DOCSLIB.ORG

Act No. 3 of 2020 – Chief of Defence Staff

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Chief of Defence Staff BELIZE: CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF ACT, 2020 ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 1. Short title. 2. Interpretation. 3. Appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff. 4. Functions of Chief of Defence Staff. 5. Term of office. 6 Retirement from armed forces. 7. Resignation. 8. Removal of Chief of Defence Staff. 9. Power to fill vacancy. 10. Office of the Chief of Defence Staff. 11. Regulations. 12. Act to prevail over other written law. No. 3] Chief of Defence Staff 53 No. 3 of 2020 I assent, (SIR COLVILLE N. YOUNG) Governor-General 10th January, 2020 AN ACT to provide for the appointment of a person to be the chief of defence staff who shall be responsible for the co-ordination of activities as between the Armed Forces and the Ministry of National Security; for the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff; to provide for the functions of the Chief of Defence Staff; and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. (Gazetted 10th January, 2020.) BE IT ENACTED, by and with the advice and consent of the House of Representatives and the Senate of Belize and by the authority of the same, as follows– 1. This Act may be cited as the Short title. CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF ACT, 2020, 54 Chief of Defence Staff [No. 3 Interpretation. 2. In this Act– “armed forces” includes– (i) the Belize Defence Force; or (ii) the Coast Guard; CAP. 135. “Belize Defence Force” means the Force established under section 4 of the Defence Act; and CAP. 131.01. “Coast Guard” means the Coast Guard established under section 3 of the Belize Coast Guard Act. Appointment 3.–(1) The Governor General, acting in accordance with the of the Chief of Defence. advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint a person to be the Chief of Defence Staff. (2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as Chief of Defence Staff if– (a) that person has served in any of the armed forces and attained a rank not lower than Colonel or Lieutenant Commander, as the case may be; or (b) that person is currently serving in any of the armed forces at a rank not lower than Colonel or Lieutenant Commander, as the case may be. (3) The Governor General acting on the advice of the Prime Minister may– (a) appoint a person over the age of 55 years to serve as the Chief of Defence Staff; or (b) permit a person who attains the age of 55 years to continue serving as the Chief of Defence Staff. (4) The Chief of Defence Staff shall function under the direction, supervision and control of the minister responsible for defence. No. 3] Chief of Defence Staff 55 (5) Where an officer serving as the Commander, Belize Defence Force, the Commandant, Belize Coast Guard as the case may be, is appointed as the Chief of Defence Staff, he shall, upon being so appointed, relinquish his position as the Commander, Belize Defence Force, the Commandant Belize Coast Guard, as the case may be, provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Defence Act, the Belize Coast Guard Act, the person so CAP. 135. appointed as Chief of Defence Staff shall, for so long as he CAP. 131:01. holds such position, continue to be a member of the services to which he belonged at the time of his appointment under subsection (1). (6) The Chief of Defence Staff shall, while so serving in the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, hold the rank of Major General in the case of an officer of the Belize Defence Force and Rear Admiral of the Upper Half in the case of an officer of the Coast Guard. 4.–(1) The functions of the Chief of Defence Staff shall be– Functions of Chief of (a) to assist in providing for the strategic direction Defence Staff. of the armed forces; (b) to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces; (c) to facilitate the preparation and review of strategic plans for the defence of the country; (d) to undertake assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces in comparison with those of their potential adversaries; (e) to prepare and review contingency plans relating to the armed forces for the protection of government and key personnel; (f) to advise on strengths and critical deficiencies and assess the effect of such strengths and deficiencies– 56 Chief of Defence Staff [No. 3 (i) in meeting national security objectives; and (ii) in ensuring conformity with policy; (g) to advise on the extent to which the programmes, recommendations and budget proposals of the armed forces for a fiscal year conform to the priorities established in relation to strategic plans; (h) to tender advice on the extent to which the major programmes and policies of the armed forces relating to manpower and equipment conform to strategic plans; (i) to assess military requirements as against the proposed defence procurement plans and to advise the Ministry accordingly; (j) to facilitate the formulation of policies for the joint training of the armed forces; (k) to facilitate the formulation of policies for peace- keeping operations by the armed forces ; and (l) to do all such other things as are required or are necessary for the implementation of the above. (2) In carrying out the functions under subsection (1), the Chief of Defence Staff shall– (a) consult with the Commander of the Belize Defence Force and the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and (b) take into consideration the range of military advice and opinions of the Commander of the Belize Defence Force and Commandant of Coast Guard. Term of office. 5. The Chief of Defence Staff shall hold office for a period determined by the Prime Minister. No. 3] Chief of Defence Staff 57 6.–(1) If the person appointed as Chief of Defence Staff Retirement from armed served in any of the armed forces upon appointment, that forces. person shall retire from the respective armed force after serving as Chief of Defence Staff. (2) The Chief of Defence Staff shall be entitled to all retirement benefits upon retirement under subsection (1), if the Chief of Defence Staff retires before attaining the age of 55 years. 7.–(1) The Chief of Defence Staff may resign at any time by Resignation. giving two months written notice to the Governor General. (2) Resignation by the Chief of Defence Staff shall take effect upon written acceptance of the resignation by the Governor General. 8. The Chief of Defence Staff may be removed at any time Removal of Chief Defence by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister Staff. taking into consideration issues of national security, without assigning reasons therefore. 9. In the event of death, retirement, resignation or disability Power to fill or removal from office of the Chief of Defence Staff before vacancy. the expiration of his term of office, the Governor General acting on advice of the Prime Minister shall, having regard to the provisions of this section, appoint another officer in his place. 10.–(1) There shall be established an office of the Chief of Office of the Chief of Defence Staff which shall consist of such staff as the Chief Defence Staff. of Defence Staff deems necessary. (2) The staff shall be comprised of both armed forces personnel and civilian personnel. (3) Civilian personnel may be employed from among persons presently in the public service, whether on permanent employment or employed on a contractual basis. (4) Where armed forces personnel are deployed for service in the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, such 58 Chief of Defence Staff [No. 3 deployment shall be done by the Commander of the Belize Defence Force and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, as the case may be, in consultation with the Security Services Commission. Regulations. 11. –(1) The Minister may make regulations for the better carrying out of the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Minister may make regulations in respect of the following– (a) joint doctrine, training and professional military education; (b) the programmes and courses that may be conducted in institutions established for the conduct of military education; (c) the establishment of databases and systems for collection, collation and storage of information relating to operations of the armed forces; (d) policies for peace-keeping operations; (e) guidelines for determining the terms and conditions applicable to personnel recruited on contractual basis to the office of the Chief of Defence Staff; (f) qualifications of experts whose services may be obtained for the office of the Chief of Defence Staff; (g) programmes and projects for human resources development within the office of the Chief of Defence Staff. Act to prevail 12. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding over other written law. anything contained in any other written law and in the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of this Act and such other written law, the provisions of this Act shall prevail..
Recommended publications
  • International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

    International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

    United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume I Drug and Chemical Control March 2017 INCSR 2017 Volume 1 Table of Contents Table of Contents Common Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. iii International Agreements .......................................................................................................................... v INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Policy and Program Developments ......................................................................................................... 17 Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 18 Methodology for U.S. Government Estimates of Illegal Drug Production ............................................... 24 (with dates ratified/acceded) ................................................................................................................... 30 USG Assistance ..................................................................................................................................... 36 International Training .............................................................................................................................
  • Speaker Bios

    Speaker Bios

    SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES Kate Hansen Bundt, Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee and Chair of the Board of NUPI Kate has been Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee since 2010. She is a political scientist (MA) and foreign policy analyst with expertise on German, European and transatlantic security and strategy. She is chair of the board at NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) since 2014, a board member of NOREF (Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution) since 2017, member of the CSIS Stuart Center Advisory Council since 2016 and a member of the council at Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Oslo since 2013. Prior to her current position, she worked at NUPI from 1990-93 and she was Research Director at the Oslo-based think tank “Europa-programmet” for thirteen years. In 2009 she graduated from the executive course at the Norwegian Defence University College, were she still lectures. Kate has been member of several Government appointed expert committees on security, defence and EU-issues and she is frequently invited by the media to comment on developments in Germany, NATO, and the EU. Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Honorary Chairman of New Strategy Center, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Sergiu Celac is a career ambassador who joined the diplomatic service in 1961. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first post-communist government (1989-1990), then as ambassador to the United Kingdom and Ireland, ambassador-at-large and personal adviser to the President of Romania. After retirement, he worked as president of the Romanian Institute of International Studies, alternate director general of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies in Athens and is currently Vice-President of the Romanian Association for the Club of Rome, member of the Board of the European Institute of Romania, Black Sea University Foundation, Energy Policy Group, member of the Writers’ Union of Romania.
  • The Chief of Defence Staff S.K.Sinha

    The Chief of Defence Staff S.K.Sinha

    The Chief of Defence Staff S.K.Sinha India as a nation went through a very traumatic experience in 1962. Our faith in the impregnability of the Himalayas, the infallibility of our foreign policy and the invincibility of our Army, got shattered. I was then an Instructor at Staff College. I was assigned the task of preparing a Telephone Battle exercise for Staff College on mountain warfare, based on our experience in the Himalayas. I toured the battle zone in the North-East to study the terrain and the course of operations that had recently taken place there. This also enabled me to interact with some of the officers who had taken part in those operations. The tour of the battlefield and research at Staff College,led one to conclude that there were three main reasons for our debacle in the Himalayas. First, a total mismatch between Indian foreign and defence policies. Second, the loss of élan amongst the officer corps in the Indian Army. Third, an irrational higher defence organization in which the Defence Services were increasingly isolated from the process of decision making in defence matters. Vital issues of war and peace, concerning the nation were being dealt with in a casual manner. For instance, in September 1962, on his way to Colombo, the Prime Minister had issued a statement to the Press at Chennai, that he had ordered the Army to evict the Chinese from the Himalayas. The Army Chief then at Tezpur, wanted written orders to that effect. A Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence present at Tezpur gave him those orders.
  • Curriculum Vitae

    Curriculum Vitae

    CURRICULUM VITAE Max A.L.T. Nielsen Lieutenant General Military Representative to NATO and EU DATE OF BIRTH: November 6. 1963 PRIVATE: Married to Berit Thorsø Nielsen. Two children and three grandchildren. MILITARY EDUCATION: 1983 Conscript 1984 NCO School 1985 Control, Reporting and Fighter Control Education 1986 - 1988 Officers Basic Course 1991 Junior Joint Staff Course 1991 - 1992 Officers Advanced Course 1995 - 1996 Air Command and Staff College, US 2011 NATO Defense College, Rome, IT. MILITARY CAREER: 1984 Sergeant 1987 Lieutenant 1988 First Lieutenant 1992 Captain 1996 Major 2001 Lieutenant Colonel 2005 Colonel 2008 Brigadier General 2014 Major General 2017 Lieutenant General ASSIGNMENTS: 1984 Section Commander, Training Platoon/Air Base Skrydstrup 1987 Platoon Commander, Training Squadron/Air Base Aalborg 1988 Fighter & SAM Control Officer, C&R Group, 602 SQN Airbase/Skrydstrup 1992 Air Defence Operations Officer/ICAOC 1 Finderup 1993 Staff Officer, Training Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1994 Staff Officer, Policy Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1996 Chief of Air Operations Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1998 Staff Officer and Deputy Head, Policy Branch/Defence Command Denmark 2000 Staff Officer Operations, 1st Office/Ministry of Defence. 2001 Chief of Staff & Acting Commandant/Royal Danish Air Force Academy 2002 Chief of Operations Branch/Defence Command Denmark 2005 Military Assistant to the Deputy Commander/NATO Training Mission-Iraq. Baghdad 2005 Chief of Executive Office/Defence Commander Denmark 2008 Chief
  • Nationalsecurityanddefencestrate

    Nationalsecurityanddefencestrate

    1TableMANDATE of Contents 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 4 EXECUTIVE SUmmARY CHAPTER ONE 5 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT CHAPTER TWO 7 NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE: VISION AND VALUES 8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY PILLARS 9 CORE NATIONAL VALUES CHAPTER THREE 12 NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY 12 CORE CONCEPTS AND REQUIRED CAPABILITIES 13 1 MAINTAIN THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BELIZE 15 2 REDUCE LOCAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 18 3 PROVIDE THE NECEssARY ENVIRONMENT FOR A PROSPEROUS AND STABLE BELIZE. CHAPTER FOUR 23 MONITORING AND EVALUATION 23 PERIODIC STRATEGY REVIEWS 24 THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE STRATEGY: LEAD AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY 28 GLOssARY 29 REFERENCE The global security environment is faced with a complex set of threatsMandate that, to a large extent, is common to both the Central American and Caribbean regions. By extension, Belize is faced with similar threats to our national security emanating from local and foreign actors. The most troubling are threats to our sovereignty and territorial integrity, our prosperity, and law and order. Over the past year the nation and, indeed the world, bore witness to the Republic of Guatemala’s claim that it possesses sovereignty to parts of our territory. This is despite the demarcation executed by the British and Guatemalan Boundary Commissioner in the 1859 Treaty which clearly shows what comprise the 8867sq miles of Belizean territory – a demarcation that has since been observed and accepted in published maps and State practice. The Government of Belize is particularly concerned about the activities of the Guatemalan Authorities along the Sarstoon River in Southern Belize. The Government of Belize has been calling for the Republic of Guatemala and the Organization of American States (OAS) to join the effort to develop confidence building measures for the Sarstoon River.
  • Belize 2020 Human Rights Report

    Belize 2020 Human Rights Report

    BELIZE 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Belize is a constitutional parliamentary democracy. In the most recent national election, held on November 11, the People’s United Party won 26 of 31 seats in the National Assembly. Party leader John Briceno was sworn in as prime minister on November 12. The Ministry of National Security is responsible for oversight of police, prisons, the coast guard, and the military. The Belize Police Department is primarily responsible for internal security. The small military force primarily focuses on external security but also provides limited domestic security support to civilian authorities and has limited powers of arrest that are executed by the Belize Defence Force for land and shoreline areas and by the Coast Guard for coastal and maritime areas. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Members of security forces committed few abuses. Significant human rights issues included: allegations of the use of excessive force and inhuman treatment by security officers, allegations of widespread corruption and impunity by government officials, trafficking in persons, and child labor. In some cases the government took steps to prosecute public officials who committed abuses, both administratively and through the courts, but there were few successful prosecutions. Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from: a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings There was a report that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. A team from the branch of the security force responsible for a killing or other abuse investigates the allegation and then presents the findings, recommendations, and penalties to authorities.
  • Defence Policy and the Armed Forces During the Pandemic Herunterladen

    Defence Policy and the Armed Forces During the Pandemic Herunterladen

    1 2 3 2020, Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko In cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung With articles by: Thierry Tardy, Michael Jonsson, Dominic Vogel, Elisabeth Braw, Piotr Szyman- ski, Robin Allers, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Jeppe Trautner, Henri Vanhanen and Kalev Stoicesku Language editing: Uldis Brūns Cover design and layout: Ieva Stūre Printed by Jelgavas tipogrāfija Cover photo: Armīns Janiks All rights reserved © Toms Rostoks and Guna Gavrilko © Authors of the articles © Armīns Janiks © Ieva Stūre © Uldis Brūns ISBN 978-9984-9161-8-7 4 Contents Introduction 7 NATO 34 United Kingdom 49 Denmark 62 Germany 80 Poland 95 Latvia 112 Estonia 130 Finland 144 Sweden 160 Norway 173 5 Toms Rostoks is a senior researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia. He is also associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Univer- sity of Latvia. 6 Introduction Toms Rostoks Defence spending was already on the increase in most NATO and EU member states by early 2020, when the coronavirus epi- demic arrived. Most European countries imposed harsh physical distancing measures to save lives, and an economic downturn then ensued. As the countries of Europe and North America were cau- tiously trying to open up their economies in May 2020, there were questions about the short-term and long-term impact of the coro- navirus pandemic, the most important being whether the spread of the virus would intensify after the summer. With the number of Covid-19 cases rapidly increasing in September and October and with no vaccine available yet, governments in Europe began to impose stricter regulations to slow the spread of the virus.
  • Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel

    Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel

    Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Handbookof Armed on ForcesHuman Personnel Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel ODIHR Published by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Al. Ujazdowskie 19 00-557 Warsaw Poland www.osce.org/odihr © OSCE/ODIHR 2008 All rights reserved. The contents of this publication may be freely used and copied for educational and other non-commercial purposes, provided that any such reproduction is accompanied by an acknowledgement of the OSCE/ODIHR as the source. ISBN 978-83-60190-53-1 Designed by Nona Reuter Printed in Poland by Agencja Karo Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel Acknowledgements This manual was written by Prof. Ian Leigh of the Durham University Human Rights Cen- tre (United Kingdom) and Dr. Hans Born of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (Switzerland), with the assistance of Ms. Cecilia Lazzarini (DCAF) and Mr. Ian Clements (Durham University). ODIHR and DCAF express their gratitude to the governments of Germany and Romania for hosting the roundtable events “Citizen in Uniform: Implementing Human Rights in the Armed Forces” and “Military Unions and Associations”, respectively. They also thank the members of the expert review panel assembled to evaluate an earlier version of this hand- book: Col. Britt Brestrup, Deputy Commander at the Norwegian National Defence Col- lege; Dr. Nataliya Danilova, Research Fellow, Governance Research Centre, Department of Politics, University of Bristol; Ms. Allison Gill, Director, Moscow Office, Human Rights Watch; Mr. Emmanuel Jacob, President, European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL); Prof.
  • Asuncion 5 Bogota 8 Brasilia 18 Buenos Aires 21 Caracas 23 Georgetown 28 La Paz 30 Lima 37 Montevideo 45 Paramaribo 48 Quito 50 Santiago 55

    Asuncion 5 Bogota 8 Brasilia 18 Buenos Aires 21 Caracas 23 Georgetown 28 La Paz 30 Lima 37 Montevideo 45 Paramaribo 48 Quito 50 Santiago 55

    INDEX INTRODUCTION 3 SOUTH AMERICA 4 Asuncion 5 Bogota 8 Brasilia 18 Buenos Aires 21 Caracas 23 Georgetown 28 La Paz 30 Lima 37 Montevideo 45 Paramaribo 48 Quito 50 Santiago 55 NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA 57 Belize City 58 Guatemala City 64 Managua 69 Mexico City 74 Panama City 81 San Jose 87 San Salvador 93 Tegucigalpa 95 Vancouver 97 THE CARIBBEAN 98 Bridgetown 99 Hamilton 107 Kingston 108 Nassau 112 Port-au-Prince 115 Port of Spain 119 Santo Domingo 125 SOUTHWEST ASIA 130 Almaty 131 Colombo 134 Dhaka 135 Islamabad 136 Kabul 145 - 1 - Kathmandu 146 New Delhi 148 Tashkent 153 SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 156 Bangkok 157 Jakarta 161 Kuala Lumpur 163 Phnom Penh 164 Vientiane 165 EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST 168 Ankara 169 Athens 172 Chistinau 173 Moscow 175 Riga 177 Sofia 178 Tbilisi 180 Tirana 184 Valletta 187 Yerevan 188 AFRICA 190 Accra 191 Cotonou 193 Lagos 194 Nairobi 196 Pretoria 197 Yaounde 199 GLOSSARY 200 - 2 - INTRODUCTION The annual INL End Use Monitoring (EUM) Report is a compilation of formal EUM reports submitted by posts that address the monitoring of assets provided to host nations by International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs. Each post defines the procedures they will use to monitor the use of and assess the programmatic impact of the resources. Commodities are required to be monitored throughout their useful life. Resources provided for counter-narcotics and law enforcement activities under various Department of Defense (DOD) Authorities must be included in posts’ EUM programs and reports. Posts’ EUM reports must be submitted by January 31 of each year.
  • Reserve Strategy

    Reserve Strategy

    Federal Ministry of Defence K-10/5 Reserve Strategy Reserve Strategy Purpose of the regulation: Conceptual principles for the Bundeswehr reserve Issued by: Federal Ministry of Defence Participating interest General Spokesperson’s Committee for the FMoD groups: Central Staff Council at the FMoD Approved by: Federal Minister of Defence Issuing authority: FMoD Branch FüSK III 4 Federal Ministry of Defence; Bundeswehr; Verband der Scope: Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e. V.; general public Classification: Public Effective from: 18 Oct 2019 To be reviewed by: 17 Oct 2024 Version: 1 Replaces: K-9000/020 File number: 16-39-01 Order number/publication n.a. code: K-10/5 Contents Contents 1. Preface ............................................................................................................... 4 2. Security Environment and Need for Action ......................................................... 5 3. Tasks and Responsibilities of the Bundeswehr Reserve .................................... 6 4. Purpose, Objective and Key Elements of the Reserve Strategy ......................... 8 5. Fields of Action in Shaping the Bundeswehr Reserve ...................................... 11 5.1 Systematic Approach ........................................................................................................... 11 5.2 Framework Conditions ......................................................................................................... 12 5.2.1 Sociopolitical Context ................................................................................................................................
  • State of the Belize Coastal Zone Report 2003–2013

    State of the Belize Coastal Zone Report 2003–2013

    Cite as: Coastal Zone Management Authority & Institute (CZMAI). 2014. State of the Belize Coastal Zone Report 2003–2013. Cover Photo: Copyright Tony Rath / www.tonyrath.com All Rights Reserved Watermark Photos: Nicole Auil Gomez The reproduction of the publication for educational and sourcing purposes is authorized, with the recognition of intellectual property rights of the authors. Reproduction for commercial purposes is prohibited without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. State of the Belize Coastal Zone 2003–2013 2 Coastal Zone Management Authority & Institute, 2014 Table of Contents Foreword by Honourable Lisel Alamilla, Minister of Forestry, Fisheries, and Sustainable Development ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 Foreword by Mr. Vincent Gillett, CEO, CZMAI ............................................................................................ 6 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. 7 Contributors ............................................................................................................................................................ 8 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................
  • NATO's New Members: a Model for Ukraine? the Example of Hungary

    NATO's New Members: a Model for Ukraine? the Example of Hungary

    Conflict Studies Research Centre G86 NATO’S NEW MEMBERS: A MODEL FOR UKRAINE? THE EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY James Sherr Well before their accession to NATO on 12 March 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had turned post-Communist change to positive and ‘irreversible’ effect. For good reason, this achievement is a point of interest, not to say fascination for countries of the former USSR suffering from a more virulent strain of the Communist legacy that still burdens the Central European states of the former Warsaw Pact. The fascination is particularly strong in Ukraine, a country which borders two of NATO’s three new members, a country which enjoys a uniquely close relationship with Poland, but at the same time a country whose nine-year commitment to a ‘Euro-Atlantic course’ has done little to transform the national economy or lead the vast majority of its people out of the post-Communist wilderness. Where economics is concerned, those who believe there is a ‘Polish model’ for Ukraine to follow might be optimistic, but they are not foolish – and those who argue more modestly that Czech, Hungarian and Polish experience have more to offer Ukraine than British or Canadian experience scarcely have a case to answer. But does it follow that these countries are the best qualified to point the way forward in the sphere of national security and defence? Here it would be rash to say that substantial change occurred in the Visegrad three before NATO and the ‘accession process’ intervened with their own demands, timetables and pressures. More than three years after the Madrid summit, it would still be rash to say that these countries possessed competent, self-confident and mature defence and security elites, let alone integrated defence and security systems.