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Lon-Nol Announces He and Sirik Matak Exercise Full War Power in Cambodia by HENRY KAMM Stitution

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Lon-Nol Announces He and Sirik Matak Exercise Full War Power in Cambodia by HENRY KAMM Stitution THE NEW YORK TIMES Lon-Nol Announces He and Sirik Matak Exercise Full War Power in Cambodia By HENRY KAMM stitution. However, five of General Sink Matak is now Special to The New York Times these cases involved the rais- known as Deputy Premier in- ing of officials who had headed PNOMPENH, Cambodia, July stead of First Deputy Premier 2—Premier Lon Nol asserted ministries from the rank of today on' his own behalf and state secretary to that of min- as he was before the shuffle. on that of Deputy Premier ister. The posts of second •and third Sisowath' Sirik Matak that they A number of younger, well- deputy premiers have been jointly hdve full power to make educated men of modern out- abolished. all governmental decisions dur- look were added to the Cabinet. Commenting on today's de- ing the war emergency. This move was believed intend- velopments, a Cabinet Minister The proclamation of what ed to lessen the criticism from Said that a principal reason for most political and diplomatic the intellectual elite that the the reaffirming of the existing observers consider unrestricted Lon Nol-Sirik Matak leadership state of affairs was General power came in two messages was not sufficiently employing Lon Nol's concern for legality. to the nation, one by . Chief the talents of the university- He said the Premier wanted to of State Cheng Heng and the educated younger men who had avoid being suspected of as- other by the Premier. Both also been kept out of influen- suming power for its own sake were based on a vote of "full tial posts under Prince Noro- and asked for the confidence confidence. and total support" dom Sihanouk, who was de- vote for that reason. for Lieut. Gen. Lon Nol and posed •as Chief of State In a similar bow to legality, Maj. Gen'. Sink Matak by the March 18. the Government is putting National Assembly last Satur- Keuk Kylim, a representative Prince Sihanouk on trial in ab- day and announced today. of the younger intellectual sentia tomorrow. The principal The effect of the proclama- elite, was named Information charge before the military tri- tions, in the view of qualified Minister, replacing Trinh Ho- bunal is believed to be high sources, is largely to ratify and anh, who had come under criti- treason, and the principal rea- make more specific the exist- cism for his performance in son •for the trial is to provide ing state of affairs. presenting Cambodia's case to legality for the impending con- the world. Mr. Trinh Hoanh fiscation of Prince Sihanouk's No Criticism of Move was left out of the Cabinet but vast holdings, palatial houses, retained his post as secretary motor pool and other proper- Since neither of the two lead- general of the Sangkum, Cam- ties. ers is suspected of di.:tatorial bodia's single political party. strivings, .the reassertion of Only two members of the wide wartime powers appears Other moves included the Prince's close family remain in shifting of Yem Sambaur from Pnompenh, living in enforced so far not to have aroused criti- his post cism from the limited number as Foreign Minister, to retirement. They are Queen Minister of State charged with Mother Kossomak, his mother, Assotisted Press of Cambodians who -take an DEFENSIVE MEASURE: active interest in politics. justice and relations with Par- and a daughter, Princess Boup- liament. He was replaced by ha Devi, a beautiful, much mar- Cambodian soldier goes to The nature of General Lon Koun Wick, who was Ambassa- Nol's attitude •to power and its ried dancer in her twenties. evening bath with an auto- dor to Yugoslavia until that They are playing no political matic tucked in his waist. exercise was indicated in his country broke relations with role and appear to be as for- message. He said, after noting Cambodia. Yugoslavia has rec- gotten as the very institution ■ the confidence vote and the ognized the Peking-based exile of royalty in this kingdom, subsequent message from •the Government of Prince Sihan- which has been without a king Chief of State giving him and ouk, formed May 5. Gen. Sink Matak full powers: since Prince Sihanouk father's A Concern for Legality death a decade ago. "But we -ask in advance your In all but in name and the indulgence for the measures In the shuffling, Premier Lon letter of the Constitution, Cam- that we shall be called upon Nol retained the defense port- bodia is a republic and "vive to take in all urgency to face folio, signifying the division of a republique" signs are wide- up to the present situation." responsibilities between the two spread in Government offices. The first measure he men- leaders, with the Premier in General Sink Matak has re- tioned was a shuffling of the charge of the military side and nounced his title as a prince Cabinet, increasing the num- his deputy in charge of admin- and was referred to in the new ber of ministers from nine to istrative and diplomatic func- Cabinet roster as "monsieur le the 16 called for in the Con- tions. major-general." .
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