DOCSLIB.ORG

Phd DISSERTATIONS of NORTHWESTERN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM – FINO

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Phd DISSERTATIONS of NORTHWESTERN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM – FINO PhD DISSERTATIONS OF NORTHWESTERN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM – FINO Self-evidence in Ethics. From Intuitions to Emotions Fabio Mancini 2018 Examination Committee/Commissione di esame: prof. Carla Bagnoli prof. Sergio Filippo Magni prof. Fabrice Teroni The copyright of this Dissertation rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. End User Agreement This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No- Derivatives 4.0 International License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nd/4.0/legalcode You are free to share, to copy, distribute and transmit the work under the following conditions: • Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). • Non-Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. • No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work, without proper citation and acknowledgement of the source. In case the dissertation would have found to infringe the polity of plagiarism it will be immediately expunged from the site of FINO Doctoral Consortium CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 6 1. SELF-EVIDENCE AND INTUITIONISM 1.1 Framing the issue .............................................................. 11 1.2 What is ethical intuitionism............................................... 17 1.3 Intuitions and self-evidence in ethical intuitionism .......... 22 1.3.1 Sidgwick’s conditions on intuition and self-evidence.... 22 1.3.2 Moore, self-evidence and intrinsic good ........................ 27 1.3.3 Prichard, self-evidence and the error of philosophy ...... 33 1.3.4 W. D. Ross: self-evidence and actual duty..................... 36 1.4 The nature of self-evidence ............................................... 41 1.4.1What are self-evident propositions .................................. 45 1.4.2 Self-evidence and apriori in the moral domain .............. 47 1.5 Self-evidence and fallibility .............................................. 51 1.6 Reducing intuition to self-evidence................................... 55 1.7 Conclusion ......................................................................... 59 2. A STRONG TIE BETWEEN SELF-EVIDENCE AND INTUITIONS 2.1 Framing the issue .............................................................. 60 2.2 The authority of intuitions ................................................. 63 2.2.1 Intuitions and self-evidence ........................................... 70 2.3 Theories of intuitions ........................................................ 76 2.3.1 Intuitions as beliefs......................................................... 76 2.3.2 Intuitions as intellectual seemings.................................. 80 2.4 Understanding and knowing.............................................. 86 2.5 The double nature if intuitions .......................................... 89 2.6 Conclusion ......................................................................... 91 3. OBJECTIONS TO SELF-EVIDENCE IN ETHICS 3.1 Framing the issue .............................................................. 92 3.2 The objection of relativity ................................................. 93 3.3 The objection of disagreement .......................................... 96 3.4 The objection of moral motivation .................................. 103 3.4.1 Nowell-Smith, Mackie and moral motivation .............. 104 3 3.4.2 Constructivist objections: Rawls and Koorsgaard ....... 111 3.4.3 Darwall on intuitionism and motivation....................... 114 3.5 An emotivist argument against self-evidence ................. 121 4. SELF-EVIDENCE AND COMMON SENSE MORALITY 4.1Framing the issue ............................................................. 125 4.2 Sidgwick, common sense morality and self-evidence .... 130 4.3 Common sense as moral expert ....................................... 138 4.4 Dispositional intuitions and default reasonable beliefs ... 142 4.5 Entitlement and self-evident principles of morality ........ 145 4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................... 154 5. EMOTIONS AND THE APRIORI 5.1 Framing the issue ............................................................ 155 5.2Williams on emotions and understanding ........................ 164 5.3 Emotions and understanding self-evident propositions .. 167 5.4 Emotions and Knowledge ............................................... 174 5.4.1From intuitions to emotions .......................................... 175 5.4.1 Emotions and seemings ................................................ 183 5.5. Emotional entitlement and self-evident propositions ..... 189 5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................... 191 Concluding remarks ............................................................ 192 References ............................................................................ 195 4 Acknowledgements I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, professor Luca Fonnesu. I would have neither started this project without his initial inputs, nor I would have finished it without the ideal combination of competence, trust and freedom which he has provided. I want to thank all the members of the Department of Humanities of University of Pavia. For insightful exchanges, I am grateful to professor Sergio Filippo Magni and to professor Tommaso Piazza. I have also benefited from fruitful discussions with my PhD colleagues - too many to be listed – and from the excellent collaboration of the offices of the Department of Humanities of University of Pavia. Last but not least, professor Carlo Penco, coordinator of the FINO-Consortium, has provided precious organizational support during the final phase of the course. I owe a special debt to professor Fabrice Teroni - I will be always grateful to him for insights and for the feedbacks -, to professor Julien Deonna and to all participants of the Thumos Seminar at the University of Geneva. I wish to thank Professor Robert Audi that I was lucky to meet both in Rome and in South Bend, Indiana, during my visit at the University of Notre Dame. My huge debt toward him is evident throughout the research. I am also very grateful to Professor Paolo Pagani, to Professor Carmelo Vigna and to all the members of the CISE seminars of the University of Venice, from whom I learned more than what they could imagine. During the second and the third year of my Ph.D. program, I had the incredible opportunity of taking part in the activities of the Swiss Centre interdisciplinaire of sciences affectives (CISA) as associate member. I learned a lot not only from philosophers but from scholars of more or less related fields as well. More personally, I am grateful to all my family, parents, in-laws and friends who have supported me during these years. I want to dedicate this work to my wife Flavia – only those whose partner has written a PhD-thesis know how much patience and support are needed - and to my son Bernardo – born during the final stages of the writing of the dissertation. Domodossola-Pavia, September 2018 5 Introduction “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. The opening lines of the United States Declaration of Independence, approved by the Congress on the 4th of July 1776, emphatically affirm that the spirt of the Declaration is based on self-evident truths. In an article published on 5 July 2016 in The Washington Post two hundred forty years later, John Inazu, professor of law at the Washington University in St. Louis, claims that we disagree today on these self-evident truths, as we did when the Declaration was approved. He contrasts the optimistic assertion of the Declaration with the current problems that the USA faces – that concern, for instance, the role of religion in the public life as much as the value of the life and of liberty – and that undermine the claim to an agreement on the underpinnings of the State. ‘How should we approach these challenges when we think about being a nation joined together by “self-evident” truths?’ wonders Inazu – ‘our lack of agreement about […] Equality, Liberty, and Happiness raises significant challenges for how we identify and prioritize our common interests and shared goals’. Following the article, we can conclude that the problem for those who appeal to self-evidence is that the existence of self-evident truths is not itself self-evident. The problem of self-evidence in ethics, a topic of much discussion in contemporary moral philosophy, is the issue with which I will deal in the present work. Specifically, I will analyze and discuss the relationship between self-evidence – to be understood as a property of propositions– and intuitions – to be understood as mental sates by which those propositions are apprehended. According to a long-standing philosophical tradition, intuitions are major routes to self-evidence. A great variety of articles and books has been published on the topic and the attention paid to intuitions and self- evidence, together and separately, has grown over the past few decades. Nonetheless, much work in this direction is still needed. The importance of the topic
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ethical Intuitionism: a Structural Critique
    J Value Inquiry (2016) 50:631–647 DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9547-8 Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique Danny Frederick1 Published online: 8 February 2016 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 1 Introduction Recent years have seen attempts by many philosophers to rehabilitate, with some modifications, a traditional doctrine of ethical intuitionism (henceforward ‘‘intu- itionism’’). Contemporary intuitionists claim that moral knowledge consists of those propositions that are known by intellectual reflection (intuition), by moral observation or by moral emotion, or which are capable of being cogently inferred from propositions which are items of moral knowledge. Some intuitionists, such as Michael Huemer, admit only intuition (of particular or of general propositions) as a non-inferential source of moral knowledge; but others, such as Robert Audi, allow also moral observation and moral emotion. I offer a critique of contemporary intuitionist theories that depends upon their common structure: analysis of the abstract features of the approach show it to be an inadequate account of moral knowledge. I use Huemer and Audi as representative intuitionists. The differences between their views, and between their views and those of other intuitionists, are incidental at the level of generality of my argument. In section 2, I outline the contemporary intuitionist approach to moral knowledge. In sections 3, 4 and 5, I show that the problem of inter-cultural conflict undermines the claims that moral intuition, moral observation and moral emotion, respectively, are sources of non-inferential moral knowledge. I also explain the inadequacy of the intuitionist attempt to solve the problem by invoking bias or intellectual or moral failings.
    [Show full text]
  • MINEOLA BIBLE INSTITUTE and SEMINARY Philosophy II Radically
    MINEOLA BIBLE INSTITUTE AND SEMINARY Page | 1 Philosophy II Radically, Biblical, Apostolic, Christianity Bishop D.R. Vestal, PhD Larry L Yates, ThD, DMin “Excellence in Apostolic Education since 1991” 1 Copyright © 2019 Mineola Bible Institute Page | 2 All Rights Reserved This lesson material may not be used in any manner for reproduction in any language or use without the written permission of Mineola Bible Institute. 2 Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 7 Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) ........................................................................................... 8 Philip II of Macedonia (382-336 B.C.) ....................................................................................... 12 Page | 3 “Olympias the mother of Alexander was an evil woman. .......................................... 13 Philip II (of Macedonia) (382-336 BC) .............................................................................. 13 Aristotle (384-322 BC) ............................................................................................................... 15 Works .................................................................................................................................... 16 Methods ............................................................................................................................... 17 Doctrines ............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Kantian Intuitionism
    An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism A critique of Mackie's scepticism, and an alternative proposal combining Ross's intuitionism with a Kantian epistemology by Simon John Duffy PhD The University of Edinburgh 2001 PhD Thesis: An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism - Page 1 CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................................... 4 DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................... 6 1 .................................................................................................................................................................... OUR BELIEFS ABOUT MORALITY .................................................................................................................................................................... 11 1.1 WHAT DO WE OWE COMMON-SENSE? .11 1.2 OUR EVERYDAY CONCEPTION OF ETHICS .17 1.3 THE CENTRALITY OF DUTY .24 1.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUTY .32 2 .................................................................................................................................................................... THE SCEPTICAL ATTACK ...................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ¼ PHILOSOPHY of RELIGION.Pdf
    ACONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA of the PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION other books in the same series A Concise Encyclopedia of Judaism, Dan Cohn-Serbok, ISBN 1–85168–176–0 A Concise Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Klaus K. Klostermaier, ISBN 1–85168–175–2 A Concise Encyclopedia of Christianity, Geoffrey Parrinder, ISBN 1–85168–174–4 A Concise Encyclopedia of Buddhism, John Powers, ISBN 1–85168–233–3 A Concise Encyclopedia of the Baha´’ı´ Faith, Peter Smith, ISBN 1–85168–184–1 A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, Gordon D. Newby, ISBN 1–85168–295–3 related titles published by oneworld Ethics in the World Religions, Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–247–3 The Fifth Dimension, John Hick, ISBN 1–85168–191–4 Global Philosophy of Religion: A Short Introduction, Joseph Runzo, ISBN 1–85168–235–X God: A Guide for the Perplexed, Keith Ward, ISBN 1–85168–284–8 God, Faith and the New Millennium, Keith Ward, ISBN 1–85168–155–8 Love, Sex and Gender in the World Religions, Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–223–6 The Meaning of Life in the World Religions, Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–200–7 The Phenomenon of Religion, Moojan Momen, ISBN 1–85168–161–2 ACONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA of the PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ANTHONY C. THISELTON A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Oneworld Publications (Sales and Editorial) 185 Banbury Road Oxford OX2 7AR England www.oneworld-publications.com # Anthony C. Thiselton 2002 All rights reserved. Copyright under Berne Convention A CIP record for this title is available from the British Library ISBN 1–85168–301–1 Cover design by Design Deluxe Typeset by LaserScript, Mitcham, UK Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by Bell & Bain Ltd, Glasgow NL08 Contents Preface and acknowledgements vi A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 1 Chronology 329 Index of names 337 Preface and acknowledgements Aims, scope and target readership he following selection of subject entries has been shaped in the light of Tmany years of feedback from my own students.
    [Show full text]
  • A Further Reinterpretation of the Moral Philosophy of John Stuart Mill
    A FURTHER REINTERPRETATION OF THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL. by Derek Jo Banks M.A.9 University of Glasgow, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Philosophy 0 DEREK JOHN BANKS 1972 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY January 1972 Name : Derek J. Banks !iiitlc of '.thesis : li ir'urther deinterpretation of the Floral I'hilosophy of John ,Stuart Mill Examining Cornrni-ttee : Chairman: Kay Jennings """ Lionel Kenner Senior Supervisor P "-" Donald G. Brown Lxt ernal Axaminer &of essor of 'hilosophy University of British Columbia I ABSTRACT Those of Mill's critics who focus their attention on Utilitarianism assume that Mill must have held that certain ethical sentences, including one expressing the principle of utility, are properly describable as true. In this thesis I set out to demonstrate the spuriousness of this assumption. I begin by showing that in several important works - works which he thought much more highly of than he did Utilitarianism - Mill denied that the truth (or falsity) of any ethical sentences can ever be established. Next I produce evidence that his reason for this denial lies in his commitment to the view that ethical sentences are really disguised imperative sentences, and hence have no truth-value. Pinally, it is argued that there is nothing in Utilitarianism that is inconsistent with the meta-ethical position which we have found him to adopt in his other works related to ethics. In a short coneluding chapter I devote as much space as I deem permissible in a thesis of this type to show that reinterpretation of Mill's ethical theory on an imperative model renders it more plausible than it is generally taken to be, since all theories which allow truth-values to ethical sentences are open to knock-down objections.
    [Show full text]
  • A Perceptual Theory of Hope
    AN OPEN ACCESS Ergo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY A Perceptual Theory of Hope MICHAEL MILONA Auburn University KATIE STOCKDALE1 Sam Houston State University This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We ar- gue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the con- tent of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. Our proposal stands in contrast with familiar views on which hope is fundamentally about the good. We conclude by considering the increasingly popular idea that some hopes are non- intentional and thus, by implication, non- perceptual. We reply by arguing that our perceptual theory plausibly generalizes to these instances of hope. Keywords: hope, perception, emotion, moral psychology 1. Introduction The view that hope involves a desire for p and a belief that p’s obtaining is pos- sible but not certain has become known as the standard or orthodox account of hope (Martin 2014; Meirav 2009). Some philosophers think that the standard view is sufficient to capture some of our trivial hopes, like the hope that the sun will come out soon (Calhoun in press; Pettit 2004). There is widespread consen- sus in the literature, however, that the standard account cannot make sense of our most significant hopes, like the hope to be cured of cancer or the hope that a wrongdoer be brought to justice.
    [Show full text]
  • From: Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (2005)
    From:214 L—rsmkv!rs—ks—syxsMichael Huemer,sm! Ethical Intuitionism (2005) finds Sally funny, but later decides he was mistaken about her funniness when the audience merely groans.) It seems, then, that humor subjectivism is far more defensible than moral subjectivism. One further point. Many examples of 'obviously subjective' properties may have evaluative components, and this will stymie any attempt to give them purely subjectivist analyses. 'If baby-killing i mpressed a lot of people, then baby-killing would be cool' is false because baby-killing is bad, and 'cool' implies 'good' (whatever else it implies). Similarly, in some cases, a person may argue that something is 'not funny' on moral grounds—for instance, that it is inappropriate to laugh at a thing because doing so would offend others or express a bad attitude. Perhaps 'funny' implies 'not bad to laugh at'. 'Sexy' may similarly imply 'not bad (or abnormal) to feel sexual attraction towards'. If this is so, then of course these concepts will resist purely subjectivist treatments, but that would not pose a challenge to the arguments of this book. :08 E}ur{zout gtj kznoiy 8.6.1 The evolutionary objection to realism Sociobiologists (or 'evolutionary psychologists', in the current lingo) have offered explanations for moral behavior and moral beliefs, in terms of the theory of evolution. Since evolution generally leads us to expect selfishness, the main problem has been taken to be that of explaining why we often help others at some cost to ourselves. Proffered partial explanations include: Kin selection: We help members of our own families, often at great expense to ourselves, because family members share many of the same genes.
    [Show full text]
  • The Italianate Englishman:‖ the Italian Influence in Elizabethan Literature
    International Research and Review: Journal of Phi Beta Delta Volume 1, Issue 1 Fall 2011 Honor Society of International Scholars ISSN: pending URL: http://www.phibetadelta.org/index.php/publications/online- journalsirr/316-current-issue.html ―The Italianate Englishman:‖ The Italian Influence in Elizabethan Literature Maureen Fox, B.A. California State University, Fullerton Whether it was thought of positively or negatively, Italy is a popular topic of discussion in Elizabethan literature. Some Elizabethan writers mimic Italian writers and incorporate Italian ideas into their own works, while other writers alter Italian literary conventions and openly attack Italian morals. This range of positive and negative sentiments towards Italy ultimately reveals the existence of a love-hate relationship between England and the Italian Renaissance that became a foundation of Elizabethan literature. My paper illustrates how various Elizabethan writers, including Sir Thomas Wyatt, Edmund Spenser, and William Shakespeare, demonstrate their awe for the Italian Renaissance by imitating Italy‘s greatest poets and integrating Italian ideas into their texts, reveal their feelings of inferiority and jealously towards Italy‘s literary and social progress through their efforts to improve upon Italian literature, and show a genuine fear of Italy‘s negative influence on English morals and values by using their works to warn against Italians‘ immoral natures. Keywords: Italy, England, Elizabethan Literature, Love-hate relationship Whether it is described as ―'the influenced Elizabethan literature. A closer Apothecary-shop of poison for all Nations'‖ look at Elizabethan literature shows that (Thomas Nashe, Pierce Penilesse, His Italian culture influenced England society by Supplication to the Divell, 1592, as cited in serving as an inspiration for creativity and as Jones 251) or ―'the fairest Lady, yea the an outlet for criticism.
    [Show full text]
  • Italy Between Fictional Past and Postnational Future
    No Future For You: Italy Between Fictional Past And Postnational Future Emanuel Rota Io non mi sento Italiano ma per fortuna o purtroppo lo sono --Giorgio Gaber In the past few decades the intellectuals who have been discussing globalization have predicted the demise of the nation-state. Italy is probably the first western country where such predictions have become common currency. Given the fragility of Italian national identity and the weakness of the Italian state, the foundering of the nation-state in Italy should not be a surprise. The celebrations for the 150th anniversary of political unification and their limited and controversial success in capturing the Italian political imagination should serve as a reminder that nation-states are, despite their efforts to appear timeless and transcendental, recent, historically-specific creations. Now, at what may be the end of an epoch, the present and the future of Italy already are already looking post-national.1 The “Southern Question,” Northern Separatism, and Pseudo-Federalism The globalization debates have underscored the long-standing failure of the Italian state to solve its most important and most obvious problem: the Southern Question. In 2007, according to the European Union, five southern regions of Italy—Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily—had a GDP per capita that was still less than 75% of the European average, while all the Northern Italian regions had a GDP per capita equal or superior to the European average (European Commission 2011, 47). As the map below shows, the GDP of Italy’s five southernmost regions is in line with the GDP of Greece and Portugal, while the GDP of the central and northern regions of Italy is in line with that of the neighboring countries to the north and west.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberty University School of Divinity a Non
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Liberty University Digital Commons LIBERTY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF DIVINITY A NON-VOLUNTARIST THEORY: AN ALTERNATE EVANGELICAL APOLOGETIC FOR DEALING WITH THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF LIBERTY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF DIVINITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY EVAN TAYLOR POSEY LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA OCTOBER 2016 APPROVAL SHEET A NON-VOLUNTARIST THEORY: AN ALTERNATE EVANGELICAL APOLOGETIC FOR DEALING WITH THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA Evan Taylor Posey Read and approved by: Chair Person: Richard A. Holland Reader: Edward N. Martin Reader: Anthony C. Thornhill Date: 10/9/2016 ii To my wife, Leslie-Ann, my children, and my family: There are no words that can adequately express my gratitude for your love, encouragement, and patience. iii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................ vi ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 Statement of Purpose and Thesis ...................................................................................... 10 Definitions .......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • A Presocratics Reader
    3. PYTHAGORAS AND EARLY PYTHAGOREANISM Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos in the eastern Aegean some time around 570 BCE; according to tradition his father was a gem-cutter or engraver. He reportedly traveled in Egypt and Babylonia, leaving Samos around 530 to escape the rule of the tyrant Polycrates. Eventually, Pythagoras settled in Croton, in southern Italy. There he was well-respected and gained political influence. He founded a community for himself and his followers that was philosophical, political, and religious. The exclusivity of the group angered some, and in about 500 there was an uprising in Croton (and elsewhere in Italy) against the Pythagoreans. The Pythagoreans were temporarily driven out of Croton, and many were killed. Pythagoras himself took refuge in Metapontum and died not long afterwards (some say he starved himself to death in a temple). Despite these and other setbacks—some Pythagoreans departed for the Greek mainland—there continued to be groups of Pythagoreans in southern Italy until about 400. Even then Archytas of Tarentum remained. He was a great mathematician and a friend of Plato. Little is known of the views of Pythagoras himself, except that he had a reputation for great learning—a reputation that would later be mocked by Heraclitus—and that he was most likely the originator of the important and influential Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, a view that Xenophanes ridiculed. This difficulty is noted by those in the ancient world who wrote about Pythagoras (see selection number 8 below). Sometime during his life or after his death, Pythagoras’ followers split into two groups, which mirrored the two aspects of Pythagorean teaching.
    [Show full text]
  • Humanist Liturgy and Proposals
    84 Toward Thinking Freely: Propositions (More and Less True) Concerning Humanism and Freethought (in no particular order) One believes in existence; Another says, "There is nothing!" Rare is the one who believes in neither. That one is free from confusion. Ashtavakra Gita 18:42 (500 BCE) 85 * * * There are many ponderous tomes concerning Humanism. Some are worth the time. Many are not. In the following pages I intend to be pithy, not ponderous, concerning living a life of humanistic freethought. * * * Keep in mind that there is no single Humanism. There are many human expressions of a life well-lived that can be termed Humanism. Hereafter, when I use the term, I mean a particular type of Humanism from a particular tradition. However, humility teaches of other ways and places of being across borders and boundaries of time, place, and culture. * * * There is no one way to be a Humanist or freethinker. Your viewpoint begins with your standpoint. * * * Some argue that the concept of the human has changed so much in the last century that it’s time to move from “humanism” to “post-humanism” as a way of signaling this turn of thought. I’m good with that. * * * Freethinkers and Humanists usually adopt a naturalistic and materialistic worldview. This worldview implies that there is no difference between body and mind (all thought is embodied thought) and that human beings are each a temporary congeries of matter that has before and will later appear in a different congeries. * * * A naturalistic and materialist viewpoint implies that all matter everywhere is of equal worth and importance, whether that matter appears as a human, a squirrel, a cloud, or 86 a rock.
    [Show full text]