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The Strategies of Terrorism the Strategies of Andrew H The Strategies of Terrorism The Strategies of Andrew H. Kydd and Terrorism Barbara F. Walter Terrorism often works. Extremist organizations such as al-Qaida, Hamas, and the Tamil Tigers engage in terrorism because it frequently delivers the desired response. The October 1983 suicide attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, for example, convinced the United States to withdraw its soldiers from Lebanon.1 The United States pulled its soldiers out of Saudi Arabia two years after the terror- ist attacks of September 11, 2001, even though the U.S. military had been build- ing up its forces in that country for more than a decade.2 The Philippines recalled its troops from Iraq nearly a month early after a Filipino truck driver was kidnapped by Iraqi extremists.3 In fact, terrorism has been so successful that between 1980 and 2003, half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed by substantial concessions by the target governments.4 Hijacking planes, blowing up buses, and kidnapping individuals may seem irrational and incoherent to outside observers, but these tactics can be surprisingly effec- tive in achieving a terrorist group’s political aims. Despite the salience of terrorism today, scholars and policymakers are only beginning to understand how and why it works. Much has been written on the origins of terror, the motivations of terrorists, and counterterror responses, but little has appeared on the strategies terrorist organizations employ and the conditions under which these strategies succeed or fail. Alan Krueger, David Laitin, Jitka Maleckova, and Alberto Abadie, for example, have traced the ef- fects of poverty, education, and political freedom on terrorist recruitment.5 Andrew H. Kydd is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Barbara F. Walter is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Paciªc Studies at the University of California, San Diego. This article is the second installment in a collaborative project, and the order of the authors’ names was determined by alphabetical order. The authors would like to thank the participants at the Project on International Affairs seminar at the University of California, San Diego, for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 1. Thomas L. Friedman, “Marines Complete Beirut Pullback: Moslems Move In,” New York Times, February 27, 2004. 2. Don Van Natta Jr., “The Struggle for Iraq: Last American Combat Troops Quit Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, September 22, 2003. 3. James Glanz, “Hostage Is Freed after Philippine Troops Are Withdrawn from Iraq,” New York Times, July 21, 2004. 4. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 65. 5. Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, “Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 49–80 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 49 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49 by guest on 02 October 2021 International Security 31:1 50 Jessica Stern has examined the grievances that give rise to terrorism and the networks, money, and operations that allow terrorist organizations to thrive.6 What is lacking, however, is a clear understanding of the larger strategic games terrorists are playing and the ways in which state responses help or hin- der them. Effective counterstrategies cannot be designed without ªrst understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist violence. Terrorism works not simply because it instills fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ cause. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombed pubs, parks, and shopping districts in Lon- don because its leadership believed that such acts would convince Britain to relinquish Northern Ireland. In targeting the World Trade Center and the Pen- tagon on September 11, al-Qaida hoped to raise the costs for the United States of supporting Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab regimes, and to provoke the United States into a military response designed to mobilize Muslims around the world. That so many targeted governments respond in the way that terror- ist organizations intend underscores the need for understanding the reasoning behind this type of violence. In this article we seek answers to four questions. First, what types of goals do terrorists seek to achieve? Second, what strategies do they pursue to achieve these goals? Third, why do these strategies work in some cases but not in others? And fourth, given these strategies, what are the targeted govern- ments’ best responses to prevent terrorism and protect their countries from future attacks? The core of our argument is that terrorist violence is a form of costly signal- ing. Terrorists are too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms. They are sometimes strong enough, however, to persuade audiences to do as they wish by altering the audience’s beliefs about such matters as the terrorist’s ability to impose costs and their degree of commitment to their cause. Given the conºict of interest between terrorists and their targets, ordinary communi- cation or “cheap talk” is insufªcient to change minds or inºuence behavior. If al-Qaida had informed the United States on September 10, 2001, that it would Targets of Terrorism,” Princeton University and Stanford University, 2003; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 119–144; and Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Faculty Research Working Papers Series, RWP04- 043 (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2004). 6. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco- HarperCollins, 2003). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49 by guest on 02 October 2021 The Strategies of Terrorism 51 kill 3,000 Americans unless the United States withdrew from Saudi Arabia, the threat might have sparked concern, but it would not have had the same impact as the attacks that followed. Because it is hard for weak actors to make credible threats, terrorists are forced to display publicly just how far they are willing to go to obtain their desired results. There are ªve principal strategic logics of costly signaling at work in terror- ist campaigns: (1) attrition, (2) intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding. In an attrition strategy, terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Terrorists using intimidation try to convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A provocation strategy is an attempt to induce the enemy to re- spond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the popula- tion and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists’ side are weak and un- trustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to ªght the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Understanding these ªve distinct strategic logics is crucial not only for understanding terrorism but also for designing effective antiterror policies.7 The article is divided into two main sections. The ªrst discusses the goals terrorists pursue and examines the forty-two groups currently on the U.S. State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).8 The second section develops the costly signaling approach to terrorism, analyzes the ªve strategies that terrorists use to achieve their goals, discusses the conditions in which each of these strategies is likely to be successful, and draws out the implications for the best counterterror responses. The Goals of Terrorism For years the press has portrayed terrorists as crazy extremists who commit in- discriminate acts of violence, without any larger goal beyond revenge or a de- 7. Of course, terrorists will also be seeking best responses to government responses. A pair of strategies that are best responses to each other constitutes a Nash equilibrium, the fundamental prediction tool of game theory. 8. Ofªce of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” fact sheet, October 11, 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/3719.htm. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49 by guest on 02 October 2021 International Security 31:1 52 sire to produce fear in an enemy population. This characterization derives some support from statements made by terrorists themselves. For example, a young Hamas suicide bomber whose bomb failed to detonate said, “I know that there are other ways to do jihad. But this one is sweet—the sweetest. All martyrdom operations, if done for Allah’s sake, hurt less than a gnat’s bite!”9 Volunteers for a suicide mission may have a variety of motives—obtaining re- wards in the afterlife, avenging a family member killed by the enemy, or sim- ply collecting ªnancial rewards for their descendants. By contrast, the goals driving terrorist organizations are usually political objectives, and it is these goals that determine whether and how terrorist campaigns will be launched. We deªne “terrorism” as the use of violence against civilians by nonstate ac- tors to attain political goals.10 These goals can be conceptualized in a variety of ways.
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