Province-Centre Relations in Pakistan: a Case Study of Balochistan (1972-1977)

Home , Abdul Aziz Kurd, Attock Bridge, Balochi Academy, Dombki, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Javed Naseer Rind

Province-Centre Relations in Pakistan: A Case Study of Balochistan (1972-1977)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Abdul Basit Mujahid

Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan

2018 Province-Centre Relations in Pakistan: A Case Study of Balochistan (1972-1977)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Abdul Basit Mujahid

Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan

2018

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Department of History

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad, Pakistan

2018

Author’s Declaration

I Abdul Basit Mujahid hereby state that my PhD thesis titled Province-Centre

Relations: A Case Study of Balochistan (1972-1977) is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this University (Quaid-i-Azam

University) or anywhere else in the country/world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my Graduate the university has the right to withdraw my PhD degree.

Abdul Basit Mujahid

Date:

Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled “Province-Centre Relations in Pakistan: A Case Study of Balochistan (1972-1977)” is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, towards plagiarism. Therefore I as an Author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of PhD degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my PhD degree and that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student /Author Signature:______

Name: Abdul Basit Mujahid

CONTENTS

List of Contents List of Abbreviations Glossary Acknowledgements

Introduction………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter One Historical Background...... 18

Chapter Two Balochistan-Centre Relations: Resistance Movements, 1947-1972...... 75

Chapter Three Balochistan-Centre Relations, Theory and Practice, 1972-1977…………………….123 Chapter Four Balochistan-Centre Relations: Insurgency & its Counter, 1972-1977...... 189

Chapter Five Balochistan-Centre Relations: Elections 1977...... 242

Conclusion...... 302

Bibliography...... 313

Appendices...... 324

ABBREVATIONS

AGG Agent to Governor General

AIML All-India Muslim League

AL Awami League

AIR All India Radio

AW Anjuman-i-Watan

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BDM Balochistan Dehi Muhafiz

BELF Balochistan Exile Liberation Front

BPLF Baluch People’s Liberation Front

BRDF Balochistan Revolutionary Democratic Front

BPC Basic Principle Committee

BSU Balochistan State Union

CARs Central Asian Republics

CEC Chief Election Commissioner

COAS Chief of Army Staff

CONML Convention Muslim League

CM Chief Minister

CML Council Muslim

DC Deputy Commissioners DPR Defence of Pakistan Rules

FSF Federal Security Force

GG Governor General

HQ Head Quarter

INC Indian National Congress

JI Jammat-i-Islami

JSMM Jiye Sindh Mutahda Mahaz

JUP Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan

JUI Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam

JUP Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti

KSNP Kalat State National Party

KT Khaksar Tehreek

LFO Legal Frame Work Order

MC Muslim Conference

ML Muslim League

ML (P) Muslim League (Pagara Group)

NAP National Awami Party

NDF National Democratic Front

NDP National Democratic Party

NWFP North West Frontier Province

NFC National Finance Commission

NPT National Press Trust OIC Organization of Islamic Conference

PBUH Peace be Upon Him

PDP Pakistan Democratic Party

PFAR Popular Front for Armed Resistance

PFUJ Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

PkMAP Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party

PM Prime Minister

PNA Pakistan National Alliance

PNP Pakistan National Party

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PRODA Public Representatives and Offices Disqualification Act

QML Qayyum Muslim League

RTC Round Table Conferences

PkNAP Pashtoonkhwa National Awami Party

TI Tehrik-i-Istiqlal

UNO United Nations Organization

UDF United Democratic Front

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

US United States

GLOSSORY

Anjuman-i-Ittihad-i-Baloch wa Balochistan Organization of the people and province of Balochistan province of Balochistan

Baloch Tanzeem Baloch Organization

Bigar Forced Labour

Darul Awam Lower House

Darul Umara Upper House

Dasta-i-Khas Special Bodyguards

Dastur Constitution

Dastur ul Amal Manifesto

Dehi Mahafiz Rural Security Guards

Dharti Ka Lal Son of Soil

Diwan Parliament

Fasad-fi-Sabilillah Anarchy in the name of God

Gaddi Nasheens Spiritual Seat-holder

Jirgah Tribal House of Elders

Lashkar Army

Lathi Goli ki Sarkar nahi chale gi nahi chale gi The Government of tyranny would not continue not continue

Masajid Plural of Masjid (Prayer Place of Muslims) Muslims)

Meri Kursi Mazboot hai My office is Strong

Mullah Religious Leader Sunnah System of Sharia originated by the Prophet (Peace be upon him) Prophet (Peace be upon him)

Raj Rule

Rawaj Custom/ Culture

Razi-Allah Anhu May God be pleased with him

Roti, Kapra aur Makan Bread, Clothing and Shelter

Shah se ziyada Shah ka wafadar’ More faithful to the King than King himself himself

Shahi Jirga Official House of Elders

Shalwar Traditional trouser

Sarig a Baloch scarf for woman

Sunnah Practice of Prophet (Peace be upon him) him)

Warna Waninda Educated Youth

Zanjeer Chain

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am highly indebted to Dr. Javed Haider Syed, Professor and Chairman Department of

History University of Gujrat, under whose kind guidance and supervision this doctoral dissertation has been finalized. His fatherly attitude, whole hearted support and continuous encouragement were vital for its completion. Without his scholarly feedback and precious suggestion it would not have been possible to achieve the task. I am also thankful to all the faculty members in the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad, particularly, Dr. Tanveer Anjum for their encouragement and help. The staff at the Department has always been helpful in the research hazards. I am grateful to Prof. Dr Samina Awan, Chairperson, Department of History, Allama Iqbal

Open University for facilitating and sparing during the research period. I am also thankful to my colleagues particularly Dr Kishwar Sultana, Dr Kausar Parveen, Fozia

Umar and Sadia Aziz and staff of my department especially Late Farooq Qadir, Tahir

Aziz and Raja Rabnawaz.

I would like to pay my gratitude to the Staff of the Seminar Library, Department of History, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, National Institute of

Pakistan Studies, Taxila Institute of Asian Civilizations and DRSM Library, Quaid-i-

Azam University, Islamabad. I would also like to express my gratefulness to the staff of

Central Library of Allama Iqbal Open University, Institute of Policy Studies, National

Archives of Pakistan, National Documentation Centre, Election Commission of Pakistan,

National Assembly of Pakistan, National Library of Pakistan, Central Library,

International Islamic University and Reference Cell of Press Information Department, Islamabad. I also owe gratitude to the staff of the Department of History and Central

Library University of the Punjab, Research Society of Pakistan, Punjab Public Library

Lahore, Balochistan Archives, Quetta. I also owe my gratitude to the staff of Central

Library, University of Balochistan, Quetta.

I also wish to acknowledge with thanks the help numerous scholars and intellectual who shared their insight and experience with me during my research; Dr. M.

Rafique Afzal, Late Prof. Dr. Inam-ul-Haq Kausar, Dr. Abdul Razzaq Sabir, Dr. Munir

Gichki, Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, Late Chakar Khan Rind, Fazila Aalyani, Late

Nawabzada Talal Bugti, Amanullah Shadezai, Dr. Abdul Malik Kansi, Late Syed Fasih

Iqbal and Jamal Shah Kakar.

I am deeply indebted to all my friends and well wishers who were a constant source of encouragement throughout my work particularly Dr. Syed Akmal Hussain

Shah, Dr. Syed Tahir Hussain Bukhari, Dr. Hassan Raza, Dr. Abdul Aziz Sahir and Dr.

Malik Tauqeer Ahmad Khan.

My all achievements in life would not have been possible without the prayers and spiritual guidance of my father, Noor Muhammad (Late), and my mother (Late). My wife also deserves special thanks as she spared me to concentrate on my work while she needed my attention the most. I am also grateful to my brothers and sisters for their constant encouragement and good wishes and most particularly to my mentor and torch- bearer Abdul Wadood Alvi (Late).

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The politics of South Asia is generally under the pressure of ethnic differences. In case of

Pakistan these differences create the sentiments of sub nationalism which lead to the

emergence of regional groups. The existence of regionalism is a byproduct of ethnic and racial diversity. It is not harmful, unless it overwhelms the federal nature of society. The issue could be resolved by adopting participatory mindset.

The situation is different in case of Pakistan where each of the federating unit was semi- sovereign during pre-partition period and had its own distinct national identity.

Therefore, the authorities were incapable to tackle the process of nation and state building. They were even failed to utilize provincial diversity.

The separation of Eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971 resulted in creation of a new country, i.e. Bangladesh after losing fifty five percent of the population. The ethnic issue was still emerging in Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP. It was pathetic that even after thirty years the state was inept to deal with provincial issues. Pakistan’s all four geographical regions are ethnically divided and each has its peculiar issues. The Baloch and Pashtoons are two main ethnic groups residing in Balochistan. Pashtoons are also predominantly present in NWFP. Sindh is divided among rural and urban population, rural Sindh is inhabited by Sindhis while urban areas have mixture of Sindhis and Muhajirs except

Karachi and Hyderabad where Muhajirs had secured a significant status.

The Pashtoonistan Movement in NWFP, Jiay Sindh Movement in Sindh and

Greater Balochistan Movement trace back its root in the pre-partition period. The

continuity of these movements during latter period was the clear sign of provincialism.

The sentiments of regionalism as compared to other areas were limited and initiated with

the support of local traditional elite. Pakistan being an ideological state could not check

the development of stress between different nationalities.

The lack of proper redressing of ethnic issues is the most important problem in

Pakistan. The ruling elite were totally indifferent due to which the issue of provincial

autonomy culminated into nationalist movement in East Pakistan. The probable solution

of the issues was laid in federal principles which were not obeyed and ruling elite

stressed for centralist tendencies. About eighty five percent of the civil and military

bureaucracy is comprised of one province. The other provinces felt deprived and their

grievances were justified. It seemed that authorities had not learnt any lesson from

episode of East Pakistan. The restoration of the military action in Balochistan and denial

from the devolution of power to lower level was the major issue which might have been

settled with centre for congenial province-centre relations.

The federal parliamentary system was adopted after the creation of Pakistan. The

provincial system is based upon parliamentary system with federal constitution. This

system is suitable for multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies. The provinces are given

autonomy under the constitution in federal system. This system maintains cordial

relations between centre and its constituent units. Unfortunately, the relations between

centre and its units had never been considered exemplary in Pakistan. Less or more

centre-province rift could be seen every now and then. Obviously, because of this strife,

strong political institutions could not be evolved in Pakistan.

The political institutions inherited by Pakistan were weak enough so it could not

bring harmony between centre and the provinces. That caused strong civil-military

bureaucratic rule in Pakistan. The traditional authoritative type of government emerged

with strong centre. The concept of power sharing is hardly seen in any era. It is worth

remembering that the country had lost one of the biggest provinces in 1971. The question

of provincial autonomy came to the surface even with more intensive way after the

debacle of East Pakistan. In that entire scenario population-wise the smallest and area-

wise the largest province of Pakistan, Balochistan got the status of full-fledged province

after the dissolution of One Unit. Balochistan inherited inbuilt the issue of provincial

autonomy being the vigorous one, the passions were stronger. The province-centre

relations with reference to Balochistan during the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were

awful and bitter. During the period, the politics of vested interest was in vogue. The

political traditions were stained with power, status control and long tenures of authoritarian rules.

Bhutto being the saviour of ‘mutilated’ new Pakistan was expected towards unifying the federating units. The 1973 constitution being passed unanimously had the essence of provincial autonomy. Hence, the provinces were feeling secure and had belief

of having good relationship with centre. Bhutto after consolidating power became

authoritative and had dealt the opposition within or without his party with a severe hand,

especially, in the province where he was not sharing power directly, adopted more strict

policy.

The general elections of 1970 brought NAP at the forefront of national politics as

the opposition party. The NAP and PPP had agenda of Socialism. It was a general

assumption that the expectations could not be materialized because of clash of

personalities. After coming into power Bhutto planned to increase his influence in NWFP

and Balochistan because he did not want his government to be dependent on any other

party. After coming into power Bhutto offered two seats to Wali Khan in the cabinet,

Wali Khan did not accept the offer. He was elected as opposition leader in National

Assembly and rejected the undemocratic policies of Bhutto. The JUI was also a strong

regional party in Balochistan and NWFP which had defied the impacts of Socialism

during 1970 elections and advocated political system based on Islamic ideology. It

worked under the guidance of Maulana Mufti Mehmood and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus

Hazarvi who was a shrewd politician cum religious scholar. Despite of having basic

difference both the NAP and JUI formed coalition government in NWFP and

Balochistan. The common aspects of both were anti PPP sentiments.

The dismissal of coalition government, the governor rule and military action etc.

sparked sour relationship between Balochistan and centre. These could not be settled

throughout the period under study; 1972-1977. The political process in Balochistan was a

new phase in the sense that it remained under centre’s influence from 1947-70 due to

which regional sentiments emerged in the area. The PPP leadership could not redress the

deprivations in Balochistan even before becoming province practically. The 1973

Constitution was a possible solution of centre province differences in its original initial

form. The amendments made during 1973-77 were a sign of centralist tendency against

federal setup.

Therefore, a lot of questions arise in mind that politically inexperienced provincial

government could not make adjustment with centre. The PPP under leadership of Bhutto

at centre was also non-accommodative, so keeping all the ground realities in mind it is

assessed that whether the government in Balochistan was not experienced enough to

tackle the issue politically? Whether the policies of provincial government were not

harmonious to centre? On the other hand, was the centre responsible for the rift? Was

Bhutto authoritative or democratic? Whether Bhutto ever tried to bring harmony between

centre and province? Whether Bhutto was conceiving military option, as sole solution of

the issue? The whole of inquiries is searched through applying research methods and

techniques.

Significance of Study

There is no full-fledged research regarding the issue of Balochistan-centre relationship

during Bhutto era. Therefore, it is the first attempt to cover whole of this period. The

present study is significant from theoretical and empirical aspect. Theoretically, the study

has explored the nature of province-centre relations by having comparative analysis of

stake holder parties at federal and provincial level and endeavors to contribute to the

constitutional and democratic framework in Pakistan. Empirically, the study examines the

myths and realities with reference to ideology and practical working of federation. The

study of interaction among NAP, JUI and PPP has been formulated and the consequences

on general masses especially on the deprived people of Balochistan have been focused.

The present research also enquires the factors which directed towards the establishment

of NAP-JUI coalition government in the province and dissolution of the same

government in a very short span of time.

The present study analyses the political conditions of Balochistan also in the

paradigm of province-centre relations during 1972-1977. It reveals how mutual tussle

between Balochistan and centre and other provinces led to the collapse of system. The

federal system and its working during the period are of special importance. The

applicability of federal principles has also been analyzed. The authoritative style of

governance which led to the failure of democracy in 1977 has been minutely observed to

avoid the forth coming problems. The time period marked for the present study stretches

from 1972 to 1977.

The literature to be consulted for studying Balochistan-centre relationship during

the period under question is comprised of primary and secondary sources. The secondary

sources related to Balochistan and the governance of Bhutto has been consulted to

understand the particular area. The newspapers, research articles, personal interviews of

political and social personalities, National Assembly Debates, Balochistan Provincial

Assembly Debates, Balochistan and National Archives have also been consulted. To

make the study conceptual, the theories of nationalism, federalism, provincial autonomy

and democracy are employed.

Scope and Significance of Study

The study under research covers the political development in Balochistan after becoming

province and its relations with centre from 1972 to 1977. The Balochistan was federally

administered area since 1947. It was given the provincial status on August 1, 1970 under

Legal Framework Order (LFO) of General Yahya Khan. The first elected government

was established in 1972. The aim of the research is to evaluate the nature of relations

between the central government and the provincial coalition. These had a great impact at

national level politics during the period 1972-1977 and onwards.

There are various explanations about the nature of province-centre relations under

the aspect of federalism. The period under study have been discussed differently by

scholars. Some have explained it without the importance of regional politics while some

others have analysed the period with reference to Bhutto strategy to have balanced

working relations with the opposition.

The study is worthwhile because it discusses the nature of politics, political

leadership, role of NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan and Bhutto’s ambition

to have absolute power all over the country. This work is significant for evaluating

Bhutto’s strategy to dominate under one party system. It is also important for focusing on

the mutual tussle of PPP and regional parties.

Context of Analysis

The province-centre relations during 1972-1977 were overwhelmed by PPP. The

confrontation with reference to national and regional levels emerged and the regional

parties felt insecurity. The PPP started declaring itself as ‘symbol of federation’; NAP,

JUI and parties at regional level whose exposure was limited even then succeeded. The

cooperation between JUI and NAP was temporary because both of them were based on

different ideologies.

The PPP wanted to maintain hold at national level politics which was challenged

by JUI, JI, NAP etc. the study focuses on the period 1972-1977 by employing the

concepts of federalism, nationalism and provincial autonomy. To assess the province-

centre relationship the democratic norms and values have been used as a tool.

The situations before and after the provincial status of Balochistan have also been analyzed. In Pakistan federal units do not feel comfortable to coordinate with federation on the basis of mutual sharing of resources and allocation of funds, which ultimately resulted in bitter province-centre relations. The regional politics remained limited under

local politics and unable to participate at national level due to differences between

provinces and centre. The repeated military rules and limited tenures of democracy have

further intensified province-centre relations especially Balochistan versus centre.

Methodology

To understand the narrative of centre-province relations, it is necessary to understand the

function and practice of real federal system. It provides a basic principle under which a

federation works successfully. In case of Balochistan these principles were totally

negated. Firstly, it was directly controlled by centre till 1972 and later on after becoming

province it was again at the mercy of centre. The Balochistan was dealt with tactics of

centralism. The federal system is based on participatory democracy but it lacks in case of

Balochistan.

The study is descriptive as well as analytical. The published primary sources, i.e.

National and Provincial Assembly Debates, The Constitution of Pakistan 1973,

Eighteenth Amendment, Reports of the Election Commission, 1977, Court Verdicts and

other relevant mutual laws are consulted. The biographies, autobiographies have also

been consulted along with interviews from relevant personalities to collect first hand

information.

The explanation of events is given according to the timeline. The events which

really affected the history of Pakistan have been described. The study explains the

establishment of government for the first time in Balochistan in 1972. The policies and

interest of participant parties have also been discussed to have onward guide line.

Review of Literature

There is no separate exclusive study which deals with all aspects of the topic. However

the Bhutto period 1971-77 has been researched generally and some scholarly works are

available from other angles on Balochistan. The researchers and general authors have

selectively expressed about different issues of Balochistan. Despite of bulk of work on

Balochistan, no extensive study is available on Balochistan with reference to its relations

with centre under the paradigm of federalism. Due to the sensitivity of issue up to mark

work is not available.

An effort has been made to consult the relevant sources and whatever was

humanly possible has been done. The primary sources consulted for the topic include all

three constitutions of Pakistan i.e. 1956, 1962 and 1973. Constituent Assembly Debates

1947, 1948, National Assembly Debates 1971-77, Balochistan Provincial Assembly

Debates 1971-77, Election Commission Report 1970 and manifestos of PPP and other

opposition parties.

There are some other sources which contain impartial information. The primary

sources, official and non-official record of PPP, manifestos of different parties, relevant

newspapers and interviews of the personalities concerned. The research has been made

mostly with reference to political conditions and performances. The province-centre

relations under the narrative of federalism have been casually dealt. The issues and

deprivations of Balochistan before being province 1947-70 have not been highlighted and federal control over the province and its consequences have also not been discoursed.

The scholarly works which provide specific information about the topic includes

Ali Abbas’s edited work Balochistan Tanaza Aur Hal (Urdu), (Islamabad: Narratives

Private Limited, 2012), contains articles of different authors about the issues of

Balochistan from different aspects. These articles provide a good insight about

Balochistan but there is no expression about the working of federation during 1972-1977.

A.B. Awan’s work Baluchistan; Historical and Political Process, (London: New

Century Publishers, London), is very important because it provides the basis of

Balochistan’s early history along with its characters. The book has gradually mentioned different dynasties but is unable to explore the tussle between the province and centre.

Ahmad Saleem’s work Balochistan Azadi Se Subai Be Ikhtiari Tak (Urdu),

(Lahore: Jamhoori Publications, 2013), provides critical study about province-centre relations in historical context. It provides material about different resistance movements and their repercussions however, the issues have not been elaborated within constitutional paradigm.

Akhtar Ali Khan Baloch’s work Balochistan ki Namwar Shakhsiaat (Urdu),

(Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), elaborates the services of prominent personalities of Balochistan in three volumes who have rendered their service for the land

and people of Balochistan. It is a valuable work in general and does not have the

description about province-centre relations.

Asma Faiz’s book Making Federation Work (Karachi: Oxford University Press,

2015), has explained function as well as working of federation under different aspects,

however the book has not detail description about the mutual state of affairs between

Balochistan and centre.

Aziz Muhammad Bugti’s book Balochistan Siyasi Culture Aur Qabaili Nizam

(Urdu), (Lahore: Fiction House, 2009), describes about the imprints of tribal system on

Balochistan’s politics and its general conditions. The book provides general information regarding mind set of the people and their response towards political process, though it does not focus on the period under consideration.

Hamid Khan’s Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford

University Press 2009), is valuable work which explains the gradual constitutional

development in country. The work is a practical study of constitutional and political

changes in Pakistan but does not provide the information regarding federal issues.

Hassan Askari Rizvi’s book Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86 (Lahore:

Progressive Publishers, 1986), elaborates the role of Military in politics of Pakistan and

its consequences but the information about centre-province relations between Balochistan

and centre has not been extensively highlighted.

Inam-ul-Haq Kausar’s book Jidojuhad-e-Azadi Mein Balochistan Ka Kirdar

(Urdu) (Lahore: Idara-e-Tehqiqat-e-Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1991), explains

the role of Balochistan in Pakistan Movement. It re-supplemented with the proofs of

letters and correspondence of Jinnah with prominent personalities of Balochistan. The

book provides clarity of mind to work under the views of Jinnah, however the book does

not cover the period from 1972-1977.

Kamil-ul-Qadri’s work Muhimmat-e-Balochistan (Urdu), (Lahore: Al-Asar

Publications, 2009), provides explanation of different armed resistances of the sons of

soil. The book does not provide specific required information according to the topic.

K.K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National

Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), explains the political system of

Pakistan in the early years. He evaluates the role of political parties with special emphasis

on the roll-back of democracy. The work contains the political panorama of the initial

political phase in Pakistan and lacks the information under the paradigm of centre-

province relations.

Lawrence Ziring work Pakistan in 20th Century (New York: Oxford University

Press 2003), has discussed the politics of Pakistan in chronological pattern but the work

does not focus on the specific area.

Maria Malik’s work Balochistan: Conundrum the Real Perspective, (Islamabad:

Poorab Academy, 2013), provides detailed information of the area with reference to the

historical framework and has explained about the issues of nationalism under different

unrests and uprisings but the work has not expressed about the issues between province

and centre particularly Balochistan-Centre relations.

Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo’s biography compiled by B.M. Kutty In Search of

Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo (Karachi: Pakistan Study

Centre University of Karachi, 2009), contains discussion on different issues with

reference to Balochistan. It provides good insight about different dimensions of

Balochistan’s politics. The personal experiences of Bizenjo regarding the establishment,

working and dissolution of NAP-JUI coalition expressed and different issues of

Balochistan centre confrontation have been explained.

Muntzra Nazir’s Federalism in Pakistan: Early Years (Lahore: Pakistan Study

Centre University of the Punjab, 2008), explains about the centre province relations from

1947-58 under the narrative of federalism. This book has explained about the features and necessity of federal system but has not provided information about centralist tendencies during the early period.

Rafique Afzal’s work Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-71 (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 2007) describes a detailed analyses about the state of politics and governance during the early years of Pakistan. It provides comparative analyses between theory and practice of federal principles.

Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2003), provides information about politics and political changes in

Pakistan up to 1990. The book describes the political scenario of provinces but Centre’s strategy and dealing with provinces is not given due importance.

Saeed Shafqat’s book Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Colorado: West View Press, 1997) describes about the military-civil relationship with special focus from the reign of Z.A. Bhutto to Benazir

Bhutto. The account also discusses regarding the military operations in Balochistan under

Bhutto but lacks in Balochistan- Centre relations during 1972-1977.

Sayyid A.S. Pirzada’s book The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, 1971-77

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) narrates the role of JUI in Pakistani politics.

The author has generally described the political conditions with reference to JUI’s

background and contemporary role. It provides information about the role of coalition

government in Balochistan during the period 1972-1977 but lacks the approach with

reference to federalism.

Seemi Naghmana Tahir’s work Balochistan Mein Ablagh-e-Aama (Urdu),

(Islamabad: Muqtadra Qaumi Zuban Pakistan, 2006), is a review of journalism and mass

media of about 170 years which shows the sense of awareness in Balochistan historically.

The work does not depict about the relations between Balochistan and centre during the

period.

Sherbaz Khan Mazari’s book A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 2001), is an autobiography. This book contains and reflects personal

experiences of Mazari with reference to the political game at that time. Mostly the author

has expressed about the issues of concern under divine authority. The work lacks the

inner study of the working of federation.

Syed Iqbal Ahmad’s book Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal

Book Company, 1992), describes Balochistan’s potential at national and international level. The author has not explained the importance of area under a federation.

Tahir Amin’s work Ethno National Movements of Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute

of Policy Studies, 1998) describes issues regarding ethnicity at regional level which have

supplemented the nationalist sentiments. It’s a valuable work and provides guidance to

understand ethnic differences. However the work lacks the information about issues

under federal societies.

Tariq Rehman’s work Language and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1997) provides analysis about political and sociological development

due to language change which is a strong cultural element. The role of language for

cultural and historical sustainability has been effectively discussed. The work is more

concerned with language issues.

Zarina Salamat’s book Pakistan 1947-1958: An Historical Review (Islamabad:

National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992) describes the problems confronted by the new state which resulted in the decline of democracy at central and provincial level. This work also reveals the mindset of the then political leadership and bureaucracy which created the sentiments of regionalism and provincialism.

The literature reviewed above is valuable and provide sufficient information as well as analyses related to the area under research. However, the available work lacks

Balochistan- Centre relations during 1972-1977 with reference to centralist tendencies, the inner study of the working of federation, the information about issues under federal societies. Therefore, the present research endeavours to fill the gaps in the context of

Balochistan-Centre relations in the backdrop of the nature of politics of the time, political leadership, role of NAP-JUI ruling and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s desire to have absolute

power in whole of the country. The study addresses the missing area i.e. Bhutto’s strategy

to dominate under one party system. It also provides the analysis of PPP’s relationship

with the regional political parties.

Chapterization

The present research consists upon five chapters beside introduction and conclusion. The

first chapter comprises of historical perspective and background of Balochistan with

reference to its land and people. Geo-strategic location of the region is of immense

importance which enhances its political importance. The resources of the province and its

location increase its importance. The second chapter analyses the Balochistan-Centre

relations since the inception of the new state Pakistan up to the establishment of first

elected government in Balochistan in 1972. The area did not have a province status and

was directly under the administration of Centre; therefore, the chapter also focuses on

different resistance movements during the period in the paradigm of Balochistan-Centre

relations. The third chapter describes the importance of Balochistan under theoretical

narrative of federalism; it discusses the performance of Center and province with

reference to their mutual comparison. The actual state of affairs has also been analysis

during the period 1972-1977. It has stressed the importance of Balochistan for federation

and vice versa. It elaborates the federal principle under which units having regional

tendencies are governed to maintain cordial relations at intra provincial level and with

centre also. The chapter also contains discussion regarding political developments during

1972-1977. The province was for the first time governed by an elected government of

NAP-JUI coalition. The chapter also evaluates the working and performance of the

coalition provincial government and its dissolution just after ten months. Moreover, the

governor rule in the province and direct federal control has also been critically reviewed

along with working of other political parties has also been highlighted. The fourth chapter

elaborates and analyses Balochistan-Centre relations in the context of reaction against

federal government measures for the province. It focuses on the militant activities and

counter act of federal government. It also evaluates the causes of military operation and

its impacts on the region. The fifth chapter assesses the whole story of 1977 elections in

general and with specific reference to Balochistan also. The election campaign and

causes of the boycott of elections by PNA in Balochistan has also been critically

reviewed along with the performance of NAP Pashtoonkhwa It also analyses the failure

and collapse of democratic set-up and implementation of 3rd Martial Law in the country

by providing a comprehensive scenario and aftermath of 1977 rigged elections and

agitation movement of PNA. In the end conclusion, bibliography and appendices are

included

CHAPTER ONE

BALOCHISTAN: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The expansion of the ‘Company Raj’1 compelled the government in Britain to devise a

procedure and strategy to control and manage in India. For the purpose, British

Parliament had legislation of certain Acts under which the British Government was

authorized to monitor the Company affairs. Through those Acts, the Parliament of the

Great Britain introduced a series of administrative as well as economic reforms, through

which it established ultimate control and command over the Company. The Acts

acknowledged the Company’s political role. During the process, gradually Western

political system was introduced.

However, the Muslim political party All-India Muslim League (AIML), in the

British India till 1912 avoided to concentrate on Western democracy in contrast to Indian

National Congress (INC). Even though in the same year, in the Council session it

supported self-government under the Crown. The AIML and INC were aware of the fact

that the policy of differentiation would not be suitable for both of them. By then the

AIML changed its motive from loyalist to self-government (1912), a road-runner to the

Lucknow Pact under influence of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (onwards

Jinnah). In that context, particularly, Karachi Session of INC (1913) and Agra Session of

AIML (1913) paved the path to bring both the parties in rapprochement. Consequent

upon that both the parties summoned a joint session at Lucknow in 1916 and drafted a

scheme in which efforts were made to minimize the differences.2 The Lucknow Accord

was signed by both the parties, resultantly the Muslims succeeded to get one third seats in the Central Legislative Assembly as well as separate electorate. The INC also accepted

that after the accord. The Hindu and Muslims both started demanding ‘Home-Rule’. It

reflected that reforms implemented by the Raj were unsatisfactory for different groups

and communities. Deep in their hearts and minds the passion behind the demand was

their desire to ask for such a system in India under which Indians would be in decision

making position. The pressure was such that in 1919, Montague-Chelmsford Reforms

were introduced.3 The Reforms were introduced upon the Indians’ demand for more administrative authority. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of separate electorate was

enhanced. Keeping in view, the multi-cultural and multi-religious structure of Indian

society, the Act also brought the concept of provincial autonomy. 4 The Provincial

Legislative Assemblies got more authority regarding legislation. Both the major parties,

i.e. AIML and INC were agreed upon the federal system of government. Under the same

reforms, diarchy was introduced, which provided limited provincial autonomy, although

diarchal agreement hindered the implementation of autonomy.5 Both AIML and INC

leaders criticized the reforms because those were not in accordance with their

expectations. AIML demanded more provincial autonomy.6

Federalism: The Major Issue

The AIML was determined that if the provincial autonomy was avoided then the

safeguard of Muslim rights would be impossible even in Muslim majority areas. They

were of the view that in heterogeneous society of India, Muslims were the biggest

minority group. Aligarh Movement played an important role in evolution of the notion

named Muslim nationalism. Muslims were optimistic about their future and inclined

towards modern education. Consequently, they started participating in politics and

emerged as an enlightened political group. The AIML demanded for the establishment of

national government based upon representation of all Indian provinces in 1924. It further

demanded for provincial autonomy. Moreover, it was also demanded that central

government would only address common interest and social welfare issues. Jinnah was of

the view that in constitution such provisions may be provided that residuary powers could

be transferred to the provinces. In fact, it was indication about specifying the authority of

Central Government upon legislation, so, the provincial matters could not be interfered.

The demand was realistic for the societies like India and remedy for communal and other

related issues.

The British Government deputed a constitutional commission which is called

Simon Commission under the leadership of Sir John Simon. The delegation of British

leaders visited India in 1927 and analyzed previous reforms. In its report which was

submitted in 1930 claimed that ‘Diarchy System’ was not suitable for provinces and

recommended that provinces might be given autonomy. Furthermore, it was declared that

federalism was more appropriate for heterogeneous society of India. 7 It was further

stressed that federalism was the only system which could unite diversified states with

autonomy. However, Balochistan was neglected.8

The Muslims in British India were struggling for federal structure in India with

absolute provincial autonomy. It was the reason that Muslim school of thoughts were

against the Nehru Report 1928. The report had recommended strong federal government

with weak units even it ignored such legitimate demands of the Muslims which were

earlier accepted by INC. The constitutional proposals made under the shadow of INC

totally disregarded the Muslim community. In the report autonomy and residuary powers

were allocated to provinces.9

Responding the Nehru Report Jinnah presented his constitutional proposals and

suggested that future constitution of India must be federal. He presented the concept of

federalism in which utmost authority must be delegated to the provinces. He further

asserted that for heterogeneous land of India real provincial autonomy was the solution of

all the ills. The unconditional struggle for responsible government in India was continued

by the Muslims. They also critically targeted diarchy system and suggested to replace it

with real responsible government.

Allama Iqbal in his renowned Allahabad presidential address described that

Muslim majority provinces in India could progress only if they get rid of Hindu

domination. It depended upon Muslims that how they could achieve their rights in Indian

Federation, though they were in minority, even then they were demanding for

autonomy.10

Round Table Conferences (RTC) were arranged to resolve Hindu-Muslim

differences. At the eve, INC was proceeding towards the demand of absolute

independence. INC boycotted the RTC 1930 whereas remaining two conferences could

not reach to any resolution except that future Indian constitution could be federal.

The 1935 Act

Ultimately, after hectic exercise for legislation the British government succeeded to

introduce Act of 1935. It was the first attempt to frame federal structure on the

recommendation of Round Table Conferences, 1930-1932. It suggested federal system

comprising of the provinces and princely states under the British Indian government.

According to the Act, Sindh was separated from Bombay Presidency and made a separate

Governor province, due to which the number of provinces reached up to eleven.11 On the other hand, the states were given the option to sign the ‘Instrument of Accession’ to become the part of federation. Moreover three lists were formed for the distribution of power between the centre and provinces.12

The Act concentrated mainly on ‘devolution of powers’ from centre to provinces

by reducing the powers of centre. Its main objective was the provision to establish limited

self-government by provinces so that the central rule might be strengthened. The

authority was distributed under ‘central, provincial and concurrent subjects’. The federal

list contained 59 subjects, provincial 54 and concurrent 36. The constitution was written

having supreme authority on Indian legislature and governments. Under the Act two

leveled governments were established, i.e. at central and provincial level. The Judiciary

was independent and had complete authority to interpret, whereas the amendment was the

parliament’s discretion.

Although, it comprised federal structure but the Act addressed upon the authority

of central and provincial governments. The Muslims were very curious about the

“safeguards and special responsibilities” given to the central and provincial authorities.

Under the 1935 Act, Sindh was separated from Bombay Presidency on April 1, 1936 and

NWFP got the status of full-fledged province in 1932. The new constitutional structure

could not protect the majority of Muslims’ in the Punjab and Bengal. Jinnah declared the

Act as ‘unsatisfactory’. In both the provinces Muslims were in majority and were

converted in to minority due to the scheme introduced in the Act. Therefore, they were

not in a position to make government without the help of Hindus. The Act created a very

complex situation. Several autonomous provinces were taking their powers and authority

from the British Crown instead of the Central Government, the division of authority

under the Act was amazingly unique. 13 The provinces got autonomy defined in the

constitution, whereas, centre got superiority. The government affairs were divided in to

three categories, i.e. central, provincial and concurrent. In case of any controversy centre

was given edge. The Act was primarily federal and was made upon the experiences of

different federal states.

The Act divided the Muslim and Hindu public opinion widely; Hindus were in

favour of strong centre while Muslims were thinking otherwise. Most important issue

was of residuary powers, Hindus’ and Muslims’ solution to the issue was different. The

Act authorized Governor General to promulgate half-Federation in India; in fact the

Central part of the Act was never implemented.14

Under the Act Elections were held in 1937 for Provincial Assemblies. Though,

INC and AIML both were critical of Elections, even then participated. The INC got clear

majority in seven provinces out of eleven provinces. AIML snatched 109 seats but even

in Muslim majority provinces could not get majority. The INC, after short dialogue with

government formed its ministries in seven provinces, the period of the ministries 1937-39

was an eye-opener for the Muslims. Indian Muslims declared the ministries as tyrannical

and simultaneously they felt that the so called federal scheme was unsuccessful in

protecting minorities’ rights. That was the turning point in the Muslim politics and they

started thinking about their future in separation instead of federation.15 The INC’s utmost

desire was that central government must be all strong, while Muslims were thinking in

another way by then. Jinnah’s view was now changed, Muslim leadership had consensus

on the issue that federation on all India basis was now out of question. They resented

against the domination intension of the majority Hindus.16

Jinnah’s Concepts of Federation

Although Jinnah was agreed upon the point that Federation was better than the other

political systems yet till then was not supporter of flexible Federation or Confederation.

He was of the view that even if federating units would be given maximum autonomy and

residuary powers, the federation could compel them to surrender the authority to centre

with force.17 Here the question arises that what was the idea of Jinnah about the future

system for Pakistan? Lahore Resolution answers; “North-Western and Eastern zones in

India can be grouped in independent states” that would be autonomous and sovereign.18

In November 1945, Jinnah declared;

The theory of Pakistan guarantees that federal units of the National Government would have all the autonomy that you will find in the constitution of the United States of America, Canada and Australia. But certain vital powers will remain vested in the Central Government such as monetary system, national defense and federal responsibilities.19

Jinnah said that the concept of Pakistan guarantees all units included in the national

government would be autonomous as in USA, Canada and Australian Constitutions

reflect.20

In 1946 the AIML only accepted Cabinet Mission Plan on the ground that it

guaranteed provincial, political and economic autonomy. It devised a federal structure

having weak centre with the opportunity to Muslim majority provinces to dominate in

their respective sphere.21 The INC was reluctant to adopt Centre with weak setup, its own

interpretation about the grouping created confusion. The increasing wrong view of INC

about the concept of Muslin Nationalism compelled Muslims to come on the conclusion

that they had to designate their passion to a separate sovereign state. Federalism was the

most appropriate system for Pakistan keeping in view the huge distance between north-

western and eastern parts. Pakistan was comprised of such areas which were multi-ethnic

as well as multi-lingual in nature. There is no doubt that Islam as common religion was

the only binding force for Muslims in India. Although, it was realized that not only a

common religion but also practicable political and economic system be devised so that

Muslims according to afore-mentioned facts might be united in a diversified multi-

cultural and multi-lingual society. The principle of unity in diversity as well as unity

upon commonalities was the answer to the challenge, which was propagated by those

elements that were fond of provincialism.

The British Raj and Balochistan

Before the analysis of Islamabad-Balochistan relations, it deems appropriate to review the

historical sequence since the British Raj in the area. Balochistan was comprised of States

in the British times that included Makran, Kharan, Lasbela and Kalat while British

Balochistan was comprised of the areas which were handed over to the British under the

Gandamak Treaty in May 26, 1879 by Afghan government.22

The Ahmadzai tribe of Brahuis founded the Khanate of Kalat in 1666 AD, the

founder was Miru Qambarani. 23 The Khanate declared its independence in reign of

Ahmad Khan in the period 1666-95. 24 In the era of expansionism, Ahmadzai rule

extended itself a lot. 25 The Baloch country got consolidation in eighteenth century.

During the time of fourth Khan named Abdullah Khan (1714-1734) expanded it from

Kandahar(South-Eastern Afghanistan) to Makran and Bandar Abbas ( which is now in

Southern Iran ) and even stretched till Dera Ghazi Khan.26 The period of Naseer Khan 1st

(1749-1796) is known as golden period during which military as well as economic interests were achieved. He conquered Makran, Lasbela, Kharan and numerous seaports including Karachi in the region.27 He also established United Balochistan Army and

included most of the Baloch tribes through recruitment and structuring of the United

Army.28 Therefore, he became Commander of well trained and organized standing Army.

He also structured internally the Sardari System and devised supra Sardars of Sarawan

and Jhalawan. 29 Nasir Khan’s demise produced restiveness; there were certain other

factors for uncertainty and disorder in the Khanate.30 Luxurious life style was also a

reason of the worsened situation.31

The British administration was waiting for the suitable time, so that it could

intervene into north-western region because of its political and economic significance.32

There were considerations that the area could become a buffer state in the perspective of countering Russian expansionism toward British India. The expected attack of Russia, whether through Afghanistan, Khyber Pass or Bolan Pass was considered as a great danger for the British India. In that context, British India Government sent Capt. Grant

(1809) Col. Harry Pottinger (1810) and lastly Mounstuart Elphinstone (1812) to the vast

South-western areas to gather geographic and political information. The geo-strategic importance of Balochistan influenced the policy-makers British India government. The government wanted to secure its communication line through Balochistan to Afghanistan.

To realize its defense strategy they ultimately installed Shah Shujah as ruler in

Afghanistan, who was in exile at the time. The British Army was provided safe route

toward Afghanistan by Mir Mehrab Khan (1817-39) in the wake of First Anglo-Afghan

War (1839-42). While returning from Kandahar the British forces attacked Kalat.

Allegation of deception was leveled against the Khan. Furthermore, it was also blamed

that he had dishonoured the agreement with the British Administration. Mehrab Khan

refused to surrender and martyred along with hundreds of followers. Shahnawaz a remote

relative of martyred Khan was nominated as Khan of Kalat in the age of just fourteen.

Gradually, Mastung was annexed to Afghanistan and Kacchi to Sindh.33 The British had

to come down due to strong resistance. During the period Nasir Khan II took the charge

as ‘Khan’ who accepted subservience to the British. It resulted in to the Agreement of

1841. Kalat was declared vassal state of the British and the British Armed Contingents

could be deputed anywhere in Kalat State.34After the failure in First Anglo-Afghan War,

the British started reviewing their ‘frontier policy’ regarding Khanate and under the

agreement of 1854 the status of Kalat as an independent state was accepted.35Afterwards,

regarding ‘India Imperial Policy’36 particularly in the context of North-Western regions,

two schools of thought emerged; the school of ‘Closed Border Strategy’37 was of the

view that the British Indian State could protect itself by maintaining friendly relations

with the states in the North-Western region. With trade ties and establishment of

infrastructure could be helpful in blocking foreign intruders. The followers of ‘Forward

Policy’38 were having dissimilar approach. They supported the states situated the North

West which were relying upon the British Indian government in the context of their

defense. Furthermore, they favoured indirect vigilance upon the states.39

The British adopted ‘Closed Border Policy’ in the period 1854-72. Major Roberts

Sandeman was appointed ‘Agent to Governor General Balochistan’ (AGG) in 1887-1892.

Then onward a new-era of the Baloch-British relations started.40 Sandeman was assigned

the task to develop indirect influence of the British in Balochistan. His administration

tirelessly worked for maintaining law and order and a net-work to protect roads and

passes and he was more than enough succeeded in achieving the objectives of ‘Forward

Policy’.

Sandeman by-passed Khan and developed direct contacts with Sardars the tribal

chiefs were provided financial and political support as well to resolve intra-tribal feuds.

Jirga and Shahi Jirga was constituted. The anti-government activities were suppressed.

The Levi Force was erected from tribes which were on their own disposal. The critics

criticized the policy on the ground that it changed the very fabric of tribal system and

norms. The British used them to crush the rebels.41 Balochistan practically came under

the British control. The Khan’s status was reduced and Sardars were made feudal instead

of elected Sardars.

Accord of 1876 brought a political structure based upon decentralization in Kalat.

The ‘Sandeman System’ changed the traditional status of the tribal chiefs and Khan

which reduced the dependency upon their tribes instead they became more dependent on

the British.42

Quetta became directly under the sway of British after 2nd Anglo-Afghan War

(1878). Quetta, Bolan Pass, Chagai and Marri-Bugti areas were taken by the British on

lease. Sibi, Pishin and Chaman districts came under the British after Gandamak Treaty.

So the British Balochistan was created. It was comprised of leased areas as well as

Pashtoon land. The back bone of the newly introduced indirect control of the British was

‘Sandeman System’. The British administration was aware of anti-centralist inclination of

the Sardars. Therefore, the leaning was managed properly.

With the advent of twentieth century, political awakening started in Balochistan.

In and around Balochistan such conditions prevailed that it developed in the region the

sense of facing political issues as well as situations. By then to avoid political activism

was not possible, the modernization compelled the people to enter into political and

constitutional arena. Karl Marx had noted it an “unconscious tool of history” in case of

1857 uprising.43

In 1920, a son of Kalat state and civil servant, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd (1904-79)

laid the foundation of “Young Baloch” a political organization. It vigorously demanded

reforms in different institutions. The organization was a combination of western typed

educated, constitutional experts and middle class. They mobilized Indian nationalists.44

In 1927 Kurd and Nasir Talwi started the publication of Daily Balochistan from

Delhi, though it could not sustain for long. In the same period a personality having long lasting impact on Balochistan, was Yousaf Ali Khan Magsi wrote an article titled

“Faryad-i-Balochistan”, when he was student at Lahore which was published from

Lahore, for raising the cry from Balochistan. 45 He had to face imprisonment. He

sponsored another newspaper Azad at Lahore, and Mir Abdul Aziz was designated as

editor.46

After the release from prison Yousaf Ali Khan and Kurd established Anjuman-i-

Itehad-i- Balochan wa Balochistan in 1920.47 Khanate of Kalat experienced in the shape

of Anjuman as first political party. 48 The organization started efforts regarding

administration, unity and legal reforms in Balochistan. The Baloch nationalists were

having different view point. They thought that the organization was founded for

independent Balochistan with elected government. Kurd presented ‘a separate and

independent Balochistan’ idea.49 It was a secular movement with a nationalist tendency

without tribal prejudice. 50 The manifesto of Anjuman was progressively bright. The

manifesto suggested that there could be an elected parliament as well as responsible

cabinet under the authority of the Khan. It was desirous to free the area from the indirect

yoke of the British. Nationalists targeted the Sardari System, Having relationship with

Colonial administration Sardars were not having good reputation.51 They were used by

the British to suppress their enemies.52 Khan Azam Jan after taking charge of the Kalat

promised to introduce constitutional set-up. Because of the firm conviction of the Azam

Jan a settlement was penned with Yousaf Magsi. Anjuman was supporting Azam against

Anwar Khan, who was having constant favour of the Prime Minister of Kalat State and a

British stooge.53 It was not possible for Azam to become Khan of Kalat without the

combined support of Anjuman and tribal chiefs.

In fact, that was the first worth mentioning achievement of the Anjuman, though

they ultimately failed to compel the Khan to own his promise. However, the Khan was

reluctant in reducing his authority, Sardars were also against the reforms and desired to

sustain status-quo. Another mile stone of the Anjuman was to organize first Baloch wa

Balochistan conference at Jacobabad on December 27-29, 1932. The conference was in

its nature Balochistani; that is why Bloch as well as Phashtoon were gathered to their

common goal i.e. home-land, which was consisted of the British Balochistan and the

Khanate.54 Abdul Samad Achakzai participated along with Baloch delegations, he also

presided the first conference.55About two hundred delegates attended the conference

hailing from different tribal and ethnic groups in Balochistan even delegates from Iranian

Balochistan attended the conference.56 It was an extra ordinary breakthrough for Baloch

and Pashtoon nationalists in the context of facing contemporary dangers for the Baloch

and the Pashtoon. The Conference demanded the complete representative constitutional

government. It also presented an agenda for the development of Balochistan on the basis

of political, economic and educational reforms on the pattern of other provinces.57 The

colonial rulers without any sane reason confronted the reform demand.

According to the British Balochistan had not yet ready to have representative

government because of less political development as compare to the other areas of British

India. The British government got annoyed upon the efforts of Anjuman for reforms.

Abdul Aziz Kurd and Abdul Samad Achakzai along with other Baloch nationalists were

confined behind the bars.58

The Second Balochistan Conference held in 1933 and the venue was Hyderabad.59 where unachieved agenda of the First Conference was discussed. Yousaf Ali Khan sponsored many Karachi based newspapers which were proscribed. In May, 1933, influenced by Allama Iqbal, he published a pamphlet Balochistan ki Aawaz. He met

Jinnah in England in May, 1934.60 He died in the young age of 27 because of terrified

Quetta earth quack, May 1, 1935.61 So, the Baloch nation was deprived of a leading

figure.

The demise of Yousaf Ali Khan was the major reason of the evaporation of the

Anjuman. Kalat State’s National Party replaced the Anjuman, with Abdul Aziz Kurd as

its Chairman. The enthusiasm seen in Baloch conferences organized by the Anjuman was

missing. Even Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, who was an eminent figure in the Baloch

conferences, also departed and founded Anjuman-i-Watan (AW) in 1938. Mainly, its

jurisdiction was the area of Balochistan except the states. The AW made close contacts

with Indian National Congress (INC). In fact, he was the sole representative of Pashtoon

nationalism. Because of his passion, he had to face imprisonment at various times. Most

appropriately, he was keeping himself aloof from the radical separatist elements in

Anjuman-i-Ittihad-i-Balochan wa Balochistan. The AW demanded constitutional as well

as administrative reforms in the British Balochistan. Prior to that in 1937, the Anjuman-i-

Ittihad splinted into constitutional reformists and liberation seekers. The honey moon

period of Baloch and Pashtoon nationalists was ended.62 Afterwards, both concentrated

towards their own areas with their peculiar interpretations.

Actually, Pashtoon British Balochistan was not part of Khanate, after Second

Anglo-Afghan War it became the part of the British Balochistan. The Pashtoon’s Cultural

and historic origins were more in Afghanistan than in Baloch areas, furthermore

Pashtoons had several reservations upon sovereign Balochistan, they were quite aware of the oddity of the Baloch majority Balochistan. They demanded help in that regard from their racial connectivity in Afghanistan and NWFP. The AW clearly followed INC politics. Achakzai was also follower of non-violence and was titled as ‘Balochistani

Gandhi’ as well.63

The British administration refused to talk about constitutional reforms due to the

low demographic density and dearth of recourses in the region. The British saw the AW

activities with hatred. Achakzai was arrested in the backdrop of World World-II, the

British government blamed his philosophy as intolerable. AW had become one of the few

popular organizations working in the province. In fact, the British could not ignore the

popularity of the AW and hence considered it to be represented in the Advisory Council.

It was anticipated that for the preparation of constitutional proposals Agent to Governor

General (AGG) might be advised. It got presence in the elevated ‘North West Frontier

Tribal Committee’ which was made through an Advisory Committee formed by the

British Indian government.64

Anjuman-i-Ittihad-i-Balochan wa Balochistan (AIBB) replaced the Kalat State

National Party (KSNP). It attracted youth and middle class educated people.65 The party

got inspiration from the nationalists. It also supported undivided India, struggled for

socio-political as well as economic development associated with the rituals and traditions

of the tribal norms. It got its place in the hearts of the masses and hatred in the eyes of the

rulers.66 Baloch nationalists supported Mir Ahmad Yar’s tenure succession, who also

favourd KSNP. The Khan wished to have grip on the areas again, which were then in

British control. Simultaneously, the Khan also desired to minimize the sway of tribal

chiefs, the KSNP had extended its support in that regard, and it was mutual interest which

brought them close to each other. The KSNP needed Khan’s backing to establish popular

government in the province and abolish ‘Sardari system’.

The relationship between KSNP and the Khan could not be sustained because of

the clash of interests and soon there was ‘parting of the ways’. The Khan did not agree to

accept titular role in the proposed representative sort of government, he was also not in

favour of defaming of Sardari system nor of the British. The British, Sardars and the

Khan were at same page in that context. Ultimately, the Khan banned KSNP on July 22,

1939.67 The activities were strictly banned and the leadership was exiled from Kalat

State. The step proved counterproductive, because the KSNP got more popularity after the decision. The party shifted offices to Quetta. After disappointment from Khan, KSNP affiliated itself with INC. After World War II the ban upon the party was lifted and the party joined the ranks with another offshoot of INC, the All India States People

Conference in 1945.68

In the columns of Baloch nationalists, though differences were there upon the

inclusion in Indian Union or sovereignty, however, there was no difference of opinion for

opposing Pakistan movement. Present day Baloch nationalists are of the view that the

decision of KSNP to attach with INC for short span of time was a blunder, because it

damaged at large scale the separate identity and independent status of Balochistan which

was not favoured by the INC.69

The concept of independent Balochistan is worth-mentioning here, which was not

discussed in Jacobabad conference. It is not clear; if it happened so then Achakzai would

not have presided over or favoured that conference. Achakzai kept himself at a distance

from the extremist elements and dissociated from the Anjuman for demanding

sovereignty for the province. Pashtoons did not consider the demand of independent

Balochistan worthy.

The AIML appeared on the political scene of Balochistan during last decade of

the British Raj. Prior to it, Jinnah had been demanding ‘constitutional and administrative

reforms in Balochistan’ on the basis of his Delhi Muslim Proposals, 1927 and popular

Fourteen Points, 1929. The AIML demanded provincial autonomy for Balochistan since

1927.70

A Pashtoon advocate hailing from Pishin, Qazi Isa, founded AIML Balochistan

Chapter in a Masjid.71 He was highly inspired by Jinnah’s personality during his visit to

Bombay in 1938. He decided to organize League properly in Balochistan. 72 It was formally established in 1939 and its offices were setup at Quetta.73

In June 1943, Jinnah visited Balochistan, for about two months and activated the

party. He also met Khan of Kalat who invited Jinnah and his sister Fatima to Kalat. He

took every possible step to infuse new spirit in the political movement of the Muslims of

the province. The people were very much impressed of him on his second visit of

Balochistan in 1945.74

It was difficult to gauge the popularity of AIML through the partisan literature.

Two prominent tribal elders were among the influential Sardars who supported AIML

whole-heartedly as well as financially.75 They were active supporters and well-wishers of

the Pakistan movement in Balochistan. Those both Muslim leaders were not happy with

the politics of Qazi, an urban lawyer, with tribal Chiefs. Although Qazi Isa was a

confirmed candidate for the Indian Legislative Assembly from Balochistan but Jamali

along with other Sardars opposed Qazi’s nomination because of his criticism on Sardars

and Sardari system. Jaffar Khan Jamali convinced Muhammad Khan Jogezai to contest

elections on Balochistan seat for Legislative Assembly, the later contested against Abdul

Samad Achakzai and won.76 AIML had become popular in the province due to that

success.

Actually, the constitutional status of Balochistan is an attention-grabbing subject.

Balochistan had been given sovereignty in line with the Agreement of 1839.77 On the

other hand, Khanate was being made a vessel state of Afghanistan according to the

second agreement. Another agreement took place in 1854 between Nasir Khan and the

British which endorsed Balochistan’s self-governing status. Later on, a ‘final treaty’ was

signed in 1876, which not only endorsed the agreement of 1854 but reaffirmed the

‘friendly relations’. However, the British government changed the status of Khanate

unfairly, which was severely opposed by Ahmad Yar Khan referring to the agreement of

1876 according to which the Khanate was having independent status.78 However, the

British government rejected the plea on the basis of article 3 of 1854 agreement

according to ‘the independent status’ was conditioned to remain subservient.79 In the wake of time, the British intrusion into the state affairs increased although the Khanate was claiming its sovereignty.

Afterward, the case of independent Khanate was defended strongly by offering two memorandums to the Cabinet Mission in 1946. The argument in that regard in the first memorandum was that Kalat had also the same status of agreement as Nepal had; therefore, it might not have been dealt as other India states.80 In the same memorandum,

the Khan also claimed Lasbela, Kharan and Marri-Bugti tribal areas as part of Khanate.

On the other hand, in the second memorandum the Khan was demanding to hand over

him back the areas which were taken by the British on lease including; Naseerabad

Quetta and Noshki. The Baloch nationalists and Khan of Kalat were at the same page as

for as the independence of Khanate was concerned, before the departure of British.

Although the Khan was well aware about the gravity of situation at the time of partition

yet he could not get the level of interest of both the competing major political entities, i.e.

INC and AIML. Future course of annals reflected that the central as well as provincial

leadership of AIML were trying head to nail to get access to the British Balochistan and

Khanate. The geo-strategic importance of Balochistan was the main factor of interest for

Pakistan in the mineral rich Balochistan. The British government declared Shahi Jirga

and Quetta Muncipal Committee as Electoral College for the future decision at the time

of partition. At the eve, Khan tried his level best to exclude leased areas, tribal areas and

areas under Sardars Khan from the jurisdiction of the Shahi Jirga but in vain.

Eventually the Jirga and Muncipal Committee voted in favour of Pakistan in June 1947.

81 Moreover, the gap between the announcement and the actual occurance was just a day,

therefore, the Jirga did not extend the jurisdiction of Khanate to its claimed territories.82

Some authors who are considered as Pro-centre observe that the date for referendum was fixed as June 29, 1947.83 Their analysis is that the INC in connivance

with the British created the environment against Pakistan Movement. Ultimately,

Pakistan got the areas of ‘British Balochistan’ on August 15, 1947.

Following the end of British Raj, the Khan had three options, (a) inclusion into

India (b) inclusion into Pakistan (c) have independent status. Nobody can deny the

existence of the relation of Jinnah and the Khan. It was co-incidence that it was Jinnah who presented the Khan’s memorandum to Cabinet Mission in 1946, in which it was mentioned that after the British rule, Kalat would be independent and non-Indian state.84

On August 4, 1947 a meeting was held at Delhi, attended by Lord Mountbatten, Jinnah,

Ahmad Yar Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Sultan Ahmad, resolved that the Khanate might be given sovereign status.85 The Standstill Agreement was explained with couple of

stances. The Khan and nationalists were happy on its article 1 in which Khanate was

accepted as independent state as it was in the agreement between the British and the

Khan.86 The Government of Pakistan according to Agreement claimed the status of heir

of the British government and demanded the status-quo and decision to get more time to

include Balochistan into Pakistan, whereas the Khan made efforts to have stronghold on

the state by taking different steps. He established bicameral parliament having Darul

Awam (Lower House) and Darul Umara (Upper House). Lower House was to defend the

rights of the people while Upper House consisted of hereditary of Sardars. In the election

of the Lower House, the KSNP under the leadership of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo got the

majority seats. Jinnah and government of Pakistan disclosed their intention to include

unconditionally Kalat into the state of Pakistan. On the other hand, Ahmad Yar Khan had

taken the issue with parliament of Kalat. The parliament decided to sustain independent

status of the state and decided against the accession to Pakistan.87 The Khan was also

taking time to get his objectives realised. 88 Pakistan adopted a unique strategy of instigating already existing old disputes between Khan and the states of Lasbela, Makran and Kharan. Practically, the states by the end of British period opted semi-independent status. They desired to maintain their position and authority, in fact, Lasbela, Makran and

Kharan accessed into Pakistan. Prior to that, the Khan contacted all three of them but in vain. Pakistani administration succeeded to isolate Khan and deprived him from important territories. At last on March 27, 1948, the Khan signed the accession treaty unconditionally.89 Astonishingly, he signed the agreement without consultation of the parliament whom he always declared as final authority. In that context Baloch nationalists declared the issue of accession as illegal and unconstitutional.90

Balochistan: A Historical Perspective

Balochistan has important strategic position as well as the status of being the largest

province according to its physical mass.91 It is located amid 27.54° latitude and 23.41°

longitudes.92 The area of province is around 1, 34000 square miles.93 The location of

Balochistan lies at the Strait of Hormuz.94 The province has 723 miles long border with

Afghanistan and 520 with Iran.95 Balochistan has topographic significance, i.e. on one

side towering mountains and large deserts and plain lands on the other.96 The province

has less plain area in contrast to its total area, i.e. Kachhi Plain in the Southern part of

Sibi District up to Nasirabad, Southern region in Dera Bugti and coastal area of Mekran

up to Iranian Border. Moreover, Kharan and Chaghi Districts are also having vast plains.

The province has 760 kilometers coastal line with peninsulas and capes. The coastal area

is not well linked with the interior; the sharp hills ascend suddenly away from the thin

coastal plain. Ports, like Sonmiani and Pasni are not developed yet though Gwadar is an

apple of every one’s eye. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has increased

importance of the region manifold.

The weather is severe and dry, excluding some area.97 Thirteen rivers flow across

the province to the Indus.98 However, the flow is irregular and mostly not utilized.99 The province is evident of extreme weather in winter even below freezing point in some areas; on the other hand it rises as high as fifty degree centigrade in some parts.100 The extreme weather is the permanent component of upper highlands both in summer and winter. Though, in winter it varies district to district, summer witnesses the area as hot and dry. The arid areas, particularly, Chaghi and Kharan are having very extreme weather

in summer. The plain portion of the province is very tough in summer as the temperature

rises up to fifty degree centigrade. The plains are nice and comfortable in winters. The

climatic conditions in the desert areas are mostly hot with arid character and sometimes

windstorms make the life difficult. The coastline consists upon almost four hundred and

seventy miles which is climatically arid in nature. A writer comments, “… brazen coast,

washed by a molten sea”.101 It has a unique location in the country as it connects with all

remaining provinces of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan and Iran both through land and

later with Arabian Sea too. Overall it can be assessed that:

It is an austere land of steppe and desert intersected by numerous mountain chains. There are few perennial water sources; most rivers have flood water, fed by the spring melt in the mountains. Rainfall is generally scanty and characterized by great annual and local fluctuation. Temperature inclines to extreme: harsh winters in the high lands and hot summer in the low lands.102

Another uniqueness of Balochsitan is that, being largest area-wise witnesses the tiniest demographically in the country. 103 Simultaneously, different areas within the

province also vary population wise.104 The most important is Quetta, the capital city of the province.105 The North of the province is dense demographically with comparison to

the South and the Centre. 106 Having abundant in mineral resources as well as rich

strategically, lag behind all other provinces of the country in every walk of life, from

development to literacy. 107 The province is rich in minerals like gas, coal, copper,

chromite, oil and gold.108 The major demographic partners in the province are Pashtoons

and Baloch-cum-Brahui.109 The Baloch and Brahui population is slightly bigger than

other ethnic groups. Demographically Balochistan has clear divide between regions. In

comparison to competitive tribes Pashtoons are far ahead in education and business.110

The Strategic Significance

Balochistan has great assets of solid and liquid minerals mostly unexplored. The province

is situated very near to ‘the Strait of Hormuz’ and the shortest nearer route toward

Central Asia. It is blessing for the land-locked countries like Afghanistan. The capital of

the province is Quetta, located in the region of the ‘Sulaiman Mountains’ along with

Bolan Pass. It could be said that the province is the region which was route for all the

conquerors starting from Alexander to Muhammad bin Qasim. The situation continued

till the modern times as the major powers had their own strategic interests in the area.

The great powers evolve competitive strategies and well-thought-out plans; and in

order to achieve the desired objectives, they use small powers for one or many roles. The

great powers seldom use their own soil for objective that may be recipe for conflicts. The

small countries usually used by the Super-Powers to achieve their designed objectives.

Sometimes, it could not perform up to the mark even having the continuous demand of

‘do more’. As a result the small ones become prey between the major powers and lose

their peace and seldom even their integrity. According to an author, “Geo-politics is the

study of the geography of relations between wielders of power, be they rulers of nations

or of transnational bodies.”111

The global situation has transformed drastically over the last few decades. Areas

that were of geographical importance, a few years ago have lost their significance.

During the same period, many insignificant areas have gained strategic importance. For

many years, Balochistan has had a chequered past. Its significance kept changing.

However, it never lost its geo-strategic significance. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan

in 1979 brought Balochistan in limelight. As a result, the national and international

political dynamics of Pakistan had deep impacts and they had also influenced the world

history in the making. Moreover, Balochistan became a firing range as well as sandwich

between the hostile blocks of the world and their allies. Balochistan is distinctive in the

context of its size, coast and approach towards Arabian Sea.

The distinctive geographical location of the province in the back drop of major

sea routes and long strip of border with World’s interest focus areas, i.e. Afghanistan and

Iran.112 “Serious observers of the contemporary scene cannot miss the importance of

certain new, or tainted, geo-political realities vis-à-vis Balochistan which will impinge

upon and help shape the future history of Pakistan and the region.”113 The following

points are important to mention regarding the Balochistan importance.

Gawadar has six hundred km long border and is of prime importance for

Balochistan. Previously it was a part of Oman till 1958. It was purchased by Government

of Pakistan on December 8, 1958. 114 Due to the geo-strategic importance of the area,

Pakistan with the support of China has taken steps to construct a commercial deep-sea

port in 2002. The port has its geo-political and geo-economic importance at international

level. Because of its geography, place it strategically very prominent. It attracts the

international power players and clash of their interests. By the end of twentieth century

the global map of Asia drastically altered because of different wars like Iran-Iraq War,

Russian disintegration as well as Gulf War. After the dismemberment of USSR, Central

Asian Republics (CARs) reemerged and added more importance to the area. Gawadar

may play an important role with defense point of view. Most of the Gulf States consider

it as threat to their interests. Its geo-economic importance has brought it at international

horizon. It is a deep-Sea port with much potential for Pakistan.

Richodek is situated in Chaghi district of Balochistan, has become important at

global level. It has immense mineral treasures, especially gold and copper. These

treasures have cost value of $260 billion. 115 It is bad luck at on the perspective of

Pakistan that it lacks technical expertise for mining, surveying etc. the international

companies working in the area have their vested interests. The area is very much

sensitive due to proximity of Iran and Afghanistan. According to an estimate about ten

billion k.gs coppers and three hundred and seventy k.gs gold exist in the area. 116

The People of Balochistan

The Baloch people have played vital role in the historical development of Iran, Iraq and

Syria. They rendered their services for the defense of those states. The Baloch have been

the warriors who dispel the idea of surrender. The renowned conquerors and rulers like

Ardsher and Nausherwan could not be able to bow the Baloch before them. The Baloch were under constant threats by Arabs in seventh century and in tenth century faced other powers in their neighbourhood.

The period between sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was important for them because they established their powerful states under the Talpurs in Sindh and in the shape of Khanate of Kalat in Balochistan. The warriors from Balochistan like Ahmad Ali and

Hassan Ali had a significant place in the history of Baloch as they annexed the portions of Iran and Iraq challenging the authority of the then Caliph.117 In the context of conflict

with Bawaihid in the shape of Kirman Wars (946A.D and 998A.D), the Baloch rule was

extended up to Kirman, Mekran and Seistan areas which later on, even met with the

destiny of smaller units because of intra-conflicts.

Due to the absence of central authority, warriors in the region troubled the trade

caravans. Even, there was plundering of the representatives of Mahmood Ghaznavi which

was met with iron hand.118 On the other hand, historians mentioned that the Baloch tribal

chiefs were brave enough to meet the external threats with strict hand and were not ready

to be subjugated. However, they were kind and gentle to the guests coming from other

parts of the world.119

Balochistan was not demarked at that time as a single entity, the areas inhabited

by Baloch and Brahui was the land of the Baloch. It was an area between eastern Persia

and the Indus. The present day Balochistan was demarked during the British Raj and the

Phashtoon areas were also included. For defense perspective, they also annexed a huge

Pashtoon area north to Bolan Pass and attached with Quetta Valley taken on lease from

Khan of Kalat. Mir Chakar Khan consolidated the Baloch in the areas of Mekran, Kalat,

Kachhi and Sibi. The period is remembered as Rind-Lashari tribal enmity era which dissolved the Baloch area in to different tribal land.

The original area of the Baloch was comprised of the parts of Iran, Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. According to an estimate the Baloch population throughout the world is almost nine million.120 Approximately half of that is living in Balochistan.

Around forty percent are living in Sindh as well as good numbers of the tribe is settled in

the South Punjab. According to the Baloch oral tradition, the Baloch tribe is descendent

of Hazrat Ameer Hamza Razi-Allah Anhu, the Prophet’s (Peace be upon him) uncle.121

Generally, the Baloch love to live either in mountains or in deserts which provide

them natural defense against any sort of aggression. In the context of custom and

traditions they follow tribal evolved laws. They have their own style of outfits, a large

turban, loose long shirt with open sleeves and a very huge shalwar mostly in white colour. They have their own traditional handy-craft and stitches. The ladies’ dress is very

colourful with minute Baloch needlework. The prominent design of the dress is a long

pocket in the lower part of the dress. The use of glass pieces is also common in the dress.

Most of the Baloch women cover their head with the sarig (a Baloch scarf for woman),

their traditional dress has its historical root, even, at the time of Achaemenid era. The

traditional lullabies of the Baloch mothers to their kids are a strong source of transmitting knowledge since the centuries.122

Other inhabitants of Balochistan are the Brahui, the term has its origin in ancient

Dravidian tradition. 123 The other Dravidian languages existence is in south of India

region.124Academic versions are different about the origin; that Brahui are the remnants

of the Dravidians. Another version is that they migrated from interior of India to

Balochistan in thirteenth century. The third opinion is that they migrated from central

India in early twelve century to Balochistan.125 The cultural resemblance of the Brahui is

with the Baloch and the Sindhis. Major Brahui tribes are; Mengal, Zarakzai, Mirwani,

Bangulzai, Sarparah, Muhammad Shahi, Qambarani, Kurd and Jattak.126

The Brahui language has its traces in Dravidian languages because it has large

vocabulary of Indo-Aryan words. It is mostly spoken in Kalat. It is also popular in some

areas of Iranian Balochistan and Afghanistan. It consists of three dilects, i.e. Jhalawani,

Chaghi and Sarawani. According to the international standards up to 2013 about 4.2

million people speak Brahui and out of them four million reside in Balochistan. This

language has resemblance with Indo-Iranian languages including Persian and Balochi. 127

There are estimated fifty million Pashtoons that inhabit in a larger area across

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pashtoons could never integrate themselves into a state.

The Pashtoonwali is a central element of Pashtoon identity. In Pakistan, Pashtoons are the inhabitants of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Northern Balochistan and Karachi.

Historically, Pashtoon areas remained independent and out of the sphere of the central government. The terrain of these areas is such that it has been difficult for the state law enforcement agencies to access Pashtoon inhibited areas. The hardship intensifies as there was no effective communication system in these areas. Therefore, it has been difficult to maintain law & order in these inaccessible tribal societies. How the law and order be regulated? How the action of the people be controlled for the establishment of peace? And most importantly, how independence be maintained? To answer all these questions Sultan-i-Rome has a simple answer that Pashtoonwali is the code of life of Pashtoons that has the solution to all these problems.128 According to the

1938-39 NWFP border report:

. . . . each tribe has a tribal ‘jirgah’, or representative body of persons with an acknowledged position in the tribe”. . . . “where every man considers himself a member of the tribal jirgah and where the political officer’s task is not completed until he has convinced the last man of a jirgah numbering anything up to three thousand”. ... In Waziristan . . . “almost every head of a household considers himself a member of the tribal jirgah and has no intention of obeying the jirga’s decision unless he happens to agree with it.129 In Jirgah system the decision requires consensus not majority. However, question

arises in the mind of the reader that in the absence of central authority, how the decision

taken by the Jirgah be implemented? The answer is very clear that the force of enforcement will be the society and social pressure, as Barfield wrote that:

When conflicts have escalated and have become very serious, attempts will be made to persuade the parties to accept a negotiated settlement. The local community has no formal means at its disposal, but is dependent on putting social pressure on the parties to accept the negotiated solution.130

The Baloch are consisting of hundreds of different tribes and clans.131 According

to their claim, they belong to Semitic origin. They have common culture, language and

traditions.132 Another point of view reflects:

Though Baloch tribes are different, yet one thing is common that every Baloch has a bold bearing, frank manners and is fairly truthful. He looks on courage as the highest virtue and on hospitality as a sacred duty. He does not barter his honour and self respect with any worldly gain. He is kind and considerate person in friendship but fierce in enmity. His loyalty to the tribe is complete and total.133

The Baloch are having hierarchy within tribe by sub-tribes and clans, 134 out of which forty three tribes and clans are worth-mentioning.135 The Hindu tribes who are

inhabitants of Mari, Bugti Kalat, Mastung, Noshki, Kharan areas are called Tildar.136 The

There is difference of opinion about the Baloch origin.137 Some writers observe that the

Baloch have Semetic origin and other say that they have lineage up to ‘Balus’ who is

popular as Nimrood.138 On the other hand, there are opinions regarding their Turkish,

Aryan or Iranian origin as well.139 There is also a controversy over the meanings of word

‘Baloch’. According to one version Baloch means wanderer because they are nomadic

people.140 Some point out that Baloch is a Persian word. The word ‘Baloch’ means

“tough”. The Balochistan government, in 1990 officially adopted the spelling of Baluch

as Baloch and Baluchistan as Balochistan. Another explanation is that the Baloch is a

Sanskrit word141 Sylvia A Matheson believes that, “Baloch almost have Arab blood probably mixed later with Rajputs and Mahratta. Before the birth of Holy Prophet

(PBUH) Baloch lived in Aleppo (Now in Syria). The presence of Baloch was also

recorded during the time of Naushirwan.”142 According to one tradition that Baloch were

supporters of Imam Hussain (R.A) against Yazid and they were forced to flee to

Kirman.143 Elphnistone believed that Baloch occupied the Mekran at the time of first

Arab invasion in 664 A.D.144 While Ibn-Haukal said in the 10th century that Koch and

Baloch lived in the Iran Zamin bordering Hind and Sind. 145 Many other authorities

believed that Baloch are of Syrian origin or of the Turkoman stock. Firdausi in Shahnama

described that in sixth century Chosroes destroyed the Baloch, whose banner bore the

device of tiger. Because of this tiger motif some believed that they came from the shores

of Caspian. This interpretation is supported by the fact that meaning of the name of many

Baloch tribes is tiger such as Mizari.146

The oldest historical Ballad of genealogies which is known as Daptar Shair147 described that Baloch was the descendant of Holy Prophet’s Uncle Amir Hamza.148 Gul

Khan Naseer rejected this theory and explains that, “it is possible that in old Baloch generations a man in the name of Hamza would have been present which was termed as

Uncle of Holy Prophet (PBUH)”.149 Selig S. Harrison concludes this discussion in these

words:

Ethnically the Baloch are no longer homogeneous, since the original nucleus that migrated from the Caspian has absorbed a variety of disparate groups along the way. Among these “new” Baloch were displaced tribes from Central Asia, driven south word by the Turkish and Mongol invasions from the 10th century through the 13th century, and fugitive Arab factions defeated in intra-Arab war fare.150

The Tribal Structure

The tribal composition of the people is the most noteworthy trait of the region. 151

Pashtoons, Baloch and Brahuis are all knitted into tribal chain.152 The tribal norm is

common in northern and eastern regions. The Mekran area is an exception where tribal

structure is not so hard because of coastal line along with Arabian Sea and close to Oman

and Iran. 153 The tribal norms and design are extra-ordinarily different from other

demographic structures.154

Towards the Political Unification / Identity

Balochistan has been under influence of two dominant empires of Iran and India. The

hegemonies have always tried to put Balochistan under their control. Iran and India could

hold portions of Balochistan and required to provide ‘man and material’ for wars.

However, it remained sovereign most of the time. In this regard Mir Chakar Khan Rind is

of immense importance who consolidated the region in the 14 AD. 155 The region

stretched from Iran to Southern Afghanistan including a lot of areas of Sindh and

Balochistan.156 The area was named as ‘Baluchistan’.157 He established the city of Sibi and made it the capital.158 He was the patron of learning and cultural activities.159 The tribal disputes between Rinds and Lasharies weakened this confederacy.160 Therefore, the first confederacy lasted till the end of 15th Century and Balochistan was divided into three kingdoms namely, the Baloch Confederacy of Mekran, the Baloch Confederacy of Kalat and Derajat. The independence of these confederacies was respected by both Mughals

and the Persians. In fact, Balochistan became a buffer between the two major powers of

Iran and Mughal India.161 The worth-mentioning period for the consolidation of Baloch

power was the eighteenth century when Ameers of Kalat unified the region under a single

entity.162 Mir Abdullah united the Baloch tribes. His Khanate (1714-1734) stretched from

Helmand to Bander Abbas.163

The sixth Khan of Kalat Mir Naseer Khan (1749-94) built the political system for

Baloch state based on tribal governance system.164 He established two houses of the

Baloch Parliament. The upper house was named as Dar-ul-Umara. The members of this house were elected by the tribesmen. The lower house was advisory council nominated by the Khan. The state was governed by a Prime Minister.165 During Ahmad Shah Abdali

era, the Khanate was paying an annual compliment to the Afghan king. However, in 1758

Naseer Khan repudiated to acknowledge the Afgan Suzerainty over Balochistan.166 He

developed the communication system and constructed roads. According to Fred Schloz,

“the territory under his rule achieved the highest stage of development and Kalat reached

its economic and architectural apex.”167 Untill the British advent in 1758; the Khanate was having independent position although it was having military pacts with

Afghanistan.168

The Baloch nationalists consider Naseer Khan’s achievements as an important

symbol of united Baloch political identity.169 In this connection, Ian Talbot observes that

the “Baloch nationalist look to Mir Naseer Khan as an inspiration for independent

statehood in much the same way as Sikh ethno-nationalists marked back to the

achievements of his contemporary, Ranjit Singh”.170

The Baloch Rulers

An important era in the history of Balochistan is the Rind period. It stretches through the tale of rise, starting of disintegration tendencies which resulted into absolute fall. The period has its glorious impact on the Baloch mind because after almost two thousand years they got something to be proud of. The history of Baloch has been marked by chaos and confusion, war and woes, decay and degeneration in an alien land, Iran, from Media to Seistan. Since centuries, the Baloch remained migrating in search of food and fortune, peace and prosperity. They neither recognized nor were recognized by any state or politics. They remained away from civilizations and had to dwell in barren, lifeless, unheard-of and uninhabited parts of Persia. The Persian never endeavored for the love and loyalty of the Baloch. They were considered as outlaws, whereas, the Baloch considered the Iranian as oppressors and tyrants.

Almost the precious seventy years of the Baloch history reflects the charm of Mir

Chakar’s able leadership.171 He brought a huge territory under his control which was

comprised of the area from Mekran to Sibi. He was a true portrait of pure traits and

characteristics of the Rinds in particular and the Baloch in general. Almost all the

succeeding notable poets have adorned Chakar and the Rind influence. The 19th century

famous Rind poet of Mekran, Mulla Fazil, feels proud while stating in one of his verses

that “he belongs to the proud progeny of Chakar”.172 The beginning of the fifteenth

century witnessed a huge migration of the race from Bampur to Kech valley in Mekran.

The migration was led by Amir Shaihak Rind who was a descendent of Amir Jala Khan.

The Rind domination acted as the centre of gravity of the entire race and, therefore,

various Baloch tribes flocked towards the region. The system of governance at that time

was feudalism. By the 1500 AD, Mir Chaker Khan consolidated power in the Baloch

areas, i.e. Kalat, Mekran, Sibi and Kachi. The skirmishes between Lashar and Rind tribes

were ignored by the historians. Due to the wars, Kalat was divided into smaller factions,

which were controlled by tribal chiefs.

The Lashari-Rind power met their decline about 1512 AD. Due to which the

Baloch Kingdom split into many independent states, i.e. Mekran, Derajat and Kalat. The

era of anarchy ended when Mir Ahmad Khan Ahmadzai founded the Khanate in 1666

AD.173 It was indeed a mile stone in the history of Baloch. Abdullah Khan (1718-1734)174 as well as Naseer Khan the Great (1749-1794) also played their role in the consolidation.175

The Kalat has its own uniqueness in the context of unifying all the Baloch regions

of the time.176 It was consisted upon not only just Kalat but also Mekran, Seistan, Lasbela

and Derajat. The shape of the Khanate was a confederacy with a sort of central authority.

It not only presented a platform for the Baloch unity but also an unwritten constitution in

the shape of Dastur/ Rawaj. Though it was Khanate of Balochistan but because of the

capital city got popularity as Khanate of Kalat. Initially, it was tiny state or confederacy

just consisted of Kalat and the surrounding areas. In 1666, Mir Ahmad First had become

elected Khan by the constituency of jirga. 177 Though, as in all tribal confederations the

inner fabric was fragile because of the presence of many mini-power centres, yet it provided a central power hub. The immediate reason was the fall of Rind-Lashari confederacy. 178 Mir Ahmad First’s era was the period of expansion in the history of

Khanate.

The eighteenth century saw the Khanate as consolidated entity. Abdullah Khan

took its expansion to higher level. At time it consisted upon the areas starting from

Khuzdar to Afghanistan, Mekran to Bander Abbas and even till the Dera Ghazi Khan in

the Punjab. 179 The golden period is of Naseer Khan, who was having dynamism of a

class and simultaneously got the height of popularity in the minds of Baloch. 180 He

expanded the border of Khanate up to Karachi and envisaged most of the area of Iran

where the Baloch live. Masson narrates:

At an early period he consolidated his authority over an immense kingdom, the secret of his success being that he had influence enough to ensure the obedience of his feudal chiefs, and discretion enough to- refrain from interfering in their internal affairs.181

Naseer Khan had a strong Army to consolidate the whole area. His Khanate was

comprised of Quetta, Marri–Bugti areas, Kharan, Mekran as well as Lasbela.

Furthermore, he also revived the Baloch claim on Baloch areas in Iran and even,

occasionally, used to send expeditions as well. His state was bigger than the Great

Britain with Ireland, because it comprised of the areas; Karachi to the border of Iran and

Quetta to Derajat. He did not interfere in to traditional norms of the Baloch social fabric.

One can consider his Khanate as a state on the blueprints of the Rind-Lashari Union. The

system was “devolution of power” based. The Sardars were almost autonomous, except

to show allegiance, pay some sort of revenue and to provide contingents of warriors at the time of warlike situations. He has a status of an inventor, because he originated the concept of ‘Tribal Army’ in Baloch tradition known as Lashkar. It was because of his exposure of Afghan and Persian pattern of defense. He initiated the concept of ‘Standing

Army, at his capital called Dasta-i-Khas , which comprised of twelve hundred personnels

in peace time and more than ten thousand at warlike situation. He also established two

new divisions named Sarawan Lashkar and Jhalawan Lashkar. He was not just the Khan

but in his own right the Commander in Chief as well. He is considered as the most

‘powerful Khan’ among the rest of all Khans of Kalat. 182

The death of Naseer Khan-I in 1817183 was proved as a bad sign for the Khanate.

It can be said that it was the starting point of downfall, though it dragged till the British

arrival. His successor Muhammad Khan (1794-1817) had the blessing being born with a

silver spoon in his mouth. Therefore, he administered the huge state incompetently.

Within a year he lost a lot. The Derajat was occupied by the Afghans, Kech area was also

challenged the Khan in revenue denial terms. The Karachi fell down in the lap of Talpurs.

Furthermore, the Sardars in the western side declared themselves as independent rulers.

By the beginning of nineteenth century, Afghanistan was facing ‘civil war’ sort situation.

The Iran consolidated her power and Punjab was having strong rule of Ranjit Singh. So the major source of income in shape of war booty by attacking Mughal India, Sindh and parts of Iran disrupted. The British got the opportunity in 1810 to send ‘adventurers’ to initiate anarchy and chaos.184

Ahmad Yar Khan succeeded his father Azam Jan on September 9, 1933. He was

in favour of Independent Balochistan. Inspired by the Baloch Nationalists, he became a

reformer e.g. he abolished begar as well as improved education and judiciary. There was

a drastic change in budget allocation in education sector.185 The Baloch were given

priority in services. The major development was the establishment of press at Kalat. 186

The infrastructure was given special focus; towns to ports roads were improved. So the economic activity was raised. In the context of his plan for independence, he sent Magsi

as his assignee to the Britain to negotiate on return of ‘leased areas’ to the Khanate and

also the sovereignty in black and white. Some consider that travel as conspiracy against

the Baloch nationalist movement. 187

The British Intervention and Colonial Rule

In 1830, the British became concerned about Russian expansion in central Asia. They

wanted a co-operative ruler in Afghanistan. 188 In this regard Balochistan became a

strategically important for them.189 British adopted a policy that was executed in two phases. The first phase extended from (1839 to 1876) and second phase consisted of

(1876-1947).190

The British desired for a secure route from Sindh to Kandahar for their Army, in

first period (1830-1876). In this regard, the British and Khan of Kalat signed a treaty in

1838.191 However, this treaty was not honoured by the local tribes.192 British suspected

that Mehrab Khan conspired with tribes. Therefore, they undertook a punitive action

against Kalat.193 A contingent was sent to assault the Khanate.194 Mehrab Khan refused to

surrender and was killed in the battle. After this, Balochistan came under British rule.195

The British appointed Shah Nawaz Khan on Khanate of Kalat. Soon after, there was a revolt against him and tribes selected Naseer Khan II for Khanate. The British accepted

Naseer Khan as ruler of Kalat. During the 1st phase which was termed as punitive phase,

Kalat affairs were controlled through Sindh. Sir John Jacob Chief Commissioner of Sindh

(1783-1856) declared that if the Baloch chiefs seek peace, they should be admitted only

on unconditional surrender.196 He adopted a Close Border Policy or Sindh System which

produced a continual disorder.197 Despite this, the British Commissioner of Sindh was

reluctant to abandon Close Border Policy. The military confrontation of British with

tribes was frequent. Continued resistance and revolts finally forced the British to accept

the failure of Close Border Policy. Sandeman was sent as the First Agent to Governor

General to Balochistan due to having experience of tackling the Baloch in the Punjab.198

Then, the second phase of British relations with Balochistan started (1876-1947)

which was marked by peace. 199 Sandman was authorized to mediate the differences between the Khans and the Sardars. In 1876 an agreement was signed which is known as

Mastung Agreement.200 According to this agreement, the British began finally got a foothold in Balochistan.201

The first objective of the British was to pacify the Baloch Sardars in order to have

secure travelling, protection of passages and ways, enhancement of British influence without engaging much Army and to have control over the areas which were having strategic importance.202 For this purpose Sandman exploited the tribal elders through

financial support, offering executive positions and conferring upon titles. He also

persuaded the Sardars by facilitating them in getting extraordinary positions. Another

important step taken by Sandeman was to introduce ‘Jirga system’ to settle the differences and recognized ‘Levy system’ as an alternate of police. He also exploited tribal feuds in the favour of government through the dominate Sardars. In this way they have not used Army to achieve their objectives in the region.203

Nina Swidler criticized both the policies of British in these words, “Both policies

produce major deformation in the Khanate, close border ignored the Sardars while

forward policy undermined the authority of Khan”. 204 During the second phase

Balochistan was demarcated between Afghanistan and Iran. The British Balochistan and

Afghanistan were sharing eight hundred miles border which was demarcated between the

both the countries in two years.205 On the other hand, the boundary demarcated between

British Balochistan and Iran is called Goldsmid Line.206

Occupied Area

The tribesmen of the region intercepted the movement of the British Indian force named

as ‘Army of the Indus’, toward Afghanistan in 1939, via Bolan Pass and other routes in

Balochistan. Keeping in view the situation, the British started thinking seriously to get

direct command in the region. It was the commencement of their involvement in

Balochistan, a step which would permanently transform the destiny of that barren

boundary. Javed Haider Syed describes:

On the eve of the British advent, the social and economic infrastructure of Balochistan represented almost all characteristics of a desert society, such as isolation, group feeling, chivalry, hospitality, tribal enmity and animal husbandry. There was hardly any area in Balochistan that could be considered an urban settlement. Even the capital of the state of Kalat looked like a conglomeration of mud dwellings with the only royal residence emerging as a symbol of status and power.207

The Leased Areas

Had Mehrab followed Ranjit Singh and signed a settlement with the Amir of

Afghanistan208the future course of events would have been different. However, gradually,

the British immersion augmented and they achieved and reinforced their control over

Balochistan through further agreements, military missions and maneuverings. Now there

was barely any option for the Khan to look for. The British signed an agreement with the

Khan on March 28, 1839 to give safe way to the Army of Indus towards Kandahar.209

Akhund Mohammad Hasan210 differed with the option. The Khan was also not happy on

the terms of the agreement.211 The Army of Indus was attacked by the tribes of Kachhi and Bolan when it was underway through Bolan Pass, It was assumed that Akhund

Mohammad Hasan was behind the ambush. It was considered by the British that Mir

Mehrab Khan, Khan of Kalat (1817-1839) was responsible for the violation of the

agreement. The British forces during their journey back from Kandahar attached Kalat

under the command of General Wilshire. The Khan was deposed212; Mehrab Khan got

martyrdom in fighting bravely with the British, on November 13, 1839, thus Kalat fell

down to the British. In fact Akhund Mohammad Hasan was spying for the British to take

revenge of the removal of his father as vizier.

Under the terms of new treaty, The Khan was recognized as self-governing ruler

with the condition to be friendly to the British friends and enemy to the enemies. 213

Though the detail was not enclosed yet it was clear like a sunny day light that the Khan would act as a sort of subordinate. In lieu of that The Khan got assured of annual grant of fifty thousand rupees and military support in case of any attack on the Kalat. The agreement was penned down at Mastung and the authority of the Khan was again accepted. 214 “In 1854, when war was anticipated between England and Russia, to strengthen the position on the frontier, a fresh treaty was made.” A British source reflects.215 In 1862, the treaty was strengthened more after the announcement of defined

borders between Balochistan and British India and Kalat got the status of an adjacent

state of India.

The other clause with sub-clauses explained; firstly, directly controlled areas

secondly, Native states and thirdly, the tribal areas. Under the first category, the aquired

areas include; some areas taken on lease from the Khan, tribal areas from where revenue

was levied. It included; the eastern portion of the Quetta tehsil, Chagai and Zhob Political

Agencies with some other areas like Bolan Pass. 216 The areas around Railway line

including northern boundary with north-eastern curve were also under the direvt control

of the British. “The remainder of the territory belongs to the native states of Kalat

(including Mekran and Kharan) and Lasbela. Tribal areas, in the possession of the Marri

and Bugti tribes”217

By 1877 the Cantonment of Quetta, which became Head Quarter (HQ), was

occupied by the British. After the passing of two years, the District Administration was

also occupied by the British ceremonially on behalf of the Khan of Kalat. The vague

demand by Afghanistan regarding Sibi and Pishin became null and void because of the

Gandamak Treaty in 1879. As the result of Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-1881 the vast

territory, i.e. Pishin, Sharodi, Duki, Sibi, and Shahrag were handed over to the British by

1887 and the area was declared as ‘British Balochistan’.218

The then shape of Kalat Administration was altered by the Sandeman expedition

towards Kharan in 1883. Azad Khan, the Chief of Naushirwani Tribe had reunion with

Khan of Kalat. The year 1883 was significant as the Khan handed over the important

districts of Quetta and Bolan to the British on rent of just twenty five thousand and thirty

thousand rupees respectively. Furthermore, Loralai and Barkhan were also come under

the direct control of British in the years 1886-1887. The journey of occupation continued

as the British authority envisaged Zhob and Kakar Khurasan areas in 1889, Chagai and

Sinjrani areas by 1896. Naushki was taken over from the Khan on annual rent of just nine

thousand rupees in 1899 and in 1903 Nasirabad, on annual rent of one hundred and

seventeen thousand five hundred rupees.

The Communication System

The British Government committed to pay twenty thousand five hundred rupees annually

to the Khan of Kalat to establish and maintain development and security along the trade

routes in the region. By the demise of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Ruler,

the Khan of Kalat Mir Khudadad Khan got an opportunity to strengthen his position at

Kalat and even for the purpose he offered to the ruler of Kandhar to annex the Quetta

Valley. The British had also rationalized that for the best of their interest the Khan must

be strong upon the Sardars. If the situation would be vice versa the Khan had to seek

assistance from any power. The solution sorted by the British of the situation was

sizeable presence of the troops in the area for not only strengthening the Khan over the

Sardars but also to keep aware of the activities of the Kalat establishment. In 1876, the

British occupied Quetta completely by signing a treaty called ‘Treaty of Kalat’ which

included; a permanent British Resident at Kalat with the authority to settle disputes

among Khan and Sardars as well as to construct the means of communication where

deemed fit.

The treaty was a compulsion rather than an agreement, imposed by Sandeman, the

AGG. The future course of relationship reflected the impulsions; it was also reflected through the letter of John Jacob to the Viceroy which discloses that “we should continue to exert such influence which is absolutely necessary and it would neither be advisable

nor necessary to assume, in these respects, greater power, either in nature or extent than

we now virtually possess or exercise.”219

By then the British had consolidated their hold in the area as reflected by the

treaty that they were in domination status in affairs of Kalat. The Sardars were given

extra-weightage to create equilibrium with the Khan. Therefore, both had been exploited

when the situation required. In the aftermath of the treaty, control of the British was

tightened more by installing Telegraph and Railway Lines. Sandeman 220 due to his

services regarding the British expansion in Balochistan and particularly in the erection of

the cantonment at Quetta elevated as Agent to the Governor General (AGG), the amount

given to the Khan of Kalat was also enhanced to rupees thirty thousand per annum.

Therefore, the British influence increased manifold and the Khan’s authority was further

curtailed and Balochistan was declared as an Agency of the British Indian Government

on February 21, 1877.221 The British policy in Balochistan must be understood through

the prism of situation in Afghanistan. As the province was the shortest way to the Central

Asia and Afghanistan, therefore, the British policy in the context of Balochistan was

shaped. The strategic location of the area increased the interest of the British in the

backdrop of ‘Great Game’.

The British expansion in Balochistan squeezed the sphere of influence of the

Khan as well as Sardars, because both sides of their territories were controlled by the

British. Gradually, properly gagged Railways were extended up to Chaman through

remarkable tunnels constructed through Bolan Pass. All the developments were having

important place in the backdrop of Forward Policy, which was opted by the British “….

Balochistan thus became the first point of advance in the pursuit of Forward Policy.”222

The British clutches were further tightened by the dawn of twentieth century. As

they secured their borders with Afghanistan and Iran as well as stream lined their Military

Caravan Routes. Even then the Khan was important for them as reflected in a

memorandum; “… this would secure not only our borders of Sindh and the Punjab

against the inroads of Baloch robbers, and the plunder of travelers and merchants to and

from our territories to Central Asia but also to the protection of India itself against the

possible dangers from the direct or stimulated advance of Persia.”223 On the other hand

the British Resident at Kalat was of the opinion that the Khan would have been given

more subsidies to achieve further goals in the region.224

The British Occupation and Baloch Nationalism

From British point of view the Sandeman system was a great success for peaceful penetration. 225 But it is a fact that all Baloch never submitted to the British till

independence.226 The Baloch often rose against British rule. There were revolts in north

east and central Balochistan in 1897-98 and in 1901, in Bampur and Dizak in 1897-1900

and in Kalat in 1907. Those risings continued in 1915, 1916, 1925, 1927 and in 1928.227

Jan Muhammad rightly says, “Baloch continued their resistance in their own peculiar way throughout the British period of hegemony and never allowed the alien influences to pervade their society”.228 But all those sacrifices were fruitless because of the lack of a

revolutionary organization which did not emerge due to prevalent tribal system and

feudalism.229

The Baloch nationalist increased their exertions after World War I, to attain unity

among the people and to work to get an independent Balochistan.230 In 1920 Mir Abdul

Aziz Kurd and Mir Yousaf Aziz Khan Magsi initiated a political movement in

Balochistan and announced the formation of Anjuman-i-Itthad Balochistan.231 At first its

activities remained underground; it was formally launched in 1933.232 The Anjuman was transformed to the Kalat State National Party in February 1937. The party endlessly fought against the Sardari system and thrived in revising many political injustices.233 The party enlisted educated young Baloch and employees of the state. The party convinced the Khan to eliminate number of taxes imposed on tribes by Sardars.234 The National

Party in its manifesto declared its objective to unite Baloch people under one platform.235

The party was controlled by the more secular inclined anti-imperialist and mainstream people; Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Naseer, Abdul Aziz Kurd and most of the other party leaders as well by temperament and practice were more fascinated by Abul Kalam

Azad and like-minded personalities, who supported a secular federal united India rather than the Muslim league point of view. Majority of the Ulema in Balochistan were graduated from a seminary of Deoband. Some among them like Maulvi Irz Muhammad and Maulvi Muhammad Umar were nationalist and part of National Party. All overf th

India Deoband Ulema excessively opposing Muslim League. 236 This shows the real fact

that why opposition emerged in Kalat state on question of accession with Pakistan in

1947.

On July 20, 1939 National Party was declared illegal within the boundaries of

Kalat state and its active leaders Malik Abdul Rahim Khawaja Khel, Abdul Karim

Shorish and Gul Khan Naseer etc. were exiled from Kalat. The party established its head

Quarter at Quetta.237 During World War II all political activities were barred. After

World War II Party leadership resolved to be part of Indian National Congress indirectly

through its subsidiary i.e. All India States Peoples Conferenc e.Its leaders participated in

the conferences conducted at Jodhpur, Jaipur and Delhi where they discussed the

problems of Balochistan.238

Accession to Pakistan

In March, 1945 the Khan assigned Samad Khan239to take up the case of Kalat with the Congress leadership. It is assumed that the Khan intended to accede with India in

1947 but Jawaharlal Nehru did not agree and returned the accession papers. In the situation Bizenjo, who was heading Kalat State National Party visited Delhi to discuss the future status of Kalat with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Azad was of the view that it would be difficult for Kalat to be independent because it had to ask the British for protection, which could cause danger to the independence of remaining India. That was the reason; India did not accept the inclusion.

In that backdrop, on March 27, 1948, All India Radio (AIR) covered a press talk by VP Menon240who declared that the Khan was insisting India accession of Kalat, he

further opined that India was least interested in the matter. By disappointment on the

report, the Khan refuted the allegation and said in a communiqué:

On the night of March 27, All India Radio, Delhi announced that two months ago Kalat State had approached the Indian Union to accept its accession to India and that the Indian Union had rejected the request…It had never been my intention to accede to India…It is, therefore, declared that from 9 pm on March 27th – the time when I heard the false news over the air, I forthwith decide to accede to Pakistan, and that whatever differences now exist between Kalat and Pakistan be placed in writing before Mr. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan, whose decision I shall accept.241

It was reported that the Khan asked Jinnah to start negotiations for the accession

of Kalat to Pakistan. Subsequently, the Khan242 took decision to accede in 1948 with

Pakistan on the perusal of Jinnah. It was decided that defense, foreign office, currency

and finance will be with the federal government control. Jinnah died in 1948, the

situation changed and further transformed into the formation of One-Unit in 1955 and

Kalat merged into Pakistan and the last Khan was formally removed from his powers,

243though the title is still used unofficially by his offspring. Currently Mir Suleman

Dawood Khan has the title. 244

Balochistan inherited by Pakistan was comprised of two sorts of areas; British

Balochistan and the Balochistan States Union. In fact British Balochistan was a strip sort

in between Afghanistan and NWFP. It also created a gap between Baloch tribal Srdars

and their tribes and the territory divided between them having several levels of

sovereignty. Balochistan States Union was consisted of four princely states of

Balochistan, three of those feudatories; Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela; had surfaced as

different political entities by 1947, and with Kalat of course made it a union. The position

of them was slightly additional than tribes, but fewer than states.

In the Cabinet Mission as well as according to June 3, 1947 Partition Plan the

status of Baloch States was maintained. The State of Kalat was provided the choice to

merge with Pakistan or India under Partition Plan. The authorities preferred to hold

referendum about the future of British Balochistan and other states.

The 1947 Plan for the partition of India retained the autonomous status of the

Baloch states. The Partition Plan aimed to divide British India into two sovereign states,

namely India and Pakistan. The Plan gave the option to the Princely States including

Kalat to either merge with India or Pakistan. Referendum was conducted to determine the

fate of British Balochistan and other tribal areas. Jamal Khan Leghari, the Chief of Dera

Ghazi Khan opted for merging his area with Kalat.

Pakistan and the British Both accepted the sovereignty of Kalat state. On July

30, 1947, Jinnah declared that he would follow the policy of non-interference towards

autonomous states including Kalat. The Tripartite Agreement between Balochistan,

Pakistan and the British on August 4, 1947 accepted the sovereign status of Balochistan.

It also agreed that Kalat will be declared independent as its earlier status was.245

In accordance to the Standstill Agreement, on August 12, 1947, Khan affirmed the independence of Balochistan. The Khan at the occasion dreamed for a peaceful and flourishing Balochistan. The Khan wanted to realize the Baloch to maintain their identity and traditions. The Khan declared that Kalat will be independent state and would have unconstrained control on its internal and external matters on August 11, 1947.246 On

August 15, 1947 a formal declaration of independence of Kalat was announced. The

national flag of Balochistan was notified. It had green and red colours.247

The Khan promulgated Kalat State Act 1947. According to this supreme law, the Khan became the highest and absolute ruler of the state. He designated Muhammad

Aslam Khan as his Prime Minister and Capt. D. Fell as the foreign minister of the state.

The constitution declared a bi-cameral parliament; Dar-ul- Umara (the House of Tribal

Chiefs or upper house) and the Dar-ul -Awam (the House of Commons, or lower

House).248

The elections held under the constitution in which the KSNP won thirty nine out

of fifty one seats in the Dar-ul -Awam. That was considered as a great success of

democratic activism in Balochistan. The activists worked incessantly for the

independence of Balochistan. The Prime Minister met with the British officers to raise

the issue of leased areas. However, the meeting reaped no result. Afterwards, on the

invitation of Jinnah the Khan visited Karachi to discuss the future relations of Khanate

with Pakistan. The accession of Kalat to Pakistan remained the sole agenda.249

The Khan presented the proposal of accession in the State’s Parliament. The

proposal was debated in the successive sessions of Dar-ul-Awam. The nationalist leaders

who were in majority rejected the proposal.250 The Prime Minister communicated the democratic decision of the parliament to Jinnah. Nonetheless, Jinnah wrote a letter to

Khan for accession of Kalat and visited Sibi on February 12, 1948. After the meeting, the

Khan blamed that Jinnah has an unfriendly policy towards the Khanate.251

Pakistan by using the old enmities among the Khan of Kalat and rulers of the

subordinate states of Lasbela, Mekran and Kharan achieved its goals.

Jam of Lasbela and the Nawab of Kharan appeared with the patronage of Pakistan

in 1948. They hurriedly annexed their states to Pakistan unconnectedly to Kalat state.

After losing these territories, Kalat was isolated by losing its connection with Iran and

access to the Arabian Sea. What to Mekran.

Ultimately, merger document was signed by the Khan on March 27, 1948

unconditionally with Pakistan. 252 Khan tried to justify the decision on the plea that

otherwise the very existence of Pakistan was at risk. The Khan had no right to take

unilateral decision without the consultation and the approval of State Assembly under the constitution of the Baloch Confederacy. Pakistan got absolute power in Balochistan on

August 15, 1948 and consequently, the legal entity of Khanate was abolished for good.

References & Notes

1The rule of British East India Company. 2Muntzra Nazir, Federalism in Pakistan : Early Years (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 2008), p.55. 3Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969) p.44. 4Waheed-uz-Zaman, Towards Pakistan (Lahore: Publisher United, 1989), p.17. 5Mehrunsia Ali, Politics of Federalism, p. 27. 6Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Federalism in Pakistan: Theory and Practice (Islamabad, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1994), p.34. 7Ibid., p. 29. 8Javed Haider Syed, “Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Acession to Pakistan” in Pakistan Journal of History and Culture,pp.29-52,Vol.XXIX, No. 2, July-December 2008, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p.33. 9Safdar Mehmood, Muslim League ka Dour-i-Hukumat ( Lahore: Jang Publishers,2002), p.19. 10Saeed ud din Ahmad Dar, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1998), p.11. 11George Dunbar, A History of India: From Earliest Times to 1939, Vol. II, (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1943), p. 236. 12 The lists were; central, provincial and concurrent. The Government of India Act 1935, Schedule 7, Section 100 & 104. 13Golam W Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (Islamabad: Allama Iqbal Open University, 1983) p.188. 14 Craig Baxter “Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan” in Asian Survey, December, 1974, 14:12, p.1075. 15 Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1961). P.115. 16K.K. Aziz, Making of Pakistan: AStudy in Nationalism (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1967), p.53. 17Jamil-ud-din Ahmad (ed),Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Sh. Mohammad Ashraf,1968), Vol.I.p.529. 18 Sharif al Mujahid, Idealogical Foundations of Pakistan (Islamabad: Shariah Academy, IIUI, 1999) p.77. 19 Sayed Jaffar Ahmad, Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1990), pp.32-33. 20Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, p. 232. 21Khalid Bin Saeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase, p.43. 22 Kannan Srinivasan, “Afghanistan and Imperial Choice” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 18, No. 25 pp. 1096-1098 (Jun. 18, 1983), p.1097. 23Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan (Stuttgart: Steineerverlage Wiesbaden-GMBH, 1987), p.101. 24Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p.102. 25Ibid, p. 103. 26Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (New York: Carneige Endowment for international Peace, 1981) p.18. 27 Martin Axman, Back to the Future Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955), (Karachi: Oxford University Press), p.22. 28 Harrison, In Afghanistan, p.16. 29 Martin Axman, Back to the Future p.22.

30 Khan was in favour of feudalism and Sardars were agreed to change it any other mode having same authority. Harrison, In Afghanistan, p.16. 31 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Search light on Baloch and Balochistan (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1985), p. 241. 32 The advent of 19th century brought certain important changes in the Sub-Continent, i.e. the French threats, Napoleon policies, Russian designs, Tipu’s demise and Company’s North-Western designs to counter Russia. 33 A.B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process: (London: New Century Publisher, 1985),p. 62. 34Ibid,p.54. 35Ibid, p.66. 36 N. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.35. 37 The Closed Border Policy was just to intact the already occupied areas and to consolidate and develop infrastructure to be more strengthened to protect the Raj territory. 38 The Forward Policy means to advance and occupy tactfully as followed by Sandeman in the case of Balochistan. 39 Syed Fakharuddin Shah “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakeng and Merger” Global Journal of Human Social Sciences, pp.2230. Volume 13 Issue 6 Version 1.0 Year 2013, p.26. 40Baloch, The Problem, p.141. 41Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p.141. 42 The Sandeman devised a policy of taming the tribal chiefs through diplomacy and to reduce their dependency upon the Khan and their tribes as well. Axmann, Back to the Future, p.33. 43 Crispin Bates and Marina Carter, Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 (New Delhi : SAGE Publications, 2017), p.178. 44Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p.33. 45 Seemi Naghmana Tahir, Balochistan mein Ablagh-i-Aama: Aghaz-o-Irtaqa, 1888-2005 (Islamabad: Muqtadira Qaumi Zaban Pakistan, 2006), p.162. 46Awan, Balochistan, p.164. 47 Akhtar Ali Khan Baloch, Balochistan ki Namwar Shakhsiyat (Urdu), Vol. II (Karachi: Royal Book Company,1995 ), p.7. 48Javed Haider Syed, “Balochistan: The Origin and Development of Political Parties” in Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, pp.105-130, Vol.44, No. 1, July 2007, University of the Punjab, Lahore, p.108. 49Axmann, Back to the Future, p.146 50Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, pp.17-18. 51 Taj Muhammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism to Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p.208. 52Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion (Quetta: Gosha-e-Abad, 1988), p. 170 53At that time Shah Shams was Prime Minister of Kalat. See, Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, p.151. 54Axmann, Back to the Future, p151. 55 Pervez Ahmed, Shazia Jaffar, Muhammad Zakir and Waheed Razzaq “Political Movements in Balochistan their Achievements and Losses: A case study from 1920 to 1948”, Journal of Education & Humanities Research, pp.33-46, Institute of Education and Research (IER), University Of Balochistan, Quetta Pakistan VOL.I.NO 1, 2016 p.40. 56Syed, “Balochistan: The Origin and Development of Political Parties”, p.112. 57Ibid, p.113. 58Axmann, Back to the Future, p.151. 59 Ibid. 60 Akhtar Ali Khan Baloch, Balochistan ki Namwar Shakhsiyat, Vol.2, (Urdu), (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), p.7. 61Ibid, p.10. 62Awan, Baluchistan, p.165.

63Axmann, Back to the Future, p.165. 64 Syed Fakhar uddin Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger”, Volume 13, Issue 6, 2013, Global Journal of Human Social Science, p.26. 65 Like Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Muhammad Hussain Anqa and Gul Khan Nasir. 66Ibid, p. 153. 67 Himayatullah Yaqubi, “Leftist Politics in British India: A Case Study of the Muslim Majority Provinces”, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I,pp. 63-98, Islamabad, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2013,p p.89-91. 68 Ibid. 69Awan, Baluchistan, p.165. 70Axmann, Back to the Future, p.165. 71Syed Sharifud din Pirzada, (eds.) Foundation of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents: 1906- 1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970), p. 280. 72Ian Talbat, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), PP. 117-118. 73Awan, Baluchistan, p. 166. 74Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement in Balochistan, (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan, 1980) p.31. 75 They were; Nawab Muhammad Khan Jogezai and Mir Jafar Khan Jamali. 76Awan, Baluchistan, p. 169. 77 The agreement took place between Mehrab Khan and the British government. Naseer Dashti , The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State (Victoria: Trafford Publishers, 2012),p.209. 78 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), pp.268-269. 79Axmann, Back to the Future, p.177. 80Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, pp. 174-175. 81 Inam-ul-Haq Kausar, Balochistan Mein Tarikhi Referendum 1947: Pasmanzar-Peshmanzar (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Hamd Publications, 2013), p.91. 82Axmann, Back to the Future, pp.197-198. 83 They were; A.B Awan, Inam-ul-Haq Kausar and Syed Abdul Quddus . 84Ibid, p.223. 85Sultan Ahmad attended the meeting as the Legal Advisor of the state of Kalat. For details see, Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch The Khan of Kalat (Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p.147. 86 H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969),p.370. 87 Awan, Baluchistan, p. 206. 88Axmann, Back to the Future, pp.231-232. 89 Iqbal Chawla, “Prelude to the Accession of the Kalat State to Pakistan in 1948: An Appraisal”, pp.81- 106, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Vol. 49, No. 2, July – December, 2012, University of the Punjab, Lahore, . p.14. 90 Ibid, 15. 91 Syed Abdul Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1990),p.1. 92 Akram Mirani, Religious Tolerance in Balochistan Myth and Reality (Lahore: Minority Right Commission of Pakistan, 2003), p.14. 93 Aijaz Ahmad, “The National Question In Balochistan” In Dr. Feroz Ahmad ed. Focus On Balochistan And Pushtoon Question. (Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975),p.6. 94 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.23. 95 Akram Miran, p.14. 96 M.K. Pekoleen,, Baloch. Trans, Dr. Shah Muhammad Marri, (Lahore: Takhliqat, 1995), p.23. 97 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.23. 98 Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi: Royal Book company, 1975), p.11. 99 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.25. 100 Ibid. 101 Quoted in, Oskar Hermann Khristian and Andrew Thomas Amos Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (London: Methuen, 1967), p.482.

102 Nina Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”, in Paul Titus ed. Marginality and Modernity Ethnicity and Change in Post Colonial Balochistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996),p.171. 103 Qazi Shakil Ahmad, “Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions” Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. 58, No. 2, April 2005, p.27. 104 Ibid. 105 A. G. Boycot, The Elements of Imperial Defence: A Study of the Geographical Features, Materials Resources, Communications, and Organization of the British Empire (Gale & Polden: The University of California, 1939), p.232. 106 Ibid. 107 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.172. 108 Sivita Pande, Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Pakistan (Kolkata, Maulana Abdul Kalam. Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p.47. 109 Ahmad, “Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions”, p.29. 110 According to the federal government official source i.e. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics under the title of Population by Mother Tongue Balochistan has just 29.64 percent population is Pushtoon where as 54.76 percent is Baloch. www.pbs.gov.pk/content/papulation-mother-tongue, last updated on March 2, 2017. 111 Quoted in, Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992),p.xiii. 112 Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, Umbreen Javaid and Naheed S. Goraya, “Balochistan: From Strategic Significance to US Involvement”, in Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, pp.113:127, Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2012), p.117. 113 Ahmad, Balochistan, pp.248-249. 114 Mazhar, Umbreen and Goraya, “Balochistan: From Strategic Significance to US Involvement”, p.117. 115 Ibid, p. 118. 116 Express, Karachi, January, 20, 2011. 117 Mir Khuda Baksh Marri, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1997), p.125. 118Masud Ghaznavi, the son of Mahmood Ghaznavi attacked the robbers killing forty and capturing the same number. Later on, after another incident a caravan of poisoned apples was sent to the region due to which a lot of robbers were assassinated. Ibid, p.142. 119 Jugdep S. Chima, Ethnic Sub-nationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, Interests and Challenges to State Authority (London: Routledge, 2015), p.125. 120 Vidya Prakash Tyagi, Martial Races of Undivided India (Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2009), pp.10- 15. 121 Hazrat Ameer Hamza R.A. was uncle of Hazrat Muhammad Sallahu Alaihi Wa Salum and his descendents migrated to Seistan from Allepo after Karbala incident. However, some historians trace their lineage to the Aryans. Ibid. 122 Javed Haider Syed, “The Baloch Resistance Literature Against the British Raj”, in Pakistan Journal of History & Culture, pp.75-94, Vol.XXVIII, No.1, 2007, pp. 83-94. 123 Denys Bray, The Brahui Language, an Old Dravidian Language Spoken in Parts of Baluchistan and Sind: Grammar (Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1986), p.25. 124 Ibid., p.26. 125 Ibid., p.28. 126 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.29. 127 Abdul Farid Brohi, Barhui Zaban Mein Islami Adab, (Urdu) (Quetta: Brahui Academy Pakistan, 2013), p.50. 128 For details see, Sultan-i-Room, Pakhtu: The Pakhtun Code of Life, p. 5. 129Report on the Administration on the Border of the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1938-39 (Delhi: The Manager of Publications, 1940), pp.11-13. 130 Barfield, Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions, p.10. 131 Justice (R) Mir Kuda Baksh Marri, Search Light on Balochis and Balochistan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, n.d.), p.1. 132 Ibid. 133 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.95.

134 Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Balochistan in the light of old and Modern History (Urdu) (Quetta: Gosha-e- Adab, 1982), p.142 and Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri, 319-337, pp.142-205. Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, pp.95-108. 135 Mengal, Bajoi, Bizinjo, Bugti, Buledi, Bungulzai, Dombki, Harroni, Jamali, Kaisarni, Khetran, Khoso, Kurd, Lashari, Laghari, Lehri, Mari, Mazari, Muhammad Hassan, Muhammad Shahi, Raisani, Rind, Shahwani, Tiblind, Zehri, Ahmadadani, Dehwar, Dasti, Daya, Gishgori, Gopang, Gorchani, Gurmani, Jatak, Jatoi, Jiswani, Kandorani, Magsi, Rais, Sangarani, Sadzi, Sasoli and Talpur. 136 Naseer, Balochistan in the light of old and Modern History, pp.202-203. 137 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimension Repercussion (Quetta; Gosha-e-Adab, 1998), p.13. 138 Marri, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, p.8. 139 Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National struggle, p.14. 140 Sylvia A. Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.8. 141 Dost Muhammad Dost, The language and Race of Afghanistan (Kabul: Pashtu Academy, 1975), p.362. 142 Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan, p.8. 143 Brig. Muhammad Usman. Balochistan Post Pregent Future (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1976), p.49. 144 Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan, p.8. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid. 147 See appendix. 148 Marri, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, p.53. 149 Naseer, Balochistan in the Light of Old and Modern History, p.19. 150 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. (Washington, D.C.: Carngie Endowment for International peace, 1981), p.11. 151 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.89. 152 Ibid. 153 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.173. 154 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan,p.89. 155 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, in Pakistan Horizon, pp.41-62, No. 58 (2) April 2005, p.42. 156 Fred Scholz, Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hindered Years of Balochistan 1872-1972 (Karachi: OUP, 2002), p.22. 157 Inyatullah Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination” in W.P. Zingal and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in the 90s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy Foreign Policy (Lahore: Vanguard 1985), p.336. 158 Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.42. 159 Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan , p.9. 160 Mani Shankar Aiyas, “Baloch Nationalism A Revisionist History” in Pakistan Papers (New Delhi: UBS Publisher, 1994), p.126. 161 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, p.336. 162 Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and the political stalemate in Pakistan.” in S. Akbar Zadi ed. Regional Imbalances and the national Question in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), p.231. 163 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, p.336. 164 Ibid, p.337. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Scholz, Nomadism and Colonialism, p.23. 168 Selig S. Harrison, “Ethnicity and political stalemate in Pakistan”, p.231. 169 Ibid. 170 Ian Talbot: Pakistan: A Modern History (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), p.225. 171 Chakar Khan was a poet of unmatched excellence; his mind was stored with the traditions, wars and history of the Baloch. He found pleasure and perfection in the blood purity, high traditions and honorable conduct of his race. Taj Mohammad Breseege, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p.38. 172 Ibid.

173 Akhund Muhammad Siddique, Akhbar ul Abrar, (Urdu)Trans.Mir Gul Khan Naseer(Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1984 p.31. 174 Ibid. p.45. 175 Ahmad Yar Baloch, Tareekh Baloch Qaum wa Khawaneen-i-Baloch (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Asr Publications, 2007), p.51. 176 Ibid.p.47. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid.p.43. 179 Hakeem Baloch, Baloch Qaumiat: Khaniat wa Sardariat(Urdu)(Lahore: Jamhoori Publications, 2010),p.27. 180 Ahmad Yar Baloch, Tareekh Baloch p.51. 181 Charles Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, the Punjab & Kalat, Vol. IV (Delhi: Munshirm Manoharlal Pub Pvt Ltd, 2001),p.68. 182 Akhund Muhammad Siddique, Akhbar ul Abrar, p.61. 183 Ibid. 184 They include; Pottinger, Christie and Grant 185 The budget was raised from Rs. 13000 to 400,000. Scholarships were given to students to study in India and abroad. 186 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p.126. 187 M. A. Shaheen Qaisarani, Balochistan. Tarikh wa Mazhab. Quetta: Edareh Tadris, 1994, p. 204. 188 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.178. 189 Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.43. 190 Ibid. pp.43-44. 191 At that time Mir Mehrab Khan was Khan of Kalat. 192 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.178. 193 Ibid. 194 Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle, p.163. 195 Ibid, p.164. 196 Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.44. 197 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.180. 198 Scholz, Nomadism and Colonialism, p.91. 199 Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.44. 200 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.181. 201 Scholz, Nomadism and Colonialism, pp.93-95. 202 Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.44. 203 Ibid. 204 Swidler, “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”,p.183. 205 The demarcation took place between April 1894 to May 1894. For details see, G.P. Tate, The Frontiers of Balochistan. (Lahore: East and West publishing company, 1976), p.26. 206 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance. (Karachi: Royal BVook company, 1992), p.83. 207 Javed Haider Syed, “The British Advent in Balochistan”, pp. 53-86, in Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007), p.53. 208 Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 209 Through Shikarpur, Jacobabad (Khangarh), Dhadar, Bolan Pass, Quetta and Khojak Pass. 210 He was the son of an overthrown vizier. 211 Such terms include; a) salutation of the authority of Shah Shuja b) his reinstatement in Kabul c) to collect and protect supplies of British troops d) to get in return a stipend of one hundred and fifty thousand rupees. 212 Akhund Muhammad Siddique, Akhbar ul Abrar, p.141. 213 Ahmad Yar Baloch, Tareekh Baloch. pp.151-154. 214 The Khan was recognized as a ruler of the areas stretched, south of Kalat to Arabian Sea and west of Sindh to Iran plus Lasbela. 215 Administration Report of the Baluchistan Agency,year Including the Districts of Quetta, Pishin, Thal Chotiali, and Sibi (Quetta: Government of Balochistan, 1988), p.4.

216 Hugh Chisholm, Encyclopedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, Volumes 3-4, p.291. 217 Mario Silva, Balochitan: Denial and Destiny ( European Media Ltd., 2012),p 218 For details see, Forbes, Archibald, "The Afghan wars, 1839-42 and 1878-80 (1892)" (1892). Digitized Afghanistan Materials in English from the Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection. Paper 31. Available on http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/afghanuno/31. 219 The letter was addressed to Lord Canning, the British Indian Viceroy on July 28, 1856 220 He was earlier served as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. 221 H.T. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975), p.413. 222 Edward Oliver, Across the Border: Pathan and Biloch (London, Chapman and Hall, 1890),p.123. 223 Sir Robert Montgomery to the British Government, 224 the British Resident in Kalat, he suggested, “Would it not be possible to make arrangements for the subsidizing of inferior chiefs guaranteed and secured by English power, through English payment? It is my opinion that great political advantages may be gained by the extra grant of the subsidy to the Khan.” 225 Ibid, p.101. 226 Ibid. 227 Quddus, The Tribal Balochistan, p.45. 228 Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle, p.168. 229 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination” ,p.339. 230 Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle, p.168. 231 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, p.340. 232 Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle, p.168. 233 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, p.346. 234 Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh-e-Balochistan an (Quetta: Kalat Publishers, 2005), pp.453-56. 235 Taj Muhammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p.222. 236 Ibid., p.222. 237 Baloch, “The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, p.348. 238 Ibid., p.349. 239 He was a member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). 240 He was Secretary in the Ministry of States 241 Parkash K. Singh, Encyclopaedia on Jinnah (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2009), p. 61. 242 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan 243 Vidya Prakash Tyagi, Martial Races of Undivided India (Delhi : Kalpaz Publications, 2009), p.14. 244 Akbar, The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist Movement, p.58. 245 Naseer Dashti, The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State (Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2012), p. 330. 246 Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), pp.19-20. 247 Ibid. 248 Syed Fakharuddin Shah, “Baluchistan: British Rule, An Era of Political Awakening and Merger” in Global Journal of Human Social Science Political Science, pp.23-30, Volume 13 Issue 6 Version 1.0 Year 2013, p.29. Retrieved on August 2, 2017 from https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume13/3-Baluchistan- British-Rule. 249 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Balochistan, A Study of Baloch Nationalism (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987), pp.183-184. 250 Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), p.20. 251 Dawn, Karachi, February 13, 1948. 252 Rehana Saeed Hashmi “Baloch Ethnicity: An analysis of the Issue and Conflict with State” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, pp.57-84, Vol.52, No.01 January-June 2015, p.63.

CHAPTER TWO

BALOCHISTAN-CENTRE RELATIONS: RESISTENCE MOVEMENTS, 1947-1972

Since the inception of Pakistan many resistance movements emerged in Balochistan due

to different circumstances. Affection of potential political party’s objective was to get

complete provincial autonomy. The same tendency remained successful at different

occasions to create powerful and strong resistance against central government on

different grounds. This chapter is an attempt to analyse the causes, events and

implications of the resistance movements of Baloch nationalists against the Centre. It has

been discussed earlier that there was a group in Balochistan which was not in favour of

the accession with Pakistan. The people of same school of thought remained active to

retain Balochistan as an independent state. The group at different times and occasions

launched resistance movements to get independence from Pakistan. When partition of

India appeared as writing on the wall, on March 24, 1946, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan met

with the Cabinet Mission. He claimed that under the 1876 Accord, without the advice of

the ruler of Kalat nobody could decide about its future. He further argued by describing

the example of Nepal’s sovereign position, political rights and lot of assistance from the

British government but the Viceroy and Jawaharlal Nehru both disagreed with Khan.1

Muhammad Ali Jinnah pleaded the case of Khanate with Cabinet Mission in 1946.2 After

3rd June Plan of the partition, activities of the opponent political parties were aggravated

manifold. Balochistan had an immense importance in the eyes of Jinnah in the context of

the future of Pakistan.3 Under the 3rd June Plan a referendum was announced to be held

on June 13, 1947. The Shahi Jirga as well Quetta Municipality put their decision in

favour of Pakistan.4 In that context Syed Iqbal is of the view “Muslim League got

independence against Congress and its extensions that at a particular time descended

from ‘Indian Nationalism’ to ‘Baloch Nationalism’ and campaigning on lingual and

ethnic grounds. The paid agents of Congress raised the slogan of independent Balochistan

meanwhile the anti-Pakistan propaganda was going on at Kabul”.5 It is worth mentioning that Nehru had recognized strategic importance of Balochistan by then, that is why

Congress supported a group who could raise the slogan of independent Balochistan for achieving Congress objectives in Balochistan. The Birla, Tata and Dalmia were providing financial resources.6 According to 3rd June Plan the states which wanted to sustain their

independence could opt for that. Jinnah clarified the view of AIML that there would not

be any interference into the internal affairs of Balochistan; simultaneously he negated the

claim of Khan Kalat about the decision of their future.7

The Khan was anxious about the future of Kalat state, he sent his Prime Minister

Nawabzada Mohammad Aslam Khan to Delhi to defend the Khanate’s right over the

states of Kharan and Lasbela which had been taken by the British on lease. A meeting

was held between PM Kalat and Viceroy in the presence of Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar,

Minister for State and Tribes. In that meeting though Viceroy admitted the special status

of Kalat but also opined that the confusion was still there about the reluctance of Kalat on

transfer of leased areas to successor government.8 Nishtar opposed the view point of

Kalat and argued that the areas were given to Pakistan as it were given to Afghanistan

under the Accord of 1921.9 Jinnah, Liquat Ali Khan, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan legal advisor

of Kalat Sir Sultan had a meeting on August 4, 1947. After the discussion it was resolved

that Pakistan would accept special status of Kalat and Stand Still Arrangements. Khan of

Kalat and government of Pakistan were the signatories. It was announced on August 11,

1947.10

On the issue of succession the intentions of Khan were not in accordance with the

interest of Pakistan. Jinnah was very much shocked when Khan issued the proclamation

of independent status of the state of Kalat on August 15, 1947.11 Constitutionally that

proclamation was not of any importance and Pakistan government did not take any notice

of it.12 Khan announced to celebrate the event on August 15, 1947. While addressing to a

group of people he also announced the establishment of upper and lower houses. Election

was conducted and as a result, Kalat State National Party (KSNP) was successful to

secure thirty nine seats in lower houses.13 The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Douglas F. Fell contacted with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ikram Ullah in September to

have an agreement on leased area. He was informed that these areas have been inherited

to Pakistan and was advised to pave the way for the succession of Kalat with Pakistan.14

The same kind of advice was also given to Khan of Kalat by Jinnah.15 As a result of this

proposal Khan summoned the session of Diwan (parliament). Anti-Pakistan statements

and speeches were delivered. Under the prevalent conditions, Pakistani government took

a timely decision and convinced Kharan, Makran and Lasbela rulers to have succession

with Pakistan separately which were the peripheral areas of Kalat state. At the moment,

Kalat stood in totally isolated position.16 It was announced on All-India Radio at 9 am on

March 27, 1948 that Khan had contacted Indian government for accession two months

before but the request was denied.17 After the news, Khan wrote letter to Jinnah

mentioning his desire to have succession with Pakistan.18 At last Khan signed on the

accession papers on March 27, 1948 unconditionally.19 Pakistan took over the charge of

state of Kalat under 3rd June plan and after signing the agreement of accession with Khan

of Kalat on March 28, 1948. All of that happened before sending military troops to their

destination.20 Another contemporary historian also opined that accession was not forcibly

in any context.21 According to Tahir Amin, the state of Kalat made an agreement with

Pakistan unwillingly. They were disappointed by aid from India or Russia. Secondly, he

was also threatened by Pakistani government that against his state the option of exercise

of power would be used.22

The parliament of the state announced on December 12, 1947 that Balochi would

be the National Language whereas the office routine work of state was conducted in Urdu

and correspondence at external level was conducted in English. It was significant that

during the two twenty-seven days of independence of state of Kalat the Baloch

nationalism was expressed through Balochi.23

The same elites of Pakistan believed in one nation, one language and one

culture.24 They wanted to declare Urdu the single language of country. They stressed on

the establishment of strong Centre and Islam to get legitimate position. Ethnic identities

and cultural variety was considered dangerous for the concept of a single nation. The

ethnic elites were declared anti-sate and anti-Islam. The state elites expressed total

intolerance with reference to regional languages. They believed in unity under prevalent

principles.25

The First Baloch Resistance Movement, 1948

The younger brother of the Khan, Prince Abdul Karim did not compromise on the

changed position of state. He was governor of Makran at that time. He decided to take up

arms in a protest against the accession of state against Pakistan. He gathered the

ammunition, arms and treasury, and declared revolt under the circumstances. He along

with his seven hundred followers crossed the border and entered in Afghanistan.26 He

took the decision on the hope that the liberation movement would get some assistance.

He settled his base camp in Saarlet just on the other side of Mastung.27 He adopted

different resistive techniques and skills. The Baloch freedom fighters made efforts to get

the support and favour of Baloch Sardars to fulfill their own motives. Moreover, they also

tried to win over the help of Afghan and Russian governments.28 They made every

possible effort to create crises and lawlessness.29 Muhammad Hussain Anqa, Malik Saeed

Dehwar and Abdul Waheed Kurd, who were Baloch Nationalists, also supported the

armed resistance. It is noteworthy that Gul Khan Naseer, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and

Abdul Aziz Kurd were not in favour of armed resistance against Pakistan because they

were not sure about the internal or external support.30 Prince Karim could not gather

support from Afghanistan for his anti-Pakistan activities. Afghan government offered

asylum to Prince Karim but declined to support him militarily. It is possible that

Afghanistan could not be helpful for Baloch movement because it was contrary with its

claim of ‘Pushtoonistan’ which was stretching from Chitral to Balochistan and Arabian

Sea.31 In that way it was unsuccessful due to internal unity and external support.32

Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan took counter steps. The border was sealed; the Assistant Commissioner Jhalawan was transferred who was apparently helping the Lashkar. The Seventh Baloch Regiment was directed to reach Kalat from

Quetta and Prince’s whole Lashkar was besieged. Prince Abul Karim returned on July 8, because he could not materialize his effort of independence and was arrested near Harboi

Hills along with his companions.33 He was tried on November 27, 1948 and was charged

with ten year imprisonment and fine of five thousand rupees. His other followers were

also penalized.34

Afterwards, Prince Abdul Karim Khan established a new political party named

Ustama Gall (people’s party) on his release from imprisonment. He was helped

financially and morally. He started to consider the establishment of a separate Baloch

province. Under the leadership of Abdul Samad Achakzai’s Wror Pashtoon had also been

working on the lines in Pashtoon dominated Balochistan. This entire affair of Khan was

embarrassing for Baloch National Party because it had to face very cold response in

Makran, Kharan and Lasbela.35

Although the resistance was within Kalat but after its ineffectiveness a peaceful

era started in Balochistan. The revolution of Prince Karim in 1948 was not of any

importance for Baloch’s political affairs because the Baloch had no involvement in it as a

nation. The public opinion in Balochistan, especially, in Quetta and other cities was in

favour of Pakistan. There are two concepts about its influences. According to one concept it had no effects whereas some other critiques were of the view that its implication was wide spread because it had created an atmosphere of mistrust between nationalists and the federal government. Central government was suspicious about the loyalty of people of Kalat and especially nationalist with Pakistan. The nationalists were of the view that the revolution of Prince Karim was a milestone for the Baloch liberation movement.

The Regionalists in Constitutional Struggle

After the uprising of Prince Karim and Kalat accession the political leaders of KSNP

were arrested while a small group of ‘Marxists’ and ‘Leninist’ established Balochistan

Peace Committee under the leadership of Abdul Karim Shorish.36 It demanded the right

of self-determination and eradication of tribal system. In 1953 Baloch intelligentsia

stepped forward and demanded self autonomy. Many other political and social

organizations, for example All Pakistan Baloch League, Baloch Student Federation and

many other organizations demanded for social and economic reforms.37

The Administrative and Constitutional Reforms

Balochistan enjoyed the status of province of Chief Commissioner under the British

India. Just of the creation of Pakistan it was the duty of new Constituent Assembly to

ensure the establishment about making the area a complete province. The Muslim League

had been demanding to declare it as a complete province but the British government

could not do so on different excuses. Although, Jinnah himself as Governor General

could not uplift Balochistan into a full province, yet while addressing to Sibi Darbar

1948, he said that;

…and so I wanted some things to be done without delay for the period between now and the time when the new constitution would finally emerge and be inaugurated; some things that would enable the people to share the responsibilities of their government and give them a voice in its administration.38

Jinnah had a strong desire in his heart to change the status-quo. To fulfill his

pledge, he announced the establishment of a Council in Balochistan so that the people’s

participation in official affairs of the province might be ensured.39 It was a big

announcement and step forward for the province. According to it an Advisory Council

was established, which was a nominated organization of British Balochistan. According

to Axman it was established on June 11, 1949,40 its main function was to look after the

administrative scheme and other plans. Before that, it was a practice that Chief

Commissioner used to submit them in Governor General’s office,41 although, it did not meet the expectations, because it was only a recommendation body. It consisted of two members with a little authority. However, it was devoid of real representation. All hopes

regarding people’s participations in performing provincial affairs could not be

materialized. The real powers vested with Agent to Governor General who was rarely

consulted for any consideration by Advisory Council. The plan ended on September 1,

1951. The Council turned into such organ which was a hurdle before the decisions of

AGG and administrative planning. Its real position and capacity was not as it was being

considered.42

Nawab Liaquat Ali Khan, PM of Pakistan after the demise of Jinnah left no stone

unturned to seek the constitutional solutions of Balochistan’s issues under interim

government.43 During his address at Sibi Darbar in 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan announced

that the Centre desired to combine both the British Balochistan and the states at equal

administrative level.44 He announced the establishment of Reform Committee in 1950 to

bring administrative and constitutional changes as per their economic, political, and

social conditions of the province.45 The Committee presented its recommendations to the

Pakistan Constituent Assembly on November 12, 1951. It was recommended in the report that Balochistan may be given the provincial status without disturbing the Sardari system.46 The report was a prominent development in the political and constitutional history of British Balochistan. It was suggested in the report that the province might be

given the status of governor province and provincial autonomy. It also demanded to give

vast powers to provinces and adult franchise. The creation of institutions of local bodies

was also considered inevitable.47 The central leadership opposed the report of committee

and it could not be materialized in post colonial Balochistan. The arguments presented in

that connection were not impressive, for example, the financial position and less

population of post colonial Balochistan had also been a problem for Centre. Jinnah

argued that Centre would help the province in the best interest of the people and to solve

financial constraints.48

The states of Balochistan were provided due safeguards49 but central government

was reluctant to merge all the four states in to one union, i.e. Balochistan State Union

(BSU).50 That was totally contradictive with recommendations of the report.51 The BSU

was under the constitution of Pakistan along with common judiciary and Constituent

Assembly.52 The government of Pakistan facilitated the four states under an agreement

and guaranteed to act upon the sections of the agreement. The government presented a

section of Council of Rulers according to which President would be elected among the

rulers and Prime Minister would be appointed by governmental procedure under the

constitution of Pakistan.53All the four states agreed upon the proposal in March 15,

1952.54 There was an effort to prepare an interim constitution for BSU. According to it,

the BSU had Constituent Assembly having twenty eight elected and twelve nominated

members.55 Agha Abdul Hamid Khan became its first Prime Minister and Khan of Kalat

the President.56 The Union had a common executive, legislature and administrative body

whose head was Prime Minister. Although the nomination or dismissal of Prime Minister

was subject to the permission of government of Pakistan yet Council of Rulers had

powers to appoint or remove him.57

The Council of Rulers which comprised of all the four rulers of states worked

under the headship of President which was elected one by one among the rulers. The

BSU had its own cabinet which was elected from the assemblies. The cabinet members

could not be appointed or dismissed without the prior permission of the government.

Ahmad Yar Khan considered it an opportunity to be the future leader of post colonial

Balochistan. He instigated Marri and Bugti tribes to demand for inclusion in the BSU.

The BSU was an attempt to seduce Khan before his removal.58 Whereas, Dehwar opines

that high Centre leadership did not like the institution of BSU and they had some ill and

un-understandable designs like One Unit.59 The later events proved that the BSU was

established under the objective to merge it in the province. The government at last

considered it the area of special importance.60 The selected areas were included in the province. There was no representation of provincial legislature in those areas. The provincial administration, Chief Commissioner or governor would control those areas.

The BSU lasted for a small period. Hardly any session of Council of Ministers

could be held and its treasury was totally empty.61 Many Sardars of State Union

requested the AGG to merge Union in the previous Balochistan province.62

Consequently, during early June 1954 the ministry for states of government of Pakistan dissolved BSU Assembly. Later on, Council of Rulers of BSU recommended for the merger of into centrally administrated Balochistan. The Balochistan Muslim League and

Basic Principle Committee (BPC) had also recommended for the province of governor status, but when One Unit was implemented Balochistan was merged into the West

Pakistan. In that way, Balochistan could not get the status of a full-fledged province until

the dissolution of One Unit in 1970.

The Dissolution of Assembly

Meanwhile, the conflict between Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and the

Constituent Assembly was at peak. The two decisions taken by the Constituent Assembly

in haste became the root cause for dissolution of Assembly on October 24, 1954 by

Governor General. When Assembly exercised its real powers, the Governor General

became annoyed from the assembly. Firstly, it re-enacted Public Representatives and

Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA). It was constituted to check the corruption,

malpractices and maladministration in the society during Liaquat Ali Khan’s period. The

status of assembly was defamed by this step.63 Secondly, it had amendment in 1935 Act, through which the powers of GG to dissolve the Assembly were curtailed. In fact, it was

the first step towards the flourishing of parliamentary democracy.64 The Governor

General was kept unaware by the Constituent Assembly in that connection. He reacted very quickly and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The Governor General’s step was not justified because at that time the members of Assembly were at the final stage of finalizing the constitution. If Governor General would have dissolved it after 1954

elections his step could have be defended because the assembly would have lost its

dignity. He safeguarded his personal interest instead of defending democratic principle.65

The Civil Military Bureaucracy proved its worth after dissolution of first

Constituent Assembly and decided single handedly for the future constitution making for

Pakistan. An agreement was made between Khan of Kalat and government of Pakistan on

January 1, 1955. Ahmad Yar Khan and other rulers were advised to dissolve the BSU and

later on the other states also. The dealing was made with Pakistan government according

to which their annual scholarships were increased.66

The One Unit Politics in West Pakistan

The most conflicting step of Second Constituent Assembly was establishment of One

Unit Plan. It was basically the creation of Central government well-wishers who

considered it necessary to consider all provinces of West Pakistan as One Unit. They

were of the opinion that by this way provincialism and feelings of haltered would be

reduced. This was necessary for a viable political and economic system. The defense

expenditure could also be met in such manner.67 Ayub Khan supported One Unit scheme

in these words “the fortune of Pakistan from defense and economic perspective

Pakistan’s aim was to get more and more results. For proper development and defense

from North to South, One Unit’s in inevitable and all artificial provincial limits should

have to be ended without taking notice of any prejudice and these are mostly ban child of

politicians.”68 Balochistan was included in West Pakistan to get status of a complete

province. That was actually the plan of big ones of the central government to counter the

numerical superiority of East Pakistan and unity and cooperation be increased in Bengal

and smaller provinces.69 The politics of One Unit in made the smaller units and the

nationalists more organized and sensitive for their cultural identity.70

This is an accepted fact that central characters of the state used every type of

political tricks that One Unit plan may be implemented. They became successful in

getting One Unit scheme approved by the provincial assemblies. The Sindh assembly did

not follow Civil Military elites and had to pay the price. Due to opposition and

unacceptability of One Unit Abdul Satar Pirzada’s ministry was dissolved. The prominent

political parties were opportunist, non-serious and ambiguous for One Unit Plan.71 One

Unit scheme was included in the constitution of 1956 which became the cause of end of

Federal principle in Pakistan.72 The provincialism could only be reduced by amending the

policies and attitude of Civil Military establishment.

The regionalists were against One Unit plan in Balochistan. They wanted

complete independent status or at least complete political and economic autonomy for

their province. The nationalists were suspicious about this matter and they had a lot of

apprehensions about the policies of central actors in their minds. They considered the

policies of central actors as an attack on regional demand. The Baloch nationalist laid

emphasis to finish the Baloch-Brahui differences and advised them to create

homogeneity. They believed that Baloch and Brahui were descendents from the same

origins.73 Both Brahvi and Baloch were off-shots of ancient Baloch.74 According to Tariq

Rehman, Khan of Kalat was a Brahvi ruler. He developed the concept of common origin

of Baloch and Brahvis to strengthen his position.75

The sense of neglect and deprivation flourished in Balochistan on the issue of One

Unit. The NAP and Khan of Kalat opposed it and demanded its dissolution. The ruling elite was anxiously waiting that Khan might be arrested on the basis of charges of treason. He was blamed of a conspiracy for merging Kalat with Iran.76 He was also

blamed to ask Afghanistan for help to establish proposed independent Balochistan.77

While addressing at Balochistan Academy Quetta on August 26, to a gathering of

workers Khan demanded for the dissolution of One Unit and creation of a new ethnic-

basis province.78

A significant change took place on November 30, 1955 when like-minded

political parties in West Pakistan established a new political organization named Pakistan

National Party (PNP).79 These like-minded groups like Azad Pakistan Party of Mian

Iftikharuddin, Awami Party of G.M Syed, Waror Party of Abdul Samad, Khudai

Khidmatgar of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Ustaman Gal (People’s Party) of Prince Karim

and Sindh Hari Committee of Hyder Bakhsh Jatoi were included. All these political

elements considered the unification plan under One Unit as equal to usurping the

regional, constitutional, economic and political rights of smaller provinces.80

The regionalists and separatists elements enthusiastically opposed the idea of uniting whole West Pakistan under One Unit. They demanded the end of One Unit and stressed for maximum provincial autonomy for all the provinces. Abdul Hamid Khan

Bhashani joined it in 1957. Its name was changed as ‘National Awami Party’ and the

President was Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.81 The manifesto of party was comprised of the

following important points. It stressed on the defense of regional identity and integrity. It

called for independent and non-alliance foreign policy. Moreover, adult franchise, the

creation of provinces on the linguistic grounds, and end of exploitation of people

belonging to different areas was also demanded.82 The NAP started playing the role of

real opposition front. It provided a platform to the left wing group to express their point

of view about national politics.83 After returning from abroad the Khan of Kalat found his

state as an integral part of West Pakistan province. So, he joined hands with the NAP for

the opposition and end of One Unit. He again tried to revive his state and to establish an

independent homeland for the Baloch. In that connection he asked former Sardars for

help. He severely protested against unification plan.84

The Khan presided a historic meeting of the Baloch Sardars at Palace Hotel

Karachi in 1957. The session was attended by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Nawab Ghaus

Bakhsh Raisani, Mir Jamal Khan Jamali and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The historic demands of the session were, end of One Unit and establishment of Balochistan province on ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historic basis again.85

When the participants of the session became aware of the intensions of Khan

about the recreation of the state of Kalat, many of them disagreed and walkout from the

session as a protest.86 After losing the confidence of Sardars the Khan’s political future

was uncertain. After refusal of his meeting with President and Prime Minister for the

clarification of his position regarding alleged anti-state activities. He was arrested at the

end of September 1958.87 According to Martin Axmann, these charges were leveled on

Khan to level the ground for Martial Law in country, whereas, Awan and Iqbal Ahmad

disagree. According to them there is no connection between both incidents. Khan was

arrested from Kalat on the blame of starting a comprehensive Baloch insurgency with the

help of eighty thousand tribesmen. The armed forces entered into Kalat on 16 October.

They did not find any rebel. Many tribesmen were killed in different skirmishes.88 Khan was deprived of all tittles and facilities by President Iskandar Mirza. Agha Dawood Jan was appointed as his successor.89

The Federal Structure under 1956 Constitution

Under the constitution of 1956 a federal structure was constituted. Keeping in view the

serious demand of regional autonomy the provinces were given autonomy to some

extent.90 According to 1956 constitution the jurisdiction of Centre and provinces were

described under federal, provincial and concurrent lists. The list containing federal

subjects had thirty departments including commerce and industry, foreign affairs and

trade, defense, currency, all types of communications, insurance corporations, minerals,

oil and gas, postal services and telegraph etc.91 The provincial list contained ninety four items which reflected the trend of provincial autonomy. The list included law and order, justice, police, land, agriculture, local government, education, public health, and many

other issues of local interest.92 The railway which should have been in federal list was

included in provincial list. It remained under central control because there was no

legislation in parliament for transferring it to provinces.93 The government did not take

any connection in that regard and up to the dissolution of 1956 Constitution it was under

the centre. The Concurrent List was just having nineteen subjects like economic and

social planning, price control, civil and criminal law, scientific and industrial research,

trade union, inter-provincial migration, and many affairs of common interest.94

Under the constitution the provincial autonomy was limited by superiority of

parliament over Provincial Assemblies and the issue of Concurrent List. The parliament

was also given powers that they could amend or cancel the provincial legislation. The

residuary powers were given to Provincial Assemblies. Under 1956 constitution the

participation of authorities and responsibilities were also reduced which consequently

became a cause of failure of constitution. The federal assembly could have legislation

regarding the federal list and even regarding the concurrent if there is emergency. Under

this article the President was authorized to provide guidance and direction to provincial

executive regarding the exercise of administrative powers. The President could also

assume the provincial control directly or could give directions to Governor for taking

hold of all affairs of the province on his behalf except provincial assembly and

judiciary.95 Such type of Emergency powers can be found only in federal structure.96

There was a drawback in these provisions that time limit was not fixed. The President was authorized that he could get approved the action of emergency as practicable according to the prevalent conditions. Under this step democratic process could be suspended for an indefinite period of time. Therefore, the provinces were deprived from provincial autonomy under article 191 of the constitution of 1956.97 The unique article of

the 1956 constitution was 193. The President could enforce emergency by suspending

parliamentary democratic government on the condition of report submitted to him by

governor of the respective province that concerned provincial government was not

working in accordance with constitutional provision.98 Under this article the President

was also authorized that he may transfer powers of provincial legislature to the

parliament.99 This issue was severely criticized. Before it the same powers were misused

for special vested interest under article 29 of the interim constitution. The political circles

were very much apprehensive by re-introduction of this power in 1956 constitution.

These apprehensions proved true when the President dissolved ministries

undemocratically in both wings of the country without any solid grounds. Under

emergency powers the country was governed under unitary system instead of federal

system. There was a common feeling that federal feature of the constitution have been

neglected and unitary pattern of government was in practice.

The fiscal relations between the centre and provinces were imbalanced and their

tilt was mainly towards centre. According to the constitution of 1956 all important

resources were given under centre’s custody, for example, custom duty, export duty,

excise duty, corporation tax, income tax and moreover agricultural tax etc. The resources

of the provinces were reduced by decreasing the revenue percentage. Their main income

resources were agricultural tax, property tax, succession duty on agricultural property,

and stamp duty were mainly under the discretion of the central government. For this

purpose a constitutional body namely National Finance Commission (NFC) might be

constituted which could submit its recommendations to President along with provincial

share and grand of taxes. The unequal distribution of financial resource was totally the

negation concept of duel federalism under which every government (provincial and

central) must have control over its financial resources for the conduct of different affairs.

The willful interruption in provincial affairs was carried through the provincial governor

who in actual practice was the representative of Centre.

The high level central government structure produced anti-centre tendencies. That was the reaction of small provinces against the supreme central concept of One Unit in

West-Pakistan. The One Unit politics created far-reaching effects in Balochistan. The people of Balochistan felt that their right of equal partnership in state affairs was being denied. The disappointment and discontentment spread all over Balochistan due to which the demand of regional autonomy, reflected in the demand of intensified regional autonomy. Therefore, the regionalists were strengthened in the province. There was dire

need of flexible and accommodative centre for a society comprises of multi-ethnic and

multi-cultural ingredients. The decentralization along with democratic process would

have been the suitable reaction to curb down the conspiracies and opposite trends. The

economic crisis in Balochistan was also having its roots in to the politics based upon

regionalism. The anti-centre tendencies in Balochistan could have been minimized if the

elections had been held in time. Federalism is a balanced mechanism between centre and

regionalist forces. However, the real spirit of federalism was badly affected, though One

Unit and supreme central structure, under which the provincial status was declined. It was

degraded from coordination to subordination.

Meanwhile, Pakistan was facing sever political crisis which was created mostly

due to weak parliamentary system. The political parties were not organized and not

established in a proper manner. They leveled the real political culture. The West

Pakistan’s political scenario was under land lords and tribal elites. The league had a very

short history with reference to an organized political background. The untimely death of

Jinnah also created a big vacuum. Moreover, the political and constitutional issues of

Pakistan society were aggravated due to federal feature of state. The Western wing had

dominance in military and bureaucracy, it was also dominant politically. Due to it sense

of deprivation was created and being alien in the masses of East Pakistan. The small

provinces in western wing were emerging against the Punjabi domination in state affairs.

The One Unit scheme also enhanced more the apprehensions and reservations of small

provinces. The conflicts between both parts and especially in western part had delayed

the process of constitution making. The ambitious civil military bureaucracy molded the

circumstances according to their vested interests in the name of imbalance between the

institutions. It achieved its heights and stressed upon its role in politics. After the removal

of Khawaja Nazimuddin’s government in 1953 and the first assembly’s termination in

1954, the Civil Military bureaucracy had enhanced its role in the politics and played

decisive role in framing state policies. On October 8, 1958, the Martial Law was being

imposed by President Iskandar Mirza.100 There was dissolution of constitution and

dismissal of the National and Provincial Assemblies. So, ban on political parties and

delay of general elections for indefinite period of time had taken place. Moreover, the

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Pakistan was given to General Ayub

Khan.101

The Second Resistance Movement in Balochistan, 1958

The One Unit was created against the will of small provinces in 1955. Many political

workers and leaders were imprisoned on the charges of opposition to the One Unit. In

1956 six political parties established a United Front which transformed into a political

party, i.e. National Party.102 They were; Ustman Gal, Sindh Hari Committee, Sindh

Mahaz, Khudai Khidmat Gar and Azad National Party. The main objective of new party

was opposition of One Unit. It demanded for the annulment of One Unit and provincial

autonomy. It was renamed as National Awami Party (NAP) when Abdul Hameed

Bhashani from East Pakistan joined it.103 Due to the imposition of Martial Law, the party started working under ground. It gained popularity in short span of time. Later on, it was divided into two groups in 1968, i.e. Bhashni Group and Wali Khan Group.104 With the

passage of time the NAP became the representative of reformist and nationalist forces in

Pakistan.105 Meanwhile, Prince Karim and Mir Unqa were released from jail on June 8,

1955. They called up a session of workers of previous KSNP on July 14, 1955. They laid

the foundation of a political party Ustman Gal, Prince Karim became its president and

Q.B. Nizamani became its general secretary.106 It demanded for a separate province on

social, cultural, geographical and linguistic basis.107 The demands included; the establishment of a democratic federal political system. Moreover, it stressed upon the provincial autonomy and formation of separate Baloch province comprising of all Baloch areas with Balochi as official language.108

The creation of One Unit for the politics of Balochistan was considered an

important development since accession.109 There was maximum resistance against One

Unit as compared to other areas of Pakistan.110 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was in favour of

the plan but was influenced by the Baloch nationalists who were against it.111 Therefore,

after that the Khan opposed the idea and supported the concept of United Baloch State

but wanted to keep that under his own control.112 He was motivated for the protest against

One Unit on a broader spectrum under the repeated demand of 1947 of restoration of the

British occupied areas.113 While addressing to the workers of the Balochi Academy on

August 26, 1958 he supported the demand of dissolution of One Unit and establishment

of a new province on lingual basis.114 He called for a meeting in Mastung and repeated

his previous objectives.115 He was offered for a meeting with the President at Karachi due

to his ‘anti-State activities for which he refused.116 The flag of Kalat State was hoisted on

the Mirri-Fort of Kalat replacing the Pakistani flag.117 Due to his ‘activities’ Khan was

arrested on October 6, 1958 and was detained in a bungalow at Gulberg, Lahore.118

According to official sources, during his arrest a huge crowd of people gathered outside his residence and was not willing to disperse. Ultimately, police opened fire due to which three people passed away and two injured.119 Approximately, fifty ‘loyal’ people and

three hundred activists were detained from Kalat and some other cities.120 The central government lamented allegations that Abdul Karim and Khan’s uncle were busy in secret dialogues with Afghanistan to launch an uprising in Balochistan and in that regard he organized tribal Lashkar comprised of eighty thousand people.121 It was also described

that Khan had gathered huge weapons and food storage for a big army requirement.

According to Jan Muhammad and Selig Harrison, the proof for allegations was just that

Khan’s wife went to Kabul for holidays.122 According to Khan, those allegations were

lamented against him to justify the imposition of extensive Martial Law.123 Just after a

day of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan’s detention, not only in Balochistan but in whole country,

Martial Law was imposed.124 Against the arrest of Khan, there was extensive agitation

across Balochistan, including a huge demonstration at Quetta as well.125 Most of the

Baloch leaders declared army action on the State of Kalat as aggression. The tribal people

showed strong resentment against the announcement of the government for them to

submit their weapons in local police stations.126

A wave of resentment spread all over Balochistan due to Khan’s detention. A

ninety years old Sardar, Nauroz Khan Zarakzai had come out to challenge the State

authority.127 In that regard, he thought out the idea of a massive arm insurrection for the

support of Khan.128 Nauroz Khan was notorious for his fiery statements since the British

times. His main demand was the release of Khan and dissolution of One Unit. He further

stressed upon the safeguard of Baloch customs and traditions.129 Nauroz Khan departed

for Dara Mulla along with one thousand guerrillas. The army bombarded on his hideouts

in the mountains. After a few skirmishes an agreement took place between Nauroz Khan

and the State authorities. According to it the tribesmen ended up their arms resistance in

response to security and general amnesty. Moreover, it was also assured that One Unit

would be abolished. At that time, Sardar Doda Khan Zehri pledged on Holy Quran

before the extremists that authorities had accepted all of their demands.130

According to nationalists the authorities disowned their pledge by arresting

Nauroz Khan and his sons, although the government had denied accepting the

authenticity of any such agreement.131 Nauroz Khan along with his sons and seven other followers were given capital punishment by the Military Court at Mach. Keeping in view the age factor, the punishment of Nauroz Khan was changed into life imprisonment.132

The Military considered it as a basic crime and brought armoured vehicles and artillery at important places so that they might assert their powers. The army blocked some mountains passes to curb down the rebellious elements in Jhalawan and Sarawan.133

Some skirmishes occurred between tribesmen and military. Meanwhile, Chief of Zehri tribe Sardar Nouroz Khan emerged as a guerilla force commander whose number was from 250 to 1000.134 He settled himself at the peak of Mirgat.135 He demanded that Khan

of Kalat should be released unconditionally, the confiscated weapons should be returned

and the One Unit should be dissolved.136 The first serious conflict took place at Wadh,

forty kilometers from Khuzdar which caused heavy loss from both side. Brigadier Tikka

Khan (later on Army Chief) ordered to attack Nouroz Khan’s house. His all property was

confiscated.137 Despite of all these steps the power of the rebels could not be curbed

down. According to Syed Iqbal the sentiments of extremism emerged in many guerilla

groups accompanied Nouroz Khan. The military attempted its best to control extremism

which included air raids. That unrest continued for a year.138

The government made a full-fledged military operation in 1960 which caused

heavy human loss but the opposition could not be suppressed. Later on, the

representatives from both sides gathered to minimize differences. Nouroz Khan, his son

and some followers laid down their arms between 19 and 20 May, 1959 but they were

arrested. It was claimed that their security and pardon was promised on the pledge of

Holy Quran and, later on, their arrest was against the mutual confidence and spirit of

agreement.139 Later on, especially military court in Mach jail interrogated from 163 persons. Severe punishment was awarded to Nouroz Khan and his his family persons including his son Batay Khan. The rebels were hanged in July 1960 in Sukkur jail but

Nouroz Khan’s punishment was changed to life imprisonment for being aged. After four years he died in the jail.140 Many Baloch declare him a martyr of Baloch cause.

The first two military actions took place in post-colonial Balochistan against the

Khan. According to the nationalists, firstly; the Khan was forced to accede with Pakistan

and secondly; with reference to his anti-State activities. The next conflict emerged after

the punishment of Nauroz Khan and his associates who were the leaders of second armed

revolt. After the repeated military attacks and the arrest of Baloch leaders in post-colonial

Balochistan created confusion and aloofness among the people of Balochistan. As a result

One Unit was established in 1955 and Martial Law was imposed in 1958. The centralists

were of the view that they knew better about the area, its people and their conditions.

Therefore, the authorities must pay heed to them. The Baloch were not ready to accept

their views which resulted in to military operations and their leadership was detained for

a long time.

The policies of top level civil-military leadership created distrust and lack of

confidence among the people of Balochistan. A series of aggression and counter-

aggression took place which remained the phenomena for a long period. After the

military attack on Kalat State in 1958, the ray of hope ended in the mind of Khan for the

restoration of the State’s previous status. For the rest of his life, he remained Governor of

Balochistan, i.e. 1974-1977.

The Armed Resistance, 1958

The first anti-State act was of firing attack over running train on October 13, 1958.141

Although, there was no causality but this created an alarming situation. The Martial Law authorities issued a proclamation according to which public was directed to submit their unlicensed weapons to the government. That act of government created rumours about the future intention of the government. The general masses became aware and they refused to obey the order. It was the beginning of Jhalawan riots.142 The Mengal tribe

attacked sub-treasury at Wadh and took away the deposited arms acceding to Martial

Law regulations.

The Third Baloch Resistance, 1960 to 1969

The third Baloch resistance flourished under the Mengal tier. Its operative centre was

Marri-Bugti area. This lawlessness occurred due to many reasons firstly it was a Martial

Law Ordinance to deposit weapons with the government secondly the Baloch nationalists were elected under 1962 constitution thirdly those were the organizational activates of

Baloch students in the educational institution of Quetta and Karachi fourth was the

distribution of Patfeeder Canal land among army personnel and non local people and the

Baloch leaders were mal-treated.143

The political, cultural and economic policies of Ayub era were based on complete unified system. During his rule One Unit plan was sustained. ‘Controlled Democracy’ was introduced on the basis of ‘Basic Democracies’.144 The civil military elites of Ayub

regime were confident that the only way to control opposition is the option of use of

power. The government intensified the military operation in Balochistan to curb down the

extremism which was spread as a result of Nouroz Khan Imprisonment and death

sentence of his companions. The military operation of July 1960 created a wave of

resentment among political activists. Ayub Khan visited Quetta during 1962. The Baloch

leaders held a political meeting upon his arrival. They opposed the military operation as a

solution to Balochistan issue.145

Ayub Khan became angry upon the warning from Baloch leaders and threatened

them for dire consequences if they continued resistance.146 The regionalist in Balochistan

severely opposed the policies of elites of state. The Bugti, Marri and Mengal tribes

continued their resistance under Akbar Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Attaullah Mengal,

respectively.147

It is worth mentioning that the Baloch representation was just nominal in the

power structure of state during Ayub regime.148 Next wave of resentment was initiated by

Mengal tribe and spread up to Marri Bugti areas. The series continued up to 1967 till the

announcement of general amnesty. The Mengal tribe was critically annoyed by the state

demand of laying down weapons. They had become sick of from the state decision of

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appointing nominated persons by removing traditional tribal chiefs. The Mengal tribe

attacked treasury and maltreated the officials and even snatched their weapons of

defense. Attaullah Mengal intercepted and pacified the rebels in January 1958.149

The Guerilla war continued during Ayub regime in Jhalawan and Marri areas and

different skirmishes took place between state and opposite forces. The government

replaced hostile tribal chiefs Nawab Akbar Bugti, Sardar Khair Bakhsh and Marri

Attaullah Mengal, to curb down their rebellious activities. The government’s steps in that

connection were completely failed. The tribesmen killed all nominated people of

government.150

Ali Muhammad Mengal started armed resistance after the imprisonment of

Attaullah Mengal and put forward the following demands. Firstly, Attauullah Mengal should be released, secondly, the weapon collection campaign should be ended, and thirdly, the police stations should be closed.151 The limited skirmishes between tribesmen

and security forces which continued till the end of 1966. The government arrested Sardar

Attaullah Mengal, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Nawab Akbar

Bugti, on the charges of facilitating armed rebellion.152 They were repeatedly arrested and

released on the basis of different charges.153 Ali Muhammad Mengal was charged of

backing Baloch resistance movement and providing help to them. Moreover, Sher

Muhammad Marri was prominent figure in the guerilla resistance.154 He was known by

the name of general Sheroff.

Sher Muhammad Marri started participating in politics in 1945 and established a

political party named ‘Mazloom Party’ in the tribal areas of Suleman Mountains.155 He

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laid down the foundation of ‘Parari Movement’. There were two commanders under his

control. He himself took over the charge of northern Marri-Bugti areas.156 Ali Muahmad

Mengal was commander of southern Jalawan district.157 It was quite sure that Sher

Muhammad organized twenty two base camps during July 1963 in Marri, Bugti and

Mengal areas.158 The military arrested Pararies under the command of Maj. General

Tikka Khan. Military had to face tough resistance and state authority had to face serious

blow by the killing of all its newly appointed Sardars. The Baloch had become very much motivated and united against military operation.159 The policy adopted by Ayub Khan

was unique in the sense that the way in which Ayub regime changed Sardars, even the

British government avoided it.160 Sher Muhammad enumerated the aims and objectives of

rebellious struggle before “News International”. According to him the basic objective of

armed resistance was the dissolution of One Unit.161 The rebellious elements were

politically aligned with the NAP which was struggling for provincial autonomy.162 The

government failed to control the situation which deteriorated with the passage of time.

The government realized its strategy as useless and un-successful with reference to

Balochistan crises. The attitude of government of Pakistan changed somewhat after the

appointment of General Musa as Governor Balochistan. General amnesty was announced

and Baloch leaders were released as a gesture of good will. The powers of deposed tribal

chiefs were also revived. They were assured that their political demands will be fulfilled.

The condition became normal after the proclamation of end of rebellious activities in

1967.163 The conditions became critical again after a short interval when distrust was created between racial elements and central state elements. Muhammad Akbar Bugti, Gul

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Khan Nasir, Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Abdul Samad Achakzai were again arrested164 and

restlessness spread among Eastern Balochistan and Patfeeder areas.165

The fire arms and guns were considered the sign of bravery. There was a rumour

that the next order after laying weapons would be about their women. That was quite

sufficient for restlessness in Baloch tribes and especially Mengal tribe. When Mengal

heard the news that their one Sardar had laid weapons, they attacked depository and

looted all weapons. Ayub Khan limited the ownership rights of irrigated land up to 500

acres and un-irrigated land up to 1000 acres. Those agriculture reforms challenged the

land tenure and land holdings. Many tribesmen declared it un-suitable because the tribal

land was collectively owned by all members of the tribe and this was given to them by

the Khan as Jagir or revenue free grant. There was no concept of any sort of tax-paying

on land to government or to the Khan and when government started taking steps to levy

tax on land, land owners, tenants and tillers strongly resisted. There was not any concept

of paying revenue to government or Khan. When government made such arrangements,

the severe resistance was shown by land owners, peasants and farmers.

The year of 1960 proved as an era of political awareness in Baloch students at

Karachi, when Baloch students of Karachi University established Baloch Educational

Society in 1960. That was the first organization of Baloch students and its objective was

to solve the educational issues of Baloch students at Karachi. Many delegations of Baloch students visited leaders of important political parties to solve the educational issues of

Balochistan before the elections of 1962. It was an amazing fact that except the NAP no

other political party paid attention to their issue. Therefore, a relation of mutual trust was

maintained between Baloch students and the NAP. The moment, NAP was in a position

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to impress the ideas of Baloch youth i.e. it infused the spirit of Baloch nationalism and

regionalism among Baloch students.

The 1962 Constitution and Federal Structure

The 1962 constitution was centralist in nature. It increased the grip of centre on provinces. Ayub Khan considered a strong centre inevitable for development and unity of country. He ruled as an autocrat and all the powers were centered at his office. The regionalists were clearly against his ideology. During Ayub regime the regionalism, unlimited powers of president, national federal structure and subdued position of elected

National Assembly reached at its peak.

Under the constitution of 1962 a list of issues of national importance was prepared whereas the rest of issues were given to the provinces.166 The National

Assembly was authorized to legislate in provincial affairs. It was authorized according to

the demands of “National Interest”, planning, mutual coordination and unity.167 The

issues handed over to the centre were defense; foreign exchange, foreign affairs, national

economic planning, international trade, and national economic coordination, currency,

natural gas, central banking, minerals, oil, nuclear energy, insurance, preventive detention and industry were included. The federal list contained 49 items whereas these were 30 in

the constitution of 1956 and 61 in 1935Act. The powers of National Assembly regarding

legislation about provincial affairs on the basis of “national interest” were a severe blow

for the federal status of constitution.

Ayub tried to compensate the complaints of autonomy by taking different steps.

The constitution of 1962 tried to remove the regional differences and deprivations

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between the provinces. The resources of public sector of East Pakistan as they were in

1950-60 i.e. 36% were increased to 47% during 1963-67. In 3rd Five Year Plan East

Pakistan was allocated 27 billion rupees out of the expenditure of 53 billion rupees.168

The quota system regarding selection of civil servants in East Pakistan was reviewed.

Those steps of Ayub government could not satisfy the autonomy demands of the provinces. The Bengali nationalists were unsatisfied from the autocratic and centralist structure of presidential system. The Bengali intelligentsia preferred parliamentary system of government on the basis of majority in population of Pakistan. The movement for maximum autonomy became popular in East Pakistan.

The situation in West Pakistan also became adverse. The racial elites in

Balochistan resisted against One Unit. In spite of adopting conciliatory strategy the ruling elite tried to suppress the Baloch regionalists. Military troops were deputed in the province to curb down the extremism and many Baloch regional leaders were arrested.

The strategy of undue pressure strengthened the anti-centre forces. Ayub’s regime miscalculated the forces working for democracy and provincial autonomy. The regionalists and supporter of democracy launched a movement against authoritarian regime which brought Ayub’s regime to decline in March 1969. In the 1970 Elections

Ahmad Nawaz Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Attaullah Mengal were elected MNAs.

They made critical speeches against the government. They were arrested and their tittles of Sardari were taken back as a punishment. Attaullah Mengal was charged of murder and was trialed under FCR and was awarded punishment of imprisonment.169 Due to the

changes, the reaction of enmity arose. Sher Muhammad Marri who had links with Soviet

Union launched a Guerilla Movement. The movement was named “Parari”.170 It

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established twenty two base camps which spread over 4500 square miles consisting

Mengal tribe of Jhalawan. Ali Muhammad Mengal was commander of Marri-Bugti

area.171 According to Harrison, there were four hundred full time volunteers deputed at

every base camp which were called “Commando Force”. Whereas, the hundreds of others

were called “Reserved Force”, they were less organized.172 The Guerilla forces were

distributed among many groups under different commanders. They adopted classical

Guerilla War tactics avoiding the small level limited battles. The enemy could be

harassed in that way. They attacked military convoys and engineers who were deputed in

the construction of roads, army signals and telephone lines. The army retaliated with full

strength but could not chase them in difficult terrain.173 The forces took extremist

measure many times and bombarded even gatherings of Eid prayers.174

The Reaction of Central Government

The government on the other hand started pressurizing the opponents of One Unit after a

little delay. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was trialed under FCR and was awarded fourteen

years imprisonment and fine of Rs 5000. He was charged that he brought the currency

notes in circulation having written slogans against One Unit.175 Ayub Khan addressed a

public meeting at Quetta. During his speech, he threatened Baloch nationalists of dire

consequences, if they did not mend their behaviour. The Governor West Pakistan Malik

Ameer Muhammad Khan adopted strict policy to crush the powers of Sardars. He

deposed the Sardars of Marri, Mengal and Bugti tribes and replaced them with new

Sardars.176 That policy did not bring any fruitful results because the new appointed

Sardars were murdered before taking charge of their offices. The government released

Khan of Kalat in 1963.177 The government was of the view that this step would bring

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improvement in the situation but it was too late. After it the government expressed its

determination of military operation against the rebels. The military contingents were

deputed in troubled areas to assert government power.178

Pakistan army had to face severe resistance from guerilla forces in Balochistan.

There were many tough combats during 1964-65. During December 1963 about 500

Marri tribesmen attacked the army due to which a lot of people died on either side. A

second combat took place in December 1965 at Gharur during which Army had to face

heavy loss. In another combat at Bhambar army used “Napalm bombs”179 in an air raid.

Many other skirmishes took place during 1966.180 The situation became more adverse

due to distribution of land of Patfeeder areas among the services personal and their

families. The resistance started from Marri areas.181 The contingents reached at Marri

areas from Kohlu and Kharan and had to face tough resistance. Fresh contingents and

support was sent for the release of besieged soldiers. The Pishin Scouts and Zhob Militia

were ordered to enter the Marri areas. After severe combat, heavy causalities occurred on

both sides.182 According to Dehwar, “The military operation and air strike made them die hard or rather formidable. The Baloch seemed to be more united now”.183

The movement of Sher Muhammad Marri had become popular and even urban

youth joined the rebels at the mountains. An underground newspaper Spark was also

published in English, Brahui and Urdu languages by Balochistan People Liberation Front

(BPLF). However, the government announced general amnesty on January 28, 1967 to

Baloch leaders along with thirteen hundred Pararies approximately. The Government also

reinstated the previous Sardars on their offices.184 Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri came

forward with some new demand in 1968. Those included the remedy of losses, right of

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property of Sardars on minerals in particular areas, removal of revenue staff and police

and not to construct road in the area.185 As a result government re-arrested all leaders and

fight once again sparked throughout Eastern Balochistan. Meanwhile, the national

political situation became adverse. A wide spread protest was launched against

government. The experiment of “limited democracy” and “basic democracies” ended in

confusion. The highly centralized and authoritarian political system could not effectively

rule out the grievances of Baloch people. They were not given any share in power fabric

of politics of West Pakistan. Due to this process the issues of regional autonomy and

Baloch nationalism became active.

The growth of real and pure democracy was checked during Ayub regime whole of the system was revolving around the powerful personality of Ayub Khan and his own political party Convention Muslim League. After removal from president ship all met with decline. Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman a sincere supporter of regional autonomy and

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the representative of popular politics filled the political gap.186 The

Baloch nationalists stopped the activities against the government because most of their

demands had been fulfilled, although they continued to maintain their command head

quarter and Guerilla formation.

On March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan resigned from his office and General Yahya

Khan, the then Army Chief took over the reins of government187 During his broad cast

address to the nation he announced the end of One Unit and holding of elections based on adult franchise.188 Yahya Khan announced that the province of West Pakistan had to be

divided among different provinces and this task would be completed soon. “… the

administrative powers of every province rest with the Governor who appointed by the

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President and he discharges his duties according to the instructions of the President”.189

According to the announcement Balochistan came into being as an independent and complete province. The Baloch nationalist ended up their differences because their demands had been fulfilled. Yahya Khan had imposed Martial Law and suspended constitution after taking charge on and consequently the constitution of 1962 was dissolved. The political parties were banned and two major changes were brought in the future structure of country. Firstly, One Unit was dissolved and previous status of province was revived. Secondly, Balochistan was given the complete and independent status of governor province. Yahya Khan Government also released some Baloch nationalist.190 The undemocratic regime of Ayub Khan deprived country from

Balochistan’s effective role in national and state construction process. It is worth

mentioning that Ayub Khan, in his last days of his rule was ready to accommodate the

opposition but not at the cost of dissolution of One Unit. Yahya Khan dissolved the

Province of West Pakistan with the hope that political demands in both parts of the

country would be fulfilled.191 He revived the autonomy of Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and

established a complete province of Balochistan.192 The new province started working

w.e.f. July 1, 1970.193 This decision was welcomed all over the province with great

enthusiasm and zeal. People celebrated the occasion.194 A torch bearing procession was

taken out on July 1, 1970 at Quetta at the announcement of end of One Unit,195 after achieving a full-fledge province through untiring efforts.196

The worth mentioning event was the participation of Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman in the celebration. He assured the Baloch leaders that he would support the just demands of people of Balochistan in the upcoming National Assembly (Parliament). The Baloch

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participants also assured their complete cooperation regarding pathetic plight of Bengalis in response.197 General Riaz Hussain was appointed first Governor of the province.198

During the process of formation of an independent province there were many ups and downs in the politics of Balochistan. The condition of Balochistan Muslim League became apparent that it had not any clear policy or stand point from any reference. People were shocked to know that it had already got prepared two types of placards, one in the favour of dissolution of One Unit and the other to maintain One Unit. The fact was revealed when a few placards to maintain One Unit were pasted on the walls mistakenly by workers along with the placards of welcoming dissolution of One Unit. It created very bad impression about ML on peoples’ minds.199

The previous rulers of Baluchistan State Union passed a resolution on January 13,

1970 in which they demanded to reinstate BSU. Their demands were not supported

properly by people. On the other hand, government also did not pay heed to their

demand.200 During all those circumstances, the NAP emerged as a strong political force

in Balochistan but differences emerged between Pashtoons and Baloch elements

regarding the demarcation of the boundary of province on lingual basis. Abdul Samad

Achkzai a Pahtoon leader demanded that the province be divided between Pashtoon and

Baloch areas. The central leadership of NAP did not agree on this issue and it became the

cause of separation of Achakzai from the NAP. Achakzai laid down the foundation of a

new party named as Pashtoonkhwa National Awami Party (PkMAP).201

The main objective and manifesto of his party was to create a larger Pashtoon province by including all the Pashtoon areas into NW Pashtoonkhwa National Awami

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Party (PkMAP).202 Yahya Khan made a good start by abolishing One Unit. The nationalist had ended up their differences and enmities because their main demand was

fulfilled but they were not sure about the future. They adopted the policy of ‘wait and

see’. They neither closed their headquarters nor ended guerilla formations. They worked

hard to spread the structure of their command. They gathered large forces and at least

became defecto authority in Jhalawan and Marri-Bugti areas.203

The 1970 Elections

The general elections were decided to be held on October 5, 1970, according to the announcement of General Yahya Khan, which later on were delayed till December, 1970.

He had lifted the ban from political activities w.e.f. January 1, 1970. He issued an ordinance called Legal Framework Order (LFO) on March 13, 1970.204 The formation of

National Assembly and its duties regarding constitution making were enumerated in that

ordinance. The representation of national and provincial assemblies was specified

according to the census of 1960.

East Pak Punjab Sindh Balochistan NWFP Tribal

Area

National 162 82 27 04 18 07

Assembly

Seats for 7 3 1 1 1 -

Women

Total 169 85 28 05 19 07

Provincial 300 180 60 20 40 -

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Assembly

Women 10 06 02 01 02

Indirect

Election

Total 310 186 62 21 42

Source: A.H. Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers of Fortune (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1988), pp.46-47.

Twenty five political parties launched campaign for National Assembly elections.

Collectively 1570 candidates contested for 300 seats.205 The scenario of political parties which participated in election for 4 seats of Balochistan for National Assembly is as under.

ML JI PMQ PPP Council PDP JUI JUI Total

ML NAP

Wali

Seats 1 2 4 1 2 1 4 3 18

Source: Election Commission, Report on General Elections Pakistan 1970-1971, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp.204-5. The election campaign of NAP in Balochistan was under the control of Attaullah

Mengal, Khai Bakhsh Marri and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. Everyone was working at local level. The personality behind the curtain was Nawab Akbar Bugti who was a steering force and worked more than all.206 Bugti, whole heartedly worked for three candidates.

His brother Ahmad Nawaz Bugti was an independent candidate for Provincial Assembly and his son in law Mir Chakar Dombki was also independent candidate for Provincial

Assembly seat.207 Dr. Abdul Haye Baloch was ticket holder of the NAP.

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During elections, PPP and NAP avoided from opposing each other.208 Mir Ahmad

Yar Khan joined Muslim League Qayum and his two sons contested elections only

because their opponents were contesting.209 Agha Mohiud Din was defeated by Ghaus

Bakhsh Bizenjo and Dr Abdu Haye defeated Asgha Yahya Khan. The third seat of NAP

was secured by Khair Bakhsh Marri.210 He participated in elections from Quetta Sibi constituency and defeated the candidate of the Muslim League Mir Taj Muhammad

Jamali.211 The fourth elected candidate as Maulavi Abdul Haq of JUI who was elected

from Pashto speaking constituency.212 He defeated Abdul Samad Achakzai, Yahya

Bakhtiar and Nouroz Muhammad Khan Jogezai.213

The PPP could not secure any seat in the elections, on the other hand people of

Balochistan had completely rejected ML.214 The elections had at last provided an

opportunity to the people of Balochistan that their representation should be from their own province.215 In the province of Balochistan, PPP contested elections on one National

and six Provincial Assembly seats. Even the security amount of all candidates of PPP was

confiscated.216

Following were the results of Balochistan Provincial Assembly Elections.

Total PPP PML PML PML JUI JI JI NAP Other Independen

Q COU CON Parties t

N V

20 - 2 - - 3 - - 8 1 6

Vote 1.9 15.0 2.6 11.0 2.1 19.8 1.4 46.2

% % % - % - % % % %

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Source: Election Commission, Report on General Elections Pakistan 1970-1971, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp.219. In NWFP, NAP, JUI and ML (Q) remained successful. NAP secured 3 seats of National

Assembly whereas JUI secured 1. On the other hand Awami League got clear-cut majority by occupying 160 out of 162 National Assembly seats. PPP was able to secure

81 seats of National Assembly out of 138 seats.

According to Mehrunnisa Ali:

The regional basis of the parties clearly emerged from 1970 election results….NAP having its roots in two sensitive border region and firmly committed to regional autonomy; it is a force to reckon within these areas same is the case with JUI.217

The election results reflected the ugly political reality which portrayed the polarized electorate based on regional frame work.218 Thus, Awami League emerged as majority party in East Pakistan as well as in the whole country whereas PPP as a majority party in West Pakistan. Moreover, the base of PPP was in the Punjab and Sindh and on the other hand NAP and JUI were having majority in Balochistan and NWFP. Awami

League contested elections for maximum provincial autonomy for East Pakistan based on its six point agenda. On the other hand, PPP instead of assuring provincial autonomy for all provinces of Pakistan was not willing to reduce the powers of central government. The

NAP and JUI supported Awami League so that they might be able to get maximum autonomy in Balochistan and NWFP.219 Nawab Akbar Bugti in a statement, on February

11, 1971, declared that Awami League’s six points were in the best interest of smaller provinces.220

It is also stated that only two parties from Balochistan and NWFP were supporter of six points whereas all other smaller political parties in West Pakistan supported PPP

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for a broad based and viable centre.221 Therefore, a new political structure emerged from

the elections of 1970 according to which there were three centres of power, i.e. in East

Pakistan Awami League, in the Punjab and Sindh PPP and in Balochistan and NWFP

NAP-JUI.222

There was another supreme power above all under the command of General

Yahaya Khan i.e. military, the fourth power. There was a basic issue for Yahya Khan after the elections that to whom the power should be handed over. That issue became very much complicated due to personality clash and their difference of political opinion about future constitution of Pakistan.223 Therefore, the game of power politics started

between three personalities, i.e. Yahya, Mujeeb and Bhutto. They were not prepared to

agree upon any formula of power sharing. The affairs reached at point of no return and

consequently East Pakistan became separate from West Pakistan on December 16, 1971

when general Niazi formally laid down his arms before Indian army Chief Jugjit Singh

Arrora along with 93,000 troops. It was a black day for Pakistan whereas Indians

celebrated the day.224 After the dismemberment of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan was

criticized severely by the lower military officers and people of West Pakistan.225 Then, there was no space for General Yahya Khan.226 At last power was handed over to

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Thus Bhutto had become President of Pakistan and first civilian

Martial Law Administrator and. In this way a new age of Pakistan’s history started from

December 20, 1971 with the advent of Bhutto rule.227

Amazingly, nobody was expecting that the charge of Chief Martial Law

Administrator would also be handed over to Bhutto. The oath taking ceremony was held

at the Presidency where negotiations continued between the relieving and the upcoming

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presidents for two hours before singing the document.228 According to Lawrence Ziring,

“to no one surprised it was Bhutto who called upon to pick up the pieces of our shattered nation”.229

Balochistan was a backward area of Pakistan, the British did not bring any social, political or economic change before independence because their objectives were mostly of strategic in nature. Their policies kept Balochistan aloof from modern factors of development. The old tribal system with certain amendments was continued which fulfilled their political interests. It was bad luck that the forth coming governments maintained status-quo even after establishment of Pakistan. They did not take proper measures to alter the situation. The Baloch nationalistic sentiments started during colonial rule and they were strengthening during that period. The utmost severe resistance against

One Unit arose from Balochistan. The government took severe steps under which the nationalist leaders from Balochistan were arrested. The people started armed resistance as reaction. In response to it government launched military operations against trouble makers. During the whole rule of Ayub Khan there was restlessness in Balochistan due to rebellious and military operations. Due to those steps nationalist sentiments arose. The military operation was a temporary solution of the issue. During all resistance movement an important matter was revealed that there was not separatist movement in real sense because their demands were based on more vast provincial autonomy

References & Notes

1 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), p.114. 2 Taj Muhammad Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism: Its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p.229. 3 Ibid., p.229. 4 Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1983), p.111.

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5 Ibid., p.112. 6 Ibid., pp.112-13. 7 Inayatullah Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan (Stuttgart: Steineerverlage Wiesbaden-GMBH, 1987), p.352. 8Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan (Quetta, Third World publication, 1994), pp.228-29. 9 Ibid. 10 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism, pp. 232-233, also see, Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, pp.299-300. 11 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.116. 12 A.B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), p.204. 13 Ibid., p.205. 14 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.118. 15 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism, p.235. 16 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.119. 17 Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh-e-Balochistan (Quetta: Kalat Publishers, 2010), p.579. 18 Awan, Baluchistan, p.221. 19 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.120. 20 Dushka H. Saiyid, “The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality,” Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, p.43. 21 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.323. 22 Tahir Amin, National Movements of Pakistan (Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1998),p.71. 23 Naseer, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, p.554. also see, Tariq Rehman, Language and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1997), p.161. 24 Amin, National Movements of Pakistan, p.73. 25 Ibid.,, p.85. 26 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (New York: Carneige Endowment for international Peace, 1981),p. 26. 27 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.120. 28 Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.191. 29 Awan, Baluchistan, p.211. 30 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p. 323. Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.196. 32 Ibid., p.197. 33 Awan, Baluchistanp.211 34 Gul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan (Urdu) (Quetta, Nisa Traders, 1982) p.526. 35 Awan, Baluchistan, p.219. 36 Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.357. 37 Ibid. 38 M. Rafique Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1973), p.53. 39 Quddus, Tribal Balochistan, p.131. 40 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.206. 41Afzal, Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam, pp.56-57. 42 Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.146. 43 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.332. 44 M. Rafique Afzal, Speech and Statement of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, 1941-51 (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1975), p.324. 45 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.332. 46 Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.151. 47 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.209. 48 Ibid 49 Ibid.

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50 The four princely states in the South West Pakistan Kalat, Kharan, Las Bela and Makran declared their union under the title of ‘Baluchistan States Union’ (October 3, 1952 and October 14, 1955) for details see, ‘Gwillim Law (1999). Administrative Subdivisions of Countries: A Comprehensive World Reference, 1900 through 1998. McFarland. p. 276. 51 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.333. 52 Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.151. 53 Awan, Baluchistan, 214-15. 54 Ibid, p.124. 55 Ibid. 56 Agha Abdul Hamid Khan was an ex-civil servant. For details see, S. Fakharuddin Shah, “State Elites’ Policies towards Balochistan (1947-70): Its Dynamics and Impacts”, pp.377-390, IJMSS, Vol.03 Issue-01, (January 2015), p.380. Available online on, http://www.ijmr.net.in. 57 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, 334. 58 Ibid., pp.215-216. 59 Ibid. 60 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.334. 61Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.151. 62 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.336. 63 Awan, Baluchistan, pp.215-216. 64 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2006), p.81. 65 Ibid, p.81. 66 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.267. 67 Amin, Ehtno National Movements of Pakistan, p.84. 68 Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.187. 69 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.267. 70 Harrison, In Afhganistan’s Shadow, p.27. 71They were; Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Republican Party. M. Rafiq Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947 – 1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural research, 1976), p.216. 72 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-97 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication), p.63. 73 Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: Political Autobiography of Mir Yar Muhammad Khan Baluch The Khan of Kalat (Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p.56. 74 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri, Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan (Quetta: Nisa Trader, 1985) p.110. 75 Rehman, Language and Politics in Pakistan, p.158. 76 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.285. 77 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.224. 78 Awan, Baluchistan, p.224. 79 Jang, Karachi, December 1, 1955. 80 S. Fakharuddin Shah, “State Elites’ Policies towards Balochistan (1947-70): Its Dynamics and Impacts”, p.382. 81 Awan, Baluchistan, p.222. 82 National Awami Party, Manifesto (Karachi: Anjuman Press),p.5. 83 Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism, p.267. 84 Awan, Baluchistan, pp. 220-221. 85 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 82. 86 Ibid., p. 83. 87 Awan, Baluchistan, p.225. 88 Axmann, Back to the Future, p.285. 89 Ibid.,, p.286. 90 Mehrunnisa Ali, Politics of Federalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1996), p.94. 91 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Article 106 (1), fifth schedule – federal List. 92 Ibid., Article 106 (3), Fifth Schedule – Provincial list.

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93 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.109. 94 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Article 106(2), Fifth Schedule – Concurrent list. 95 Ibid.,, Article 191(2), Fifth Schedule – Concurrent list. 96 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.117. 97 Mehrunnisa Ali, Politics of Federalism in Pakistan, p.98. 98 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956, Article 193. 99 Ibid., Article 118. 100 Dawn, Karachi, October 9, 1958. 101 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.27. 102 Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.359. 103 Ibid. 104 Nasir, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, p.340. 105 Awan, Baluchistan, p.220. 106 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion (Quetta: Gosha-e-Abad, 1988),p.195 107 Nasir, Balochistan in the Light of Old and Modern History, pp.337-338. 108 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, p.196. 109 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, in Pakistan Horizon, pp.41-62, No. 58 (2) April 2005, p.45. 110 Ibid., p.46. 111 Ibid. 112 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.27. 113 Ibid. 114 Awan, Baluchistan, pp.223-24. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid., p.225. 117 Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Pakistan A Political Profile, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1991), p.179. 118 Awan, Baluchistan, p.225. 119Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.167. 120Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.27. 121Ibid; pp.27-28. 122Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.28. 123Mir-Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Balochistan (Karachi Royal Book Comp. 1975) pp.180-90. 124Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Development (London: West view 1980), p.163. 125Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, p.200. 126Axmannn, Back to the Future, p.286. 127 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.28. 128 Awan, Baluchistan, p.227. 129 Axmannn, Back to the Future, p.228. 130 Rehana Saeed Hashmi, “Baloch Ethnicity: An Analysis of the Issue and Conflict with State”, Journal of South Asian Studies, pp. 57-84, Vol,29 No.1 January-July 2014, p.69. 131 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.29. 132 Amin, National Movements of Pakistan, p.104. 133 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.28. 134 Ibid. 135 Awan, Baluchistan, p.228. 136 Rehana Saeed Hashmi, “Baloch Ethnicity: An Analysis of the Issue and Conflict with State”, Journal of South Asian Studies, pp. 57-84, Vol,29 No.1 January-July 2014, p.69. 137Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, p.201, Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.28. 138 Ahmad, Baluchistan, p.169. 139 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp.28-20.

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140 Ahmad, Baluchistan,, p.169. 141 Dawn, Karachi, October 14, 1958. 142 Awan, Baluchistan, pp.225-226. 143 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.46. 144 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion p.202. 145Khan, Inside Balochistan, p.189. 146Amin, National Movements of Pakistan, p.96. 147Ibid., p.106. 148Awan, Baluchistan, p.229. 149Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, p.203. 150Outlook, Vol.1. No.24, September 16, 1972. p.10. 151 Gulshan Majeed and Rehana Saeed Hashmi, “Baloch Resistance during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era: Causes and Consequences” Journal of South Asian Studies, pp.321-331, Vol,29 No.1 January-July 2014, p. 327. 152Ibid., p.10. 153Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p..174. 154Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.252. 155Ibid, p.252. 156Outlook, Vlo.2, No.41 January 12, 1975, p.10. 157Ibid. 158Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.30. 159Ibid.,, p.33. 160Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.175. 161Sher Muhammad Marri’s Interview with the News International, July 9, 1992. 162Baloch, The Problem of Greater Baluchistan, p.296. 163Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch Nationalist Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion, p.203. 164Outlook, Vol.1. No. 24 September, 16, 1972, p.11. 165Yusuf, Pakistan, A Study of Political Development, pp.108-109. 166 The Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, third Schedule of the Constitution Article 30. 167 Mehrunnisa, Politics of Federalism in Pakistan, p.131. 168 Outline of the Third Five Year Plan (Karachi: The Government of Pakistan Press, 1965), pp.5-12. 169 M. Rafiq Afzal Pakistan History and Politics 1947-1971 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 331. 170 Parari is a Balochi word which is used to describe a militant person or group with grievances that cannot be solved by talk. 171 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.30. 172 Ibid. 173 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.368. 174 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.47. 175 Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, pp.332-333. 176 S. Fakharuddin Shah, “State Elites’ Policies towards Balochistan (1947-70): Its Dynamics and Impacts”, p.386. 177 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.368. 178 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism, p.305. 179 It is a kind of Bomb which results into quick inflammation and the target come under fire within few moments. 180 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.368. 181 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem”, p.47. 182 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, pp.368-69. 183 Ibid. 184 Ahmad, Baluchistan: Its Strategic Importance, p.176. 185 Ibid.

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186 Pat Feeder area is located in South-East of Marri-Bugti area. It has fertile land and irrigated by Pat Feeder canal taken out from Indus River. 187 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.188. 188 Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Pakistan a Political Profile 1947-1988 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1991), p.235. 189 Rafe-uz-Zaman, ed. Pakistan year Book 1970 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1970),p.68. 190 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.33. 191 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments, 1947-97 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1999), p.113. 192 Manzoor-ud-Din Ahmad, ed. Contemporary Pakistan Politics, Economy and society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p.10. 193 Sherbaz Khan Mazri, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999),p.165. 194 Tahir Muhammad Khan, Saiyasiat-i-Balochistan (Urdu) (Quetta Goshaa-e-Adab, 1988), p.232. 195 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.165. 196 Muhammad Khan, Saiyasiat-i-Balochistan, p.232. 197 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.165. 198 Ibid. 199 Aziz Muhammad Bugti, Balochistan, Political Culture and Tribal System (Urdu) (Lahore: Fiction House, 2003), p.189. 200 Mir Gul Khan Nasir, Baluchistan in the Light of Ancient and Modern History (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982), pp.353-55. 201 Muhammad Khan, Saiyasiat-i-Balochistan, p.232. 202 Bugti, Balochistan, Political Culture and Tribal System, p.162. 203 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.376. 204 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Development (England, Dawson West Views, 1980), p.100. 205 Lawrence Ziring, “Militarism in Pakistan the Yahya Khan Interregnum” in W.H. Wriggins ed. Pakistan in Transition. (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975), p.213. 206 Awan, Balochistan: Historical and Political Process,p.253. 207 Ibid., p.174. 208 Aziz Bugti, Balochistan, p.35. 209 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.174. 210Ibid., p.174. 211 Aziz Bugti, Balochistan, p.81. 212 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.174. 213 Aziz Bugti, Balochistan, p.195. 214 Ibid., pp.35,190. 215 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.175. 216 Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power, p.312. 217 Mehrunnisa Ali, “Federalism and Regionalism in Pakistan” in V. Grover and R. Arora ed. Pakistan Fifty Years of Independence (Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, n.d.), p.123. 218 Manzoor-ud-din Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, p.11. 219 Ibid. 220Hafeez Malik, “Problem of Regionalism in Pakistan” in W.H. wriggins ed. Paksitan in Transition, 106. 221 Ibid. 222 Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, p.11. 223 Ibid. 224 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.369. 225 Lawrence Ziring, “Militarism in Pakistan” in W.H. Wriggins, p.224. 226 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Development, p.104. 227 Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan, p.13. 228 Dawn, Karachi, December 21,1971. 229 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, p.104.

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CHAPTER THREE

BALOCHISTAN-CENTRE RELATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1972-1977

The Latin word foedus is considered as the origin of federalism, which stands for an

agreement or accord under a political or legal system about the distribution of authority.

It can be functioned reciprocally and with common understanding. The main ingredient is

its participatory aspect in power structure. Federalism appears to be the political principle

of the current era, a time that is marked simultaneously by globalization and

localization. 1 Different explanations about federalism stress upon the distribution of power between Centre and its units. 2 K.C Wheare who considers US Federal System as an ideal has called federal government as a union of such states among whom different

powers are distributed at mutual level independently. For example the issues of finance,

foreign relations and defense are vested with central government while others are given

to provincial governments. According to it, people are governed, simultaneously; both by

the central and regional governments. Every person is considered subject of both the

central and provincial governments. 3 While mentioning the necessary features of a

federal government William Ricker is of the view that a federal government is collection

of governments which rule over the people at the same time and same territory. The

people under it must have authority to take decisions independently.4

A lot of definitions of federalism explain the most prominent feature, i.e.

distribution of authority between both levels of government. It is necessary to maintain

balance between the ideological trends of federalism and their practical implications.

Preston King brought the matter under consideration and stated that differences between

both levels were hindrance to comprehend the concepts of federalism. He studied

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federalism from both angles, i.e. ideological and practical. Keeping in concentration

aforementioned definitions about twenty eight countries with 40% of world population

are there e.g. USA, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Despite of these states

there are some states which contain federal features.5 Federalism covers basic political identity of its units. The federal principles consider the value of dialogue and discussions between the centre and its units as essential.6 The federal System of government is of such kind under which state authority is distributed between centre and its units under a

constitution and such state is being called federal in nature. The national unity and

authority along with state rights is called federalism.7

The federal system is an agreement between two prominent political forces. First

a united front which is the result of common interests and objectives, second every part is

determined to maintain its identity. The beauty of federal system is that it involves the

central as well as provincial tier in law giving process. Every level of government is

assigned particular responsibilities as well as authorities which are specified under any

sort of constitutional arrangement; therefore the sovereignty in the state be divided into

centre and provinces. Neither central government nor provincial governments can

transgress into each other’s constitutional jurisdictions. Federal states are in a way

sovereign, in their own jurisdictions, they are sovereign and independent states among the

comity of nations. In such states the principle of participatory norm is adopted to run state

affairs properly.8

The federal system is suitable for states having heterogeneous society. It is more

appropriate form of political system for the societies that consist of multi-cultural multi-

ethnic and multi-linguistic people. Pluralistic societies need this sort of system which is

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suitable for their peculiar needs. It is worth mentioning that societies having diversified

groups have often differences of severe nature regarding, economic, social and political

interests which are generally conflicting to each other. Under this situation federalism is

opted as the best solution.9

K. C. Wheare has mentioned the importance of legal and institutional aspects of

federalism. 10 According to him the central and provincial governments should work

separately and independently within their jurisdiction with regard to the federal principles.11 According to Watts federalism is a principle of compromise on concurrent demands and regional diversity in a society. He further observes that in the federal system, federal and regional governments work in coordination and none is under the other. 12 Federalism can also be explained as a political system which facilitates the

smooth running of the affairs between central and provincial governments and having an

exclusive mechanism for final decision in the case of any controversy.13 Federalism is an

invisible and amalgamated structure.14Although there is no controversy among political thinkers upon federal principle of division of power yet there are multi-opinions regarding the nature of centre-province relationship. The concepts of “dual federalism” and “cooperative federalism” reflect the diversity of their views about the nature of relations. According to J.D. Duchacek there are three conditions for liberal sort of relations between federal and provincial governments; firstly both should have control over financial resources to fulfill their responsibilities; secondly there should be proper distribution of affairs, so there will not be any sort of interference in other’s affairs;

thirdly unilaterally no government can bring any amendment in the constitution. 15

Cooperative federalists are not in agreement with conservative approach.16 According to

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Vile the spirit of federalism is that neither government be dependent completely on other

level government but this view is more close to the passion of superior inter-

dependence.17

Few political scientists are more focused on the adjustment and tuning up the

relationship between both levels of governments. Reagon is of the opinion, “The new

style federalism refers to a multi-faceted positive relationship of shared action. The

meaning of federalism today lies in a process of joint action, not in the matter of legal

status. It lies not in what government is but in what it does. It is a matter of action rather

than structure. It is dynamic and changing, not static and constant.” 18 Some other

political experts are critic of federalism because of the classification of affairs, rigidity

and traditional conservativeness. According to their views the weaknesses in-built in

conservative concepts are obstacles in practicing the modern requirements. Even though

inherent differences of federalism are resolved through cooperative federalism. It is now

dynamic because of having harmony with modern political, social and economic views.

This is now evident that federal system has been preferred upon confederal system.

Almost one third of the world population has adopted federal system in one way

or the other. The states which are governed through the federal system are; Australia,

Canada, Switzerland, Malaysia, US, Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil, and Pakistan etc. Although,

the US is a federation but instead of parliamentary system it has presidential system.

Australia, India and Germany have federal parliamentary system.19 In these states Federal

system is not homogeneous, but still governments at both levels have share in sovereign

power at central as well as provincial. No government can deny the affairs of others’.20

Federal scheme is a step to maintain unity in a society having colliding tendencies in

126 diversified political, social as well as economic context. It is a strategy to achieve the common objectives and to maintain individual identity, independent way of action, unity and cooperation. The setup is suitable for the societies where regional interests, values and norms can be achieved jointly according to a political and constitutional frame work.

All federations carry common features, even though there may be minor differences in their peculiar political conditions and historical context. The common feature of federalism is sense of coexistence of both level governments. Federal or central and regional or constituent units are autonomous to function in their specified jurisdictions. It depends on cooperative implementation which safeguards their spheres.

The written constitution is sustained by the federation which designs the rule of federal contract among centre and the unit. It also specifies the conditions and principles for constituent units or provinces to exercise their authority. Distribution of authority and frame work of relations envisaged in constitution cannot be altered except the constitutional amendment, which is considered a complicated as well as difficult to do.

At regional level, the authority and jurisdiction of responsibility is assigned to a regional unit through constitution, but no model exists for the division of authority between centre and its units. For every political system there is a need of consensus of distribution of authority and it needs evolution with the passage of time, it acts in itself as an institution.

Another important need for a federal system is not having centralized authority at centre.

It emphasizes on devolution of power to lower level and it is protected through constitutional bindings. In a federation, both the governments acquire authority and power directly through constitution. This authority cannot be seized through any executive order nor simple legislation, or through any government against each other.

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The sovereign judiciary is another quality of federalism which has final authority to

interpret the constitution, in the case of any controversy upon authority between central

government and its units. Federalism is an effort to resolve the socio-political, economic

and administrative issues in heterogeneous societies; it also accommodates the diversity

and regional identity of different units in a federation.

According to K C Wheare“… for autocracy or dictatorship, either in general

government or in regional government, seems certain, sooner or later, to destroy the

equality of state and that independence which the government must enjoy, each in its own

sphere.”21In a system based on democracy, and non-centric system, the theory increases manifold the opportunity for citizens to participate in political activities. It helps to evolve consensus in political dialogues and give opportunity to a group or a political party to engage with other. Madison was well aware of the fact that if the opportunities being analyzed, federation provides better opportunities. According to another opinion the proper distribution of authority between central and regional governments increases avenues both masses and the political entities also accelerate multi-dimensional politics.

Afore mentioned diversified ideas and concepts about federalism reflect the views of political scientists about the important qualities and principles of federalism.

Constitution is a superior law which determines the jurisdictions of central and regional governments. The governments up to a level exercise autonomy in legal, administrative

and fiscal terms. Even after the demarcation of authority, the central as well as units

sustain the passion of influence and cooperation. The authorities and responsibilities of

every sort of governments are mentioned in a written constitution which determines a

legal structure between centre and units and their relationship. The procedure of an

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amendment in a constitution should not be so flexible that the governments of every level

can unilaterally amend it. The need for rigid constitution is evident that if the amendment

procedure is easy then provincial governments or units can easily suffer and never feel

constitutional protection.

Since in a federation central and provincial governments exist, constitution is

superior upon the authority and powers of the governments. Likewise there must be a

superior federal court in every federation which interprets as well as decides the constitutional conflicts between central and provincial governments. Federal court makes the federation viable in the specification of authority at every level. Only an independent powerful and impartial judiciary can shoulder the responsibility envisaged in the constitution.

Federalism, Federal Political System and Federation

To explain federalism three terminologies have to be identified i.e. federalism, federal political system and federation. Federalism is a descriptive term which argues for multi- stages government under which the element of self-rule and participatory-rule is embodied. It is constituted by already specified combined value of unity and diversity. It emerges on the basis of safety and flourishing the prominent identities in a large political union. Under a federal principle the unity and anti-centralist tendency may work at the same time.

Federal political system and federation are narrative terms which can be applied on special conditions of political organization. The term federal political system is relevant to broad based political system in which relatively central source of unitary

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system and strength is present. The government has two or more than two levels which

amalgamate the elements of combine institutions and power-sharing for the constituent

units. Some political systems which are generally not relevant to the federal system can

have federal features because national political leaders focus on practical steps rather than

ideological issues. Therefore, dual system developed such as European Union, although

this is a pure confedral system yet it has adopted federal features in the present era.

Centre represents a special species in federal political systems in which neither centre nor its constituent units are constitutionally under each other. Both the centre and its units are sovereign in their capacities being awarded by the constitution. The

government of each level is directly elected by its citizens and has the privilege to use its

authority regarding executive, legislative and taxes. The general characteristics of the

structure of federation are specific for federal political system which are as following; the

government of both levels, i.e. centre and its constituent units, is directly addressing the

citizens; both the governments may have executive and administrative authority and

specification of revenue resources according to a constitutional procedure ensuring each

other’s sovereignty; representation of the regions in the federal policy making institution

provided by the federal government; a supreme written constitution with the consent of

constituent units; a system for the solution of the disputes among units or with the centre

in the shape of courts or referendum; a methodology or institution responsible for

collaboration and cooperation among the governments particularly in the institutions

having shared responsibilities.

Many important points are worth mentioning. The constitutional structure and

operational reality are two different phenomenons. The political structure can be

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transformed through constitutional operation. In Canada and India the initial constitution

was quasi federal under which many extra privileges were meant for centre which is the

quality of Unitary System. However, in Canada these powers were misused whereas in

India they have been moderated. In both the cases gradually it evolved toward full-

fledged federal system. Second worth-mentioning example of operational practice is

Switzerland, Russia and Belgium. In this way it is necessary to study constitutional law,

politics and their relationship to understand federal systems and federations. Other federal political systems’ major structure can be understood in the context of its political dimension. The federal system of governance has a very strong relation with democracy.

Though, in such federations the opinion of citizens of the constituent units is voluntary.

Non-centralization is a decisive principle in political decision-making in constituent institutions. The ray of hope in the context of deciding matters is open political bargaining for the political power focus is evident proof of methodology for decision making. Simultaneously, it provides system of check and balance to block concentration of power.

In all this process the sanctity of constitution is a bench-mark because both the governments extract their authority from it. Third kind of federalism can be regional or geographically united, or the both. There are examples of such federations where regionally far-situated units are also included. The most important example of such

federation is Belgium. Under constitutional division of power between units is a

traditional pattern of governance under federation. In various federations constitutional

authority is equally divided into main constituent units. It is worth-mentioning that in

some federations the relationship between main units is not on equal grounds e.g.

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Canada, India, Spain and Russia. Furthermore in some federations main constituent units are categorized into two or more categories e.g. Malaysia and Russia and very few have categorization on the ground of main units and territorial distinctive units.22

The Political Developments, 1972-1977

The political scenario in Pakistan is stained with the ‘Blame Game’ since its inception.

The accusations and counter accusations between Centre and Balochistan are always put against each other which are mere wastage of potential and time. Low constructive political approach has been adopted by both the parties. It has become customary to severely criticize the failures and unaccomplished tasks of every government of the past.

Sometimes drastic results emerged out due to such allegations which result in the improper accountability of former governments.

On March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan resigned and Yahya Khan assumed the reins of government and the country was, once again, under the clenches of Martial Law. The

National Assembly of Pakistan and both the provincial assemblies were dissolved.

The Legal Frame Work Order 1970

On March 30, 1970, Yahya Khan introduced the Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) which provided directions for the future constitution. The foremost step of Yahya’s Regime was the dissolution of One Unit and to undo parity so as to meet the demands of the autonomists. The LFO provided direct elections for National Assembly and Provincial

Assemblies for each province elected on the basis of adult franchise; Federal Constitution based upon Islamic ideology; Muslim as head of the state; provision of fundamental rights; maximum provincial autonomy and removal of economic disparity between the

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provinces.23 The LFO required the National Assembly to prepare the constitution within

120 days. The East Pakistan was given 169 seats, including the reserved seats for women.

The rest of the seats were to be distributed among the provinces of the west-wing. A simple majority was enough for the approval of a constitution.24 The principle of simple

majority for the approval of the constitution was unusual for a country where an

atmosphere of mistrust and political confrontation among units was at its peak.

The General Elections 1970

It was announced on October 5, 1970, that the general elections would held on the basis

of adult franchise. The regime’s announcement for holding the general elections was

warmly welcomed the by the political parties. The parties finalized their manifestos and

announced to contest the elections. The political activities began in January, 1970.

In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman emerged as leading leader. He stood

for the maximum autonomy. He blamed West Pakistan for every wrong done in East

Pakistan. He targeted the Central Government and warned the people of East Pakistan

that if the Awami League was not given votes, they would be further exploited and East

Pakistan would remain the colony of West Pakistan. 25 The demand of provincial

autonomy was included in his six points which were first adopted in February 5, 1966, at

Lahore.26

The Six Points defined in 1966 were (i) a federal form of government on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, (ii) federal powers over defence and foreign affairs only and residuary powers to be vested in the provinces; (iii) two separate freely convertible currencies or one currency with guarantees against the flight of capital from one province to another and a separate banking reserve; (iv) units to have power of taxation and revenue collection; (v) two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; (vi) a separate militia or para-military force for East Pakistan.27

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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto surfaced on the political scene of West Pakistan with “idealism,

vision, brilliance and authoritarianism.” 28 He formed his own political organization

named Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967. PPP expressed its election manifesto in the

famous slogan.

“Islam is our faith.

Socialism is our economy.

Democracy is our politics.

All power to the people”. 29

It was further summed up which was Roti, Kapra aur Makan.30

The National Awami Party (NAP) contested the 1970 elections and proved to be a

popular party in the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan.31 It was considered a leftist

party believing in socialism. It believed in maximum provincial autonomy. The party had

also played vital role in anti-One Unit campaign. It condemned the atrocities occurred

upon the Baloch during the regime of Ayub Khan. Khair Bakhsh Marri, Attaullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo were the organizer of NAP’s election campaign in the province of Balochistan. Its election campaign in Balochistan was mostly organized and run by, and. 32 Nawab Akbar Bugti prominent and powerful Baloch Sardar also

participated in the election campaign of the NAP. The Nawab had become tribal chief in

very young age and started his political career in 1958 from the platform of Pakistan

Republican Party. During the Ayub regime he remained Federal Minister of State. Once

he was given death sentence for the alleged killing of his relative, however, it was

reduced to fourteen years imprisonment on a mercy petition due to the help of Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto. In the following years he was arrested and released time and again.33

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Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), the follower of Deobandi school of thought, was also

participant political- cum-religious party in the elections. It was divided into two factions.

The JUI (Hazarvi Group) was headed by Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti, its General

Secretary was Maulana Mufti Mehmood. On the other hand, JUI (Thanvi) was headed by

Maulana Ehtsham-ul-Haq Thanvi. Its main agenda was the enforcement of political system based on Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.34

Jammat-i-Islami (J1) was founded in August 1941 by Maulana Syed Abdul Ala

Maududi.35 It took part in the elections with the manifesto of introducing Islamic spirit in

the state institutions. Its aims and objectives were to have close ties with the Islamic

World, socio-economic justice and religious freedom, etc.36

Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) was another political-cum-religious party which

contested the elections. Its demand was the introduction and implementation of political

system based on Islamic principles.37All the major political parties contested the election

of 1970 with their own political programmes.

The surge and unrest in East Pakistan primarily motivated the ending of One Unit and the holding elections at provincial level. The government was in severe difficulty to tackle the ever-increasing demand for provincial autonomy and in the wake of this difficulty it took severe actions in certain areas. However, to fight on more than one front could be hardly affordable. Therefore, a policy of reconciliation was adopted in the province. The 1970 elections were held on the basis of adult franchise and direct elections. The elections were first ever effort to have an exercise for democracy in the country. PPP got majority in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh whereas the NAP and

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JUI were successful in NWFP and Balochistan. On the other hand, East Pakistan elections were swept by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League (AL).

Hence, the election results reflected triangle of political power, i.e. AL, PPP and the NAP-JUI in East Pakistan, Sindh and the Punjab, and NWFP and Balochistan respectively. As a whole, the AL was leading one by getting 160 seats. Resultantly, it came out as the single largest political party in the National Assembly. The PPP occupied

81 and the NAP- JUI captured four seats of the National Assembly.38

The election results in Balochistan proved to be extraordinary success for the nationalists their majority had become Provincial Assembly member. Eight out of twenty elected members of Balochistan Provincial Assembly were of the NAP. The independents and splinter groups occupied the remaining seats. The most important among the NAP elected were; Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri Nawab Akbar

Bugti, and Sardar Ataullah Mengal. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, old nationalist guard, was nominated as Governor and Sardar Ataullah Mengal Chief Minister of the province.

There was no principle framed in the LFO regarding units’ consensus or any special majority for constitution making. There was only simple majority and the AL had obtained already. The formation of Central government was no more difficult for AL.

However, on the basis of violating the terms declared in LFO, the President was authorized to withdraw his consent for constitution making. Mujib’s clear-cut success was not expected within power corridors. There were also prospects of having some sort of soft attitude and reconciliation from the AL ranks on ‘Six Points’ because they were considered as secession points in West Pakistan. However, Mujib had shown no flexibility. On the other hand, Bhutto’s opposition to Mujib’s ‘Six Points’ brought him

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close to the Army.39 In the context of that scenario, Bhutto and the ruling generals were

not in favour of convening the National Assembly session. Yahya Khan’s was making

efforts to exploit Bhutto to get rid of the state of affairs. However, Bhutto was shrewd

enough to mould the circumstances in his favour and to become the most popular leader

of the western wing.40

Due to the rebellious activities and insurgency in East Pakistan, the year 1971 was

chaotic in the country. The imposition of Martial Law and severe military action were

evident against the ‘rebels’ in East Pakistan’s. According to Hamid Yusuf;

…. mismanagement and folly on the part of successive governments of Pakistan, which to the estrangement of people of East Pakistan was crowned by Yahya Khan’a regime, which brought out the crisis failed to put forward a comprehensive stand which could be convincing on the international plan, had now provided the opportunity which India had been looking for. Eventually, it resulted in to the breaking up of Pakistan on December 16, 1971.41

After the Pak-India War 1971 and consequent upon that the surrender of Pakistan

Army led to partition of Pakistan and creation of a new state, Bangladesh. In the wake of

those circumstances, the Army retreated from politics and on December 20, 1971,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman PPP took over the reins of the state as President and Chief

Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. 42 Bhutto made very emotional address on the

occasion of taking over the power and said “we have to pick up pieces, very small pieces

but we will make a new Pakistan.”43 It was the time when the sufferings were at its

gravest situation in the country’s history. There were a lot of hereditary serious problems

for Bhutto government. The Baloch and Pashtoon nationalism were at its height.44 Due to the embarrassing defeat in the 1971 War the nation was badly depressed.45 The masses

were not in favour of Martial Law’s continuity. They were also looking forward toward a

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comprehensive constitution of the country. There were severe political chaos and

economic crisis in the country. Under those circumstances, Bhutto had three edges to

tackle the situation, i.e. firstly, his success in West Pakistan due to the slogan of Roti,

Kapara aur Makan (bread, clothing and shelter) and hence expectations of the people for

the solution of their problems; secondly, declaration of Yahya’s regime as illegitimate

and unlawful by the Supreme Court and; thirdly, demoralization of Army due to its

surrender before the Indian forces in East Pakistan.46 On the basis of 1970 polls, the

political parties were looking forward for the formation of governments in their

respective provinces. Bhutto was also interested to discontinue Martial Law and to

introduce a real democratic system based on new constitution. 47 In the process of constitution making, he wanted to develop political consensus.48 To gain the objective, he

lifted ban on the NAP which was banned during Yahya regime.49 The decision of lifting

the ban on NAP was appreciated by the nationalists including Wali Khan. In the context

of positive gestures by the government, there were negotiations between Wali Khan and

Bhutto. Consequently, an agreement was signed by the both on March 6, 1972.50 The

main features of the agreement were; lifting of Martial Law on August 14, 1972 and

convening National Assembly for the consideration of draft constitution; appointment of

governors in NWFP and Balochistan with the consent of NAP and JUI and; the formation

of central as well as provincial governments on the grounds of having parliamentary

majority.

On the basis of agreement, on the recommendation of NAP and JUI, Arbab

Sikander and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo were appointed Governors of NWFP and

Balochistan respectively.51 However, in the initial period the agreement remained under

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threat because of mistrust between both the signatory parties. On one hand, the NAP was not contented over the dismissal of a lot of civil servants by the Central government, belonging to NWFP and Balochistan, without assigning reason. It was rather considered assault on ‘provincial autonomy’. The provincial governments warned the Central government to reconsider the decision. 52 On the other hand, Bhutto suspended the

appointment provincial governors as per nomination of NAP and JUI. Both the parties

had negotiations to solve the existing issues. Nonetheless, Bhutto announced on April 14

1972 in the National Assembly for lifting of Martial Law.53 The Interim Constitution was approved in the National Assembly with consensus. As per agreement, the Governors of

Balochistan and NWFP were appointed by the Central on April 28, 1972 and on May 1,

1972 respectively.54

It can be evaluated that the country was secured from deadlock and political chaos

due to the agreement, though for a short while. However, political confrontation could

not be stopped afterward. Bhutto did know the political tactics to address the issues for

time being. His accord with NAP and JUI was a political strategy to address the national

and international challenges at that crucial time.55 The development of consensus for the

solution of those challenges, Bhutto supported the formation of NAP-JUI coalition

governments in NWFP and Balochistan.56 However, the provincial governments were not

allowed to work in their respective provinces after nine months.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto adopted very ‘smart’ moves by providing logical grounds of his actions. He produced ‘constitutional’ causes for sacking the NWFP and Balochistan governments. He also provided a detailed list of charges against former governments of the both provinces. He launched an organized campaign of defaming and accusing the

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NAP to declare it non-constitutional.57 The main effort of PPP government at centre was

to remove the NAP from provincial and federal politics permanently.

The NAP-JUI Coalition Government in Balochistan

When Martial Law was lifted in the country on May 1, 1972, the NAP-JUI coalition

government in Balochistan was sworn in.

Under Chief Minister Ataullah Mengal and Governor Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, the NAP government moved swiftly to fulfill its electoral pledges. It was under this Baloch nationalist leadership that the province, for the first time since Pakistan’s independence, witnessed real social and economic development.58

The coalition NAP-JUI government started working in Balochistan. Mir Ghaus

Bakhsh Bizenjo, a veteran nationalist, was chosen as Governor of the province. Mir Sahib belonged to the Bizenjo tribe. His popularity as politician was based upon dialogue instead of disagreement and clash.59 On the other hand, the chief minister-ship went to

Sardar Ataullah Mengal. The leadership of NAP in the Provincial Assembly remained in

the hands of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. All the three Sardars were having great

popularity and following in their particular areas.60 During its rule in the province, the

NAP-JUI coalition affirmed its aspirations for promoting rule of law, fundamental rights

peace, stability, and democratic values. The government also wished to develop friendly

relations with the federal government. The Chief Minister Attuallah Mengal, declared to

make Balochistan an exemplary province.61

The non-cooperative attitude was basically the main cause of bitter centre-

province relations. It was blamed by central government that coalition governments of

both provinces i.e. Balochistan & NWFP were showing cold shoulder to centre in even

mutual working relations. The Attorney General of Pakistan Yahya Bakhtiar, who

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himself belonged to Balochistan, stated that NAP was involved in un-constitutional

activities and was working against the interest of the centre. The NAP leaders had

expressed that they did not believe in ideology of Pakistan. The provincial government of

NAP-JUI coalition in both the provinces created hurdles for different development

projects. It was expressed by federal authorities that NAP wanted to weaken the centre

and it was involved in different un-constitutional activities. The NAP had collected huge

sums of money by illegal means to launch a secret resistance movement against centre to

establish an independent state.62 According to a judicial reference of federal government

NAP was reflected as an un-democratic party. It was also alleged that NAP was against

permanent constitution of the country because it would support the democracy.63

Bhutto very clearly stated that due to sad episode of East Pakistan, the NAP also dreamed about an independent state. He expressed his views and mentioned that, initially, the negotiations regarding constitution were not successful with Sheikh Mujeeb and when his dream of getting power was not materialized he disassociated himself from West

Pakistan. The NAP was also working on the same lines and its main object was to get an independent state.64

However, the terminology used for the territory was intact, i.e. Balochistan. The

areas included in ‘Chief Commissioner Province’ were merged into Balochistan.65 On the other hand, Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad having majority of Baloch population were not included in the province and remained with the Punjab and Sindh respectively.

The expected ethnic-based tensions on the ground of inclusion of Pashtoon districts were totally ignored. The then Chief Minister Mengal on the basis of that expected problem, recommended to include Pashtoon areas of Balochistan in to NWFP. Moreover, he

141 claimed for the Baloch districts of Dera Ghazi Khan and Jacobabad to be included in

Balochistan. 66

It was a better chance for the nationalist in the provincial government to prove their ability. The opportunity could realize their dreams for the development of their province. One of the clear-cut objectives of the nationalists was the abolition of Sardary system. In that context, the speech of chief minister Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal while moving a resolution in the in the provincial assembly was of great significance:

Now, that the Tribal System has lost its advantages keeping it instead is going to act as a hurdle in the development of the people of these tribes. And the large amounts of annual allowances being given to the royal families (of the states which merged with Pakistan) and the Sardars are putting undue pressure on the country’s economy. Therefore, the Sardari system should be abolished in all parts of Pakistan (in whichever form it exists) and the annual allowances to former royal families be discontinued. And all the responsibilities of the Sardars be transferred to other institution just like in the other parts of the country.67

Mir Gul Khan Nasir the nationalist poet, in the emotionally discussed that:

Sardari in the beginning wasn’t a parasitic institution but when the Sardars became the agents of an imperial power the integrity of this institution began deteriorating. With the passage of time, and a newfound sense of political awareness, some knights arose from within the ranks of the Sardars and tried to destroy this castle of oppression and succeeded in diminishing its influence. But despite this, we do not wish to keep this rusty skeleton of the Sardari system as a monument or memorial of the past because as long as this institution remains (even as a vestige) it will keep our nation divided into various tribes and sub tribes which will render it impossible for us to achieve economic progress. Therefore, the main objective of presenting this resolution is to completely eradicate from the face of this earth, the disease stricken Sardari system which is taking its last breaths. The second thing is the Jirga system which is paramount for Sardari. Without it the Sardari system cannot thrive and vice versa.68

The Regional Politics

In its period of nine months, the NAP-JUI coalition government adopted positive steps for the development of institutions and resolution of issues. The establishment of

National Council of Arts (NCA) at Quetta for the promotion of Baloch culture was an

142 important step. But, the Ministry had gone on back foot on the issue of provincial language and Urdu was declared as language of the province.69 Probably, it was due to the concerns of the Pashtoons over the language issue that Urdu was adopted as the provincial language.70 Moreover, it might have been adopted to minimize the pressure of

Pashto, Balochi and Brahvi supporters.71

According to the federal government’s charge sheet, the leadership of NAP was also held responsible for spreading regionalism under the shade of regional politics in

Balochistan and NWFP. The NAP was spreading the concept of five or six nations and its main purpose was to cut-off Balochistan and NWFP from Pakistan.72 According to the

NAP leadership the five nationalities were Pashtoons, Bengalis, Baloch, Sindhis and

Punjabis. It was trying to damage the main fabric of Pakistani nationalism and to introduce sub-nationalism in Pakistan. The NAP also clarified according to its own version, the concept of nation and nationalities. This concept of nationalities was critically evaluated by Attorney General of Pakistan in court. He explained that NAP was working against the Islamic ideology of nation. 73 The constitution of NAP was presented in the court which was published on March 1, 1970. The constitution demanded complete provincial autonomy and the re-allocation of geographical boundaries of the provinces in accordance with culture and language. The constitution considered West Pakistan as regional federation after the dissolution of One Unit and demanded equal representation of provinces in National Assembly. The NAP leadership was propagating the concept of four nationalities presented by Wali Khan. It also demanded that only defense, currency and foreign affairs should be under centre’s control. Actually, every political party had its own version and approach about federal system and federation. It was for the first time

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that federal constitution was being adopted since 1947 for which, nation had no prior

experience. It was very sensitive period and only the capable political leadership could

manage the situation. On that situation Muzaffar Ahmad, President NAP (W) stated;

I would like to make humble suggestion to the party commanding majority in the National Assembly to propose a Bill at the very outset of the Session guaranteeing every nationality the right of self determination …Then and then only believe and do sincerely believe negotiations among various parties and nationalities can start with a clean slate without any fear and mistrust and thus the task of constitution making can run smoothly.74

The NAP leadership, especially, Wali Khan was very much critical about ‘Two

Nation Theory’. While explaining his own concept of nationalism, he stated that the

foundations of the creation of Pakistan were wrong. He was of the view that Pakistan was

created in the name of religion of Islam and its bifurcation proved that the basis of its

foundation was wrong. He stressed that four different nations were inhabitants of the country.75

The concept of nationalities of NAP got popularity in Balochistan and NWFP due

to the reason that the Punjab was holding the control of the whole country on the basis of

larger population. Ajmal Khatak76 in his booklet ‘Bullet for Bullet’ enumerated that

Punjab’s control over whole country had created imbalance of power and no single

province had the right to do so. It was totally against democratic and the federal

principles.77

There were certain causes due to which the relationship between the provincial

and central government started becoming sour. As per the description of federal

government, the some leaders of Jamotes resident of Lasbela were arrested by the Mengal

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government. Resultantly, they stood against the provincial government and rebellious

activities. The chief minister took severe action against them with the help of a lashkar

under his command privately, having support of official forces. Due to that, the federal

government got involved and asked the Balochistan government to end the atrocities

upon the Jamotes. The response of provincial government was in accordance with the

demand due to which the central government sent force to stop the activities of the

lashkar. The interference of the federal government was severely criticized by the

provincial government. In return, on the night of February 14, 1973 the central

government dismissed the Mengal ministry. As a reaction to that act of central

government, the NAP-JUI ministry of NWFP resigned. The important leaders of the

opposition were locked up by the federal government.78

There was also charge on Marri tribesmen for targeting Punjabi settlers in the Pat-

feeder area. 79 The centre also blamed a student organization, Balochistan Students

Organization (BSO), for the abduction of Railway Officials. As well as the point of view of the nationalist writers is concerned regarding the uprising in Lasbela district and Pat- feeder area, it was planted by the centre to topple over the provincial government.80 The

federal government point of view was disregarded by the nationalists. Against the

centre’s opinion, they declared for being devoted Pakistani and committed to the

solidarity and integrity of the country. They declared that it were the criminal who were

rounded up in the Pat-feeder areas. According to their point of view, the figures

mentioned by the centre regarding the causalities was in correct, i.e. eight rather than

forty two. They blamed the centre for exploiting the issue for the dismissal of the

provincial government.81

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Another reason for worsening the relations between the centre and Mengal

ministry was the murder of Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, who was outspoken against the

federal government. The culprits of such a great incident could not be arrested. Maulvi

Shamsuddin, Deputy Speaker of Balochistan Assembly, who was of the Baloch origin,

was also assassinated. Wali Khan charged Bhutto for the assassination, so that the civil

war might have been started between both the ethnic groups, i.e. the Baloch and

Pashtoons.82

Moreover, the centre was not happy with the decision of exclusion of non-Baloch

bureaucracy from the province. Another factor was taking over control law enforcement

agencies and opposition of federal forces in the affairs of Balochistan. All those

developments were not liked by the federal authorities. 83 Furthermore, the central

government also set aside the proposal of nationalization of land by the provincial

government. Obviously, PPP government had no interest in purging of landlordism.84 The

centre suspected that problems in certain areas of the province were due to the Sardars’

who wanted to continue their supremacy.85 According to the viewpoint of Bhutto, the

opposition of provincial government was because of his reforms and intention to abolish

the Sardari system.86

However, the standpoint of centre was the contradiction when it started hand-outs

supporting “the good Sardars” or. The “cooperative Sardars” were awarded with gifts and

Sardars who were cooperative; therefore, the centre lost its. According to Lawrence

Ziring, Mengals and Marri tribes were exploited against the Bugti tribe. Moreover,

Bhutto left the Bugtis at the cost of Khan of Kalat.87

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It can be estimated that Bhutto even proved to be worse for the province as

compare to the dictators. He ever alleged that the Baloch were having some conspiracy

for independent Balochistan. His assumptions were further enhanced by the officials due

to exclusion of none-local bureaucrats from the province. The promotion of local culture

and language was also considered as ‘disruptive’ by the federal government. The prime

minister was also irritated over nationalists for opposing the upcoming constitution. The

nationalist were opposing the extraordinary powers of the centre and withholding of some

fundamental rights of the provinces. They also blamed that the centre was sponsoring

certain culprits for the creation of disturbances in the province. According to them, at the

time of civil disobedience in the province, the provincial government was halted to

control the situation and was blamed of creating the disturbance. 88

On the occasion, Bhutto tried to persuade alternate Sardars to convince them against the nationalists. It was further tracked by the suspected plan to disintegrate the country. The discovery of USSR branded weapons from the Embassy of Iraq, was declared as a conspiracy of the Baloch nationalists, designed for Balochistan. Due to the differences between Nawab Akbar Bugti and the Governor Bizenjo, the NAP was accused for hatching the plan popular as the “London Plan” so that in order to remove

Balochistan and the NWFP might have separated from Pakistan.

The London Plan

It was a serious allegation against NAP and Wali Khan about which he strongly condemned especially before the formation of coalition governments in Balochistan and

NWFP. He strongly refuted the charge of London Plan and declared it a concocted story

147 of the press. He openly criticized the news papers and denied the existence of any such plan. According to him, it was the political maneuvering against him to damage his political stature.89 In actual practice it was the achievements of the news papers that they revealed such a plan. The opposition and withdrawal from the plan was quite natural by all political figures who considered about the possible public reaction. It was quite strange incident that all important figures of Pakistan were present in London in the name of their ‘Medical Check-up’. It was not a normal or routine coincidence that Shaikh

Mujeeb ur Rahman,90Nawab Akbar Bugti, Malik Ghulam Jilani91 and others were present there.

Malik Ghulam Jilani from Punjab was seasoned politician. He proposed Mujeeb, being leader of the majority party, to appoint the provincial governors of his own choice in both the wings of country. The proposed names in that respect were Nawab Akbar

Bugti, Malik Ghulam Jilani, Mahmood Haroon and Wali Khan for Balochistan, Punjab,

Sindh and NWFP respectively.92 It was the period of crisis for Pakistan because the conflict between AL and PPP had reached at peak. Mujeeb’s position was considered justified with regard of taking charge of government at centre but the question was that those proposed governors were not legally authorized to take charge of their posts during

Martial Law. The issue was planned to be tackled in a very dangerous manner. It was proposed decision that the proposed governors of Balochistan NWFP and Sindh would announce separation from Pakistan and would also declare the establishment of a confederation with Bangladesh. It was expected that the Punjab would also favour the plan, if not, and then the blame of breaking Pakistan into two parts would be lamented on the Punjab. The plan was published in leading national and international news papers.93

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Later on, it was confirmed by Malik Ghulam Jilani that the London Plan was discussed

and adopted during meeting of politicians from both the wings of Pakistan.94

It were the newspapers at London who unveiled plan including The Guardian,

The Irish Times, The Sunday Times and The London Times.95 The correspondent of

Nawa-i-Waqt London Bashir Riaz had a detailed meeting with Malik Ghulam Jilani and

discussed the various aspects of the London Plan. During the investigation at the

Supreme Court regarding Wali Khan’s and NAP’s ‘anti-State activities’ evidences of the

charges were produced in the shape of photocopies of the above-mentioned newspapers.96

The alleged meetings of Wali Khan with High Commissioners of India and Bangladesh were also investigated but could not be verified.97 Wali Khan’s statement was the focus of the centre. Yahya Bakhtiar objected in the court that how Wali Khan managed the expenditures of his tour to London, central and Eastern Europe and Afghanistan frequently with reference to his statement that he was not a rich man but a ‘poor land owner’.98 The Supreme Court also summoned Bashir Riaz who stated before the court

that Akbar Bugti and Sher Muhammad had a secret meeting to discuss the plan of

independence Balochistan. Bashir Riaz’s verdict was very much important because he

was an eye-witness to all the events as a journalist. While submitting his answers before

the court he revealed that Akbar Bugti had secret links with the NAP. The critics

considered the version of Bashir Riaz in favour of the government. It created negative

impression about the government and lay man considered Bashir Riaz as a planted person

against the NAP by the sitting government.99

The Nawab Akbar Bugti allegation on the NAP government led to the dismissal of nine month old Mengal ministry by Bhutto on February 12, 1973. 100 The NAP

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government was alleged for violating the legitimate power and for having with overseas

powers against Pakistan. The Governor Raj was imposed in the province and the

prominent leadership was imprisoned.101

The Pashtoonistan Issue

The idea of independent State of Pashtoons had its origin from the glorious rule of

Ahmad Shah Abdali (1748-1770), whose reign once expanded from Persia to Delhi

during eighteenth century.102 The Pashtoons remind the memories of that magnificent empire and desired to have their own separate state where they could live according to their customs and traditions. That idea got strength soon after the establishment of

Pakistan due to the casual approach of federal government to the issue. The government did not take any action regarding the representation of the Pashtoons in administration

which created sense of deprivation among the Pashtoons.103 The provinces of Balochistan

and NWFP were handled with ‘unfair’ attitude regarding social, political and economic

developments. These areas were lacking in their basic rights and the conditions were

alike East Pakistan. The demand of Pashtoonistan could be nullified by the provision of

basic rights and reforms in these provinces. Bhutto government considered Pashtoonistan

as a primary charge against Pashtoons and used it as an excuse to hold complete power in

both the provinces. 104 Mainly NAP was declared responsible for the propagation of

Pashtoonistan issue. 105 The issue had started since 1947 referendum in NWFP was

conducted by the British administration on the issue of accession of NWFP with India or

Pakistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan boycotted the referendum on the grounds that it would be

held on the option of separate independent state for Pashtoons.106

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The case of Pashtoonistan had been tackled differently by different people. The

issue was mainly highlighted by media. According to a version, NWFP while remaining

as part of Pakistan would be renamed as Pashtoonistan. It could be consisted of some

areas of Balochistan, Kashmor, Jacobabad, Dera Ghazi Khan which was not practically

feasible. Another version was that it might include the areas of Chitral, Hazara, Swat,

Dir, Kohistan, Buner, Tirah, Peshawar, Kohat, Bunnu, D. I. Khan, D.G. Khan,

Waziristan, Khyber, Gomel, Bolan and Malakand.107

The ideology presented by the NAP for the creation of Pakhoonistan was based upon ethnic linkages. It was of the view that major areas of Balochistan and NWFP comprised of the same group, i.e. Pakhtoons, therefore Pashtoonistan might be comprised of common Pashto speaking people and area of Balochistan and NWFP.108 The separate independent state must have a separate political identity along with right of self- determination. Wali Khan demanded the state of Pashtoonistan as an autonomous body within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. He was in the favour of ‘loose federation’ of the country.109 The NAP was in the favour of maintaining the potential of

Pashtoonistan regarding the party politics of Pakistan.

Quite amazingly, Wali Khan withdrew from the idea of Pashtoonistan. He disclosed it during his address to the District Bar Association on March 29, 1972.110 He

very clearly stated that the separate state of Pashtoonistan was no more the issue of NAP.

He further elaborated that he had not spoken on the issue for the last three years.111 It was surprising that soon after the establishment of coalition governments of Balochistan and NWFP, Wali Khan issued the statement on May 5, 1972 that the taxonomy of NWFP would be restructured in to Pashtoonistan. It shows that the NAP leadership was hopeful

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to materialize the dream of Pashtoonistan on the basis of NAP-JUI coalition in both the

provinces.112

The NAP struggled for the idea of Pashtoonistan in the garb of demand for the

provincial autonomy.113 Actually, the master-minds of the idea were Khan Brothers.114

The Baloch leadership was conscious about the issue because if the idea of Pashtoonistan had been materialized then Balochistan would have to withdraw from its Pashtoon population as well as the area. Nawab Akbar Bugti declared the real plan of Wali Khan as dangerous for the country and advised the people to stay away from the issue. He elaborated that the NAP had developed the concept and establishment of

Pashtoonistan.115

Yahya Bakhtiar, the then Attorney General of Pakistan, declared Pashtoonistan as

a serious damage to the country for its solidarity, sovereignty and integrity. While

addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on March 5, 1948, Abdul Ghaffar Khan

stated:

What does our Pathanistan mean? I will tell you just now. The people inhabiting in this province are called Sindhis and name of their country is Sindh. Similarly the Bengalis in the same way there is the North West Frontier Province. We are one people and ours is a land within Pakistan: we also want that the mere mentioning of the name of the country should convey to the people that it is the land of Pakhtoons. Is it sin under the tenets of Islam?... Pathans is the name of the community and we will name the country of Pakhtoonistan. I may explain that the people of India used to call us Pathans, and we are called the Afghans by the Persians. Our real name is Pakhtoons. We want Pakhtoonistan.116

The deviation in ideas of Wali Khan for and against the issue of Pashtoonistan is

in understandable. After getting power through NAP-JUI coalition Wali Khan’s version

shows liking for Pashtoonistan stand point. During that period Sarhad NAP expressed the

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same sentiments but in a careful manner.117 Wali Khan also stated, “We will no longer

offer arguments and proof of our being patriotic. We have done that 25 years ago.”118 In

another speech on October 4, 1973 at Nowshera he expressed that, “If Pakistan is

destroyed, we will not be destroyed. We would remove the chain from Chaman to the

border of Sindh and from Torkham to Margalla.”119 The same statement was presented in

the court against him.

The speech references of Abdul Ghaffar Khan were also presented in the court

made on different occasions about Phashtoonistan issue. He issued a statement at Bannu

on March 1, 1970 to serve the cause of Pashtoonistan for providing Pashtoons their just

status. 120 At another gathering, he directed his associates that, “they should prepare themselves to launch a struggle similar to one which was successfully launched by the people of Bangladesh for achieving all their objectives and freedom.”121Yahya Khan

pleaded strongly against Wali Khan with proper evidence regarding his stand point on

Durand Line.”122 Wali Khan was against the existence of Durand Line and considered it an obstacle for the establishment of wider Afghan state.123 He refused to accept the

charge and stated that, “NAP as a party has never advocated any slogan of Azad

Balochistan or Pashtoonistan.”124

The aims and objectives of NAP were clearly uncovered during Bhutto rule. NAP

outwardly showed dissociation with the idea of Pashtoonistan.125 Collectively the idea of

Pashtoonistan was considered dangerous for the state of Pakistan.

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The Anti-State Activities

The NAP was trialed strictly in the court and a lot of allegations were leveled against it.

The statements issued at different stages and phases by the NAP leadership were clear

proofs against the party. Due to the joint geographical location of NWFP, Balochistan

and Afghanistan, the NAP was considered as an agent of Afghanistan because it was a

popular political party of Balochistan and NWFP. The frequent visits of NAP leaders to

Afghanistan and cordial relations with regime of Sardar Dawood further strengthened the

argument against them.126

Afghanistan’s role against Pakistan was played with the help of NAP. The

government and media of Afghanistan were propagating for the establishment of

Pashtoonistan. The Kabul Radio became mouth organ of the NAP policy.127 The NAP

was also considered responsible for creating the regional issues with mutual help of

Afghanistan Government.128 Afghanistan had always been considered rival of Pakistan

since its inception. It was clearly involved in the activities against the sovereignty of

Pakistan.129 Afghanistan stressed to highlight the issue of the right of self-determination

of Balochistan and NWFP. Afghanistan propagated it internationally at Algiers

Conference. 130 The Government of Afghanistan left no stone unturned to get the

international attention regarding the alleged discrimination with the NAP but could not

get remarkable favour because it was not considered as an international issue. 131

Afghanistan interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan which was clear violation of international diplomatic ethics. Pakistan desired to maintain good relations with

Afghanistan but no compromise was acceptable on the cost of solidarity and integrity of the country. It is quite amazing that almost all Afghan Governments till 1979 were

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severely against Pakistan. It was also against the international diplomatic codes that an

independent state was supporting the NAP to create disturbance against the state of

Pakistan. It was an example of involvement of Afghanistan in internal affairs of

Pakistan.132

According to the proves submitted before the Supreme Court, it was revealed that

the NAP was creating disturbances in Balochistan and was involved in anti-State

activities with the secret support of Afghanistan. It was trying to instigate tribesmen for

armed revolt against the government of Pakistan. A massive amount of weapons

including anti-air craft weapons were recovered from secret hideouts near Mastung. The

armory and weapons of war were supplied from Afghanistan along with instructions

printed in Persian language which were actually printed for Afghan army.133

The Attorney General stated that the leaders were issuing anti-state statement and

were busy in ‘National Liberation War’ according to them. Therefore, they were also

accused of revolt and it was declared that none country of the world allows such

activities. Yahya Bakhtiar further elaborated that the government appointed Governors of

Balochistan and NWFP on the recommendation of NAP under Tripartite Accord134 by deviating from normal routine, although, NAP was not a majority party neither in Federal

Legislature nor in the Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP. However, the governors appointed under such conditions adopted non-cooperative policy with the federal government which, later on, aggravated and was transformed in to an open confrontation and violation of law.

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The governors had agreed with the federal government to follow certain

conditions but the Baloch leadership disagreed. For example an important condition was

that efforts would be made to maintain national integrity. The trends of disintegration was

not only dangerous for the nation but also had impacts on our international relations.

Therefore, the movements like “Independent Balochistan” would be curbed at initial level

and it would not be allowed to affect the relations with international powers.135

Bizenjo accepted the conditions in his reply to the letter.136 Another similar letter

was addressed to the governor NWFP who also accepted the conditions. Sardar Attaullah

Mengal also expressed gratitude after becoming the CM and thanked the President for

cooperation. He also promised to cooperate with the Federal Government.137

A declaration was issued on June 11, 1972 after the first joint session of the

provincial governors and chief ministers, under which governors had pledged for

maintaining political peace in their provinces. Its main objectives were to maintain

national unity and inter provincial coordination and to keep it away from party conflicts

and to adopt common policy for national prosperity and integrity.138

It is quite amazing that Wali Khan stated on June 20, 1972 that he and his party were not bound to the agreements of governors.139 The conditions regarding law and

order started worsening. The coordination among different institutions lacked. The

Deputy Commissioner Lasbela in his letter addressed to Director General, Coast Guards

on August 31, 1972, informing him that he was directed by CM Balochistan to forward

that then onward the federal authorities would not enter the province without prior

permission from District authorities. Furthermore, the Assistant Commissioner Hub was

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directed on the entry of in to the area without permission could be tackled with the help

of Police, Balochistan Reserved Police and Levis.140 According to another report dated

July 2, 1972 certain pro-NAP authorities of the province removed ‘taker circuit’ from local Civil Telephone Exchange with the intention to remove all obstacles while operator intercepting the calls. It was assumed that it might have been done by the NAP leaders, so that they might remain aware with the activities of the central government.141

The Pat-Feeder incident and activities of Balochistan Student Organization (BSO)

were clear proves of the provincial governments and, particularly, the NAP’s

involvement in anti-State activities.142 It was further blamed that the NAP government in

Balochistan started arresting its political opponents without any reason and the whole

province was suffering due to law and order situation. Jam of Lasbela revealed the

oppressive activities of the NAP in a Press Conference. His son was arrested by the

Provincial Authorities and arrest warrants were issued under the directions of the NAP on

December 30, 1972. The SHO Hub Police Post arrested him on January 21, 1973 along

with his companions.143

The Views of Wali Khan

The politics in South Asia is mostly centered on dynasties or personalities. If analyzed in

detail it becomes evident that certain leading families from different areas remained

dominant at local and domestic affairs. They also played their role in national politics on behalf of the respective local population. Same was the case of Wali Khan. He along with his father Abdul Ghaffar Khan and uncle Dr Khan sahib took active part in the national politics. Their attitude at the time of establishment of Pakistan was brought in to lime-

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light with reference to Supreme Court’s investigation. The statements and speeches of

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan were provided as documentary proof before the

court. In the speech, he stated himself as an inhabitant of independent state, till then he

had not accepted the establishment of Pakistan. He regarded the creation of Pakistan as a

mistake by the British. He showed conformity to the British authorities’ policies. He was

of the view that due to the division of India, the good policies adopted by the British

during last 200 years could become null and void. Wali Khan’s argument showed

complete hatred for other nationalities, he said that the partition might have been reversed

by reuniting the Pashtoons of India and Afghanistan and creation of a great and larger

Afghan state. 144 The statement of Wali Khan passed through different phases. He

expressed a varied point of view during and after the British rule.145

Other parties were also trialed under allegations of anti-state activities including

JUI and JI. All of these were against the creation of Pakistan and even were critic about the leaders of Pakistan movement.146 They jointly held a convention at Rawalpindi in

March 1973. During the proceedings of convention anti-Pakistan feelings were launched.

The convention also demanded to hold the process of constitution meetings. Bhutto

criticized all of the opposition which had signed the constitution priorly and declared it

satisfactory.147

Mainly, it was media which provided evidence against Wali Khan to show its

power. Wali Khan met G. M. Syed who was admitted at Jinnah Hospital Karachi due to

ailment. At the moment G. M. Syed inquired Wali Khan about his role in Pakistan

movement for which he replied “thanks God I am not a culprit, I had not given any

services in the process of formation of Pakistan”.148 This mutual conversation was later

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on published by Nawa-i-Waqt which portrayed the mindset of Wali Khan about

Pakistan.149 The only target before Bhutto Government was the NAP leadership, it was

revealed from judicial reforms also because the whole opposition was not the target

except the NAP. Later on, the NAP was held responsible for anti-State activities.150 The

Bhutto Government was restless to put ban on the NAP. The Political Parties Act 1962, was amended under which Government herself became authorized to decide about any political party illegal on the charges of foreign aid.151 On the same charges the NAP was

declared unconstitutional party and the party was banned and its securities were

confiscated. The main party leadership including Wali Khan was arrested.152

Wali Khan responded to clarify his position. In his written application before the

Supreme Court on June 5, 1975, he elaborated that the Federation was violating the

federal principles and creating discrimination between larger and smaller provinces on

the basis of population.153 The Balochistan and NWFP were suffering due to the federal

policies. He also mentioned the disparities of the centre in economic, social and financial

matters against Balochistan and NWFP.154

If critically analyzed then it becomes evident from the proceedings of the

reference and its implementation that Bhutto wanted to oust the NAP leadership from

politics of Pakistan forever.155 It was the case of unique in nature trialed by the Supreme

Court. Many eye-witnesses were brought before the Court for cross examination. The

charges were denied by Wali Khan strongly on the plea that it was master-minding the

entire plan to find any logical stand point to ban the NAP. Wali Khan was regularly

presented before the Court. However, it is quite strange that no other coalition partner or

opposition leader was trialed by the Court.156

159

The Special Tribunal was set up by the Court under the directions of Supreme

Court’s verdict dated October 30, 1975 to trial the whole leadership of the NAP.157 Under the decision of the Supreme Court, the NAP was declared responsible to establish a separate soverign state parallel to the Pakistan’s solidarity and integrity. The Hyderabad

Tribunal was set up at Hyderabad jail and the NAP leaders were trialed there.158

Later on, after the takeover of General Zia-ul-Haq, Wali Khan was released on

July 5, 1977 and afterward the Tribunal was declared suspended. On January 1, 1978 the rest of NAP’s leadership was released.159 The series of allegations and counter allegations were actually ‘show of power’ and authority from both the sides. The Reference against the NAP and Wali Khan was well prepared and based on the confidential reports of ISI, official government records, pamphlets, local and foreign newspapers, which were also presented before the Court as evidence.160

Wali Khan responded much critically and held Bhutto responsible for price hike,

economic policies of government and no capital investment in private sector which

damaged the national economy.161 He also took notice of ill planned cotton policy of the

government due to which more than half million of cotton bales could not be exported.

The then commerce minister made lame excuses that it could not be done due to the

reason that prices of cotton had been lowered at international market. The other charges

made by Wali Khan were regarding huge increase in expenditures of government, more

than 200 percent. According to him Bhutto was damaging the national economy due to

his policy of nationalization and national policies. Despite of his belief in Socialism the

influence of capitalists, landlords and bureaucrats increased and he became victim of self

centralism.162

160

Bhutto could not deliver according to the manifesto of PPP and promises made with people during 1970 elections. The fruits of democracy i.e. regional and provincial autonomy could not be provided for the whole of Pakistan and especially for Balochistan and NWFP.163 The political situation in Balochistan and NWFP was out of control of

Bhutto. These provinces were a real challenge for the authority and power of the centre.

The policies of excessive centralism earned bad name for PPP Government. Under the policy of centralization democratic and elected governments were dismissed and handpicked government was established in Balochistan and NWFP. It increased provincialism. To have the complete control over Balochistan army was deployed which further aggravated the tense political atmosphere.164 Bhutto adopted the way of political maneuvering and tactics to deal with his opponents. Actually, he was politically groomed under the regimes of Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan which had centralist tendencies, therefore, despite of being a civilian the self centric trait were inbuilt in his political personality.

The decision of Bhutto for the dismissal of nine month old Mengal ministry was just after a couple of days of discovering USSR weapons from the Embassy of Iraq. It was alleged that the arms were meant against the Iranian state by the Iraq. However, the centre blamed the NAP which had long-lasting impacts. According to the allegation there were efforts by the NAP to not only challenge the central authority but for hatching the conspiracy against the integration of both Iran and Pakistan. 165 On the other hand the

NAP leadership denied the charges leveled against them. It was alleged by them that the charges were put against them were just to defend their unlawful act of dismissing the

Mengal ministry.166

161

In 1970 elections, the NAP had the support of Nawab Akbar Bugti. The rift

between the NAP and developed afterward. One of the factor was denial of NAP for

supporting Nawab’s women contestant foe the Senate. 167 The NAP awarded the

provincial finance ministry to Ahmad Nawaz Khan, the younger brother of Nawab

against his consent.168 In that backdrop, the Nawab approved the charges against the

Mengal ministry. Interestingly, he declared his support for the alleged plan, however, had

declined later on. His support had been provided facilitation for the dismissal of Mengal

ministry. As a reward, he was being given the ‘responsibility’ of provincial governor.169

“In its White Paper on Balochistan, issued on October 19, 1974, the Pakistan government repeated the same charges, but relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence to support its case that the Baloch-NAP leaders had sought in concern with unnamed hostile foreign powers to work for the country’s disintegration.”170

The removal of Mengal ministry was interpreted with different angles and

aspects. As per a nationalist historian, the dismissal of Mengal ministry was due to the mistrust of Bhutto on the nationalists.171 On the other hand, few writers indicated the

external involvement. They considered; Shah of Iran’s stress on Pakistan government

against the use of Iraqi Embassy against Iran.172 Moreover, the government of Iran was reluctant about any mover for independence in Pakistani Balochistan might have shifted

to their Balochistan.

Earlier, Bhutto worked in collaboration with the nationalists of the province. Due

to which there were a lot of positive developments and political activism. Majority of the

nationalists were least interested in separatist trends. They affirmed to be the patriots and

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devoted nationals. Regrettably, the newly started political process was disturbed by the

centre and they were dubbed as ‘anti-state’.173

During the political process, the focus of nationalists was provincial autonomy

and decentralization of authority. The centre not only ignored the demand but went for the military option. Therefore, instead of taking them in to mainstream, the gulf was further widened distrust, hatred and disappointment enhanced in the province. In the context of Balochistan-centre relationship it had long-lasting impacts. Earlier, due to the politics of reconciliation by the centre, even the nationalists adopted Urdu as the language of province and compromised on certain issues leaving the hard-liner approach. They opted for cooperation and negotiations. However, Bhutto underestimated the Mengal ministry and had not recognized their legitimate political right to run the provincial affairs. The NAP might have been considered as rising political force against PPP.

The Third Uprising in Balochistan

Instead of accommodating the regionalist forces, the Bhutto regime resorted to use of oppressive policies in Balochistan. Because of impractical and non-realistic strategy of the centre, the radicals within NAP’s ranks turned separatists. They tried to get access to foreign powers. Use of force also created psychological isolation among the people of

Balochistan. The dismissal of the Balochistan government provoked a rebellion by the

Baloch guerrillas. So the fantasy of the masses in Balochistan regarding their own rule

was devastated in just the tiny period of ten months. The result was enraged sentiments of the Baloch about the centre action; they declared it as totally unjustified and thus rebellious insurgency erupted. Bhutto summoned army, which proved a fatal decision in

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the context of a federation. Significantly, it marked the first direct involvement of the

army under Bhutto rule to deal with political foes. It paved the way for another decade of

military rule in the country.

The dismissal of NAP government was a turning point in the unfaithful treatment

history of Pakistan with its federating unit. It instantly hastened another insurgency in

Balochistan third of its kind. A mushroom emergence of militant groups to fight against

army was seen.

The main group was of Mir Hazar Khan Marri the left-leaning Balochistan

People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), operating from Marri terrain with base camp in

Afghanistan. The BPLF had its root in the ‘Parari movement’ of the 1960s and its head

was a staunch disciple of Sher Mohammad Marri, the founder of Parari. The BPLF have had between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters at the height of the insurgency mainly hailed from the Marri tribe with full support of the Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri.

The Balochistan National Army (BLA), another left-leaning militant group, also surfaced during the insurgency. In the political realm, the leftist Baloch Students Organization (BSO), divided though it was in competing factions, became one of the most important recruiting grounds, and has remained so, for the Baloch nationalist parties. When the NAP was banned in 1975, many of its members joined the insurgency. During the four year insurgency, there were one hundred seventy eight major engagements and one hundred sixty seven lesser incidents between Pakistani forces and Baluch militants. The Baluch militants avoided direct confrontation with the Pakistani army and whenever possible, the primary tactic of the insurgency remained ambushing army convoys and harassing its supply lines. At the height of the war, there were over 80,000 Pakistani troops in the province and by July of 1974, Baluch guerrillas succeeded in cutting off most of the main roads into Baluchistan and blocking coal shipments from Baluchistan to Punjab.174

The central government deputed more than 80,000 soldiers against 55,000 Baloch

fighters in Balochistan.175 Furthermore the military assistance from neighboring Iran was

164 also sought to curb the insurgents.176 The political face of the Baloch in the shape of NAP was totally shelved and the various militant groups emerged .The nucleus of insurgency was mainly BPLF and BSO. The BPLF carried the tradition of uprising from Ayub era

Parari organization.177 During military operation era, NAP was the prey of doubt on the issue of separation.178 The NAP was of the view that it wanted to resolve the political conflicts by negotiations but army action had left no choice except to stand up against use of malicious force.179

Early 1973 was the time when the armed conflict was on its height. The strong hold of the young guerrillas was Jhalawan, Sarawan, and Marri Bugti areas. The insurgents were under the command of Mir Lawang Khan, Khair Jan Bizenjo and Mir

Hazar Khan. Sulaiman Khan Ahmadzai was leading in Mustung and Kalat. Mir Aslam

Khan Gichki was looking after the fighters at Muhammad Hasni region. Even in the presence of large placement of army, insurgents managed to block road links from Sindh to Balochistan. 180 At Mali the army had to confront massive fight, thirty five militants along with their commander Lawang Khan were wiped out. 181

The insurgents, particularly their leadership were indecisive regarding the claim of the secession right. The group having left leaning was of the view that instead of solo flight other nationalities were included in the democratic socialist movement, while tribal mentality was not convenient with the left wing intensions.182 The Baloch insurgents had to face a state, well organized and trained force. They were total contrast in all factors and having rely on Afghan government. They tried to interrupt road inks and the movement of forces. The army movement was facing attacks. 183 An estimated loss was

165 six thousand militants and three thousand army men in the encounters. 184The human resource area include; Mengal, Marri, Muhammad Hasani and Bizenjo tribes.

The Baloch activists were having close links with the Baloch living in

Afghanistan. The Afghan government was supporting the secessionist movement in

Balochistan but was compelled to rethink their policy due to Pakistan’s initiative to counter by supporting Islamic groups in Afghanistan.185 Shah of Iran due to his own interest supported Pakistan in combating the Baloch militants. The support was not only in cash but also in defense equipment as well as personnel wise.186

The struggle grew in ferocity over the next four years. The rest of Pakistan and the outside world learnt little of what was going on because of the news blackout Bhutto had imposed on the Balochistan operations. The fighting was more widespread than during the previous resistance struggle and affected most of Balochistan’s population at some stage or [the] other.187

A Baloch activist188 during the period had narrated broadly about the Baloch version of the happenings:

In keeping with the Pakistani tradition of camouflaging history, a vital chunk of the country’s past has been shrouded in mystery for over 20 years. This was the period of 1973-1977, when the Baloch rose in revolt against a state that had relentlessly oppressed them for decades and military operations against the Baloch people were at their peak. The ‘Baloch insurgency’ as it has been termed, was the end product of a history of injustice, excesses and provocations against the Baloch people by the centre, which has ruled without a consensus of consultation, and made decisions about the fate of the people totally arbitrarily…1973 saw an intensification of the effort to quash the will of the Baloch people in a manner similar to that used in Bangladesh a couple of years earlier. Marri agency, Jhalawan and other supposedly sensitive areas were blockaded to deny to the population the basic necessities. This blockade, which continued till the end of 1977, was very effective and resulted in immeasurable, suffering for the people.189

The military operation against the Baloch insurgents was headed by General

Tikka Khan. Although, the Air Force had also participated in the operation yet could not achieve the target of ‘total wipeout’ of the militants. Talpur observed that in the operation

166 such policy was adopted to eliminate ‘anti-state actors’ which could be considered ‘extra- judicial’. Repeated killing of ‘uninvolved’ Baloch population as well as cases of missing persons reflected that it was a policy matter instead of unwanted incidents. This is exactly what happened in Balochistan during the period. Furthermore Talpur reiterated that number of cases appeared in which unarmed ‘mutilated’ bodies were found and publicized by the forces as encounters could not be considered as mere lapses. He further stated that as a policy the basic livelihood necessities were either destroyed or confiscated in the shape of livestock or wheat reserves. He said that due to the entire situation thousands of Marri tribal migrated to Afghanistan. 190

The insurgency of 1973-77, “aroused unprecedented political awareness in

Baluchistan, and the degree of psychological alienation from Islamabad now evident in

Baluchistan, is strikingly reminiscent of the angry climate that was developing in East

Pakistan during the late 1960s.”191 To fight against the state is not an easy task and the same was the case with Baloch insurgents in 1974-75. Bhutto used the Army and Air

Force extensively in the ‘disturbed area’. The major of the forces was at Chamalang, the stronghold of the Marri tribe. The families of the militants had taken refuge there and gave tough fight to the operating forces for three days. The end result was the death of militants in abundance including their families.

The military was able to restore a semblance of centralised control by deploying some 80,000 troops and killing thousands of militants. But military action also claimed hundreds of civilian lives, including women and children, increasing, as now, local support for the militants who also killed thousands of soldiers. The military operation heightened Baloch political awareness and alienation, particularly among the youth. While the military was perceived as a brutal occupying force, Baloch leaders such as Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo became heroes.192

167

The peace only prevailed after the ending of Bhutto sour era for the Baloch.

General Muhammad Zia ul Haq after taking over the government negotiated a settlement

with the Baloch and the normalcy returned in the province. Until that time a lot of

causalities occurred, according to an estimate more than five thousand militants as well as

three thousand forces personnel had been killed. General Zia announced withdrawal of army as well as release of the thousands of militants and their supporters. However, he

did not accept any demand of the rebels. 193 One can consider it as a ceasefire not as

permanent solution of the issue.

In recollection, it would look that Pakistan’s leaders from the very inception tried

to make ‘Pakistani nationalism’ that did not exist in past. According to a Baloch

nationalist writer, “created in 1947 was a disparate composite of numerous ethnicities,

cultures, languages and belief systems, with no ‘basement’ of nationalism upon which to

build. As a result, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and his subsequent successors, faced the

daunting task of creating Pakistani nationalism from scratch.”194 The artificial effort to

inhale Pakistani Nationalism into the Baloch through the mighty use of force brought destruction and left hundreds dead. The situation was depicted in the statement of Bizenjo in the Supreme Court:

However, I must accept that by use of superior force, it is possible to maintain state borders, even gain new territories, hold colonies or slaves in chains for certain historical periods, but you cannot create brotherhood by means of bayonets, butchery, death and destruction. You cannot create a united nation by force. Nations have risen and come into being in historical processes by feeling of common interests, by voluntary unions, by recognition of each other’s rights, by respect and brotherly love for one another. Bayonet and bullets cannot give birth to a united nation; they can only damage that objective irreparably.195

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Bizenjo accepted the Soviet inspiration in Baloch movement. Though, there was

no evidence of Soviet direct involvement yet circumstances reflect its ample interest in

the same.196 Afghanistan provided base camp to the Baloch fighters.197 By the end of

1975, Mir Hazar Khan Rumkhani decided to continue struggle against Pakistan Army their should be a base camp in Southern Afghanistan, so leaving a very thin quantity of comrades, he crossed the border along with family companions and the cattle. Sardar

Daud permitted them to establish too bigger and various small camps which in fact were parari base camps. In the later stage they issued Jabal a magazine representing their views from Afghanistan. 198 Rather it was self-exile and continued till Zia era. But

interestingly, Afghan leadership was not in line with Baloch demand because they were

considering Balochistan as part of their pursuit of greater Pashtoonistan instead. 199

Though, the camps were labeled as ‘refugee camps’ but were functioning as ‘Guerrilla

bas camps’.200 There is series of correspondence to the General Secretary UN by Sardar

Daud and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regarding the Baloch camps in Afghanistan as well as

Afghan alleged involvement in the guerilla attacks in Balochistan.201 In a letter, Daud

mentioned that Pakistan Army was suppressing Baloch children, women and elders and

that the liberation movements could not be labeled as terrorist movements.202 Bhutto

alleged Daud as supporter of terrorist activities in Balochistan in a letter to the Secretary

General UN. 203 He reiterated the allegations in another letter as well204 which were

accepted by Daud as well.205

The federal government initiated Hyderabad Conspiracy Case against mainly

NAP leaders and workers, fifty five in number, hailing from Balochistan and NWFP. The

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accusations lamented against them were of treason. The case was in progress and Bhhtto

was sacked through Zia Martial Law.

The Bhutto Policies and its Reaction

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto devised smart moves since the beginning to have absolute hold on all

the institutions but could not manage the situation properly. That resulted into crisis at

national level. The government had not taken sufficient steps for remedy because the

country was governed still under emergency. The National Assembly was yet unable to

bring any consensus on constitution making. The political structure was shabby and the

national economy was suffering badly due to smuggling, black marketing and

inflation.206

The political parties were unsatisfied from the features of draft constitution. The

main issue which lacked was the provincial autonomy. The opposition felt itself deprived

because endless powers were given to the office of Prime Minister. The procedure of no

confidence movement against Prime Minister was very much complicated, it could be

launched with the support of 2/3 majority of members.207 According to the procedure

opposition was deprived of its role. The PPP government became successful in

persuading Maulana Mufti Mehmood of JUI to accept constitution agreement. He

demanded certain changes in draft which were accepted.208

Differences between the NAP and JUI started emerging; the General Secretary of

JUI accused the NAP government that it did not ban the trade of Alcoholic products in

Balochistan.209 He further stated that the NAP was not following the agreement. The lawlessness in Balochistan resulted in the deployment of federal forces and troops by the

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end of 1973. Due to such extraordinary steps, the civil war like conditions prevailed.210

The abrupt involvement of Federal authorities was not justified. General Tikka Khan was deputed to lead the operation against the Baloch who was blamed for the ‘atrocities’ in

East Pakistan and was titled as ‘Butcher of Bengal’. 211 It created resentment in the

Baloch; different Baloch activist groups launched guerilla activities against federal

forces.212 About one thousand guerrilla fighters competed against eighty thousand army

troops, which were well equipped with latest weapons including armored vehicles and

gunship helicopters, along with Special Services Group (SSG) support. The Baloch were armed with traditional old style weapons. What so ever it was, the first massive resentment of the Baloch against the military, due to aggravating law and order situations about seven thousand families migrated towards Afghanistan.213

The Central Government devised iron hand policy to manage the opposition

voices. In the same period, the assassinations of Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, a veteran

Pashtoon leader on December 2, 1973214 and Dr. Nazir Ahmad, MNA from JI 215 had

taken place. Likewise, successive attempts were made against Wali Khan and Asghar

Khan.216 That series of political violence led to chaos.217

The charge sheet under which the NAP-JUI ministries were dissolved was baseless. The wave of violence which PPP Government had started was put in the account of the NAP. Balochistan government was dissolved on February 15, 1973 and

NWFP ministry resigned against the removal of Balochistan Assembly.218 Nawab Akbar

Bugti was appointed new Governor of Balochistan.219 Both Ghaus Bakhsh Bezenjo and

Sardar Attaullah Mengal were declared responsible for all lawlessness and disturbance in

Balochistan. Bhutto appointed Bugti later on and declared his government as

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democratic.220 The Tripartite Accord was dissolved which remained in practice for about

ten months.221 The central government under the premiership of Bhutto was alleged

responsible for deviating from the accord and interrupting in the provincial affairs.

The excessive use of authority by Bhutto brought his downfall much earlier. His desire to

be ‘all powerful’ even violated the basic principles of federalism. It might be due to his

political upbringing which was under Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan who were of

authoritarian minds. His democratic disguise damaged the real spirit of democracy and

federalism. Due to such behaviour of Bhutto, political parties of opposition got united

against him and he lost most of his close associates. It was just due to his authoritative

policies. The issue of acceptance of Bangladesh was of serious conflicting nature for

PPP. It was accepted under the resolution passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan

on July 9, 1973.222 Mian Mehmood Kasuri, Federal Law Minister of Bhutto resigned in

protest, which was followed by another cabinet member223 Meraj Khalid;224 both of these

ministers belonged to the Punjab. The resignations revealed that there was division in

ranks of PPP at provincial level. It encouraged the opposition to disagree with the

centre225 that pattern of governance under Bhutto was monarchic.226

The poor governance was evident that Army was called upon many times to maintain law and order in control.227 The governor rule was also imposed in the Punjab. Abdul Wali

Khan called Bhutto as Hitler because of his policies and objectives.228 His objectives

were the source of damaging the federal back bone of the country. He was not convinced

of diversity. There is a difference of opinion even in a family which can be resolved

amicably. He reacted like ‘The Prince’ of Machiavelli’.

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The Banning of NAP and Supreme Court Verdict

The NAP leadership was charged by the centre for generating political disorder and disturbances in Pakistan. Another accusation was to work for the disintegration of country with the help of Afghanistan. 229 Consequently, the NAP was banned and affirmed as illegal party. The important leadership of the party was imprisoned and the offices were confiscated. On February 24, 1975, the Bhutto government filed a reference to the Supreme Court with reference to section 4 of the Political Parties Act, 1962, referring to that NAP leadership was issued notices. In reply, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Wali

Khan, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Sardar Khair Bakhsh

Marri, presented their written declarations in the court.230 The following actions of the party were declared against authority and integrity of the country: a) The NAP argued that the ruling party i.e. PPP had not respected the Tripartite Accord, so there is no bondage of the constitution upon it. b) The Court was of the opinion that the argument of the NAP was like Subversion of the constitution. c) In the declaration of Court it was included that the NAP in the garb of autonomy seeking secession. d) The court pointed out that the standpoint of the party regarding the modification of the international boundaries was actually against the integrity of the country. e) Another point highlighted by the court was the efforts of the NAP for propagating the right of self-determination for the people of FATA was against the solidarity of Pakistan.

While raising the points the approach of the court could be considered hostile rather than sympathetic. Moreover, the verdict of the court was based upon inadmissible evidence. Furthermore, requests of certain politicians were not accepted for pleading in the court. “Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rehman had been good judge and wrote some

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outstanding opinions. This judgment and the proceedings on which it was based were

certainly a disappointing”.231

The Federal Structure under 1973 Constitution

Basic feature of the 1973 constitution was the federal form of government. The

constitution provided unambiguous distribution of authority between the centre and provinces and the theory of devolution of power was also acknowledged. It was mentioned in the federal and concurrent lists. The jurisdiction of federal list was the entire country.232 The powers of the Provincial Assembly extended to the whole or any

part of province.233 The centre was given subjects of foreign affairs, defense, currency, citizenship, minerals, oil and gas, copyright, trade mark designs, shipping and navigation, maritime, taxes and duties of excise and customs, leisure, central and all forms of telecommunications, census, foreign and inter-provincial trade and commerce, and others. There were fourty seven objects in the concurrent list. It was related to matters as population planning, trade union, tourism, bankruptcy, arbitration, trust, drugs, arms and explosives, transfer of property and registration, marriage and divorce, civil and criminal law, electricity, and other matters of common interests. The precedence of central legislation was maintained over the provincial legislation with the matters comprising in concurrent list.234 The constitution did not include any separate list for the provinces.235

The president was empowered to form a Council of Common Interests in relations to subject in part II of the federal legislative or the concurrent list. This body was considered a proper platform for the units to come up with complaints and grievances against federation and other provinces. If the federal government or the relevant province

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was not agreed with the decision of the councils, the matters could be referred to the

parliament for final decision.236 The Central Government could intervene in provincial

matters during the period of emergency. The Parliament had powers of legislation for

concerned province regarding any subject not mentioned either in central or concurrent

lists.237

The Financial Relations

The distribution of financial resources is of prime importance in a federal state. The constitution of 1973 could not bring the desired results due ti improper distribution to collect financial resources. The centre was authorized to implement different taxes and duties i.e. custom, export, excise, agriculture, land, property taxes, income tax and

surcharge duties on mineral resources. The main sources of provincial income were

through agriculture, land and property revenue. Other taxes like electricity, transportation, recreation etc. were included in federal list.238

The Administrative Relations

The federal government would protect each province from internal and external

aggression. It would ensure the running of the business of the provincial governments in

agreement with the constitutional provision. The provincial authorities could be given

direction by the federal government regarding the following matters.

 Construction and maintenance of strategically important communication

network.

 Exercise of provincial executive authority to prevent a large scale chaos in

Pakistan partially or completely.

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 The federal government could entrust its executive function, with the

willingness of provincial government to it or its officers.

 Similarly, provincial authorities, in coordination with the federal

government entrust its executive function to it or its officer.239

The President had powers to impose emergency in case of any threat to country

which the provincial government are unable to tackle.

Its effects were as follows.

 The federal government could direct the provincial Governor to hold the

powers of provincial government.

 The constitutional provisions were under the operative authority of federal

government for the implementation.

 The President could also direct the governor to assume the powers of the

provincial government on his behalf in case of unsatisfactory governance

or law and order situation in the province or the government of the

province could not be operated according to constitutional provisions.240

The centralist tendencies emerged during Bhutto rule to get absolute power and

supremacy. Although during his rule the 1973 constitution was unanimously approved by

all the units and it stressed on the equal distribution of the resources under the provision of provincial autonomy, but the situation was different in case of Balochistan. Bhutto was of the view that the strong centre could provide him strength to maintain stability at national level. In that quest he violated the constitutional provisions and became completely intolerant for NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan. The real spirit of

176 federalism was damaged because Bhutto became authoritative and favoured strong centre for absolute control on national affairs.

The federal authority under the control of Bhutto showed the abuse of power by banning the NAP and initiation of military action which proved fatal for the Balochistan-

Centre relations. The feelings of deprivations and discontent spread all over the

Balochistan. The grievances of Balochistan could be redressed if the issue would have been tackled under the constitutional provisions of provincial autonomy. It was considered a constitutional joke that state of emergency was operative under a federal system and an elected government was dissolved for nothing. It was total violation of federal principles. Such type of behavior created highly centralized and authoritarian culture at centre for which Balochistan responded. This was absolutely undemocratic step due to which the role of Balochistan reduced at national level. Such steps were against the unity among federation and the provinces. National integration could develop if the real federal principles were followed. Under the authoritative steps of Bhutto government an attempt was made to deprive Balochistan for its equal and constitutional role at federal and provincial level regarding planning and development. It was misfortune that in spite of conciliation and participatory role the central government became much authoritative in the case of Balochistan. The improper tackling with the situation resulted in Baloch uprising. The feelings of mistrust and differences created in security and fear in the province which created the anti-centre tendencies.

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The Formation of United Democratic Front (UDF)

In such critical situation a prominent development emerged at the ranks of opposition

parties with the formation of United Democratic Front.241 It was a political alliance containing eight political parties on board which included NAP, JI, PDP, Khaksars and independents. Mostly all of these parties belonged to opposition. It was established on

February 28, 1973 at Rawalpindi.242 The objectives of that alliance were to make joint

efforts for implementation of Islamic Constitution under parliamentary system, release of

political prisoners, to obstruct dictatorship and restoration of democracy.243 The UDF

leadership had detailed sessions on March 1, and 2, 1973 to settle future course of action.

The UDF enabled to get strength due to inclusion of Wali Khan, Pir Pagaro and

Maulana Mufti Mahmood. Although UDF being the mixture of all opposition parties

having their own agenda but the only thing common was anti-Bhutto feelings. Pir Pagaro

was elected President and Professor Ghafoor was elected as General Secretary. Maulana

Mufti Mahmood and Nawabzada Nasarullah were elected as vice presidents. The UDF

mainstream leadership belonged to all provinces which pressurized federal government.

They had reservations about the nature of constitution. Later on, the negotiations were

held between Bhutto and UDF leadership to resolve the differences on the issue of

constitution. Some differences emerged internally with regard to Council Muslim League

(CML) and NAP relations. These were also highlighted by other leaders outside the UDF.

They critically apprehended the role of Wali Khan with reference to Pakistan Movement.

The UDF was objected due to inclusion of NAP in to the alliance.244 On February 17,

1973 Federal Law Minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada tabled the Constitution Bill in the

National Assembly. The Bhutto maneuvered opponents for their support of the upcoming

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constitution. The government also convinced the opposition for the settlement of

autonomous units very soon.245 The opposition was ready to cooperate in the best interest of country but the way in which Bhutto tackled opposition was objectionable. The UDF had also been established as a result of wrong political strategies and miscalculations of

Bhutto. The UDF started anti-government demonstrations to pressurize PPP government.246

A public meeting of UDF was organized at Liaqat Bagh Rawalpindi on March 23,

1973. The PPP Government at centre and the Punjab took every violent measure to

disturb the public meeting. The Law enforcing agencies openly shot fires on the venue

causing the causalities of tens of people.247 It was a peaceful public meeting which was

targeted just to remove Wali Khan from political scene. The audience of the meeting

retaliated by putting on fire many vehicles either they were government owned or private.

There was a complete scene of lawlessness. Actually, it was mentioned by certain news

papers that at that time the proceedings of law and order were monitored, controlled and

directed by the then Governor of the Punjab, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, who himself was

present at the venue.248 That incident intensified the already charged environment. The

opposition agitated against the tyrannical happenings in the meeting all over the country.

Bhutto maneuvered to tackle the situation and started meetings with the opposition

politicians on April 2, 1973, excluding Abdul Wali Khan and Pir Pagaro.249 Bhutto

maneuvered to divide opposition by having meetings with selective leaders. He had series

of the meetings with them to passive the conditions. He accepted all the demands of UDF

before 3rd meeting on the constitution bill. It was a turning point because the constitution

had been approved unanimously.250 Bhutto’s later period proved that he did not have any

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intension to compensate the opposition but just wanted to extend his tenure as long as

possible.251 The UDF proved to be a hard nut for PPP government. During the first week of the August 1973 National Convention was summoned. It issued a declaration that a nationwide movement would be launched if the civil liberties and basic rights of people were not restored by August 24, 1973.252 The demands of the UDF were; the release of

political prisoners, lifting up of emergency, freedom of press, withdrawal of cases against

opposition activists, the rejection of press ordinance and control on prices.253

The law and order situation in Balochistan was out of control on which army

action was the only option according to the PPP’s central government, which was seeking

lame excuses to take actions against NWFP and Balochistan. On February 8, 1975 a PPP

leader of NWFP Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao was assassinated in a bomb blast at

Peshawer University.254 That incident badly affected law and order situation in NWFP.

The PPP central government got another plea against NAP. Consequently the Ban was

imposed on the NAP on February 10, 1975 after the murder of Sherpao.255

The people in NWFP and Balochistan were completely disappointed by the

decision; Bhutto targeted the elected governments of NAP- JUI in both the provinces

very cleverly. Despite of accountability against NAP under the government pressure

nothing was revealed against the NAP. The government proclaimed that Pakistan had

become free of anti-state politics after the ban on the NAP.

The top leadership of the NAP was imprisoned. The lower leadership at second

tier constituted National Democratic Party (NDP) which was renamed National

Democratic Front (NDF) in November, 1975.256 The NDP was originally set-up to fill the

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gap and replace the NAP. It had sympathetic feeling with Abdul Wali Khan and Baloch

Leadership. It played a considerable role during the period of decline of PPP. Sherbaz

Mazari the President of PDP repeatedly demanded the dismissal of special tribunals and

courts including Hyderabad Tribunal.257 It was widely apprehended that PDP was another

mild face of the NAP. It had anti-Pashtoonistan agenda. It was considered as part of anti-

Pakistan elements despite of all assurances.

The NDP following the track of the NAP demanded for provincial autonomy. It

considered defense, currency, communication and foreign affairs as federal government’s

subjects. The most sensitive demand stressed by NDP was restructuring of the provinces

on linguistic and cultural basis.258 It was a damaging factor for the federation which

might have created inter-provincial differences.

On the whole, NDP provided an alternative pedestal for the political activities of

the NAP workers. Its main membership comprised of the stalwarts of the NAP like

Begum Nasim Wali Khan, who effectively worked to reinstate the democratic process alone while her husband Wali Khan was imprisoned in Hyderabad Jail. The PPP government used negative tactics for the character assassination of its opponents and especially NAP/ NDP leadership including Begum Nasim Wali Khan. The NDP was able to gather public sympathies after inclusion of Begum Nasim Wali Khan, who addressed

large public meetings. NDP’s policy favoured the existence of democratic system in

Pakistan and its non-aligned role internationally. It had anti- pashtoonistan agenda and

was critic about the interference of Afghanistan in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The

establishment and working of NDP was a challenge for other political parties. It also

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aggravated the apprehensions of the Punjab, which observed NDP as tool of ‘anti-

Pakistan’ elements. The situation further worsened the political scene at national level.259

After the arrest of Wali Khan and others and establishment of Hyderabad

Tribunal, PPP Government was facing an alternative challenge under NDP leadership.

Bhutto was very much apprehensive and stated that NDP would dissolve itself within a

period of a week but it remained active even after the execution of Bhutto. JUI was also

very much critical about NDP. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi of JUI stated that NDP

was a changed version of NAP and basically it was the Wali Khan group who had the

same aims and objectives as NAP had. 260 The PPP government was very much

apprehensive about the existence and working of NDP under the prevalent conditions

NDP desired to launch a campaign with the cooperation of other opposition parties

against PPP’s government. By mutual consensus of other opposition parties a joint

alliance was formed under the name of United Democratic Front.261

References & Notes

1Harihar Bhattacharyya, Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia (London; Routledge, 2010), p.8. 2K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.2. 3Ibid. 4W.H. Riker, “Federation” in F.I. Granstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, Vol.5, Government Institution and Process (Mass, Addision Wesley, 1975), p.5. 5Andrew Heywood, Politics (New York, Palgrave, 1997), p. 161. 6Bhattacharyya, Federalism in Asia, p. 161. 7Encyclopaedia of Britannica, Vol-IV, p. 712. 8Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 1994), p.113. 9A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: English Book Society and Macmillan, 1973), P. 143. 10 Wheare, Federal Government, p.10. 11Ibid, p.14. 12Ibid. 13R.L Watts, New Federation: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1966), p.13. 14W.H. Riker, “Federation” in F.I. Granstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, Vol.5, p.101.

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15 J.D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehard, Winston, 1970), p.190. 16Mehrunnisa Ali, Politics of Federalism in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1996), p.4. 17J.C. Vile, The Structure of American Federalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). p.197. 18Michael D. Reagan, New Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.14. 19 Akhtar Ali, Pakistan’s Development Challenges: Federalism, Security and Governance, Charleston: Create Space, 2011, p.185. 20Heywood, Political Theory, p.162. 21Wheare, Federal Government, p.13. 22 Reagan, New Federalism, p.35. 23 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2006), p.231. 24 Ibid., p.231. 25 Hassan Askari Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan. 1947-86 (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986), p.173. 26 Ayyaz Gull, “Charter of Independence: A Critical Study of Mujib’s Six Point Programme”, Journal of Punjab University Historical Society, pp. 59-74, Vol.27, No.1, January - June, 2014, p. 62. 27 Mansoor Akbar Kundi, “Federalism in Pakistan: Problems & Prospects” in Asian and African Studies, pp.37-48, No. 11, 2002, p.41. 28 Hamid Yusaf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments, 1947-1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999) p.169. 29 Maqsood Jafary, The Ideals of Bhutto (Rawalpindi: Maqsood Jafary, 2008), p.61. 30 Ibid. 31 Safder Mehmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development (Karachi. Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 146. 32 A.B Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), p.253. 33 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto managed to get the approval from Ayub Khan of changing the punishment of death sentence to life imprisonment and later waved off the imprisonment as well. For details see, Akhtar Ali Khan Baloch, Balochistan ki Namwar Shakhsiyat, Vol. II (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), p.66. 34 Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971-77 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.13. 35 Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, p.60. 36 Mehmood, Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, p. 154. 37 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan, 1948-1979 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural, Research, 1993), p.7. 38 Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process, pp. 253-254. 39 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,p.231. 40 Ibid., P. 60. 41 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-97 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication), pp.134-135. 42 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 247. 43 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 247. 44 Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations, p.93. 45 Amin, Ethno-National Movements, p.123. 46 Rizvi, The Military and Politics, p.195. 47 Rafi Raza, ZulfikarAli Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977 (Karachi: Oxford University Press. 1997), p.52. 48 Ibid., p.152. 49 Ibid. 50Dawn, Karachi, March 7,1972 51 Ibid. 52 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.263. 53 The New York Times, April 15, 1972. 54Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (London: The Macmillan Press, 1992), p.181.

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55 The most important were; an agreement with International Monetary Fund (IMF), settlement with India and support on the constitutional draft. For details see, Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, p,87. 56 Muhammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994), p. 318. 57Roedad Khan, Pakistan Inqilab ke Dahanay Per (Urdu) trans. Irfan Ahmad Imtiaz (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.77. 58 Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Crisis Group Asia Report No119, 14 September 2006. 59 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.310. 60 Taj Muhammad Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism: Its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p. 263. 61 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.363. 62 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Speeches and Statements, January 1, 1973- March 31, 1973(Lahore: Classic Publishers, 1973), p.101. 63 Ibid. 64The Morning News, July 23, 1973, Karachi. 65Those were; Pashtoon areas of Zhob, Pishin and parts of Loralia districts. 66 Taj Mohammad Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism: Its Origins and Development (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004), p. 102. 67 Balochistan Chief Minister Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal’s statement, Dawn, June 22, 1972. 68 The June 8th speech of Gul Khan Nasir, translated from its original Urdu into English. Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan Debates, Volume II (7th June to 4th July 1972). 69 Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism, p. 308. 70 Jan Muhammad, Essays on Baloch Nationalism, p, 292. 71 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow.p.314. 72 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Sayyid A.S Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971-77 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.111. 76Ajmal Khattak was a renowned politician, prolific writer and popular Pashto poet. Ideologically, he was Khudai Khidmatgar as well as active politician. He remained President of Awami National Party and was also close friend of Wali Khan. 77 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 78 Government of Pakistan, white paper on Balochistan (Rawalpindi, October 1974),pp.18-23. 79 There is a fertile land in Sibi District which was irrigated by the seasonal canal called Pat-Feeder. 80 Jan Muhammad, Essays on Baloch Nationalism, pp. 301-302. 81 Statement of Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri, made in Lahore Highcourt. The Pakistan Times, December,1, 4, 1974. 82 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.315. 83 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism, p.315. 84 The Herald, Karachi, July 1986, p.59. 85 Ibid., p.5. 86 Ibid., p.39. 87 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Development (Kent: W Dawson & son Ltd, 1980) P. 164. 88 Awan, Baluchistan, p.267. 89 Jang, Rawalpindi, April 10, 1973. 90 Mujeeb had grievances that despite of Awami League’s majority in 1970 elections he was not allowed to form government at centre. 91 He came into lime light at national level for his contribution in anti-Ayub movement during Bhutto reign he initially favored Bhutto but later on he disagreed Bhutto for his policies 92 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, November 27, 1970. 93 London Times, August 30, 1972. 94 The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, July 25, 1975. 95London Times, August 30, 1972.

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96 Inaugural Speech of Attorney General of Pakistan, Yahya Bakhtiar, in the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the Case against NAP, in Ahmad Salim, Balochistan: Azadi se Subai be Ikhtiyari Tak (Urdu) (Lahore: Jamhuri Publications, 2013), pp.278-285. 97 Ibid. 98 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 18, 1975. 99 The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, August 18, 1975. 100 Nawa-i-Waqt, February 13, 1973. 101 The worth mentioning among them were; Ataullah Mengal, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Marri Ahmad Salim, Balochistan: Azadi se Subai be Ikhtiyari Tak, p.60. 102 Rushbrook Williams, Pakistan under Challenge (London: Stansy International, 1975), p.52. 103 Surindra Nath Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan (Jaipur, Aalekh Publishers,1985),p.17. 104 Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1978), p.157. 105 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, p.109. 106 Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar: Political Bibliography (Lahore: Qadria Books, 1985), pp. 151-159. 107 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, p.110. 108 Ibid. 109 Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 110 Ibid, March 30, 1972. 111 Ibid. 112 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan,p.110. 113 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 114 Dr. Khan and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the veteran leaders of NWFP were known as Khan Brothers. 115 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan,pp.110-111. 116 “Text of the Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 117 Ibid. 118 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. 119 Ibid. 120 Dawn, Karachi March 2, 1970. 121 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. 122 Ibid. 123 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, p. 117. 124 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 125 William, Pakistan Under Challenges, p.77 126 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. 127 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, p. 112. 128 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 129 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. 130 The conference held in September 1973 regarding non-aligned countries. It was attended by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan who criticized Pakistan severely and condemned the situation in Balochistan and NWFP. See details in Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan,, p.112. 131 Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. 132 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, January I, 1973-March 31, 1973, p.92. 133 Statement of Yahya Bakhtiar, Attorney General of Pakistan, before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. 134 “A Leaf from History: Sherpao’s Murder and Ban on NAP” in Dawn, Karachi, March 24, 2013. 135 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, April 1-June 30 1972 (Islamabad: Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), p.284. 136 Appendix V, Letter of Acceptance from Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizengo dated April 27, 1972 in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, April 1-June 30 1972, p.286. 137 Ibid. 138 Dawn, June 12, 1972. 139 Ibid, June 21, 1972. 140 Ahmad Salim, Balochistan: Azadi se Subai be Ikhtiyari Tak, pp.281-282. 141 Ibid.

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142 The Punjabi settlers were attacked and mal-treated in Pat-Feeder by the Baloch tribesmen whereas Balochistan Students Organization which was affiliated with the NAP, attacked non-Baloch crew of Pakistan Western Railway and kidnapped a Railway Guard on November 28, 1972. Jang, Karachi November 29, 1972. 143 Dawn, January 22, 1973. 144 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 145 Ibid. 146 Kaniz F. Yusuf, Moḥammad Salim Aẖtar, Syed Razi Wasti, eds., Pakistan Resolution Revisited (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1990), p.193. 147 Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, January I, 1973-March 31, 1973, p.102. 148 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 149 Asif Bhalli, Siyasat Dan (Urdu) (Lahore: Mawara Publishers, 1988), p.335. 150 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 151 Safdar Mahmood, Political Roots and Development: 1947-1999 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.150. 152 Tajamal Hussain Anjum, Pakistan: Tarikh-o-Siyasi Jaizay (Urdu) (Lahore: Nazir Ahmad Publishers, 1993), p.409. 153 Jang, Karachi, June 6, 1975. 154 “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 155 The interview of Wali Khan in the Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, January 11, 1978. 156 For details see, “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 157 The authoritative Bhutto mind reflected and fifty two persons were arrested including Wali Khan, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Mari, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizinji, Sardar Attaullah Mengal. Others were the NAP leaders and Muslim League leaders. 158 Paula Newburg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). pp 146–150. 159 Pirzada, The Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, p. 113. 160 For details see, “Text of Supreme Court Judgment” in Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. 161 The News Times, Rawalpindi, August 25, 1974 162 Ibid. 163 Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, p.17. 164 Ibid. 165 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, P. 35. 166 Ibid., p.35. 167 Ibid., p.267. 168 Hamid Khan, Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.264. 169 Ibid., p.264. 170 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism, 171 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, P. 399. 172 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, P. 35. 173 Syed Fakharuddin Shah & M. Zubair Khan, “Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s”, p.60. 174 Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Crisis Group Asia Report No.119, 14 September 2006, p.50. 175 Ibid., p.97. 176 Amin, Ethno-National Movements,p.149. 177 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.76. 178 Amin, Ethno National Movement,p.150. 179 Ibid.,p.151. 180 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan,p.184. 181 Ibid., p.84. 182 Amin, Ethno-National Movements,p.151. 183 Ibid., p.152. 184 The Weekly Takbeer, Karachi. 6 September, 1986. 185 Amin, Ethno-National Movements,p.153.

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186 He provided two hundred million US dollars in aid and twenty Huey Cobra helicopter gunships complete with crew to fight the insurgents. 187 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism,p.317. 188 He was Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur. 189 Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur, “A Page from the Past” Newsline, March 1988. 190 Ibid. 191 Selig S. Harrison, "Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan", p.300. 192 Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Crisis Group Asia Report No119, 14 September 2006 193 Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Balochistan”, Foreign Policy, No. 32, Autumn 1978, p.139. 194 Breseeg, Balochistan Nationalism,p.319. 195 People’s Front, vol. 2, No. 6-7, London, 1975, p.4. 196 Ibid.,p.153. 197 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p.84. 198 Ahmad Salim, Balochistan: Azadi se Subai Bay-Ikhtiari Tak (Urdu) (Lahore: Jamhuri Publications, 2013), p.39-40. 199 Amin, Ethno-National Movement, p.153. 200 Gulshan Majeed and Rehana Saeed Hashmi, “Baloch Resistence during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era: Causes and Consequences” in South Asian Studies, pp. 321-331, Vol. 29, N0.1, January-July 2014, p.328. also see, Balochis of Pakistan: On the Margins of History (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), p. 29. 201 Salim, Balochistan: Azadi se Subai Bay-Ikhtiari Tak, p.p.47-49. 202 Sardar Daud’s letter to Secretary General, UN dated November 27, 1974, Ibid, p.47. 203 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s letter to Secretary General, UN dated October 4, 1974, Ibid, p.48. 204 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s letter to Secretary General, UN dated January 17, 1975, Ibid. 205 Daud said that he had been supporting the Baloch insurgents and would continue to do so. Sardar Daud’s letter to Secretary General, UN dated March 2, 1975, Ibid.

206 Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York: Oxford University Press,1993)p.299. 207 Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, November 24, 1972. 208 Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.188. 209 Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, December 9, 1972. 210Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan,p.211. 211 At that time Tikka Khan was Chief of the Army Staff. 212 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1988, p.213. 213 Stephan P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), p.220. 214 Dawn, Karachi, December 3,1973. 215 He was elected from Dera Ghazi Khan on JI ticket and defeated a Tumandar Sardar Muhammad Khan Leghari. He was very brave critic of Bhutto and was dramatically killed on June 8, 1972. 216 Asghar Khan is former Air Chief as well as ADC to the first Governor General of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was a vocal opposition leader at the time. He was head of Tehrik-Istiqlal, present PM Nawaz Sharif and Nawab Akbar Bugti were also associated for some time with the part. 217 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.381. 218 Afzal Haider, Bhutto Trial (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1996), p.87. 219 Jang, Rawalpindi, February 14, 1973. 220 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p.211. 221 Ibid. 222 Mahmood-ul-Hasan Khan, Hakoomato-Siyasat, 1947-1990 (Urdu), (Lahore: New Palace, nd), p.190. 223 Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, p.327. 224 Riaz Iqbal, “Peoples Guards ko kis ki Taqreer sun kar Ghusa a Giya” in Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, April 1, 1973. 225Amin, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, p.28.

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226 Mir Jamil-ur-Rahman, Masters of the Games (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), p.26. 227 Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, ed. Political System in Pakistan: Role of Military Dictatorship in Pakistan Politics, Vol. 5 (New York: Deep & Deep Publishers, 1995), p.255. 228 Dawn, Karachi, August 21, 1973. 229 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p.300. 230 Ibid., p.303. 231 For details see, Ibid.,p.303. 232 Constitution of Islamic Republic Pakistan, 1973. Fourth Schedule. 233 Ibid., Article 143. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid., Article 143. 236 Ibid., Article 142. 237 Ibid., Article 153 and 154. 238 Ibid., Article 154. 239 Ibid., Article 147. 240 Ibid., Article 234. 241 Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, p.334. 242Khan, Hakoomato-Siyasat, 1947-1990 , p.212. 243 Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development, p.150. 244 Salim Younas, Siyasi Itehad aur Pakistani Siyasat par un ke Asrat (Urdu)(Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993), p.100. 245 William, Pakistan Under Challenges, p.144. 246 Muneer Ahmad, Pakistan ke Siyasi Itehad (Urdu) (Lahore: Frontier Post Publishers, 1993), p.74. 247 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.297. 248 An eye witness Dr. Syed Tahir Hussain Bukhari said in a personal interview that, the Governor Khar was present at the top of the Park hotel, just opposite of the venue of the UDF meeting. See also Daily Jasarat, Karachi and Hurriyat, Karachi March 24,1973. 249 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, p.212. 250 William, Pakistan under Challenges, p.145. 251 Ibid. 252 Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, p.335. 253 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.149. 254 Dawn, Karachi, February 8, 1975. 255 Morning News, Karachi, February 24, 1975. 256 Amin, The Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, p.139. 257 Waseem, Politics and State in Pakistan, p.328. 258 Amin, The Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, p.139. 259 Mahmood, Pakistan Politics and Development, p.150. 260 Jang, Rawalpindi, January 23, 1976. 261 Amin, The Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, p.141.

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CHAPTER FOUR

BALOCHISTAN-CENTRE RELATIONS: INSURGENCY AND ITS COUNTER, 1972-1977

In the context of resistance movement in Balochistan, it can be assessed as truce during

Yahya’s regime and even until the introduction of Interim Constitution 1972. Though,

fighting between centre and the Baloch guerillas stopped but the formational structure of

the ‘pararies’ was still intact. They utilized the temporary peace for their future planning

for the resistance against the central policies. The ‘honey-moon’ period of the peace

could not be sustained long and heated exchange of allegations started between Bhutto

government at centre and nationalist government in Balochistan. The turning point was

the dismissal of the Mengal government by the centre in 1973.1 As a reaction a new wave

of insurgency erupted in Balochistan with full swing. In the present chapter the effort will

be made to dig out the causes of the conflict between centre and Balochistan. The

resistance movement in 1970s, central response in the shape of army action, interest of

foreign powers and socio-political policies of the centre regarding Balochistan will also

be discussed.

The Federalism at Stake

The miscarriage of federalism in Pakistan resulted separation of East Pakistan.

Consequent upon the debacle of East Pakistan ‘the New Pakistan’ emerged and it

inherited the same challenge again.2 The federal state of Pakistan had to face regionalism

like a big-bang. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in a position to tackle such issues in the Punjab

and Sindh because both the provinces came up as strong hold of PPP but the situation in

Balochistan and NWFP were not easy-pie.3 Though the nationalist band in the Punjab and

Sindh was also drumming light tunes like nationalists in the Punjab were feeling

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threatened by Sindhi dominance whereas Sindhi nationalists were complaining of being

ignored regarding their interests and benefits.4 The herculean task in front of Bhutto was

to maintain equilibrium between the feelings and interests of both the provinces.5 As far

as NWFP and Balochistan were concerned Bhutto toed the policies of suppression and

oppression adopted by the Military predecessors.6

The despotic posture of Bhutto in his policies surprised the Punjabi nationalists

and even his ex-Governor and CM Ghulam Mustafa Khar stood up.7 Khar’s basic issue

was nationalization and the reform policies of Bhutto which were targeting the feudal in

the Punjab. He was pressing Bhutto to formulate policies through the prism of the Punjab.

Subsequent upon the differences Khar was replaced by Muhammad Hanif Ramay. 8 He

too could not sustain long on the seat vacated by a strong feudal like Khar and hence,

replaced by another feudal Sadiq Qureshi9 with minimal political ambitions. The reaction

to the decision emerged as ‘Save Punjab Movement’ jointly launched by Khar and

Ramay with strong threat of bifurcation of the Punjab in the shape of another off-shoot

province of Bhawalpur. 10 The justification for the demand was the social gap and

difference between indigenous Seraiki people and Punjabi settlers.11 Some violence was

reported from the Bhawalpur area though it was not noticeable.12 The cruder nationalists,

i.e. Punjabi Adbi Sangat were step forward and started advocating reunification of ‘both

the Punjabs’. 13 Bhutto was too sharp and managed to tone down the left oriented

nationalists in the Punjab.

The Punjab was not the exception; Bhutto had to face the nationalistic music in

the ‘home theater’ as well. The ‘new’ and ‘indigenous Sindhi’ issue was one major

challenge.14 Furthermore, the more escalating issue was of the Punjabi settlers in the

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province which resulted riots in Hyderabad on January 27, 1970.15 It was reported that

Jeay Sindh, a nationalist group led by G.M. Syed, was also involved along with PPP in

the riots.16 Gradually the situation worsened and spread widely in the interior Sindh by

1972.17 To calm the nationalists in the province, PPP Sindh government adopted Sindhi

as an official language on July 7, 1972.18 The ‘new Sindhis’ reacted and protested against

the bill which resulted in to violent incidence in the months of July and August 1972,

resultantly forty seven persons died and lot of loses to the property occurred in whole the

province in general and Hyderabad and Karachi in particular.19 Bhutto addressed the

issue by declaring Urdu simultaneously as second official language of the province.20

Beside that Bhutto extensively toured Sindh to control the situation in his home province.

The replacement of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, from the Chief Ministership, with

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was another important step in that context. Therefore, Bhutto

succeeded in minimizing the crisis with his sharp political strategy. 21 The Muhajir

community was demanding the declaration of Karachi as independent province.22 But

Bhutto did not pay any attention to the demand. Though, Bhutto managed the regionalist

issue in the Punjab and Sindh yet another challenge was waiting for him to be addressed.

NWFP and Balochistan were having different socio-political panorama which was quite

different from the Punjab and Sindh. Particularly, Balochistan was a continuous

challenge for centre throughout the PPP government, 1972-1977.

Tripartite Accord and Formation of the Balochistan Government

To create cordial environment for the ‘New Pakistan’ Bhutto made a right step and

invited the majority parties in NWFP and Balochistan to collaborate with the central

government to run the democratic system smoothly.23 In that context to show his sincerity

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Bhutto lifted the ban on NAP. He engaged with majority parties in Balochistan and

NWFP and started hectic dialogue with the leadership of NAP and JUI. On March 6,

1972 a meeting held in Rawalpindi among Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood, and Bhutto,

along with their associates. The outcome of the negotiations came out in the shape of an

accord having twelve points.24 The agreement is recognized as Tripartite Accord in the

political history of Pakistan.25 The salient features of the agreement were;

Martial Law will be lifted with effect from August 14, the day when the National Assembly would be convened to consider the draft constitution. …The centre would appoint the Governors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of the NWFP and Balochistan. The government at the centre and in the provinces will be formed on the basis of parliamentary majorities. The parties’ settled for PPP rule at the centre and in the Punjab and Sindh, and NAP-JUI rule in the NWFP and Balochistan.26 Actually, this accord was a result of political necessity rather than ideological affinity between the three parties because the three parties had opposite directions in ideologies from each other.27

Although, the accord was mile-stone yet were also having seeds of future

turbulent situation in the province.28 In that honey-moon period Bhutto offered NAP-JUI

to join hands at the central government as well but the later refused to be subservient.

After the refusal from NAP-JUI, Bhutto tendered the invitation to the Muslim League

Qayyum which was accepted whole-heartedly and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was given

the ministry of Interior and Tribal Affairs which proved fatal for Balochistan in future.29

The decision was a wrong and problem creating for the country in the long run. It was

Qayyum Khan who seemed to be responsible for sour province centre-relations in the

context of Balochistan. He exploited the situation for his petty personal interest.30 It could

be fair to say that Qayyum Khan was the person who showed tripartite accord the way to

doom’s day.

In accordance with the accord, Bhutto proceeded to offer NAP-JUI; the

Governorships of both the provinces as well as their Ministries in the same provinces and

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by their recommendations NAP-JUI Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo and Arbab Sikandar Khan

Khalil were nominated as Governors of Balochistan and NWFP, respectively.

Consequently, Sardar Attaullah Mengal and Maulana Mufti Mahmood took over the

charge of Chief Ministerships in Balochistan and NWFP, in the order. The selection of

the Governor for Balochistan was an interesting episode;

One of the NAP Members also at the meeting later told me that when Bhutto offered the Governorship of Balochistan to Khair Bakhsh, the Marri Sardar coldly turned to Attaullah Mengal and offered the office to him. Attaullah observing traditional etiquette replied, I would prefer Sardar Khair Bakhsh Khan becoming the governor; Bhutto one more faced Khair Buksh and requested him to accept the office. Khair Bakhsh had arrogantly turned his face away from him and haughtily announced that Attaullah, both determinedly involved in the rigors of tribal decorum, Bizanjo steped in and he told Bhutto, ‘Ye Sardar log hain. Un kay leeyeh aisi chees un kay shaan kay Khilaf hae. Aap Mujhai mauka dain’ (They are Sardars. It is beneath their dignity to accept such on office. Give it to me instead). Thus, to surprise every one present, Bizenjo was appointed as Governor of Balochistan.31

There were different views regarding the decision of NAP-JUI recommended

Governors in the provinces. One point of view was that it was misjudgment on the part of

Bhutto because NAP-JUI came at par with PPP and used the offices of Governors and

Chief Ministers to consolidate their political power. In the context of theory as well as

practice the arrangement under Tripartite Accord was not in accordance of the principles

of federalism.32 Bhutto had his own justifications, “I took the unique and unprecedented

step of appointing NAP governor in NWFP and Balochistan to stabilize the shaky NAP-

JUI coalition in the two provinces and to checkmate the parliamentary intrigues of the

independents.”33 He further pleaded as,

…there were other reasons also making such a bold gesture of good will to NAP. Many politicians in my party and in other parties especially the Muslim League of Qayyum Khan were alarmed by my gesture. They thought (sic) that the end was nigh. Not only the politicians but many other powerful and influential sections of our society were perturbed. NAP had a long and inerasable record of opposition to Pakistan. Their leaders had spent many years in Jail at the hands of successive government after the creation of Pakistan. General Yahya Khan, who

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had started his Martial Law with a flirtation with NAP, banned the party a few months before his downfall. Here I was, immediately on taking over the office of president of Pakistan unconditionally lifting the ban on NAP. Now I was taking the extraordinary step of appointing NAP governor in NWFP and Balochistan and helping them to form coalition governments in the two provinces in partnership with JUI. There are number of white papers, documents and the judgment of the supreme court of Pakistan on NAP that chronicle the events of that period. Suffice it is to say that I made earnest and whole some endeavors to extend the hand of cooperation to NAP in the larger interest of Pakistan, after the dismemberment of the country. It was a matter of policy and not of exigency. I had my reason. None of the reasons were personal or selfish none of the reasons were based on partisan interest. My reasons were rooted in the supreme interest of Pakistan and the region. It was high thinking and not low living. I wanted to give another chance to Pakistan. I wanted to begin with a clean slate.34

The correspondence between Bhutto and Bizenjo is now part of official archives,

one such letter was written on April 26, 1972 by Bhutto which was having guidance

regarding centre-province official relations. 35 Subsequently, Bizenjo reciprocated; “I

acknowledged with thanks receipt of your letter of April 26, 1972 and I have pleasure in

confirming that I accept its contents.”36

The Provincial Ministry at Draggers Drawn

Sardar Attaullah Mengal was elected as Chief Minister by the Provincial Assembly with

clear-cut majority. Bhutto wrote a letter of facilitation to him on May 1, 1972.

Please accept my congratulation on being elected as leader of the provincial assembly of Balochistan. I know your province well and have great respect and affection for its brave people. I know the problems of Balochistan and I am deeply interested in the progress and well being of this backward part of our country. I can assure you that you will have the fullest cooperation of the central government not- with standing party attachment and consideration. Please do your utmost to better the lot of the people and respect their genuine rights and aspiration. I might add here that I have taken special measure t promote the welfare of the people of Balochistan even before your government was formed. This policy will be continued with resolution and determination.37

Sardar Attaullah replied as;

We, in this province, are fully conscious and greatly appreciate your keen desire to accelerate the pace of development. Enhanced allocation of funds has been made to this backward province. Since your assumption of office on 20th December 1971 is a step in this direction.

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The people here have particularly admired the fulfillment of the promise made by you in the public meeting at Quetta on January 17 1972, regarding the utilization of Sui gas for the economic development of this province which the previous regimes denied to Balochistan on one pretext or other. The action, already initiated in this direction under your directive, by Natural Resources Division, had been very well received.38

The early correspondence was cordial and that was neither a smell nor the smoke

of bitterness. To some extent, Bhutto had tried between the lines the NAP-JUI ability to

govern.39 The Mengal government in its short lived time span initiated long-lasting steps

towards the right direction, like abolition of Land Revenue on less than 12.5 acres land,

Grazing Tax and some other taxes.40 The government also intended to abolish Sardari

System and the taxes levied by the Sardars.41 It was also planned to nationalize the

Mining Companies working in Balochistan for the betterment of the labourers working

there mercilessly. 42 Having taken aforementioned steps, the tendency of crossing

constitutional limits43 and the spirit of the federation, it ordered some 2600 policemen

belonged to Punjab to quit the province.44

The Balochistan Dehi Muhafiz (BDM) was also erected, which later on became

bone of contention between centre and the province.45 The BDM was under the command

and control of Colonel Sultan Mohammad Khan.46 The necessary approval from the

federal government was also not obtained.47 Mengal recruited 1100 Baloch as BDM and

further 550 as Special Levis.48 A nationalist view of the issue was quite contrast, i.e. all

the serving secretaries and other head of the departments were non-Balochistanies and

acting on the behest of the federal government having the predictions of short-lived NAP

government. It was the reason behind the establishment of the BDM.49

According to the nationalist viewpoint;

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The main task of Mengal government was to provide jobs to local people and change the socio-economic system in order to meet the un- employment issue, his government decided to return non local employees to their respective provinces, Punjab, Sindh and NWFP with this policy the Mengal government succeeded in employing their educated persons.50

Attaullah himself depicted the situation as, “when tried to correct the balance in

the police force, Bhutto and his Punjab aide Khar organized a police strike against our

government”.51 Therefore, the contradiction of the provincial government view and the

central government was apparent. The federal government was lamenting allegations

against the provincial government for its involvement in the smuggling of arms and

grains.52 Furthermore, the White Paper on Balochistan, 1974 is full of the reports of

different illegal activities like attacks and harassment on the federal employees in the

province by allegedly BSO, associated with NAP.53 Another allegation was about the

monitoring of the provincial government in to central government affairs and officials.54

The interference in the matters of Coast Guards was reflected by the Deputy

Commissioner Lasbela’s order to his Assistant Commissioner Hub that if any contingent

or personnel tried to enter in to the district without permission, must be hindered by the

reserved police as well as Levis.55 Though, Bhutto had showed open-heartedness by

allowing political opponents to make their Ministries in two provinces but the later did

not show the same spirit.56 The provincial government was also harassing its political

opponents e.g. arrest of the son of Jam on January 1, 1973.57 The warrants were also

issued against Jam of Lasbela himself because he and his son addressed a Press

Conference against the ‘tyrant attitude’ of the NAP Government.58 Under section 186 as

well as 353 PPC, the case was filed against Jam Yousaf.

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The Famous London Plan

The conspiracies and power politics have hand in love relationship. A conspiracy was

reported to further minimize Pakistan in August-September 1972.59 According to the

official sources the NAP was involved in the conspiracy known as ‘London Plan’.60 The

government spokesman, Maulana Kausar Niazi, the Federal Minister for Information,

lamented allegation on Abdul Wali Khan and his companions of hatching a plot against

the country, during his stay in London.61 A report was published in the print media on

August 19, 1972 that a meeting was held in London among Shaikh Mujibur and Akbar

Bugti, Mahmud Haroon, Qazi Faiz Muhammad,62 Hamid Sarfraz and Yousaf Haroon.63

After two days, another report of a meeting was published in which Sh. Mujibur and

Malik Ghulam Jilani met64 and on August 29 the reports of further meetings at Geneva

were also published.65 The government controlled print media comprised of the National

Press Trust (NPT) was chewing the ‘London Plan’. According to their reports opposition

leaders gathered at London and took advice from Shaikh Mujib, who assured them to

convince India to delay the withdrawal of its forces from Pakistani territory to pose

pressure on Bhutto. The second point under discussion was to create such a situation in

the country which could culminate in to a ‘loose federal structure’ comprised of four

semi-independent states.66 The federal government was of the view that it was treason

against the state of Pakistan.67 The Federal Information Minister propagated the plan and

accepted as well responsibility of spreading it which was initially in the British Press.68

Another such paper which was controlled by the Federal Government accepted that no

solid-proof existed of any treason except the meeting of important opposition leadership

at London.69 Thus Bhutto summoned governor Bizenjo to look in to the conspiracy.70 The

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governor disapproved allegations of the conspiracy and also stressed that it was all the

fabrication by a frustrated mind.71 Shaikh Mujib also declared the story as base-less.

Bhutto commented that he knew nothing about the London Plan, nor he gave any heed to

the gathering of some individuals at London.72 The London Plan was a culminating point

to maligning the NAP and JUI.73 In that regard, Bhutto followed his formal god-father

Ayub, replicating Agartala Conspiracy Case against Mujib and Awami League.74

The Episode of Pat-Feeder

There is a fertile land in Sibi District which was irrigated by the seasonal canal called

Pat-Feeder.75 In the Ayub period a quantity of rich portion of the land was distributed to

some Army men. On November 27, 1972, almost one thousand tribal attacked the settlers

in some villages of the Pat-Feeder canal area of the Karachi District. The attackers

mainly belonged to Marri tribe including some Lehris as well.76 The main targets were

Goth Muhammad Hussain, Badar and some adjacent villages. Killing and kidnapping

men, women and children also occurred at the time. While remaining people were

forcibly expelled from their houses and the crops were burnt.77 In a few days more

villages of the area met with same fate.78 In response to those brutalities, the central

government anxiously asked the provincial government to take immediate action. Sardar

Khair Bakhsh Marri was given the responsibility to coup with the issue by the NAP

government.79 Simultaneously, the central government also deputed Civil Armed Forces

to clear the area.80

There were lot of explanations of the incident like, the Punjabi settlers were

tenants’ of the Lehri and Marri tribes, the tribes were facing drought in their mountainous

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areas so they came down to the plains.81 Another immediate reason was the introduction

of Land Reforms, which instigated the tribal to forcibly snatch the land.82

The Lasbela Episode

The Jamot tribe stood up against the provincial government in the early days of 1973.83

The local law enforcement agencies were silent on the occasion. The overstated reports

were received by the CM narrating the denial of the Armed Forces to rescue the civil

establishment. It was quite natural that being tribal chief of the Mengals, Attaullah felt his

tribal ego and pride at stake and he asked his fellow tribesmen to rescue his government

in the area. He not only mobilized his tribe but also declared that he himself would lead

the lashkar.84 The doors of provincial government Ordinance Stores were open to equip

the lashkar with the government weapons.85 Sardar Attaullah Mengal was the supreme

commander of the lashkar, along with eighteen sub-commanders from different tribes.86

After the advance of lashkar, forty two Jamots lost their lives and the damaged property

estimated as 2.6 Million Rupees.87 Almost eight thousand Jamot were reported to be

plagued by the BDM forces and the lashkar. By the orders of CM, the food supplies were

stopped to the besieged tribe till their surrender to the District Authorities.88

The situation in the area became more deteriorated politically because of Sardar

mentality of the provincial chief executive.89 The CM Balochistan was asked on January

31, 1973 for stopping his operation in the area and handing over the law and order to the

Armed Forces but despite of that he continued till February 3, 1973.90 Subsequent upon

that, the central government ordered Pakistan Army to rise to the occasion in Lasbela

under the Defense of Pakistan Rules, 1970.91 Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Frontier

Crops (FC) Colonel Muhammad Khan was the commander of the force.92 Later on, it was

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revealed that 260 rifles and 34000 rounds of ammunition were given to the tribal lashkar

by the NAP government having even no legal cover.93 Sardar mindset prevailed and

brought sour results, “…saner counsels both in administration as well as the party, tried

to dissuade him, but the Sardar’s mind had been made up and there could be no deviation.

The trap succeeded and the fate of the NAP ministry was sealed”.94

The Dismissal of Provincial Government, 1973

A bulk of Russian arms was confiscated from the Embassy of Iraq in Islamabad on

February 10, 1973.95 The discovered arm lot was consisting of around 0.1 million rounds,

more than nine hundred magazines, forty hand grenades, three hundred and fifty fatal

sub-machine guns and advance signal machines as well.96 Furthermore, under diplomatic

bag cover of the Foreign Ministry of Iraq more consignments having the same fatal

material were recovered from Airport.97 Later the responsibility had been fixed on attaché

of the Iraqi Embassy named Nasir Al-Saoodi, who already escaped from the country on

February 1, 1973.98 The arms and ammunition were not brought in Pakistan in a single

attempt rather in bits and parts. Firstly, it was brought to Karachi in National Flag Career

aircraft of Iraq and then under Saoodi’s supervision to Islamabad by PIA and finally to

the Iraqi Embassy.99 It is worth-mentioning that there was dense confusion about the aim

and objectives of Russian ammunition in Iraqi Embassy Islamabad.100 Neither any proof

was there regarding the linkages of the arms to Balochistan.101 The central government

along with controlled media created hype regarding Russian arms discovered from Iraqi

Embassy and alleged that the consignment was for the NAP to start insurgency in the

country.102 The whole propaganda was speculated without any evidence or proof. Bhutto

claimed that USSR, Afghanistan and India were involved in the plan, which he

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mentioned in a letter to American President Nixon. 103 He further alleged that

aforementioned countries were the part of a game plan to further disintegrate Pakistan.104

The Iraqi officials blamed the anti-Sadam elements in the intelligence agency of Iraq

wanted to make ashamed the government. Later on, Iraqi version took another glance by

explaining that the arms cache was not designated to Pakistan but to Iran where Iraq was

openly helping the Baloch guerilla rebels, on the principles of tit-for-tat as Iran was

supporting Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. To some extent the western intelligence sources

accepted the Iraqi plea, even then it remained an unresolved mystery. Though, there were

some evidences about Sher Muhammad Marri’s visit to Baghdad in August 1972.105

Allegedly, the weapons were for the Baloch of both the sides, i.e. Pakistan and Iran.

Akbar Bugti accused the NAP of the same.106 Ultimately, on the pretext of the arms

discovery the NAP government was dismissed.107 Simultaneously, Bhutto dismissed the

governors of Balochistan and NWFP on February 15, 1973, on the basis of Iraqi arms

smuggling issue and disobeying of his instructions.108 Bhutto also dissolved the ministry

in Balochistan on the charge of its failure to coup with the disturbances and President

Rule was imposed for thirty days in the province.109 Consequently, the NAP was banned

and all prominent leaders of the party were imprisoned.110

The NAP Standpoint

According to NAP-JUI leadership took a stance that plan of destabilizing their

government was prepared by central government which was constantly busy in

interrupting in provincial matters. The lowest level government affairs were controlled

and directed by central government; even the Tehsildars were appointed and posted under

the instructions of central government. 111 It was a unique example that Police of

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Balochistan went on strike against provincial government; Attaullah Mengal stated that it

was provoked by Bhutto and Khar.112 The central government was taking benefit of the

situation and it was blamed by provincial authorities that federal interior minister was

involved in Lasbella disturbance and he was in contact with Dauda Khan who established

a parallel provincial government.113According to Attaullah Mengal it was a deliberate

policy of central government to create problems,114 Such as to create lawlessness in the

province. Later on Mengal while addressing a press conference warned the central

government that it would not be able to escape the consequences for creating anarchy in

the provinces.115 The Central Working Committee (CWC) of the NAP passed a resolution

declaring central government responsible for creating troubles in Balochistan.116 The

federal government refused the charges posed by the CWC of the NAP. Bhutto stated

that, “I was more interested in attaining lasting stability in the orderly development of

democracy under the new constitution, than in toppling two provincial governments in

order to replace them by unreliable independent, and some PPP members”.117 Moreover,

he elaborated that, “I was not so foolish as to jeopardize the great mission and throw

everything to the winds for the dubious and un attractive objective of having PPP

government in Balochistan and NWFP.”118 Bhutto also explained:

I was trying to seduce NAP into a historic compromise I was trying to do what Aldo Moro was seeking to do in Italy. I wanted to bring them into the net of Pakistan unity. But just as I had made my calculation, the NAP leader had made their calculations. They were not prepared to become the Enrico Belingures of Pakistan. After the fall of Dacca and with the advent to power of Sardar Daud in Afghanistan, it appears that NAP leaders had come to the conclusion that their hour had arrived. Events moved fast. I was compelled by their defiance to dismiss the provincial government.119

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The Dismissal of NAP Ministry

There were number of factors which caused the dismissal; a) there were some inherent

weaknesses for NAP ministry in Balochistan i.e. lacking of strong political base, mainly

elections were contested on tribal affiliations, furthermore, manifesto was emotional

rather than having any socio-economic agenda. 120 Another problem was no past

experience of governance and to manage youth in the limits. The decision which later on

proved fatal was expulsion of non Balochistani officers.121 b) Some mistakes committed

by provincial government proved blunders later on, e.g. no check and balance upon

workers of NAP and their irresponsible actions which portrayed the illusion of the

backing of the provincial government.122 To understand the weakness and wrong doing of

NAP ministry an event was sufficient i.e. the arrest of Mirza Tahir Muhammad Khan

just because if a report published in Pakistan Times which depicted the imprisonment of

more than 2000 political opponents by the NAP government.123 c) The Baloch regional

leaders’ point of view was totally contradicting with that of national level leaders. The

PPP government widened this gulf that had the support of Punjab and Sindh. The civil

military hierarchy at central level was mostly Punjabi.124 The root cause of the problem

was the same. The leadership at regional level were suppressed and dejected due to

overriding steps of central government. 125 d) The differences between central and

provincial level governments were aggravated by the leaders like Qayyum Khan and

Akbar Bugti.

The relations of Akbar Bugti with NAP remained fragile, firstly he supported

NAP government but later on differences grew between both on the issue of election of a

women seat. The NAP supported Fazila Alliani but Bugti contradicted with the idea. He

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wanted to support his own candidate. This incident took place at the session of working

committee. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari was of the view that the issue of women seat crated

disastrous effects on future politics of Balochistan.126 Bugti’s presence was challenged by

Aziz Ahmed Kurd as he was not having membership of NAP. The event damaged the

pride of Akbar Bugti and he started working against the party.127 He accused NAP

leadership for its involvement in London Plan. He stated, “since 1963 there had existed in

Balochistan an organization called, the Baloch Tanzeem that was secret organization

under Mengal and Bizenjo which was working for greater Balochistan and he (Akbar

Bugti) knew its secrets because he had been working as its treasure”.128 According to

Bugti, Bizenjo was responsible for smuggling fire arms with the support of Russians to

create lawlessness in Balochistan.129 Bugti played a considerable role for the end of NAP

ministry. He informed Bhutto about all secrets regarding NAP government.

Abdul Qayyum Khan was also severely against NAP-JUI ministries in NWFP and

Balochistan. His own political survival was at stake in NWFP due to popularity of

coalition partners, therefore he did not spare any chance to aggravate the differences

between the provincial and central government. He played a negative role as federal

interior minister and damaged the interest of federation and units simultaneously just for

his own vested interest. Actually, Bhutto utilized his services very cleverly. He was

appointed interior minister just for having one seat in National Assembly. Bhutto saved

his own face, and used Qayum Khan on the plea of his own enmity against NAP. e) The

federal experiment did not prove viable for NAP JUI coalition versus federation because

there was political immaturity at both levels.130 Both sides were totally impatient and

inexperienced. 131 This was totally a show of power politics and both central and

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provincial governments crossed their limits.132 Therefore, PPP and NAP both can be

declared equally responsible to create crises due to intolerance. f) The regional groups

demanding greater provincial autonomy were considered as threat and such tendencies of

regional groups were misconceived in spite of redressing them.133

There was a supposed threat against Pakistan’s solidarity and the military and

civil establishment was very much concerned about it. Bhutto in order to avoid

Bangladesh like experience again planned to control the province directly; it might be the

cause to propagate the Iraqi embassy arms issue.134 The military supported the federal

government for national cause.135 According to American Embassy Secret Reports the

issue of maximum provincial autonomy for NWFP and Balochistan was a serious threat

not only to PPP government but to the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan.136 g) there was

also foreign pressure especially from Iran to dissolve Balochistan government. There was

allegedly problem in Irani Balochistan area which might spread under nationalist feelings

of Pakistani Balochistan. Therefore, the Shah of Iran was demanding Pakistani

government to curb down the nationalist sentiments in Balochistan.137 According to Wali

Khan’s statement before Supreme Court, Bhutto was not ready to allow the formation of

NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan due to Shah of Iran’s concerns.138 The

Shah of Iran’s visit to Larkana, having a detailed meeting with Bhutto, just before the

dissolution of Balochistan government, is also of great importance.139 According to an

editorial of Irani newspaper Kayhan International the decision of dismissal was

appreciated by Irani government.140 This reveals that how for Shah was interested in this

issue to avoid emergence of any movement against him. h) There were international

factors which played role in that context. The surrounding scenario at the point of time

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was shadowed with Soviet designs in and around Balochistan, ‘Popular Front’ for the

Liberation of Oman, influence and interest of USSR in Persian Gulf, friendship between

USSR and Iraq, Soviet plan to compress both Pakistan and Iran had massive impact on

the policies of central government of Pakistan.141 The establishment was anxious about

the NAP relationship with Afghanistan, India and Iraq.

Aftermath of the Dismissal of Provincial Government

Bhutto designated Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti as the governor of Balochistan for a period

of President’s Rule after the dismissal of provincial government. The governor had to run

administration of the province with the help of advisors chosen by the central

government.142 The reward was because of Bugti’s help in building case against the NAP

government.143 Bugti took charge of the province in a very difficult situation. He took

some drastic steps like disbanding of Dehi Mahafiz and even arrested some of them who

went underground with government arms and ammunition. Bugti had enjoyed full

financial and administrative support of the centre.144 He was a strong administrator and

had tightened bureaucracy. He had taken some senior officials from the centre and

replaced some local officers on the suspicion of loyalties with the previous

government.145 Another development was on April 28, 1973 when Jam Ghulam Qadir of

Lasbela became CM, interestingly without having majority in the Assembly which was

still with the NAP-JUI coalition. Naturally, the upheaval task was to break away some

members but after hectic efforts only one member switched towards new setup who was

Maulvi Saleh Muhammad, later rewarded by ministership.146 In the prevailing situation,

even in the presence of CM, practical authority administratively as well as financially

was in the hands of Bugti. He ran the administration with an iron hand, suppressed the

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opponents, e.g. Mir Gul Khan Naseer was sent to the prison in May 1973. 147 In

retaliation, the NAP launched disobedience movement. The government started arresting

local leadership of the NAP as well. For instance, Malik Faiz Muhammad Yousafzai and

Saeed Dehwar were trialed under Section 121-A and 124-A of PPC, respectively, and

sentenced eight years and three years rigorous imprisonment. Later on, the central

leadership of NAP, i.e. Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri, Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal, Mir

Khuda Bakhsh Muhammad Shahi, Amir-ul-Mulk and Senator Zamurad Hussain were

arrested.148

The budget session was ahead in June, the NAP-JUI devised the strategy and sent

a memorandum to the President, having signatures of twelve members, showing their

consistent majority in the Assembly. Consequent upon that a meeting held on June 28,

1973 between Bhutto and NAP-JUI leadership at Murree.149 However, no consensus

could be made and Bhutto signed an amendment in the Interim Constitution which

authorized the Governor to pass the budget without having the session of the

Assembly.150 The session of the Assembly was summoned on September 28, 1973, where

Jam was able to produce ten members out of twenty one members’

house. 151 Simultaneously Abdur Rehman, MPA was declared an offender and thus

unseated, another member also convicted and disqualified. In bi-elections both the seats

were bagged by PPP.152

Abdul Samad Achakzai was attacked on December 2, 1973. According to press a

hand grenade was thrown from a ventilator to the drawing room of his house which

proved fatal and took the life the veteran politician.153 Point to mention is that by the

demise of Achakzai another seat became vacant from the opposition benches.154 Another

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incident happened on March 13, 1974, when Maulvi Shamasuddin, the Deputy Speaker

of Balochistan Assembly was attacked when he was going from Quetta to Zhob and

consequently died. Important point to mention is that he left Quetta in his official vehicle

having registration No. QA 6428 but his dead body was found in his personal car near

village Killa Shangal.155 Those were the circumstances under which Jam the CM was

seeking to prove his majority in the Assembly.

Akbar Bugti was trying to take independent decision regarding the dissolution of

Assembly and to convene new elections under the new constitution.156 However, Bhutto

was not prepared to take risk. Therefore, Bugti resigned from the governorship and Mir

Ahmad Yar Khan (Khan of Kalat) was appointed in his place.157 The situation in

Balochistan remained rot despite of the appointment of new governor. The provincial

administration was unable to control lawlessness in the area. The administration at the

province was incompetent and corrupt and there were a huge number of complaints

against the government. Therefore, the power of Balochistan Assembly was captured by

the centre. The centre ran the affairs of Balochistan through governor with the help of

five advisors.158 The Government presented the reason for the action as administrative

weakness and the economic problems of the province, yet the real cause was escalating

insurgency in Balochistan.159 Bhutto signed an ordinance regarding abolition of Sardari

System on April 8, 1976.160 He also visited the province for fifteen days and addressed

some public meetings at different localities. The Governor Rule was expiring by the end

of six months was replaced by direct President Rule June 30, 1976. The governor

assumed the function of Provincial Cabinet, CM and his ministers were stopped to

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continue the office while the Legislative Assembly stood revive and the situation

continued up till 1977.161

The gravity of the situation compelled Bhutto to start political dialogue. He

started negotiating with the people who mattered. He also contacted Sherbaz Khan

Mazari and as a bargaining chip offered him the governorship which was refused by the

Sardar.162 Bhutto was blaming the Baloch Sardars for the deteriorating situation in the

province, particularly, Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and Nawab

Akbar Bugti. He even severely criticized Bugti.163 On the other hand, behind the curtain

negotiations were also conducted with the ‘Baloch leadership’ for settlement.164 The story

was reflected through the PM letter to Jam Ghulam Qadir, CM Balochistan. PM declared;

“I have reliable information that Gul Khan Nasir is anxious to help us to reach a settlement and ready to persuade other NAP leadership who are in jail toward this end. I think it would be advisable to utilize the change in Gul Khan Naseer’s attitude for achieving our objectives of solving the Balochistan problem.”165

Bhutto employed exploitative methods with MPA’s in the province to gain his

‘objectives’. The Secretary to PM mentioned in his memo that the two seats in the

Provincial Assembly could be used as leverage to obtain positive settlement. The PM

commented on the memo in as; ‘exactly’.166 He also ordered the arrest of main-stream

leadership in the province. Mengal, Bizenjo and Marri were sent behind the bars without

any trial.167 Bhutto was intending to pressurize all of them, so, they could kneel-down for

a political settlement.168 There were reports in the press that the government had offered

the release of the Baloch leaders in lieu of the political settlement.169 Bhutto himself

confessed on the floor of the Parliament that he tried the Baloch leaders to bring them on

the negotiation table.170 Bhutto justified himself by believing that he pressurized the

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Baloch leadership not only for the sake of ‘national integration’ but also for a couple of

reasons like protection of small peasants, tenants and the serfs in the area.171

The Backdrop of Liaquat Bagh Incident

The non-ceremonial dismissal of the first Balochistan Ministry compelled the opposition

to join hands in the opposition in an organized way, thus an alliance merged named

United Democratic Front (UDF) on February 28, 1978.172 Eight political parties gathered

in the front and demanded; a) call for judicial inquiry to enquire in to Iraqi Embassy

Arms Conspiracy, b) call off the state of emergency, c) protection of fundamental rights

and civil liberties, d) general amnesty to all political prisoners, e) stop persecution of the

press, f) withdrawal of forces from Balochistan.173 Bhutto stated on the formation of

UDF saying that the NAP, JUI and JI were against the very creation of Pakistan.174

Feeling threatened, Bhutto unleashed Federal Security Force (FSF), on the UDF

leadership.175 The UDF scheduled a public gathering on March 23, 1973 at Liaquat Bagh

Rawalpindi.176 As per procedure, the alliance got permission for the meeting on March 22

1973.177 The backdrop of the meeting was the removal of NAP ministry in Balochistan

and subsequent resign of the NWFP ministry. It was expected that it would be a show of

power by Wali Khan to the federal government. On the other hand, the Bhutto

government planned to knock out the UDF. The FSF opened fire resulting a number of

causalities and a bulk severely injured. According to an eye witness the governor Punjab

himself was controlling FSF from a nearby hotel and watching the ‘operation’ through

the window.178 Consequently, the coffins and stretchers bearing corpses and the injured

carried out by Wali Khan to Charsada, Mardan and Peshawar.

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The opposition as a protest planned to boycott the proceedings of National

Assembly. Ultimately, Bhutto engaged the UDF leadership in to negotiations, in that

context, a meeting held on April 2, 1973 and a settlement finalized and UDF rejoined the

National Assembly proceedings. 179 The focus of UDF at that point of time was

Balochistan issue. A series of meetings and gatherings were organized by the Front, one

such meeting held at Quetta on April 27, 1973. In the meeting speakers commented

severely on Bhutto and his policies. Their demand was to restrain Army back to their

barracks and settle the issue with negotiations.180 The UDF standpoint and activity forced

the government to send a fact-finding Parliamentarians’ mission to Balochistan.

The mission comprised of Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Federal Minister for Law, Mir

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sherbaz Mazari and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad along with some

more treasury members.181 The Mission was given two weeks for visiting Balochistan as

well as present report of their findings to the National Assembly.182 By the end of July

1973, the UDF held its convention at Lahore and resolved to launch a full-scale civil

disobedience. The zeal and passion of the workers could not attract the masses al large,

resultantly, the movement could not succeed. At the same time Bhutto toured Balochistan

extensively. In his visit, Bhutto exploited the situation and announced couple of relief and

reform pledges to win the sympathies of the people in province.183 The response at

different places was mixed, for instance at Khuzdar pistol shots were fired while Bhutto

was speaking to a gathering.184 Two major clashes took place between Army and the

Baloch tribesmen. At Baran Lak and Jhal Jao forces got heavy losses.185

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Proscription of the NAP

Hayat Muhammad Khan Shepao was assassinated in bomb explosion on February 8,

1975.186 Just after the incident the NAP was blamed by Bhutto responsible for the attack.

Many leaders of NAP including Wali Khan and his son Asfandyar were arrested and put

on trial for sabotage and causing bomb explosion.187 Asfandyar, was particularly targeted

and blamed for causing the blast killing Hayat Sherpao.188 On February 10, 1975, the

government of Pakistan issued a notification, SRO -176(1)/75 under Section 6 of the

Political Parties Act 1962, according to which the NAP was operating in a manner

prejudicial to the integrity and sovereignty of the country.189 The government also issued

another notification, GSOR-176(1)/78, on the same date declaring that as per first

notification NAP was dissolved and its properties and funds were confiscated.190 The

reference was submitted in the Supreme Court on February 24, 1975 under Political

Parties Act.191

The full Bench of Supreme Court heard the Reference headed by Chief Justice

Hamood-ur-Rehman. Mahmud Ali Qasuri along with eminent lawyers defended the

respondent.192 Yahya Bakhtiar as Attorney General pleaded the government along with

his associates.193 Wali Khan submitted two different statements, one as president of the

party and other by working committee, he refuted the charges.194 The court worked for 44

days from June to September and finalized its judgment on October 30, 1975.195 The

court decided that NAP had been operating in a way prejudicial to the integrity and

sovereignty of the country so liable to be dissolved. The NAP was creating doubts

regarding the very basis of Pakistan i.e. ideology of Pakistan. It has its historical linkages

and roots with a movement which had been against the creation of Pakistan.

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The NAP’s basic aim was to advocate and achieve separate nationalities which

could lead to the ultimate secession of Balochistan and NWFP. NAP program had quite

similarities with that of AL in former East Pakistan.196 The court also opined that the

original objective behind the Pashtoonistan movement was a complete independent state

or at least an area in position to enter in an agreement to any union of states regarding

Defense, Foreign Affairs and Currency. The court referred to the recent speeches of the

NAP leadership and decided that they were behind the insurgency and subversion in

Balochistan.197 As far as the allegation upon Afghanistan for the support and aid to the

insurgents are concerned, the court mentioned the statements of Afghan leaders and

continuous propaganda through Kabul Radio. The court in the concluding remarks of its

verdict mentioned that there were overwhelming evidence regarding established links

between NAP, its leader Wali Khan and the Afghan government.198

The Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan as a

complainant registered a case against the same on August 7, 1975 in which he accused

for high treason under article 6(1) and (2) of the Constitution of Pakistan. That was done

before the judgment of Supreme Court on the reference.199 Only fifty five could be

arrested out of ninety accused and were imprisoned at Hyderabad Jail, where the trial

started on May10, 1976. Because of that the case was known as Hyderabad Conspiracy

Case.200 Under the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Ordinance of December

20, 1975, later regularized as Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act of 1976,201

the special court consisted of three judges established under the law for trial.202 It is

worth mentioning that some special rules for evidence were employed in the case.203 The

reason of the trail in a special court which explained by the Attorney General of Pakistan

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in his letter dated August19, 1976 to the Amnesty International that the case was based

upon the follow up of the findings of the Supreme Court of Pakistan verdict which

declared that NAP was working against the integrity and sovereignty of the state.204 The

trial lingered beyond July 1977, in the mean time Bhutto was replaced by Zia-ul-Haq.205

The proclaimed guardians of the ideological frontiers of Pakistan granted amnesty to all

the accused of the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case and the case was withdrawn.206

The Insurgency and its Response

The situation in Balochistan after the removal of NAP government in the

provincedrastically changed. By April 1973 the Baloch insurgents started attacks on army

convoys.207 A lot of trained deputies of Sherof 208 started operating in his command in

Sarawan, Jhalawan and Marri-Bugti areas. 209 Kalat and Mastung areas were also

threatened by the activities of Suleman Khan Ahmedzai while Muhammad Hassani area

was targeted by Muhammad Aslam Gichki.210 The estimated number of the fighters was

around four thousand. Their strategy was hit and run in the difficult terrain of

Balochistan.211

During the period RCD Highway was so vulnerable to the attacks that only armed

escorted convoys could use in a limited scale. Marri area was under the blockade and

food commodities were short. On Sibi Harnai railway line a contingent of paramilitary

force was attacked by the insurgents which resulted into the killing of eight personals,

they were on duty to protect railway track. The attackers also took with them one Light

Machine Gun (LMG), a Stein gun and five rifles along with a bulk of ammunition.212

The warlike situation was at its height in the period 1973-74.213 Around eighty thousand

214

troops were in Balochistan to carry out operation. 214 The recent fighting was

comparatively spread widely to the skirmishes of fifties and sixties and the Bloch

population was effected.215 In such conditions Bhutto toured Iran and exchanged views

with Shah of Iran regarding the situation. Who provided two hundred million dollars as

military cum financial aid?216 An important event took place on August 7, at Mali a

village in Balochistan which became a part of Bloch folk culture.217 The elder brother of

Gul Khan Naseer Lawang Khan, who was of 72, at the time commanded the insurgents.

The army made the villages of the sector clear.218 In that operation Lawang Khan was

killed along with 35 other fellows. The army had to suffer with loss of 14 soldiers.219 The

Pakistan Army troops spread all over the areas of Chaghi, Bolan, coastal area and Kharan

up to Taftan. The Baloch fighters were responding actively by blocking link roads of

Balochistan with Punjab and Sindh. The oil and gas exploration teams at Marri Bugti

areas were also targeted.220

The disturbance was so wide spread that the activity and influence of the

insurgents was affecting the area of Balochistan from its borders to Punjab extended up to

border of Afghanistan.221 According to another source;

… the insurgent seemed to be well trained in guerrilla warfare and spared no opportunity to attack army convey and camp.… The hostile were becoming quite bold as the years progressed. They thought they had reached the stage of confrontation with the armed forces in which they would actually be able to drive us out of Balochistan they were determined to stop oil exploration we knew that we had to respond very forcefully or we would simply be unable to bring the situation under control.222 The central government decided to wage full fledge operation i.e. land forces

sheltered by Air Force, Chinook and Iranian Heuy Cobra helicopters devastated fire

power extensively. The later brand of helicopter was having six barrel, 20 mm automatic

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canon which could fire 750 rounds in a minute. The Baloch were often flushed by

advanced turbo turning Huey Cobra.223

General Tikka Khan, having notorious experience in East Pakistan,224 unleashed

his brutal forces to pacify unwanted situation in Balochistan.225 Bhutto was so sharp that

he completely managed media blackout, so, the rest of Pakistan and the world could not

get any news of brutalities.226 The Chamalong Operation, which was carried on in Marri

tribal areas was decisive. The Army operation in the area started on September 3, 1974

and continued for three days. The operation had the support of helicopters flown by

Iranian pilots with the aid and supply of Pakistan Air Force.227 According to the sources

125 guerillas were killed and about 900 captured.228 The Baloch claimed that 446

Pakistani soldiers were also killed.229 The other losses reported were about 550 camels;

50000 thousand sheep were captured and disposed off through auction at nominal prices

in the Punjab.230 This operation caused heavy losses to lives of the Baloch people and

was considered the bloodiest clash which caused guerilla’s downfall. Afterwards, they

withdrew towards hills and many fled toward Afghanistan. Their hideouts were

demolished and Army had more strong hold over the area.231

During late 1975, Mir Hazir Khan moved to Afghanistan and a number of shelters

were established in the border area to accommodate the ‘Prairies’ with his efforts.

Following the footstep of Hazir Khan, two other popular guerilla commanders, Safar

Khan Zarakzai and Dad Muhammad also crossed the border, whereas two more, Agha

Islam and Shaista Khan moved toward hard hilly-terrain of Chaghi district of the

province.232 These guerilla commanders were connected with five bases in Afghanistan

located at Kalat, Ghilzai and Kandahar, the other three were located close to Pakistan

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border opposite to Gulistan, Chaman and Dohamandi. The Kandahar main headquarter

was for supplies and training whereas the others were utilized as advance camps.

However, all these were known as Muhajir camps in Afghanistan.233 The insurgency was

successfully reduced as a result of Chamalong Operation and because of that shifting of

headquarters to Afghanistan. The most rigorous conflicts were noticed between 1973 and

1975. During the time, total 178 encounters took place in the whole province out of

which 84 alone in Marri area and the rest in Khuzdar and Jhalawan. The guerillas made

another attempt in November 1975 to combat with the Army near Kalat which resulted in

heavy human loss.234 According to an estimate, the Chamalong Operation engaged eighty

thousand military personnel, whereas fifty five thousand guerillas retaliated against

them.235 The civilians were also victimized as a result of cross fire. It was so much

comprehensive operation that whole of the Baloch population was affected by one way or

the other.236 The skirmishes in the province have become common and continued till the

end of Bhutto period. After Army take-over under General Zia, in July 1977, the

insurgency was stopped temporarily as a result of release of Baloch leaders.237 Zia

applied the conciliatory approach and granted concessions to the Baloch and released

almost six thousand prisoners from Loralai and Kohlu.238 The General announced general

amnesty in the province which was not responded by some Baloch leaders, however, the

majority accepted after having experience with the regime.239

Balochistan and the Bhutto Reforms

The PPP Government under Bhutto continued to induce reforms in Balochistan which

may uplift the socio-economic standard of the masses. Bhutto claimed that he had taken

the province in to the twentieth century. Under the reforms agriculture was promoted,

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abolishing the Sardari System was announced, the development projects like construction

of roads, provision of electricity to certain villages, etc. The heavy machinery for

agriculture was also provided on easy installments. Bhutto stated at the moment that he

“captures the imagination of the poverty stricken people of Balochistan.”240 The reforms

proved to be a real set back to the Sardari System.241 It is assessed by a writer;

Bhutto’s abolition of Sardari system did create a sense of liberation among the tenants the landless laborers and workers in mines and oil fields. They had become aware that they had been exploited by the Sardrs. The abolition of Sardari system could perhaps turn out to be a modest beginning of the end of feudalism in Balochistan.242

The military took the responsibility of completing the development projects in

time for effective communication between Kohlu to Maiwand and Fazil Chel to Kahan,

resultantly; Kohlu was linked with Sibi and Kahan.243 These projects also shortened the

distance between Sibi and Maiwand. The actual distance between both the places was

340 mile which was reduced to just 55 miles.244 Due to these communication projects, the

whole Marri area was linked with roads and became accessible for Government

administration. The transportation business flourished and private bus services in far-off

areas of the province. The network opened the avenues to other provinces which

encouraged inter-provincial trade and commerce. 245 The development and progress

reached in to interior Balochistan like medical aids, passenger transport facilities and

education.246

The nationalists were of different point of view regarding the construction of

roads. They argued that roads were constructed to facilitate Army to reach remote areas

to maintain its hold and to open oil exploration; the location of newly constructed roads

was not according to the social and economic preferences of the localities. 247 The

electrification facilities were expanded manifold in the era. Furthermore, the educational

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out-reach was also extended. It is assessed by a writer that as compare to Iran, Pakistan

focused more in Balochistan in the time period.248 But the education sector flourished

more after Bhutto era in Balochistan; in Bhutto period there had been just 138 primary

schools, 16 middle schools, 11 high schools and just one intermediate college,249 while

after Bhutto the policy adopted by Zia regime the situation changed drastically.250 In

1972, the overall electric power generation in Quetta and its superb was 17.5 million watt

and for the rest of province it was just 15 million watts. During 1976, 25 million watt gas

turbine was installed in Quetta, whereas the rest of province had the power generation

capacity of 40 million watt. The water supply and electric schemes were on the priority

table of the Government. During 1972-1973, the Government allocated 2.882 million in

1973-1974, 64.5 million, in 1974-1975, 107.1 million, in 1975-1976, 63.7 million and

during 1976-1977, it reached at 73.4 million for water supply and electricity schemes.251

The province was given special financial backing of five million dollars other than 8.7

million during the 1975-1976 financial years due to its under-developed position.252 The

White Paper published on Balochistan in 1974, revealed:

In the following year the central government steeping up its development programme in the province not only gave Balochistan $ 19 million in sub venations over and above its population entitlement but also picked up a province budgetary deficit of $ 11.9 million.253

An independent Hydrology Directorate was established to provide technical assistance

for the exploration of under-ground water resources.254

The remarkable achievement was the construction of Hub Dam which brought

agricultural revolution in the province and provided perennial irrigation to twenty one

thousand acres of land in Lasbela.255 Under Bhutto government 6000 tube wells were

planned to be installed which included 1185 built under the patronage of United Nations

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Development Programme (UNDP). 256 The Bhutto government introduced economic

development programme worth a billion rupees for Balochistan, under which educational

scholarship and agricultural loans were provided. These programmes were started to

bring the conditions at normal level in the province, but the actual restoration of the

conditions was dependent on the political patch up with the NAP. This situation was

unable to be achieved under Bhutto despite of his untiring efforts.257 The economic

development is feasible only when it is introduced gradually. The forced economic

development does not bring the desired results.258 In the case of Balochistan, the political

development was needed along with economic development so that the people may

benefit from the fruits of real development.259

International Interest in Balochistan

The province-centre relations during 1972-1977 were over-shadowed by the involvement

of some external elements and neighboring countries. Balochistan has very important and

sensitive strategic location because it is connected to Afghanistan in the north and to Iran

in west. It has proximity with gulf state due to a long coastal border. Balochistan coastal

line is an important Naval Trade Route at international level. The Soviet Union was much

interested in the province for the same to have an access to warm waters. India has also

her interest in Indian Ocean with reference to trade and navigation and coastal line along

with the province might be a potential check on Indian activities. Pakistan’s relations

with India and Afghanistan have not remained cordial since independence and NAP’s

leadership was in close contact with both of these countries. Therefore, the involvement

of India and Afghanistan increased to some extent in Balochistan.

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The Afghan patronage and relation with NAP was against national interest. It was

used by NAP to monopolize the situation in its favour and to pressurize central

government. It was unique in this case that a regional party was having links with foreign

countries to weaken federation. Bhutto exploited the issue against NAP and Wali Khan

and presented opposition leaders as foreign agents.260Afghanistan was responsible to

support Baloch resistance movement during 1973-77. 261 Sardar Daud’s regime was

responsible to support insurgency in Balochistan through military and financial resources.

He had encouraged the insurgents to establish safe heavens in Afghanistan close to

Pakistani border. For the eye wash of the international community they were declared

refugee camps.262 Just after resuming office Daud declared that the only country with

which Afghanistan had unresolved issues was Pakistan. 263 There was a multifold

increase in the power and strength of insurgent in Balochistan with whole hearted support

of Afghanistan. An off shoot faction of NAP under the command of Ajmal Khattak was

active in Kabul on the behest of the new ruler in Afghanistan.264 Afghan press and media

hoofed up the venomous propaganda regarding NWFP and Balochistan by declaring both

as northern and southern occupied areas. To manage the propaganda Bhutto started

aggressive diplomacy; by sending letters to the Secretary General UNO as well as

Secretary OIC to explain Pakistan’s stand and viewpoint. In the letters, there was charge

sheet against Afghanistan. He held responsible Afghanistan as responsible for supporting

activates of killing, hooting and terrorism in Balochistan. He further stressed that all the

ills in Balochistan were just because of interference of Afghanistan.265 Aziz Ahmad266

stated:

In total disregard of the principal of the U.N. Charter, Afghanistan has been criminally involved in creating unrest in the two provinces. It has aided and abetted subversion by training and arming guerillas` that

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infiltrate into these provinces and perpetrate violent crimes including sabotage, bomb throwing and political murders in side Pakistan.267

A group of the nationalists was considering those circumstances suitable to terrorize the

centre, particularly, in Jhalawan and Sarawan, having support of Afghanistan, India and

Russia.

During 1970-71, the relationship between Pakistan and USSR were strife. 268

Hence, the idea of ‘collective security of Asia’ launched by Brezhnev 269 was not

endorsed by Pakistan. The USSR weightage was on Indian side during Indo-Pak war of

1971. However, the same offer for Asian security was presented again when the war was

over but Pakistan adopted the former stance.270 Kosygin’s declaration, at the eve of

Bhutto’s visit to Moscow, was showing Russian annoyance against Pakistan. He said, “…

if history were to repeat itself we would again take the same position because we are

convinced that it was correct.”271 In the wake of unstable political circumstances in

Balochistan, the Russian annoyance was very meaningful and had a particular

background.272 It seemed that USSR was trying to achieve the objective of creating gap

between Pakistan and China as well as US because it had manifold interest in Pakistan.273

The Soviet design for Pakistan was loosely federated autonomous provinces with a frail

centre.274 Naturally, centre got high level of anxiety regarding Balochistan. The situation

was evolving in the province under the shadow of Soviet design and its remedy by the

federal government. The Baloch separatist were looking toward USSR with the hope and

for support.275 It was evident that the communist orientation was popular among the

Baloch and having its roots in the area since the Soviet Revolution in Russia. There was

lot of leftist groups active in the province from 1950 onward.276 Factually, the Soviet

support for the separatist Balochistan was not as much as it considered because

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fragmentation in the area was out of box of Russian design. Even then the Russians

wanted to remain the option open. Safely it can be said that keen Russian interest was

there if not direct involvement. 277 Simultaneously, USA in the period was also not

considering any threat for Pakistan’s stability and integrity viable for its interest.278

Iranian interest in Balochistan and involvement in catering crisis was vital. It was

strategic compulsion that Pakistan and Iran both must be hand in glove against the Baloch

separatism in the region because both the countries had Baloch population in the

bordering provinces.279 Iran perceived the political instability in the region as direct threat

to its own internal political stability.280 More specially, Shah of Iran visualized the crisis

in the province as preamble to the secessionist problem on Iranian side.281 Moreover, the

Iranian Government was considering Pakistani Balochistan as integral part of Iran due to

historical and geographical divisions.282 Shah of Iran once stated;

If Pakistan disintegrates another Vietnam situation could develop we must see to it that Pakistan does not fall to pieces. This would produce a terrible mess on Indo China situation of new and large dimensions. I dread to think of it…. the least we could be doing in our own interest would be some kind of protective reaction in Balochistan.283

Bhutto being a sharp observer of the global politics and regional happenings was

well aware of the Iranian interest in the province and tried to take precautionary

measures. At the time of appointing Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo as the governor of

Balochistan, he wrote a letter and advised that the concept and tendencies of Azad

Balochistan must not be tolerated because it could create sourness in our relation with the

neighboring countries.284 There was significant role of Iran in the dismissal of the NAP

ministry but also in curbing separatist insurgency through financial and military aid and

support regarding the province.

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As far as India is concerned, it always supported all sorts of separatist movements

in Pakistan, whether it was in Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP. Though, there was no

concrete evidence regarding India’s direct involvement but lot of evidences would be

available regarding indirect linkages between India and the separatist elements in the

province. Wali Khan had close contacts with India being the son of veteran leader of

British India ‘Sarhadi Gandhi’.285 He demanded financial aid for the NAP workers who

sought asylum in Afghanistan which was accepted. 286 Bhutto rightly blamed Indian

government in his letter addressed to the President Nixon of USA;

There is also a reason to believe Soviet Union is not the only power involved in this conspiracy. There is considerable evidence that India and probably Afghanistan are also intimately involved.287

The economic and military relations were too thick between India and

Afghanistan during the period under discussion. The common agenda would be

cooperation regarding cultivation of the crisis in the province. Worth-mentioning is the

visit of Soviet President to Afghanistan in June 1973 followed by the visit of Indian Vice-

President to Kabul. Indian high power delegation discussed avenues of military and

economic cooperation.288

A special envoy of Afghan president, Sardar Naeem visited Delhi on September

24, 1973 to discuss military cooperation on the pattern of Soviet-India Pact, 1971.289 It

can be assumed that there might be some under the table adjustment between India and

Afghanistan on Balochistan issue during 1973-77.

The Baloch Nationalist Organizations

The sack of Mengal government instigated sour sentiments in the Baloch political

groups.290 Consequently guerilla warfare started and military operation was also launched

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to counter that. 291 There was lack of coordination between the rebellious factions.

Moreover, no clear target was designated.292 Almost seven prominent rebel factions were

working separately in mountains under the control of their own commanders.293 Most of

the Baloch leaders openly or under the table supported the insurgency. 294 Though,

pararies sustained beyond 1977 ceasefire, whereas most of the remaining groups

evaporated at the time.295 The stature of NAP dimmed while; the two groups, i.e. BSO

and BPLF became in the lime light in the context of the opposition to the central

government.296 The BSO was established in Ayub regime and it came on the scene again

prominently. The organization was, simultaneously, effective on political as well as

militant spheres.297

The Baloch People’s Liberation Front, (BPLF)

The Baloch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), established in 1973 and was determined to

achieve the goal of ‘independent Balochistan’.298 The organization succeeded the parari

guerrilla movement originated by General Sherof.299 It was operating mainly the western

side of the Marri-Bugti Agency.300 The BPLF’s had its policy-making council by the

name organ ‘People’s Revolutionary Command’ whose chairman was Mir Hazar

Ramkhani. 301 Actually, “…BPLF is a direct outgrowth of the parari guerrilla

movement.” 302 Later on, the government arrested General Sherof in 1973 and he

remained behind the bars until the end of Bhutto Era.

The armed struggle of BPLF was organized under strict rules and regulations. The

militia groups comprised of fifty people was established having independent structure

and decision-making capacity according to the prevailing circumstances.303 The urban

chapter of BPLF was active in propagating the insurgents’ views and was also involved

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in ‘terrorist activities’ in urban areas. The organization adopted the policy of ‘hit and run’

policy and refrained from face to face confrontation with the army.304 Approximately, it

had sixty thousand followers, having base-camps in parts of Balochistan along with

foreign centers, i.e. Baghdad and Kandahar.305 Sardar Khair Buksh Marri’s implicit help

is also worth-mentioning which literally improved the strength of BPLF. Particularly, the

guerrilla warfare in 1975 is evident for amazing achievements of the organization.

The BPLF was having leftist ideas with the dominant influence of USSR.306 In the

context of its ideology, many people joined the organization with the hope of communist

revolution in the country. 307 The popularly known ‘London Group’ comprised of

seventeen non-Baloch youngsters having western scholarship and leftist ideology, joined

the BPLF.308 Two sons of a prominent politician of Sindh, Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur, also

joined BPLF after a short span of time.309 Those youngster revolutionaries assumed the

Baloch names and won over the trust of Baloch commanders.310 In 1973, one of the same

revolutionaries, Murad Khan, who was having relationship with Georg Habash’s guerrilla

group of Palestine, managed the training for the forty Baloch ‘freedom fighters’ in

Beirut.311 That youth played significant role in the promotion of ideology and practical

activities of the group. The exact number of the insurgents could not be found, however,

it is estimated that almost seven thousand five hundred activists were the member of the

organization, including those who were in Afghanistan, active in war-fare in Balochistan

and propagating the ideology in Karachi and in interior Sindh.312 The foreign support was

also available to the organization in the form of Afghanistan and Iraq’s aid.313 It was

evident that Mir Hazar Khan was getting per head thirty two dollars financial support

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monthly; however, Afghan Government declined to award them political asylum and

declared them ‘refugees’.314

The BPLF had difference of opinion within its ranks regarding the independence

plan which was reflected even through the front leaf-lets.315 In the bulletins, the focus

was on the masses of the Punjab and Sindh, in which ‘independent Balochistan’ was not

even mentioned while pamphlets addressing the Balochistan youth comprised the

message of ‘Greater Balochistan’. An element in the leadership was of the view that

provincial autonomy must be a mile stone for the ultimate independent Balochistan. 316

The December 1976 issue of Jabal declared, “Balochistan as a reliable base area for the

struggle of other oppressed nationalities, classes and democratic forces in Pakistan”.317 In

1976, the BPLF manifesto appeared with the verdict; “…. a struggle for greater

Balochistan is not feasible in the face of the realities of the situation in that region”.318

The organization had a policy to bring change in the social fabric of the Baloch society. It

was reflected through such policies that the brain behind the front was not acquainted

with the society and culture of the region.319 Another viewpoint was;

Different component within the front emphasized different aspects of the programme. The hard core Marri, Mengal tribes emphasized the reorganization of national identity and right of nationality to secede within the multi nationalist frame work. A small middle class, educated hard-line Marxist emphasized the right to secession and argued for the liberation of other nations within Pakistan.320

Though, BPLF never mentioned tendency of separate state, but the struggle in the

province led by the nationalist leaders alienated the Baloch youth from Pakistan.321 It was

believed that USSR was also supporting the front like organizations in Balochistan

through KGB.322

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The Balochistan Liberation Organization, (BLO)

The organization was initiated by Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal.323 The organ of the

organization Nida-e-Balochistan was renamed as Azad Balochistan and was published

from London. Later on, Sardar Mengal stated in a press conference;

… He has not given up his demand for an independent Balochistan, he would reconsider his demand if the political rights of the Baloch are not guaranteed in the confederation demand by Sindh, Baloch and Pakhtoon Front.324

The organization fixed its ultimate objective, ‘the greater Balochistan’ comprised

of the Baloch land spreading in three countries, i.e. Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. 325

Azad Balochistan was propagating the idea of ‘Greater Balochistan’ with its full zeal and

strength. It claimed that the objective and policy was not the reaction to the Pakistan

government policies but in accordance with the internationally recognized right of self

determination. The paper had the stance that the policy and objective of the organization

could not be amended nor influenced. Sardar Mengal’s ideas regarding the issue were

that the provincial as well as central government were pressing the Baloch and had

pushed them to the wall that is why they were compelled to work for the freedom to

sustain their very existence. 326 The manifesto of the group demanded equal socio-

economic openings for each and every ethnic group and independent foreign policy. 327

The Baloch Student Organization, (BSO)

The Baloch Student Organization (BSO) was a significant organization in the Baloch

Movement, 1970-77.328 It was successor of Quetta based the Warna Waninda.329 The

Warna Waninda was established to advance the Balochi language and literature and to

have deliberations and discussions on the then existing politics in the country. The

organization allied with the NAP.330 Karachi was the hub of the activities of the Baloch

228

youth in general and students in particular by 1960. Prominent Baloch educated figures

met at Karachi in 1961, some of them include Qadir Bkhsh Baloch, Changiz Aliani, Tahir

Muhammad Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Nadeem, Dr. Namitullah Ghickhi, Rahim Jani, Fateh

Muhammad Buzdar, Yousaf Naskindi, Yar Muhammad Ali Bakhsh Talpur, and Kadir

Bakhsh Nizmani.331 The deliberations ended with the consensus on the establishment of

‘Baloch Student Educational Organization’ to address Baloch students’ issues. Tahir

Muhammad Khan drafted the constitution. Initially, the focus of the group was on

Karachi. The first president of this organization was Changiz Aliani and its Secretary

General was Rahim Jani. The participants stressed that the organization must plan to

struggle for the awakening of the Baloch youth.

Another historic meeting was held in 1965 at Karachi in where the title of the

organization was changed to Baloch Students Organization. November 26, 1967

convention was a mile stone in the Baloch youth struggle; a three days convention took

Warna Waninda Gal merger took place into BSO. The objective was announced,

promotion of awareness through education in Baloch society and uplift of Baloch

students.332 At later stage BSO politicized more its outlook by supporting the Baloch

right of self determination.333 BSO also declared its Dastur ul Amal (Manifesto). The

main points were; a) Secular and free and education for the Baloch. b) Uplift of the

Baloch culture, language and literature. c) Abolition One Unit with provincial autonomy.

d) Opposition to imperialism, new colonialism and national oppression in Asia Africa

and the Latin American countries.334

229

A Balochi trana composed by Master Abdul Majeed Gwadri “Ma Chukkien

Balochani” was also incorporated in the manifesto, which was read in the meetings of

organization. The Oath of the membership of the BSO is as follows;

I do swear solemnly in the name of Balochistan, the Baloch masses and in the name of all oppressed and working class people of the world; that I will abide myself to follow the manifesto of the BSO and its aim and objectives in letter and sprits; and that I will never hesitate to offer any sacrifices for the cause of the organization; and that I will not act in such a manner which may contravene the manifesto and aims and objectives of the organization.335

However, the differences emerged within the ranks of organization in a very short

span of time and resultantly it bifurcated into two groups, i.e. moderate and

revolutionaries, which were known as BSO and BSO Awami, respectively.336 The BSO

leadership in its early phase was bonded with the NAP because of its anti-feudal

policy. 337 It was due to the ideology that BSO opposed the restoration of Sardars

announced by Ayub Regime. The NAP also severely criticized the move. However, when

some Sardars joined the NAP it was criticized by BSO Awami.338 The BSO discarded

with the verdict that majority of them was opponent of the party for its progressive

ideas.339 However, it is noteworthy that the leadership of BSO Awami later on inclined

toward Pakistan People’s Party and even joined the party in 1971.340

The BSO had a Council of two hundred members and it was organized in forty six

subdivisions, out of which thirteen were in the province of Sindh. A newsletter Girukh a

monthly magazine Sanghat and a monthly journal Bam were the organs of the

organization.341 “Between the 1967 and 1981, 25000 students had joined the two BSOs at

one time or another”.342 The BSO proved to be nourishing camp for the nationalist

organizations.343

230

The BSO emerged as a stake holder in the Baloch national politics by 1968. The

role in agitation against One Unit of the organization is now part of history. Whether it

was the NAP political activities or the Baloch militant activities, the BSO had a worth-

mentioning role,344 which was even being appreciated by Sardar Ataullah Mengal.345 In

the election 1970, Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch contested and won the National Assembly

seat representing the NAP. Yahya Khan the son of Ahmad Yar Khan ex-ruler of Kalat

was his competitor. It was the token of recognition that BSO sacrificed for the Baloch

cause.346

The repetition of the policies of Military rule by Bhutto made the Baloch life

miserable; therefore, BSO workers took weapon in to the hands and proceeded to the

mountains. The prominent figures of the organization who were active at that time

include; Khalid Jamaldini Aslam Kurd, Khair Jan, Hakim Lehri, and others. Khair Jan

commanded forty militants against the army.347 Consequently, many of its members had

been arrested and punished strictly. The BSO president and some members established a

guerilla faction in 1970s.348 So much so that, Abdul Majid, a BSO member lost his life

during unsuccessful attempt to kill Bhutto in Quetta on August 12, 1974.349 However, it

is estimated that the BSO was not clear-headed regarding ultimate objective, i.e.

independent Balochistan or provincial autonomy.350

The Popular Front for Armed Resistance

In the wake of 1973-77 operation against the Baloch the Popular Front for Armed

Resistance (PFAR) emerged. It could not be traced out that how and when it was being

established.351 The group claimed to be responsible for armed struggle in the mountains.

It appeared in the press in May 1974, proclaiming armed struggle for national rights.352

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The organization declared for operating hundred effective attacks on state forces in July

1974 bulletin. The PFAR warned the central government not to interfere in the affairs of

Balochistan declaring that;

They went to mountains against military action launched by Bhutto regime. They were fighting for democratic and national rights.They claimed that idea of separation had never occurred to us but the Bhutto regime provoked us to take that road.353

The Balochistan Revolutionary Democratic Front, (BRDF)

Balochistan Revolutionary Democratic Front (BRDF) also emerged on the scene during

operation 1973-77. Its organ Jiddojahad played important role in propagating its ideas. In

November 1975, the organization demanded that;

End of military operation, compensation for the people who had suffered during the army’s action; guarantee of complete autonomy for national entities in a federal set up; one thing was important that it did not mention a sovereign Balochistan outside Pakistan.354

The Balochistan Exile Liberation Front, (BELF)

Balochistan Exile Liberation Front (BELF) was another organization established on June

20, 1978. It raised slogan ‘Unity, Sacrifice and Revolution’. The declared objectives of

the organization were;

Liberate the country from usurpers and oppressive agents of imperialism; work selflessly for the liberation of Balochistan; unity in Baloch for great cause of liberating home land; the front boasted that soviet presence in Afghanistan changed the situation in favour of progressive forces.355

In the armed struggle in Balochistan during 1970-77, some organizations were

prominent and popular, i.e. BPLF and BSO whereas a few had their base camps abroad.

International forces were directly or indirectly supporting the revolutionary groups within

Balochistan. Those groups were helped with the weapons. The leadership of those

militant groups was having the leftist ideology. Therefore, even from among different

provinces of Pakistan the forces having the same mindset also gathered in the province to

232

strengthen the ‘Socialist struggle’. Their objectives were to have Socialist Revolution in

the country and Balochistan might become the launching pad in this regard. Socialist

programme was on the agenda of many organizations. That is reflected in the statement

of Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo in 1972;

…students have been welcoming me with the cries of Balochistan Surkh hae (Baochistan is red) but I would be happy if the centre simply let us modernize Balochistan. There is a plenty of time to make it red.356

The organizations having clear message for a Socialist Revolution were

ambiguous regarding their stand for the future of Balochistan whether it would be

separate state or would have autonomous status within Pakistan. The statements of BPLF

leadership were showing contradiction. Confusion was all around whether independent

Balochistan or socialist revolution in Pakistan was the objective. The guerrilla

commander Mir Hazir Khan Ramkhani declared that the nationalists’ were not ready for

the onslaught rather the situation thrown on them by the rulers at centre.357

References & Notes

1 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), p.227. Bhutto after taking over invented the term for the mutilated and bleeding Pakistan whose 90,000 soldiers were POWs. 3 Surendra Nath Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan with Special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, n.d.), p.34. 4 Syed Akmal Hussain Shah, “Pakistan People’s Party’s Ascendancy to Power in Sindh, 1967-1972”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, pp.265-275. 5 Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, p.34. 6 General Yahya Khan and Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan. 7 He was declared by Bhutto as Sher-i-Punjab (Loin of the Punjab) and what was his personality traits are depicted by his former wife Tehmina in her autobiography. Tehmina Durani, My Feudal Lord (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1996). 8 Being a writer and artist Ramay was having mild temperament and the Takht-i-Punjab (Throne of the Punjab) required historically a strong administrator just not an ideologue. 9 Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi served both as Governor and Chief Minister of the Punjab during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto era and left the politics after the army had taken over in 1977. 10 Philip E. Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party: Rise to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.263. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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13The East Punjab of India and West Punjab of Pakistan. 14The ‘New Pakistanis’ were those who migrated from India to Pakistan. 15Dawn, Karachi, January 28, 1970. 16Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party, p.262. 17Ibid. 18Jang, Karachi, July 8, 1972. 19Hafeez Malik, “Problem of Regionalism in Pakistan” in W.H. wriggins ed. Paksitan in Transition, p.92. 20Ibid, p.93. 21Kaushik, Politics in Pakistan, p.37. 22 Jones, The Pakistan People’s Party, p.263. 23Inyatullah Baloch, “The Balochistan Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination” in W. Peter. Zingal and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in 80’s Ideology. Regionalism Economy Foreign Policy, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p.361. 24A.B. Awan, Balochistan Historical and Political Process (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), p.265. 25Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Pakistan A Political Profile, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1991), p.277. 26Dawn, Karachi, March 7, 1972. 27Baloch, “The Balochistan Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination”, pp.261-62. 28Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.265. 29 Manzoor-ud-din Ahmad, ed. Contemporary Pakistan Politics, Economy and Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p.14. 30 Ibid. 31 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 243-44. 32 Ahmad, Contemporary Pakistan Politics, p.14. 33 Syed Abdul Quddus, ed. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Politics of Charisma (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1994), p.199. 34 Ibid, pp.199-200. 35 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches and Statements, April 1-June 30, 1972, (Islamabad: The Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1972), p.283. 36 A.H. Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers of Fortune (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1988), p.247. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem” in Pakistan Horizon. (Vol. 58, April 2006),p.56. 40 “Baloch Nationalism A revisionist History” in Mani Shanker Aiyar ed. Pakistan Papers (New Delhi: UBS Publisher, 1994), 128. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 “White Paper on Balochistan”, Dawn, October 20, 1974. 44 Ibid. 45 Supreme Court Judgment on dissolution of NAP 30 October 1975 (The Al Pakistan League Decision) vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 1976), Sc. 15. 46 He was brother of Mir Gul Khan Naseer, the then Education Minister of Balochistan, belonging to the NAP. “White Paper on Balochistan”, Dawn, October 20, 1974. 47 Ibid. 48 Taj Mohammad Breseeg. Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development (Karachi: Royal Book company, 2004), pp. 312-13. 49 Inyatullah Baloch, “The Balochistan Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination” p.363. 50 Quoted in Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (London: Penguin Books, 1983), pp 117-118. 51 “White Paper on Balochistan”, Dawn, October 20, 1974. 52 Ibid. 53 Supreme Court Judgment on Dissolution of NAP, 30 October 1975 (The All Pakistan League Decision), Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 1976), Sc-153. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1980), p.34. 57 Dawn, Karachi January 1, 1973.

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58 Dawn, Karachi January 11, 1973. 59 Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan (Quetta: Third World Publication, 1994), p.386. 60 Pasha, Pakistan: A Political Profile, p.179. 61 Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 170. 62 An Awami Leaguer belonged to Hyderabad. 63 Jang, Karachi, August 19, 1972. 64 Ibid, August 19, 1972. 65 Ibid, August 29, 1972. 66 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.170. 67 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.267. 68 Kumar, The New Pakistan, 170. 69 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, September 10, 1972. 70 The Guardian, London, September 10, 1972. 71 Musawat, Lahore, September 12, 1972. 72 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, September 16, 1972. 73 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.173. 74 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, n.d.), p.83. 75 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.267. 76 Supreme Court Judgment, PLD, April 1976, SC. 153. 77 Ibid. 78 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.267. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Kumar, The New Pakistan, 174. 82 Ibid. 83 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.275. 84 Ibid. 85 Supreme Court Judgment PLD Sc-154. 86 Ibid. 87 “White Paper on Balochistan”, Dawn, October 20, 1974. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Supreme Court Judgment, 154-55. 91 Sub-section 4 of Section 3 of the Defense of Pakistan Rules was applied to the situation. 92 Supreme Court Judgment, 154-55. 93 Ibid. 94 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.275. 95 The American Papers Secret and Confidential: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Documents. 1965-73. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.888. 96 Ibid. 97 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.271. 98 Dawn, February 2, 1973. 99 Ibid. 100 American Papers, p. 897. 101 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.35. 102 American Papers, p.888. 103 Ibid. 104 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.35. 105 Ibid. 106 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.275. 107 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.386. 108 American Papers, pp.890, 892-93. 109 Ibid. pp.892-93.

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110 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), p.182. 111 Imtiaz Ali, “Balochistan problem” in Pakistan Horizon (Vol. 58, April 2005), p.49. 112 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? 117-118. 113. The then federal Interior Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan was ‘famous’ for anti NAP sentiments. Bhutto utilized the ‘potential’ of the minister to curb NAP with iron hand. For further details see, Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.394. 114 Dawn, January 14, 1973. 115 Ibid, January 11, 1973. 116 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.176. 117 Zulfikar Ali Bhuto, My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell (Lahore: Classic, 1994), p.20. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid, pp.29-30. 120 Awan, Balochistan Historical, pp.273-74. 121 Ibid, p.274. 122 Syed Jaffar Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-7” in S. Akbar Zaidi Ed. Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan. (Lahore: Vanguard, 1992), p.289. 123 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.177. 124 Khalid. B. Sayeed, Political in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1980), p.116. 125 Ibid, p.117. 126 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.240-241. 127 Ibid. 128 Awan, Balochistan Historical, pp.270-71. 129 Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-7” p.296. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.387. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Sayeed, Political in Pakistan, p.115. 136 American Papers, p.854. 137 Ibid, pp.115-16. 138 Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-7”, p.301. 139 Ibid, p.302. 140 Ibid. 141Saint Brides, John Morrice and Cairns James, Pakistan Chronicle (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 195. 142 Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (London: Macmillan, 1992), p.186. 143 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.276. 144 Ibid, p.278. 145 Ibid, p. 279. 146 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.402. 147 Ibid. 148 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.284. 149 Ibid. 150 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.285. 151 Dawn, Karachi, September 29, 1973. 152 White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime, Vol.III, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, January 1979), p.43. 153 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.285. 154 White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime Vol. III, p.44. 155 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.285. 156 Brides, Morrice and James, Pakistan Chronicle, p.196. 157 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.285. 158 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.203.

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159 Ibid. 160 Dawn, Karachi, April 9, 1976. 161 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, pp.308-309. 162 Ibid. 163 Sayeed, Political in Pakistan, p.119. 164 White paper on the Performance for Bhutto Regime Vol. III, A-1-A-5. 165 See, Prime Minister Letter No. 2232/74-Ss (1) dated August 17, 1974 in White Paper on the Performance for Bhutto Regime Vol. III, A-1-A-5. 166 Sayeed, Political in Pakistan, p.119. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 For details see, The Report of Amnesty International, in Sayeed, Political in Pakistan, p.120. 170 Bhutto was replying to a debate in the Senate of Pakistan on December 16, 1976. Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.293. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.393. 174Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.296. 175 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.281. 176 Jang, Rawalpindi, March 22, 1973. 177 White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Vol. III, p.112. 178 A Personal Interview with Syed Tahir Hussain Bukhari, Rawalpindi dated April 23, 2010. Also see, Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, pp.298-299. 179Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.310. 180 Dawn, April 28, 1973. 181Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.317. 182 Kumar, The New Pakistan, p.53. 183 Ibid, p.56. 184 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, pp.314-315. 185 Brides, Morrice and James, Pakistan Chronicle, p. 197. 186 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, February 9, 1969. 187 Ibid. 188 H.V. Hudso, Ed. The Annual Register World Event in 1975 (Longman, 1976), p.260. 189 Judgment of Supreme Court, PLD, April, 1976, SC. p.77. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid, Sc, p.57. 192 Ibid, p.77. 193 Ibid, SD, pp.79-80. 194 The Annual Register World Events in 1975, p.260. 195 Dates of hearing, 16th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 30th, June: 1st, 2nd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, July: 18t, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, August: 1st, 2nd, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17 September 1975. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 Awan, Balochistan Historical, pp.290-291. 199 Awan, Balochistan Historical, 291. 200 White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime Vol. III, 56. 201Ibid, 61. 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid, p.63. 204 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.388. 205 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.184. 206 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.38. 207 Ibid.

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208 Sher Muhammad Marri because of his guerrilla tactics and experience of fight agaist the state was famous as General Sherof among the Baloch. Probably the title sounds his ideological tendency towards the Soviet Russia. 209 The prominent among his commanders were Mir Hazir, Mir Lawang Khan, Ali Muhammad Mengal, Sarfraz Khan Zarakzai and Khair Jan Bizenjo. 210 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, pp.184-185. 211 Breseeg. Baloch Nationalism, p.332. 212 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.185. 213 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.39. 214 Breseeg. Baloch Nationalism, p.332. 215 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.97. 216 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence Dimension Repercussions (Quetta: Gogha-e-Adab, 1988), p.305. 217 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.39. 218 Ibid, p.40. 219 Breseeg. Baloch Nationalism, p.333. 220 Quddus, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, p.202. 221 Sayeed, Political in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, p.120. 222 Ibid, p.121. 223 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.186. 224 Later on, Tikka Khan had to pay the price of operations in East Pakistan and Balochistan when he was contesting Elections from NA 38 Rawalpindi and his shrewd opponent Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed in his last day public appearance at famous Liaquat Bagh, declared him as Toka (large blade used by the butchers). It had become so popular among the voters of the constituency that the General faced befitting defeat. 225 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.291. 226 Ibid. 227 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.36. 228 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.402. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid, p.403. 231 Awan, Balochistan Historical, p.279. 232 Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism, p.329. 233 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.36. 234 Ibid. 235 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p.317. 236 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.184. 237 Ibid. 238 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.403. 239 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.184. 240 Ibid. 241 The Government abolished the grants and compensations and personal concessions to the Sardars. Tribal jirgas were replaced by the proper judicial system. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, pp.37-38. 242 Breseeg, Baloch Nationalism, pp.330-331. 243 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.166. 244 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.186. 245 Ibid. 246 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.166. 247 Ibid, p.167. 248 Syed Muhammad Shah Bukhari, Tarikh-e-Balochistan (Quetta: Bookland, 1981), p.587. 249 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.167. 250 In the Zia regime the overall situation developed and there were 2382 primary schools, 283 middle schools 144 high schools 18 intermediate colleges, 10 degree colleges 4 vocational institutes, 5 teacher training school, one medical college and one university was established. Bukhari, Tarikh-e-Balochistan, pp.591-92. 251 Government of Pakistan, Achievement of Peoples Government; 1972-1976 in Balochistan, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1976), pp.6-7. 252 White Paper on the Performance of Bhutto Regime Vol. III, 68.

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253 Ibid. 254Ibid. 255 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.175. 256 Jahndad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.147. 257 Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers of Fortune, p.172. 258 Ibid. 259 Jaffar Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-77”, p.299. 260 Tahir Amin, Ehtno National Movements of Pakistan (Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1998), p.153. 261 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.180. 262 Riffat Haq, “The Coup in Afghanistan and its Impact on Pakistan 1973-77” in Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XX, No, 2, July-December 1999, p.93. 263 Ibid, p.95. 264 Ibid, p.96. 265 The Annual Register World Events in 1975, p.259. 266 Aziz Ahmad was Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs at that time. 267 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, pp.183-84. 268 Ibid, p.179. 269 Brezhnev was Premier of USSR at that point of time. 270 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.396. 271 Ibid. 272 Ahmad, Balochistan its Strategic Importance, p.179. 273 Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan, p.396. 274 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.127. 275 Ibid, p.138. 276 Ibid. 277 Amin, Ehtno National Movements of Pakistan, p.153. 278 American Papers, p.395. 279 Jaffar Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-77”, p.300. 280 Ibid. 281 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, pp.96-97. 282 Jaffar Ahmad, “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-77”, p.301. 283 White Paper on Balochistan. 284 American Papers, p.888. 285 Abdul Ghaffar Khan popular by the name of Bacha Khan. 286 Raina Asoka, Inside Raw: The Study of India’s Secret Service (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), p.88. 287 American Papers, p888. 288 Rafiq Akhtar, ed. Paksitan Year book 1974 (Karachi: East and West Publication, 1975), p.86. 289 Ibid, p.87. 290 Hanid Yousaf. Pakistan: A Study of Political Development 1947-97 (Lahore Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1999), p.157. 291 Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.125. 292 Tahir Amin, Ethno National Movements of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.125. 293 It included; Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), Balochistan Liberation Organization (BLO), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan People’s Democratic Organization (BPDO), Balochistan Liberation Movement (BLM), Balochistan Revolutionary Democratic Front (BRDF) and Balochistan Student Organization (BSO). Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.71. Also see, Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, pp. 446-447. 294 Ahmad, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, p.175. 295 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.71. 296 Amin, Ethno National Movements of Pakistan, pp.149-50. 297 Ibid., p.150. 298 Inayat Ullah Baloch, The Baloc question in Pakistan and Right of Self Determination in W.Peter Zingal and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in the 80s Ideology Regionalism Foreign Policy (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), 365. 299 Sher Muhammad Marri got the title of General Sherof by the Baloch separatists and he established the organization in 1963. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.72.

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300 Ian Talbet, Pakistan a Modern History (London: Harst Company, 1998), p.226. 301 Mir Hazar Ramkhani was a follower of Sher Muhammad Marri. 302 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.72. 303 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.318. 304 Ibid. 305 Talbet, Pakistan a Modern History, p.226. 306 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.390. 307 Ibid., p.319. 308 Most of them were having the background of Punjabi business-tycoons and bureaucrats. For details see, Ahmad Saleem, Balochistan Soba Markez Twalaqat (urdu) (Lahore: Frontier Publication, 1993), 35-36, Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.73. 309 Ibid. 310 Ahmad Saleem, 36. 311 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.74. 312 Ibid., pp.75-76. 313 Ahmad Saleem, 33. 314 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.81. 315 In such leaf-lets, the strategy mentioned was of long-term; Balochistan was just the beginning in the long run all the people of Pakistan had to follow suit. Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, 319. 316 Jan Muhammad, 319. 317 Jabal was the organ of BPLF. For details see, Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.78. The February 1977 issue mentioned; “…in the concrete circumstance of our country there is as yet no secessionist movement in Balochistan, to the extent that we are able to explain the nature of the struggle and its perspective to the people of Pakistan as a whole and win their moral, political and practical support to that extent we shall have laid the biases for the voluntary union of the nationalities in Pakistan”. Jabal February 1977, Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.78. 318 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.76. 319 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.322. 320 Amin, Ethno National Movements of Pakistan. 150. 321 Feroz Ahmad, Ethnicity and Policies in Pakistan, 176. 322 Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan its strategic Importance, p.251. 323 Sardar Attaullah Mengal was residing in London at that time on self-exile. Baloch, Pakistan in 80s, p.367. 324 He was addressing a Press Conference in London in 1985. For details see, Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.418. 325 Ibid., p.424. 326 Dawn, Karachi, 18 July 1973. 327 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.348. 328 Breseege, Baloch Nationalism, p.341. 329 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan,p. 216 330 Ibid., p.216. 331 Shakil Ahmad Baluch, Balochistan Ki Pukar (Urdu) (Turbat: Bazim-i-Balochistan Publication, 2004), 25-26. 332 Paul Titus, Marginality and Modernity, Ethnicity and change in Post Colonial-Balochistan (Karachi: OUP., 1996),p. 246. 333 Ibid., 334 Later on an amendment was made in the manifesto in 1979 for the right of self determination and the demand of Balochi as the official language. For details see, Jan Muhammad, 233. 335 Ibid, p233. 336 Breseege, Baloch Nationalism,, 341-42. 337 Selig Herrison, 84. 338 Ibid. 339 Manzoor Ahmad Baloch, Balochistan and Political; Parties (Quetta: Kalat Publisher, n.d) ,p.21. 340 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.218. 341 The organization had four thousand three hundred members at that time. However, BSO Awami could not exceed than two thousand. Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.84. 342 Ibid. p.36. 343 Breseege, Baloch Nationalism, p.342.

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344 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.227. 345 Dawn, 20th October, 20, 1970. 346 Breseege, Baloch Nationalism, p.343. 347 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.219. 348 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, p.86. 349 Majid was considered as a member of the team trained by the Afghan Government being given the task of killing Bhutto at the eve of his visit to Quetta. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 350 Ibid. 351 Kumar. New Pakistan, p.198. 352 Jan Muhammad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p.318. 353 Ibid., p.319. 354 Ibid., p.320. 355 Ibid, p342. 356 Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Service?, p.117. 357 Harrison, In Afghanistan Shadow, pp.38-40.

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CHAPTER FIVE

BALOCHISTAN-CENTRE RELATIONS: ELECTIONS 1977

Under the strategy for elections, Bhutto started postings and transfers in Civil as well as

Military Bureaucracy by the beginning of the year 1976. The certain changes were also

brought by him in even his cabinet on February 5, 1976. The federal secretariat was also

refurbished human resource wise. More focus was on certain ministries such as; Ministry

of Communications, Defense, Agriculture and Economic Affairs. Party associates were

promoted and appointed to important slots; furthermore, some of them were taken as

Advisors in the ministries. Even the wave went down to the provinces. The major

reshuffle was also managed in the Army for safe side; COAS General Tikka Khan was

appointed Special Assistant to PM for National Security and General Zia ul Haq was

elevated as COAS. The main purpose of the above mentioned transfers, postings and

appointments was to secure all hindrances in the success of upcoming elections as well as

to cope with any probable movement or agitation.

Bhutto also directed his advisors to chalk out a flaw less strategy regarding

internal structure and technique for elections and Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi, Advisor

for Information to PM was deputed for the purpose. Rao Rasheed, Special Secretary to

Bhutto suggested a well thought plan; a) to transfer non-trust worthy officers from

important positions. b) Leading and winning opposition candidates should not be

permitted to submit their nomination papers. Muhammad Hayat Taman, Political Advisor

was of the view that the elections must be controlled. To get the positive and certain

results lot of special cells were established such as; Confidential Cell, Field Cell, Policy

Cell, Administration and Transport Cell, Publicity Cell, and Finance Cell.1

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Rafi Raza, Minister for Production convened a high power meeting which

finalized the plan for elections which was later endorsed by Bhutto. The meeting was

attended by Maulana Kausar Niazi , Rao Rasheed, Yousaf Baloch , Pir Ali Muhammad

Rashidi and Hamid Jalal. The government under Bhutto also prepared a hyper

propaganda strategy and Ministry of Information was given the task. The ministry

portrayed Bhutto as ‘Builder of Pakistan’ ‘Defender of Ideology’ and an internationally

celebrated statesman. The Information Ministry circulated direction to National Press

Trust (NPT) to portray the policies and person of Bhutto as the pattern followed for

Quaid-i-Azam. Furthermore, it was stressed that opposition must be criticized and its

weaknesses also be highlighted and for the purpose additional budget was allocated to the

ministry for the year 1976-1977. 2 The Ministry of Finance appointed Additional

Economic Assistants for the extensive ‘field publicity’. The Directorate of News and

Documents produced eleven documentaries based on the theme of Bhutto and his policies

projection which burdened the nation exchequer one million rupees, just in the year 1976-

1977 five more such documentaries released by spending 1.3 million rupees. The titles of

them include; “A Nation Reborn, Achievements of the People’s Government, Dharti Ka

Lal (Son of Soil), Prime Minister Bhutto: the Man of People and Prime Minister Bhutto:

the Servant of Islam.”3 Scripted books were also being written to magnify the party and

its leadership. Print and electronic media was extensively used for campaign. Another

strategy was adopted of arranging different weeks of celebrations to attract people of

different walks of life between June, 1976 to January, 1977 i.e. Defense Week, Labour

Week, Minority Week and Women Week. 2.4 million rupees were spent on just

celebrations of Labour Week. 4 Additional tactic to use government resources for

243

campaign was to publish books highlighting PPP and Bhutto; furthermore Media was

compelled to cover Bhutto’s visits impressively, so the masses could be influenced to

vote for PPP.

To counter the opposition criticism in general and the religious right in particular

a Publicity Cell was established in November, 1976 and was directed to counter as well

as portray Islamic image of PPP and ensure that the government is committed to safe

guard Islamic principles nor take any step against its teachings.5 It was further reiterated

that PPP made it imperative that any such law which is repugnant to Islam would not be

practiced in Pakistan. Moreover, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed Fifth

Constitutional Amendment Bill on September 5, 1976, to grab more powers for the Chief

Executive of the country; which curbed the authority of Judiciary. 6 The Sixth

Amendment Bill was also passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan on December 22,

1976 and Bhutto got extraordinary powers; to dismiss Advisors, Provincial Ministers,

Chairman and Members of Council of Islamic Ideology. It was to adjust party loyalists on

the important slots. The Bill was named as ‘The People Representation Bill’.7

The PPP took ample advantage of being in the government for the election

benefits; during the year 1976, some major steps in the economic policy, e.g. relaxations

in agriculture area which was beneficial for farmers in Sindh and the Punjab.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ruled the country with all real powers from December 1971 to

July 1977. During the period opposition was dealt strictly. In this regard Federal Security

Force (FSF)8 was formed to deal the opposition with iron hand. He established notorious

torture centre at Dalai, Azad Jammu & Kashmir, twisted the arm of press and proscribed

244

the political party, i.e. NAP. Through the ordinances, he concentrated arbitrary arrest

powers and to curb the political agitational gathering of more than ten people was also

declared illegal. To tighten the financial control as well as exploitation, Bhutto

nationalized every worth-mentioning private sector institution, starting from banking to

the educational institutions; every earning opportunity was snatched by the government.

Subsequently, the notable business tycoons from Karachi, which was financial hub of the

country, were forced to leave the country.9

The investment gush to industries, financial institutions and media was almost

blocked. On the other hand, the policy of media control had been implemented under

which total blackout of opposition coverage was also directed. Due to such policies it was

assumed that Bhutto was planning to bring single party rule as it was in USSR and China.

He was so authoritative that even in his own party he could not tolerate difference of

opinion, whosoever had dare to say something against Bhutto’s opinion would have to

leave the party rank.10 In the context of his temperament the management of Elections

1977 was a symbolic. The single sided result stunned even the party well-wishers.11 In all

important constituencies, particularly in Sindh the strong opposition candidates were

restrained forcefully to submit their nomination papers. 12 The masses were fiercely

agitating against the results of allegedly rigged elections and the power desire of Bhutto

was at its climax. To counter the agitation of the opposition, Bhutto called paramilitary

forces and Army with their armoured vehicles to silent the public voices. Furthermore,

mainstream opposition leadership was taken in to custody and the demand for the new

elections was absolutely refused. The action against the agitators was very harsh in the

Punjab. The slogans were chanted for the first time in Pakistan, like lathi goli ki sarkar,

245

nahi chale gi nahi chale gi (The Government of tyranny would not continue). Even the

situation arrived when the forces refused to obey the order of liquidating opposition

through arms. To justify the suppressing policy towards the opposition, Bhutto brought a

far cry in to the surface by blaming America for its involvement in supporting

Balochistan uprising. Bhutto was very much confident in defending his policies of

suppressing opposition and the press by saying that Pakistani society was not mature

enough to have the luxuries of freedom of expression. The newspapers which could

survive in the era were toeing the pro-Bhutto policy.13

Background of the Establishment of PNA: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto era is stretched on about five and half years. During the period, he is

blamed to pressurize the opposition, taking complete hold of media and expelling his

opponents from party ranks. 14 He had his own standards of maintaining political

impression and running government affairs. He was sure of public support from all

constituencies of country because he had given self respect to common man for the first

time. Bhutto felt pride for success in his foreign policy and internal political

confrontation. Under the prevalent conditions political parties had organized themselves

for upcoming elections by the end of June 1975. The opposition parties had already

constituted an alliance under the name of United Democratic Front (UDF) to attract

public opinion in its favour. The opposition observed Black Flag Day on December 19,

1975.15 The situation was so deteriorated that the negotiation of Federal Government with

opposition went sour; the opposition boycotted the National Assembly sessions. It was a

common impression about Bhutto government that it had agreed to hold general elections

whereas some of opposition parties were apprehensive about Bhutto’s exploiting trends

and abuse of democratic powers. It was dangerous for the sustenance of political system

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and threat for national development. Law and order situation was deteriorating day by

day according to an estimate about fifty thousand people were put behind the bars on

political grounds. The political activities of opposition were uprooted ruthlessly under

special presidential ordinances and Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPR).16 Federal Revenue

Board was established to check the activities of important political personalities. Many

political opponents were trialed in special courts under Criminal Law Ordinance. The

steps of Bhutto were against his political opponents generally. His main objective was to

tackle Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his allies severely. He, actually, wanted to eliminate

all staunch opponent groups which could challenge his powers.

Amazingly, Bhutto declared on January 1, 1976 that general elections would be

held before time. He did not announce the exact date but it was supposed that the

announcement could create problems taking in view the same experience of previous

elections. 17 It is presumed that Bhutto himself smelled the expected political fuss in the

upcoming elections campaign. He took the challenge of elections as battle against

opposition. By the announcement of the elections schedule, Bhutto envisaged the strategy

to win the elections at any cost.

The year 1976 was the year of all concentration on upcoming elections winning

plan. In that context transfers, postings and reshuffling of departments and designations

were extensively done among the ranks, civil and military bureaucracy and political set

up.18 The federal secretariat was overhauled. The Communication and Public Works

Ministry was assigned special responsibilities in that regard. The party associates and

members were inducted and promoted to lucrative and ‘important’ portfolios in the

context of upcoming elections. A bulk of Advisors and Special Assistants were

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appointed.19 The main objective behind all those appointments and reshuffling was the

re-emergence of PPP as the sole majority party in the federal and provincial legislatures.

More specifically, after having done all aforementioned arrangements, the under

carpet plan was also in offing, i.e. comprehensive plan about internal structure and

‘technique’ of election. Under the clear directions of Bhutto, his Advisor for Information

Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi envisaged a comprehensive flawless strategy to control and

dictate the media related policy for electioneering. The Special Secretary of Bhutto, Rao

Rasheed proposed to expel the non-trustworthy officers and prepare such a plan that

notable candidates of opposition might not be able to submit their nomination papers.

Another political advisor Muhammad Hayat Taman proposed that “the forth coming

elections should be so controlled as to flow in regular channels. To achieve the targets a

Confidential Cell, Policy Cell, Publicity Cell, Communication Cell, Finance Cell,

Administration and Transport Cell and Field Cell were established to maneuver forth

coming elections of 1977.”20 Rafi Raza, the Minister for Production called an important

meeting on October 9, 1976, which was attended by ministers and advisors.21 Rafi Raza

Committee ‘elections plan’ was finally approved by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.22 Several other

election plans were also approved by Bhutto including the strategy to woof-up

propaganda in favour of the performance of the PPP government. In this regard the

government directed Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to publicize the PPP

government success stories at national and international level and to portray Bhutto as a

defender of country as well as its ideology. 23

The federal government of PPP declared Bhutto as Quaid-i-Awam and special

directions were conveyed to the editors of National Press Trust (NPT) to portray Bhutto as

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traditionally Jinnah was projected as Quaid-i-Azam. Another task being given to the managers of

state controlled media was to malign the opposition leadership and highlight their mutual

differences. In that context, the federal government was so particular to achieve the targets in the

upcoming elections that additional handsome amount was allocated to the Information Ministry in

the Federal Budget 1976-1977. 24 Moreover, a unique idea of deployment of Additional

Economic Assistants to run ‘Field Publicity’ appointed by Ministry of Finance was not only

conceived but operationalised. At the expense of Rs. 1 Million, eleven purely propagation based

documentaries were produced by the Directorate of News and Documentaries. 25 Furthermore, a

lot of books were also published to strengthen the party policy and impression in the masses. The

print and electronic media was reserved solely to cover each and every event and visit of PPP

leaders in general and Bhutto in particular.

The Publicity Cell was given the task to highlight the association of PPP with Islamic

ideology and to erase the misconception that the federal government would take steps against

Islam. 26 The government controlled electronic as well as print media was trying to refute the

allegations of opposition that Bhutto was anti Islam and his thought is socialist. The media

publicized that it was Bhutto who ensured that no law should be practiced in Pakistan which

would be repugnant to Islam.

In the context of the idea of grabbing more power to win the upcoming decisive elections,

Bhutto also focused on constitutional amendments in that regard. The 5th Constitutional

Amendment Bill was passed on September 5, 1976 which reduced the authority of Judiciary.27 In

the same manner, the 6th Constitutional Amendment Bill was also passed on December 22, 1976

under which PM Bhutto was empowered to dismiss advisors, provincial ministers, chairman and

members, Law Commission, chairmen and member, Council of Islamic Ideology. The purpose of

the amendment was to accommodate his associates on the lavish slots.28

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The federal government was taking maximum advantage of state institutions and finances

to strengthen the ruling party’s position in the context of forth-coming elections. The facilities

and relaxations were announced in the agriculture area to appease farmers in the stronghold areas

of PPP, i.e. the Punjab and Sindh.29 To attract investors and industrialists towards party support,

the Investment Corporation of Pakistan granted the loans of ninety million rupees.30 Furthermore,

it was announced that industries in which foreign investors were involved would not be

nationalized. Some major changes were also made in the state import policy to facilitate subsidy

in agro-based imports. The tax-free item list was also reviewed and as a result house-hold

commodities were included in the tax free list.31 The major focus in the year 1976 was to show

that national and international renowned institutions were admiring the successful policies and

their outcomes such as the World Bank Report showing effective recovery performance in the

financial recoveries by the government of Pakistan since 1971. 32

Bhutto reiterated on the eve of 5th anniversary of PPP government and centenary birth

day celebrations of Quaid-i-Azam that the elections would be held early as he already announced.

While talking at Press Club Lahore on December 23, 1976, Bhutto announced that elections

would not be postponed in Pakistan. There was democracy in Pakistan and the demands of

democracy should be fulfilled.33

Election Commission of Pakistan announced the final electoral list on January 2, 1977 for

National Assembly and all four Provincial Assemblies. 34 The assembly was dissolved by

President Choudhary Fazal Elahi as per advice of Prime Minister Z.A Bhutto on January 10,

1977. The election dates were also announced, that were March 7, 1977 for the National

Assembly and March 10, 1977 for the Provincial Assemblies.

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The Establishment of PNA

The opposition parties had to become on one page after the announcement of elections. The

opposition considered all steps taken by Bhutto in the wake of elections as a great danger for their

existence. Therefore, they unanimously felt that elections were not mere elections but the

question of survival either for them or Bhutto. If Bhutto would be succeeded then PPP would

convert Pakistan into a one-party state.35 Under such feelings and due to Bhutto’s undemocratic

political approach made sense of insecurity about their political future for the political parties of

opposition. The nine political parties of opposition announced the establishment of Pakistan

National Alliance (PNA) on January 11, 1977. Immediately, Prime Minister Bhutto was informed

by secret services that opposition parties were themselves prone to internal differences. PNA was

initially an electoral alliance which later on proved to be a protest alliance.

Constituent Parties of PNA

The parties which were included in PNA were participating in forth coming election were as under:

1) Muslim League (Pagara Group) ML (P) 2) Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) 3) Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) 4) Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI) 5) Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) 6) Khaksar Tehreek (KT) 7) Muslim Conference (MC) 8) Jamat-i-Islami (JI) 9) National Democratic Party. (NDP)36

The establishment of PNA was totally unexpected for the leadership of PPP because they thought

that the constituent parties were ideologically opposite to each other and their union was out of

question. Therefore, the elections of 1977 were different from elections 1970 because the then

opponents were now allies. The president of JUI Maulana Mufti Mehmood was elected president

of PNA whereas Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa of JUP was elected its General Secretary.

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The Manifestos of PPP and PNA Manifestos of the Major Political Parties

The rightist parties37 were in tussle with PPP in the Elections 1970 and same was the case

in the Elections 1977. Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), a rightist party was also an integral

part of PNA.38 Although PNA was, dominantly, an alliance of rightist parties but all the

different segments were having different approach and targets in the politics. Their

purpose was just to let Bhutto down due to his authoritative and oppressive polices

against the opposition parties. Three religio-political parties, i.e. JI, JUI and JUP were in

the leading position; therefore, the posture of the alliance inclined to right.

This alliance comprised of the major political parties of the country and covered the entire spectrum from the religious right to the secular left. The alliance had no alternative political agenda and was, therefore, mainly targeting at removing Bhutto from office . . . among the nine constituents of PNA, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan were religious parties which stood for the enforcement of the Shariah. The Pakistan Muslim League and Pakistan Democratic Party were Islamist modernists. The National Democratic Party‘s rank and file was secular and inclined to Socialism. The Khaksar Tehrik (KT) and Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference fell somewhere between the religious parties and Islamist-modernist elements; while Tehrik-i-Istiqlal was a secular party for all political purposes.39

The 1977 Elections brought out the Islamic posture of the main opposition alliance, i.e.

PNA. The impact was far-reaching; election results caused Tahrik-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa,

famous PPP-PNA negotiations and ultimately the exit of Bhutto and emergence of Zia-ul-

Haq.

The Manifesto of Pakistan People’s Party

The manifesto of PPP was announced on January 26, 1977 which contained the pledge of

compulsory education of Quran and Sunnah and arrangements for the preaching of Islam in other

countries. The Islamic advent of the manifesto was to remain safe from the objectives of right

wing parties and to minimize the Socialists or non-Islamic impression of party.

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The manifesto also promised to increase the wages of labours. It was planned to allot

20,000 residential plots free of cost every year to the industrial workers and the national agro-

production was to be increased by 50 % in the upcoming five years. The homeless people would

be allotted one million plots in the rural areas and about 7.5 million plots in urban areas. The

economic strategy was based on socialism under Islamic teachings. Its main objective was to

eradicate social injustices and give importance to private sector. The step for the eradication of

water logging and salinity were also in consideration. The improvement in the means of

transportation and provision of rights of Kashmiris were also preferred. The armament factories

for defense purposes based on modern technology would be setup. The foreign policy claimed to

maintain close relations with third world countries. The people were requested to provide help for

making Pakistan more prosperous.40

The Manifesto of Pakistan National Alliance

The PNA played an ample role as a single political party. In actual practice, the divergent parties

were united. In the beginning the united alliance stated that the Quran was their manifesto but the

alliance was severely criticized during election campaign because up till that PNA could not

announce its manifesto. Therefore, its manifesto was announced on February 8, 1977. Bhutto

criticized it and stated that it did not contain any ideology.41

According to a comparative analysis of both the political entities, it seems that

manifesto of PNA was vague because it was prepared in haste under the cooperation of

parties having divergent ideas. The ruling party had started its election campaign soon

after the announcement of elections. The government had started highlighting the

personality of Bhutto and policies of PPP. Although both parties had very high hopes

and claims in their manifestos but election campaign mainly revolved around the

personalities. The election campaign of PNA was based upon the propagation of

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dictatorial steps of Bhutto, liberal character of PPP policies and financial conditions of

the institutions and moral deterioration of the society which was criticized severely in

electioneering. The most fatal blame upon Bhutto was his connivance in the debacle of

East Pakistan, therefore, the PNA pledged in its manifesto to publish the Hammod ur

Rahman Commission Report. The charges against PPP government were, increase in

prices, wastage of national wealth, failure of economic policies, abuse of power and

resources, establishment of FSF and discriminatory activities against opposition were

highlighted against Bhutto and PPP in public speeches and statements. To counter

effective criticism of the opposition alliance the PPP had to adopt defensive policy from

very outset of the campaign.42

Bhutto took advantage of his oratory skills and lamented counter allegations on

PNA by saying the alliance as anti-Pakistan by arguing that the constituent parties of

PNA had been against the Pakistan Movement in general and Quaid-i-Azam in particular.

Furthermore, the stance of religio-political parties and focus on JI’s stance43 on the issue

of ownership right against the nationalization as well as agricultural policies of Bhutto.

PPP declared the parties agents of feudal and landlords and claimed that PPP would wipe

them out with a stroke of sword.44

The implementation of Islam was the common demand on both sides. PNA raised

the slogans of ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ S.A.W. and on the other hand PPP pledged for

‘Musawat-e-Muhammadi’ S.A.W. PPP also propagated its Islamic services so that people

might realize that PPP is more sincere than PNA in its commitments. The main features

of speeches of both sides were the personal attacks and criticism. According to an

analysis the forty four percent speeches of PPP leaders contained severe criticism on

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opposition leaders with reference to their previous attachment, sabotage activities and

future plans etc. contrary to that the seventy five percent speeches of PNA leaders

contained criticism of Bhutto.45

The information minister of PPP Hanif Khan presented documents in a meeting

on January 22, 1977. The document reveals the inner planning of PPP which elaborated

that projection campaign would be direct towards ruthless exposure of PNA. The

objective would have been, alienating masses from PNA by realizing the people about

worthless and baseless combination of divergent political elements in PNA which were

unable to serve the masses. There might have been efforts to impress the masses and PPP

was the only party which could serve them up to their desire.46

The above mentioned report shows that how ruling party was abusing media for

its own cause. Due to ever increasing interruption of PPP in election affairs PNA

announced the boycott of elections in Balochistan. Maulana Mufti Mahmood president

PNA announced that they would not nominate candidates for seven seats of National

Assembly and forty seats of Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. 47 The boycott of

election in Balochistan was a resentment shown against the army action in Balochistan

and Centre’s undue interference in provincial affairs. It was a very dangerous sign which

might damage federation. The federation had become accustomed with its strategy of

dealing and controlling Balochistan affairs since 1947 and the government of Balochistan

was not being allowed to work independently.

It was a common impression that PPP with the help of its clever strategy had

become successful in winning seventeen seats of National Assembly because its

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candidates were declared unopposed elected by election commission on January 21,

1977 at the eve of scrutiny of nomination papers.48 It is worth-mentioning that out of the

unopposed elected candidates 14 belonged to Sindh and three to Balochistan. The

incidents of unopposed election occurred in the constituencies where PPP was not sure

about its success and the opposition candidates were quite effective.

The Election Procedure

The second general elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies were arranged in 1977.

According to the 1973 Constitution, the Parliament was comprised of two houses, i.e. Senate and

National Assembly. The National Assembly was consisted of two hundred members being

elected directly for the tenure of five years. Furthermore, there were ten seats reserved for female

and six for the minorities who had to be elected by the National Assembly members. On the other

hand, the upper house called Senate of Pakistan comprised of sixty three members. Every

province had fourteen members each; five seats were reserved for FATA and two for the Federal

Capital. The Senate having a permanent house with half of its members retiring after

every two years had tenure of four years.49

All Pakistani nationals of twenty one years of age were registered with the

Election Commission of Pakistan had been declared eligible voters. The eligibility of the

contestants for National Assembly was; Pakistani national, registered in voters list with

twenty five years of age, whereas the age limit to contest Senate election was thirty years.

The procedure also included; proposed contestants had to be nominated by two registered

voters of the same constituency and to deposit one thousand rupees for the National

Assembly and two thousand rupees for the Senate. The amount could be reimbursed

provided the candidate earned at least more than one eighth of the casted votes for the

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National Assembly and at least one votes for the Senate. All the National Assembly seats

including reserved seats allocated on the basis of population and simple majority in the

constituency had to be achieved by the winning candidate. The criterion for the election

of senators was on the basis of parity among provinces. In the case of vacation of any seat

in the parliament there would be process of bi-elections.

The Parties’ Strategy for Elections

The National Assembly was dissolved on January 10, 1977. The election manifesto of

PPP was declared on January 24, 1977. On the other hand, opposition left the differences

and formed Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was formed on January 11, 1977 by nine

political parties, i.e. Tehrik Istiqlal, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, the Jamat-i-Islami,

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, National Democratic Party (NDP), Muslim League (ML), the

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Khaksar Tehreek and Muslim Conference. The

interesting feature regarding the alliance was its composition, i.e. rightist parties and

progressive nationalist parties. The alliance was aggressive in its campaign against the

PPP which could not deliver as promised in the lections 1970. They declared that Roti,

kapra aur makan was still a far-cry. The alliance was not only highlighting the weak

performance of the PPP government but also the brutalities occurred upon the opposition

during the period. Moreover, there was demand of implementing Islamic Laws and ban

on non-Islamic values, i.e. alcoholic drinks and gambling. Furthermore, the strong

demand of lifting of emergency was immensely popular. The rise in prices of daily use

items was also focus of the alliance. They put allegations on PPP’s weak policies for the

financial break-down and demanded for the restoration of finance and trade policies of

the previous government.50

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Electioneering: Campaign and Strategies of the Parties

Basically anti-Bhutto sentiments brought all main opposition parties closer and ultimately

shaped them in to an alliance. Surprise for the political observers was that the constituent

parties of PNA were on the same pitch, which was exhibited during the complex stage in

election campaign and strategy, i.e. distribution of tickets, they decided in limited time,

consequently major benefactors were TI and JUP. The important respect shown by

alliance with honouring the decision of a party within its ranks, i.e. NDP which decided

to have constraint from elections in Balochistan National as well as Provincial Assembly

as a token of protest against the Army operations in Balochistan. The amalgamation of

upright and nationalist left could not pose any difficulty in deciding its head in the person

of Maulana Mufti Mahmood. The big-wigs of the time like, Mufti Mahmood, Air

Marshall Asghar Khan (Rtd), Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani

and Begum Naseem Wali Khan presented an attractive landing in to the political run-way

at the time of electioneering of 1977 elections. The beauty of the alliance was that every

party included though had its own identity but followed the alliance line adequately.

Almost twelve hundred candidates filed their papers for National Assembly

constituencies and around four thousand for the four Provincial Assembly constituencies.

According to an analysis majority of the winning candidates on the tickets of PPP were

mainly feudal and business elite along with Gaddi Nasheens.51 Until the elections held,

the National Assembly contestants were minimized to seven hundred and seventeen

because of political maneuvering and role of Muslim League Qayyum. Though Qayyum

Khan had enjoyed the lucrative interior ministry but the relationship was not comfortable.

In the elections 1977, most of winning candidates of PPP from popular constituencies

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landed in assembly unopposed. The former Chief Ministers and PM managed to elect

themselves without contest. The PNA soon accused the elections as engineered.

Furthermore, it was explained that as much as in eighty one constituencies both in the

National Assemblies and provincial assemblies’ opposition candidates were denied to

submit their forms. The most popular case was of the JI’s Jan Mohammad Abbasi in the

Larkana constituency of Bhutto himself where the incumbent was detained by the police

so he could not file his papers for the elections. There might be some exaggerations from

the side of opposition but the results were unexpected even for Jialaz. The case of Bhutto

and the use of unnecessary abduction of his very contestant raised high doubts about the

lack of sincerity of the sitting government to hold free and fair elections.52

The major opposition alliance was consisted of nine political parties, though none

of them had any momentous political achievement. Just after the permission of campaign

and political activities, an alliance emerged in hasty by the title of ‘United Democratic

Front’ (UDF). Maulana Mufti Mahmud, the Pir of Pagaro, and Sardar Sherbaz Khan

Mazari were the prominent leaders. It mainly consisted of hardcore religious political

parties JUI, JUP and JI along with the NDP, which was in fact the outfit of the proscribed

National Awami Party (NAP).53 When, after hectic dialogue, Asghar Khan, Tehrik-e-

Istiqal jumped in the anti-government coalition, the UDF was transformed into the bigger

entity i.e. Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which snatched the role of overriding force

in the opposition. Just the Pakistan Muslim League and the Muslim League (Qayyum)

were left outside the major opposition alliance of the time. Strangely coalition held

together to an unexpected level, despite of the apparent differences in ideologies,

temperament, and objectives of its nine components. It had significant victory in

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gathering anti-government as well as anti-authoritarian ‘beckon’, and gradually it became

a true frightening opposition. It was able to attract large gatherings, even larger than PPP

meetings with the exceptions of Bhutto himself led crowds. Karachi had seen a

procession nearly twenty miles long to welcome Asghar Khan. By then Asghar Khan

emerged as the most efficient and most accepted opposition leader as well as spokesman

of the PNA. That was the time when the opposition got a remarkable scale of unanimity,

and an exclusive leader who could vie Bhutto in appeal and in magnetism. The PNA was

able to uphold its rising impetus almost to the end of the campaign. However, some

factors effected the position and popularity of PNA in the masses, i.e. Bhutto’s

extraordinary canvassing in the final days of campaign and irresponsible statements by

the PNA leadership.54

The PPP and PNA leadership participated in the elections’ campaign across the

country and tried to influence voters in their favour through processions, corner meetings,

press statement and publicizing advertisements in the press. Bhutto was very confident

while talking to the press at Lahore airport, while expressing his assessment about

election campaign he said that PPP had taken out the nation of the worst crises. He was

sure about the success in elections on the basis of his party’s achievements. The Secretary

General of PNA, Rafiq Bajwa demanded on March 6, 1977 that the army should be

deputed at polling stations and not FSF. Bajwa was apprehensive about the alleged

interruption of official machinery. He accused government of using cheap tactics by

harassing and arresting the polling agents of PNA candidates while quoting the incident

of Gujranwala where 68 polling agents of PNA candidates were arrested before the

elections.55 The title of Quaid-i-Awam was given to Bhutto by the workers and leaders of

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PPP and was consecutively used during the campaign in 1977 elections.56 The PNA

leadership overwhelmingly religious in nature was promising that if they would have

been given the chance to run the government, they would implement Islamic system of

governance.57

The Media Coverage The Election Commission of Pakistan assured for the sanctity of the ballot box.

Moreover, it repeatedly published advertisements in leading English and Urdu news

papers regarding information and educating general masses and election staff about the

process of elections.58

The Pakistan television (Ptv) also telecasted the proposed balloting procedure and

the duties of people in general and the election staff in particular. The presence of polling

agents of the candidates during vote casting and counting process under the supervision

of the Presiding Officer was also being ensured for the transparency of the elections.

Due to the successful strategy and directives of PPP government, main stream

print media as well as controlled electronic media supported its candidates through hard-

core coverage. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), daily Jang, the most popular

Urdu newspaper, along with The Pakistan Times, the well-circulated English daily, were

fore-runner in support of the regime. The Federal Government not only ordered the

papers to avoid proper coverage of the opposition view point and gatherings but also

monitored them minutely. For example The Pakistan Times seldom included a news item

regarding PNA even then minimized the impact by including a powerful item in editorial

to refute the impact. However, the daily Dawn could cover PNA but editorial policy was

pro-government. Surprisingly, purely state organ the Ptv telecasted some visuals of PNA

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activities but taking it seriously that no sound track follow the visual nor the proper size

of the gathering be shown. In addition to that the Radio Pakistan, another wide-spread

government owned electronic media was very particular to black-out opposition and

maximum coverage to PM’s activities, e.g. once PNA arranged a huge public gathering at

famous Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi but Radio Pakistan broadcasted activity of plantation

by a Minister, totally ignoring such a great event of the opposition. In the wake of

ignoring the broad-day realities the government controlled media lost its reliability even

before the Jialaz. Virtually, the masses not only in the cities but even in the remote areas

of the country switched to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Urdu Service to

get reliable information regarding electioneering. The fact was admitted by the decisions

of Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan that Radio Pakistan and Ptv

were not covering the election campaign justifiably and thus ordered to redress the

complains of the opposition. But both the institutions did not show any heed to that.

The Misuse of Media The government used different strategies for election propaganda out of which one was to

publish alarming advertisements for the defamation in the eyes of general masses

regarding the statements of opposition leaders previously given to malign their reputation

at the time of elections. One such advertisement reflected the statement Bacha Khan

(Abdul Ghaffar Khan) as “India is my country and Indians are my brothers, we are one

country as well as a nation even today.”59

In another advertisement government alarmed people that East Pakistan episode

would be revised if PNA could come in to power. In that regard PPP advertisement

campaign continued, e.g. a statement of two main leaders of PNA was reproduced in a

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distressing manner. “Mufti Mahmood and Asghar Khan said; ‘we will take out of prison

Wali Khan and take him from Hyderabad to Peshawer in a procession that when

Bhashsani said Assalam-o-alaikum then Bangladesh came to existing.’ Wali Khan would

not say the same Assalam o Alaikum at the Attock bridge? The decision is in your hand

on March 7”60 It was also observed that mostly Shia community favoured PPP in the

election campaign. It was reiterated by an advertisement published in daily Dawn that

JUI, JUP, JI and PNA did not accept a particular sect as their member, therefore they

would support PPP.61

The PPP also took advantage of media and published advertisements in its favour,

which contained the snaps of Bhutto and his cabinet members performing Umrah and

coming out of Holy Kaaba. It was further elaborated while addressing the leadership of

opposition that Islam is our religion but you have adopted it as occupation, who served

Islam the most, you or PPP, who established a separate ministry for religious affairs,

during your reign or PPP’s reign. Although, Mufti Mahmood remained Chief Minister of

NWFP yet he could not establish such ministry. This advertisement was published under

the name of Anjuman Tahaffuz-i-Pakistan contained other reforms about Hajj and

religious affairs. It was critically mentioned that opposition had divided the nation on

sectarian grounds. Evenly they themselves were not united under any unanimous

leadership of Maudoodi, Mufti Mahmood or Shah Ahmed Noorani. PPP fully launched a

planned election campaign by attracting the attention of women voters. It propagated that

opposition was against women rights and enlightened moderation.62

The main target of PPP’s campaign was NAP’s leader Wali Khan and tried to

prove him as enemy of Pakistan. By referring the statements of Wali Khan, PPP alarmed

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masses about the intentions of the opposition. The statements were republished in

advertisements for reference, according to which Wali Khan stated on May 24, 1973 that

the Quetta and Karachi would be ‘burnt’ like Dhaka.63 He was also being blamed as

stating on another occasion that if Pakistan would be ruined they would not be, as they

would bring the zanjeer (chain) from Chaman to the Sindh and from Toorkham to the

River Attock.64 Another leader of PNA, Asghar Khan was alleged to say about the ban on

NAP that, the National Alliance would lift the ban on the NAP if they could get power.65

Mufti Mahmood was blamed to say that, they would bring Wali Khan from jail with

pomp and show.66 The PPP government called Wali Khan as anti-Pakistan element and

asked for the choice between Wali Khan and Pakistan.67

PPP managed to publish enchanting advertisements not only herself but also

under the name of different organizations. All leading newspapers published election

supplements which mostly contained election propaganda of PPP and PNA. PPP was

having edge because of the position being ruling party, extensively misused government

funds and resources for election campaign. The PM and other high-ups’ used to travel in

aero planes designated to the chief executive of the country as well as provinces.68 The

PPP lashed last media strike on March 7, 1977;

Exploitation is your economy We gave respect to laborers We gave land to peasants We liberated the Haris (bonded cultivation labourers) We gave confidence to the poor We gave shelter to shelter less On what pattern you want to drag economy You supported the Industrialist You tried to impose the curse of capitalism again You instigated again the feudal for tyranny Is this your economy? Exploitation is your economy

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(Equality according to the teachings of Hazrat Muhammad Sallalahu Alaihi Wa Aalihi Wasallum is our economy69

The Election Campaign in Balochistan

Despite of the boycott announcement of the elections in Balochistan the electoral interest

was at high level in the areas where election for Provincial and National Assembly’s had

to be held. PPP took advantage of the situation and got about 50% seats uncontested in

PA and NA. PPP achieved 20 PA and 7 NA seats which brought PPP at safe position.

The elections were contested on 3 seats of NA and 20 seats of PA. Thirteen candidates

contested for 3 NA seats including 3 independent candidates and 10 candidates belonging

to PPP, Pashtoonkhawa NAP, Qayyum Muslim League, and JUI (Hazarvi Group) and

one candidate from Mujahideen -i-Islam. The main contest in three NA constituencies

was in NA-194 Quetta I (Quetta- Chaghi), NA 195 Quetta II (Pishin) and NA 196 Quetta

III (Zhob- Loralai) between nominees of PPP and Pashtoonkhwa NAP. In Pishin

Mahmood Khan Achakzai was a strong candidate of Pashtoonkhwa NAP against PPP.70

Pishin was the main constituency where PPP and PkNAP concentrated their

electioneering efforts. PPP’s nominee, the then Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiyar

contested against Mahmood Khan Achakzai. In Quetta-Chaghi constituency, there were

92856 male and 65891 female voters. There were 131 polling stations. The Chaghi

district (NA 194) was important constituency and it played a decisive role in the elections

of Balochistan. The biggest constituency was Quetta-III NA 196 (Zhob, Loralai)

contained 106927 male voter and 94722 female voters and 165 polling stations.71 The

main contest was between two out of total five candidates, i.e. the PPP nominee, Wazir

Ahmad Jogezai and Pashtoonkhawa NAP nominee Maulvi Rahmatullah of JUI Hazarvi

Group.

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The PNA held prayer meetings in Quetta and other main cities and towns in the

province after Friday prayers for the success of alliance and enforcement of Islamic order

in the country. The Pashtoonkhawa NAP held five corner meetings in the Quetta, Pishin

and Sibi districts. Overall 29 public meetings were held on March 5, 1977 by PPP and

opposition. The meetings explained the viewpoint of the respective parties. Out of these

twenty two public meetings were arranged by PPP, four by Pashtoonkhawa NAP, one by

PNA and two by Qayyum ML.72

The interesting advertisements were appearing in leading newspapers during the last

days of the election campaign in March, 1977, one such add was published in Dawn

which reflects the mood and statements of different leaders and the community groups;

The Sowrd or Plough

Charges, counter charges, manifestoes, meetings, processions, pardah, flags, counter flags...the month long battle of the sword and the plough has raged fast and furious. But now the sounds of battle are fading out… the day of the battle is near. The sword or the plough! March 7 and March 10 will decide. Meantime, observers comment and candidates claim. Sherbaz Mazari: “Uniformed people are saluting us” Mushir Pesh Imam: “We will redefine sedition” Abdul Hafeez Pirzada: “No more nationalism” Professor Ghafoor Ahmad: “No more women receptionists” And if you have that precious commodity-a balcony-you can use a little flag rent to pay the house rent… “You don’t want ‘aloo’ to come into power, do you?” “tu phir ‘aloo’ sastay karo!” The feminine voter speaks73

The PPP’s Strategy

Bhutto himself managed to be elected unopposed from his Larkana constituency. The

PNA refused to accept the unopposed election of Bhutto because Maulana Jan

Muhammad Abbasi the opponent PNA candidate was kidnapped at the eve of submission

of nomination papers. Even then, Z.A Bhutto was declared unopposed successful by

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Election Commission of Pakistan and even the Commission did not entertain the

complaint of Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi.74

Already directed media propagated the unopposed success of PPP members and

specially Bhutto. The representatives of major newspapers were directed to comment in

favour of the unopposed election of the Prime Minister as his large scale fame among the

masses.75

Mostly the media was under the government control, therefore, the sources of

communication only propagated manifesto of PPP for elections and portrayed it as more

revolutionary and progressive whereas PNA manifesto was severely criticized and was

shown as unclear, vague and conservative. Bhutto elaborated in all of his speeches that if

alliance would have succeeded then Pakistan would be plunged and it would have to bear

severe loss. PNA was mostly described as vested interest group of feudal and

capitalists.76

The election campaign lasted for two months. It was an open expression of hatred

between PNA and PPP. The ruling party had insured its success already at any cost for

which media was used at vast level. The PNA candidates and leaders were mostly

arrested before general elections. Under the situation PNA President Maulana Mufti

Mehmood demanded that army should be deputed on every polling station of the

country.77

The government ensured the freedom of press at any cost but on the other hand

the election campaign of PNA was criticized by the government for its election publicity

and campaign even the news regarding incidents of Balochistan were censored. Due to

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such oppressive activities Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) presented seven

point charter of demands for the freedom of press and the conduct of next elections with

the provision of independent press.78

The Election Results The PPP became heavily victorious securing 155 out of 200 seats of the National Assembly. The Party position in March 1977 General Elections was as under:

Political Pun Sin NW Balochi To Parties jab dh FP stan tal PPP 108 32 8 7 15 5 PNA 8 11 17 36 PML(Q) 1 1 Independ 8 8 ents Source: Dawn Karachi, March 8, 1977 According to Iqbal Afandi79 about twelve federal ministers contested elections

that made the transparency of election out of question, among them federal minister

Malik Meraj Khalid, NWFP CM, Nasrullah Khan Khattak, Punjab Minister, B M Masud.

Meraj Khalid contested against Abdul Qayyum Khan in Lahore. Nasrullah Khan

contested elections against Maulana Abdul Haq in Peshawar. Punjab minister S M Masud

contested against Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa, Secretary General PNA. Beside others Speaker

National Assembly, Sahibzada Farooq Ali Khan, Deputy Chairman Senate, Tahir

Mahmood Khan, the Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiyar, twelve federal ministers,

provincial CM and three provincial ministers were awarded PPP tickets for National

Assembly. The proceedings of the elections were particularly watched with interest by

the masses in that context.

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The Boycott of Elections in Balochistan The boycott of elections in province of Balochistan was announced by the President PNA

Maulana Mufti Mahmood. He demanded that the government might postpone elections

until the conditions were normalized in the Balochistan and if the government of

Balochistan would not accept this demand they were ready for elections in Balochistan

and want to portray the positive impression about Balochistan. They invited the

representatives of other provinces to Balochistan to observe the conditions and decide

themselves that how they could participate in the elections.80

The Federal Minister for Information Muhammad Hanif Khan while commenting

on this decision of PNA called it an open defeat and stated that opposition was afraid of

its defeat and popularity of PPP. He further reiterated Mufti Mahmood had invited

foreign intervention in national affairs by inviting international community to inquire

about Balochistan conditions. The state of affairs was normal at Balochistan and

democratic institutions were functional as per routine. He stated that Mufti Mahmood had

no right to deprive Balochistan from their basic and democratic right of adult franchise.81

The decision of Balochistan at that important juncture of political development

was quite strange. The boycott decision of Mufti Mahmood seems to be the boom of Sher

Baz Mazari’s statement who was head of the NDP. Once he stated that in case of

transparent elections would be held in Balochistan then his party would secure all

National and Provincial Assembly seats and on the other hand he pointed out that army

would be called back from the Balochistan otherwise his party would boycott the

elections of Balochistan.82 The decision of opposition to boycott the elections seemed to

269

be inappropriate, whatsoever was the reason it was necessary to participate in elections

for the onward flow of democratic traditions.

One should remind that it was the same province from where opposition got

collectively more seats as compared to PPP during 1970 elections. Suppose that the

conditions in Balochistan were not completely normal then it was appropriate to check

the lawlessness and disturbance which started some three years before the elections.

Opposition had to play its role to level public opinion in its favour and play its role for

the reservations of peace. According to analysts the boycott decision was not justified. It

was the result of boycott only that PPP got majority in Provincial Assembly otherwise it

could not have got such position. Twenty candidates were elected unopposed out of total

forty seats, whereas, PPP was able to secure four out of seven seats for National

Assembly unopposed. The situation was contrary to the 1970 elections. There were many

strong candidates on some seats while at other place the position of Pashtoonkhwa NAP

was very strong. Abdul Samad Achkzai had established Pashtoonkhwa NAP after NAP

was banned. The Pashtoonkhwa NAP remained ally of PPP for a long time and then

became independent before Governor Raj.

The Pashtoonkhwa NAP also boycotted Provincial Assembly elections in

Balochistan in 1977. It was revealed by the party president Mehmood Khan Achkzai that

the irregularities which had been committed during NA elections had disfigured the real

democracy and he decided to boycott the PA elections as a protest. About twelve

candidates of Pashtoonkhwa NAP including Mehmood Khan Achkzai were contesting

PA elections. Maulana Mufti Mahmood while addressing a large gathering at Peshawar

on January 30, 1977 had analyzed the situation regarding Balochistan. He mentioned that

270

due to law and order situation and Army action tribes had migrated from Balochistan,

Mari Mengal and many other tribes were not in their respective areas then how the

elections could be conducted in the absentia of the voters? He said that they wanted

elections in Balochistan but not under such conditions. Therefore, they did not accept the

conduct of elections.83

The PPP’s Reaction on the Boycott Zulfikar Ali Bhutto severely criticized the boycott of elections in Balochistan by the

opposition. He said that if PNA had had any regard or respect for the people of

Balochistan they might not have boycotted the elections in Balochistan rather than in the

whole of country. Bhutto refuted to the PNA excuse for boycotting the elections on the

ground of stationing of Pakistan Army in Balochistan. He said it was the Pakistan Army

and not the Army of America, Russia, China or India etc. He clarified that the Army was

not just in Balochistan but it was there in all the parts of country. He further added that it

was Army which helped in the development work of tribal areas and constructed schools

and hospitals etc. 84

The PPP had the stance that by boycotting elections in Balochistan PNA have

once again neglected the people of Balochistan as they had been doing all along in the

past. Bhutto said that prior to the advent of people’s government there used to be an

Agent to the Governor General (AGG) and during the One Unit set up two

Commissioners. He further stated that Balochistan was then enjoying the status of full-

fledged province. He said that it was PPP government which gave provincial autonomy to

Balochistan and there were fresh Provincial Assembly elections of 45 members. The

appointment of Baloch Governor and Chief Minister, i.e. Raisani and Bizenjo and

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Ataullah Mengal was also being considered as the contribution of PPP. However, Bhutto

criticized that in spite of those ‘favours’ the Baloch leaders started malicious activities,

indulged in wrong practices, challenged the government to launch civil disobedience

movement and burning of bazars in Quetta.85 Bhutto remarked against whom they were

launching civil disobedience movement, against their own government? It was remarked

that they did not launch the civil disobedience movement in the pre-PPP regimes when

there was no democratic government existed. The PPP had the stance that they started

uprising, sent their people to the mountains and carried out bomb blasts due to which the

people of Balochistan suffered.

Due to large scale failure in NA elections PNA boycotted provincial elections.

The PNA demanded for re-polling of NA elections because of rigging at large scale.

Asghar Khan addressed a press conference on March 8, 1977 in which he declared these

elections as a big fraud with people of Pakistan and announced total boycott of PA

elections.86

Interesting proofs of rigging were revealed under government machinery. The

total number of all candidates exceeded than the total number of voters of the

constituency. The result of a constituency of Mauanla Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi was

handed over by presiding officer under the date of March 10, 1977, in spite of March 7,

1977, which was a blunder and clear proof of rigging.

The PPP secured all seven seats of NA in Balochistan, The four seats were

secured earlier uncontested while remaining three were won after tough contest. The

unopposed candidates were Mir Taj Muhammad Jamali, Federal Minister for Labour,

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Health, and Population Planning (NA 197 Sibi I), Mir Abdul Nabi Jamali, (NA 198 Sibi

II), Prince Moheyyuddin son of Governor Balochistan ( NA 199 Kalat I) and Mir

Ammanullah Khan Gichki, Advisor to the Chief Minister NA 200 Kalat II.87

There was strong contest on the remaining three seats. The Deputy Chairman of

Senate, Tahir Muhammad Khan defeated three other candidates including Saadullah Jan,

of PML (Qayyum Group) whose security deposits were even forfeited. His close

contestant was Arbab Abdul Qadir Khan, Senior Vice President PkNAP who secured

15744 votes against 30497, secured by Tahir Muhammad Khan. The fourth Candidate

Sardar Allah Gul Sasoli was an independent candidate and had earlier announced his

withdrawal from the contest.88

The Sindh senior minister Abdul Waheed Katpar in his statement said that the

overwhelming majority of PPP in the elections had affirmed the faith of people in the

leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. All Pakistan Minorities Federation also showed their

gratitude and feelings in rejoicing the victory of PPP candidates under the name of its

President G.D. Advani and Kalidas J. Kandra, Secretary General through an

advertisement published in Dawn.89

Almost twelve hundred contestants were there for two hundred seats. The PPP

occupied one hundred and fifty five seats and thus acquired clear-cut majority. There

were allegations against the ruling PPP for rigging the elections by PNA. The PNA

declared that its thirty six winning candidates would not take the oath and demanded for

re-election. The dead-lock created due to the firm stand of both the parties, i.e.

government and opposition, later on, led to the imposition of Martial Law on July 5.

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Responding to the allegations of rigging in NA elections by PNA and other

opposition parties Bhutto stated that NA elections of March 7, had been a settled fact and

could not be held again and government was prepared for dialogue on other issues. He

said that he was not only ready to listen to the opposition but also about their solution. He

stated that he would not allow protest and demonstrations which might disturb law and

order situation. He stated that Meri Kursi Mazboot hai (personally he could be a weak but

the office he was holding was not weak).90

According to a press release of CM Balochistan Muhammad Khan Barozai the

people of Balochistan played their positive role in making the opposition strike

unsuccessful. He affirmed that the government would not allow anybody to disturb peace

in the province. According to the Provincial Directorate of Public Relations, the PNA and

NAP Phashtoonkhwa jointly called for strike in Balochistan. According to the details, the

strike was partial in Quetta, there was no strike of transport, a few protestors stoned

vehicles in the morning but were controlled effectively by the the law enforcing agencies.

The partial strike was noticed in the other regions of Balochistan including Mastung,

Nushki and Loralai while there was no strike in the other remaining areas of the

province.91

According to the press note issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan;

… in pursuance of the directive contained in article 224(2) of the constitution that the results of a general elections to the assemblies shall be declared not later than 14 days after the completion of the poles, the Election Commission is notifying the results today, on the intimation of the results as received from the respective Returning Officers under section 42 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. However, it is made clear that this notification of the results is without prejudice to the inquiries which the Commission is conducting and will continue to conduct in respect of the all constituencies in regard to which it has received serious allegations of the grave illegalities and violation of law.92

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Due to alleged grave irregularities and rigging PNA reiterated the demand for the fresh poles.93 The Provincial Assembly Elections

The polling for the Provincial Assemblies was held on March 10, 1977. There were total

four hundred three PA seats throughout the country out of which fifty seven were decided

without contest and interestingly all unopposed winners were on PPP tickets. The PNA

boycotted the elections, in the second phase on the plea of alleged rigging massively in

the first phase. Earlier in the first phase the PNA only boycotted in Balochistan on the

pretext of the presence of Army in the province for the operation. 94

The Balochistan PA session was summoned by the Governor to meet at Quetta on

April 3, 1977 at 10:00 am. The newly elected members of the Balochistan Assembly took

oath on the opening day of the first session of the Assembly. The session continued for a

couple of days during which election of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and provincial

Chief Minister took place.95

Seven members cabinet took oath, i.e. Muhammd Khan Barozai, Chief Minister,

1)Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani Senior Minister Agriculture, Local Government and Tourism 2)

Fazeela Aaliyan Health and Education 3) Dr. Naseer-u-Din Social Welfare,

Communication and Construction 4) Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Law and Parliamentary

Affairs, Information and Food 5) Mir Bahadur Khan Bangulzai Water and Power 6)

Qadir Bakhsh Baloch, Industry, Labour and Transport 7) Molvi Saleh Muhammad

Revenue, Excise and Taxation and Auqaf. Barozai also held the charge of Interior

Affairs, Services and General Administration, Finance, Planning and Development and

Livestock.96

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The Result Analysis

The distrust which developed after the elections was not due to the PPP success but

because of its landslide victory. The party bagged one hundred and fifty five NA seats out

of two hundred whereas PNA, QML and independents could only secure thirty six, one

and eight respectively. According to the APP seventeen Million out of thirty one Million

registered voters casted their votes and PPP and PNA bagged fifty nine and thirty six

percent votes, respectively.97 However, the PNA’s performance in the Punjab and Sindh

shocked the people.98 Consequent upon the difference of political approach of the parties

composing the alliance, the ‘boycott’ of PNA activities by electronic and print media, the

government created legal obstacles against PNA mass-contact and severe propaganda by

state-sponsored machinery had minimized PNA triumph in the polls.99

The Government lifted the Section 144 leaving just two months for election

campaign to thrust the opposition in complexity. In the wake of all the shortcomings and

the prevailing situation even the PNA leadership confessed in private gatherings that

beating PPP was out of question. However, it was general perception due to large public

gatherings that PNA would occupy a good number of seats to become a strong opposition

in the upcoming National Assembly. In the context of ground realities, even the PPP

leaders declared that PNA would be able to occupy fifty to sixty seats in the elections. 100

In the context of the estimates, PPP’s landslide victory not only caused suspicion over the

elections’ transparency but also created distrust in the mind of masses. Therefore, later

on, PNA easily propagated the issue in its favour and hence provided opportunity for

mass level agitation. In lieu of the diverse explanations of election results by PPP and

PNA, the perception was emerged regarding elections as unfair. However, it could be

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finalized that the election rigging was well-planned and at vast level as alleged by PNA101

In comparison to the result of Karachi and NWFP with the Punjab was surprising one as

the margin of PPP victory was wide enough.102

Even in the controlled media along with the comments of Chief Election

Commissioner (CEC) Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan were tilted towards the allegations made

by PNA regarding large scale rigging in the elections. Furthermore, the null and void

decisions made by the Election Commission in four cases where PPP stalwarts were

elected showed the trend of massive involvement of the sitting government was

apparent. 103 That also reflected massive malpractices and frequent involvement of

officials, so much so that in many cases polling stations were closed for hours. The

presiding officials were abducted; ballot boxes snatched and in some cases polling staff

were subjected to severe violence. Although, PPP extraordinarily committed illegal

practices to sweep the elections but PNA also did the same, where they could manage.

The Election Commission had no authority practically to control and manage fair and

free elections which was reflected by the CEC statement on April 6, 1977. The rigging

was so massive that CEC itself came to the conclusion that fresh elections were required

on all two hundred National Assembly seats.104 The comment of the CEC was issued two

times, i.e. while commenting on Voice of America 105 and second time through a

statement on June 5, 1977.106 The EC sealed the record of election results of eighty

constituencies because of allegations of rigging. Thus it was clear by the statements and

decisions of EC that under Bhutto administration the possibility of valid elections was a

far cry. Bhutto himself accepted irregularities though of small scale.107 In fact, the

strategy adopted and executed with utmost zeal by Bhutto in the elections had given

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opposition a valid ground to agitate and brought Bhutto government to down on its knees.

The PPP had on its credit to secure “New Pakistan” and successfully managed the release

of Pakistani Prisoners of War, popularity in masses. The PNA had weak wicket to play

because of the presence of successors and affiliated personalities of banned NAP among

its ranks. Therefore, to adopt rigging strategy was not needed by PPP to be successful in

the elections.108 Bhutto could have succeeded through fair elections very comfortably but

his advisors and his own Machiavellian style brought the brunt of his actions.

It was not seemed that Bhutto himself ordered each and every act of irregularity

but factually stooges planted by him at the helm of affairs proved themselves as ‘Shah se

ziyada Shah ka wafadar’ (more faithful to the King than King himself). The whole plan

of engineered elections was made earlier to the campaign; the jialas were posted on

important positions particularly in the Punjab and Sindh, who later on played their role in

the elections respectively. The specific orders were issued, particularly to restrain

opposition main leadership to be entered in to the Parliament. 109 The Martial Law

Regime ordered a high power enquiry against as much as hundred and fifty government

official including the District Management and the senior Police Officials of Larkana for

alleged involvement in the rigging of the elections. 110 The former CEC himself alleged

that PPP leaders for exploiting positions to compel election conducting staff to act as they

wished.111

The PPP government allegedly spent the government treasury for their election

campaign. A cell was established under Chairman of National Press Trust, which had

spent as much as eight million rupees just for election posters.112 Moreover, around

twenty corporations at centre and in provinces were ordered to submit huge sums in the

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party secret account of PPP. It was also suspected that sums were contributed to the party

funds for electioneering by large industries, e.g. Cotton Trading Corporations contributed

in the fund.113 In the wake of getting support during the polls, different sort of vehicles,

i.e. including jeeps, bicycles and motor bikes were distributed through the funds of the

corporations in the country side.114 It was also a severe allegation that even Bhutto

himself got kick-backs in defense procurements from abroad.115 Though, the allegations

were refuted by the then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.116

The Protest and Movement against Rigging

Bhutto ruled the country with his Fascist approach of tyranny to crush the opposition.

The apparent examples included the murders of Dr. Nazir Ahmad, MNA of JI from South

Punjab, Abdul Samad Achakzai, a renowned Pashtoon Nationalist and MPA from

Balochistan, Maulvi Shamsuddin, a member of JUI from Balochistan, Choudhary Zahoor

Elahi, a Muslim League leader from Gujrat and Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri, former Law

Minister in Bhutto’s Cabinet. No political entity could replace Bhutto; the only option left

to fill the vacuum was the khakis. Thus, the situation was ripe for the ‘blue-eyed boy of

Bhutto’, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who superseded a lot of senior colleagues on

the behest of Bhutto. Zia had two precedents to follow in the shape of General Ayub and

General Yahya.

Furthermore, the allegations on Bhutto in the White Paper published by the

Martial Law Regime included; the establishment of Federal Security Force (FSF) to be

used as personal force to achieve his autocratic goals and to crush the opposition forces

through an iron hand; tortured the opposition activists not only in Dalai Camp established

in Azad Jammu and Kashmir but at Shahi Fort Lahore as well; targeted the press, banned

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political parties like the NAP, to control opposition activities through the restriction on

gathering of above ten persons, nationalization of almost whole private sector and given

to his own faithful Jialaz; through his policies compelled industrialists particularly from

Karachi, the commercial hub of the country to drain their capital from the country.117

Furthermore, due to the policies of centre the private investors were pushed to the wall

and the financial activity shrank adversely. The government controlled electronic media

was not ready to give coverage to the opposition.

In the era of PPP government it was assumed that the one party system like

Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, Mao’s China and Lenin’s USSR would be in process

to be implemented in Pakistan. The government used special emergency powers

throughout PPP rule to curb every sort of difference of opinion, no matter in the case of

opposing parties or opposition within party ranks. Bhutto himself was directing and

over-seeing the implementation of the orders regarding torture and abduction of the

opponents.

Having that tendency and approach it was easy to believe that the 1977 elections

were rigged at alarming level on the personal directions of Bhutto because the results

were shocking even for the staunch supporters of PPP. The PPP bagged as much as one

hundred and fifty five seats of NA out of two hundred seats. The competitor of Bhutto

was abducted tortured and restrained to submit his papers even and consequently Bhutto

was elected ‘unopposed’.118 Bhutto’s cousin Mumtaz Bhutto followed the same pattern to

suppress his opponent. The sequence of the policy continued even after the

announcement of the results as all opposition leaders belonged to PNA were sent behind

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the bars and the demand of opposition for talks regarding fresh elections was refused at

once.

In the wake of agitation against the rigged elections, Bhutto was so furious that he

ordered Army to suppress the opposition with iron hand and even fire upon the protesters.

The security agencies obeyed the orders of the Chief Executive of the country which

resulted in to the deaths and injuries to the countless protesters, particularly in the Punjab.

The same tactics were used against the urban Sindh opposition processions.119

The tyrant policies of Bhutto were so oppressive that Army felt itself at an odd

position. Bhutto’s policies were continued and, furthermore, he also started allegations

and criticism against USA. He alleged that America was funding PNA activities to topple

him down for the benefit of Israel; he was also claiming that he had proof of what he

said.120 Within army ranks the difference was about to erupt due to the government

domestic as well as foreign policies.

The ‘Rigging’

On the evening of March 7, 1977 an official handout was issued under which section 144

was imposed soon after the polling time under which the gathering of five and more than

five persons and processions carrying arms was banned. The necessity of imposition of

section 144 was felt due to lawlessness and charges of alleged rigging. The PNA

protested due to such actions. Asghar Khan the leader of PNA while addressing a press

conference stated that government had directed all Deputy Commissioners (DC) to

manage more seats than the limit and every technique would be adopted for the

purpose.121 Bhutto addressed a press conference on March 8, 1977 and stated that despite

of boycott decision of opposition the elections would be held under the schedule. He

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declared that the opposition decided about the matter of boycott after proper thinking on

the issue. He further added that there was no rigging in the elections and any sort of

lawlessness, protest and effort to damage the ‘constitution’ would not be accepted. Bhutto

reiterated that when assembly would start functioning then the emergency would be

relaxed and the session of NA would be summoned during the same month.122 On the

other hand it is evident from the White Paper published on 1978 elections that the PNA

boycotted the provincial elections due to large scale of rigging in NA elections.

The Provincial Assembly Elections

The PA elections were also held during the depth of boycott of PNA under which PPP

got 435 out of 460 seats. The independent candidates got 16 seats and two had gone to

PML (Qayum Group). The result of seven constituencies was not announced.

Interestingly the PPP won all hundred seats of Sindh. The province wise result was as

under;

a) Punjab 232 out of 240 (independent candidates 7)

b) Sindh 100 out of 100

c) NWFP 69 out of 80

d) Balochistan 34 of 40 (independent candidates 5)123

The PNA totally refused to acknowledge the results of national as well as

provincial assemblies under election 1977. This restlessness led the country towards

chaos and the elections became a ridiculous symbol. The disorder was also accredited by

Bhutto in his broad casted speech of March 12, 1977. He stated as he had overcome every

crisis in the past, therefore, Inshallah he would also overcome that crisis. He said that

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elections held in March 7 were a settled issue, which could not be held again, although

negotiations could have been held with opposition on other matters. He invited the

president of PNA Mualana Mufti Mahmmood and his companions for negotiations and

clarified that he was not summoning such type of round table conference as was held by

Ayub Khan during his last days.124

On the same day, the Chief Election Commissioner Sijad Ahmad Jan also

addressed a press conference and stated that the action would be taken against the

authorities involved in malpractice in elections. The concerned officers of the department

would be treated under law if found involved in rigging and irregularities. 125 The

leadership of PNA also held the session on the same day and decided not to hold any sort

of negotiations with Prime Minister Bhutto. Therefore, PNA presented two main

demands;

1) The election of March 7, 1977 and March 10, 1977 be declared null and void and Prime

Minister Bhutto along with Member of Elections Commission should resign.

2) The President, after taking nation into confidence, should appoint new Election

Commissioner which would hold independent just and impartial elections with the

support of Judiciary and military.126

The PNA further gave deadline to government to accept its demands till March 13,

1977 otherwise launching of countrywide agitation movement would be announced. The

movement of PNA started as per-program i.e. March 14, 1977.

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The People’s Agitation Movement

The PNA charged Bhutto and his party PPP for misuse of civil bureaucracy and military

machinery for rigging in general elections. Alliance general council rejected the results of

election 1977. It demanded resignation from the newly elected members of assembly.

The General Council of PNA also demanded that elections might have been convened

under the management of army and that the Army might have also worked as caretaker

government. Under such emergency situation council also demanded resignation from

election commission because it basically remained failed to hold independent just and

impartial elections. The PNA appealed people for peaceful strike on March 11, 1977

against rigging in elections127 whereas the ruling party declared the charges of rigging

baseless. Bhutto asked PNA leaders to accept the election results and they were also

informed that government would not let them to play with the life of people and

subversive activities would not be allowed. Despite of the initial warnings of Bhutto,

PNA observed strike on March 11, 1977. About two hundred people including important

leaders of PNA were arrested.128

Bhutto clarified about the rejection of re-polling of general elections and declared that

it was a settled issue which could not be negotiated. 129 On the other hand, the PNA was

stuck at the demand of holding new elections. It also demanded that illegal and

unconstitutional government of Bhutto would resign at once. The sharp and stern

standpoint and behaviour from both sides i.e. PNA and PPP put the country into a severe

political chaos.

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The PNA announced launching of a nationwide movement from March 14, 1977. The

government adopted two ways to stop the movement. Firstly, a letter from Prime Minister

was delivered to the PNA President Maulana Mufti Mahmood for dialogue, who was at

Karachi at that time. Mufti Mahmood declared that the contents of letter were vague and

there was no need of useless meeting. Secondly, the government managed to publish

news in daily Mashriq that the Secretary General of alliance Rafiq Bajawa held a meeting

with Prime Minister.130 The intention behind the publishing that news was to propagate

and give impression that PNA and government had reached at certain settlement; hence,

there was no need of the movement. Rafiq Bajwa strongly condemned and denied that he

never had any such meeting with the Prime Minister, therefore, both the steps of

government could not work. 131

The nationwide ‘protest day’ was observed in all major cities of country and demand

of resignation of Bhutto and holding of fresh elections were repeatedly made. The

confrontation led to fight between the PNA protesters and law enforcement agencies, due

to which many people were wounded.132 At the moment Bhutto accepted that there might

be rigging in some constituencies and he showed his condent to give PNA some extra

National Assembly seats so that the boycott of Provincial Assembly elections by PNA

might be adjusted. However, the PNA rejected the offer and demanded for

negotiations.133

The government took severe action and imprisoned important political leadership.

Asghar Khan, Begam Nassem Wali Khan, Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Maulana Shah

Muahmmad Noorani and Sardar Sher Baz Mazari and imposed curfew in Karachi.134 The

PNA Action Committee announced the strike on March 21, 1977 for the release of their

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leaders. It also held many agitational processions and protested violating the section 144

at Lyallpur (Faisalabad), Sargodha, Multan, Lahore, Gujranwala and many other cities.135

Bhutto wrote a letter third time to PNA President and showed his willingness to

bring the chaos to end. Bhutto also clarified that he would negotiate as Chief Executive of

the country and not as PPP chairman. Maulana Mufti Mahmood rejected the letter third

time and led stress on the demands of general council and release of arrested leaders.

The mild leaders of PPP showed the willingness for talks with government but

Asghar Khan, Sher Baz Mazari, Maulana Shah Muahmmad Noorani considered the offer

as diplomacy. The PNA leaders criticized the role of mediators that until all arrested

leaders would not be released and appropriate atmosphere was not revived, any sort of

negotiation with government was useless.

Interestingly, those leaders were of the opinion that the PNA had to take the

control of administration in collaboration with the President Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to

conduct fresh elections. The PNA General Council did not agree and formulated three

points agenda for any reconciliation with the government;

1) Prime Minister Bhutto tender his resignation

2) New Elections Commission might be constituted

3) The fresh election might be announced136

The government did not declare the demands of PNA unconstitutional but

considered them as source of disturbance for the nation. The pro-government media

charged PNA leaders that they had created the uncertain situation in country by useless

agitational politics in the country. The federal government responded harshly against the

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protest. It issued the “shot at sight” orders and called military to make the people’s strike

of PNA unsuccessful on March 26, 1977.137 The strike remained successful and despite

the pressure of police and military it suspended normal routine life in big towns and cities

of Pakistan.138

The PNA General Council clarified through its resolution that PNA had rejected

National Assembly elections due to ‘rigging at large scale’. The countrywide public

meetings, processions and protest had shown that people had neither accepted election

results nor legitimacy of National Assembly. It is a fact that history repeats itself. During

people’s movement in 1968-69, Bhutto was in favour of solving issues in streets and now

he was not in its favour. He showed his willingness to lift emergency on March 26, 1977

if the alliance give up agitational politics and get ready to solve the issues democratically

under constitutional and legal process. Soon after the oath taking for new term, Bhutto

stated that he was ready for any “Big Compromise” but was not ready at all to dissolve

the National Assembly. 139 The condition was entirely out of control due to firm

standpoint of the both i.e. government and PNA.

During the month of April the people’s movement got momentum and it entered

into a new phase, when PNA started countrywide Civil Disobedience Movement on April

11, 1977. The PNA leaders appealed people to stop paying taxes to the ‘unconstitutional

Bhutto government’ and to remove their deposits from banks and refuse to travel public

transport without tickets and not to return loans taken from national organizations. The

movement brought PPP government to failure and the PNA ascending mode.140

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Bhutto came down to offer some deal with PNA without giving resignation under

the pressure of day by day increasing momentum of the agitation. Bhutto even consented

for the dissolution of the National Assembly and to have re-elections. However, he put

the condition that PNA would assure to get 2/3 majority. In the meantime, government

lifted ban from public meetings but did not call- off Emergency. On the other hand,

Bhutto dramatically got inclined towards Islamic teachings to be popular among religious

circles. The government announced many steps and reforms among which Sharia Laws

were at priority under which Friday as weekly holiday and ban on liquor were announced

but all of the steps were like drowning man catches at the straw.

The agitation procession often started from different Masajid of cities because the

movement was based on the slogan of ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’. The official newspapers

propagated against the processions that people were being exploited in the name of Islam.

According to Pakistan Times “the present PNA agitations for the over-throw of the

constitution happens to be just another phase of the ‘Fasad-fi-Sabilillah’ of our Mullah

turned politicians and our politicians turned Mullahs”.141

The PNA responded that it was being blamed to use Masjid for political purposes

it replied that Allah has specified for congregation but government had besieged

Masajid.142 The PNA movement was getting intensity day by day. Its climax was on

April 9, 1977 when police opened fire on the protesters moving towards Assembly Hall

Lahore. Actually, Bhutto had arrived Lahore on April, 8, 1977 so that he might attend the

Punjab Provincial Assembly session on April 9, 1977. He reiterated that elections were

just and the re-election was out of question. Furthermore, Bhutto stated that the holding

of fresh elections was not so easy but it would be unbearable financial stress on the

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already weak national economy. On repeated inquiries he abruptly answered, “I do not

want to go down in history as a rigger of election which I am not. If I have reflection I

would be conceding their false charge that I am a manipulator and rigger of election. I

have my own political career and political reputation to consider”.143

A large procession under the leadership of Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, acting

president of PNA started from Neela Gunmbad Masjid, Lahore and aimed to reach

Punjab Assembly building had to face many hurdles on its way. The protesters put many

buildings, banks and vehicles of fire brigade on fire after firing incidents occurred by the

police. Many people were killed and wounded due to police operation in front of the

Assembly Hall. The death toll was uncountable because many corpses were removed

from the scene.144 That was the tragic incident which reflected the brutal policy of ruling

party. The whole national and international media commented on the tragic incident

including daily Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan Times and News Week. To mourn the tragic

incident of April 9, 1977, consequent protest also started on daily basis which further

deteriorated the conditions. The economic, political and administrative setup of the

country was also dismantled due to the incident.

The brutal steps against people’s movement uncovered the ‘authoritarian’ and

‘Fascist’ policies of Bhutto which not only damaged his opponents but his own political

party was defamed and many stalwarts of the party resigned from the party and assembly

both. The law and order situation deteriorated so much that army was called to control

administration of five big cities.145 The government became so much under pressure that

severe measures were taken against the people’s strike on April 22, 1977. To suppress a

people’s strike the government imposed Martial Law at Karachi, Lahore and

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Hyderababd. 146 The agitational movement continued with constant energy and

momentum. The PNA passed a resolution on April 25, 1977 in which imposition of

Martial Law was severely condemned as well as the military was criticized for supporting

illegal and unconstitutional government of Bhutto.147 The Bhutto charisma was fading

away due to the intensity in PNA movement. Resultantly, Bhutto had to depend on army

and the journey towards decline erupted. Many members refused to accept the leadership

of Bhutto and detached themselves from the party. Ahamd Raza Kasuri founded a new

political party which was named as Pakistan Awami Jamhoori Party.148 Due to severe

tension, the ambassadors of Spain, Greece, France and Russia presented their

resignations. These resignations were presented as a protest against Martial Law.

Different pressure groups adopted different techniques to get popularity. Moreover, three

Brigadiers of Pakistan Army also resigned as a protest against Martial Law.149

The actions of Bhutto administration played the role in popularizing the agitation

and many pressure groups, political organization rapidly joined the PNA movement. The

PNA got the favour of women organizations, students, professional groups, labour

organizations, and trade unions. The Pakistan Students’ Alliance also criticized Bhutto’s

viewpoint regarding the movement and demanded for the immediate resolution of

political chaos. It also demanded to reopen the educational institutions. About twenty six

trade unions and Pakistan Labour Alliance were supporting the PNA, due to which

government was under immense pressure to solve the political crisis. Nearly, all walks of

life were protesting against the government. The main feature of political movement was

political motivation of the women. For the first time, the women participated in

processions at Quetta, Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad and Rawalpindi. The movement was

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also supported by National Democratic Party (NDP) in Balochistan and Jiye Sindh

Mutahda Mahaz (JSMM) in Sindh.150

The subsequent days witnessed the climax of movement. Bhutto declared the

people’s movement of PNA as a petty bourgeois struggle. He stated that the people were

not in favour of the disturbance created by Mullahs. To get rescue to come out from the

political anarchy, Bhutto requested Islamic countries to use their sphere of influence.

Renowned leaders of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Libya contacted political parties of

the alliance. Arab countries also promised to provide financial assistance for the new

elections.

The representatives of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah al Ahad met with Maulana Mufti

Mehmood President of PNA and Vice President, Nawadzada Nasrullah at Sihala Rest

House, Rawalpindi where they were kept. He also met Pir Pagara, the Acting President of

PNA. Meanwhile he also met Bhutto and tried to play his role to ease the situation.151

Saudi Ambassador Riaz al Khateeb met Maulana Mufti Mehmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah

and Bhutto to convey them the massage of Saudi King Shah Khalid. The special

representatives of leader of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat met

both the factions and hoped for good results. Due to the efforts of the above mentioned

conciliatory delegations the negotiations between the both could become possible.152 The

conciliatory efforts were also started at national level for which responsibility had been

given to Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan who held extensive meetings with the arrested

leaders and was hopeful for melting of ice. He stated on May 21, 1977 that the ground

work for the said negotiations had been finalized.153 Later on, he stated on May 26, 1977

that PNA was ready for the negotiations.154 Hence, the negotiations started under the

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auspices of Islamic countries and through Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan. The PNA

delegation consisted upon the President Maulana Mufti Mehmood, Vice President

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and General Secretary Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, whereas,

the official team included the Prime Minister Bhutto, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Maulana

Kausar Niazi. Simultaneously, Bhutto was playing his cards very smartly on one side he

started conciliatory efforts and on the other, he had called special meeting of

Commanders of Armed Forces which was attended by General Zia-ul-Haq, General

Muhammad Sharif, and Air Martial Zulfikar Ali Khan, participated in the session. The

meeting was presided over by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.155 The conduct of negotiations became

too much effective when Lahore High Court declared the Martial Law illegal at Lahore.

After long series of conciliatory sessions, both the delegations had finalized the script of

agreement that some irresponsible statements were issued from some stalwarts of the

government, e.g. Sheikh Rafique Ahmad, President Punjab PPP, stated that lawlessness

had been created with the support of ‘American Aid’.156 Due to such conditions the law

and order conditions became worse in Pakistan and the agitation started again. Both of

the delegations were about to reach the settlement after different amendments in the

manuscript of the agreement.

On one side, the conciliatory efforts were on the way and on the other, the

national political conditions deteriorated so much that army had to intervene in the name

of ‘saving the state of Pakistan’ and the Martial Law was imposed on July 5, 1977 and

General Zia took over the charge of the country. The 1977 elections were completely

boycotted in the province of Balochistan by PNA therefore the electoral process could

not get legitimacy. It was bad luck of the province of Balochistan that the democracy was

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rolled back just after the advent of democracy in Balochistan. The elected representative

government was dismissed and the innocent people of Balochistan along with nascent

democracy were in doll drums. According to the constitution, the democratic age had

commenced but there was a still long journey to develop democratic culture. The Baloch

leadership had lost their trust in the federal government, due to repeated security forces

involvement and operations in the province. The ‘democratic government’ of Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto was stained with state operation, military involvement, ban on political parties,

arrest of political leaders and unproved cases against them in the context of Balochistan.

All of the radical steps severely affected the Baloch youth. They also felt dejected upon

rolling back of democratic process in the province. Such steps of the federal government

encouraged ‘nationalist’ approach in the Baloch youth. The political struggle and process

once again turned towards hilly dens in spite of the assembly. The delicate fabric of real

political struggle of Balochistan broke down from the national stream. Most of the

Sardars benefited from the situation and changed their political loyalties except Attaullah

Mengal, Sardar Khiar Bakhsh Marri and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remained successful only up to the limit that he alienated

Nawab Akbar Bugti from his political companions; second big achievement was the

division of top political leadership of the NAP. 157 After release from jail, the NAP

leadership was divided on ethnic basis of Baloch and Pashtoon. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh

Bizenjo established his own separate party named Pakistan National Party on December

2, 1956.158 Thus, it proved to be parting of ways between the common political struggle

of NWFP and Balochistan.

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The dismissal of NAP government and military action in Balochistan had far-

reaching effects. Thousands of families of Balochistan were affected. The members of

those families were either killed in jails or had migrated to Afghanistan. The 1977

elections were blessing in disguise in the context of Balochistan because Bhutto rule

ultimately ended and situation for Balochistanies became congenial.

Aftermath

The election results brought havoc for the political system in Pakistan. The situation was

deteriorating day by day. The opposition was getting support of the masses and

government was using all sorts of tactics to crush opposition at any cost;

Like a seismic upheaval, the general elections has shaken the nation and left it in a Hamlet-like mood, sullen and explosive. . . . The inconclusive vote has given a new twist to the contest for power and divided the nation. It has also brought political fundamentals into question and put the people on trial again. Once again, a crisis looms large. . . . And, if it is not resolved in time, and resolved amicably, the nation may soon slide into a quagmire of unending conflict. This, indeed, is a new crisis with a new focus one which was neither foreseen, nor foreseeable. It has caught the people unaware. ... Constitutional hair splitting apart, the crucial question, on which the very fate of the country hinges, is; will the contending parties agree to a dialogue, or opt for a “duologue” 159

The Government-PNA Dialogue

It took almost three months for the initiations of talks, because top leadership of PNA as

well as thousands of activists were jailed by Bhutto at the time, furthermore the PPP

jiyalas also terrorized the opposition. At times, it seemed as if the talks would be

successful (June 15th), but then delaying tactics prevailed again (June 19th). At that

important juncture, instead of showing seriousness to the talks Bhutto opted to visit some

important Islamic countries i.e. Libya, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,

Kuwait and Iran. The purpose to visit the Islamic countries was to get their support to

sustain power after the rigged elections of 1977; therefore he could have edge upon PNA

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and to show his cards to the Army as well. By the return of Bhutto from the visits abroad,

the situation regarding dialogue with PNA was stand still; both had difference of opinion

even on the procedure of the dialogue.

However, later on talks restarted but on July 3, 1977 again dead lock emerged,

due to the reason that PNA rejected the amendments in their draft by the government.

According to PNA the amendments made by the government would be proved fatal for

the conduct of free and fair election.160 Bhutto issued a statement to clarify the position

that PNA had presented ten additional demands after the settlement of the agreement.

Nawabzada Nasrullh responded that PNA had not presented any new demand, Those

were already included in first two drafts and the PM had tried to give a wrong impression

on public. That situation aggravated the already prevailing chaos.161 The country was in

a politico-economic crisis but politicians were showing no heed to that. The situation was

demanding re-election but Bhutto was not in the mood to do so. The ultimate result of

political non-seriousness was in the shape of third Martial Law in the country on July 5,

1977. Bhutto was detained at Murree and Zia pledged the nation that within ninety days

the elections would be held. He suggested Bhutto to be calm and quiet otherwise the

country would suffer more.

The political history of Pakistan witnessed a bleak scenario in the aftermath of the

elections 1977. The main political alliance, PNA charged that National Assembly

elections were rigged in Toto. Hence, PNA boycotted the provincial part of the elections

and further demanded that Bhutto must resign and urgent fresh elections be held in the

presence of the Army at polling booths. The leadership of PNA was not ready for talks

though Bhutto was offering re-elections of the Provincial Assemblies. Agitation

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continued at full scale by opposition and Bhutto reacted with iron hand, a series of arrest

starting from top leadership to workers started and even Martial Law was imposed in

some important cities. The situation was deteriorating day by day and ultimately reached

to no return point. At that time the options were; a) domestic as well as international

mediators which could be internally Army and externally might be the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. b) Continuation Bhutto’s authoritative rule c)

Imposition of Martial Law or d) Forced resignation of Bhutto and formation of

Opposition’s Government. Bhutto himself felt the extraordinary faulty election campaign

run by PPP as he admitted,

“learned a lot of lessons from the election campaign-the mood of the people, what the

people want.”162

Collapse of the System

The situation in the country was again deteriorated and violent agitation erupted. It was

assumed that Military may intervene to tackle the condition. It had been the tragic record

of the political history of Pakistan that whenever politicians become failed to run the state

affairs under democratic traditions, military takes over to save the solidarity and integrity

of the nation and state according to their own claim. Same happened on July 5, 1977 that

the army again took over the charge of the country under the command of General Zia ul

Haq, the Chief of Army Staff. He took over the political administration of the country as

Chef Martial Law Administrator by deposing Bhutto. After the imposition of Martial

Law, General Zia addressed the nation and pledged to hold free and fair elections within

ninety days. He clarified that the constitution has not been abrogated but some part of it

held in abeyance. He elaborated his programme in his speech which was mainly focused

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for the improvement of law and order situation in the country. However, the people of

Balochistan took sigh of relief by the end of PPP Government at centre.

References & Notes

1 White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977(Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan,1978),pp.1-25. 2 White Paper on Misuse of Media (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1978), pp.243-244. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. pp.254-256. 5 Dawn, Karachi, September 6, 1976. 6 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, September 6, 1976. 7 Dawn, Karachi, December 23, 1976. 8 Prior to it PPP’s militant wing ‘People’s Guards’ following the footprints of the militia of Mussolini’s Fascist party, established at Hala Convention 1970 under the leadership of General (Rted) Akbar Khan popular as ‘Communist Revolutionary’. Musawat, July 8, 1970. 9 M. G. Weinbaum, “The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 7 (Jul., 1977), pp. 599-618, University of California Press, pp.603-604. 10 Particularly the stalwarts of party founding members like Mubashar Hasan, J.A. Rahim Meraj and Muhammad Khan were ousted from party in early years of its government. 11 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) bagged as much as 155 out of 200 constituencies. See, Notification, Islamabad, the 21st March, 1977 No. F.13(1) 77-Elsx (I), In pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (LXXXV of 1976), Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad. 12 Jan Muhammad Abbasi of JI was declared defeated without contest on Larkana constituency. 13 Newsweek, February 28, 1977. 14 Some founding members of PPP were ideologues and when Bhutto took the office as President, Chief Martial law Administrator and Prime Minister, they went in back yard in the party ranks like Sheikh Rashid, Hanif Ramay and Meraj Muhammad Khan. 15 The Tribune, December 27, 1975 16 The Pakistan Times, December 27, 1975 17 During the electioneering in 1970 the situation took such stance due to the Six Points of Shaikh Mujeeb that the debacle of East Pakistan occurred. It also became the cause of provincialism in the coming days. 18 Dawn, Karachi, February 6, 1976. 19 News Review on south Asia and Indian Ocean, February 1976. 20 White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977.Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, July 1978, pp. 1-25. 21 Maulana Kausar Niazi (the Information Minister), Muhammad Hayat Taman (Special Political Advisor to Prime Minister) and Yusuf Buch (Special Information Advisor to Prime Minister), Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi (Advisor to Minister Information), Rao Rasheed Ahmad Khan (special secretary to Prime Minister), Hamid Jalal (Additional Secretary Prime Minister Secretariat), for details see, Dawn, Karachi, October 10, 1976. 22 White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977.Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, July 1978, pp. 1-25. 23 White Paper on Misuse of Media (Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, August 1978), pp. 223-232. 24 Ibid, pp.243-44 25 Five more such documentaries were also produced in 1976-77 at the cost of 1.3 million rupees which were ready before elections 1977. The titles of those documentaries include; A Nation Reborn, Achievements of People’s Government, Dharti Ka Lal (Urdu), Prime Minister Bhutto: The Man of People, Prime Minister Bhutto: The Servant of Islam. For details see, Ibid. 26 Dawn, Karachi September 6.1976.

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27 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, September 6, 1976. 28 It was named as, ‘The People’s Representation Bill’. Dawn, Karachi April 16, 1976. 29 The Pakistan Times, May 1976. 30 Ibid, May 26, 1978 31 The Pakistan Times, October 30,1976 32 Dawn, December 28,1976. 33 The Pakistan Times, December 25,1976 34 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan ki Aham Siasi Jamatain: Mazi, Hal, Mustaqbil (Lahore: Maqbool Academy, 1992) p.255. 35 The Pakistan Times, January 12, 1977 36 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan ki Aham Siasi Jamatain, p.257 37 The political parties which are nationalist or conservative and in opposition to socialism are considered as tightest or right wing parties. 38 Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-88 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, n.d), pp.70-71. 39 Ibid. 40 Election Manifesto of the Pakistan People’s Party, 1970 (Lahore: Classic, n.d), p.26-28. 41 Manifesto of Pakistan National Alliance, Department of Information and Publication, Lahore, pp.13-17. 42 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan ki Aham Siasi Jamatain, p.259 43 Maulana Maududi wrote against the PPP stance of nationalization as well as reducing the size of ownership of agrarian land. For details see, Maulana Maududi, Masila-i-Malkiat (Urdu) (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1963). 44 Sani Hussain Panhwar, ed. Sardari System Abolished by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1976: A Historical Document p.35. Retrieved July 29, 2017, from www.bhutto.org/Acrobat/Sardari_System.pdf. 45 White Paper on Misuse of Media, pp.254-265 46 The Pakistan Times, January 23,1977. 47 Dawn, January 22, 1977. 48 The Pakistan Times, January 22, 1977 49 Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections, VII (1972-1973), p. 10. 50 Jang, Rawalpindi, January 22, 1977. 51 A. H. Shahbaz, ed., “Election 1977,” Islamabad Reference Bureau, 1977 (mimeo), p. 3. 52 M. G. Weinbaum, “The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost” 53 The leader of the NAP, Wali Khan, was in jail, but his wife, Begum Wali Khan, was an active member of the NDP and was in fact the only woman candidate of any party for the National Assembly. 54 Release of Wali Khan in spite of Supreme Court’s verdict regarding his detention as legal, introduction of Islamic punishments, abolition of the family planning law, appearance of General Niazi (The general who surrendered in 1971 in East Pakistan) in the public gatherings of PNA, declaring Bhutto and PPP leadership as anti-Pakistan and anti-Quaid-i-Azam. 55 Jang, Rawalpindi 5, 1977. 56 “Let us express our love for and faith in our beloved Quaid-i-Awam March with the procession that will welcome him from the Karachi airport to Kakri ground, today. Hakim Muhammad Saeed, PPP candidate Karachi NA-184 (2), Dr F. U. Baqai, President PPP, District West Karachi.” The content of an advertisement by PPP leaders published in Dawn, Karachi March 3, 1977. 57 Syed Munawwar Hassan a PNA candidate for the National Assembly from constituency Karachi IX said that if voted to power, the PNA was ready to shoulder the responsibility of running the administration of the country on Islamic principles. Dawn, Karachi, March 3, 1977. 58 Ibid. 59 “India mera mulk hy aur Hindustani meray bhai hain, ham aaj bhi aik mulk aur qaum hain” in Weekly Organizer, October 1968, republished by PPP in an adeverisement in Dawn Karachi, 60 “Ham Wali khan ko reha kerke Hyderabad se Peshawer tak jaloos nikalain gay, Kia Wali Khan Attock ke pul per ja ker Assalam o Alaikum nahi keh de ga. Sat March ko faisla aap ke hath mein hy.” See Jang, March 6, 1977. 61 Ibid. 62 Jang, Rawalpindi, March 4, 1977 63 Dawn, Karachi, March 4, 1977.

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64 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, March 4, 1977. 65 Ibid., March 5, 1977. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Jang, Rawalpindi, March 7, 1977. 69 The main advertisement was published on March 7, 1977 based on the achievements and manifesto; Masawat-i-Muhammadi hamari maeshat hay Istehsal tumhari maeshat hay Mazdooron ko izzat de tu ham nay Kisanoon ko zameen de tu ham nay Hari ko aazad kia tu ham nay Ghareeb ko hosla dia tu ham nay Begharon ko ghar diay tu ham nay Tum maeshat ko kis dagar per lejana chahtay ho Karkhanadar ki himayat ki tu tum nay Sarmayadari ki lanat ko dobara musallat karnay ki baat kit u tum nay Jagirdar ko phir zulm per uksaya tu tum nay Kia ye tumhari maeshat hay? Isehsal tumhari maeshat hy Musawat-i-Muhammadi hamari maeshat hy, Equality according to teachings of Hazrat Muhammad Sallalahu Alaihi Wa Aalihi Wasallum is our economy, in Jang, Rawalpindi, March 7, 1977. 70 The Pakistan Times, March 4, 1977. 71 Ibid., March 5, 1977. 72 Nawa-i-Waqt, March 6, 1977. 73 An advertisement in Jang, Karachi March 8,1977. 74 Nawa-i-Waqt, February 13, 1977 75 White Paper on Misuse of Media, p.266 76 The Pakistan Times, February 8,1977. 77 Ibid, March 5, 1977 78 The seven point agenda of PFUJ was; Repeal of undemocratic laws, An announcement by the government that it would not resort to arbitrary and abnormal action against the press and journalists, An unequivocal commitment by the government against the use of official advertisement and news print quota as instrument of political favour are chastisement. 79 He was correspondent of Dawn Karachi during 1977. 80 The Pakistan Times, January 28, 1977. 81 Dawn, Karachi, January 29,1977. 82 Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore, January 29, 1977. 83 The Pakistan Times, January 31, 1977. 84 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, February 2, 1977. 85 Dawn, Karachi March 2, 1977. 86 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, March 9, 1977. 87 Dawn, Karachi, March 9, 1977. 88 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 10, 1977. 89 An advertisement by All Pakistan Minorities Federation in Dawn, Karachi March 10, 1977. 90 Jang, Karachi, March 11, 1977. 91 Dawn, March 12, 1977. 92 Dawn, Karachi, March 22, 1977. 93 Ibid. 94 The following candidates were elected unopposed to the Balochistan Assembly; PB 15 Chaghi, Mir Nusratullah Khan PB 16 Sibi 1, Sardar Muhammad Khan PB 18 Kohlu 1, Mir Qaisar Khan PB 20 Naseerabad 1, Shahnawaz Khan Mir Shahlyani PB 21 Naseerabad 2, Mir Zafarullah Khan

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PB 22 Naseerabad 3, Mir Nabi Bakhsh Khan Khosa PB 23 Naseerabad 4, Fateh Ali PB 24, Karachi1, Ghaus Bakhash PB 25 Karachi 2, Bahadur Khan Bangulzai PB 27 Karachi 4, Mir Tariq Hussain Magsi PB 29 Kalat, Hussain Bakhsh PB 30 Kalat-Khuzdar, Sardar Doda Khan PB 31 Khuzdar 1, Haji Naik Muhammad PB 33 Makran 1, Sabir Ali Baloch PB 34 Makran 2, Imdad Ali PB 36 Makran 4, Nawabzada Abdul Hameed Khan PB 37 Makran 5, Ahmad Khan PB 38 Kharan, Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan PB 39 Lasbela 1, Jam Mir Ghulam Qadir Khan PB 40 Lasbela 2, Muhammad Saleh Bhootani, see, Jang, Karachi, March 11, 1977. 95 Dawn, Karachi, April 4, 1977. 96 Jang, Karachi, April 8, 1977. 97 Dawn, Karachi, 13 March, 1977. 98 In Sindh, the PNA won nine of eleven Karachi constituencies and two of Hyderabad three seats. In Punjab it secured 8 seats with none in Lahore and Rawalpindi. In the NWFP province it polled 17 seats while in Balochistan it had boycotted the polls. 99 Section 144 prohibits assembly of more than four persons 100 Asghar Khan, who later emerged as the most popular Opposition leader, was welcomed in Karachi on 20 February by a procession nearly 20 miles long 101 A PNA leader, Nasrullah Khan asserted that PNA's claim for winning the majority was not baseless. Since during the talks, Mr Bhutto had offered 55 seats to the PNA in addition to 38 it had won. Dawn, Karachi, 1 and 2 September 1977. 102 PPP got 115 whereas PNA just eight. 103 Referred in the All Pakistan Legal Decision (PLD) Supplement to November 1977, Supreme Court, Lahore,, pp. 696-697 104 See his press conference reported in the Urdu daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, cited in The All Pakistan Legal Decision (PLD) Supplement to November 1977, Supreme Court, Lahore, p. 697. 105 Weekly Chataan , Lahore, May 23, 1977. 106 Dawn, Karachi, June 6, 1977. 107 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, June 7, 1977. 108 NDP, a component of the PNA-is a revival in a different form of the outlawed National Awami Party (NAP). Wali Khan and his NAP is suspect in Punjab. 109 The memorandum prepared on January 23, 1977 by the special Secretary for Prime Minister Bhutto contained the names of these opposition leaders. For details see, The Pakistan Times, Lahore, October 11, 1977. 110 See Sun, Karachi, August 24, 1977 and Dawn, Karachi, August 28, 1977. 111 Dawn, Karachi, November 29, 1977. 112 Jang, Karachi, August 24, 1977. 113 See the Statement of four former judges, Dawn, Karachi, August 31, 1977. 114 For the letter issued by the Prime Minister Secretariat see Ibid., October 11,1977. 115 See the statements of Pakistan’s former envoys to Greece and Spain in Ibid., August 28, 1977 and Jang, Karachi September 16, 1977. 116 The fact remains that public purse and public officials were excessively used to ensure Bhutto's success in the polls. Dawn, Karachi, August 30, 1977. 117 White Paper (Islamabad Government of Pakistan, 1978),p.2-3. 118 Jan Muhammad Abbasi of JI was expected contestant against Bhutto from his native Larkana seat. 119 The Statesman, March 13, 1977. 120 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, April 29, 1977. 121 Ibid, March, 9, 1977. 122 Ibid.

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123 Dawn, March 13, 1977. 124 Bhutto’s speech in Ibid, March 12, 1977. 125 Press Conference of Chief Election Commissioner, Nawa-i-Waqt, March 12, 1977. 126 Ibid. 127 The Pakistan Times, March, 10, 1977. 128 The Statesman, March 13, 1977. 129 Ibid. 130 Daily Mashriq Lahore, March 15, 1977. 131 Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, Pakistan mein Jamhoriat ka Zawal, p.70. 132 The Pakistan Times, March, 15, 1977. 133 Ibid, March 18, 1977. 134 Dawn, March 19, 1977. 135 Ibid, March 20, 1977. 136 The Pakistan Times, Lahore 26, 1977. 137 Dawn, March 27, 1977. 138 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, March 27, 1977. 139 Dawn, March 29, 1977. 140 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, April 11, 1977. 141 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, April, 3, 1977. 142 Weekly Chatan, Vol 3, copy no. 7 August, 1977. 143 The Pakistan Times, April, 9, 1977. 144 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore April 11, 1977. 145 Safdar Mehmood Pakistan ki Aham Siasi Jamatain, p.261. 146 The Pakistan Times, April 23, 1977. 147 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, April 25, 1977. 148 Dawn, April 9, 1977. 149 News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, April-May 1977. 150 Dawn, April 9, 1977. 151 Mashriq, Lahore, May 18, 1977. 152 Weekly Islami Jamhuria, Lahore, Vol. 8 July 3, 1977. 153 Dawn, Karachi, May 21, 1977. 154 Mashriq, Lahore, May 27, 1977. 155 The Pakistan Times, June 2, 1977. 156 The Mashriq, Lahore, May 29, 1977. 157 Professor Muhammad Aziz Bugti, Balochistan Siyasi Culture aur Qaabaili Nizam (Lahore: Fiction House 1995), p. 120. 158 B. M. Kutty, In Search of Solutions: An Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2009), p.91. 159 A. T. Chaudhuri, “Hamlet-Like Mood of Nation,” Dawn, March 30, 1977. 160 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, July 4, 1977 161 Mashriq, Lahore, July 4, 1977 162 Quoted in William Borders, “Bhutto's Choice: Resign or Resist”, The New York Times, April 20, 1977.

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CONCLUSION

Balochistan have been the most backward and deprived province among the federation of

Pakistan. Generally its physical geography and features i.e. water, scarcity of rain

resulted decline in agriculture. Therefore, the historical and political reasons;

backwardness, deprivation, poverty and ignorance are neglected. At the same time the

elite classes are not taken into account that was responsible of the condition.

The demography of Balochistan is the main cause of the misfortune of province.

The area of Balochistan has become a boundary line for Czars of Russia and on the other

hand for British imperialism. Firstly the British imperialism and then its successor

American imperialism safeguarded their interests by maneuvering with the rulers and

tribal chiefs of the area. They checked every kind of political, social and economic

progress so that there might not be any resistance for using the area as their base.

Moreover, the tribal chiefs themselves were also the main hurdle for the development in

Balochistan. They kept their people backward and proved their loyalty with foreign

authority in return of material gains.

The study of Province-Centre relations with reference to Balochistan under the

paradigm of federalism expresses the role of regional forces at national level. These

forces are quite active in Balochistan. This challenge was intensified after the separation

of East Pakistan. Balochistan had identical issues economically and politically as were

faced by East Pakistan. Such conditions created feelings of disappointment and

deprivation among people of Balochistan which was already a sensitive area with

reference to regionalist tendencies.

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The study has intended to prove the narrative that bitter Province-Centre relations

always lead to damage the federation. The violation from federal principles and

especially the policy implications created far reaching disastrous results. Although the

federal system is a practical solution for the heterogeneous societies like Pakistan but due

to the intense issues of regionalism and nationalism the principles of unity in diversity

losses its utility.

During the last century the most important development at national level was the

liberation or independence of various nations from the clutches of colonial masters.

However, the heterogeneous societies and culture was a proven threat for the solidarity of

nation state. In such conditions the statement of unity in diversity is issued to tackle

affairs at emotional level. The spirit of nationalism is a state of mind at conscious level

which practically unites citizens who are capable to form a nation as their common goal

despite of difference at regional level.

It has been observed that mostly the states are heterogeneous in nature and due to

varied nature of culture and societal traditions the solidarity lacks and state has to adopt

means to maintain its fabric intact. Mainly, the use of coercive authority creates negative

impacts and an atmosphere of alienation is created between state and its citizens. The

establishment of a ‘nation state’ always has passed through the emotional steps of ethnic,

racial and linguistic differences which are a check in the onward process of a nation

building. Pakistan is a heterogeneous society that is why confronting the same situation.

Pakistan has remained under threat since its establishment by the danger of regionalist

forces. These forces created sub-nationalist opportunities of division within a nation state

by creating pressure groups and undue demands.

303

The elections 1970 were decisive in the national history of Pakistan. It was the

first time that the nation experienced transparent general elections based upon adult

franchise which created the sense of responsibility and pride among whole nation. The

military regime under General Yahya Khan played a vital role to restore powers to

civilian government. The elections, 1970 set a new direction for the mutual relations

between East and West Pakistan. The election results created polar atmosphere because

Awami League (AL) got land slide victory by getting an absolute majority in the National

Assembly where as PPP appeared as majority party in western wing, having lead in the

Punjab and Sindh and NAP-JUI collectively got majority in NWFP and Balochistan. The

emphasis of Awami League was on its manifesto and ‘Six Points’ under which the

prevalent federal structure had to be reorganized to ensure maximum provincial

autonomy for East Pakistan. The AL launched its election campaign mainly on the basis

of six points’ formula and anti-establishment statements due to the injustices with the

people of East Pakistan since 1947.

East Pakistan’s conditions were not improved even after independence and the

issues remained unattended as in British period. The condition of West Pakistan on the

other hand was comparatively better which created the atmosphere of alienation between

both wings. The civil and military establishment handled the situation discriminately. The

Army action in East Pakistan created more hatred against West Pakistan. Their

weaknesses were keenly observed by the rival countries particularly India, which

considered it a golden opportunity to dismember Pakistan and create Bangladesh.

The separation of East Pakistan was a great tragedy in the national history of

Pakistan. The events happened in that episode are still kept secret. The Hamoodur

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Rahman Commission Report declared Yahya, Mujeeb and Bhutto responsible for the

incident. The issue could be settled by accepting the majority of AL which was a clear

fact but the matter was mishandled and minority party PPP was managed drastically to

become majority party. The ruling regime very successfully managed to maintain and

sustain their power at centre and handled the regional forces strictly.

The taking over of the charge of full-fledged President, Bhutto had ‘justified’

reasons by replacing Gen. Yahya Khan. The nation was disappointed due to the division

of country and Bhutto’s foremost task was to strengthen the morale of the nation. PPP

government took certain measures and introduced various reforms but it was just

eyewash. Despite of being a democratic government PPP ruling elite were not willing to

work with the spirit of participation with other parties in the context of federal

democracy. The government became authoritative in spite of provision of complete

autonomy to the provinces.

The division of country encouraged the sentiments of regionalists which were

already existed in Balochistan. It adversely affected the state of Balochistan-Centre

relations. Actually in 1970 elections PPP could neither secure any seat out of 40 seats of

Provincial Assembly and nor out of 4 seats of National Assembly for Balochistan. NAP

(Wali Khan) was the largest party in Balochistan and NWFP which secured seven and

twelve seats in respective Provincial Assemblies.

Under the conditions NAP and JUI proposed for cooperation with PPP to

constitute governments at provincial level. According to a valid point of NAP and JUI,

PPP had no prerogative to share or form government in Balochistan and NWFP because

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it did not have a single seat in Balochistan Assembly. Bhutto while feeling helpless

permitted NAP and JUI to constitute coalition setup in Balochistan and NWFP. The

‘honeymoon’ period prevailed for a short time. The coalition governments were not

permitted to function independently as was permissible constitutionally. Bhutto

government violated the constitutional barriers prescribed by federal principles. When

Bhutto considered that his own image was being deteriorated, he appointed Abdul

Qayyum Khan as interior minister. He was staunch rival of NAP and the appointment

further intensified the already prevailing sourness in Province-Centre relations. The

national politics seemed to be divided into two factions one of PPP having control over

Centre along with the Punjab and Sindh. The other was NAP-JUI coalition which had

control over Balochistan and NWFP. Each of them criticized the other and declared

responsible for adverse conditions.

Bhutto was an elected and popular leader of Pakistan in democratic and political

setup. He could be considered important equally at national and international level. It was

generally considered that after Jinnah, Bhutto was the only charismatic leader and was

capable of sustaining national leadership. Throughout his rule, he dealt opposition

harshly and blamed non cooperative attitude of the same. Instead of working together,

negative ways were adopted to deal with opposition undemocratically. He also created

Federal Security Force (FSF) to help civil administration to counter law and order

situation. Due to such steps he had become authoritarian. Wali Khan and other opponents

called him a fascist and modern Machiavelli. The accord with NAP and JUI was for the

time being to show national solidarity in the context of smooth passage for the

Constitution 1973.

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The mutual cooperation between Centre with NWFP and Balochistan proved

temporary and Bhutto accused coalition ministry as threat and damage for national

integrity. The NAP was banned and leadership was jailed on the charge of anti-state

activities. Actually, Bhutto had planned to check the way for upcoming general elections

of 1977. The dissolution of coalition ministry resulted in skirmishes between military and

Baloch activists causing heavy human loss. It provided a chance to scattered opposition

forces to constitute a force namely United Democratic Front (UDF). It was a positive

development. It brought tendency to peace in Balochistan and demanded the

implementation of federal parliamentary constitution.

It was a great task for National Assembly of Pakistan to prepare and pass a

constitution unanimously accepted by the opponent forces. The constitution provided

Islamic and democratic provisions along with safeguard of fundamental rights and

regional autonomy. Bhutto wanted to maintain his sway throughout the country including

Balochistan. He created suspicions about the utility of provisions of constitution

regarding provincial autonomy. The stern politics of central government caused political

unrest in Balochistan. The PPP government became successful to maintain its rule by

governments of its choice during 1975. It was a fake control. Despite of it PPP could not

perform better in upcoming elections in 1977.

The misappropriate behavior of Bhutto further widened the gulf. Different

regional groups were demanding regional autonomy. They were hopeful under the

constitutional provisions and its implementation. The PPP government was under

pressure internationally. The geo-strategic position of Balochistan created over conscious

stimulations among neighboring countries especially Iran. The Shah of Iran and the army

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pressurized PPP government to take severe action against the Baloch. The use of force

and military actions was not justified, the innocent Baloch were blamed for nothing. They

had no concern with terrorism. The centre adopted such policies to handle the situation

which enhanced the differences between centre and Balochistan. More troops along with

latest weapons were sent into the area. The federal control under Governor Raj and

implications of anti-terrorist laws against innocent Baloch masses adversely effected the

Province-Centre relations with respect to Balochistan.

The Baloch had to consolidate them under the iron hand policy of centre. The PPP

government by adopting severe measures claimed that it had controlled the ethnic

separatism effectively. The government sources claimed that militants had been

eliminated along with their networks. The central government announced certain

economic concessions for the area to normalize the situation. With the passage of time

representative democracy flourished in Balochistan.

The disturbance in Balochistan leads to conclude that racialism and ethnicity is

an un-ended tale in Pakistan. The federation has always been at logger head with units

which resultantly created difference at political, economic and cultural levels. In

Pakistan, it is an episode of majority verses minority under vested interests. The abrupt

demographic changes were culminating into new economic and social factors. The census

record is still to be updated for the provision of due rights to the people. Under the

circumstances the statistics of jobs and opportunities still remain under threat. A sense of

insecurity emerged among Baloch due to political and administrative upper hand of

Muhajirs and Punjabis.

308

When Bhutto tried to assert his power, it was directly confronted by the interests

of civil-military bureaucracy. Bhutto had to be accommodative during his last days in

power but escape was out of question. The political tragedy of Balochistan is outcome of

manipulative trend of centre. Ethnicity is a common bond which connects people among

themselves. It is present as a problem in Pakistan because a single largest ethnic group

constituted about half of the population. The issue could be solved though participatory

democracy.

In Pakistan a highly centralist government could not create the sense of national

integrity, rather it provided a chance to anti-centre forces to flourish. An important cause

of development of regionalism was the working of extremely centralist federation. The

smaller provinces reacted in the shape of regionalist tendencies among their masses. The

domination of the Punjab in administrative and military circles also enhanced

regionalism. The One Unit Act created sense of deprivation among smaller provinces and

they felt that they were not having equal right of participation in state affairs.

It is a common perception that a strong centre is necessary for a society having

differences at ethnic and geographic level. Such centre helps to maintain national

solidarity. The later incidents revealed the negative reaction against centralism. The

problems during 1956-58 mounted regional pressure on centre. Due to increasing

momentum of the process of centralism without adopting democracy, the destructive

trends emerged in society. A heterogeneous pluralist society tilts towards regionalism

when anti-centre forces exist already.

309

The gulf between East and West Pakistan was widened due to the lack of contact

between people and geographical distance between both wings. The extremely centralist

government further intensified the situation. A strong centre in a federation can only be

successful only with participatory democracy. In the case of Pakistan, strong centre under

all powerful rulers had not adopted democratic procedure which resulted in the

emergence of regionalism. If the elections would have held in time, then democracy

would have flourished with the participation of people due to which the anti-centre forces

might have been checked. The Constitution of 1956 could not last long and paved the

way for the imposition of Martial Law in 1958.

The working of PPP government under Bhutto which was elected democratically,

having a federal constitution is also questionable because it became authoritarian in

nature. The Constitution of 1973 which was considered as an ideal document for a

federation was de-shaped after many amendments for the quest of power. The behavior

and approach of Bhutto became authoritative when he felt himself bound under the

constitutional provisions. The excessive powers in single hand created imbalance

between institutions of the state. The amendments reflected ambitions of more powers in

the person of Prime Minister. Having all powers, Bhutto really became authoritative

which damaged the federal basis. It again leveled the way for the imposition of Martial

Law in 1977. Human society is federal in nature; therefore it cannot adopt an artificial

system.

Following the establishment of Pakistan the rulers persisted to adopt the tactics of

maneuvering with tribal chiefs for the maintenance of their authority and to safeguard the

demands of their imperial masters, therefore the pace of development was very slow in

310

the area. The status of province for Balochistan and provincial rights had been the

constant demand of Muslims of India and All India Muslim League but after the

establishment of Pakistan the Muslim League as ruling party deviated from its

programme. Balochistan had neither been given the status of governor province nor

provincial rights since 1947 to 1955. After that, it was engulfed by the One Unit scheme.

The elected government established after 1970 elections was dissolved and the province

again went under the control of federal government. After 1977 the country became

victim of Martial Law but the province of Balochistan despite of having provincial status

suffered as before. The period of limited democracy from 1988-1999 also could not bring

fruits. Even the famous 18th amendment which revived the original shape of 1973

Constitution according to its authors could not bring the desired results for Balochistan.

All of these are mere compilation of high sounding words. The tug of war between tribal

chiefs for power and their misuse by Centre to utilize them against each other had

adversely affected the cause of Balochistan and its people.

The tale of province-centre relations not only in Pakistan but as a whole in the

region is, in fact, the policy of avoiding federalism through the means of not giving real

provincial autonomy. Pakistan has witnessed strong centralist tendency on the ground of

national security as well as interest throughout the period, i.e. 1947-1977. 1 Indian

structure of federalism reflects a unique phenomenon as “decentralization with strong

centre”. The very strong demand there is that states must have vital role in policy making

of the federation.2 Although, neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran cannot be considered as

federations yet having strong grievances from the ethnic minorities in the shape of

provinces.3 The Baloch minorities in both the countries are in constant turmoil.

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1 Zubair Faisal Abbasi, Federalism, Provincial Autonomy, and Conflicts (Islamabad: Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives, 2010), p.27. 2 M.P. Singh, “Indian Federalism: Structure and Issues” in Cochin University Law Review, 1987, School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology, Kerala, pp-277-279. 3 For details see, Omer Zakhilwal, “Federalism in Afghanistan: A Recipe for Disintegration” Federalism: Special Issue on Afghanistan, Forum of Federations, Ottawa. And Idris Ahmedi, “Iran, Diversity, Democracy and Federalism” in , www.unpo.org/images/2010 retrieved on April, 8, 2018.

312

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Sohail, Massarrat Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991. Swidler, Nina. “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”, in Paul Titus ed. Marginality and Modernity Ethnicity and Change in Post Colonial Balochistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996. Syed, Anwar H. The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. London: Macmillan, 1992. Talbot, Ian. Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990. ______. Pakistan a Modern History. London: Harst Company, 1998. Titus, Paul. Marginality and Modernity, Ethnicity and Change in Post Colonial- Balochistan Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996. Tucker, Alexander Lauzun Pendock. Sir Robert G., Sandeman: K.C.S.I., Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1921. Tyagi, Vidya Prakash. Martial Races of Undivided India. Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2009. Usman, Muhammad. Balochistan Post Present Future. Karachi: Indus Publication, 1976. Vile, J.C. The Structure of American Federalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Waseem, Muhammad. Politics and the State in Pakistan. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994. Watts, R.L. New Federation: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1966. Wheare, K.C. Federal Government. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Williams, Rushbrook. Pakistan under Challenge. London: Stansy International, 1975. Wolpert, Stanley. Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Yousaf, Hamid. Pakistan: A Study of Political Development 1947-97. Lahore Sang-e- Meel Publication, 1999. Zaidi, S. Akbar, ed. Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, 1992. Zaman, Waheed-uz. Towards Pakistan. Lahore: Publisher United, 1989. Zingal, W. Peter. and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in 80’s Ideology. Regionalism Economy Foreign Policy. Lahore: Vanguard, 1985. Ziring, Lawrance. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. London: West View, 1980. ______. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005

Books (Urdu) Ahmad, Muneer. Pakistan ke Siyasi Itehad . Lahore: Frontier Post Publishers, 1993. Ahmad, Shakil. Balochistan Ki Pukar. Turbat: Bazim-i-Balochistan Publication, 2004. Anjum, Tajamal Hussain. Pakistan: Tarikh-o-Siyasi Jaizay. Lahore: Nazir Ahmad Publishers, 1993. Bhalli, Asif. Siyasat Dan. Lahore: Mawara Publishers, 1988.

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Bugti, Muhammad Aziz. Balochistan, Siyasi Culture aur Qabaili Nizam. Lahore: Fiction House, 2009. Bukhari, Syed Muhammad Shah. Tarikh-e-Balochistan. Quetta: Bookland, 1981. Hasan, Muhammad Usman, Balochistan: Mazi, Haal, Mustaqbil. Karachi: Indus Publications, 1976. Kausar, Inam-ul-Haq Balochistan Mein Tarikhi Referendum 1947: Pasmanzar- Peshmanzar. Lahore: Al-Hamd Publications, 2013. Khan, Mahmood-ul-Hasan. Hakoomato-Siyasat, 1947-1990. Lahore: New Palace, nd. Khan, Roedad. Pakistan Inqilab ke Dahanay Per. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998. Khan, Tahir Muhammad. Saiyasiat-i-Balochistan. Quetta Goshaa-e-Adab, 1988. Mehmood, Safdar. Pakistan ki Aham Siasi Jamatain. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990. Naseer, Mir Gul Khan. Balochistan in the Light of Ancient and Modern History. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982. ______. Tarikh-i-Balochistan. Kalat Publishers, 2005. Saleem, Ahmad. Balochistan Soba Markez Taaluqat . Lahore: Frontier Publication, 1993. Younas, Salim. Siyasi Itehad aur Pakistani Siyasat par un ke Asrat. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993.

Journals Balochi Duniya, Multan. Outlook, Vlo.2, No.41 January 12, 1975. Weekly Islami Jamhuria, Lahore, Vol. 8 July 3, 1977.

Interviews The Interview of Sher Muhammad Marri’s in the News International, July 9, 1992. The Interview of Wali Khan in the Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, January 11, 1978. A Personal Interview with Syed Fasih Iqbal, Islamabad dated March 7, 2010. A Personal Interview with Syed Tahir Hussain Bukhari, Rawalpindi dated April 23, 2010. A Personal Interview with Fazila Aaliyani, Rawalpindi dated August 10, 2011. A Personal Interview with Dr. Abdul Malik Kansi, Quetta dated June 21, 2012. A Personal Interview with Syed Amanullah Shadezai, Quetta dated June 22, 2012. A Personal Interview with Sardarzada Talal Bugti,Quetta dated June 24, 2012. A Personal Interview with Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, Islamabad dated October 2, 2012. A Personal Interview with Prof. Dr. Inam-ul-Haq Kausar, Lahore dated May 9, 2012. A Personal Interview with Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Islamabad dated February 12, 2016. A Personal Interview with Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, Islamabad dated December 27, 2013. A Personal Interview with Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Islamabad dated February 12, 2016.

Thesis Mahsood, Muhammad Ali Khan. “Provincial Governments in Baluchistan and NWFP, 1972-73” Unpublished M. Phil Thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2002.

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Naureen, Shazia. “Social Structure and Political Representation in Pakistan: A Case Study of Baluchistan Tribes, 1971-1977” Unpublished M. Phil Thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 1999. Rizwan, Muhammad. “Political Development in the NWFP and Balochistan: 1971-1976” Unpublished PhD thesis, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2011. Shah, Syed Akmal Hussain. “Pakistan People’s Party’s Ascendancy to Power in Sindh, 1967-1972”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2016. Syed, Javed Haider “The Political Development in Baluchistan in the Last Decade of the British Raj”. Islamabad: Unpublished PhD thesis, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad , 2005.

Articles Ahmad, Aijaz. “The National Question in Balochistan” in Dr. Feroz Ahmad ed. Focus On Balochistan And Pushtoon Question. Lahore: Peoples Publishing House, 1975. Ahmad, Qazi Shakil “Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions” Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. 58, No. 2, April 2005. Ahmad, Syed Jaffar. “Federal Crises in Pakistan 1972-7” in S. Akbar Zaidi Ed. Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, 1992. Ali, Imtiaz. “The Balochistan Problem”, in Pakistan Horizon, pp.41-62, No. 58 (2) April 2005. Ali, Mehrunnisa. “Federalism and Regionalism in Pakistan” in V. Grover and R. Arora ed. Pakistan Fifty Years of Independence (Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, n.d. Axman, Martin Back to the Future: Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008. Baloch, Inyatullah. “The Balochistan Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self Determination” in W. Peter. “Baloch Nationalism: A Revisionist History” in Mani Shanker Aiyar ed. Pakistan Papers. New Delhi: UBS Publisher, 1994. Baxter,Craig “Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan” in Asian Survey, December, 1974, 14:12. Borders, William. “Bhutto's Choice: Resign or Resist”, The New York Times, April 20, 1977. Chawla, Iqbal “Prelude to the Accession of the Kalat State to Pakistan in 1948: An Appraisal”, pp.81-106, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Vol. 49, No. 2, July – December, 2012, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Chaudhuri, A. T. “Hamlet-Like Mood of Nation”, Dawn, March 30, 1977. Harrison, Selig S. “Nightmare in Balochistan”, Foreign Policy, No. 32, Autumn 1978. Malik, Hafeez. “Problem of Regionalism in Pakistan” in W.H. wriggins ed. Paksitan in Transition. Islamabas: University of Islamabad, 1975. Riker, W.H. “Federation” in F.I. Granstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, Vol.5. Boston: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers. 1975. Shah, Syed Fakharuddin “Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakeng and Merger” Global Journal of Human Social Sciences, pp.2230. Volume 13 Issue 6 Version 1.0 Year 2013. Stein, Michael “Federal Political System and Federal societies” in J. Peter Meekison, (eds.), Canadian Federalism: Myth and Reality, Toronto, 1968.

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Swidler, Nina “Beyond Parody Ethnography Engages Nationalist’s Discourse”, in Paul Titus ed. Marginality and Modernity Ethnicity and Change in Post Colonial Balochistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996. Singh, M.P. “Indian Federalism: Structure and Issues” in Cochin University Law Review, 1987, School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology, Kerala. Syed, Javed Haider. “Balochistan: The Origin and Development of Political Parties” in Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, pp.105-130, Vol.44, No. 1, July 2007, University of the Punjab, Lahore. ______. “Balochistan: The Introduction of Reforms and Acession to Pakistan” in Pakistan Journal of History and Culture,pp.29-52,Vol.XXIX, No. 2, July-December 2008, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. ______. “The British Advent in Balochistan”, pp. 53-86, in Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXVIII, No.2 (2007). Talpur, Mir Mohammad Ali “A Page from the Past”, Newsline, March 1988. “White Paper on Balochistan”, Dawn, October 20, 1974. Yaqubi, Himayatullah “Leftist Politics in British India: A Case Study of the Muslim Majority Provinces”, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXIV, No.I,pp. 63- 98, Islamabad, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2013. Zakhilwal, Omer “Federalism in Afghanistan: A Recipe for Disintegration” Federalism: Special Issue on Afghanistan, Forum of Federations, Ottawa. Ziring, Lawrence. “Militarism in Pakistan the ahya Khan interregnum” in W.H. Wriggins ed. Pakistan in Transition. Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1975. Zingal and S. Zingal ed. Pakistan in 80’s Ideology. Regionalism Economy Foreign Policy. Lahore: Vanguard, 1985.

Newspapers (English) Dawn, Karachi, January 28, 1970. Dawn, Karachi March 2, 1970. Dawn, Karachi, March 7, 1972. Dawn, June 12, 1972. Dawn, June 21, 1972. Dawn, Karachi January 1, 1973. Dawn, Karachi January 11, 1973. Dawn, 11 January 1973. Dawn, 14 January 1973. Dawn, January 22, 1973. Dawn, Karachi, July 18, 1973. Dawn, Karachi, September 29, 1973. Dawn, Karachi, December 3,1973. Dawn, Karachi, November 3, 1975. Dawn, Karachi, April 9, 1976. Dawn January 22, 1977. Dawn, March 12, 1977. Dawn, March 19, 1977.

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Dawn, March 29, 1977. Dawn, March 30, 1977. London Times, August 30, 1972. Newsweek, February 28, 1977. The Guardian, London, September 10, 1972. The Herald, Karachi, July 1986. The Morning News, July 23, 1973, Karachi. The News Times, Rawalpindi, August 25, 1974. The New York Times, April 20, 1977. The Statesman, March 13, 1977. The Weekly Takbeer, Karachi. September 6, 1986. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 21 December 1971. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, September 10, 1972. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, September 16, 1972. The Pakistan Times, December, 1, 1974. The Pakistan Times, December, 4, 1974. The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, July 25, 1975. The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, August 18, 1975. The Pakistan Times, January 12, 1977. The Pakistan Times January 28, 1977. The Pakistan Times, February 8, 1977. The Pakistan Times, March 5, 1977. The Pakistan Times March, 10, 1977. The Pakistan Times March, 15, 1977. The Pakistan Times, Lahore April, 3, 1977. The Pakistan Times, April, 22, 1977.

Newspapers (Urdu) Daily Jasarat, Karachi March 24, 1973. Hurriyat, Karachi March 24, 1973. Jang, Karachi, November 29, 1972. Jang, Rawalpindi, February 14, 1973. Jang, Rawalpindi, April 10, 1973. Jang, Karachi, June 6, 1975. Jang, Rawalpindi, June 18, 1975. Jang, Rawalpindi, June 22, 1975. Mashriq, Lahore, March 15, 1977. Mashriq, Lahore, May 27, 1977. Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, November 24, 1972. Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, December 9, 1972. Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, April 1, 1973. Nawa-i-Waqt, February, 13, 1977. Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, March 9, 1977. Nawa-i-Waqt March 12, 1977. Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore, March 27, 1977.

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Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore, April,11, 1977. Weekly Chatan, Vol, 3, Copy No. August 7, 1977

Websites www.pbs.gov.pk/content/papulation-mother-tongue. http://www.ijmr.net.in. www.bhutto.org/Acrobat/Sardari_System.

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APENDIX I Memorandum of Settlement between Pakistan People’s Party, National Awami Party, and Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam on March 6, 1972 The following participated in the discussions which began on 4th March and concluded on 6th March 1972: PPP President of Pakistan [Zulfikar Ali Bhutto] Chairman PPP Mr. Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao Mr. Ghulam Mutafa Jatoi Mr Abdul Hafeez Pirzada Maulana Kausar Niazi Mr Rafi Raza NAP Khan Abdul Wali Khan President NAP Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo Mr Arbab Sikandar Mr Khair Bakhsh Marri JUI Maulana Mufti Mehmood General Secretary JUI Maulana Ghulam Ghous Hazarvi 1. (a) The Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) proposed that a short session of the National Assembly should be convened on 21 April 1972, for a period not exceeding three days. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the National Assembly session be convened on 23 March 1972. (c) It was settled that the summons to the members should be issued on 23 March 1972, and the National Assembly session should be convened on 14 April 1972, for a period not exceeding three days during which time the matters specified at paras 2, 3, and 4 below will be voted upon. 2. (a) The PPP proposed that the National Assembly should meet for the purpose of endorsing an interim constitution on the basis of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Independence Act, 1947, with consequential amendments, or on the basis of the 1962 constitution with consequential amendments.

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3. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the interim constitution should be passed on the basis of the government of India Act, 1935, read with the Independence Act, with consequential amendments, or on the basis of the 1962 constitution with consequential amendments. (c) It was settled that an Interim constitution would be prepared on the basis of 1935 Act read with the Independence Act, 1947, with consequential amendments and that there should be a debate not exceeding 3 days at which only party leaders on their nominees would speak. The parties for this purpose would be: Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League (Qayum Group), Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, National Awami Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Council), Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), one representative from the independent MNAs of tribal areas, and one representative of the remaining independent MNAs. 3. (a) The PPP secondly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened on 21 April 1972 pass a vote of confident in the Government and approved and confirm the continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972 (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that Martial Law should be continued till 7 June 1972.

(c) It was settled that there would be a vote of confidence in the Government and approval of continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972.

4. (a) The PPP thirdly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened for the short session should appoint a Committee of the House to draft a Constitution to be presented on 1 August 1972.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the draft Constitution should be presented by 1 July 1972, and that the National Assembly should be reconvened on 7 July 1972.

(c) It was settled that the report of the committee on the Constitution should be submitted by 1 August 1972, and that the National Assembly be reconvened on 14 August 1972.

5. (a) The PPP proposed that when the National Assembly was reconvened on August 1972, it should act only as constitution making party to ensure the early framing of the constitution.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that when the National Assembly meets on 14 August 1972, it should also act as a legislative body after 14 August 1972.

(c) It was settled that after 14 August 1972 the National Assembly should act both as a constitution-making body and as a legislative body till the permanent constitution comes into force. It was reiterated that the powers of the President in pursuance of the Declaration of Emergency will continue till the Emergency is lifted.

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6. (a) The PPP proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened after the passing of the interim Constitution i.e., on 1 May 1972.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened on 10 April 1972.

7. It was accepted that the government both at the Centre and in the Provinces would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority.

8. It was accepted that till the new constitution comes into force, a person elected as a Member more than one Assembly would be permitted to retain his seats in both the Houses till the Constitution is finally passed. Similarly, the President, Vice President, Governors, Ministers and Advisors both at centre and in the provinces will retain their seats in their respective assemblies.

9. (a) The PPP proposed that the present Governors should continue till the new Constitution is passed, but after the interim Constitution is passed they would cease to be Martial Law Administrator.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that after the Provincial Assemblies are convened, the governors may be appointed in consultation with the Chief Minister. Meantime from today till the convening of the Provincial Assemblies the Government in NWFP and Balochistan should be given to the NAP/JUI.

(c) It was settled that until the permanent Constitution is framed by the National Assembly, the Central Government should continue to have the right, as in the past, to appoint Governors in the Provinces but by way of compromise the Central Government would, during the interim period, also appoint the Governors in consultation with the majority in the two aforesaid Provinces.

10. It was accepted that in the North-West Frontier Province and the Province of Balochistan, the Majority parties are NAP and JUI and they will be entitled to form the Governments in these two Provinces.

11. The PPP proposed that the date for Local Bodies Election should be fixed as early as possible after the Provincial Assemblies are convened and that the Elections in all the Provinces should be on the same date. This was agreed date soon after the convening of the Provincial Assemblies.

12. The President said that he would announce today that Martial Law would be lifted on 14 August 1972.

Signed by Mr. ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO President of Pakistan and Chiarman of the Pakistan People’s Party

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Signed by KHAN ABDUL WALI KHAN President of the National Awami Party. Signed by MAULANA MUFTI MAHMUD General Secretary of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Rawalpindi, 6 March 1972.

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APENDIX II

Text of Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Speech of 6 March 1972

Although I am against frequent appearance by Heads of State on radio and television networks, nevertheless, it falls within my responsibility to inform the nation about important developments. It so happens that number of such developments have taken place in the past few days, necessitating my troubling you again tonight. I hope you will bear with me.

In order to overcome the political tensions generated by the misdeeds of the past decade or more, you know that, among other initiatives, on the 4th of this month we opened negotiation with the National Awami Party and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, the majority parties in the North-West Frontier Province and in the Province of Balochistan, with a view to reaching a settlement. These negotiations have been watched with concern by the nation. It is for this reason that I must inform you of the settlement that has been reached today.

The terms of the settlement are clear, without ambiguity, and do not require any interpretation or elaboration. The term, spelling out the position of both sides and the final accord, are:

1. (a) The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) proposed that a short session of the National Assembly should be convened on 21 April 1972, for a period not exceeding three days. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the National Assembly session be convened on 23 March 1972. (c) It was settled that the summons to the members should be issued on 23 March 1972, and the National Assembly session should be convened on 14 April 1972, for a period not exceeding three days, during which the matters specified at paras 2,3 and 4 below will be voted upon.

2. (a) The PPP proposed that the National Assembly should meet for the purpose of endorsing as interim Constitution of the basis of the Government of India Act 1935, read with the Independence Act 1947, with consequential amendments, or on the basis of 1972 Constitution with consequential amendments.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the interim Constitution should be passed on the basis of the Government of India Act 1935, read with the Independence Act 1947, with consequential amendments.

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(c) It was settled that an interim Constitution would be prepared on the basis of the 1935 Act, read with the Independence Act 1947 with consequential amendments, and there would be a debate not exceeding three days at which only party leader or their nominees would speak. The parties for this purpose would be Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League (Qayum Group) Jamiat Ulema- i-Islam, National Awami Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Council), Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), one representative from the independent MNAs of tribal areas, and one representative of the remaining independent MNAs.

3. (a) The PPP secondly proposed that the National Assembly, on being convened on 21 April 1972, pass a vote to confidence in the Government and approved and confirm the constitution of Martial Law till 14 August 1972.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that Martial Law should be continued till 7 June 1972.

(c) It was settled that there would be a vote of confidence in the Government and approval of continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972.

4. (a) PPP thirdly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened for the short session should appoint a Committee of the House to draft a Constitution to be presented on 1 August 1972.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the draft Constitution should be presented by 1 July 1972, and that the National Assembly should be reconvened on 7 July 1972.

(c) It was settled that the report of the Committee on the Constitution should be submitted by 1 August 1972, and that the National Assembly be reconvened on 14 August 1972.

5. (a) The PPP proposed that when the National Assembly was reconvened on 14 August 1972, it should act only as a constitution-making body to ensure the early framing of the Constitution.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that when the National Assembly meets on 14 August 1972, it should also act as a legislative body after 14 August 1972.

(c) It was settled that after 14 August, the National Assembly should act both as a constitution-making body and as a legislative body till the permanent Constitution comes into forces. It was reiterated that the powers of the President in pursuance of the Declaration of Emergency will continue till the Emergency is lifted.

6. (a) The PPP proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened after the passing of the interim Constitution i.e., on 1 May 1972.

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(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened on 10 April, 1972.

7. It was accepted that the Government both at the Centre and in the Provinces would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority.

8. It was accepted that the new Constitution comes into force, a person elected as a member of more than one Assembly would be permitted to retain his seat in both the Houses till the Constitution is finally passed. Similarly, the President, Vice President, Governors, Ministers and Advisors both at Centre and in the provinces will retain their seats in their respective assemblies.

9. (a) The PPP proposed that the present Governors should continue till the new Constitution is passed, but after the interim Constitution is passed they would cease to be Martial Law Administrator.

(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that after the Provincial Assemblies are convened, the Governors may be appointed in consultation with the Chief Minister. Meantime from today till the convening of the Provincial Assemblies the Government in NWFP and Balochistan should be given to the NAP/JUI.

10. It was accepted that in the North-West Frontier Province and the Province of Balochistan, the majority parties are NAP and JUI and they will be entitled to form the Governments in these two Provinces.

11. The PPP proposed that the date for Local Bodies Elections should be fixed as early as possible after the Provincial Assemblies are convened and that the Elections in all the Provinces should be on the same date. This was agreed date soon after the convening of the Provincial Assemblies.

12. The President said that he would announce today that Martial Law would be lifted on 14 August 1972.

I am happy to state that in our discussion, when I explained to these leaders some of the imperatives for the retention of Martial Law, they appreciated our genuine

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difficulties and agreed that the Martial Law should continue till 14 August 1972. I want categorically to inform the nation that the curse of Martial Law which has haunted us for so long will be buried forever, Insha Allah, on 14 August 1972.

As a political being, I have always subscribed to the fundamental principle that political problems need political solutions. I have strained to the ultimate to ensure the success of these negotiations. We have acted in a spirit of adjustment which is the essence of democracy.

As the leader of majority party both in the National Assembly and in the two province of Punjab and Sindh, I have considered it my duty to keep in touch with other political leaders as well.

We will continue to maintain a positive dialogue with all relevant political forces, giving to each the importance and respect due to them. The settlement reach today demonstrates that we are not dogmatic, either in attitude or approach.

Since the word ‘alliance’ has been used before, not without causing unnecessary misunderstandings, I would like to make it clear that today the majority parties of four provinces have arrived at the political settlements of the crucial issues concerning the nation. The accord achieved at this critical hour does not by itself forge an alliance. One good step taken in the mood to reach agreement might however lead to other steps and with added momentum possibly to greater strides in the future. This will depend on the spirit of co-operation shown by all sides in the framing of the Constitution of Pakistan and other related matters on National support.

In this moment of satisfaction looking back nostalgically let me recall to you, citizens and friends, that in October 1967 in Larkana, I wrote on the subjects ‘WHY A NEW PARTY’?, which document latter became one of our Foundation Papers on 1 December 1967. This is what I wrote nearly four years ago:

It may be asked why in the circumstances is it necessary to form a new party when the main objective is to unite the existing opposition parties. A slightly deeper analysis would reveal that precisely for this reason a new party is necessary to cement the unity of all the existing opposition parties. It will form a bridge between the existing conflicting interests and give a lead in reconciling the historical dichotomies.

I envisaged that we would be the Golden Bridge. With this purpose, a vigorous force was released in the form of a new revolutionary party born with the destiny to serve the people of Pakistan. Today we have passed through the dark tunnel, and I see the golden bridge.

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APENDIX III

Statements of Khan Abdul Wali Khan welcoming the Tripartite Accord

‘Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Chief of NAP, said today that the NAP-JUI-PPP agreement has given a new and constructive direction to the political affairs of the country. He said the lifting of Martial Law was now a settled fact and a date has been set for it. The arbitrary nature of Martial Law (however) will go after the Assembly had met and sanctioned its continuance till 14 August.’

(Extract from an interview with Khan. Abdul Wali Khan, published in The Sun Karachi, 8 March 1972).

‘Khan Abdul Wali Khan yesterday stoutly defended the tripartite political accord between his party, the PPP, the JUI. Addressing Charsada lawyers, he said the accord was in the best national interests and essential for the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan. He said that the NAP’s stand on lifting of Martial Law, the rule of majority parties, both in Provinces and the Centre and restoration of democracy had been vindicated by the accord.’

(Extract from Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s address to Charsada Lawyers. APP report. Published in Dawn, Karachi, 17 March 1972).

‘Replying to questions from lawyers, Mr Wali Khan said his party has accepted continuance of Martial Law till 14 August in good faith because the conditions were such that the country needed unity and understanding among various political forces.’

(Extract of Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s address to the Members of District Bar Association of Peshawar

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on 11 March 1972, published in Dawn, Karachi, 12 March 1972).

‘At the centre, too, Martial Law will finally come to an end on 15 August 1972.’

(Extract from the Resolution of the Central Working Committee on the NAP meeting in Rawalpindi on 6 March 1972. PPI report published in Dawn, Karachi, 7 March 1972).

APPENDIX IV White Papers on Baluchistan The situation in Baluchistan has been a central concern of the government of Pakistan for the last two and a half years. The issue involved in this situation is not primarily political but social, economic and administrative. 2. It is not political in the sense that there is any difference between the status of Baluchistan and that of the other three provinces of federation. Baluchistan enjoys the same degree of provincial autonomy as a Punjab, Sindh or the North Frontier Province. Nor is it political in the sense that the constitutional process has been suspended in Baluchistan or an alien regime foisted on it. 3. It is social because, more than in any other region of Pakistan, the feudal and tribal structure of society in Baluchistan has inhibited progress and development. No government can pretend to any concern with the welfare of the people of Baluchistan unless it resolutely aims at releasing them from their feudal shackles. Not to demedievalize Baluchistan is to betray the province. 4. The issue is economic because Baluchistan has been relegated to backwardness for centuries. Its problem is that of an under-developed part of the developing country. No government can claim to have fulfilled the popular mandate unless it seeks to remove the disparity between Baluchistan and other regions of the country. It is roads and electricity, schools and hospitals rather than any constitutional change for which the people of Baluchistan hunger. 5. The issue is administrative because, unlike the other provinces of Pakistan, Baluchistan has not enjoyed the amenities of justice and civil administration. The pre-requisite

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of any progress in Baluchistan however oriented is the building of an administrative infrastructure. 6. This socio-economic-administrative issue has been distorted and the conditions responsible for it exploited by the elements which wish neither Pakistan nor Baluchistan itself to prosper. They took advantage of Baluchistan’s lack of communications its terrain and location and its relative insularity to launch and insurgency in the Marri-Mengal areas of Baluchistan. 7. This insurgency has had two facets. One is its instigation by forces which seek t cause the disintegration of Pakistan. The other reflects the strains of development in the province. Even if the consequent turbulence had not been mendaciously represented by hostile forces abroad, it could not but cause distress to the government and the people of Pakistan. The issue confronting the government however has been whether to choose the easy path, appease the reactionary or isolationist elements and sign away Baluchistan’s right to progress or to combat the forces of retrogression and enable Baluchistan to gain its rightful place not only in the constitution (which is already has) but also in the political, social, economic and intellectual life of Pakistan. 8. Conscious of its duty, the government has chosen the latter course. 9. To understand the situation in the correct perspective, it is necessary to recapitulate its background and causative events.

Background 10. Baluchistan is the youngest, largest and least populated province of Pakistan. It is the youngest because the territory constituting Baluchistan became a full-fledged province only with the promulgation of Pakistan’s interim constitution in April 1972. In colonial times other provinces of Pakistan were administered by a governor and a representative cabinet but Baluchistan’s affairs were entrusted to the lower ranking Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner. Twenty-three years after independence, it was given the title but not invested the appurtenances of a province when the One Unit administrative set-up of West Pakistan was annulled in July 1970. There has thus been far less time in Baluchistan than in Punjab, Sindh and the North West Frontier Province to develop the machinery of civil administration. In fact, until very recently, Baluchistan was divided into three zones : one under normal civil administration, including a skeletal police machinery ; another under political tehsils, policed by levies supplied by the tribal chiefs of the area ; and the third, a vast region with large inaccessible tracts, under no administration at all except of tribal Sardars who maintained a medieval system of justice and had absolute authority over their tribesmen. 11. Baluchistan covers a little over 134,000 square miles which is about forty per cent of the area of Pakistan. As indicated earlier, the writ of the Federal o the Provincial Government, until recently, ran in not more than 134 square miles of Baluchistan. That is one- thousanth part of the province. Outside this tiny island, where the nation’s penal and civil laws

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and procedures are in force, administrative difficulties were compounded by the vast distances over one of the most arid deserts of the world. The long, barren and almost impregnable mountain ranges, reaching out into the desert like a hand with many fingers, have not only shaped an insular tribal psychology but barred the entry of the people into the modern age. These harsh physical features have not made easier the task of setting up a normal civil administration or initiating socio-economic development. The low density of population about 18 persons to a square mile—has weakened the social cohesion, retarded the growth of a sense of community and thus strengthened those tribal Sardars who place their own present form of power and privilege above the well-being of their people. 12. The population of Baluchistan, according to the census of 1972, is 2.4 million. Ethnically, it is pluralistic. The main groups, each with its own language and tradition, are the Baluch, the Brohis and Pathans. The Baluch are divided into a number of tribes, the major ones being Mengals, Marris, Bugtis, Muhammad Hasni, Zehris, Bizenjos and Raisanis. Though the unity of all these tribes within the framework of the unity of the province and the large one of the nation as a whole should rightly be cherished aim, their origins are not necessarily identical. While legend suggests that they originated in Arabia of Aleppo, they may also be Iranian ; one of the tribes, Nausherwani, certainly is. The Marris and Bugtis claim to be Kurdish. Together with the Brohis, the Baluch inhabit the central and western part of the province. 13. The Brohi tribes mainly occupy the highland areas of Sarawan and Jhalawan in Kalat Division. But, like the Baluch tribes, they are also to be found in Chagai and Mekran. The origin of the Brohis has not been finally established, especially in view of the fact that their language belongs to the Dravidian family. Their own explanation is that the word Brohi is derived from an eponymous ancestor, Braho (which could be a modification of Ibrahim) who was a descendant of the Holy Prophet’s uncle, Amir Hamza. 14. The chief Pathan tribes, indigenous to Baluchistan, are Kakars, Tarins and shiranis. They live in the northern belt and having overwhelming majority in the most settled part of the province, the Quetta Division, are active in commerce and other social activities. 15. Also living among the main tribes are like Tajiks, Turkomans and Hazaras who must have immigrated to Baluchistan centuries ago. They still speak their own languages. Other ethnic groups, less in number are the Jamotes, Lasis, Gujar and other non-Baluch tribes who lived in Kachhi and Las Bela districts. There are also Jats who are cultivators in these areas, the Mekrani fishermen and the settlers (Punjabi, Gilgitis and Muhajirs) who live in the main cities. 16. The chief languages of Baluchistan are Baluchi, Barohi, Pushto and Jatki. Baluchi is spoken by nearly a third of the population, Brohi around Sarawan and Jhalawan while Jatki is a term which includes a number of local dialects ; they in turn fall into two main groups resembling Sindhi on the one side and the western variation of Punjabi known as Lahnda on the other. Jatki is scattered and spoken in Kachhi, Lasbela, Sibi and Barkhan. 17. This is the broad background, geographical and ethnic, of the situation in Baluchistan which is the subject of this paper. It follows that this situation has varied from area to area, from tribe to tribe, issue to issue. In many causes, agencies of the Federal and

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Provincial Government have been, and are, working on high priority programes for speedy socio-economic development and on effective and integrated administration towards the uniform application of laws common to the whole province or country. In some areas the tribes and their chiefs have cooperated fully in this task. But some of the Sardars who wanted to keep their tribes isolated and land free from the impact of roads, schools, dispensaries, electricity, tubewells, industries and impersonal administration and to retain their privileges. It was this resistance to change which led to a confrontation, in some areas of Baluchistan, between the forces of progress and those of reaction. Background---Political 18. At this stage it would be appropriate to narrate in sequence the important political and other relevant event which led to the formation of Bluchistan’s first provincial cabinet and then its dismissal. The oblivious starting point is 20 December 1971 when, for the first time in Pakistan’s history’ a political representative elected on the basis of adult franchise, became its President. Despite last minute efforts to retain power, the discredited Yahya Khan military junta was finally compelled, in the face of mounting public pressure, to transfer power on that day to the chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party which had swept the polls in West Pakistan during the 1970 general elections. Arbitrary rule had come to an end but only after half of the country had been lost, and the remaining half was near integration. The people were demoralised and almost every institution was in disarray. The first task was the immense one of reconstruction. Almost every problem needed immediate attention. A number of steps were taken to restore the people’s morale, to cleanse the administration, to reform the socio- economic sector and to give the foreign policy relevance and vitality. In this a major ingredient was to fostering of national unity and the development of a national consensus that could withstand the corrosive action of party politics. 19. Seeking such a national consensus in the political field, President Bhutto, within a few hours of assuming office, withdrew unconditionally the ban imposed by the Yahya regime on the National Awami Party (NAP).in making the announcement he said:---- “I will start with a clean slate. I am assuming that we all are patriots and that we all want to serve Pakistan. So I am withdrawing the ban on the national Awami party and I am going to request the leaders of NAP to meet me very soon. In this connection I am also going to ask leaders to other parties to meet me.” 20. On 24 December, President Bhutto announced his cabinet leaving two vacancies for ministers from Baluchistan and NWFP. It was indicated that these would be filled after consultation with other political parties. (within five years assuming office, he had held two meetings with Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, Prsident of the National Awami Party). The offer was reiterated in April 1972 and it formed part of the Tripartite Agreement signed on 27 April (after the promulgation of the interim constitution), the relevant passage saying that the office was to take one central ministry from NAP and another from the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Neither of the two parties acted on the offer. 21. The NAP did not command the majority but held the largest single block of seats in the Baluchistan Provincial Assembly. The pattern of votes cast in the provincial elections in December 1970 had been revealing. Of the 960,000 registered voters only 43 per cent cast their

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votes---on papers the lowest turn-out in the country, on paper because several of the politically ambitious sardars had padded the electoral rolls. The largest block of ballot papers----more than 46 per cent-----was for independent candidates, and this tended to confirm the insularity of many of the voting groups. Others who did well were parties with programmes which ostensibily aiming at regional autonomy, would in reality preserve tribal autonomy. The Baluch and Brohi sardars, several of them with NAP tickets, emerged successful from the elections in their areas; and in the Pathan areas the conservative candidates won on the platform of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam candidates with programmes for socio-economic reforms did not fare well initially because not only was their idiom too new for the people of the province; it did not get past the heavy insulation of the tribes. (In subsequent bye-elections, owing to the gradual spread of political consciousness, the progressive candidates did much better, as a result, in coalition with other groups which stand for national integration, they later formed the Provincial Ministry in Baluchistan functioning today----constructing with the help of the federal government an infrastructure for socio-economic development and an administration that would be effective not only in 134 square miles but over the whole Baluchistan. 22. In this talks with President Bhutto in March 1972, Mr. Abdul Wali Khan thanked him for lifting the ban on NAP and promised unreserved and unconditional cooperation to the People’s Party government. In public, however the NAP chief’s statement ranged over a wide field; challenging the appointment of governors belonging to the People’s Party in Baluchistan and NWFP; charging the People’s Party government with trying to impose a one-party rule in the country; criticising the continuance of Martial Law; playing up parochial feelings and threatening to resort to violence. The posture as well as the language was one of confrontation. President Bhutto, however, refused to be provoked and, in his address to the nation on 3 March 1972, posed the question, “If I wanted one-party rule, would I have lifted the ban on the National Awami Party?” He added that under no circumstances would any injustice be done to the two provinces where his People’s Party was in minority. The majority parties in Baluchistan and NWFP, he said, would from the provincial governments. 23. It is necessary here to explain why negotiations became difficult on this issue. This was due mainly to Mr. Abdul Wali Khan’s inconsistent stand on the political rights and privileges of a majority party as evidenced by a comparison between his statement issued after the 1270 general election and the views expressed by him after the dismemberment of Pakistan. His statement in 1971 suggested that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Six Points should be the corner-stone of the National constitution because the Awami League was the Majority party. But his attitude changed in 1972-72 when the People’s Party became the majority in the National Assembly. What seemed right to him in 1971 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League was the majority party in the National Assembly and the largest of Pakistan’s five provinces did not seem right in 1972 when after the country’s dismemberment the People’s Party was in a majority in the National Assembly and in the two largest provinces. 24. Despite this impediment in the establishment of party relationship on a democratic basis, President Bhutto preserved in his effort to enlist the cooperation, indeed the partnership of NAP in the governance of the country. These efforts seemed to bear fruit when a Tripartite Accord was signed on 6 March 1972 by the People’s Party, the National Awami Party and the

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Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam. The memorandum of settlement clearly showed a spirit of accommodation on the part of the Pakistan People’s Party. 25. But Mr. Abdul Wali Khan’s stance in favour of unity and inter-party political understanding did not last for very long. On March 1972, he came out with a press statement (The Pakistan Times, Rawalpindi, 25 March 1972) setting out the unconstitutional proposition that the new governments in Baluchistan and NWFP when installed would not be bound by an exchange of letters between NAP chied and PPP leaders. The construction put upon the Tripartite Accord by the National Awami Party led to a deadlock. Although the foremost need, according to the Government’s perception, was a demonstration of unity for a nation that had recently seen the consequences of differences among political parties, the spirit in which the Accord had been negotiated a few weeks earlier was dissipated, threatening to leave behind a bitter residue. It was to prevent the situation from deteriorating further that President Bhutto reopened negotiations on 8 April with NAP and JUI on new basis. By the end of April 1972, a new Tripartite Agreement was announced. In it the Pakistan People’s Party not only recognised the right of the NAP-JUI coalition to form Government in Baluchistan and NWFP but also let it propose names for appointment as governors of the two provinces. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, two ministries at the centre were offered to JUI and NAP for harmonious liaison between Baluchistan and NWFP, on the one hand, and the Central Government, on the other. 26. President Bhutto’s letter to Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo on 26 April 1972 preceding his appointment as Governor of Baluchistan said:--- “Discussions are coming to a close on your appointment by me as Governor of the province of Baluchistan. This is the first time that the head of the state is appointing a Governor who is neither a non-partyman nor a member of the ruling party at the Centre. I am making this experiment in good faith and in the quest to achieve national purpose and unity which is my supreme object. The governor will, of course, hold office during the pleasure of the President, as provided in the constitution. “ I would, therefore, like to take this opportunity to make clear certain matters regarding the Province of Baluchistan: i. The Provincial Government should take steps to ensure that all inhabitants of the Province, both local and non-local, receive equal and fair treatment, and that the non-locals are not in any manner harrassed. ii. No attempt should be made by the Provincial Government to take steps with regard to matters that fall within the constitutional jurisdiction and competence of the Central Government, for example, in matter of external trade, cultural and economic ties or any other negotiations of contacts with any foreign power, without the express and prior approval of the Central Government. Foreign relations must not be allowed to get complicated by adverse actions or statements. iii. No major policy decisions taken by the Central Government recently, for example, Land Reforms, action against Government

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officials under Martial Law Regulation No. 114 and the taking over of the management of some industries, can be upset in any way. The administration framework instituted for the implementation of these decisions should not be disturbed and in fact its smooth functioning should be ensured. iv. The Sui Gas installations are located in the Province of Baluchistan. They are of national importance. Every effort should continue to be made to ensure that there is no disruption in the proper running of these installations or in the transmission/distribution of gas from Sui. The Provincial Government shall continue to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the Sui are and a smooth labour-management relationship. v. Every effort should be made to preserve national integrity. Fissiparous tendencies are not only harmful to the nation but also affect our international relations. Therefore movements like Azad Baluchistan Movement, however nebulous, should be firmly put down, and not to be permitted to affect our relations with foreign powers, particularly friendly neibouring countries. vi. Civil armed forces are centrally administered forces and perform a vatal function in the production of our borders and in the administration of the tribal areas. No political party or activity should be allowed to subvert the loyalty of the civil armed forces. vii. With the change of government in the province, the provincial government should ensure that there is no victimisation on political grounds, either of official, politicians or political workers. There should be no political vendettas as this would not only affect the law and order situation in the Province but would have serious national repercussions. As Governor you will represent the Central Government and not be influenced by party considerations or affiliations.” On the following day, Mr. Bizenjo replied : “I acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter of April 26, 1972 and have pleasure in confirming that I accepted its contents.” 27. The appointment of the Governors of Baluchistan and NWFP on the recommendation of a party which is not the ruling party in the Federal Government was the first instance of its kind in a parliamentary democracy. This departure from convention had been made by the Pakistan People’s Party in order to consolidate national unity. Because a new precedent was being set, the President wrote to Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo specifically mentioning certain matters relating to Baluchistan and asked him to accept these conditions before his appointment. It was on his acceptance of the contents of the President’s letter that Mr. Bizenjo was appointed Governor of Baluchistan. 28. After a new Governor was sworn in, the NAP-JUI parliamentary coalition in the Baluchistan Provincial Assembly elected Sardar Attaullah Mengal as its leaders and thus Chief

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Minister of the province. President Bhutto wrote to Sardar Attaullah Mengal on 1 May 1972 saying : “Please accept my congratulations on being elected as leader of the Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan. I know your Province well and have great respect and affection for its brave people. I know the problems of Baluchistan and I am deeply interested in the progress and well being of this backward part of the country. I can assure you that you will the fullest cooperation of the Central Government, notwithstanding party attachments and considerations. Please do your utmost to better the lot of the people and respect their genuine rights and aspirations. I might add here that I have taken special measures to promote the welfare of the people of Baluchistan even before your government was formed. This policy will be continued with resolute determination. 29. Sardar Attaullah Mengal is his reply said: “We in this Province are fully conscious and greatly appreciate your keen desire to accelerate the pace of development. Enhanced allocation of funds made to this backward Province since your assumption of office on 20th December, 1971 is a step in this direction. The people here have particularly admired the fulfillment of the promise made by you in the public meeting at Quetta on 17 January, 1972, regarding the utilization of Sui gas for the economic development of this province which the previous regimes denied to Baluchistan on one pretext or the other. Action already initiated in this direction, under your directive, by Natural Resources Division, has been very well received. 30. This constructive note promised a smooth relationship not only between the Centre and Baluchistan but between the People’s Party and the NAP-JUI coalition. While political difference might be ventilated in public by provincial and central ministers and other spokesmen, any issues or disputes of an administrative nature had to be confined to governmental interchange. It was to help harmonize the working between the Centre and the Provinces and to broaden the base of national reconstruction that, as mentioned earlier, President Bhutto had offered two Central ministership to NWFP and Baluchistan : this was the part of the Tripartite Agreement signed on 27 April. But, instead of accepting this offer, the NAP-JUI leaders issued statement to the press that it was not binding on them. When President Bhutto indicated on 7 May that the offer could not be kept open indefinitely, neither NAO nor JUI ever made an issue of it. It is a reasonable conclusion that the presence of their representatives in the Central Cabinet would have inhabited certain NAP and JUI leaders in the defiant and uncooperative attitude their coalition governments in Baluchistan and NWFP were to adopt in the months to come. Evidence for this conclusion was provided by subsequent events which showed that it was their intention at the very outset to violate the constitutional obligations which they had accepted and to follow a path that could lead to administrative anarchy.

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31. The very first meeting of the Provincial Governors and Chief Ministers after inception of Provincial Governments decided to institutionalize coordination between the Centre and the Province. There was unanimous agreement on the need for regular consultations at high level policy meetings to be held every month by rotation in each province. Joint statement was issued at the conclusion of the first meeting on 11 June 1972. The Governors covenant promised political peace and identified the future course of collaboration between the centre and provinces. The major aims which it listed were;---- a) Inter-provincial harmony and accord b) Segregation of national issues from party dialectics, and c) Commitment to a joint policy of action to usher in an era of national prosperity and stability. However, barely 9 days later, in a statement to the press on 20 June 1972, Mr. Abdul Wali Khan said: “My party and I are not bound by the Government’s Agreement.” It was clear that National Awami party had not set its self on a collision course with the Centre. The NAP chief’s main contentions were: a) The National Awami Party was in control of half of Pakistan. b) Regardless the NAP strength in the National Assembly, it should be given cabinet representation equal to that of PPP. 32. The factual potion is that in 1970 general elections the Pakistan People’s Party had captured 81 of the 139 general seats of the national assembly—later it also won 3 seats reserved for women. In Sind, PPP won 80 out of the province’s 27 general seats. Of Punjab’s 82 general seats in the national assembly, PPP captured 62. The National Awami Party won only 6 out 139 general seats in the national assembly, 3 of them from Baluchistan and 3 out of NWFP’s quota of 18 national assembly seats. It won no seats in the Punjab or Sind. In the Provincial Assemblies the National Awami Party won 13 out of 40 general seats in NWFP and in Baluchistan 8 out 21 general seats. Did this performance at the polls provide the slightest justification for NAP’s claim that it should be equated with PPP in all decision making in Pakistan? Oblivious of this reality, certain leaders of NAP made the main them of their campaign on the month ahead. The fact that the half of the Pakistan which NAP claimed to control and sought to rule was identical with the territory that Afghanistan called “Pakhtoonistan” could not go unnoticed, and Mr. Abdul Wali Khan’s frequent visits to Kabul and Jalalabad—where his father, Mr. Abdul Ghafar Khan, lived in a self imposed exile from Pakistan—acquired a significance greater that the meetings of dutiful son with his father. 33. The activities of the National Awami Party could not be placed in perspective without relevant references to its background. It may be said without unfairness that if the National Awami Party as led by Mr. Abdul Wali Khan were to have a generic name, it would be the Indian National Congress. This is indicated by, among many other utterances, the statement made by Mr. Abdul Ghafar Khan in March 1972 in Kabul that NAP was in fact a continuation of Indian National Congress which, for reasons obvious to any student of Hindu and Muslim politics in the South Asian subcontinent, operated in the Muslim majority North West Frontier

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Province mainly under the name of Khudai Khidmatgar or Red Shirts. In an interview (published on 3 March 1972) to the Washington Post correspondent, John Siceloff, about the decline of the Congress-Red Shirts-Khudai Khidmatgar conglomeration in Pakistan, he said, “We started it again in 1957 with my son, Abdul Wali Khan, as the President. The new name was the National Awami Party.” It must be mentioned here that, within the Congress Mr. Abdul Ghafar Khan had opposed the acceptance of the Partition Plan establishing the independent states of India and Pakistan and on 21 June 1947 demanded “a free Pathan state of all Pakhtoons” but in a letter to Mr. Gandhi, written soon afterwards, he said, “ We would like to have a free Pathan state within India.” 34. Considering this background, it was natural that, in the conditions which prevailed in Pakistan in early 1972, the domination of NAP over the ministry in Baluchistan caused serious misgivings about the survival of Pakistan as an integrated state. These apprehensions were aggravated when, right from start, the NAP Ministry withheld cooperation from the Centre and the NAP leaders and workers outside the Ministries indulged in agitational activity on several fronts. A prime example of administrative no-cooperation between the NAP-JUI Provincial Government of Baluchistan and the Federal Government was provided when the Pakistan Coast Guard started intensive operation along the Mekran Coast. The Deputy Commissioner, Las Bela, on the instructions of Chief Minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal, issued instructions that members of the Coast Guards were to restrict their activities and operations to defined areas only. They would entre Baluchistan only when an office from Las Bela District was informed, his permission obtained and he or his representative accompanied them; otherwise they would be penalized. In another instance, persons informing the Coast Guard about smuggling activities—leading to the interception and seizure of contraband goods—were arrested by Baluchistan officials. This abnormal sensitivity of the NAP supporters to the independent operations of the Coast Guard along the Mekran coast could be explainable only by their anxiety to keep the coast clear—literally for the landing of arms from ships anchored off shore. 35. Lest it be thought that this was a disproportionate conclusion, the deterioration of the law and order situation in Baluchistan under the NAP administration could hardly be fortuitous or due only to inefficiency and lack of vigilance. Acts of lawlessness became part of a pattern which suggested that the more serious ones were attributable not to individuals as such but to organized groups supported by the NAP leaders, several of whom used their official positions to strengthen bands of roughnecks loyal to them personally or to their political party. The initial incidents were comparatively of less serious nature but gradually as the NAP-controlled administration established itself, it allowed, encouraged or initiated acts against the law which could—and did—escalate into a situation threatening the security of Pakistan. The NAP Governor, instead of acting as the President’s agent which was his constitutional position, was determined to act more as an agent of his own party. Among his foremost concerns appeared to be the arming of tribal striking forced supporting NAP. the process of acquiring arms had started before the NAP nominees took office but it was accelerated afterwards under officials patronage. Smuggling of food grains on a large scale also began and it was complimented by the return traffic of illegal arms. Perhaps, it was some sort of barter arrangement, the purpose of which was to weaken Pakistan economically, cause food roits and create a situation in which as well armed forces with political motivation could bring about the same sort of situation that had ended in the splintering of East Pakistan.

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36. Before the eruption of large scale turmoil in Baluchistan the acts of lawlessness which attracted nationwide attention included attacks on non-Baluch personnel of Pakistan Western Railway. These attacks were made by the members of Baluchistan Student Organization affiliated to NAP. On 28 November 1972 a railway train guard was kidnapped by some members of BSO. The next day, the zonal president of the BSO in Quetta, accompanied by about a score of persons, entered the Divisional Superintendent’s office, manhandled the Head Clerk’s rescue. On 30 November 1972, two Assistant Station Masters and a Pointsman of the Sariab Railway Station were also kidnapped by members of BSO. 37. At about the same time, that is, the end of November 1972, attacks on the new settlers along the Pat Feeder canal were reported. There was a delay of several days before details of the incidents came out. Pieced together, the report showed that the sequence of lawlessness began when about a thousand Marri tribesmen, along with Kalohis and Lehris, armed with automatic weapons, attacked Punjabi settlers in Goat Muhammad Hussain, Bedar and some other villages in the Pat Feeder Canal of the Kachhi District on 27 November 1972. In this attack, a settler and four children between the ages of 3 and 5 years were killed, several settlers injured, a number of women and children kidnapped and others ejected from their homes. Crops were destroyed and forcible possessions were taken of some of the settler’s land. The loss of property accessed by a government committee came to over Rs. 800,000. Before the attack, the settlers had logged complaints with the Provincial Government about the early depredations of the tribesmen. Obviously these were ignored. 38. On 2 December 1972, the Federal Government, at the request of Baluchistan Government, ordered the deployment of the Frontier Corps to check the marauding tribesmen. On the following day, an ultimatum was given to the Marri tribesmen to surrender by the mourning of 4 December, to hand over those responsible for the lawless acts, to return the abducted persons and all looted property, to vacate lands in adverse possession and pay compensation. The ultimatum had to be extended when the outlaws agreed gradually to fulfill these conditions in installments. The Baluchistan Government later sought to explain this incident as one of tribesmen—tenants trying to occupy the Punjabi settler’s lands as a result of the land reforms introduced by the Central Government. But these reforms fixed a ceiling of 150 irrigated and 300 un-irrigated acres of an individual owner. This limit on holding could hardly be said to have been exceeded by the Punjab settlers comprising 160 families of about 5 members each, with only 7,500 acres of land in their possession. 39. As stated earlier the NAP-JUI ministry was helping its supporters to acquire guns and ammunition. Some of the arms came through smugglers using the Mekran Coast or the mountain passes but some were issued from Government armouries under the orders of Sardar Attaullah Megal, the Chief Minister himself. An instance which would illustrate this is the removal from his post, of an Inspector General of Police, Baluchistan, who refused to comply with his Chief Minister’s demand that 200 rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunitions to be given to his tribesmen whom he wanted to send as his private army for action in Las Bela to suppress the Jamote and other tribes in order to settle a tribal feud. Sardar Attaullah Mengal replaced the Inspector General and got the Police Department to supply arms and ammunition for the tribesmen forming his tribal lashkar. Official records show that 260 rifles and 34,000 rounds of ammunition were supplied to this lashkar. None of the 260 rifles were recovered when the lashkar dispersed after the dismissal of the NAP Governor and Ministry.

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40. Apart from this, the Mengal Ministry seriously tampered with the strength, structure and striking ability of the law-enforcement agencies in Baluchistan. Sixty per cent of the personnel, approximately 2,600 men, of the Baluchistan Reserve Police (BRP), which could not but have been drawn from other provinces, was to made to leave Baluchistan. As a result, this important law-enforcing agency was rendered ineffective, virtually disbanded. To fill the self-created vacuum, another agency was created ostensibly for policing duties. This was called the Baluchistan Dehli Muhafiz (BDM). About eleven hundred men were recruited, mostly the supporters of National Awami Party. Special levies numbering five hundered and fifty were also raised. Their duties were spelt out ; they had no recruitment rules or any command or operational structure. They with the Baluchistan Dehli Muhafiz were used in Las Bela. When, subsequently, the Bizenjo-Mengal administration was dismissed, 45 men of BDM, 153 of the Special Levies and 32 of the Regular Levies deserted. Some of them were forcibly held back by the histile tribal lashkars. Though the men of the Baluchistan Dehli Muhafiz, 87 of the Special aaaaac and 3 of the Regular Levies were later allowed to return, most of their arms were retained by outlaws in the tribal areas. The task of recovering about 160 rifles and 22,000 rounds of ammunitions and of apprehending the deserters was difficult because of the manner in which the levies were raised, trained and equipped. While on paper, it the Deputy Commissioner Quetta-Pishin, who had enlisted 100 of Special Levies, actually the men were enrolled on the recommendation of Mr. Abdul Hakim Lehri of Baluchistan Student Organization (BSO). This arrangement was verbally approved by the Chief Minister, Sardar Attaullah Mengal. Mr. Abdul Hakim Lehri was actively associated with the Chief Minister in the selection, training and arming of these Quetta Levies. Sardar Ataullah Mengal had also verbally instructed Deputy Commissioner, Quetta-Pishin that Mr. Abdul Hakim Lehri would act with his (Chief Minister’s) full authority and represent him personally in affairs connected with the raising, training and arming of Additional and Special Levies. The arms and ammunition, issued to these levies, were given by the former Commandant of Dehli Muhafis to Mr. Abdul Hakim Lehri and Mr. Musa Kurd without obtaining any surety and where kept by the Levies in a room in the Levies’ Line and guared by their own men. On the dissolution of the Mengal Ministry, the men of these Levies walked off with the arms and ammunitions in their possession. 41. Only naivete could ascribe to inexperience the fact that the established legal process regarding the recruitment, training and the issuing the arms and ammunition after obtaining a proper surety for them, was not observed. Had it been, Baluchistan would have had a properly disciplined, balanced and capable organization for law enforcement instead of an irresponsible undisciplined force. But since these levies were to be used by the Bizenjo-Mengal administration for its own purposes, the regulations were flouted. No men would have obsconded with arms and ammunitions if sureties for them had been provided by persons who would have been responsible for the conduct of men bearing their normal endorsement. The large qualities of arms and ammunitions missing were most likely used by the deserters in the arms confrontation that took place after Las Bela incident. 42. Since October 1972, there had been indications of impeding trouble in some parts of Baluchistan. Some tribal chiefs had informed the Federal Government of their apprehensions. They had been opposed to NAP and they feared that it wanted to wipe out all opposition. This was true of, among others, Jamotes who had a running feud with Mengal and had voted against NAP in the 1970 elections. During December 1972, the NAP nominated Baluchistan

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Government made a series of arrests in Las Bela which gave the Jamote tribe the feeling that its members were being politically victimised. When some of their leaders arrested, there were violent demonstrations. On the basis of this, and using the pretext that the Jamotes had cut some telephone wires, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the Chief Minister, decided on a punitive action, under his personal supervision, against Jamote tribe. On 26 December 1972, he led into the field lashkars from Mengal, Bizenjo and nine other tribes, describing them as volunteers. These private armies of tribal chiefs freely indulge in looting and attacking Jamotes, 42 of whom were killed. Loss of property, amounting to about Rs. 2.6 million, was caused. Nearly, 8,000 Jamotes were forced to take refuge in the adjoining hill where they were surrounded and besieged by the tribal lashkars and the BDM forces. The food supplies of the tribe were cut off so that they could be starved into surrender. The Chief Minister personally ordered that food not to be supplied to the Jamotes until they had all surrendered to the district administration. This was not the way a Government would deal with a problem which was essentially that of law and order and could be dealt with by a regular force f by the Federal armed forces called to the aid of the civil administration. The Mengal administration’s whole approach to the Las Bela situation was indicative of the sardari system asserting itself. The Chief Minister, in his capacity as the sardar of the Mengal tribe, took the Jamote dissent as a personal affront and made it a personal issue. 43. This was pre-eminently a situation in which the Federal Government could have remained passive only by disregarding its responsibilities. Events in Las Bela could not be allowed to turn into full-fledged tribal warfare. On 31 January 1973, the Chief Minister was requested to call off his operation and hand over the law and order situation to the Civil Armed Forces. This also implies lifting the siege of Jamotes, the withdrawal of tribal lashkars and BDM forced from Las Bela and the deposition of Government weapons in the police armouries. However, the Chief Minister prevaricated. Governor Bizenjo made his contribution by trying to prevent the army or any other armed forces of the Federal Government from operating independently in the affect region of Las Bela. What he conceded privately he repudiated in public. When the Federal Government ordered the Baluchistan Chief Minister to call of his operations, it also decided to send contingents of the army to help resort law and order Las Bela. The decision was taken after the Governor of Baluchistan himself had requested that Federal armed Forces be sent to help control the situation. Later Governor Bizenjo explained that he had not asked for army units but for Federally controlled Civil Armed Forces. This was an untenable position. In an emergency, the Civil Armed Forces cannot be detached from the operational command of the Pakistan army. Governor Bizenjo tried to confuse the situation. He sought to place them under the control and direction of the chief minister of Baluchistan: in effect, to prevent the Jamotes from returning to their homes. It is noteworthy that, at this time the local civil official not only were made instruments of the chief minister’s unlawful designs but also began to give misleading information to the federal armed personnel in their area. For instance, the deputy inspector general, Frontier Corps, who was the responsible for law and order was told by the Tehsildar of Bela on 4 February 1973 that Government weapons taken back from the tribal lashkers to whom they had earlier been issued, had been deposited in Uthal Armoury, but when he went to inspect them in the early hours of 5 February 1972, he found no weapon there. 44. In such a situation, the Federal Government had no option but to order the Pakistan Army to assume control over the district of Les Bela. It did so on 9 February and, a day later the army

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was in full control of the situation. In addition to 9 tons of food dropped by the Pakistan Air Force to the people hiding in the hills, 162 bags of foodgrains were despatched to the affected areas under arrangements made jointly by the Army and the civil authorities. The delaying tactics of Sardar Ataullah Mengal and his officials resulted in many members of the lashkars slipping away into the Mengal territory with the weapons that had been issued to them from Government armouries. A hundred members of the Special Levies from Quetta about 130 other levies of members of Dehly Muhafiz also escaped. It is they and the dispersing lashkars who were at the post of the armed forces, waylaying and looting of buses and disrupting of telephone lines, acts which escalated later into a large confrontation with the Pakistan Army. 45. as the Federal Government’s armed forces moved into Las Bela, serious note was taken of Governor Bizenjo’s statement that he would resist the induction of the army units into Baluchistan. His constitutional position was that of the President’s agent in the province, and no government worth the name could suffer such defiance. Far from helping to resolve tribal feuds, to unify the warring tribes and to bring about a reconciliation between then and other ethnic groups in the province, his policies were leading to tribal strife and general unrest and turbulence in Baluchistan. The President decided to remove him from office. In a letter to him of the night of 14 February 1972, the President stated the reasons for his dismissal. He wrote : “The Governor under the constitution holds office during the President’s pleasure and in his agent in the province. I regret to say that in spite of your written acceptance of my letter of 26 April 1972, preceding your appointment, and your subsequent assurances, you have not fulfilled the conditions set out in my letter nor have you carried out the directions given from time to time in that behalf. Little purpose would be served at this stage in once again going into details, so I shall refrain from doing so. “Moreover, recent development in the country makes it imperative that I have a Governor in whom I have full confidence and who faithfully carries out my directions. I have therefore decided to terminate your appointment with immediate effect and to appoint a new Governor. You will appreciate that considering the king of situation the country is faced with, the larger interests of the nation must take precedence over all other matters.” Military Operations 46. While dealing with the Las Bela incident, it was noted that when the Pakistan Army was called in and later when the Governor and Chief Minister of Baluchistan were dismissed, a large number of tribal gunmen and members of the Special Levies raised by the NAP-dominated administration had decamped with firearms issued from Government armouries. They started sniping at posts of Pakistan’s armed forces, ambushing buses and indulging in similar hostile acts. Initially most of these incidents remained fonfined to the Jhalawan area, with stray cases in the Marri areas. But, in the next three months or so, they revealed a pattern : they were aimed at disrupting the lines of communications, and the movement of supplies into and within Baluchistan. On 18 May 1973, a serious incident took place in Marri area at Tandoori. In it some Marri tribesmen ambushed a posse of eight dirscouts on a routin patrol and shot them down with automatic weapons, and took away the scout weapons

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47. Hitertho, a armies operations had been aimed mainly at the suppression of armed marauders in Las bela district. The incident of 18 May, however, lent a new dimension to the armed confrontation. Accordingly, the Governor of Baluchistan, Nawab Muhammad Akbar Bugti, who had replaced Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, addressed the following telegram to the President of Pakistan on 20 May: “Most immediate. Top secret. From Governor Baluchistan for the President. “Subject: Calling in Army in aid to civil power. “As a result of recent events in some parts of Sibi district and Jhalawan of Kalat district a situation has arisen in which it is not possible for civil authorities, with the help levies and police only, to maintain law and order adequately and, in particular, to bring to book the perpetrators of certain crimes which have been committed in certain areas of Sibi District ,particularly areas which are inhabited by Marri tribesmen, armed terrorists , criminal offenders and other elements hostile to the security of Pakistan or being harboured. The incident of May 18 in which eight jawans of Dir Scouts were killed by a hostile force of Marri’s had made it imperative that action should be taken immediately to apprehend those responsible for the attack so that adequate action under the law may be taken against them and to prevent further trouble as as desired by the President. “it is, accordingly, requested that military authorities should immediately carry out such operations in appropriate areas of Sibi District and Jhalawan in aid of civil power as may be necessary, in consultation with the provisional government with the aim to: “first, apprehending hostile elements responsible for incidents which have taken place involving life and property of citizens and members of armed forces as well as government property ; “Second, ensuring that aid and succour are not made available to criminal offenders in territorious aforementioned ; and “Third, Seizing any armed and ammunition which may be found in the area.” 48. The request was accepted. The tasks assigned to the armed forces were : to arrest those responsible for the killing of the Dir Scouts at Tandoori, to seize their weapons to search for arms dumps reportedly hidden in terrain difficult to reach and to give full protection to the law abiding population and to resort the free movement of supplies in Baluchistan. The military operation began on 22 May 1973 when the army secured the small town of Mawand, in the heartland of the Marri area. The troops were fired upon by two tribal gunmen both of whom were seized along with their weapons. Apart from this incident, there was no armed resistance and the troops did not have to use force.

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49. The aim of the Pakistan Army’s operations in Baluchistan was clearly defined. It was : (a) To assist the civil administration in resorting law and order in the affected areas ; (b) To apprehend hostile elements and recover unauthorised arms and other war-like stores; (c) To maintain the security of the lines of communications in the affected areas and undertake whatever action was necessary against the hostile elements ; and (d) To assist the civil administration in various development and uplift projects in the Marri and Mengal areas. 50. For the next sixteen months, trouble in Baluchistan remained confined to two main areas ; the Jhalawan sub-division of Kalat District where some Mengal hostile are still operating and the Marri area of Sibi District (now Marri-Bugti Agency). By and large the population in these areas has been peaceful. The hard-core of the hostiles has consisted of some ring-leaders who, with their small bands of bandits, were even previously used to leading a lawless life with the express approval and backing of their sardars. It is estimated that the total strength of this hard-core of hostile was originally about 400 Mengals and about 500 Marris. This number eventually grew to thousands but most of them were the sympathisers and carries of supplies to that hard-core hostiles. These hostiles normally operated in small bands of 30 to 50 men used by them were usually. 303 and 7 mm rifles with some automatics including light machine guns. Many of the bands of the hostiles encountered by theArmy seemed to be well-trained and not short of arms and ammunition. The increase in their activities which took place shortly after the coup in Afghanistan was significant. 51. in the Mengal area, in the initial stages, the Army’s operational activities were confined to intensive patrolling, picquetting show of force and taking retaliatory actions against hostiles who fired at its posts and picquets. As the tempoe of hostile activities increased, particularly in the Jhalawan area, the army stepped up its oreventive operations and carried out a number of search operations. The Army’s presence in the Jhalawan area, and its demonstrated capability of reaching inaccessible hideouts like Dansar Plateau, contributed substantially towards the restoration of law and order and instilling necessary confidence among the law-abiding tribesmen. Eventually, therefore, the number and scale of attacks was reduced. In the last few weeks the hostiles have attempted nothing more than small scale looting of shops, civilian buses and trucks and stray incidents of cattle-lifting. Reportedly, some ring-leaders are lying low because of the effective Army action.on the whole, the Jhalawan area is now calm. In the Kharan District, however, there have been some incidents of raids by Mengal hostiles on BRP posts and picquets. 52. In the Marri area the Army was ordered to take action against the hostiles consequent on the Tandoori incident. After securing Mawad, the Army units conducted limited search operations in Quat-Mandai and Gamboli areas. The operations in the deeper areas, that is, Thadri and Bambore hills, were called off on the advice of the then Governor of Baluchistan who desired to obtain the return of the captured Civil Armed Forces weapons and the surrender of the hostiles involved in the Tandoori incident through political negotiations. This approach,

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if it was made, did not yield any result. After this, the hostiles’ action in the Marri area was confined to stray sniping incedents. There was, however, a sudden spurt in their activity in the first week of August 1973 when sniping at Army posts and picquets, at working parties of engineers and at vehicles and trains on the Sibi-Harnai sxis started increasing. A serious incident occurred on 25 August 1972, when an Army picquet was attacked and over-run by the hostiles resulting in seventeen personnel killed, six wounded and two abducted, with the loss of some weapons. The Army then conducted search operations in the area and this has produced significant results. Although the Army is in control in the Marri area, some hard-core hostiles are still at large. A search for them is in process. 53. During the Army operations, at no stage has the Pakistan Air Force been used for any bombing nor were paratroops ever drooped anywhere. Some light aircraft, including a small number of helicopters, are used for aerial reconnaissance but no village, base or band of hostiles has been subjected to an aerial attack. Since the trouble started in Baluchistan, the hostiles have been responsible for 488 incidents, 302 of them sniping incidents, some with exchange of fire, 22 ambushes, 65 acts of looting villages, buses and trucks, 49 cases of telephone lines are being cut, 8 cases of damage installations, 40 miscellaneous incidents (including sabotage) and 2 raids on posts of Civil Armed Forces or levies. The Army’s major search operations have numbered 48. The casualty figures show 241 hostiles killed and 62 wounded. The casualties on the Governemtn side were 87 personnel of the regular forces killed and 93 wounded, 34 personnel of the Civil Armed Forces killed and 79 wounded, 21 personnel of the Baluchistan Reserve Police killed and 16 wounded, and 2 attached civilians killed and 3 wounded. 54. As soon as the Army has established its presence into the heart of the disturbed territories and moved into hitherto inaccessible areas, the Federal Government announced on 14 April 1974 that a partial amnesty would be granted and the military operations would be frozen from 15 May 1974. This was misconstrued by the insurgents who accelerated their activities, particularly in the Marri areas. Suitable counter-measures had, therefore, to be adopted. On 2 August 1974, the Prime Minister again called on the hostile elements in the Marri and Jhalawan areas to come down from the mountains and lay down arms by 15 October 1974. 55. This call, along with the measures to check hostile activities, evoked a positive response from the insurgent tribesmen. They began to move down from the hills and the number doing so steadily increased. This included the prominent figure mentioned in the Prime Minister’s statement made in Quetta on 15 October. As of 17 October, a total of 5,501 persons including 112 levies, had left the ranks of insurgency through surrender or capture. The weapons surrendered by them consist of 1,035 rifles of 303 bore, 39 rifles of 7 mm, 30 rifles of 7.62 or 7.92 mm, 98 other types of rifles, 25 shotguns, 18 pistols and one sword. Those captured from them consist of 866 rifles, 2 machine guns, 32 shotguns, 6 stenguns, 18 pistols and 4 hand grenades. Of the rifles, 753 were of 303 bore, 37 of 7mm, 21 of 7.62 mm, 9 were G-3 and 46 other types. On 15 October, the Prime Minister announced the grant of full amnesty to all who had offered resistance to the Government and had been either captured or had voluntarily surrendered. This left only some remnants of insurgency in certain pockets and the Prime Minister mentioned the ring leaders still at large who were invited to lay down their arms by 15 December to enable their cases to be sympathetically considered.

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56. It is apparent that the insurgency against the state which took the shape of organised resistance against the lawful authority in Baluchistan has now crumbled. 57. it need hardly be said that the Government is distressed by even a single casualty, whether of soldier or civilian in any confrontation in the country. It deplores the loss of life that has occurred in Baluchistan. Yet the reality has to be acknowledged that the human toll taken by the suppression of insurgency in the province is far smaller than by campaigns launched by other governments in the contemporary age for far less worthy aims. Thousands more have perished in situation which did not involve a country’s integrity or survival. Here, in Baluchistan, what was at stake was not any partisan interest of tribal privilege but the consolidation of Pakistan. With Baluchistan in the hands of people who have foresworn, or failed to cultivate loyalty to the country, Pakistan itself would be vulnerable to both internal fission and external attack. The jawans and officers who have laid down their lives in Baluchistan, let it be remembered, have paid the ultimate price, now as before, for the defence of their homeland. The Army’s Developmental Role 58. With the presence of the Army in the disturbed areas, particularly in the Marri area, the Provincial Government has been able to establish, for the first time, the initial components of the civil administration in the area. The Army has helped in the undertaking of major development projects such as the installation of tubewells the electric generators, the construction of roads, and opening of schools and dispensaries. Indeed, the military presence in Baluchistan in aid of civil power has a dual purpose: preservation of law and order and economic development. The promotion of conditions conducive to peaceful existence implies the development of the socio-economic potential. The building of a road, the opening of a police post, the establishment of a school, a dispensary, of a community centre constitute developmental activity. Yet, they are also administrative acts designed to bring a measure of organised peaceful life to the area. Economic development promotes law and order in much the same way as law and order promotes development. In areas that had so far experienced very little of either, the need for simultaneous emphasis on both imperatives is critical. The Army has thus been called upon to build the economic infra-structure as a part of the political programme of transforming Baluchistan into present day province. The inability of any other organised force in society to assume this task in the initial groundwork stages is evident from the cruel topography itself. Constructing a 2,800 foot tunnel in a mountain range or building a road to an inaccessible are requires manpower, material and organisation that Baluchistan lacked completely. The Army has been asked to provide these essentials. 59. The dual role of the army can be viewed most clearly in the communication sector. The Army has assigned the highest priority to road construction because without roads the rugged mountains of Baluchistan will never yield to the will of the economic planners. Moreover, roads create opportunities in an economically depressed area, as they have done in the Marri-Bugti Agency where a labour force of about 5,00 tribesmen (working under local contractors on liberal terms) has now been employed. Before roads were pushed into their areas, the Marri tribesmen took as long as three to four days to reach Sibi from Mawand across the formidable mountain ranges. Small wonder that, frightened by the inevitable transformation the road were to bring about the erstwhile isolated area, a leading tribal chieftain had pleaded that the Baluch people be done the favour of being left tho their own devices for the next ten

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years. In addition to road building, the Army’s role can be perceived from a recent example. Finding 100 of the surrendering Marri hostiles consumptive due to malnutrition, the Army physicians discovered that 10 of them were in advanced stages of tuberculosis. They were airlifted to a sanitorium at Quetta. A specialist was also flown in to examine the rest. The Army is running hospitals and dispensaries at Kohlu, Mawand, Kahan and Dera Bugti. This is being done for an area where ailments are ascribed to evil spirits, diagnosed as either hot or cold fevers and cured by incantations or encasing the patient in the skin of a freshly slaughtered sheep. 60. The quantitative achievements of the Army’s development plan can best be summarized under the following broad categories:--- (1) Road Construction----The works has been entrusted to the Corps of Army Engineers. One of the most difficult jobs undertaken there is the construction of a 2,800 foot tunnel a Talli Tangi,of which one-fourth has already been completed. With the completion of this tunnel the 400-mile journey from Sibi to Kohlu on the old Sibi –Mach-Quetta-MuslimBagh- Killa Saifullah-Loralai-Bostan-Kohlu route will be reduced to 96 miles. The other old available eoute was Sibi-Bellpat-Jecobabad-Shikarpur- Kandkot-Kashmore-Sadiqabad-Rahimyar Khan-Khanpur-Muzaffargarh- Dera Ghazi Khan-Rakhni-Barkhan-Kohlu which worked out to roughly 600 miles. The new route---a priority project---will be Sibi-Talli Tangi- Mawand-Wadhi Wanga-Fazilchel-Daula Wanga-Kohlu. The details of the various works in the Marri-Bugti Agency are briefly as follows :---- The first road is Sibi-Mawand-Fazilchel-Kohlu-Barkhan-Rakhani, which is under construction, and then to D.G Khan, where a small portion already exists. The major part of the new road has already been completed. The work on the second road, Kashmore-Sui-Dera Bugti-Kahan and joining up with Fazichel, is progressing fast large chunks of this road being already complete. The work on the third road, Sibi-Talli Tangi- Kahan, is progressing fast, the 16-mile Sibi-Talli portion having been already completed. The fourth road, Bellpat-Lehri, which is already existing,is to be joined up with Sangsila-Dera Bugti. Here the Lehri- Sangsila, a 51-mile long chunk, is in an advanced stage of completion. The 58-mile long Rakhni-Barkhan-Kohlu raod is complete with the exception of protective works to join up with Talli and Sibi. Plans have been made to provide rest houses along the roads. Two other roads, one being a 13-mile long stretch from Mohammad Lath to join the road between Dera Bugti and Kahan, and the other, roughly of the same length, from Barkhan to Spring Brackish, have been completed by the Army for the Oil and Gas Development Corporation and other foreign drilling agencies. Another road, from Fort Munro to an exploration site in the mountains of the Marri area, measuring 10 miles, has been constructed by the Army for the foreign drilling agency. The summary of the road construction by the Army is as follows :

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Sl. No. Axis Total distance Road Construction Balance Miles Furlongs Miles Furlongs Miles Furlongs

1. Kashmore-Sui-Dera Bugi-Kahan 111 4 108 4 3 - - _ 2. Barkhan-Kohlu 26 -- 10 4 15 4 3. Kohlu-Fazilchel Triman 29 2.5 23 4.5 5 5 4. Sibi-Talli Tangi 22 2 22 2 -- -- 5. Talli Tangi-Mawand 34 1 -- 5 33 4 6. Fazilchel-Mawand 26 3 10 2 16 1 7. Lahri-Sangsila 51 -- 9 1 41 7 8. Dera Bugti-Sangsila 21 -- 21 ------

9. Barkhan-Spring Brachish 14 1 13 4 -- 5 10. Talli Tangi Tunnel 2800 -- 733 -- 2067 -- feet feet feet

(2) Water Development--- The Army has installed 15 tube wells in Kohlu, Mawand Kahan and Dera Bugti. Three more tubewells are being drilled and other sites are being developed. Two new drilling rigs have been sent to this area ; one for Kohlu and the other for DeraBugti. (3) Electricity ----- A 55 KW generators has been functioning at Mawand. Similar generators have recently been installed at Kohlu, Kahan and Dera Bugti. (4) Agriculture-----Dera Bgti, Kahan, Mawand, Duki and Kohlu have been supplied two bulldozer each. In addition, Kohlu and Dera Bugti have been supplied four and two tractoes respectively. A maintenance Workshop had already been established at Kohlu. Seeds have also been made available in adequate quantity at Kohlu for free distribution

(5) Food and Consumer Goods---- A Provincial Food Reserve Centre had been established at Dera Bugti and another one at Kohlu. They will hold stock in reserve for one month. Ten days reserve stock is now being maintained at Kahan and Mawand. Fair Price shops started functioning on 1 October 1974. All tribesmen, residing in known settlements, have been issued ration card.

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(6) Medical Cover ----- A doctor each has now been stationed at Kohlu, Mawand, Kahan and Dera Bugti. Five dispensaries are being established in the Marri area and seven in the Bugti area. (7) Education---- The buildings of schools at Kohlu, Mawand, Kahan and Dera Bugti have been repaired. The required number of teachers has also been provided. 61. The Development activity rapidly undertaken by the Army has in some areas created a vivied contrast between primitive life and progress. The contrast can be seen in its sharpest focus in the Marri-Bugti Agency. However, as the military operation as such is subjecte to the decision of the Federal Government, so the Army’s development activity is dovetailed into, because it is meant to facilitate, the Provincial Government. Economic Development 62. Although rich in economic potential, Baluchistan has suffered from neglect. Government investment in this province never exceeded Rs. 30 million in any year during the entire decade preceding 1970. This may be compared with the Rs. 120 million allocated to the province by the Federal Government in 1972-73. The allocation was increased to Rs. 180 million inthe following year and is no Rs. 210 million for the current year. in addition, Government’s expenditure through its federal agencies is Rs. 150 million annually. In fact, the public sector’s actual expenditure since 1972-73 has been more than twice the cumulative expenditure during the entire preceding decade. 63. This level of annual financial outlay is borne entirely by the Federal Government. In fact, the province’s own revenues together with its share of the federal taxes amount annually to Rs. 88 million only. This is not enough even to meet the province’s non- development expenditure on administration and foodgrain’s subsidy, presently at the level of Rs. 416 million. In the current year the province’s income is expected to go up by Rs.138 million on account of the royalty and excise duty on Sui gas transferred to the province under the Constitution. This will, however, still leave the provincial deficit at the level of Rs. 190 million which will continue to be met by the Federal Government. 64. The increased allocation of federal funds to Baluchistan is indicative not only of the Federal Government’s concern for the province but of its anxiety to remove the disparity between Baluchistan and the other provinces as fast as national resources and Baluchistan’s absorptive capacity will permit. It reflects the Government’s faith that economic benefit should reach all people of Baluchistan and not be confined to the privileged classes. No portion of the public sector outlay is meant to be used as a prop for the traditional overload’s hegemony. The development plans aim simultaneously at opening new economic opportunity and at developing the human resources and capability to take advantages of such opportunity. 65. The lack of Physical infrastructure, such as water, power and roads constitutes the principal bottleneck to development. The Government’s primary emphasis, therefore, during the last two years has been on overcoming this problem because little progress can be achieved in the productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry, unless requisite utilities are adequately available.

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66. The single largest allocation in the development programme is for the water sector. This includes provision for the supply of drinking water to small township/villages which remain in pressing need of it. Pure drinking water was supplied to 23 townships for the first time last year. In irrigation, the two major projects underway are the Hub Dam and widening of the Pat Feeder canal. Construction of the storage dam on the Hub river had been stalled for the past decade. The work has now been accelerated to complete the project within the next two years. This will provide perennial irrigation to 21,000 acres in Las Bela together with 15 million gallons daily for industrial use. The Pat Feeder canal is being widened to increase its present capacity of 2,600 cusecs to the improved designed discharge of 6,700 cusecs. On completion, this will benefit an additional 400,000 acres of land there by doubling the present irrigated acreage in the province. 67. The greatest economic potential lies, however, in the development of groundwater resources in this province. This requires use of modern technology and systematic investigation. A scheme costing Rs. 122 million was launched last year for a comprehensive investigation will cover about 25,000 sq. mile and be phased over 5 years. A separate Hydrology Directorate has been set up at Quetta to implement this scheme with technical assistance from the UNDP. The UNDP’s contribution of dollar 2.84 million is the largest ever by this United Nations agency in this sector. The scheme involves the sinking of 1,200 test holes of which 600 will be converted to production tu bewells. This itself will add Rs. 60 million per annum to agriculture production in the province. The principal objective of the scheme however, will be to provide reliable data for groundwater development projects o be taken up every year. Technical experts have estimated a total potential of 6,000 tubwells in the province. Full development will take time, but it will double agricultural production within the province. Groundwater development in two project areas will be taken up this year. The total number of tubewells being sunk in these areas is 1,185. This compares with the annual rate of 10 to 15 tubewells sunk in the past. 68. In the past thermal generation was confined to the Quetta area alone. Even here, there was extreme shortage of power supply and a virtual ban was imposed on new tubewell connections in 1970. This ban was lifted last year after the Prime Minister ordered the shifting of a gas turbine from Kotri to Quetaa which made it possible to allow 517 new tubewelll connections. The demand for power is rising very rapidly and 800 new applications for tubewell connections have piled up with WAPDA. As an interim solution a new 25 MW gas turbine has already been imported from Germany and will be commissioned in Quetta by November this year. This will effectively double the power supply at Quetta. The permanent solution of the power problem in this area lies in the completion of the new transmission line from Guddu to Quetta. This should be completed within the next two years and will increase the power availability five-fold. It will benefit not only Quetta but furnish electricity to such far-flung towns as Nushki, Chaman, Muslim Bagh, Harnai, Loralai and Kalat. Another transmission line is being brought from Karachi to Bela and will subsequently be connected to Kalat via Khuzdar. This vast network of transmissions lines will still leave out portions of Baluchistan where the only alternative is to go in far diesel generation. Schemes have already been prepared to set up diesel generating power houses in 46 townships. The capacity of each power house is designed to cater to tubewell electrification and industrial use, in addition to domestic consumption.

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69. Lack of roads has been the most serious impediment to progress. This sector had been totally neglected even during the British days, although they made sizeable investments for strategic purposes in the N.W.F.P. Only one major road was taken up since Independence. This was RCD Highway but it remained lingering for the last 12 years. The work has now been taken up and 45 miles have been blacked-topped during the last 3 months. The road linking Fort Sandeman and Quetta will be metalled by March 1975. Another important road linking Loralai with D.G Khan has also been started. 71. The government’s decision to abolish Shishak is at once administrative and symbolic. It is administrative in that it ends an arbitrary exaction and thereby brings the Province in line with the taxation system prevalent in other province of Pakistan. it is symbolic because it displaces feudal values and seeks to redress the deeper imbalance of traditional society ; its exploitative production relationship and its dysfunctional attributes and anachronism. 72. Small wonder that Baluchistan has always been singularly un-productive and in fact a food deficit region. Its requirements were usually met either by imports from abroad of from other Provinces. After Baluchistan was accorded an autonomous status, the NAP-JUI coalition used food distribution as a political weapon to starve opponents and create ustable conditions, leading to famine. Looting of foodgrain and standing crops became common practice. Stocks-piling of essential commodities and blackmarketing was encouraged. Smuggling became an established business practice used by the leaders to futher their political end of seeking arms in return for food from across Pakistan borders. After the dismissal of the NAP-JUI Government in Baluchistan, the Federal Government took steps to check the smuggling of wheat. It is a measure of a more cooperative relationship now established between the administration and the people that, while in the past the Provincial Government did not procure wheat from the Province itself for subsidized sale in urban areas, in 1974 it not only did so but also nearly doubled the procurement target. 73. The development objectives in the agriculture sector are not restricted now to meeting the cereal deficiency but are simultaneously aimed at exploring the full potential of the Province in livestock, poultry and coastal fisheries. The projects include grading/packing of fruits, expanded plant protection coverage, wool shearing, grading and baling, expanded poultry production, afforestation and the construction of jetties and wholesale fish markets on the coast and the construction of a fish harbor at Gwadar. 74. In line with its policy of locating new industries in the more backward areas of the country, the People’ Government has laid particular stress on industrialising in this Province. A vegetable ghee factory is already under installation at Quetta. A larger unit will be located at Tempal Dera. Project planning has been completed for setting up a Ferro-Chrome plant a rice milling unit and Paper Mill based on rice straw. Two large textile mills each of 50,000 spindles and 1,000 looms are being set up with foreign collaboration. This collaboration also covers the setting up of a Cement Factory at Spintangi with 1,000 tones daily production capacity. All these units will be in production within the next 3 years. On completion, the annual value of their combine production will be more than twenty times the present industrial production in Baluchistan.

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75. Important new development are also taking place in the minerals field. Among the Provinces, Baluchistan has been given the largest allocation for this sector. Copper investigation at Sindak is in full swing and has revealed the presence of a porphyry deposit. The Federal Government has set up a separate Resources Development Corporation to complete this work. Iron ore investigation at Nokhundi is also proceeding on schedule. The People’s Government has also given top priority to oil exploration in Baluchistan ; seven foreign companies have been granted concessions for this purpose. The drilling for oil will begin at Jandran near Barkhan in the Marri area in December this year. 76. Given the demoghraphic profile of Baluchistan, meeting its social sector needs should have been a relatively easy task. But even this had been ignored. The Province had neither a Medical College nor a any School of Engineering. The People’s Government has established a Medical College. The construction of College Campus and of a 500-bed hospital is being financed entirely by the Federal Government. an Engineering College is soon to come up in Khuzdar. The lack of trained manpower is emerging as an impediment to further quickening of the pace of development. Investment in the human sectors, therefore, become all the more imperative. Government is doing its best to push forward this programme through a liberal grand of scholarships and other incentives. 77. It would be unrealistic to expect immediate changes an d instant adaptation on the part of the neglected people of Baluchistan to the new social realities. In a population, the illiteracy rate of which exceeds the 84 per cent national average, traditional life styles take time in adjusting to newer conditions. As the tribal mould begins to break, the people’s mental horizons broaden and mass communications become a need. The Government is responsive to this basic requirement for ending Baluchistan’s insularity. Television will come to Baluchistan in the next two weeks. The high power radio transmitter inaugurated by the Prime Minister on 26 April 1974 and the Quetta Television station opening on 5 November, will both reflect and stimulate social change. Soon there will be Television licence fees where there was sardari tax. 78. The narrative of the Government’s effort to restore tranquillity to Baluchistan and quicken its developments as an indication of the fact that the Government has firmly rejected the colonial option with regard to the Province. It is one of the characteristics of colonialism to force subservience on a people and, when that condition is secured, to leave them alone, compel no alteration in their life style and let their society stagnant. Nothing would be more appealing to a colonial or semi-colonial regime than the adaptation of such a policy when dealing with a population like Baluchistan’s with a large insurrectionary potential. But nothing would be more repellant to a Government which is democratic and in which the people themselves participate. The path of lest resistance is not open to a Government which has accepted the obligation of fighting primitivism and poverty and disease. Whatever the strain, the Government of Pakistan could not but actively collaborate in Baluchistan’s efforts and respond to Baluchistan’s need, to end its backwardness. The Present Situation 79. To sum up, whatever have been the manifestations of the situation that has prevailed in the vast and inhospitable Marri-Mengal areas in the past 22 months, its main cause has been the resistance of the Sardars of these and some other tribal areas to the induction of civil administration and the launching of socio-economic reforms which inevitably erode the

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absolute feudal authority of tribal chieftains. Their tribesmen began the fighting by ambushing men of the Civil Armed Forces, firing on civilian railway trains and road transport and on military posts, ultimately coming face to face with the Pakistan Army. Statements made by hostiles who recently accepted the Prime Minister’s amnesty offer and turned in their guns are indicative of the motive force of the insurgency. This was furnished by the arousal of the tribeman’s prejudice and fear by stories being fed to him that a foreign power was seeking to make inroads into his preserve. He could not but succumb to fear. However, what a tribesman may do for his sardar out of ignorance, he is likely to decline to undertake when he is given a chance to think for himself. 80. Not being a believer in class hatred, however, the Government does not condemn the whole class of Sardars. It acknowledges that a large number of Sardars have perceived the direction of social change and decided to further or at least not to retard, Baluchistan’s advance. Not to recognize their contribution would be unjust. Moreover, the institution of sardari is not something which can be liquidate by a mere resolution or directive. The NAP-JUI regime in Baluchistan got the Provincial Assembly to pass a resolution recommending to the Central Government that the sardari system be abolished. It tried to transfer a responsibility to the Federal Government which it could have discharged itself. But a system that is woven into the social fabric can be abolished only by the creation of conditions which will make it atrophy. The NAP-JUI regime pretended to seek the end but opposed the employment of the very means which would bring it about. There can be little doubt that, as civil administration will take root and all traces of insurgency will be wiped out from the Province, the sardari system will advance towards its extinction. 81. The Government of Pakistan is confident that the reconciliation of all tribesmen with the Province’s and the country’s development is an irreversible process. It is gratified that a military operation compelled by insurgency and by the terrain, the lack or paucity of communication and the absence of the machinery of civil administration in Baluchistan has not only been conducted with the minimum use of force necessary but has also yielded beneficent result in economic development. The political situation in Baluchistan need no longer cause the apprehension that the Province is dominated by elements that bear loyalty to forces other that their own people and country. There is no suspension of political life in Baluchistan. Nor is there any disparity between representative government in Baluchistan and that is each of other three provinces. The Province Legislature is functioning normally. The canard that the Province is ruled by a minority government is disproved by the party composition of the Baluchistan Legislative Assembly which is as follows:-- National Awami Party 8 (including two under detention) Pakistan People’s Party 7 NAP (Pakhtunkhwa) 1 Jamiat-e-Ulemai-i-Islam 2 Pakistan Muslim league (Qayum group) 2 Independent 1

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Total 21 Thus, even assuming that all members of NAP endorse the policies of their party leadership (which they might not), they number less than 40 per cent of the Legislature. The External Plot 82. Mainly because of the success of conciliation and Baluchistan the leadership of NAP and an unfriendly power, Afghanistan they have synchronized moves in a four doomed attempt to internationalize and issue that is solely and entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan. In this, the lead has come from the regime of sardar Muhammad Dawood Khan in Afghanistan which openly claims Baluchistan and North West Frontier as a part of Pakhtunistan. Following the long and virulent campaign by Radio Kabul against Pakistan, sardar Dawood regime in August 1974 addressed letters to the secretary general of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the Islamic International Secretariat seeking to involve them in Baluchistan situation. The bid to infuse something new into Kabul’s version conditions in Baluchistan, began with a signal from the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Wahid Abdullah. As he repeated the Daud regime’s usual tirade against Pakistan, and added that he foresaw a war against Pakistan in the near future---a war in which, he declared Afghanistan would not stand alone----several Pakistani politicians whose record shows that their moves are carefully coordinated with those of Kabul, went into action. On 4 October 1974 they passed a resolution which was tantamount to inviting foreign interventions in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. Three days later, they visited various embassies in Islamabad trying to persuade the envoys to violate diplomatic norms, and receive them and hear them their version of situation in Baluchistan. In doing so, they exposed their unconfessed wish for Pakistan to surrender its sovereignty and become a pawn in the hands of foreign powers. The fact that not one envoy agreed to cast aside diplomatic proprieties did not deter these politicians from continuing to work in concert with Kabul. They went ahead with preparations to organize Baluchistan Day on 11 October 1974. As expected, this campaign failed. The people of Pakistan---first and foremost, the people of Baluchistan itself---have lent to credence to the distorted picture of the situation in the province which is purveyed to them by these engineers of disorder. 83. It is necessary hear to refer to the ramifications of the conspiracy of which the NAP leadership has become a willing agent. Without such reference, a deeper understanding of their motivation may be difficult. The elements in Baluchistan and NWFP that are at odds with the Government clearly draw their support from outside forces which seek to make these provinces secede from Pakistan. it is an indication, not of the weakness of the conspiracy, but of the absurdity of their case that there is a large measure of incoherence and inconsistency in it. Some speak of “Greater Baluchistan” and other of “Pakhtoonistan” and except in rare cases, they have avoided defining the territories which they have notionally included in their place. “Pakhtoonistan” has been describes at various times as a state of stretching from “Jehlum to Oxus”, “Margalla Pass to the Oxus”, NWFP renamed “Pakhtoonistan within Pakistan”, a new country comprising both NWFP and Baluchistan”, or a “Greater Afghan” state going upto the Arabian Sea with the Indus as its eastern border. The most vociferous group for “Greater Baluchistan” is located elsewhere but since the assumption of power by Sardar Muhammad Daud in Afghanistan, Kabul has also become highly vocal on behalf of the tribal sardar for whom the only attraction for the present Afghan system can be its feudal society and lack of democratic institutions. Maps published by different groups of these elements abroad show that

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they claim almost as much territory from each other as they do from Pakistan and Iran. This, perhaps accounts for friction between them. The lack of support from the Baluch and Pathans has of course been evident for over two decades. But groups in the country have continued to function with the help of foreign elements that are interested either in weakening Pakistan and Iran or getting access to the sea by absorbing either “Greater Baluchistan” or “Pakhtoonistan” or both. The “Greater Baluchistan” map claims, the whole of the Pakistan territory of Baluchistan plus the Jecobabad-Kshmore areas of Sindh, the Dera Ghazi Khan area of Punjab, a slice of NWFP, and all of Baluchistan’s Pathan majority areas in pockets or adjoining NWFP. The Pakistan territory however forms less than half of total area covered in the map. The remaining area also draws in the Afghan territory of Farah and parts of the Hilmand valley and a good part of Iran. Its western boundary runs from Lingeh on the gulf coast to Turkamanistan (USSR) taking in Kirman, Zarind and Turbat-e-Haideri. Its southern base of about a thousand miles runs from Lingeh along the gulf coast to Sonmiani near Karach. As stated earlier that there is no precise territorial demarcation of Pakhtoonistan. A postage stamp issued by Afghanistan Government shows this map covering the territory of Baluchistan, blotting out its name and calling the whole area Pakhtoonistan. 84. These inconsistencies do not end with territory. They extend to arguments supposedly on ethnic grounds, advance in favoure of the preposterously irredentist claim of Pakhtoonistan. While the NAP leader in Paksitan propagate their four nationalities concept, their mentor, Me Abdul Ghafar Khan in his Pakhtoonistan day speech in 1976 and his autobiography written by Mr. Kanwar Bhan Narrang speaks in a different strain where he stated that all Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkamans, Uzbeks, Baluch and Pathans whether they speak Pashto or not show in effect for get their separate identities and call themselves Pakhtoons living in a state extending from the Amu (Oxus River) and to the west as for as Herat and to the south as for as Jehlum River. He seems to desire that while the various groups in Afghanistan should forget their ethnic and linguistic difference and accept one nationhood as Pathans, there should be no single nationhood in Pakistan because he advises Sindh Baluchistan Punjab and Pakhtoonistan to join together (obviously as an independent state) with India, Iran and Afghanistan. It seems that after years of regular meeting with Afghan and Indian leaders are diplomats, he felt that there was little chance of success in pressing only for NWFP’s separation from Pakistan. The seeds of secessions therefore had to be cast over a wider area in the hope that they would sprout simultaneously and make it difficult for patriotic elements to deal with them all at once. The strategy seems to be for concurrent and not consecutive action. 85 Whatever its variations, the strategy is being foiled by the Government of Pakistan. The Government is confident that the irresponsible utterances and behavior of Kabul regime apart, no power—far less a global one--- will find its interest served by instability in the region in which West Pakistan is placed. No policy, domestic or foreign can be predicted on rumours or promises of study foreign patronage with which the ring leaders have sought to maintain the moral of their followers will gradually subside and realistic and peaceful loving outlook will prevail both in the region and beyond. Conclusion 86. With the insurgency in Baluchistan having virtually ended, the military operation in the Province has achieved the results at which it was aimed. The Government has treated with

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magnanimity not only the hostiles who have surrender but also those who were captured. This is apparent from the announcement made by the Prime Minister on October 15 1974. The amnesty is explained by the fact mentioned by the Prime Minister that the operation in Baluchistan was not primarily a punitive action but a conciliation campaign. It was a campaign launched by the people’s Government and it could not have been sustained except with popular support. After the inevitable difficulties and setbacks a turning point was reached recently but it could not have been reached if the aim had not been the consolidation of Pakistan’s national integrity in which alone lies the progress and prosperity of Baluchistan. The Government is resolved that Baluchistan be an equal partner in Pakistan’ national enterprise. Appendix 1 The statement issued by the Federal Government on the situation in Baluchistan on 14th April 1974. The following statement was issued at the conclusion this evening of the two day meeting to review the situation in Baluchistan which was held under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The situation in Baluchistan has been under the constant review of the Federal Government. it was the Provincial Government which made a specific request for military assistance to civil power in Province the necessity was rooted in the peculiarly under developed conditions of Baluchistan willfully depleted what civil administration existed and seriously impaired its functioning. During the last one year the Federal Government has taken a series of steps to establish civil administration in the Province and to extend it to hitherto inaccessible areas. A number of political agencies have been setup in the tribal areas and their personnel installed. This has proceeded in parallel with the acceleration of development work. A high level meeting to review the situation as it now exists was held on 13 and 14 April under the chairmanship of Prime Minister. It was attended amongst others by the Governments of Baluchistan and NWFP, the Chief Minister of baluchistan and Federal and Provincail Ministers. The Chief of the Army Staff was also invited to give the latest accessement of the situation. The Federal Government notes with satisfaction with the task of restoring tranquility to the Province has been largely in accomplished and there has been a study and progressive improvement in the law and order situation. It is further gratified that the civil administrative machinery has now been effectively geared to take over the responsibility of the maintenance of law and order. The meeting came to the conclusion that the first phase in the effort of ameliorating the feudal and primitive conditions in Baluchistan can now be considered to have been completed. In the view of these positive developments the Prime Minister has decided that from 15 May, all military operations in aid of civil power in Baluchistan will cease. The responsibility of maintaining law and order will thenceforth vest in civil administration.

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For sometime now the army has undertaken development work in Baluchistan which includes the building of roads, the sinking of tubewells, the opening of schools and electrification of villages, particularly in the romter part of the Province. Evidently such work can not allowed to be interrupted. It has, therefore being decided that the army will continued to discharge these limited functions in the Province until they can be taken over by appropriate civil agencies. The Prime Minister has further decided to grant amnesty to all persons detained with the Province who are not implicated in cases of serious criminal nature. Those people were not involve in serious crimes, but had left their homes, are invited to return and feel assured of due protection. These decisions are based on confidence that, with the return of tranquility in Baluchistan, the extrea-ordinary measures which had earlier become imperative or no longer necessary. These are but the first step towards opening a new chapter in the life of Baluchistan which promises social, political and economic progress in the Province. Conscious of experience in the past Government does not wish to take any illconsidered or hasty steps in a attempt to evolve an instant solution for complicated questions which area a legacy of earlier regimes. The interest of the people of Baluchistan are as close concern of the Federal Government as those of any other Province of Pakistan. the Government trusts that, in an environment free from distractions, these interests will be steadily advanced and disparity between conditions in Baluchistan and those in other Provinces will before long the be overcome. The objective required the utmost cooperation of progressive and forward looking elements in Baluchistan. The Government is confident that this cooperation will be forthcoming. Government of Pakistan Rawalpindi, 14 April 1974 Appendix II Statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in Quetta on 15 October 1974 On 8th October I stated a press conference in Peshawar that I would make an announcement about Baluchistan on October 14 or 15 which would contain happy news for the nation. Today I am gratefully in a position to inform the nation that the organize resistance to legal authority in Baluchistan which more precisely meant insurgency against the state, has come to an end. I must recall here that on 14 April the Federal Government stated that there had been a study and, progressive improvement in the law and order situation in the Marri and Bugti areas of Baluchistan and that the first phase in the effort of ameliorating the feudal and primitive conditions in Baluchistan could be considered to have been complete. In view of this positive development I noted that from the 15th May, military operation in the aid of civil power would cease and that amnesty would b granted to all persons detained within the Province who were not implicated in cases of serious criminal nature. The people who had left their homes and taken to the hills were invited to return and feel assured of the due protection.

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later on 2nd August had a public meeting in Quetta I asked those who were still offereing resistance to come down from mountains by 15 October and lay down their arms without fear. I assured them that they would be treated with dignity.

The offer of partial amnesty which was contained in the statement of 14 April was misconstrued by the insurgence as a sign of weakness, with the result that they accelerated their activities. This compelled the Government to launch suitable counter measures.

I am glad, however, that my call of 2nd August, with the counter measures which were adopted had evoked a positive response from the insurgent tribesmen. They started moving down from the hills and surrendered to the administration along with their weapons.

PROMINENT FIGURES

To start with they came down in small groups but the move gained momentum. So far, about 5,000 Marris’ and a number of persons from the Jhalawan areas have presented themselves with their arms to the authorities. Some of the prominent figures, who had laid down their arms along with their follower are:---

Ali Gul Thingiani, Ghulam Rasool Zing, Saida Thingiani, Janghan Thingiani, Dilwash Thingiani, Chargul Thigiani, Safar Khan Piradidiane, Haji Aru Pawadi, Haibat Pawadi, Yaar Khan Pawadi, Kamal Khan.

I must make it clear that the opposition in Baluchistan, of which we know, see the decisive result that has been of a scale far larger than the necessary and ordinary law and order situation. While the total strength of hardcore of hostiles was about 4,000 Mengals and 5000 Marris, when the trouble initially started, this number eventually grow to thousands. This was because the insurgents drew towards them a large number of carriers of supplies and others who were misled by their chiefs.

Statements made by a large number of hostile tribesmen who recently accepted my offer and turned, in their guns have been revealing. They indicate that they were incited by the agents of Sardars with such stories that they were to fight a foreign power or that, when the construction of roads was complete the Government would take away their sheep and break up their families by sending their children to schools to learn alien tradition and behavior. Whatever, was said to them was enough together with their traditional readiness to obey all the commands of their sardars, to take to the hills and to work in shifts to snipe at army, patrol and engineers building roads into their hitherto inaccessible areas.

It was that this thick coating of recaletrience which took the administration considerable time to pierce.

Happily now that our call has met with a positive response, we are in position to treat with magnanimity all who offered resistance to the Government and were either captured or

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voluntarily surrendered and accordingly, I announce the Government has decided to grant them full amnesty.

In doing so I am confident that the valour and resistance of Balu character, which was manifested in their resistance to the state will now animate their participation in the social, economic, political and cultural life of the Baluchistan. Let all the people of Pakistan remember that the grant of forgiven to an erstwhile foe conforms to the highest Islamic traditions. It was the beloved founder of our faith who set the supreme example of it when he entered Makkah as a conqueror and forgave all those who had fought the spread of Islam years and subjected helpless Muslims to unbearable persecution and torture.

In saying this, I am sure, I voice the sentiments of those brave officers and jawans who have suffered injuries during the operation and their comrades and families. The Jawans and officers who led their lives in the Mengal and Marri areas of baluchistan paid the supreme price for the consolidation of their nation’s integrity and thus for its defence. I salute their memory and I am sure that their families that were thus bereaved—like the people of Paksitan—realise that the secrificies were made so that then nation should be unified and those estranged should now be reconciled. It can not be forgotten that the military operation which has been conducted in Baluchistan was not a punitive action but essentially a conciliation campaign. The army was given a clear mandate by the Government to ;

MANDATE a) Assist the civil administration in restoring law and order in the affected areas; b) Apprehended hostile elements and recover unauthorised arms and other warlike stores; c) Maintain the security of the lines of communication in the affected areas and undertake whatever action was necessary against the hostile elements and d) Assist the civil administration in various development and uplift projects in the Marri and Mengal areas. The aims of the operation were thus clrearly defined. Since these aims have now been fulfilled in large measure, the Federal Government has come to the conclusion that a stage had arrived for a forwarded looking move towards reconciliation and burying an unfortunate past. It has been demonstrated beyond doubt that misguided tribesmen cannot challenge the writ of Government. Therefore, it is from this position that the Government has granted general amnesty today. The amnesty reflect the firm conviction of the people and the Government that all its resources, including its physical power, have to be used in the service of the people and not against them. The Government trusts that the response to the amnesty announced today will be one of the participation in the process of rehabilitation and the progress of the trouble areas of Baluchistan.

RING LEADERS

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There remains now only the task of clearing a way the remnants of insurgency and apprehending certain hostile ring leaders who are still at large. They are invited to lay down their arms by 15th December. If they do not, their cases will also be sympathetically considered in the hope that it will enable them to lead an honorable and peaceful life as loyal citizens of Pakistan. these are : Mir Hazar Khan Rahmkani, Said Ali Rahmkani, Wazir Khan Badini, Shabaz Marghaini, Miskili Salarani, Mir Jan Sherani, Abdul Karim (Karimoo) Langin, Shakari Kalwani, saifal Loharani, Mehrab Khan Chalghari, Sharbat Khan Shalghari, Shadu Chalghari, Mehrullah Shahizai Mengal, Abdul Karim (Abdoo) Gamshadzai, Kangi Khan (Jangoo) Ramzanzai, Mir Safar Khan Zarakzai, Bhahzaida Salman Ahmedzai, Murad jan Bizenjo, Aslam Gichki, Uhaista Khan Zagar Mengal, Akram Khan Zagar Mengal and Esa Khan Mengal. The nation is fully aware of the background of the situation in baluchistan which rendered a military operation necessary. This will further be set out in detail in a white paer which the Government will use on 19th October. Here I must recall that Baluchistan gained the real status of a ful fledge Province of Pakistan only with the promulgation, under the People’s party administration of the interim constitution in April 1972. In colonial times other Provinces of Pakistan were administered by a Governor and a representative cabinet but Baluchistan’s affairs were entrusted to the lower ranking Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner. Given this history Baluchistan could hardly be expected to have such an established structure of civil administration as existed in the Punjab and Sindh and NWFP. When the burden of reconstructining Pakistan after the disaster of 1971 fell on the shoulders of my Government, I gave highest priority to enabling Baluchistan, to be an equal partner in the country’s political life. I wanted to start with a clean slate and not only allowed the composition of Provincial Cabinet by a coalition of other parties but also led that coalation nominate the Governor of the Province. EXPERIMENT The experiment was made in good faith and the Governor was appointed on the aussrance by him that there would be harmonious relationship between the Centre and the Province, no political victimisation would occur and that nothing would be done to weaken nation integrity. Even though the then Chief Minister of Baluchistan on his appointment acknowledged my administration’s efforts to accelerate the pace of economic development in Baluchistan, his coalition government subsequently assumed a studiously non-cooperative attitude towards the Federal Government and deliberately created conditions of tribal warfare an anarchy in the Province. It depleted the law enforcing agencies of the Province and clearly appeared to be working in concert with force hostile to the integrity of Pakistan. DEFIANCE It is well-known that embryonic movement of the defiance of the central authority in the Pakistan erupted during the tenure of Ayub Khan and it grew and continued afterwards. Consequent on the breakaway of East Pakistan, the instigators of this movement thought that they would somehow clinch the issue and make Baluchistan splinter from the country. Ali the actions of the NAP-JUI coalition, when it held an office, and it was dismissed, betrayed the conviction of their leaders that they had only to give one more push and the structure of central authority over Baluchistan would topple. The Federal Government resolved to disabuse them

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of this extravagation notion. This was a situation which pre-eminently called for Federal Government to send Armed Forces in aid of civil administration in view of the fact that a situation had arisen in which it was not possible for civil authorities, with the help of Levies and Police only, to overcome insurgency. Considering the terrain, the lack or paucity of communications and the absence of normal machinery of civil administration in Baluchistan, the Federal Government had no option but to respond to Baluchistan’s need and help banish strife and conflict from the Province. The whole effort has been not only to overcome insurgency but also to stimulate the development of Baluchistan. I must mention here that, although rich in economic potential, Baluchistan has suffered from cruel neglect in the past. Government investment in this Province never exceeded rupees 30 million in any year during the entire decade preceding 1970. But, in 1972-73 my Government allocated Rs. 120 million to the Province. The allocation was increased to Rs. 180 million in the following year and is now Rs. 210 million for the current year. In addition the Goverrnment’s expenditure through its Federal Agencies is Rs. 150 million annually, making a total of Rs. 360 million. In fact, the public sector’s actual expenditure since 1972-73 has been more than twice the cumulative expenditure during the entire preceding decade. PRIMARY EMPHASIS The primary emphasis is on providing water, generating electricity, constructing roads, meeting the food deficit of Baluchistan and abolishing feudal institutions like the “Shishak”. It is a measure of Baluchistan success in normalizing its administration and enlisting the cooperation of the people that why no wheat was ever procured for distribution by the Provincial Government, this year the procurement has nearly doubled its target. Drilling rigs, bulldozers and tractors have now appeared where hitherto they could not even be imagined. Tribesmen are seeing electricity for the first time. Schools, and hospitals have been opened in places where ignorance and disease were regarded as man’s unchangeable lot. Nearly one out of every ten people who have come down from the mountains is suffering from T.B. they have been flown out in the banches of ten for medical treatment. To the outsider, these achievements may appears insignificant, but one has only to visit the areas to see the tremendous change that is Now taking place. As a result of the intense development activity, inaugurated during the past year, Baluchistan is now poised for social and economic development and is rising to the same level as the other provinces of Pakistan. In retrospect, it will be seen that the whole campaign was neither motivated by the partisan interest nor aimed at a petty advantage. Launching an operation of this character, it would be ludicrous to suppose that a Government would seek something so relatively inconsequential as the holding of certain offices by one party’s members or those of another. What was at the stake in Baluchistan was not would or would not be the Governor of Chief Minister, but for larger question of whether Pakistan consolidate its unity and make itself invulnerable to internal fission.

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It is the initiation of the Government’s development effort and the success of the Government conciliation campaign that is responsible for further action of external forces which sought the further disintegration of Pakistan. This explains why recently the Kabul regime took some extraordinary initiatives in order to internationalize an issue that is solely and entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan. These initiatives were synchronize with activities of certain individuals in Pakistan. The most recent move in this coordinate campaign was a memorandum presented to foreign envoys by these individuals on the same day that a spokesman of the Kabul regime made a speech hostile to Pakistan at United Nations. These elements made it manifest that they have not vestige of a sense of their country’s sovereignty and independence. Their activities have been thwarted and their agents stand exposed. The Government is confident that the reconciliation in Baluchistan with the province and the country’s development is an irreversiable process. It is the patriotism of people of Baluchistan which is Pakistan’s first line of defense in this region. This line will remain impregnable. BOMB BLASTS It is noteworthy that, when a turning point had been reached in Baluchistan and the nation is being released from its anxiety on this score, bomb blasts have occurred in a number of places. Evidently, these are acts of desperation which are committed at this crucial time only under foreign inspiration. The Government assures the people that it will that it will be effectively deal with the perpetrators of those crimes and liquidate the plot of which they the agents. The campaign which was launched by the People’s Government could not have been sustained except with the backing of the popular will. Inevitably experienced difficulties and suffered some setbacks, but it met with success because of our unshakable resolve to preserve and defend national unity. I see a Baluchistan which is no longer driven from within and no longer a tempting target of foreign plots. It is a Baluchistan which will be an equal participant in the country’s political, economic, social and cultural life. Let no one in Pakistan now fear that Baluchistan is dominated by those who bear loyalty to elements other than their own people and their own country. After much pain and distress, we have truned the corner and we can offer gratitude to Allah that the mission if internally consolidating the nation’s has been fulfilled.

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