operating a network” and “educational activities” geared towards migrants’ integration (Gőbl, 2018)).

⎯ Article 7 was imposed on against Hungary on the 12th September by the European Parliament (Carrera & Bárd, 2018). The process was led by the Green MP Judith Sargentini who in the July introduced a report on Hungary that calls the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (Köves, 2018). The Sargentini in a report made a list of numerous violations and processes done by the government thou years that are threat to democracy, all backed by the a previous reports by EU and UN bodies and institutions, regional and international court decisions, statements from local and international NGOs, and numerous interviews done on sight in Hungary (Beswick & Palfi, 2018), (Kovács- Dobák, 2018).

The public opinion on Article 7 being triggered on Hungary as well as media report coverage of it widely differed:

o Pro–government outlets media outlets called a report a fraud and a successful vote against Hungary “Viktor Orbán is being hailed all–over Europe” while the left–leaning news portals reported it as Orbán was not able to defend himself as well as Hungary (Kovács-Dobák, 2018).

o Considering public opinion about the triggering Article 7 results depended on who asked for the poll. The one done by the Pulzes for the Euro news had 56% of 800 respondents answer “yes” when asked if the European Parliament’s 68

decision on the so–called Sargentini report was fair, 24% responded “no“, when asked if they saw the European Parliament’s decision as being on the whole country or only on the acts of the Hungarian government 53% of respondents said it was only about the Hungarian government, while more than 12% saw it as being about the whole country, and 16% thought it was about both (Cuddy, 2018). While the one done by the Századvég Foundation for the Hungarian government had total of 82 % of the respondents heard of the report, 57 % said they were against the report’s approval, and 32 % said they agreed with it continuing in their brief on government web page that in survey a 55 % of respondents said the Sargentini report criticized Hungary mainly for its migration policy, while 39 % : believed it was because there was “a problem with democracy and human rights” in the country (About Hungary, 2018) .

⎯ The “slave law”84 was signed in December by the President Janos Ader (this law increases overtime employers can demand from 250 to 400 hours a year – thus adding two extra hour on average working day, while the payment for it can be delayed by up to three years). Hungarian government said law address a “serious labour shortage85 “ in for example big auto factories; prior to its implementation Fidesz party said bill was intended to allow “those who want to work more to work more, and those who want to earn more to earn more” (BBC News, 2018) leading to repeated protests86 in Budapest (tens of thousands participants) and on smaller scale in numerous cities87 all around Hungary, (Karasz & Kingsley, 2018), (Euronews, 2018). The protest against this law united Hungarian opposition88 as they had liberals, greens, conservatives, socialists, and [far–right] Jobbik as well as trade unions as speakers (Stancil, 2018), (France 24 English, 2018). Observers and analysts called these protests as a milestone one, as the

84 Hungarian government said law address a serious labour shortage in for example big auto factories and Fidesz party said bill was intended to allow “those who want to work more to work more, and those who want to earn more to earn more.”

85 Labour economist Janos Kollo in a New York Article said three main factors led to a labour shortage: a high level of emigration, low of immigration (as consequence of Mr. Orban’s rhetoric of discouraged foreigners to come to Hungary) and placement of the 200,000 unemployed Hungarians on government-run workfare programs instead of encouraging them to enter the formal employment in the private sector, he also said the situation is exacerbated by the country’s low birthrate as Hungarian woman gives birth to an average of 1.4 children.

86 Protests started in early December and included social categories who did not protest before, as well as ordinary Hungarians outside of the “opposition heartland of the capital, Budapest. Fidesz party said protests were the work of foreign mercenaries paid by Hungarian-born US billionaire George Soros, who denied the claims.

87 Some local councils (of south city Szeged and north Salgotarjan) passed a resolution vowing not to implement the new law

88 In all the arcticles I red and videos I watched these are the first protests in Hungary on which I noticed participants accepted all the speakers regardless their political affiliation. 69

last time public was this angry was in 2006 over the “the lie speech” that doomed then– ruling Socialist Party.

The protests against “slave law” continued in January of 2019 and protesters also were angry about the new law by which administrative courts are going to be overseen directly by the justice minister. In a same time government announced a new tax and a subsidized loan (to buy used homes and subsidies for car programme) for families with at least two children purchases and waived personal income tax for women raising at least four children (Davies, 2019), Prime Minister Viktor Orban said it is done as fewer children are born in Europe and that their solution for it is immigration saying “we do not need numbers. We need Hungarian children (Kennedy, 2019). The demonstrations considering the slave law ended in the end of February 2019. In the March 2019 the ’slavery law’ was extended to the government employees who’s days of leave were reduced from 25 to 20, days for leave will be decided based on the employee’s title and the employer can order a 12–hour–long workday without any compensation (Istrate, 2019).

The European parliament elections that were held in May were also a preparation for the municipally elections in October 2019. The May European parliament elections in Hungary as a winner had a ruling Fidesz party that has won 13 seats of 21 and a shift in opposition where the Democratic Coalition (the party led by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány) that is part of the S&D – Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament took 4 seats, liberal technocratic Momentum — a member of ALDE for the first time entered the European Parliament wining two seats while MSZP (+ Párbeszéd) and far–right Jobbik both won only one seat (comparing to the 2 in case of MSZP and 3 in case of Jobbik on the 2014 elections) and Greens did not win any seat (European parliament, 2019).

In August 2019 officially campaigning for the municipal elections began, Fidesz representative said party will not have a central campaign message during the municipal elections as candidates will be focusing on local issues and opposition parties announced they will jointly nominate single candidates to run against Fidesz's candidates in most places of strategic importance, including Budapest, all of Budapest's districts, and most larger cities (Kovacs, 2019). The elections happened on the 13th October 2019 and both politicians of opposition and of Fidesz claimed victory. Opposition talked of “electoral breakthrough” as their candidate won a post of major89 of Budapest, additionally 14 of 23 Budapest districts major seat were won by

89 The Gergely Karácsony for whom more than 50% voters voted became a new Budapest major – he is “the first green Mayor of Budapest” who during his campaign emphasized that he is the candidate of the people of Budapest against the people of the power and after being elected said he would like for Budapest to be a carbon-free capital by 2030, in November 2019 when asked by the euro news does he plan to run for prime minister in 2022 he said he have other jobs to do (Prescott, 2019) In an interview with the Heinrich Boll Stifung in December 2019 he said he will continue to pursue a cooperative relationship with 70 their joint candidates and they won in 10 of Hungary’s 23 big cities like Miskolc, Szombathely and Pecs (Laszlo, 2019). Fidesz`s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó commenting elections results to the index.hu said orange still dominants the country – a third of their voters live in large cities and in rural areas they had better results than on 2014 elections, there was an increase in municipal councilors to 245 from 225 and a 5% increase in share of votes on the county lists90 (Kreko, 2019), (Laszlo, 2019). In their campaign91 opposition used mostly social medias and face–to–face campaigns, while Fidesz used public advertising space and media outlets.

The foreign media wrote of these elections as a Fidesz defeat, beginning of the end for Orban, him being no longer invincible, big win for opposition and so on, in reality Fidesz ground was only shaken in big cities, it remains the strongest party in Hungary (third of the urban population voted for them on these elections) and continue to pursue their policies that by some make a decade of iliberalism in Hungary and by the World report 2020 of Human rights watch continue with dismantling of democratic institution and rule of law in country prior the local elections with introduction of a law that increases state control over the Academy of Sciences thus giving government influence over scientific research and funding, and after election from government proposal of changes to the administrative courts in November, to Fidesz maintain hegemony over Media Council for nine more years (Kovacs, 2019) and country still not ratifying the Istanbul convention (Roth, 2019).

the ruling Fidesz party and that he plans to implement several green ideas in a city that will be baked by the EU from which he expects more energy-related funds to be allocated directly for municipalities in the next EU budget (Boell, 2019). 90 On the county list voters who live in the Budapest and 23big cities do not vote so this increase shows smaller settlements support to Fidesz is increasing and half of a country consists of those rural settlements

91 One of the biggest scandals of the campaign was a story, published in October, of a blogger "The Devilʼs Advocate" who accused Fidesz mayor of Győr Zsolt Borkai and his friend lawyer Zoltán Rákosfalvy for abuse of power, corruption, the use of drugs, and using the services of prostitutes (Hungary today, 2019) - some say it encouraged anti-Orbán voters in cities to participate on elections

6 EU AND HUNGARY RELATIONSHIP FROM 2009 TO THE 2019

A person cannot discuss the right wing parties in Hungary without taking into the consideration countries’ relation with the EU. The EU parliament has not only Fidesz members as Hungarian representatives, but when disusing its international politics in last 10 years I notice it mostly goes like this: Hungarian international relations = Fidesz international relations. Although Fidesz party is part of a centre–right political family – European People's Party (EPP) the group that has a majority in European parliament92 the relationship he has with EU is a troubled one. It all started with the Fidesz majority government changing its domestic laws in 2010, mainly the media laws, later altering constitution in 2011, adopting the new one in 2012 – called the Fundamental law, and having it additionally changed in 2013, it all worsen with the migrant crisis in 2015 and resulted in 2018 with the European Parliament (EP) voting in favor of launching Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU93 proceedings against the Hungarian government.

In the next section I will briefly explain answers EU had considering Hungary’s behavior – the domestic one and international one, dividing it on its governments – the second Orbán`s government 2010 – 2014, the third Orbán`s government 2014 – 2018 and the present ongoing forth Orbán`s government 2018 – 2022.

6.1 The second Orbán`s government 2010 – 2014 and EU

European Parliament (EP) firstly in July 2011 adopted by 331 votes to 274 with 54 abstentions a resolution 2011/2655(RSP) on the Revised Hungarian Constitution where they criticized its making process stating it lacked transparency, was conducted to fast without political or social consensus and that it failed to explicitly lay down a number of principles which is obliged to respect and that it creates the risk of discrimination against certain groups in society. In this resolution Parliament called on the Hungarian authorities to address the issues and concerns raised by the Venice Commission94 and to implement its recommendations, either by amending

92 They have had 274 seats from 766 after the 2009 elections, 221 seats from 751 after the 2014 elections and 182 from 751 on 2019 elections; the second by a majority group is S&D (European Parliament, 2014), ( European Parliamen, 2019)

93 This is a procedure by which EU suspends a certain rights to its member state, it deprived member state of its voting rights in the European Council – a country lose a representation in the decision-making processes of the EU

94 Notably to : ” ensure greater transparency and to foster genuine political and social inclusion and a broad public debate in connection with the forthcoming drafting and adoption of the cardinal laws laid down in the new Constitution; guarantee equal protection of the rights of every citizen…; reaffirm the independence of the judiciary by restoring the right of the Constitutional Court to review budget-related legislation without exception; provide sufficient guarantees concerning the protection of fundamental rights and so on.

72 the new Constitution or through future the cardinal and ordinary laws. Also the Commission asked to conduct a review and analysis of the new Constitution and of the cardinal laws to be adopted in the future in order to check that they are consistent with the acquis communautaire , and in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU ( European Parliament , 2011). This resolution as well as the next one in 2012 was tabled by the S&D, GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA and ALDE groups.

On the 16th February 2012 European Parliament (EP) adopted a new 2012/2511(RSP) resolution with 315 votes for, 263 against and 49 abstentions on then political developments in Hungary and expressed a “serious concern at the situation in Hungary in relation to the exercise of democracy, the rule of law, the respect and protection of human and social rights, the system of checks and balances, equality and non – discrimination.” The Parliament again called on the Hungarian Government to comply with the recommendations, objections and demands of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission. The European Commission was called to closely monitor possible amendments and the implementation of the laws95 and make sure they complied with the letter and spirit of the European Treaties and in cooperation with the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, follow up whether and how the recommendations have been implemented and to present its findings in a future report (European parliament, 2012).

For me, also, was interesting Orbáns speech for a Chatham House in October 2013 on “The Role of Traditional Values in Europe's Future” in which he considering the EU said : “I chaired the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration; as prime minister I led the accession talks and I had the chance to see a European Union full of strength, optimism and self– confidence. But what can I see now? Totally opposite. An uncertain European Union without a clear vision about its future” (Chatam_House, 2013)

The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties Justice and Home Affairs (the LIBE Committee) delegated the writing of the report to the Greens/European Free Alliance parliamentary group committee member Rui Tavares of Portugal. His report entitled “The Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary” that criticize weakening of the fundamental rights in Hungary was presented to the Parliament in May 2013 and the

95 Connected to the judiciary, the central bank, the data protection authority, media laws, registration of churches and new the new electoral law for which they said needs to respect the principle of political alternation and to meet European democratic standards.

73 findings in it were adopted96 on the 3th July 2013. The report named “The Tavares Report” called in paragraphs 78 and 80 “for the establishment of a new mechanism to ensure compliance by all Member States with the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU [Treaty on European Union], and the continuity of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’; this mechanism could assume the form of a ‘Copenhagen Commission’ or high – level group, a ‘group of wise men’. . .” and recommends this mechanism should be “be independent from political influence; regularly monitor respect for fundamental rights, the state of democracy and the rule of law in all Member States, while fully respecting national constitutional traditions” and to “warn the EU at an early stage about any risks of deterioration of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU [Treaty on European Union] and issue recommendations to the EU institutions and Member States on how to respond and remedy any deterioration of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU” (The Tavares report, 2013). On the debate in the European Parliament Orbán claimed that ”the report represented the persecution of a well – meaning right – wing government by the unified and hostile European left97” (Scheppele, 2013) on the session in the National Assembly on July 4, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that the Tavares report is “unjust” and “hostile toward Hungarians” and that it “gravely insults Hungary” and “violates Hungary’s sovereignty.” Orbán claimed that the corporate interests had instigated the report as a means of countering the government’s utility – fee cuts, which harmed the interests of European corporations that “for years collected as much money as they could from Hungarian families” (The Orange Files, 2013). The largest political group in Parliament – EPP and the one that has Fidesz as a member voted against it, the Vice–Chairman of the EPP Group Manfred Weber MEP said: “ The Report is a wish list of the European leftist parties who aim to impose their own political agenda on Hungary. The European Parliament has no competence to act as a tribunal and tell people how they have to live”98 (EPP Group, 2013). In the end Tavares Report led to an official suggesting to EU to have a process for monitoring of all its members, not only Hungary, to make sure the European norms are met, but it did not follow by any efficient EU measures against Hungary. They continue to do their internal affairs as before.

In August 2013 some of the EU funding to Hungary has been put on hold as Jonathan Todd, a commission spokesman said: “…due to significant deficiencies identified by commission

96 Of the 754 MEPs the 453 MEPs voted either to approve or not to reject it, while 249 voted to reject the report and 65 were not present.

97 Considering the Orbán`s allegations that report was conspiracy of the left – at that time the European parliament consisted equally from the left and right parties and the total number of yes votes is higher than a number of left parties MEPs

98 He continue saying : “...The dozens of legislative recommendations to the Hungarian Parliament and the setting-up of a monitoring procedure to assess their implementation have no legal basis and are totally unacceptable” and emphasising they are also rejecting it due to the double standards: “... Socialist are turning a blind eye to glaring breaches of European values in Socialist-led countries such as Bulgaria and Romania”

74 audits in the management and control systems of eight operational programmes”, Janos Lazar, head of the prime minister’s office in Budapest to said to Reuters news agency that “At the moment, the EU is not financing 13 out of the 15 programmes managed by the National Development Agency . . . as it has problems with 13 programmes” (K. Eddy; J. Fontanella- Khan, 2013)

6.2 The third Orbán`s government 2014 – 2018 and EU

As I said above EPP had a special relationship with Fidesz, some foreign journalist in 2014 said Orbán regime has been sheltered by EPP99 in the name of partisan politics. They did not said anything against his way of governing Hungary at the end of his second and in the beginning of his third government; on Fidesz campaign rally in Budapest EPPs president Joseph Daul (R. Daniel Kelemen, 2015) endorsed Orbans re–election bid and after Fidesz again on 2014 elections got parliamentary majority he congratulated Orban and Fidesz for a win continuing with: „The people of Hungary have renewed their confidence in PM Orban and his government because he has always spoken the truth to them and because he implemented courageous reforms, which put the country’s economy back on track.” (Mudde, 2014).

In 2015 Hungary was once again in focus of EU due to Orbán’s repeated statements on the possibility of reinstating the death penalty in Hungary and his government’s public consultation on migration so in May voted (362 votes for to 247 against, with 88 abstentions ) on resolution that call on the Commission to "immediately initiate an in–depth monitoring process on the situation of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary and to report back on this matter to the European Parliament and Council before September 2015 “ as MEPs stressed that reinstating death penalty in Hungary “ would breach the EU Treaties and Charter of fundamental rights, and the wording of the Hungarian government’s public consultation on migration is "highly misleading, biased and unbalanced" ” (Press Releases European Parliament, 2015). In his parliament speeches in Budapest in 2015 considering migrant crisis Orban in September said that whole Hungary and Europe is in danger as : „our borders are in danger, our way of life based on respect for the law is in danger“ and that they are quarrelling with Brussels as they : “ have diverging views on the problem, the means by which to resolve the problem, and the consequences of the problem...We should not set up refugee camps – or whatever they may be called – within the European Union, but outside it ... Proposals such as

99 Considering EPP and Fidesz relationship it is also worth mentioning that Fidesz politicians have been placed by EPP on a positions where they can defend Orbán regime, for example in 2014 EPP put Fidesz MEP Kinga Gál as a vice-chair of the LIBE committee that in 2013 issued the Tavares Report

75 the quota system merely address the consequences, rather than the causes... “ explaining that all they do is a will of their people100 and that by protecting themselves they also protect Europe101 (Orbán, 2015). On the November one he said „Europe has been attacked and we too are in danger... the EU is rudderless. It is weak, uncertain and paralysed. There are meetings and conferences galore, but there are no solutions“... he as in September speech addressed the compulsory resettlement quotas saying they instead of keeping migrants away inviting them and proposed to parliament: “...we continue to reject the quotas, and continue to insist that we ourselves should decide whom we want to let in and whom we want to live together with“ (Orbán, 2015)

In the 2017 on the 26th MEPs discussed with the Prime minister Orban Hungary’s new education law, the tightening of rules for NGOs and asylum seekers and a government survey entitled “National Consultation – Let’s stop Brussels!”. EU Commission First Vice–President Frans Timmermans said the new education law is incompatibility with the EU law – the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union :“ notably the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment but also with the right of academic freedom, the right to education and the freedom to conduct a business“ and announced an infringement procedure (EU Parliament, 2017). The Hungarian government was also criticized for the making of the “false allegations” in their survey about the EU’s intentions (Lendvai, 2017) Orbán said that accusations that his government wanted to close the CEU were false and portrayed the national consultation as a democratic tool. (EU Parliament, 2017). On the 29th April following the meeting with the EPP president Joseph Daul and Orban published statement:“ ...we will not accept that any basic freedoms are restricted or rule of law is disregarded ... NGOs are an integral part of any healthy democracy, they represent the civil society and must be respected... the blatant anti–EU rhetoric of the ‘Let’s stop Brussels’ consultation is unacceptable... The constant attacks on Europe, which Fidesz has launched for years, have reached a level we cannot tolerate“ also they said Prime Minister Orban reassured them that Hungary will act accordingly and take all necessary steps to comply with the Commission’s request a (EPP statement, 2017).

100 In May 2015 the questionnaires containing 12 questions (twelve questions as part of a national consultation concerning immigration, economic immigration and terrorism) and a letter from the Prime Minister have been mailed to all citizens aged over 18—altogether 8 million people with a deadline of returning 1 July 2015. More than 80% of Hungarians said they think that Brussels’ ill-chosen immigration policy has failed. (EWSI, 2015).

101 In his speech he said :”Europe is Europe because explicit rules govern our co-existence ... everyone here has worked hard to live in peace and security: both individuals and the national communities together have worked hard for this. In Europe, welfare is not something you are entitled to as a matter of course: it is something that you have to work for” (Orbán, 2015)

In the early 2018 several MEPs stated that they are increasingly that EU`s structural funds in Hungary are going to Orbán’s family, friends and supporters, as Ingeborg Grässle, a German centre–right MEP who leads the European parliament’s budgetary control committee, found out 36% of tenders for public projects had only one bidder and head of legal affairs at Transparency International Hungary – Miklós Ligeti said “The European Union structural funds have an eminent role in the questionable enrichment of government cronies and business oligarchs” (Rankin, 2018). During 2014 to 2018102 the Hungary`s misuse of EU funds (from 2014 to the 2021 Hungary should receive €25bn in economic development funds) were investigated by the EU’s anti–fraud office (OLAF) that concluded 52 probes and recommended the EU to recover 3.84% of all payments made to the country under the bloc’s structural and agriculture funds (Zalan, 2019).

6.3 The forth Orban`s government 2018 – 2022 and EU

The most spoken event that happen in first year of the Orban`s fourth government considering his relationship with EU was the triggering of the Article 7 by the EU parliament for the first time in the history, the same article was imposed to Poland in 2017 by the European commission over its judicial reforms. As I wrote in chapter above it was imposed on the 12th September by the European Parliament against Hungary after introduction of the report on Hungaryin in July 2018 by the Green MP Judith Sargentini.

A report on Hungary calls the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (Köves, 2018). The report was based on a previous reports by EU and UN bodies and institutions, regional and international court decisions, statements from local and international NGOs, and numerous interviews done in Hungary. The Sargentini in a report made a list of numerous processes, laws imposed by the Hungarian government thou out the years and describe the overall domestic situation, stating that countries’ democracy is threatened by the:

⎯ Violations of the right to equal treatment; the rights of minorities, migrants103, asylum seekers and refugees

102 In 2017 OLAF said it had found serious irregularities related to street-lighting contracts awarded to a company that had been owned by Orbán’s son-in-law, István Tiborcz and called EU to to claw back more than €40m of EU funds spent on lighting projects, 2018, from the concluded nine probes in Hungary and in OLAF seven cases found irregularities.

103 It cites concerns from UN and Council of Europe Commissioners considering claims of the abuse of asylum-seekers and migrants by the Hungarians authorities

⎯ Restrictions on freedom of the press104, academic independence; freedom of religion and association ⎯ abolition of economic and social rights105 ⎯ Corruption and conflicts of interest106 ⎯ Inadequate privacy and data protection107 ⎯ Constitutional changes and changes of the electoral system (Köves, 2018), (Beswick & Palfi, 2018)

On a debate on the 11th September 2018 in the European Parliament, ahead of a voting for or against the Article 7, Orban criticised the report for being “not clear on facts”, full of misinterpretations and insulting to his nation; he was called a “hero” by Harald Vilimsky (Freedom Party, Austria), as well as by Mara Bizotto (Salvini’s Lega Nord); the Commission First Vice–President Frans Timmermans said that “sadly”, the EU executive shared the report’s conclusions in many respects; Manfred Weber, the leader of the EPP group said he wanted to be a “bridge–builder” and MEPs from S&D, the Green group and the leftist GUE/NGL were highly critical of Orbán (Gotev, 2018). The imposition of the article 7 was, in my opinion, a really interesting one as it showed how EPP, largest party group in parliament, is internally divided as Euroactiv reports some of the EPP MPs find it impossible to defend Fidesz’ place in the centre–right political family – Roberta Mezzola (EPP, Malta) spoke of EU values being under serious threat as in Hungary and said she would vote for the Sargentini report, Frank Engel (EPP, Luxembourg) told Orbán he was behaving “like the head of a sect”, Sean Kelly (EPP, Ireland) told Orbán his constituents were questioning his party’s continuing presence in EPP. Before the vote European Commission President Jean–Claude Juncker told DW "I constantly explain to Viktor Orban that this radical rhetoric he's directing towards Europe helps neither him nor Europe” continuing by saying "there are big differences" between the two of them (DW, 2018).

104 She said that the current legislative framework in Hungray does not ensure an uncensored and unhindered press, as one of the examples mentioned was a publication of a list of 200 mercenaries (workers of NGOs, activists and investigative reporters) working for George Soros

105 In a report it is mentioned that Hungarian Criminal Code does not fully protect female victims of domestic violence and cities 2018 UNHRC comments of the prevalence of the stereotyped attitudes concerning the position of women in society

106 It cities OLAF investigations and it says MPs in Hungary should report conflicts of interest as they arise and that submission of the asset declarations needs to be more robust

107 It says a countrie’s laws on a secret surveillance for national security purposes allow for the mass interception of communications.

For the proposal on 12th September 2/3 of MPs vote in favor – with 448 voting in favor of the motion, 197 against and 48 abstentions (DW, 2018). Hungarian government claimed that by this vote EU is taking a revenge on the country because Budapest was against the bloc's migrant quotas, Prime minister Orban dubbed the document a "Soros–report“ and his supporters criticized108 the report for consulting with mainly left–leaning opposition groups (Beswick & Palfi, 2018), (Kovács–Dobák, 2018).

After European parliament voted to trigger Article 7 in winter 2018 and beginning of the 2019 little progress was made considering member states act on it. For country to bare some kind of punishment for breaching Article 7 several steps needs to happen and there is no time limitations on their implementation – it can go, literary till the end of time ;

⎯ Firstly a proposal needs to be made to the European parliament of the supposed breach – in case of Hungary it was done by the Sergentini report in June 2018. ⎯ Second step is proposal needs to be supported by the 2/3 of the parliamentary majority – it was done, in case of Hungary, on the 18th September 2018. ⎯ The third step, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths agree there is a clear risk of serious breach after that the subjected country is monitored and if continued than another parliamentary vote must be taken and then if they vote for it the European Council must acting by unanimity on a proposal – if agrees determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach and than by the 7.3 of the Article 7 may decide to suspend accused member state certain of the certain rights including the voting rights of that Member State in the Council (Article 7 TEU, 2012).

Considering Hungary and Article 7 there was use of social media by the individual MPs, political parties (it was part of the campaign for the EP elections in May 2019 for some) against Fidesz, Orban, the process of Article 7 was questioned – in November 2018 ALDE’s leader Guy Verhofstadt unveiled a poster in Brussels attacking Orban : “First he took our money, now he wants to destroy Europe.” continuing by saying he is creating illiberal state and that : “... we Europeans do nothing at all and don’t react” (Euronews, 2018). in January 2019 Green MEP Judith Sargentini informed Council of EU that in 2019 situation in Hungary considering the democracy is getting worse and that Council of EU member states need to start “a real process” that would examine the rule of law in that country (Rankin, 2019) and in March 2019 EPP voted to suspend Fidesz party membership – the party will no longer have any rights as a

108 Even thout the written consulted parties in the report are Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hungarian Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, National Association of Hungarian Journalists, ELTE Law University and the University of Pécs 79 party member109, following the decision Manfred Weber110 said “EPP ... make obvious to the outside world that Fidesz would not have any say over the future developments of the EPP” Victor Orban accused left the wing liberal parties within the EPP for Fidesz expulsion saying he said that he remains committed to the EU values but that he is against migration and wants to protect Christian values concluding that staying in the EPP “ensure unity of the conservative forces before the European elections” (Brzozowski, Rios, & Fortuna, 2019). In my opinion it is unlikely that Fidesz will leave EPP and join other right wing parties in the parliament in forming their own group in near future, as Orban likes power, to be in power and where it is divided and EPP is still the strongest group and to be in it is good for achieving credibility, on the other hand it is in my opinion unlikely it will be expelled from EPP as group needs Fidesz as an counter balance for the increasingly anti–center right voters in Germany.

The 2019 European parliamentary elections (figure 12 bellow) from 23–26 May had a biggest turnout in 20 years, resulted in increase of women MPs – 41%, centrist parties having a significant losses EPP gained 182 seats (comparing to the 217 seats they had on last elections – but still remained the single biggest group), Socialists & Democrats gained 154 ( compared to 184 seats from 2014 elections) and Greens, liberals and nationalists gaining better ground in Brussels (European Parliament, 2019), (DW News, 2019). Zeit.de made a map of EU elections that reflects the party group that received the most votes in each region – it showed that EU is mostly right (blue color on a map) and that support for the parties that declared Figure 12 EU elections 2019 municipalities’ states result themselves as a far right and national conservative is not decreasing, while the support for the greens is increasing in north and west parts of EU (Blickle, Möller, Platon, Schlieben, Tröger, & Venohr, 2019).

109 will no longer have the right to vote in any party meetings and will no longer have the right to propose candidates for posts, “will no longer be present at any EPP meetings. The decision also calls for the immediate removal of the “posters and other advertising materials used to run a fake news campaign against President Jean-Claude Juncker”

110 Leader of the European People's Party in the European Parliament since the 2014.

In July newly elected European Parliament elected (383 members voted in favor, 327 against, and 22 abstained) Ursula von der Leyen as a President of the European Commission (Euroepean Parliament, 2019) on 1th December 2019 she replaced Jean–Claude Juncker, prior and after assuming office she opted for the gender balance, promised a European green deal111, committed to reformation of the EU's asylum system, spoke in favor of enlargement of the euro zone and have said that EU should invest in joint defense capacities (BBC News, 2020). Considering her relation with Hungary – her presidency was backed by the Central European governments and after the first meeting with her in August 2019 Hungarian Prime minister Orban said “... a serious lady has become the European Commission's president” and that she : "understands what is happening in Central Europe, understands what we say, and understands what is important for the Hungarians." Von der Leyen tweeted: Agreed on need for fresh start & pragmatic solutions on #migration. Also discussed competitiveness + need to bring EU institutions closer to member states. #ruleoflaw is crucial, applies to all. Strong #defenseunion needed. (Bayer, 2019).

In October and December there were hearings in the EU parliament considering the Hungary’s Article 7 investigation, according to the official’s representatives from 11countries raised questions but Hungarian representatives remained largely silent – the hearings did not made any progress and were more in media due to the tweets112 of Hungarian representatives who due to them got a public rebuke by the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU (Bayer L. , 2019).

Considering Hungary and EU after an analysis of their relationship in last decade, in my opinion, only hard pressure EU`s has done considering Orbans governments were Article 7 procedures who`s further development is not moving forward, in winter 2018 and throughout the 2019 it has been in status quo and in my opinion will continue in the 2020113 due to the

⎯ firstly rule of unanimity of the European Council in order to impose any sanctions it is needed and it will be vetoed every time – since end of the 2018 two members of the EU are in the procedures under the article 7 – Poland and Hungary and any

111 Roadmap for making the EU's economy sustainable – removal of the greenhouse gas emissions from the air, creating of the transition fund for countries still dependent on fossil fuels (Just Transition Mechanism), investment in environmentally-friendly technologies.

112 The Hungarian official tweeted how Article 7 leads nowhere and only raises mistrust among member states, that questions are "ridiculous," orchestrated by Soros and that tired issues that have already been resolved were brought out

113 All the conclusions considering EU actions with Hungary are concluded with the January 2020 even thou writing of the thesis is concluded in June 2020 after/during COVID 19 outbreak – EU and Hungary`s response considering Covid 19 will not be discussed.

of them can (and most possible will) veto the decision in the European council – so this disciplinary procedure, except being highly bureaucratic and time consuming seams more, in my opinion, symbolic than a proper tool for solving the problem (of breaching EU values) . ⎯ Secondly Hungary was not focus of the EU in 2019 (EU has had more important topics to cover – like finalization of the Brexit and they did not have any response on the continuance of erosion of media freedoms in Hungary that continued in 2019). As I notice Hungary is only under the spotlight of EU when its decisions are having direct influence on major economies in EU (migrations in 2015 and 2016 ) and not when they have influence on Hungary’s citizen’s wellbeing.

7 FINAL REMARKS

The populist parties vote share is increasing, by a Guardian report it globally doubled since 2000s and populist arguments have been gradually adopted in speeches of numerous politicians; the same research, done in 2018, reviled that in Europe every fourth person votes for a populist party and the one on the 2019 EU elections reviled that populists have won 29% of seats in parliament (218 of 751 seats) but are divided between different groups in European parliament, the map of the results of the elections (figure 12 above) show the right wing one are not declining. In Hungary a political party Fidesz with its leader and Prime minister Victor Orban is governing a country for a over a decade and their position appears impregnable as they have build an illiberal/autocratic system based on an unity against the enemies of the nation ( perfect example of the Cass Mude`s definition of populism “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite) in the beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was SSSR and soviet army, later in early 2000s it was corrupt elite – the socialists, after the 2008 crisis it were the foreign direct investment companies – banks with Swiss loans, electric companies with high bills in that time also some antagonism against EU institutions appeared but it got higher with 2015 and migrant crisis – then an enemy of the state were migrants, Soros, NGOs – anybody who could threaten the Christian democratic way of life Hungarians enjoy to live. Now in Fidesz–Orban fourth government an enemy is Brussels (EU institutions) – not EU as an idea/ a free trade community/ a grant and structural funds provider but EU as an attacker of the Hungarian nation ( domestically any imposition of a rule or criticism from EU is shown as an attack on citizens’ way of life, opinion, beliefs and safety).

My master thesis is based on main hypothesis that states:

Right wing populist parties are becoming more influential in the EUs decision making processes and are becoming a threat to the EU and its own country democracy.

In order for the above mentioned hypothesis to be accepted or reject, I firstly need to evaluate specific hypotheses:

1. Right wing parties use/misuse democratic tools for populist agenda ( e.g. rule of law, elections, independent institutions, human rights).

Hungary is still fundamentally democratic as citizens are free in the act of voting and all democratic tools exists, fundamental rights (most of them) are guaranteed and protected but the process of democratic will–formation is undermined and the “fair” aspect of the democratic process is severely impaired since the right wing party Fidesz is in power in Hungary. They have had a populist campaign since early 2000s in a country and used all the possible tools – mostly democratic one to enhance their popularity from being involved in 2006 wide–scale political protestations provoked by then Prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány confidential speech to the initiation of the highly successful referendum for abolishment of the government reforms that increased medical and tuition fee in 2008 in March…During their fist government they got a majority in parliament legally democratically in elections, they imposed and changed numerous regulations all throughout democratic means to benefit them and one closer to them from restriction of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to having their members in the Election Commission to change of the electoral laws and reformation of the mass media and all other regulations they impose using democratic tolls – they have a law to back every decision they make from the one that let them influence public school curriculum to one that forces NGOs to close down to having a business environment favorable only to their allies – the evidence founded by the EU’s anti–fraud office (OLAF) of the Hungary`s misuse of EU funds between 2014–2018. Based on the stated above it can be confirmed hypothesis 1 is accepted.

2. Citizens in Hungary are oblivious to the populist propaganda of its current government because they are used to the similar one from their communist era.

In my investigation of the Hungarian society what I notice is they are not oblivious to the government actions – they do protest when they disagree with a proposed law – the society protested in Budapest during the #istandwithCEU movement in April 2017, at the end of 2018 and begging the 2019 they have protested against “slave law”. But the society in Hungary is as every election has shown is a highly divided one between the rural and the urban one. Urban 83 one is the one who have some stand against the government actions while the rural one does not as long as it does not affect their way of life they do not see a reason why would they do anything against the government – that passivity of the society may be the legacy of communism – Hungarians accept this kind of state because they are used to stability and that regime/a government is the one who is providing it, from less than 60% of eligible citizens going on election to not believing in protects as means of change – to quote an answer of a Hungarian friend about protests in Budapest: “In Hungary protests lead nowhere – I was raised by a mother who never thought of any kind of protest because my grandpa went on one in 1956 and never returned home, I am on almost every protest that happened in last 5 years and the only one that was successful was the one against internet tax and it succeeded because Orban needed job stability MNC companies provide in capital and near the borders in factories.” The legacy of communism is so intertwined with present situation in Hungary that it needs and additional research (for example the one of Hungarians being more home and family oriented than outspoken publically about current political situation... ). Based on the things I mentioned above and in the rest of my thesis I can say this hypothesis is semi–accepted based on information from last two decades and it may become irrelevant i next five years as Millennials and generation Z gets older and society in Hungry more interconnected with the world due to the globalization. Based on the stated above it can be confirmed hypothesis 2 is accepted.

3. Strong right wing party on power make citizens of that country more focused on their nationality rather than on problems of their own country and is leading a country from democracy to the autocracy.

Politics Fidesz does in Hungary is a perfect example of the Cass Mude definition of populism “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite – they are the one and only one who can protect nation. In the beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was SSSR and soviet army, later in early 2000s it was the socialists corrupt elite and the socialist “who do not care” about Hungarians as the important one globally (in 2004 than government of Prime minister Ferenc Gyurscany was campaigning against giving passports to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, while opposition led by Fidesz campaigned for giving the citizenships stating it to be an excellent way of reuniting the nation – it was one of the fist things his party did when they won election), after the 2008 crisis it were the foreign direct investment companies – foreign banks that gave Swiss loans to Hungarians, electric foreign companies that imposed high bills, in that time also some antagonism against EU institutions appeared but it got higher with 2015 and migrant crisis – then an enemy of the state were migrants, Soros, NGOs – anybody who could threaten the Christian democratic way of life Hungarians enjoy to live. Now in Fidesz–Orban fourth

84 government an enemy is Brussels (EU institutions) – not EU as an idea/ a free trade community/ a grant and structural funds provider but EU as an attacker of the Hungarian nation (domestically any imposition of a rule or criticism from EU is shown as an attack on citizens’ way of life, opinion, beliefs and safety). The right wing parties have all the time an enemy of a nation and they are the only one who can save nation from that enemy also the nation is never shown in a negative way – current government over a decade changed school curriculum and put emphasize of Hungary as a leading force as one who are protecting Europe and Christianity – from Ottomans in middle ages to the Germans in Second World War to Islamic migrants in 21 century. This right wing party is a very good manipulator in the same time as EU accused government of misuse of provided grants and foreign NGOs accused it for being corrupted the government imposed Soros law and named him and all near him as the one who want to Muslimise" the country – they shifted perception of nation from them to a new enemy. Fidesz enemy changes over time, now it is the similar one as of other right wing parties in EU – anti migrant one but mainly Brussels as attacker of state sovereignty with all the rules and sanctions they impose. As I notices a right wing populist party needs to have an enemy and who will be Fidesz`s next enemy only time will show. Based on the stated above it can be confirmed hypothesis 3 is also accepted.

4. EU institutions are aware of the right wing populist parties influence on the EU institutions but still do not have proper tools to manage them.

They are highly aware of it but there is no proper mechanism that can help them in managing it – there is only a possibility of suspending it from a party group as EPP did in March 2019 to Fidesz or “shaming them publically” by EU by investigating governance of their country as EU did in last 10 years through numerous investigations from the Tavares Report in 2013 to the OLAF investigations between 2014-2018 to the Sargentini report in 2018 and imposition of Article 7 on a country two years ago. Based on the stated above it can be confirmed hypothesis 4 is also accepted.

To sum up everything based on case study of Hungary and my overall investigation of a right wing parties in EU I can confirm my hypothesis and say that:

⎯ the right wing populist parties are becoming more influential in EUs decision making processes (one of the best examples is Hungary and migrant crisis they „disobeyed“ EU and in the end did not accept migrants in amounts EU quotas demanded and lastly the 2019 EP election have shown an increase in MPs from right wing parties ) and that

⎯ they are becoming a threat to EU and its own country democracy ( numerous investigations stated that democracy is threatened in Hungary, its Democracy Index, calculated by the The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),has been continuously deteriorating since 2010 when it had a score above 7 (7,21) to the one bellow 6,5 (a 6,63 in 2019) and its regime type is named a flawed democracy, even its own Prime minister said he is constructing an iliberal state ).

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