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New Year Resolutions President Xi Jinping's New Year Address

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New Year Resolutions President Xi Jinping's New Year Address Wednesday, January 31, 2018 The Information Office, International Department of the CPC Central Committee BEIJING REVIEW MONTHLY Xi Jinping, General Secretary of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and President of People’s Republic of China, delivers a New Year address to extend greetings to all Chinese and best wishes to friends all over the world in Beijing on December 31, 2017 (XINHUA) New year resolutions ALSO IN THIS ISSUE President Xi’s address sets the bar for 2018 Crime and punishment By Yuan Yuan China’s anti- n December 31, President contributions to the country. “In 2018, we will strive to corruption campaign Xi Jinping extended New The year 2018 will be the first develop tourism in rural areas enters 2018 with OYear greetings to the nation to move toward the goal set by the and green agricultural industries renewed vigor in his annual New Year address. Xi CPC at its 19th National Congress. to help villagers to earn more and pointed to China’s achievements in “The 19th Party Congress laid live a better life,” Jiang said. PAGE 2 2017 as well as the challenges the out a blueprint for China’s country will tackle in the new year development in the next three Reform and the world and those to follow. decades and beyond,” Xi said. “To The year 2018 also marks the 40th Toward one direction turn this blueprint into reality, we anniversary of China’s reform People first must … take one step at a time as and opening up. In his speech, Xi Non-Communist Livelihoods were at the center we progress and deliver tangible vowed that the spirit of reform political parties of Xi’s message, highlighting the outcomes.” must be carried through into the make constant “people first” principle which “Xi’s vision for China presents new year as reform and opening up underlines China’s governance. a rather stark contrast to the more is a path of demonstrable success progress in multiparty Xi said he was aware of people’s mundane messages presented to which China must stick if it is cooperation and primary concerns, which include by most other political leaders to continue its progress in national education, employment, income, to their constituents,” William socio-economic development political consultation social security, medical care, Jones, Washington Bureau Chief and realize the Chinese dream of PAGE 3 elderly care, housing and the of the U.S. magazine Executive national rejuvenation. environment. Intelligence Review, told On December 31 last year, Constitutional “There is still much room Beijing Review. In Jones’ eyes, during the final hours of 2017, the upgrade for improvement in our work the difference lies in the fact Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge concerning people’s well-being. that leaders in the West have a was lit up in a ceremony to mark PAGE 3 So we must strengthen our sense viewpoint limited to no more than the completion of the majority of of mission and responsibility and the four or five years they have the world’s longest sea-crossing make every effort to deliver a left in office, whereas President Xi structure. Six years of planning An informative read better life for our people,” Xi said is looking decades ahead at what and eight years of construction Xi Jinping: The in the speech. China can accomplish in the next went into the 55-km-long bridge Peng Xinlin, a professor from 30, 40, or 50 years. linking Hong Kong, Zhuhai in Governance of Beijing Normal University, said “This breadth of view and Guangdong Province and Macao. China (Volume during an interview with China sense of purpose characterizes “We will build the Guangdong- II) contributes to Youth Daily that he was most the difference between a mere Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay impressed by Xi’s call for Party politician and a great statesman,” Area into a green and livable understanding of Xi and government officials to place Jones said. city group,” said Gao Xinglin, Jinping’s thoughts the people’s needs as their top an official from the Hong Kong- on the CPC, China’s priority, and regard benefiting Poverty elimination Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Management the people as the highest Since 2015, 2020 has been Bureau. “This bridge will be an future path of accomplishment of their careers. earmarked as the year in which impetus for the development of the development, and the “To guarantee and improve China’s campaign to lift all rural Greater Bay Area.” people’s livelihoods is not only residents out of poverty will be “The Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong nation’s policies an economic or social issue, it is achieved, and there now are only Kong Modern Service Industry PAGE 4 a crucial political issue directly three years to go. Cooperation Zone has taken a concerning our Party’s ruling “Happiness is indeed earned new look every year,” said Wang foundation,” Peng said. “To test through hard work,” Xi said in Jinxia, Deputy Director of Qianhai Sharing the future the effectiveness of our work, the his speech. “Winning this tough Management Bureau in Shenzhen, final criteria are whether the people battle against poverty within Guangdong Province. The What can China offer really see the benefits, and whether three years means that for the first booming metropolis of Shenzhen for inclusive global people’s lives have been improved.” time in China’s history of several developed from a small fishing growth? “The word ‘people’ was millennia, extreme poverty will village following the piloting mentioned many times in the cease to exist in the country.” of market economy during the PAGE 5 speech and it is very encouraging,” Peng Xiaying, a villager from nascent stages of reform and said Zhang Xianyi, Director of Maoping in south China’s Jiangxi opening up. The Qianhai Area is Major events in Nanhu Revolutionary Memorial Province, was excited to hear Xi’s now a pilot zone in Shenzhen for January Hall in Jiaxing of east China’s remarks. In 2017, Peng and her deepening the process of reform. Zhejiang Province, where the daughter opened a restaurant in the “We will intensify reform in PAGE 5 first National Congress of the village and their annual income Qianhai and explore innovative Communist Party of China (CPC) is now more than 100,000 yuan policies for financial cooperation was held in 1921. “The original ($15,300). between Shenzhen and Hong of international relations as the aspiration and mission of the “The government has made Kong,” Wang said. “We will make overall goal of China’s foreign Chinese Communists is to seek great efforts to guide us out of it a new key area and an important diplomacy. happiness for the Chinese people poverty,” Peng said. “I am very juncture for Belt and Road “To build a community with and rejuvenation for the Chinese glad to learn that there were more construction.” a shared future for mankind is nation,” Zhang said. than 10 million rural residents like Proposed by Xi in September China’s answer to the question of Xi said that in 2017 he received me lifted out of poverty in 2017.” 2013, the Belt and Road ‘what we can do for the world,’ many letters from people across “I can feel the confidence of the Initiative aims to build trade and and this answer has been well the country, including villagers people and officials toward the infrastructure networks connecting received across the globe,” said from Tibet Autonomous Region, bright future of our country,” said Asia with Europe and Africa Ruan Zongze from the China members of the Ulan Muqir Jiang Shengxia, Party Secretary of on and beyond the ancient Silk Institute of International Studies. Art Troupe in Inner Mongolia Panlong Village in Tongcheng of Road routes, with the intention “With the world in so much Autonomous Region, and east China’s Anhui Province. As a of creating new platforms for turmoil today, the message of hope undergraduates from Nankai delegate to the 19th CPC National international cooperation. which rings clear in Xi’s New University who joined the military Congress, Jiang has been busy The 19th CPC National Year address is also a message of services. Xi wrote back to them, introducing the outcome of the Congress outlined the building hope for the world, since China is praising them for the efforts congress to villagers. In 2017, 127 of a community with a shared prepared to share its development they have already made and residents from 49 households in future for mankind and the in creating a community of shared encouraging them to make further Panlong were lifted out of poverty. implementation of a new type future for mankind,” Jones said. China officially launches its second and the first domestically developed aircraft The aerial photo of Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge taken on December 31, carrier in Dalian, Liaoning Province, on April 26, 2017 (XINHUA) 2017 (XINHUA) President Xi Jinping’s New Year Address Greetings to you all! celebrations for the 20th anniversary of its The year 2018 marks the 40th anniversary How time flies. Soon we will ring in the return to the motherland. I could see first-hand of China’s reform and opening up. Reform and year 2018. I wish to extend New Year wishes that with the strong backing of the motherland, opening up is the only way that today’s China to the people of all ethnic groups across China, Hong Kong enjoys long-term prosperity and will achieve development and progress; and including our fellow Chinese in the Hong Kong stability, and there is no doubt that the region only by pursuing reform and opening up can and Macao special administrative regions, will have an even better tomorrow.
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