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The Case of Blu-Ray Disc ORBIT-OnlineRepository ofBirkbeckInstitutionalTheses Enabling Open Access to Birkbeck’s Research Degree output The role of institutional entrepreneurship in standard wars: the case of Blu-ray Disc https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40065/ Version: Full Version Citation: Chang, Shen-Chen (2013) The role of institutional en- trepreneurship in standard wars: the case of Blu-ray Disc. [Thesis] (Unpublished) c 2020 The Author(s) All material available through ORBIT is protected by intellectual property law, including copy- right law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law. Deposit Guide Contact: email The Role of Institutional Entrepreneurship in Standard Wars: The Case of Blu-ray Disc Shen-Chen Chang Birkbeck, University of London PhD Management School of Business, Economics and Informatics Birkbeck, University of London 2013 1 Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis entitled 'The Role of Institutional Entrepreneurship: The Case of Blu-ray Disc' represents the results of my own work except where specified in the thesis. Shen-Chen Chang 2 Abstract The study is to use institutional entrepreneurship perspective to complement the functionalist’s viewpoint to understand the process underlying collective action in a mature eco-system and how institutional entrepreneurs manage critical stakeholder relations, collective action and discursive activities in technical standard change processes. The standard war of Sony Blu-ray Disc vs. Toshiba HD DVD is used as a critical and intrinsic case. The functionalist’s viewpoints have paid much attentions to the numbers of customers adopting new technologies, and etc. By means of institutional entrepreneurship perspective, it claims that it does not matter about the number and amount, but it does matter about how focal firms make the markets believe that they have the abilities to win standard wars. The study further claims that the variables studied in functionalist’s viewpoint also have the meanings of institutional entrepreneurship perspective. Moreover, the BD and HD DVD standards are incremental innovations in a mature field where there are many things are settled down. Focal firms can easily forecast the expectations of the dominant institutional logics. The study contributes that institutional entrepreneurship perspective still provides the process insight to complement the functionalist’s viewpoint. This perspective can be applied in emerging field, where it is no dominant logics and the innovations are likely to be radical. The BD case represents a critical case. It can makes possible naturalistic generalization to other similar contexts. Eisenhardt’s principles are used to build theory from the case study. I borrowed techniques of open coding to analyze the data. The findings show that collective action (including critical stakeholder management and structuring collaboration capabilities) and discursive activities are the central features of institutional entrepreneurship. They have mutual relationship with the institutional 3 entrepreneur’s resources (power and legitimacy). Furthermore, good collective action and discursive activities can lead to network effects and product performance. 4 Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been completed without the support of many different people. I would especially like to thank my supervisors Professor Klaus Nielsen and Professor John Kelly from Birkbeck, University of London. I also thank my examiners Professor Peter Karnøe from Aalborg University, Denmark and Dr Thierry Rayna from ESG Management School, France. Their comments, contributions, guidances, and support throughout the study have proved invaluable. I am grateful to the two critical informants from Sony Headquarter and New York Times. They unselfishly provided critical information to me then help me to triangulate the finding throughout data analysis processes. I am also grateful to University of London’s Central Research Fund and Taiwan government. The Central Research Fund sponsored me to conduct interviews in Japan and Taiwan government’s Foreign Study Loan provided me an opportunity to study abroad. I would like to thank my housemates in London and many friends who help me to review my introduction chapter. Ya-Ju Chang, Tom Cunliffe, Daniel Huang, and Arlene Tsai, you guys give me big emotional support to help me out. Thanks Wen-Chin Chang, Luchia Chen, Claudia Doblinger, Christopher Exeter, Thanos Fragkandreas, Alice Hsu, and Waraporn Yangsap for reviewing the study for me. Finally, I would like to thank my family, Yu-Chen Sun, Yu-Feng Pang, Yu-Li Paqng, Amy Chang, and Tom Wei, especially my dad, Fu-Yuan Chang, in the heaven. They 5 have provided constant support over the course of the these years and deserves special praise for always being there. The thesis is dedicated to them. 6 Contents Lists of Figures and Tables 13 Ch 1. Introduction 15 1.1. The Importance of Studying Standard Wars 19 1.2. Institutional Entrepreneurship and Stakeholders 21 1.3. The Case Study 34 1.4. A Brief Presentation of the Case 38 1.5. Research Method and Data Analysis Procedures 45 1.6. Structure of the Thesis 47 Ch 2. Standard Wars 51 2.1. Introduction 51 2.2. Benefits of Winning Standard Wars 58 2.3. Risks Involved in Developing Standards 60 2.4. Comparison and Contrast of Rational and Social Accounts 62 - 2.4.1. The Social Construction Perspective 63 - 2.4.2. The Stakeholder Perspective 67 - 2.4.3. The Institutional Theory 69 - 2.4.4. The Industrial Economic Perspective 71 - 2.4.5. The Perspective of Strategy 74 - 2.4.6. The Application of Social Account in Standard Wars 76 Studies - - 2.4.6.1. The Profile and Criticality of Stakeholders in 83 Standard Wars 2.5. Attributes in Standard Wars 87 - 2.5.1. Framing 88 - 2.5.2. Mobilizing Collaboration 91 7 - 2.5.3. Network Effects 93 - 2.5.4. Product Performance 94 - 2.5.5. Discussion of these Attributes in Existing Studies 96 2.6. Conclusions 104 Ch 3. Institutional Change 108 3.1. Introduction 108 3.2. Relationships between Institutions, Social Actors, Identity, and 112 Networks - 3.2.1. Social Actors 112 - 3.2.2. Networks 113 - 3.2.3. Identity 116 3.3. Social Actors 118 - 3.3.1. Social Position 119 - 3.3.2. Capabilities to Manipulate Discourse 121 3.4. Networks 123 - 3.4.1. The Utility of Network Connections 123 - 3.4.2. Social Relations 125 3.5. Identity 126 3.6. Conclusions 129 Ch 4. Institutional Entrepreneurship 132 4.1. Introduction 132 4.2. The Overview of Institutional Entrepreneurship 134 4.3. The Role of Power in Organizational Institutionalism 136 4.4. Attributes of Institutional Entrepreneurship 139 4.5. The Power Issue in Institutional Entrepreneurship 141 - 4.5.1. The Source of Power in Institutional Entrepreneurship 144 8 - 4.5.2. The Consequence of the Possession of Power for 146 Institutional Entrepreneurship 4.6. The Legitimacy Issue in institutional Entrepreneurship 147 - 4.6.1. The Sources of Legitimacy in Institutional 149 entrepreneurship - 4.6.2. The Consequence of the Possession of Legitimacy in 150 Institutional Entrepreneurship 4.7. The Collective Action Issue in Institutional Entrepreneurship 152 - 4.7.1. The Role of Membership Rules in Institutional 155 Entrepreneurship - 4.7.2. The Role of Building Specifications in Institutional 156 Entrepreneurship - 4.7.3. The Role of Having Stakeholders in Collaboration 157 4.8. Discursive Activities 158 - 4.8.1. The Information Communication in Institutional 159 Entrepreneurship - 4.8.2. The Construction of Meaning in Institutional 160 Entrepreneurship 4.9. Conclusions 162 Ch 5. Conceptual Framework 165 5.1. Clarifying the Relationships within the Framework 168 5.2. Data Themes which should be Collected 172 - 5.2.1. Institutional Entrepreneurship in Standard Wars 172 - - 5.2.1.1. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities 173 - - 5.2.1.2. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities 175 - - 5.2.1.3. Discursive Activities 178 - 5.2.2. Power 180 - 5.2.3. Legitimacy 184 - 5.2.4. Outcomes 186 9 Ch 6. Research Methodology 190 6.1. The Case Study Method and Eisenhardt’s Principles 197 6.2. Using Eisenhardt’s Principles to Analyze a Case Study 203 6.3. Theoretical Sampling: Sony Blu-ray Disc vs. Toshiba HD DVD 209 6.4. The Data Collection Process 212 6.5. The Data Analysis Process 221 Ch 7. Data Analysis 226 7.1. Before 2002: Power and Legitimacy 232 - 7.1.1. Legitimacy: The Performance of Star Products 233 - - 7.1.1.1. Brief Presentation of the History of Sony and 233 Toshiba - 7.1.2. Legitimacy: The Main Business Segments of Critical 236 Stakeholders - 7.1.3. Power: Experience of Previous Standard Wars 241 - 7.1.4. Power: Networking 245 7.2. 2002-2006: Establishing BDF and BDA 249 - 7.2.1. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: The Portfolio of the 252 Institutional Entrepreneur - 7.2.2. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities: 256 Understanding Expectations - 7.2.3. Discursive Activities: Framing 257 - 7.2.4. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: The Structure of 263 Membership - 7.2.5. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Product 266 Development Activities - 7.2.6. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Frequent 269 Communication - 7.2.7. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities: Responding 271 to Requirements - 7.2.8. Discursive Activities: Promoting 276 10 - 7.2.9. Discursive Activities: Undermining 280 - 7.2.10. Discursive Activities: Debating 285 - 7.2.11. Discursive Activities: Spokespersons 290 - 7.2.12. Collaboration Structuring Capabilities: Organizing 292 Promotion 7.3. 2006-2008: Marketing War 303 - 7.3.1. Product Performance 304 - 7.3.2. Network Effects 310 - 7.3.3. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities: Seeking 316 Exclusive Support - 7.3.4. Critical Stakeholder Management Capabilities: Giving 318 Incentives 7.4. Additional Findings of Data Analysis 320 Ch 8. The Theoretical Framework, Discussion, Limitations, and 323 Future Research 8.1. The Response to the Research Questions 325 8.2. The New Theoretical Framework 331 - 8.2.1. Media Influence 332 - 8.2.2. Human Resource Management of Core Employees 336 8.3.
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