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The Necessity of Including Hamas in Any Future Peace Process and the Viability of Doing So: an Argument for Reassessment and Engagement

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The Necessity of Including Hamas in Any Future Peace Process and the Viability of Doing So: an Argument for Reassessment and Engagement THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING HAMAS IN ANY FUTURE PEACE PROCESS AND THE VIABILITY OF DOING SO: AN ARGUMENT FOR REASSESSMENT AND ENGAGEMENT by Peter Worthington Bachelor of Arts, University of British Columbia, 2007 MAJOR PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES In the School of International Studies © Peter Worthington 2011 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Spring 2011 All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for Fair Dealing. Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, particularly if cited appropriately. APPROVAL Name: Peter Worthington Degree: Master of Arts in International Studies Title of Thesis: The necessity of including Hamas in any future peace process and the viability of doing so: an argument for reassessment and engagement. Examining Committee: Chair: Dr John Harriss Professor of International Studies ______________________________________ Dr Tamir Moustafa Senior Supervisor Associate Professor Stephen Jarislowsky Chair School for International Studies ______________________________________ Dr. John Harriss Supervisor Professor of International Studies ______________________________________ Date Approved: April 26, 2011 ii Declaration of Partial Copyright Licence The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the “Institutional Repository” link of the SFU Library website <www.lib.sfu.ca> at: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/112>) and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work. The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission. Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence. While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire. The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive. Simon Fraser University Library Burnaby, BC, Canada Last revision: Spring 09 ABSTRACT In January 2006, Hamas was victorious in the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. This development was met with consternation from the government of Israel, many western governments, and the United States government in particular. The Quartet on the Middle East, comprised of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, viewed Hamas‟ electoral victory through the lens of terrorism and took a correspondingly hard line, issuing an ultimatum and imposing sanctions for non-compliance. The Quartet‟s strategy towards Hamas indicates that they consider the movement to be what Stedman terms a „total spoiler‟ –an ideological rigid organization that sees the world in all-or-nothing terms and consequently cannot be included in a successful peace process. In this paper, I argue that the assessment of Hamas as a total spoiler is erroneous, and in fact, the designation „limited spoiler,‟ as defined by Stedman is actually more appropriate. iii DEDICATION This paper is submitted in loving memory of Farida Mohammed, an angel taken too soon – Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim. And dedicated to Rondalyn Fitz, for inadvertently starting me down this path. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Professor Tamir Moustafa for his wisdom and guidance in the completion of this project. I would also like to offer my sincerest appreciation and thanks to Professor John Harriss and Professor Alvaro Pereira for all their kindness and concern. Lastly, I must acknowledge the tireless work of Ellen Yap and Jan Smith, without whom I would never have made it through. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Approval ........................................................................................................................ ii Abstract ........................................................................................................................ iii Dedication ..................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... vi 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The Typology of Spoilers ......................................................................................... 4 1.2 The Differing Perceptions of Hamas ...................................................................... 13 2: Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................. 16 2.1 Islamists – Capable of Pragmatism or Driven by Dogma? ..................................... 16 2.2 The Wasat Party – Down the Road to Moderation ................................................. 17 3: Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................. 31 3.1 Hamas – a case study: .......................................................................................... 31 3.2 Hamas from Intifada to Intifada – A Progressively Pragmatic Modus Operandi ............................................................................................................... 47 3.3 From Resistance to Governance: .......................................................................... 58 3.4 Reflecting on Hamas in light of Stedman ............................................................... 61 3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 64 Reference List ............................................................................................................. 66 vi 1: INTRODUCTION In mid-2005, Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement), or Hamas, as it is more commonly referred, announced its intention to participate in the upcoming elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) scheduled for January 2006. What happened next is seen as a “watershed in Palestinian politics: Hamas obtained 42.9% of the votes and won 74 of 132 seats in the new parliament” (Knudsen and Ezbidi, 2007: 190). The victory, in what is widely considered the “freest and fairest democratic legislative elections” to have been held in the Middle East (Hasson, 2010: 398; Milton- Edwards, 2007: 302), made Hamas the duly elected ruling party in the Gaza strip, effectively ending the political hegemony of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and positioning Hamas alongside Fatah as a major player in Palestinian politics. Following this development, it is impossible to conceive of a successful peace process between Israel and Palestine that does not take Hamas into account. Its competency as a spoiler was affirmed by Hamas‟ successful efforts to subvert the Oslo Accords and has been enhanced by its ascendance to ruling political power in Gaza. Despite its legitimate electoral success, Israel has steadfastly refused to acknowledge Hamas as a bona fide political party, choosing instead to characterize them simply as a dogmatic terrorist organization. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‟s recent description of 1 one of Hamas‟ leaders as “…rooted in an extremist theology which fundamentally opposes peace and reconciliation” (Solomon and Barnes-Dacey, 2009: A.10), typifies the Israeli government‟s position on the organization as a whole. “For the past decade, Israel‟s policy vis-à-vis Hamas has been one of hard-line rejection and targeted assassinations of leaders and cadres” (Knudsen and Ezbidi, 2007: 197). In spite of Hamas‟ foray into democratic politics, Israel‟s policy has remained consistent, manifesting itself most recently in the alleged killing of Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabouh in Dubai (UK Police in Israel to Probe Use of Fake Passports,
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