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Does Decapitation Work? Does Decapitation Patrick B Does Decapitation Work? Does Decapitation Patrick B. Johnston Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns Targeting of militant leaders is central to many states’ national security strategies, but does it work? What should policymakers expect when armed forces capture or kill militant leaders? Is leadership decapitation more likely to succeed or fail un- der certain conditions? These questions have never been more pressing than after the May 2011 killing of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. As relevant as these questions are to current U.S. policy and strategy, they are also fundamen- tal questions of asymmetric warfare. They matter because almost all policies of “high-value” targeting require difªcult judgments concerning both the poten- tial consequences and the opportunity costs of targeting militant leaders. The decision to target enemy leaders requires that policymakers adjudicate among numerous difªcult, and potentially contradictory, choices. Leadership target- ing strategies affect how states allocate scarce military, intelligence, and economic resources; how they construct their counterinsurgency or counterter- rorism postures; and how interested foreign and domestic audiences react to their behavior. Despite the stakes, scholars have shown relatively little interest in leader- ship decapitation. Those who have written on the topic have tended to argue that leadership targeting is ineffectual and can be counterproductive.1 Tar- Patrick B. Johnston is Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conºict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A supplemental appendix is available online at http:// patrickjohnston.info. The author would like to thank Max Abrahms, Mia Bloom, Stephanie Carvin, Martha Crenshaw, Lynn Eden, James Fearon, Joseph Felter, Bryan Price, William Reno, Anoop Sarbahi, Paul Staniland, David Steinberg, and the anonymous reviewers for commenting on earlier versions of this article. 1. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003), pp. 1–19; Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001); Paul Staniland, “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005/06), pp. 21–40; Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatªeld, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conºict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 4 (June 2006), pp. 359–382; Or Honig, “Explaining Israel’s Misuse of Strategic Assassi- International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79 © 2012 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 47 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076 by guest on 26 September 2021 International Security 36:4 48 geting enemy leaders, argues Robert Pape, “has never been effective” as a coercive tool in interstate war.2 Decapitating terrorist organizations is not ef- fective either, according to Pape, whose high-proªle study of suicide terrorism concludes that decapitation strategies “have met with meager success.”3 Jenna Jordan’s recent study supports Pape’s earlier conclusion. Terrorist organiza- tions rarely collapse after their top leaders are captured or killed, she ªnds. Jordan concludes that leadership decapitation is “a misguided strategy.”4 This consensus is premature. Researchers have conducted few systematic as- sessments of leadership decapitation’s effectiveness; evidence remains scant.5 But contrary to scholars’ claims that leadership decapitation never works, the evidence appears to be more mixed. In numerous cases, decapitation was vital in degrading and defeating militant groups. In Peru, for example, Shining Path leader Abimeal Guzmán’s 1992 capture crippled the group’s bid for power. In Turkey, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan People’s Party, in 1999 precipitated the group’s steep decline. And in Italy, authorities used critical intelligence obtained from captured Red Brigades leaders to dismantle remnants of the organization.6 Moreover, the research design and methodologies used in nearly all pre- vious studies make it difªcult to draw credible conclusions about the impact of leadership decapitation. Three problems are common in the literature. First, the security studies literature, for example, relies uniformly on no-variance de- signs.7 Yet credible causal inferences cannot be made from studies that only nations,” Studies in Conºict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, No. 6 (June 2007), pp. 563–577; and Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 719–755. At least one study suggests that decapitation is effec- tive. See Bryan Price, “Removing the Devil You Know: Unraveling the Puzzle behind Decapitation Effectiveness and Terrorist Group Duration,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2009. Several authors suggest that decapitation’s impact is conditional on other factors. See, for example, Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (April 2006), pp. 95–111; Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2011); Matt Frankel, “The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns against Insurgents and Terrorists,” Studies in Conºict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Janu- ary 2010), pp. 17–30; and Austin Long, “Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting,” CTC Sen- tinel, Vol. 3, Nos. 11/12 (November 2010), pp. 19–21. 2. Pape, Bombing to Win, p. 316. 3. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” p. 14. 4. Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” p. 754. 5. Few large-n studies of leadership decapitation exist. See Jordan, “When Heads Roll”; Price, “Re- moving the Devil You Know”; and Patrick Johnston, “The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapita- tion in Counterinsurgency,” paper presented at CISAC Social Science Seminar, Stanford University, May 2009. 6. In addition, Aaron Mannes’s medium-n study found “some indication that decapitation strikes can be effective in reducing terrorist group incidents.” Mannes’s results, however, were not statis- tically signiªcant. Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Theory: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?” Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol. 9 (Spring 2008), pp. 43–44. 7. A notable exception, published in the economics literature, is Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076 by guest on 26 September 2021 Does Decapitation Work? 49 examine cases in which opposing leaders were captured or killed. Second, scholars have tended to use extremely restrictive coding criteria, setting the bar unrealistically high for decapitation to be considered successful; except in cases where the target was quickly and decisively defeated following a leader’s capture or death, scholars have usually coded decapitation as a fail- ure. This is appropriate for evaluating decapitation’s proximate strategic im- pact, but it is inappropriate for assessing decapitation’s longer-term political, military, and economic effects. Decapitation could have a wide variety of effects—some positive, others potentially negative—that this approach does not capture.8 A second problem is selection bias. Militant leaders tend to be killed or captured at key junctures in campaigns—periods when governments may already be more likely to win or lose.9 Security studies scholarship on leadership decapitation—including large-N studies—fails to address this is- sue, which makes it difªcult to identify whether decapitation explains the out- comes of interest, or whether other factors that make decapitation more likely to occur actually drive the relationship. This challenge is daunting, both for quantitative and qualitative studies that rely on observational data. An experi- mental design would solve this problem, but for many of the most important security studies questions, especially the present one, an experiment is neither desirable nor feasible. In these situations, scholars can instead exploit research designs that focus on data where confounding factors are unlikely to cause misleading correlations. Doing so helps scholars to isolate their variable(s) of interest and to avoid making conclusions and policy recommendations based on spurious, misleading ªndings. This article addresses these challenges by analyzing a large number of cases in which governments attempted—successfully and unsuccessfully—to re- move top militant leaders and the events that followed these attempts.10 This approach relies on a natural experiment to help isolate the importance of mili- tant leaders. To the extent that chance plays a role in the outcome of operations aimed at removing military leaders, this approach can help researchers assess the likelihood that organizations whose leaders were captured or killed would have fared differently had their leadership
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