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ACONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA of the OF other books in the same series

A Concise Encyclopedia of Judaism, Dan Cohn-Serbok, ISBN 1–85168–176–0 A Concise Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Klaus K. Klostermaier, ISBN 1–85168–175–2 A Concise Encyclopedia of Christianity, Geoffrey Parrinder, ISBN 1–85168–174–4 A Concise Encyclopedia of Buddhism, John Powers, ISBN 1–85168–233–3 A Concise Encyclopedia of the Baha´’ı´ , Peter Smith, ISBN 1–85168–184–1 A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, Gordon D. Newby, ISBN 1–85168–295–3 related titles published by oneworld

Ethics in the World , Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–247–3 The Fifth Dimension, , ISBN 1–85168–191–4 Global : A Short Introduction, Joseph Runzo, ISBN 1–85168–235–X : A Guide for the Perplexed, , ISBN 1–85168–284–8 God, Faith and the New Millennium, Keith Ward, ISBN 1–85168–155–8 Love, Sex and Gender in the World Religions, Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–223–6 The Meaning of Life in the World Religions, Edited by Joseph Runzo and Nancy M. Martin, ISBN 1–85168–200–7 The Phenomenon of Religion, Moojan Momen, ISBN 1–85168–161–2 ACONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA of the PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ANTHONY C. THISELTON A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Oneworld Publications (Sales and Editorial) 185 Banbury Road Oxford OX2 7AR England www.oneworld-publications.com

# Anthony C. Thiselton 2002

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NL08 Contents

Preface and acknowledgements vi

A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 1

Chronology 329

Index of names 337 Preface and acknowledgements

Aims, scope and target readership he following selection of subject entries has been shaped in the light of Tmany years of feedback from my own students. I have asked them what themes, thinkers and problems in philosophy of religion they have found most stimulating or rewarding, and also where they have needed most help, clarification and explanation. Their answers have been both formal and anonymous, and informal and personal. In addition to the criterion of ‘professional competency’ in philosophy of religion, I have explored issues where pressing problems arise from arguments for or against in God, and from differences between diverse religious traditions. For many, this subject combines academic rigour with personal and practical issues about religious belief. I have aimed to set out the arguments of major religious traditions and the counter- arguments of their critics with fairness and integrity, even if I myself find nothing irrational about belief in God, to express this as a bare minimum. It is my hope, therefore, that this volume will not only fill a needed gap as a student textbook, but that it will also provide a ready work of reference and explanation for those readers who wish to explore issues of belief for their own sake. To this extent, I admit to writing for the general enquirer as well as for students who seek a clear, useful textbook for essays and examinations. At what level is this aimed? Most of my own classes in philosophy of religion have been for second-year degree students. However, they have included also first years and final years. Most have been honours students in and/or in philosophy, but many have majored in other subjects. I have been sufficiently impressed by the standards of incoming students who have taken philosophy of religion at ‘A’ level to have no vii Preface and acknowledgments doubt that the following pages will also provide them with a readable textbook. I point out below that the regular use of cross-references will explain virtually every unfamiliar technical term, and will introduce unfamiliar thinkers.

Style, structure and more on level I have made a particular point of keeping to short paragraphs, and as far as possible to short sentences. Normally all entries except those of less than three hundred words have been divided by the use of sub-headings, so that no reader need feel intimidated by long, unbroken, pages of argument. The sub- headings also provide easy maps of where arguments lead. This is the first of my eight books (written to date) without substantial footnotes. This is for the purpose of simplicity and clarity. However, those reference books that fail to identify significant sources for major quotations or arguments lack, to my , a resource that may prove to be helpful. Where precise sources are appropriate, authors, titles, publishers and page numbers are cited in brackets in the text. This both relieves the reader of having to take everything on trust, and allows the student to follow up important issues independently. The system of cross-references and of dates of thinkers or other sources is a key feature. These cross-references assist those readers who need instant explanations of terms, or quick information about the further consequences of arguments under consideration. Dates provide appropriate historical contexts for the accurate understanding of thought in the light of the times. Theologians and philosophers often place different weight respectively upon these: they are more frequently emphasized in theology, but their inclusion prejudices no argument. A further chronological chart is added, without any pre-judgements about the importance of what names may feature in it.

Acknowledgements and thanks Mrs Carol Dakin has typed this manuscript onto disks throughout. I am deeply grateful to her for this magnificent and excellent work. I regularly gave her unclear handwritten material, which she returned promptly, efficiently and with constant judgement where guesses must have been inevitable. My former secretaries observed that over the years two qualifications for my Professorship and Headship of Department at Nottingham were required for this post: first, to have taught previously in the University of Durham; and second, to have illegible writing. I was duly appointed. A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion viii

My weakest points of expertise, I concede, relate to the articles on Islamic philosophy, on , and on Buddhist philosophy. I am deeply indebted to Dr Hugh Goddard, Reader in Islamic Theology in the University of Nottingham, for advice on the entry on Islamic Philosophy, and related Islamic thinkers. Likewise, I am very grateful to Dr Philip Goodchild, Senior Lecturer in this Department, for advice and correction on Buddhist philosophy. Dr Brian Carr, Reader in the Department of Philosophy at Nottingham, has given me valuable help, for which I thank him warmly, on Hindu philosophy and Hindu thinkers. He is also co-editor of the Encyclopaedia of Asian Philosophy. During the final month before the submission of the manuscript, I was Scholar in Residence for 2002 in Union University, Jackson, Tennessee. I should like to thank Union University, Dr Randall Bush, and his colleagues for giving me every possible facility to complete the manuscript on time, including my sending quantities of faxed handwriting to Mrs Dakin, and edited e-mails to my wife at home. My time at Union University was a very happy one. Home life often suffers during these undertakings, and my wife Rosemary continued to put up with my working every day into the late evening even though my previous book of some 1,500 pages had made the same relentless demands for several years without any interval between these books. She went the second mile of reading typescripts for errors, checking through disks, typing revisions, and undertaking related tasks. I am so grateful for this forbearance and for her work. As before, Mrs Sheila Rees also undertook some proof-reading at a period of high pressure, and I thank her most warmly. Finally, I immensely the encouragement received from colleagues, from one or two close friends, and from some former students, to persevere with yet another book which they generously encouraged me to think was worthwhile, in spite of other wide-ranging professional and church commitments. Their encouragement has been a special and needed gift. Ms Victoria Warner of Oneworld Publications has also been among these encouragers, and I thank her for her patient advice and support.

Anthony C. Thiselton, Department of Theology, University of Nottingham Good Friday, 2002 A

a fortiori Clearly what is true merely by defini- The term denotes an argument that applies tion, or what is entailed entirely by logical ‘all the more’, or ‘with greater force’. In reasoning, belongs to the realm of a priori logic, if a given consequence follows argument; while inferences drawn from from a case that is actually weaker, a empirical observations of the everyday fortiori that consequence will follow ‘from world (including the natural sciences) a stronger’ (Latin, a fortiori) argument. belong to the realm of a posteriori argu- analytic statements; This logical notion has been used since ment. (See also God, arguments for the existence of; ancient times. Traditionally it features in Kant Rabbi Hillel’s seven ‘rules of interpreta- ; .) tion’ concerning what may be inferred from a biblical text. apriori The term (Latin) denotes that which is a posteriori prior to, or independent of, human experi- Beliefs or truths that are established by a ence or observation. It therefore stands in posteriori arguments or knowledge are contrast to what is argued a posteriori, derived from evidence, experience, or i.e. from what is confirmed or discon- observation of the world. The term stands firmed from subsequent experience or in contrast to a priori, which denotes that observation. The clearest examples of a which is prior to, and independent of, such priori propositions are analytic state- experience or observation. ments, i.e. those that are true (or those A posteriori arguments depend upon that are justified) on the basis of a priori empirical evidence, which subsequently conceptual definition: e.g. ‘all bachelors confirms or disconfirms what has been are unmarried’, ‘all circles are round’. asserted as true, or as possibly true. In These remain incontestable independently philosophy of religion the cosmological of observations about particular bache- argument for the lors, or about a circle that I might try to characteristically begins with experience draw. or observations about the world, in con- Thus a priori (from first ) may trast to the , be applied to arguments or to propositions which turns on logical questions about or statements. However, their logical the concept of God. currency is often either merely formal Abelard 2

(true by definition) or negative (the argu- to Latin translations of only some of ment or statement does not depend on ’s words (especially to what is subsequently experienced or ’ translations of his Categories observed). In philosophy of religion the and On Interpretation), Abelard devel- ontological argument for the exis- oped Aristotle’s propositional logic in tence of God characteristically operates creative ways. on the basis of a priori reasoning, in In relation to and contrast to the cosmological argu- religion, Abelard rejected any blind appeal ment, which utilizes a posteriori infer- to sheer authority as such. His contem- ences from our experience of the world. porary, (See also God, arguments for the (1091–1153), denounced him for so exalt- existence of; Kant.) ing reason and logic as to make faith and , in effect, irrelevant. Parallel debates may be observed in Islamic Abelard (Abailard), Peter philosophy of this period. (1079–1142) It is difficult to argue that Abelard As a major French philosopher and discounted biblical revelation. After all, he theologian of the twelfth century, Abelard produced an Exposition of the Epistle to made his chief contribution to logic and the Romans. However, he rejected any . In particular he attempted a exclusive claim for the authority of the mediating position between Bible or the , arguing that (the view that universals are merely ancient Greek philosophy was often closer linguistic signs or names (Latin, nomen) to the New Testament than the Hebrew forclassesorparticularentities)and Bible or Old Testament. realism (universals are realities in them- Abelard also emphasized the impor- selves). tance of thinking for oneself. He disagreed Each side, Abelard argued, was right in with both of his own very different what it affirmed, but wrong in what it teachers, Roscellinus (himself unortho- denied. Nominalists are right to insist that dox) and . Like logic and semantics operate in the realm , he saw doubt (rather than of signs and concepts; they do not trade certainty) as the path to knowledge directly in realities themselves. Realists are through exploration and discovery. right, however, to insist that logic and In theology Abelard’s accounts of the semantics do not merely chase other signs and of the atonement have both and concepts that never engage with been severely criticized. He is credited realities, even if they are wrong to confuse with expounding a theology of the atone- the two levels. ment through Jesus Christ which rests Abelard’s mediating position is often upon ‘moral influence’ or ‘example’, known as . He rejects a rather than on any notion of Godward merely subjectivist account of meaning, as sacrifice as held by Anselm and Calvin. if meaning had no ‘controls’. Yet his His attempt to expound Romans 3:19–26 attacks on naı¨ve realism are even sharper. entirely in terms of a demonstration of He insists that logic operates in its own God’s love hardly does to this domain. Logical validity is not identical Pauline text. with truth about a state of affairs. However, it was for his logic and This emerges most forcefully in Abe- ontology, rather than for his theology, lard’s attention to propositions. Proposi- that Abelard attracted large numbers of tions are true or false, i.e. the property of students to Paris. From the twelfth to the being true-or-false belongs to proposi- sixteenth centuries, it has been said, logic tional content. In spite of having access occupied the position of privilege and 3 accident esteem that the nineteenth century the Absolute as wholeness. Diversity is recorded to the sciences. Paris became an mere appearance; only the whole is real important centre of philosophy, and the (Appearance and Reality, 1893). The conceptualism of Abelard influenced such Absolute is unconditioned by time or figures as Albert the Great and Thomas change, for supposedly even time is unreal. Aquinas. He constitutes a major influence Josiah Royce (1855–1916) represented on mediaeval Western . American .Heidentifiedthe Absolute both with God and with the of the great, final, ‘community of Absolute persons’. An organic whole is presupposed In its widest, most popular sense, the by the differences of human experience Absolute denotes that which is uncondi- (The Conception of God, 1897). tional and complete in itself. It stands in In identifying the Absolute with God contrast to all that is relative. In the broadest (against Bradley) Royce was returning to terms it denotes what is unqualified, inde- the early tradition of pendent of conditioning influences, and the (1401–64). Nicholas argued that God is ground of its own being (aseity). ‘absolutely infinite’. God so clearly trans- In more technical terms, the word has cends whatever is relative and contin- different nuances within different philoso- gent that God even holds together as the phical traditions. In German idealism, Absolute a ‘coincidence of opposites’, just Kant (1724–1804) uses the term to as infinity moves similarly beyond char- denote what is unconditionally valid. acterization in any specific, limited or Schelling (1775–1854) postulates an relative form. Absolute which is that prior ground before In spite of these technical nuances in selfhood comes to perceive the world or Schelling, Hegel, Bradley, Royce and reach self-awareness in terms of subject Nicholas, the term Absolute is often used and object, or spirit and nature. tillich more broadly to stand in contrast with all (1886–1965) is partially influenced by that is relative or conditioned by other Schelling in his insistence that God is not agents or forces. Especially in ethics the an existent being, but is ‘Being-itself’. term is used to exclude cultural, historical It is with Hegel (1770–1831) that the or social . term is most often associated. Hegel While the broader notion of uncondi- rejected Schelling’s account, and identified tionedness, ultimacy, self-subsistence and the Absolute as Spirit. As Absolute, Spirit aseity retains a place in the philosophy of finds self-expression within the world religion (see God, concepts and ‘attri- through a dialectic process of logical butes’ of; Islamic philosophy; trans- and historical necessity. cendence) the more technical claims of This is because Hegel’s Absolute Idea German and Anglo-American idealism are embraces within itself a unity that is also less prominent today than they were self-differentiating. In his philosophical during the nineteenth century. However, theology Hegel postulated a coherence in Ascent to the Absolute (: Allen with the Christian doctrine of God as & Unwin, 1970) J.N. Findlay has argued Trinity: God is an unqualified unity who for the unconditional basis of all things. has nevertheless expressed self-- tion in a historical dialectic as Father, Son accident and , in successive modes of self-disclosure. Used as a technical term in Aristotelian In the English-speaking world Brad- and in scholastic philosophy, accident ley (1846–1924) of Oxford argued that denotes a contingent quality that hap- differentiation presupposes the reality of pens to inhere in some underlying sub- actuality 4 stance. The ‘substance’ remains an endur- ‘things’ or objects, and to reserve ‘possi- ing supportive substratum, while the bility’ to denote an existential mode of apparent quality or accident ‘happens’ being distinctive to persons and agents. (from the Latin accidere, to happen). Sartre contrasts being-in-itself (eˆtre-en-soi; Traditional Roman cf. actuality) with being-for-itself (eˆtre- utilized the Aristotelian and Thomist pour-soi; cf. possibility). Possibility distinction to defend the notion of trans- denotes a mode of existence in which ubstantiation. The underlying substance openness to the future may be realized by changed to become the body and blood of decision, whereas actuality denotes an ‘it’ Christ, while the observable accidents which is ‘closed’ to such active decision remained perceptible to the eye as bread (see Buber; ). and wine. In teleological contexts actuality Aquinas writes: ‘It is through the denotes the fulfilment or realization of accidents (per accidentia) that we judge purpose. This brings us back to Aristotle’s the substance (de substantia)...The contrast between the possibilities of mat- accidents of the bread . . . remain when ter which find expression in the ‘actuality’ the substance of the bread (substantia of form. panis) is no longer there’ but the substance has become the body and blood of Christ under the outward appearance of the ‘accidents’ of bread and wine (Summa At first sight agnosticism is often perceived Theologiae, III, Qu. 75, art. 5). as being less dogmatic and more open than Much recent Catholic doctrine, how- either or when applied to ever, does not remain tied to the formula- the belief-systems of religions. It appears tion of Aquinas in the thirteenth century. to suspend the acceptance or rejection of The Reformers vigorously opposed it. belief. Both traditions today tend to seek a more In practice, however, thoroughgoing dynamic understanding of how the death agnosticism denotes the belief that to of Christ is ‘proclaimed’ or ‘called actively know whether a belief-system is true or to mind with effects’ in the ’s Supper false is impossible. Such knowledge lies or the Eucharist. (See also Aristotle.) beyond the enquirer (from Greek a-, no knowledge). This amounts, however, to no less dogmatic a position than theism, actuality atheism or the belief-system in question. The broadest, mainline meaning of this For it invites the rejoinder called ‘the term is drawn from Aristotle, in whose paradox of scepticism’: ‘How do I know writings it stands in contrast to potenti- that I cannot know, if I cannot know ality or ‘possibility’. Finite entities have whether I know?’ potentialities which become actual when Agnosticism as a world-view or atti- they are realized. Aristotle applied actu- tude to theism, therefore, differs from the ality to form; potentiality to matter. more pragmatic use of the term to denote developed this further a suspension of belief about some parti- in his Five Ways of argument concerning cular claim to truth. The latter may be the existence of God. Potentiality is the deemed more reasonable if it is not a basis of his Kinetological Way (argument generalized, systematic attitude towards from motion) in contrast to God’s aseity. religion or towards the of religious Existentialist writers, however, apply truth. Certainly agnosticism must be the contrast between actuality and possi- clearly distinguished from atheism, which bility differently. Heidegger, Marcel raises broader and more fundamental and Sartre tend to apply ‘actuality’ for historical and logical issues. 5

Albert the Great (, formal operation, or following of set steps, c. 1200/06–80) in logic or in mathematics, especially Albert taught in the University of Paris when symbolic logical notation rather (1245–8) and at Cologne (from 1248) in than everyday language is used (e.g. If x, his native Germany. He is known chiefly then y . . .). The use of general, abstract, as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, and as symbolic notation permits a formula or a major interpreter of Aristotle to the algorithm to remain strictly in the realm of medieval West. logic or mathematics without specific contingent Albert’s method of inference from reference to the or empirical observation of the contingent world world of everyday life. anticipated the approach that Aquinas These set steps or formulae in calcula- developed in his Five Ways. In common tion or in problem-solving may take the with most leading Islamic interpreters of form of rules or instructions for opera- Aristotle, Albert endorsed the argument tions. The term is derived from the Latin from motion (or from ‘possibility’) to a translation of the Arabic name of a logical First Mover or Uncaused Cause. He mathematics of the ninth century. rejected the notion of an infinite chain or More technically and narrowly, the caused causes (see cause; cosmological term is applied in computation where an argument; Islamic philosophy). understanding of the operation verges on In addition to his contribution as a the deterministic or mechanical. Hence, commentator on Aristotle, Albert was a for broader philosophical views of the Dominican theologian. He produced bib- world, algorithms are perceived as strictly lical commentaries, and also a commen- instrumental processes, i.e. as performing tary on ’s Sentences.He specified tasks in logic rather than yielding regarded scriptural revelation and human broader understandings of the world. reason as complementary. Albert’s drive towards synthesis and the altruism ultimate reconciliation of differences allowed him to combine the dominant Traditionally the term denotes a selfless influence of Aristotle with diverse elements concern for the well-being of others from , , and such (Latin, alter, other), in contrast to the Islamic philosophers as al-Farabi.He self-interests of egoism. The term is deontology perceived the world as a created mystic narrower than ,which harmony, which emanated from the One as denotes an ethic based on moral obliga- Prime Mover, or the Ground of all Being. tion or duty more generally. Hobbes Nietzsche Albert’s encyclopaedic drawing From to , and most together of multiple sources (from the recently in more radical postmodernist Bible, Aristotle, Plato, Arabic philosophy writers, doubt has been expressed about and the natural sciences of the day) the possibility of genuine altruism in provides a context for the founding of human life. Nietzsche and many postmo- the ancient European universities of the dernists have suggested that this motiva- thirteenth century. His belief in the com- tion is illusory, and merely disguises the patibility of revealed scripture with human interests of the self under the pretence of Ideological reason also provides the background to caring only for others. criticism the work of Thomas Aquinas. seeks to unmask and to expose these interests. In many religions, including especially algorithm the Christian tradition, a distinction may This term has a broader and a more be made between the practical difficulty of technical use. More broadly it denotes a genuine altruism for fallen humanity 6 unaided by divine grace and the altruistic Qu. 13, art. 3 (Blackfriars edn, vol. 3, love for others that may spring from the 57)). However, he does not agree with grace of renewal by the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius that on this basis ‘it Holy Spirit of God. (See also postmoder- would be truer to say that God is not good nity.) or wise . . . than to say that he is’ (ibid.). For analogical uses of language one should steer between over-confident univocal uses analogy and over-reticent insistence on the via The wider context of the use of analogy in negativa only. language in religion is set out in detail Moreover, to use analogical language under that separate, broader entry. The of God is not to equivocate. Language use of analogy is one of the most would be equivocal (Latin, aequivoca) important primary linguistic resources only if there were no resemblance (Latin, for talk of God. It permits an extension similitudo) between how the word is used of meaning or logical grammar beyond in everyday language and how it is applied that of everyday uses of language, while to God (ibid., art. 5 (Blackfriars edn, vol. retaining everyday language as its vehicle 3, 63)). ‘Wisdom’, for example, can be or vocabulary-stock. applied to God without undue ambiguity Analogy, however, is not the only or impropriety, because there is at least resource of this kind. The roles of sym- some degree of resemblance, however bol, metaphor, myth, conceptual inadequate, between what it is to ascribe grammar, and models and qualifiers wisdom to God and what it is to ascribe are also considered under language in wisdom to a human person. Aquinas religion,aswellasunderseparate agrees that this is not ‘univocal’ in mean- entries. ing (ibid.). The classical formulation of the use of Aquinas sums up his general view in analogy in talk of God comes from this way: ‘Some words are used neither Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). In thir- univocally nor purely equivocally of God teenth-century debate analogy was seen and creatures, but analogically, for we as a middle way between equivocal (or cannot speak of God at all except in the ambivalent) language, which applied language we use of creatures . . .’ (ibid. everyday language to God without genu- (Blackfriars edn, 65)). ine currency, and univocal language (i.e. controversy about the basis language that conveys the same literal and nature of analogy in meaning in a one-to-one match). Further, aquinas it also offered a middle path between the language of negation (via negativa), as Even during the thirteenth century Duns advocated by the German mystic Meister Scotus (c. 1266–1308) argued that Aqui- Eckhart (1260–1327), and language that nas tried to hold together two incompa- conveyed a positive, determinate, cogni- tible views. For when confronted with any tive content. claim for a univocal use of language in the basic approach of thomas talk of God, Aquinas emphasized the aquinas value of the via negativa in excluding even the barest hint of a one-to-one match Aquinas firmly excludes any suggestion between language about created beings that everyday words can be applied to and language about God. He did not reject God with exactly the same meaning as the use of negation: God is infinite; God is they carry in contexts of everyday life. He immortal. However, he insisted that the writes: ‘It seems that no word can be used way of negation could not offer a com- literally of God’ (Summa Theologiae, Ia, prehensive or exhaustive linguistic 7 analogy resource, but played its part only in Interpretations of Aquinas on analogy complementing analogy. are controversial and too technical for This marks Aquinas off from the further discussion here. Fundamentally mystical tradition of , Aquinas appealed to various logical from the approach of the Jewish philoso- devices to avoid on one side the collapse pher (1135–1204), from of analogy into anthropomorphism and Plotinus (c. 205–70) and Neoplatonism, on the other a logical grammar that Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) and strands retained no real currency. The problem, within Eastern Christian theology. however, that he did not fully solve was On the other side, however, Duns that of establishing criteria for appropriate Scotus questioned the reliability and stable uses of analogy. basis of analogical language, believing that Aquinas attempted to refine some of the it risked making clear and determinate issues by identifying an ‘analogy of pro- concepts of God and divine action too portionality’ in which an analogy is held vague and indeterminate to convey a formally, but in proportion to the nature of reliable content. Such concepts as truth, the analogue. Thus human fatherhood has unity and goodness may be applied, he with divine fatherhood, but is argued, univocally. Otherwise, in what lies also limited in scope because of the knowledge of God? finitude and fallenness of human nature. All the same, Aquinas believed that Hence the ‘attribution’ of analogy is analogy, rightly applied, could serve to bound up with its proportionality. convey cognitive truth about God. He ’s critique appealed to an analogy of ‘attribution’ and an analogy of ‘proportionality’. A It is, in effect, the basis of Thomas quality or characteristic can be attributed Aquinas’s appeal to the currency of to someone in a derivative sense. A further analogy that Karl Barth attacks, rather more radical qualification emerges from than the use of analogy as a purely proportionality: whatever is analogically linguistic or semantic tool within the common to two or more beings is pos- framework of Christian theology. Barth sessed by each not in the same way but in rejects the notion of ‘a common denomi- proportion to its being. nator’ to which God and the created order Thus ‘God is wise’ is not merely an may ‘both be reduced’, like species that analogy with ‘Socrates is wise’ or ‘Paul the belong to a common genus (Barth, Church Apostle is wise’; it also entails the proposi- Dogmatics III: 3, Eng., Edinburgh: T & T tion that ‘wise’, as applied to each, carries Clark, 19, 102). a meaning that accords with the distinctive Thus, while he questions the whole being of each. notion of an analogia entis as a metapho- This, in turn, implies that an analogy of rical or ontological notion supposedly language rests on an analogy of being independent of theology or revelation, (analogia entis), and it is this aspect that Barth is nevertheless willing to allow for Barth (1886–1968) attacks as presuppos- a analogia operationis, i.e. for its actual ing a Thomistic ‘natural theology’. operative currency within theology. The Recently, however, Alan J. Torrance has basis lies in God’s sovereign act of self- questioned how far this emphasis rests on disclosure, which is appropriated as an an interpretation of Aquinas that became ‘analogy of faith’. dominant through the writings of Thomas Barth’s arguments take us beyond the Cajetan (1468–1534), Italian cardinal and realm of philosophy. Nevertheless, within philosopher (Torrance, Persons in Com- philosophy of religion there is room to munion, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996, explore the entailments of a theology of 127–48). God that perceives God as sheer self-gift. analytic statements 8

The medieval and traditional notion of (See also empiricism; ontological analogia eminentiae, of working from the argument for the existence of God.) lower to the higher, may address issues of intelligibility, provided that it is not analytical philosophy transformed into an ontology that trans- poses the transcendence of God into The term serves as a broad and vague title what Aquinas seeks to avoid, namely a to denote the methods and explorations of projected anthropomorphic construct. those philosophers mainly in the Anglo- Philosophical controversy about simi- American traditions of the twentieth larity and difference and theological century who seek to clarify the logical beliefs about ‘the ’ and the forms and sometimes the grammar of incarnation of the Word in the person of concepts used in philosophy. It character- Jesus Christ as person cannot be held istically denotes a rigorous examination apart. Further, the issue of criteria for the and clarification of logical forms which valid use of analogy cannot be separated might have become obscured by sentences from the wider issues examined under the of natural languages. entry on language in religion, where It is easier to name the specific philo- these detailed questions emerge in their sophers with whom the analytical move- proper context. ment is most closely associated than to suggest a list of features. These include: Russell (1872–1970), George E. Moore analytic statements (1873–1958), Ayer (1910–89), and the Analytic statements are true a priori, i.e. earlier work of Wittgenstein (1889– by of the definition of their concepts 1951). However, more broadly the term or terms, rather than on the basis of states is sometimes extended to include the of affairs in the world. The statement ‘all ‘informal’ logical explorations of Ryle bachelors are unmarried’ or ‘all circles are (1900–76) and Austin (1911–60), among round’ depends on what constitutes the others, although Austin represents what is concept of a bachelor or of a circle. It does more often called ‘Ordinary Language’ not depend upon observations about philosophy. particular bachelors or circles in the Since ‘analysis’ is derived from the world. Greek analuo, to loose, or to untie, it is Kant used the term ‘analytic proposi- tempting to cite Wittgenstein’s aphorism tion’ for those statements in which the that we should ‘look closely at particular predicate is covertly contained in the cases’ and avoid any ‘craving for general- subject, e.g. ‘six is a number’. While the ity’ (The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: early work of Wittgenstein treated such Blackwell, 1969, 16 and 17). However, in statements as purely formal, i.e. in effect his later work Wittgenstein expressed as logical tautologies, in his later work reservations about the logical atomism Wittgenstein observed that even a formal that served to break down complex tautology might perform some additional propositions into their most logically function in everyday life, e.g. in directing primitive building-blocks of meaning (Phi- attention to what might otherwise be losophical Investigations, Oxford: Black- neglected or unnoticed. well, 1967, sects. 39–63). In his work on , logical atomism, language Ayer exempted analytical statements from games, ‘common sense’ and the need for empirical verification, i.e. logic they could convey logical meaning even if their truth could not be verified by Although Russell favoured a more radi- observing states of affairs in the world. cally analytical method, Wittgenstein was 9 analytical philosophy concerned more especially with avoiding atomism’ (lectures in 1918, based on those generalizing propositions that earlier work). However, his understanding removed words and concepts from the of the smallest possible components out of settings in everyday life that gave parti- which propositions were built differed cular cases their logical and linguistic from that of the early Wittgenstein. currency. The problem about such grand- Russell linked his theory with a quasi- iose questions as ‘What is time?’; ‘What is materialist view of the ‘elements’ of the language?’ or ‘What is a proposition?’ is world; in Wittgenstein’s view these ‘atoms’ that ‘the language-game in which they are were purely logical postulates. to be applied is missing’ (ibid., sects. 92 ‘informal’ logic, conceptual and 96). We must avoid ‘super-concepts’, elucidation, and category such as ‘language’ or ‘world’, unless we mistakes pay attention to their specificities of contexts-in-life (ibid., 97). Ayer’s exposition of logical positivism Early in the twentieth century G. E. and the principle of verification is dis- Moore posed such a question in response cussed separately. A more constructive to the grandiose metaphysical claims of version of ‘linguistic’ philosophy emerged Bradley. If ‘time is unreal’, why do we with the work of Ryle. In The Concept of take breakfast ‘before’ lunch? If reality is Mind (London: Penguin, 1949) he under- ‘spiritual’, are chairs and tables more like took a logical exploration of the relation us than we may think? Moore wrote ‘A between language respectively about the Defence of Common Sense’ which con- mind and the body in the Dualist tradition tained propositions that seemed to conflict of Descartes, which he called ‘the myth with many of the more grandiose claims of of the ghost in the machine’ (ibid., 17). philosophers. Ryle perceived the Cartesian doctrine Russell shared with Wittgenstein a as portraying life lived ‘through two ‘distrust’ of the surface grammar of collateral histories’ (ibid., 13). However, language. His work on logic provided logical analysis exposes ‘a category-mis- formal logical devices for re-formulating take’ (ibid., 17), for the logical currency of statements which in ordinary language what is stated about each differs. This appeared to make a truth-claim about an ‘double-life’ theory generates logical puz- entity while the formal logic of the zles that are illusory. If body and mind utterance or sentence could be shown not ‘exist’, each ‘exists’ in a quite different to do so. logical sense (ibid., 24). A fresh logical Thus in his Principia Mathematica (3 analysis of the vocabulary relating to vols. 1910–13, with A. N. Whitehead) intellectual action is needed, including Russell developed a theory of descriptions exploring dispositions (see belief). that allowed for the logical re-formulation In Dilemmas (Cambridge: CUP, 1954) of such sentences as those containing the Ryle applies these methods of logical phrases ‘the King of ’ or ‘a round analysis to a series of traditional logical square’ to ‘analyze out’ what were strictly puzzles. Thus the phrase ‘It was to be’ not ‘referring’ expressions at all. In tech- need not express fatalism, as soon as we nical terms an ‘existential quantifier’ could understand the difference between pro- be used in logical notation to separate out spective and retrospective logic, or ‘ante- whether or not truth-claims about one rior truths and posterior truths’ (ibid., 26; entity entailed truth-claims about another. 15–35). The paradox of Achilles and the (The notation would take some such form Tortoise, first formulated by Zeno, as (Ex) (Fx . . .).) depends for its force on the difference Russell pressed his drive toward ana- between the logic employed by an observer lyses to postulate a theory of ‘logical and the logic employed by a participant in 10 the race. Only if we confuse logic that too heavily influenced by the almost applies to ‘the total course’ with the obsessively evolutionary climate of the participant perspective of the runner does late nineteenth century. Robert Segal the possibility of a ‘paradox’ emerge (ibid., presses both criticisms (‘Tylor’s Anthro- 36–55). Again, however, this approach is pomorphic Theory of Religion’, Religion, more strictly ‘linguistic’ philosophy than 25, 1995, 25–30). (See also .) ‘analytical’ philosophy. In his final essay, ‘Formal and Informal Logic’, Ryle contrasts ‘the logic of insu- (1033–1109) lated and single concepts’, which often take the centre of the stage in formal logic, In philosophy of religion Anselm is most with ‘the logical dynamics of apparently widely known for his formulation of the interfering systems of concepts’ (ibid., ontological argument for the exis- 125). tence of God. Anselm sets out this In the 1950s a spate of collections of approach in two distinct forms in the essays (mainly articles from journals) Proslogion 2–4. However, the title Proslo- appeared under such titles as Essays in gion denotes ‘address’, and especially in Conceptual Analysis (1956) edited by the first formulation, as Barth among Antony Plew, with contributions from others insists, the supposed ‘argument’ is Strawson, G. J. Warnock, John Hospers, an address on the part of a Christian J. O. Urmson, Stephen Toulmin and worshipper or believer expressing adora- others. However, enough has been said tion, praise, and confession of faith to to indicate the varied methods and ethos God. The significance of this mode may be that the umbrella title ‘analytical philoso- stylistic (recalling the style of Augustine’s phy’ serves to denote. Confessions),butitmaysignificantly shape how the ‘argument’ is meant to be understood. Moreover it reminds us that animism Anselm writes primarily as a philosophical Animism denotes the belief that many theologian, and not simply as a philoso- instances of natural phenomena (plants, pher. He stands in the broad tradition of trees, stones) possess ‘’ (Latin, anima) Christian . or life-spirits. These may then be perceived Anselm is known under three titles. He as quasi-personal and capable of address. is sometimes called Anselm of Aosta, since In animistic religion these may become he was born at Aosta in Italy. He is also objects of reverence or . known as Anselm of Bec, because prior to Two aspects are especially significant 1093 he served as a Benedictine monk at for philosophy of religion. First, animism Bec in Normandy. However, in 1093 he may be said to extend unduly and became the second Norman Archbishop of uncritically the use of analogy and Canterbury. anthropomorphism. In his period at Bec Anselm wrote the Second, in Primitive Culture (1871) two well-known philosophical works Edward B. Tylor argued that all religion Monologion (Soliloquy, 1078) and Proslo- originated as primitive animism. However, gion (Address (i.e. to God), 1079). The today it is widely recognized that Tylor’s Monologion includes Anselm’s version of work rests on flawed assumptions. In the the for the first place, primitive religion did not existence of God, in which he infers the function like a primitive pseudo-science existence of the Source of all good things, to explain the world. Its function is the Supreme Being, from experience of different, and does not compete with that which is good within the world. The ‘science’. In the second place, Tylor was Proslogion (sects. 2–4) and the later Liber 11 anthropomorphism

Apologeticus pro Insipiente include his classics of Christian theology, Why God two versions of the ontological argument Became Man (Cur homo, completed for the existence of God. The heart of his in 1098). Anselm argues that atonement first formulation is that God is ‘that than for human sin is a matter that concerns which nothing greater can be conceived (a God as God, not merely humankind (Book liquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest)’. I: 5). Redemption flows from divine grace This gave rise to controversy, even in as gift through the voluntary sacrifice of Anselm’s day, represented by the monk Christ (ibid.: 8, 9). Gaunilo’s ‘reply’ to the effect that Sin, Anselm insists, is not mere failure, Anselm’s application of maximal greatness but failure to render to God ‘what is due’ to ‘God’ proved not the existence of God, (ibid., 11–15). God’s ‘honour’ is therefore but something about the status of the at stake, since loss of honour implies that concept of God. (In more detail, see the ‘God would seem to fail in governance’. entry on the ontological argument, On the analogy of ‘satisfying honour’, in a and God, arguments for the existence medieval feudal system, the greater is the of.) This led to a second formulation lord, i.e. God, the greater the ‘satisfaction’ (Liber Apologeticus), the distinctiveness of that is ‘fitting’ (ibid., 19–24; cf. ‘maximal which has been underlined in modern greatness’ in Proslogion 2–4). discussion by Hartshorne (The Logic Book I, on atonement and satisfaction, of Perfection, La Salle: Open Court, 1962) leads on to Book II, on the incarnation of and more broadly by Plantinga (The God in Christ as an instantiation of Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon, humankind (homo, human person, not vir, 1974). Maximal greatness cannot logically man). If the ‘fitting’ satisfaction is of infinite apply to such contingent examples as value, only God can offer it: ‘No-one but those cited by Gaunilo (Gaunilo’s island), God can make the satisfaction’; but it can since these (unlike God) can be ‘conceived beasatisfactiononbehalfofhumankindif not to be’. it is offered ‘only [by] the God-man’, Jesus During his period at Bec, Anselm also Christ (II: 6–9). This work on the cross is wrote treatises On Truth, On Freedom of offered not by compulsion, but through the Choice and On the Fall of the Devil (De self-consistency of the God who is gracious, casu diaboli). This last work is important just, almighty and self-giving in love (ibid., for the problem of . Following Augus- 18–20). tine, and anticipating Thomas Aquinas, This work takes its place as one of the Anselm viewed evil as a lack, or privation major classic models of the atonement. Its of being. It denotes the absence of good. importance, not only for theology, but no Injustice is a lack of harmonious justice. less for philosophy of religion, lies in its The identification of, for example, telling coherence with Anselm’s understanding of a lie with lack of truthfulness, or corrupt- the ‘maximal greatness’ and non-contin- ibility as lack of perfection enables Anselm gent aseity of God, from the Monologion to ascribe to God maximal almighty-ness and Proslogion (1076–8) to Cur deus which also excludes the capacity to lie or homo (1098). For a specialist account of the capacity for corruption, since these are his life, see R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm: negatives that detract from maximal flour- A Portrait in a Landscape (rev. edn, ishing. Cambridge: CUP, 1990). Anselm’s works The period of nearly twenty years from appear in various editions. the Monologion (1078) to Anselm’s con- secration as Archbishop of Canterbury anthropomorphism (1093) was one of mainly philosophical production. At Canterbury, however, The term denotes the projection of merely Anselm produced one of the lasting human qualities and characteristics onto apologetics 12

God or by (often) an undue extension criticize him. Traditionally apologetics has of analogy. Human characteristics may come to denote a reasoned defence of a also be projected onto objects, as when a belief-system (characteristically but not small child describes the operation of exclusively Christian theism, or theism vacuum brakes as a train’s ‘sneezing’. In in general) in the face of non-theistic, word history the term is derived from the atheistic, or agnostic objections to such Greek anthropos, humankind, with beliefs (see agnosticism; atheism). morphe, form. Plato offers an account of the Apology An over-ready, uncritical use of anthro- of Socrates, and Cardinal John Henry pomorphic imagery may be seen in ani- Newman (1801–90) wrote Apologia pro mism, in which ‘spirit’ or ‘’ is read Vita Sua (1864) in defence of his own into inamimate objects, thereby endowing religious and theological journey. The them with personal qualities. Edward B. name ‘the Apologists’ usually denotes the Tylor notoriously ascribed to primitive Christian writers of the second century religion the status of a pseudo-science who defended the coherence of Christian which explained mechanistic processes by belief against non-Christian charges of animistic causes. An incisive critique of falsity and inconsistency, e.g. Justin’s Tylor has been offered by Robert A. Segal Apology to the Emperor Hadrian and (‘Tylor’s Anthropomorphic Theory of Marcus Aurelius. Religion’, Religion, 25, 1995, 25–30). In the modern era Tillich (1886–1965) Traditionally philosophical theologians aimedtoproduceanapologeticor have been wary of attributing emotions to ‘answering’ theology, in which Christian God as anthropomorphic, but the Hebrew theology sought to address the questions Bible, or Christian Old Testament, often of philosophers or, more widely, of think- does this in spite of its sensitive awareness ing people. He proposed a ‘principle of of divine otherness, or divine transcen- correlation’, whereby questions about dence. Moltmann insists on the attribu- reason, being, existence, ambiguity and tion of feeling and to God, history were ‘answered’ by five respective provided that this capacity is understood responses concerning revelation, God, as the result of God’s own free, sovereign Jesus Christ, the Spirit and the kingdom decision to love in voluntary vulnerability of God. Many have challenged whether and inter-personal rapport. these ‘correlations’ are genuine ‘questions’ Hegel views anthropomorphism as and ‘answers’, even if, however, as Tillich part of a ‘religious’ use of language as it insists, ‘apologetics presupposes common is applied to God by means of symbol, ground, however vague it may be’ (Sys- myth, metaphor or ‘representation’ tematic Theology, vol. 1, London, Nisbet, (Vorstellung) in contrast to the purer, 1953, 6). more rigorous ‘concept’ of philosophy In many Protestant circles, especially in (Begriff), with its greater critical aware- Barthianism and in pietism, the whole ness. A constellation of such issues emerge enterprise of apologetics is thought to rest in the work of Tillich and in Ramsey’s too heavily on the persuasive powers of work on models and qualifiers. human reason. However, a long theistic and Christian tradition underlines the value of attempts to defend the coherence apologetics and reasonableness of religious or The English term is derived from the Christian belief. Greek apologia, defence, or speech of In the philosophy of religion, a theistic defence. According to Acts 22:1 and 1 presentation of such issues as arguments Corinthians 9:3, offers a for the existence of God, the currency of reasoned defence to those who seek to language in religion and issues about 13 Aquinas, Thomas the and the being of God God; Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas; overlap prominently with traditional God, arguments for the existence of; theistic or Christian apologetics. To argue language in religion). that a belief-system is not irrational does Prior to the commendation of Pope not necessarily entail an appeal to ration- Paul (1963), Pope Leo XIII (1879) urged alism. (See also Locke.) that Thomist philosophy be made the basis for education in Roman Catholic schools, and Pope Pius XII (1950) identi- Aquinas, Thomas (1225–74) fied it as the surest guide to Roman Born into an aristocratic family in the Catholic theology. Thomas’s influence, region of Naples, Thomas was educated however, spreads far beyond the Catholic first in a Benedictine monastery and then tradition, and touches on a multitude of at the University of Naples (1239–44). He philosophical, theological and ethical then became a Dominican friar, and from questions. 1248 to 1254 studied under Albert the In addition to his magisterial Summa Great. Theologiae (1265–72) Aquinas produced At the University of Naples and under On Being and (1242–3), On truth Albert, Aquinas was exposed to the full (1256–9), Summa contra Gentiles (1260) range of philosophical and logical pro- (‘Gentiles’ in the sense of ‘unbelievers’), blems formulated and explored by Aris- On Evil (1263–8), On Separate Sub- totle, but as a Dominican monk he stances (1271) and up to eighty other remained above all a philosophical theo- works. It would be misleading to empha- logian. size his role as theologian at the expense of Thomas Aquinas’s greatest achieve- recognizing his genuine stature as a ment was his Summa Theologiae, begun philosopher; but equally, he remains a in 1266. It ranks as one of the greatest theologian grounded in the Bible and theological classics of all time. In the Christian doctrine, alongside his respect English and Latin edition of the Domini- for Aristotle and other Greek, Jewish and can Blackfriars, commended by Pope Paul Islamic philosophers. VI (1963) it runs to sixty volumes. ‘By some leading themes (developed official appointment the Summa provides further in separate entries) the framework for Catholic studies in systematic theology and for a classical (1) Since for Thomas, Christian revelation Christian philosophy’ (Preface, vol. 1, xi). and human reason complement each Thomas not only adapted Aristotelian other, any working distinction philosophy to the service of Christian between theology and philosophy is theology in the thirteenth century. Build- not clear-cut. For some, knowledge of ing on the earlier work of Islamic philo- the existence of God may come in part sophers (see Islamic philosophy) and through drawing reasonable influences Albert the Great, he did more than any a posteriori from the created order. other single writer to ensure the revival of For others, revelation is essential. Aristotle for the medieval period and However, reason can never reach beyond. He is generally regarded as the through to grasp such distinctively leading figure in scholastic philosophy. Christian truths as that of the Incarna- It is unnecessary to include in this entry tion, the Trinity, or the nature of a detailed account of Thomas’s main . These demand faith and philosophical themes, since these are revealed truth. described and evaluated in several more (2) Language in religion operates largely specialist entries (see analogy; cosmo- through the use of analogy, although logical argument for the existence of the via negationis, while inadequate Aristotle 14

on its own, nevertheless helps to ness’ of creation and of civil states as prevent analogy drifting into anthro- that which builds upon, and reflects, pomorphism. the orderedness of the mind of God. (3) Aristotelian philosophy provides an (7) Although Thomas’s masterpiece impressive and constructive range of includes most of the topics discussed logical and conceptual resources for in a philosophy of religion, Aquinas religion and for life. Aquinas sides goes further than this in the scope with Aristotle against Plato on sev- of his work. His first main part eral issues, including Plato’s notion of includes such topics as God, lan- Forms. Only ‘beings’ exist. Aquinas guage, creation, humankind, will and respected the logical and conceptual intelligent mind, providence and the insights of Arabic and Islamic philo- world.Thesecondmainpart sophers as well as those of the Jewish includes issues of ethics and virtue, philosopher Maimonides. In effect, in as we have noted. spite of their differences of attitude Part III includes more distinctively towards Christian scripture, all shared theological doctrines, notably the the same fundamental task, he death and Christ believed, of formulating a coherent and the sacraments. Yet philosophy is . not left behind. His work on the (4) In particular Aquinas drew on Aristo- Eucharist or Lord’s Supper appeals to tle’s concepts of potentiality, possibi- the Aristotelian categories of sub- lity and movement in his exposition of stance and accident for what his Five Ways, as well as the contrast became, from the thirteenth century between the contingent and the onwards, the doctrine of transubstan- necessary. The notions of efficient tiation (ibid., III, Qu. 75, art. 5, and final cause also constituted a accidentia . . . substantia). The range constructive resource for Thomas. of thought is magisterial and monu- (5) Aquinas also developed the Aristote- mental, whether or not some sections lian notions of individual substances, remain more controversial than of definition by class and sub-category others. or distinction (genus et differentia) and the notion of a hierarchy, or Aristotle (384–322 bce) levels, of being. These provide a back- ground for his view of creation, of the Aristotle is widely regarded as among the nature of , and of ethics half-dozen most influential philosophers and virtue. The traditional Greek of Western thought, and as one of the two cardinal are supplemented by most important philosophers of the the ‘theological’ virtues of faith, hope ancient world. He made lasting contribu- and love (Summa Theologiae, IIa, Qu. tions to logic,tometaphysics and to 1–35, on the ; ibid., ethics. His , or ontology, Qu. 36–43, on providence, justice, includes what may be called a natural courage, temperance and socio-politi- theology of God and of the ‘ordered’ cal virtues). structure of the world. His metaphysics (6) Aquinas is often said to have taken aimed to construct a unified ‘science of over the Stoic and Aristotelian notion Being qua Being’. of natural law. All types of law derive Born in Stagira in Macedonia, Aristotle from the Divine law (ius divinum, came to Athens at the age of eighteen, to ibid., Ia/IIae, Qu. 90–105). However, study at Plato’s Academy for the next it may be less misleading to ascribe to twenty years. After Plato’s death he him a wider notion of the ‘ordered- travelled to Asia Minor, and returned to 15 Aristotle

Macedon where Philip appointed him This paves the way for understanding tutor to his son Alexander (Alexander both the complexity and plausibility of the Great). In 335 bce he returned to Aristotle’s concept of reality. Substance Athens to found his own philosophical constitutes a basic, underlying category, to school. This he held in the Lyceum or which attributes may be predicated. Peripatos, which also came to serve as These modes of existence may be char- names for the Aristotelian school. He acterized in terms of quantities, qualities, taught for twelve years until 323 bce,a relations, location in space, location in year before his death. time, and action or being acted upon by In contrast to Plato’s theory of Forms another object. (or Ideas), Aristotle began from observa- Aristotle inherited from Empedocles tions about particular objects or cases, and the ancient notion that the basic ‘elements’ reasoned a posteriori towards a unified which combined to form the material understanding of the world and of reality. world were earth, water, air and fire, In one of the senses of the term ‘inductive characterized also as hot or cold, wet or reasoning’, Aristotle followed an inductive dry. This is closer to modern thought than method, although he also formulated a the Greek terms in English translation rigorous formal deductive logic.His might suggest. For they represent respec- twofold emphasis on the diversity of the tively solid, liquid and gas; and a lumi- world and a unified theory anticipated an nous, incandescent, hot, gas capable of approach that would lead in due course to serving as a catalyst or to produce change. medieval scholasticism. Thus the application of fire differentiates the solid, liquid and gaseous state of ice, metaphysics and ontology: water and steam. cause, substance, the world This state of affairs underlines the and ‘god’ point that matter is mutable and exists as ‘Reality’, for Aristotle consisted not in ‘possibility’. Possibility, however, points Plato’s , abstract, Forms or Ideas, not to a chain of infinite causal regress, but but in a hierarchy of Being which began in due course to an Unmoved Prime with particular objects in the world. Mover (Greek, proˆ ton kinoun akineton). Stones, trees, animals and people consti- This logic is fundamental to most versions tute the building-blocks that instantiate of the cosmological argument for the types or species, or ‘forms’ in Aristotle’s existence of God and especially to the first own non-Platonic sense of the term. three of the Five Ways of Aquinas. Aristotle’s notion of causality offers a Aristotle’s concept of an ‘ordered’ helpful introduction to his metaphysics or world suggested to him that the ontologi- ontology. A cause (Greek, aitı´a)maybe cal ‘primary existent’ is neither merely of four kinds. In the construction of a ‘universal’ nor a material particular. This statue, for example, the material cause cannot be ‘matter’ (Greek, hy´le¯) as such, (Greek, hy´le¯, matter or material) may be because matter is merely potential. The marble or brass. The efficient cause primary existent is the ‘form’, but not in (Greek, arche` teˆs kineseo¯ s, commence- Plato’s sense of an Idea outside the world. ment of the motion) is the blows of a Within Aristotle’s emphasis on a unifying chisel. The formal cause (Greek, ousı´a, system of particulars within the world, his being or substance) is the pattern or ‘form’ amounts to the full sum of the distinctive idea in the mind of the characteristics of the species to which the sculptor, or a given architectural style. particular thing belongs. An apple tree, for The final cause (Greek, telos, end) is the example, is defined not in terms of a purpose for which the statue is made; the specific, solitary tree; but as an organism end that it will serve). that together with others of its type or Aristotle 16 species has its own distinctive ‘unity of philosophy, for which the syllogism end’ as a full life-process in relation to retains primary importance, as well as the other life-processes. Augustinian–Thomist Christian tradition. Behind this, Aristotle infers a Prime In his work on the syllogism Aristotle Mover who is Unmoved (Greek, proˆ ton distinguished between the ‘three terms’, of kinouˆ n akı´neton). This is which there must not be more than three, ‘Mind’ (nouˆ s) or ‘God’. ‘God is perfect . . . in the major and minor premises and the is One . . . Therefore the firmament that conclusion that must ‘necessarily follow’. God sets in motion is one.’ Aristotle’s The ‘middle term’ is the term that occurs universe therefore has a divine ‘ordered- in both premises, and forms a bridge ness’ and coherence that also embodies between them. It must not change its diversity, as Augustine, Aquinas, and meaning through re-definition (Prior Ana- al-Farabi sought to expound and to lytics, 25B, 32–7). Definition, therefore, underline. occupies no less an important place in Aristotle sets out this ontology in part Aristotle’s logic. in the Categories andmainlyinthe We may illustrate the logical principle Metaphysics, as a First Philosophy. In with reference to one version of the effect it is almost a natural theology. cosmological argument, which is ‘Reality’ is a teleological hierarchy of unmasked by the formal syllogism as existents, a graduated scale of forms, involving a strictly invalid step. The looking toward the more rational and syllogism may superficially run as follows: more complete. This is the Prime Major Every state of affairs has a Unmoved Mover, who is Mind. (See premise: cause. principle of plenitude); for the existence of God.) Minor The universe is a state of Aristotle’s concept of ‘God’ is set out in premise: affairs. his Physics, books VII–VIII, and in Meta- Conclusion: Therefore the universe has a physics, book XII. As actuality, not cause. possibility, God is changeless and imma- terial (On the Heavens, 279A, 18). God On the surface the three terms ‘state of moves in a non-physical way (Metaphy- affairs’, ‘world’ and ‘cause’ appear to sics, 1072B, 4). Aristotle anticipates later represent no more than three terms. versions of the cosmological argument However, ‘cause’ and ‘state of affairs’ for the existence of God. However, in the major premise mean ‘caused although God is final and efficient first cause’ and ‘caused state of affairs’; while cause, this is not a doctrine of ‘creation’, in the minor premise the term ‘state of since Aristotle perceives the world itself as affairs’ has changed its meaning. Further, eternal. if the conclusion alludes to God, ‘cause’ the logical syllogism and here denotes ‘uncaused cause’. Hence as a formal logical syllogism it breaks propositional logic down. Many regard Aristotle’s work on formal The example itself is not drawn from logic as his greatest contribution to philo- Aristotle, but if logical notation is used to sophy. He regarded deductive logic as replace the examples, it can be seen that A, fundamental, and provided what amounts B, B2, C and C2 amount to at least A, B, C, to the first formulation of a logical syllo- D. Symbolic or, notational logic thus gism in his Prior Analytics. Together with exposes the fallacy. Aristotle used symbols his work on the philosophy of language in to represent logical variables, and this On Interpretation and in Categories,this transposed arbitrary language into a for- inspired the logical enquiries of Islamic mal logical ‘science’. 17 aseity

Definitions are clarified by Aristotle ‘science’ must be necessary, invariant and through genus et differentia. For example, demonstrable. ‘a human being is a rational animal’ Aristotle does not remain in the realm of defines ‘human being’ through the genus theory, however. His Nicomachean Ethics of the animal kingdom and the differentia and Politics address issues of decision, of human rationality. Aristotle elaborated ethics and action. The ‘good’ is ‘well-being’ further forms of predication: in addition (Greek, ), which transcends to genus and difference, also species, mere pleasure, honour, or wealth, but is property and accident (contingent the fulfilment of that end (telos) for which rather than necessary predications). humankind and the world exist. To discuss Propositions remain the basic units of this requires the use of reason and the Aristotle’s formal logic (propositional exercise of patience. All structures, includ- logic). The standard form, as today, may ing the structures of the world and of be represented by the symbols S (subject) human life, are organized for the end for and P (predicate). Their relation may be which they exist. one of affirmation or denial (Prior Analy- In more concrete terms, choices toward tics, 24A, 16). In turn, the affirmation or the good, when habituated, become vir- denial may be universal (‘All S . . .’ or ‘No tues. The four cardinal virtues represent a S . . .’); or particular (‘Some S . . .’ or ‘Some relative mean between two less construc- S is not . . .’). These four logical forms are tive extremes: courage (between rashness (Greek) schemata (forms or figures). It and cowardice); moderation (between would take us beyond the scope of this profligacy and apathy); generosity entry to include Aristotle’s explorations of (between extravagance and miserliness); ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ influences (see and greatness of soul (between boastful- modal logic). ness and meanness of soul). Hence Aris- totle addresses issues of human choice, the truth, ‘science’ and ethics: an will, and character, as well as questions of ‘ordered’ world ontology and logic. Aristotle’s special attention to proposi- Yet all are woven into a unifying tions and his theory of definitions cohere system within which each branch of with his view of truth. This is firmly a philosophy plays its part. Aristotle’s correspondence view of truth. A noun ‘ordered’ philosophy reflects his ‘ordered’ (Greek, onoma, name) and verb (rhema) view of the world as a hierarchy of combine as referential and attributive particularities derived from a First components to form a proposition, state- Unmoved Mover. Augustine, Islamic phi- ment or assertion, which either corre- losophy, and Thomas Aquinas draw on sponds or fails to correspond with the this legacy. state of affairs to which it refers, and which it represents. aseity This exposition in On Interpretation specifies the truth-conditions of various The term denotes an order of being that is types of proposition. However, in Poster- ‘from itself’ (Latin, a se esse). It most ior Analytics there is a hint of a broader usually denotes the uniqueness of God, notion of truth and knowledge. ‘Scientific Allah, or a ‘Prime Mover’, as ens a se in knowledge’ does not merely concern contrast to all contingent, or finite, assertions that certain states of affairs are beings or objects. These, but not God, the case, but more especially explores ‘the are dependent on an agency or cause causes of things’ and their explanations. outside themselves. Yet deductions and formal syllogistic logic The ontological argument for the remain in play, since the of existence of God presupposes that God is atheism 18 a necessary Being in this sense. The accused of atheism, but he merely denied cosmological argument for God’s the existence of God or the gods in the existence also postulates this different form such belief took in the ‘superstitions’ order of Being as a fundamental alter- of the state religion of Athens in his time. native to the need to assume an infinite or Kant (1724–1804) affirmed the reality of endless chain of caused causes, all of God as a presupposition behind the which depend in turn on some external categorical moral imperative, freedom agency or source of causation. and immortality, but denied the personal Anselm’s designation of God as aseis God who could act within the world-order to be logically distinguished from Spino- as ‘ecclesial’ religion (Religion within the za’s notion of a ‘self-caused’ Being. This Limits of Reason, 1793). concept would fail to meet the criteria for Tillich (1886–1965) affirmed the rea- a genuinely necessary Being, as in Anselm lity of God as ‘Being-itself’ and as and in the third of the Five Ways of ‘ultimate concern’. However, he resolutely Thomas Aquinas. In the modern era insists, ‘God does not exist. He is Being- Tillich maximizes this distinction when itself, beyond essence and existence. he insists that God is ‘Being-itself’ in Therefore, to argue that God exists is to contrast to the more reductive assertion deny him.’ Tillich did not deny the that ‘God exists’. The latter may risk ontological reality of God as the ‘Ground compromising divine aseity. of our being’, but rejected the ascription of ‘existence’ to God, as implying that God is merely one existent entity among others atheism (Systematic Theology, vol.1, London: Nis- In the broadest terms, atheism denotes the bet, 1953, 261). denial of the existence of God. Broadly questionable ascriptions of also, it is to be distinguished from atheism agnosticism, the belief that to know whether or not God exists is impossible. While ‘practical’ atheism goes back into problems of definition: types the dawn of history (‘The fool says, of atheism “There is no God”’, Psalm 14:1, i.e. makes no difference in life) ‘theoretical’ atheism Many distinguish between atheism as a is a more recent phenomenon than is view of reality or ontology (often called usually widely assumed. (341– ‘theoretical atheism’) and atheism as a 270 bce) was not an avowed atheist, for view that no effective difference in life or he challenged not the existence of the in the world is entailed in the proposition divine, but the divine nature: might the ‘God exists’ (‘practical atheism’). divine exist within the spaces between Another distinction may be drawn worlds, perhaps as atoms? between ‘avowed’ atheism that positively Most identify the dawn of theoretical, affirms the assertion ‘God does not exist’, ontological atheism with the second half and a broader atheism that negatively of the eighteenth century, although some denies the existence of a deity or divine question whether Hobbes (1588–1679) beings. logical positivism stands some- propounded avowed atheism. In Levia- where between this second approach and than (1651) Hobbes made the pronounce- Agnosticism by denying that the assertion ment on religion that is most frequently ‘God exists’ has any genuine currency. It quoted: ‘In these four things, Opinions of merely expresses an emotive attitude or ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devo- recommends such belief. tion towards what men fear, and Taking of There are many examples of ‘fringe’ Things Causall for Prognostiques, consis- atheism. Socrates (c. 470–399 bce) was teth the Naturall seed of Religion.’ 19 atheism

Nevertheless more than half of The second major factor was Kant’s Leviathan is concerned to defend ‘true’ Critique of Judgement (1790). Even religion against the manipulative abuse of Hume’s Dialogues of Natural Religion religion to promote conflict within the (1779) had been sceptical rather than civil order, e.g. between Catholic and atheistic. However, Kant now claimed Protestant England. Fear and superstition that the sense of ‘order’ that had were the causes not of authentic belief in impressed Newton and Voltaire was not God, but of religious manipulation. God is ‘there’ in the universe, but part of our ‘first and eternal cause of all things’, and human categories of understanding source of ‘irresistible power’. Hobbes was through which we made sense of the not an atheist. world. They are construals or projections Voltaire (1694–1778) is regularly cred- imposed by the human mind. ited with supposed atheism. He attacked Each of these two factors encouraged many manifestations of religions and further atheistic arguments. First, the view religious authority, including the that natural science provides not simply a of Leibniz. Nevertheless, he perceived method of enquiry but a comprehensive evidences of design in the world from world-view appeared more plausible in the which he inferred the existence of a light of developmental and evolutionary supreme Being, and attacked the atheism theories of the world and human life. of d’Holbach. Hegel (1770–1831) held together a philosophy of progress and evolving his- two influences on the rise of tory with belief in God, but Feuerbach modern atheism and Marx (see Marxist critique of The impetus towards ‘avowed’ atheism religion) turned this into a humanist or derived its force from two occurrences in socio-economic principle. Darwin the late eighteenth century. First, the (1809–82) formulated a theory of natural French Enlightenment and French revo- selection, which others used to attribute lution nurtured a mind-set which, in biophysical causes to all natural change. effect, gave an obsessively high place to Spencer (1820–1903) applied Darwin’s . It was not in fact the progress biological principle to issues of selfhood, of science as such that turned a tide. Many intelligence and ethics, and was agnostic leading scientists were committed theists, on the question of God. including, for example, Newton Second, Kant’s notion of projection (1642–1727). was developed by Hegel’s pupil Feuerbach The obsession with ‘autonomy’ encour- (1804–72) to account for ‘God’ in terms of aged the view that scientific method could a human projection of the infinite. The be extended to constitute a self-contained role of projection is developed further by autonomous theory of the world, or Marx, by Nietzsche, and by Freud (see world-view: a comprehensive account of Freud’s critique of religion). all possible knowledge. Thus d’Holbach god as a human projection? (Paul von Holbach, 1723–89) published atheism or ‘non-realist’ his Syste`me de la nature (1770), in which belief? he proposed an entirely mechanistic account of the world as a ‘system’. This Feuerbach began his journey with a quasi- excluded the need to postulate ‘God’, and theistic world-view, but (in his own Voltaire denounced its atheism. In Eng- words) moved from ‘God’, through atten- land R.B. Shelley would soon make a tion to ‘reason’, to ‘humankind’. He similar logical jump (1811–12) by claim- concluded that ‘God’ is a name for ing that God could not exist because God humankind’s highest aspirations, which was incapable of ‘visibility’. are ‘projected’ upwards and outwards. atheism 20

These human values are ‘objectified’, i.e. priest’ (The Antichrist, aphorism 26 (in transposed into an objective entity ‘out Complete Works, 18 vols., London: Allen there’ (see object). & Unwin, 1909–13, vol. 16, 161)). To Feuerbach’s notion of a ‘non-objective’ experience ‘salvation’ means ‘the world God has come to be known as an ‘anti- revolves around me’ (ibid., 186; aphorism realist’ or ‘non-realist’ concept of God, as 43). advocated in the writings of Cupitt (b. Freud (1856–1939) always saw human 1934) (see non-realism). Feuerbach nature in biophysical, neurological terms, insisted that by projecting human ideals as the metaphor that he uses for ‘forces’ and human dignity onto this ‘God’ within the self shows (the ego, the super- humanity reduces its own stature. ego, and the id in its unconscious depths). In response, theists perceive this spec- The problem of neurosis reflects conflicts ulative theory as a reductionist view of between these forces deep within the self. God. God has become a mere human However, these can be projected out- construct (discussed under Feuerbach, wards, so that, for example, conflicts below). The I–Thou interpersonal rela- between guilt and aspirations of self- tionship explored by Buber has been worth may be ‘objectified’ into the face dissolved. is talking to oneself. Is of a fatherly God who both judges and a non-realist ‘God’, God? gives grace. In his work The German Freud’s theories are complex, and the (1845–6) Marx (1818–83) draws upon above summary is too simple. He viewed Feuerbach’s materialist world-view to religion as an ‘illusion’, although he did serve his own promotion of socio-eco- not go as far as calling it a ‘delusion’, nomic forces as the driving motivation of which is plainly false. Like Nietzsche and ideas as well as history. In particular he Marx, he saw ‘God’ as performing an perceived religion as a repressive, reac- instrumental role to serve particular tionary and oppressive force which threa- human interests. This conflicts with theis- tens the struggle of the working classes for tic beliefs in God as a ‘Beyond’ who is socio-economic emancipation. transcendent and the Ground of all being (see transcendence). ‘god’ as serving particular Atheistic critiques of religions from ‘interests’: nietzsche and France, Germany and Austria may seem freud to be more powerful, at least at an The work of Nietzsche (1844–1900) is existential level, than Anglo-American atheistic. The basic drive of humankind is accusations about the logical problem the ‘will to power’. However, religion, and entailed in arguments for the existence of Christianity in particular, promotes a God, or the problem of evil. What kind of manipulative ascription of power to God should we expect to be capable of priests and to hierarchies, while ensuring logical demonstration or observable as an (likedemocracy)thatthemassesare empirical entity? characterized by the ‘slave’ mentality of All the same, the critique of religion as humility, mediocrity and self-denial. serving power-interests (Nietzsche) or a Nietzsche anticipates later anti-theists way of coping with the inner conflicts of by arguing that religious language relies neurosis (Freud) need not logically apply on ‘a mobile army of metaphors’ that can to all religion and all claims about belief in be manipulated to serve interests of power. God. This is worked out especially in The Indeed, many theists find Nietzsche and Twilight of the Idols (1889) and The Freud constructive in facilitating the sift- Antichrist (1895). ‘God forgives him who ing out of inauthentic from authentic repents’ means ‘him who submits to the truth-claims in religion. Among Christian 21 theologians, Moltmann, Dietrich Bon- body of Christian writings of the first hoeffer, and Hans Ku¨ ng have addressed millennium. Ricoeur these issues head-on. , (b. 1913) life utilizes Freud’s work on self-deception for hermeneutics, without subscribing to his Augustine was born in Thagaste, North non-theist, mechanistic world-view. (See Africa, and was educated, and taught also empiricism; existentialism; God, rhetoric, in Carthage. He did not come arguments for the existence of.) formally to Christian faith until the age of thirty-two. In spite of the influence of his attribute Christian mother, Monica, he had found Christianity insufficiently compatible with In the most general terms, an attribute is a reason to be credible. In early years he fell characteristic, feature or trait, ascribed to under the influence of Manichaeanism, a person or object (in word history, Latin, which he found more intellectually accep- ad,to,andtribuere, to ascribe). In table than Christianity. However, disillu- philosophy the classical exposition of an sion set in. He remained closer to attribute emerges in Aristotle.He Neoplatonism, even if as a Christian divides the world into substances, each who viewed the Incarnation as decisively of which can be characterized by its distinctive of Christian faith. attributes. Augustine taught rhetoric also at Rome Strictly, Aristotle understands these and Milan, and came to Christian faith attributes to receive their characterization (386–7) partly through reading the Bible under the categories of time, place and (the famous tolle, lege, ‘take up and read’, relation. In Thomas Aquinas the term which prompted his reading of Romans becomes extended. 13:13–14), and partly through the influ- In classical theism it was long custom- ence of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. He ary to speak of the attributes of God (e.g. returned to North Africa (388), was holiness, wisdom, sovereignty, love). ordained in 391, and was made Bishop However, many modern theologians of Hippo in 395 until his death in 430. believe that this fails to take due account either of the transcendence of God as writings Other, or of the dynamic purposiveness of The enormous range and scope of his divine action. It risks encouraging the writings may invite possible misinterpreta- distorted notion of God as a static object, tions if specific treatises by Augustine are even as a mere object of human thought, cut loose from their context and purposes. rather than as an initiating Thou who is Buber Moltmann; Many of his works attack ‘’. Thus ‘Beyond’. (See also ; evil creation God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of; much of his material on and forms part of his polemic against Man- Tillich.) ichaeanism; many observations on habit, will, grace and the Church form part of Augustine of Hippo (354–430) his attacks on the group known as Dona- Together with Plato, Aristotle and tists; and much, but not all, of his work on Thomas Aquinas, Augustine may be and freedom features within counted among the four most influential his attacks on a Pelagian notion of freedom thinkers who shaped as autonomous free choice. before the Renaissance. He is widely Probably the least shaped by polemic viewed as the first great Christian philo- are his widely read Confessions (397– sopher, and his theology permanently 400), written in first-person narrative influenced Catholic and Protestant theol- style, and the later Enchiridion (423), ogy in the West. He produced the largest written as a ‘little handbook’ on Christian Augustine of Hippo 22 belief and discipleship. The framework Plato, Neoplatonism and Plotinus. What chosen is that of the Creed and Lord’s the senses perceive of the material world Prayer. Also in this late period Augustine can be deceptive and false. ‘Truth is produced his classic City of God (twenty- eternal . . . truth cannot perish’ (ibid., 15: two books, 413–26), which addressed 27, 28). Truth, he then infers, belongs to pagan interpretations of the fall of Rome the realm of ‘the soul and God’ who are to Alaric the Goth in 410. His philoso- ‘immortal’ (ibid., 18: 32). phical theology can be seen in De Trinitate language and knowledge in the (On the Trinity, fifteen books, 400–16). teacher Other works include numerous biblical (389) commentaries and doctrinal treatises as Augustine later expressed dissatisfaction well as letters and dialogues. with the Soliloquies as simplistic and confused. He develops his earlier writings: reason, truth and further in De Magistro (The Teacher), but knowledge of god in the soliloquies this time perceives the importance of (386–7) issues about the currency of language. The Soliloquies reveal an indebtedness to an Some early sections may offer hostages to earlier reading of ’s (lost) Hortensius Wittgenstein’s critique of referential for kindling Augustine’s early interest in theories of meaning and ostensive philosophy (consolidated in Confessions III: definition. Yet even here Augustine 4 and 7) as a search for wisdom, or recognizes that the circularity of explain- ‘blessedness’. A passion for intellectual ing signs by other signs may reach firmer enquiry remains common to philosophy ground when we ‘carry out action’ (ibid., and Christianity, and in his earlier works 4: 7). Augustine sees in this a close affinity in Anticipating Schleiermacher and Neoplatonism. The Soliloquies are a dialo- Wittgenstein, Augustine appeals to teach- gue between the writer and reason. ing, learning and training for understand- Nevertheless, Augustine argues, knowl- ing how we come to know meanings of edge of God is unique. It is distinct both signs in experience. Indeed, contrary to from knowledge of the sensual and from Wittgenstein’s example from Augustine, mathematical knowledge: ‘My question is ‘pointing with the finger can indicate not what you know but how you know. nothing but the object pointed out . . . Have you any knowledge that resembles I cannot learn the thing . . . nor the sign . . . knowledge of God?’ (ibid., I: 5: 10). I am not interested in the act of pointing’ Even in this very early work a perspec- (ibid., 10: 34). However, Augustine does tive emerges which is common to such perceive here the notion of ‘Universals’ as later Western thinkers as Descartes and truth presiding over the mind. Kierkegaard: the issue of knowing evil and freedom in on free will relates to a first-person ‘I’, whether it be the subject in Descartes or subjectivity in (395–6) Kierkegaard. ‘It is impossible to show God De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will) attacks to a mind vitiated and sick. Only the the Manichaean account of the origin of healthy mind . . . will attain vision’ (ibid., evil. Augustine rejects their metaphysical 6: 12). reason is the power of the soul to dualism, as if evil were a positive entity at look, but it does not follow that everyone war with God. Evil has its origin in an evil who looks, sees . . . ‘Virtue . . . is perfect act of will: ‘God is not the author of evil’ reason’ (ibid., 6: 13). (On Free Will, I: 1: 1). Evil stems from a Truth, therefore, thereby concerns the misdirected will behind the evil act (ibid., will as well as the intellect (ibid., II: 5: 8). 5: 7). Contrary to some of his later anti- Augustine now moves into the area of Pelagian writings, Augustine is here so 23 Augustine of Hippo concerned to emphasize the voluntary Books III and IV recount Augustine’s nature of evil acts that he portrays ‘the interest in philosophy, sparked by Cicero’s rule of human mind’ as able to resist the Hortensius, his involvement with the pull to evil (ibid., 10: 20). ‘It is in the Manichaeans, his study of Aristotle’s power of our will to enjoy or to be Categories, and his first reflections on time without . . . a good’ (ibid., 12: 26). as duration and timeliness (ibid., IV: 6 :11; If God punishes evil deeds, ‘that would 8: 13). Books VI and VII trace his journey be unjust unless the will was free not only through serious engagement with Neopla- to live aright but also to sin’ (ibid., II: 1: tonism to his eventual openness to the 3). Even divine foreknowledge does not Epistle to the Romans and Scripture. constrain free will. For divine omnis- While Platonism is right that ‘God is for cience means only that ‘no future event ever the same’, God chooses to become [is] to escape his knowledge’, not the humble and accessible through the bodily imposition of compulsion to accord with enfleshment of Jesus Christ (ibid., VII: 9: some ‘fixed’ scenario (ibid., III: 4: 11). 14). All of this underlines the goodness of The theme of praise reiterates the God. God’s gifts are good, whether or not privative view of evil. No one can ‘find humankind chooses to misuse them. ‘Why fault with any part of thy creation’ (ibid., did you not use your free will for the 14: 20). Yet this language closely parallels purpose for which I gave it to you, that is, Plotinus and Neoplatonism. ‘The evil to do right?’ (ibid., II: 1: 3). which overtakes us has its source in self- will . . . in the desire for self-ownership’ selfhood, self-awareness: god and (Plotinus, Enneads,V:1:1).‘The time in the confessions (398) unchangeable was better than the change- This first-person narrative offers a retro- able . . . The mind somehow knew the spective interpretation of past moments unchangeable . . . It arrived at that which and key issues from a theological perspec- is’ (Confessions, VII: 17: 23, where tive, in which God is addressed as Thou Augustine recalls a visionary experience (see Buber). Such first-person style places along Plotinian lines). Nevertheless, his philosophy in a new key in terms of such Christian experience of revelation remains issues as self, freedom and hedonism, rooted in the Incarnation (ibid., 18: 24, subject and object, subjectivity and self- 19: 25). His ‘full’ conversion comes in involvement and the experience of time. Book VIII, especially when a child’s song Ryle has illustrated the differences (tolle, lege) takes him to Romans 13:13 between ‘observer’ logic and ‘participant’ (ibid., VIII: 12: 29). logic not only in such areas, but also in the The character of God is now perceived generating of supposed paradoxes. as transformative: ‘Thou hast pierced our Augustine offers a sternly ethical and heart with thy love’ (ibid., IX: 2: 3). theological interpretation of the drive of Augustine has no philosophical difficulty the self for self-gratification and desire. about the effectiveness of the intercessory The self is ‘narrow’ and capable of self- prayer of his mother Monica on his deception (Confessions,I:4:4;5:6).A behalf (ibid., 10: 26), and her passing child learns language to express the through death to life shortly after their desires of the self (Wittgenstein’s selective fulfilment (ibid., 13). example of ostensive definition comes in In books X–XII Augustine leaves the ibid., 8: 13). Desire led, in his sixteenth events of his life to explore, still in first- year, to the theft of pears when ‘my person narrative before God as ‘Thou’, the pleasure was not in what I stole but in themes of self-awareness, memory, time, the act of stealing’ (ibid., II: 9: 17; cf. II: 4: the mode and time (or temporality) of 9; 6: 12). creation and of God as ‘Creator of all Augustine of Hippo 24 times’ (ibid., XI: 13: 15). In his last Book, 26). However, to deny its independent form and differentiation are perceived in ‘existence as an object’ does not entail its relation to divine creation. unreality. The mind is conscious of ‘In what temporal medium could the duration and succession. ‘Time . . . is unnumbered ages Thou didst not make nothing else than extension (distentio), pass by, since Thou art the Author and though I do not know extension of what’ Creator of all the ages?’ (ibid., 13: 15). (ibid., 26: 33). Hesitantly he wonders ‘Thou madest that very time itself, and whether this distentio, or ‘stretching’ periods could not pass by before Thou extension, is the mind; yet he concedes madest the whole temporal procession. that movement and measurement remain But if there was no time before heaven applicable to duration. and earth, how, then, can it be asked Augustine has reached as far as the “What wast Thou doing then?” For there logical tools of the pre-modern era will was no “then” when there was no time’ permit in appreciating the different logical (ibid.). currencies of time in relation to different Wittgenstein’s quotation ‘What is contexts and questions. He lays a founda- time?’ (ibid., 14: 17) has as its target tion for modern theories of narrative time, Augustine’s formulation of a generalizing as Ricoeur shows through his use of ‘super-question’ in the abstract. Yet just as Augustine’s distentio in his Time and Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s allu- Narrative (Eng. 1984–8). sion to ostensive definition tells only half evil, freedom and grace: develop- of the story, the Confessions books XI are ments of themes in later works more subtle than we might imagine from the quotation. In the later period important sources Augustine raises the issues of time include the Enchiridion (423), On the because it appears to raise problems about Trinity (400–16), the series of anti-Pela- creatio ex nihilo, i.e. the doctrine that God gian writings (411–28); and the City of has created all things without resort to God (413–26; already introduced above). ‘earlier material’. Yet how can creation In the later writings Augustine under- have its ‘beginning’ in and through God if lines even more heavily the privative view time permits us to ask what was ‘before’ of evil. ‘If you try to find the efficient cause this beginning? of this evil choice, there is none to be In practice Augustine shares with Witt- found. For nothing causes an evil will’ genstein a recognition of the logical (City of God, XII: 6). His exposition (in muddle imposed by conceiving of time partial or ‘weaker’ form) of the principle either as a receptacle into which the world of plenitude draws on the visual analogy was placed, or as a flowing river which that for light to be seen as light pre- permits the application of ‘before’ and supposes shadow (ibid., XI: 23). ‘after’ to all events. Augustine allows that This is not unrelated to the Neoplato- we may speak of ‘before’ in relation to nist and Plotinian view of form as given sets of events, but not to denote presupposing difference in the process of temporal priority before all events. creation. The ‘orderedness’ of the created Human awareness conditions how we world yields necessary variety and uneven- perceive time. For the past, the present no ness: ‘What is more beautiful than a fire? longer exists; the future is not yet; the What is more useful, with its heat, its present vanishes in the very moment of comfort . . . ? Yet nothing causes more our reflection upon it. It is therefore not distress that the burns inflicted by fire’ ‘a thing-in-itself’, but is present to the (ibid., XII: 4). The world as such is good, mind in memory, attention (strictly but it contains potential for the possibility ‘experience’) and expectation (ibid., 20: of evil when evil choices misuse it. 25 Austin, John L.

The theme of structured order, in between the contingent and the universal. contrast to the chaotic and contingent, Yet his theology served to qualify this. The finds coherent expression no less in On the Incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Trinity. The Divine Trinity exhibits unity- Christ stood as the rock that separated in-diversity. The Trinity exemplifies Being, Christian faith from Neoplatonism. Knowledge and Love. God is One; how- ever, God chooses to become visible and Austin, John L. (1911–60) knowable in the Incarnate Word, God the Son. Just as in Plotinus, the eternal One Austin was a leading exponent of ‘analy- who is ‘beyond Being’ nevertheless reaches tical’ or ‘Ordinary Language’ philosophy. expression as Mind (Nous), but is both He taught at Oxford for most of his life, bound into a unity and yet becomes and practised this method there from 1945 accessible as Soul or life. Against the until his death in 1960. His essay ‘Other Arians Augustine insists (with Athanasius) Minds’ (1946) introduced the category of that the Son is co-eternal with the Father, performative utterances by distin- while the Holy Spirit exhibits the potenti- guishing such first-person utterances as ‘I ality of ‘gift’ or ‘giveableness’ (On the promise’, ‘I warn’ from merely descriptive Trinity, V: 3: 4; and 14: 15; 15: 16). sentences (in Philosophical Papers, The anti-Pelagian writings sharpen Oxford: Clarendon, 1961, 44–84, esp. Augustine’s rejection of definitions of 65–74). His 1955 Harvard lectures on human freedom in terms of autonomy or performative utterances are published as equipoise. Human fallenness yields a habi- How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: tuated bondage which can be redeemed OUP, 1962; 2nd edn, 1975). only by divine grace. Hence the emphasis An utterance such as ‘I promise’ per- shifts from his earlier work On Free Will in forms an action in the very saying of it: ‘by such treatises as On Nature and Grace using this formula . . . I have bound myself (415), On the Spirit and the Letter (412) to others, and staked my reputation’ and On Grace and Free Will (426–7). (Philosophical Papers, 67). Similarly ‘I This distinguishes him sharply from know’ also entails giving ‘others my word; Kant: ‘ought’ does not presuppose ‘can’ in I give others my authority for saying “S is ethics. The issue is whether the will and its P”’ (ibid.). ‘I promise’ or ‘I know’ is ‘quite habituated acts are orientated towards different’ from ‘he promises’ or ‘he self-gratification or towards God. In com- knows’. mon with Neoplatonism, this is related to Nevertheless ‘the term “performative” the constraints of the temporal and con- will be used in a variety of cognate ways’ tingent as against fulfilment and blessed- (How to Do Things with Words,6). ness in the eternal and the true. Performatives are effective or ineffective, It will thus be seen that Augustine ‘operative’ or void, rather than true or wrestles with a wide range of the philoso- false. ‘We do not speak of a false bet or a phical problems that have occupied minds false christening’ (ibid., 11). Most perfor- especially in the West over centuries. In matives presuppose accepted conventions some cases, including his work on self- and regimes that words are uttered to hood, knowledge and time, he moved appropriate persons in appropriate cir- almost ahead of the pre-modern world. cumstances. In other cases, the Platonic philosophical It no longer constitutes an operative frame, within which much of his thinking performative to say, ‘My seconds will call developed, yielded constraints. Thus many on you’ if or where the conventions of would detect too great a readiness to duelling are no longer accepted. Would the accept, and to work within, a mind–body utterance ‘I baptize this infant 2704’ dualism, and an over-sharp contrast constitute an operative act of baptism? authority 26

(ibid., 35). Since presuppositions are employed by D.D. Evans) the logic of entailed ‘for a certain performative utter- self-involvement. ance to be happy, certain statements have Third, it also entails what Wolter- to be true’ (Austin’s italics, ibid., 45). storff calls ‘count-generation’. An utter- Like Wittgenstein, Austin notes the ance may count as the performing of an ‘asymmetry’ in logical terms between first- action, as when the raising of an umpire’s person uses and third-person uses of such finger may count as a declarative verdict. verbs as ‘I believe’, ‘we mourn’, ‘I give and Fourth, Austin established the huge bequeath’, ‘I bet’, ‘I forgive’ and ‘I variety of types of illocutionary acts that promise’ (ibid., 63). These cannot be language may perform. Verbs such as detected, however, by grammar alone. reckon, grade, assess, rank, rate, may, in At the heart of Austin’s work lies the the first person, constitute ‘verdictives’. destination between ‘locutions’ (roughly ‘I command’, ‘I proclaim’, ‘I pardon’, uttering a sentence with a meaning), ‘I announce’, ‘I appoint’ may function as ‘illocutionary acts’ (which perform acts ‘executives’. ‘I promise’, ‘I covenant’, in the saying of the utterance) and ‘I pledge myself’, ‘I guarantee’ are ‘com- ‘perlocutionary acts’ (which perform acts misives’. ‘I thank’, ‘I welcome’, ‘I bless’, by the saying of the utterance: ibid., 1–10, ‘I curse’ are behabitives (ibid., 150–60). 114–16). However, post-Austinian critics have Perlocutions often, perhaps always, offered improved and more coherent involve the use of quasi-causal power clarifications (notably ). rather than convention. Thus ‘I persuade’ Further, Austin has been severely criticized usually embodies perlocutionary, rather for classifying logical force in terms of than illocutionary, action. Austin rightly English verbs. Performatives cannot ade- focuses on illocutions as most fertile for quately be grouped in accordance with philosophy or conceptual clarification. stereotypical examples or verbs in the Thus ‘I praise’, ‘I welcome’, ‘I repent’, ‘I English language. promise’ come within this latter category. Even so, nothing can detract from the These require and repay clarification con- foundation laid by Austin. Searle, Wol- cerning the conditions for their operative terstorff, F. Recanati, Daniel Vanderveken currency or effectiveness. and many others have built upon, and modified, his work. relevance to the philosophy of Some American and German writers on religion biblical hermeneutics (e.g. Robert Funk The consequences of Austin’s work for and Ernst Fuchs) have over-loosely used language in religion are too numerous the term ‘performative’ to denote any kind to list in a short article. First, he offers a of dimension of action or force without semantic or performative approach to taking account of the rigour and care with truth. ‘It is true’ is more like adding my which Austin distinguishes different types signature than stating a fact. of force and action and their basis-in Second, much religious language is situations, conventions and life. He has indeed the performing of an action. opened a fruitful field for further research. Sincerely to say ‘I repent’ constitutes an act of repentance; it is not an attempt authority to inform God of a state of mind that God may already know. ‘We believe’ In the era of Enlightenment constitutes a declarative act of nailing the concept of authority appeared to one’s colours to the mast, as well as a generate conflict, or at least tensions, declaration of cognitive content. It between some religions or theological depends on and exhibits (to use the term doctrines and philosophical enquiry. 27 authority

Almost all religions entail such notions as Moreover, the ready abuse of appeals the lordship or kingship of God (or of to authority has been unmasked with Christ or of a divine figure) who has relish by Nietzsche (1844–1900) and authority to decree, to require obedience, other philosophical critics. Kant to commission agents or to forgive sins. (1724–1804) held to the notion of the On the other hand, philosophical thought absolute authority of the categorical has often assumed the importance of the (moral) imperative, but urged that divine autonomy of the self (with Kant), and authority is not merely one of raw power accorded it special privilege. and threat, since God respects the dignity, Neither the concept of autonomy nor responsibility and freedom of human the concept of authority is as simple as persons. might appear to be the case. If it means Kierkegaard (1813–55) represents a anything to call God, Allah, or Christ way of thinking that readily holds together ‘Lord’ or ‘King’, Christians, Jews and the importance of religious obedience with Muslims thereby accord to God a de jure an insistence that religious faith is not a authority, i.e. an authority of legitimate matter of responding to second-hand right. If they accept this authority in inherited doctrines and rules, but of practice, this is also a de facto authority. appropriating faith for oneself in personal Problems arise, however, when agents self-involvement and subjectivity. The or intermediaries, often in the form of two emphases are not incompatible. sacred writings, clergy or other ecclesial On the other hand, freedom of officers, are invoked. What kind and enquiry and freedom to respond are not degree of authority are these ‘penultimate’ sheer ‘autonomy’. Tillich (1886–1965) writings or persons to be accorded? argued for a middle path between ‘hetero- Wolterstorff points out that in nomy’ (a law imposed by another from everyday life we are familiar with the without) and autonomy. To accept as ‘a ‘delegated authority’ of a vice-chairperson law’ only what come from within one’s or even personal assistant who acts on own nature (autonomy) constitutes a behalf of a director, chairperson or pre- denial of the transformative nature of sident (Divine Discourse,Cambridge: religion, as so CUP, 1995, 37–54). Thus sacred texts strongly urged. Tillich calls this middle and apostles may be authorized or ‘com- way ‘theonomy’. missioned to speak in the name of God’ Freedom of philosophical enquiry (ibid., 41 and 51, his italics). Judaism, denotes not a ‘ of indifference’ as Christianity, Islam and some other reli- if the enquirer began always a priori with gious traditions view sacred writings as a blank sheet. Freedom of thought allows holding effective and justified power if and for a personal integrity that resists the when they speak as the word of God. oppression of social, religious, political or This does not remove from religious secular totalitarianism. Nevertheless it communities the freedom and responsibil- does not preclude a careful assessment of ity of interpretation, practical application, the claims of traditions and communities and examining issues that arise from the in relation to individual consciousness. recontextualizing of sacred texts in a later Gadamer (1900–2002) perhaps did age. In part this entails the discipline of more than any to rehabilitate the rational responsible hermeneutics. The notion basis of respect for authority. In con- that sacred texts are to be read like scious opposition to the complacent engineering or scientific textbooks is individualism of Enlightenment rational- broadly a ‘fundamentalist’ tradition ism, Gadamer asserts: ‘Authority . . . is within several of the major world reli- ultimately based not on the subjection gions. and addiction of reason but on an act of autonomy 28 acknowledgement and knowledge . . . where it is wealth and social influence; namely, that the other is superior . . . in aristocracy (Greek, aristos, best) pro- judgement and might . . . It rests . . . on an motes what is best for society as a act of reason itself which, aware of its own whole. limitations, trusts to the better insights of The state in the Republic (bks others’ (Truth and Method, 2nd Eng. edn, II–V) is ruled by intellectuals who London: Sheed & Ward, 1989, 279). undergo a rigorous philosophical Gadamer alludes primarily to what has training in order that the rest of the been tested in historical traditions. How- city-state (hoi polloi, the many) may ever, in religion the principle may apply to be governed in accordance with truth, prophetic or apostolic witnesses as well as wisdom and justice. Yet book VI to traditions of wisdom, narrative and concedes that in practice philosophers sacred teaching. Much of the old, now are regarded very differently. dated, over-sharp dualism between (2) Locke (1632–1704) represents a tran- authority and reason has dissipated with sitional point towards the individual- the recognition of the part played by ism of modernity. In his Two Treatises communities and traditions. However, if on Government (1689), especially in individual reason is undervalued, the issue his Second Treatise in Civil Govern- reaches a self-contradictory situation of ment Locke proposes that the indivi- the kind that emerges in more radical dual has God-given ‘rights’ to life, versions of postmodernism.Both liberty and property. However, in authority and reason are placed under effect by an implicit social contract, a radical criticism and undervalued. power of government must be con- ditionally assigned to a group of governmental agents to ensure a just autonomy distribution of the rights and . In the broad, popular sense of the term ‘Pure’ autonomy would be anarchy, autonomy denotes freedom from external when sheer might and power deprive constraints to set one’s own norms or rules individuals of these rights. of conduct, or in social applications of the (3) Kant (1724–1804) extends autonomy word self-determination or self-govern- to the will and moral decision of the ment. It derives historically from the individual. This is part of his rejection Greek auto-, self, co-joined with nomos, of the compromise with ‘freedom’ that law, rule, or principle. is imposed by ecclesial and social A decisive influence in the history and traditions and authorities which use of the term was Kant (see below). undermine the ethical status of the Prior to the eighteenth century the term individual to determine will and action largely functioned in a communal, social, in free, unconditioned, moral decision. or institutional context to denote the self- A will is ‘good’ only if it derives its government of a city-state, state or guild. ‘law’ from itself alone, i.e. in sheer autonomy. (1) Plato (428–348 bce) expounds the (4) Schleiermacher (1768–1834) per- self-supporting autonomy of the city- ceived that Kant’s transcendental state in the Republic, where it is clear philosophy, or critical philoso- that autonomy does not apply to phy, raised new questions which individuals. This would create anarchy. theology had to address. However, he There has to be law or rule, but as also perceived that autonomy struck at against tyranny, where the criterion is the heart of religion and religions. For raw power; against democracy, where religion is characterized by an imme- it is mere popularity; against oligarchy, diacy of awareness or feeling of ‘utter 29 Ayer

dependence’ upon God (schlechthinig agree that the individual is utterly Abha¨ngigkeit, The Christian Faith, helpless to make responsible decisions 2nd edn, sect. 4). which affect his or her own destiny. (5) Tillich (1886–1965) subjects both They do not see humankind as deter- ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’ to a mined decisively or entirely by social forceful critique. If autonomy is to be history. viewed positively, ‘autonomy does not mean the freedom of the individual to be a law to himself’ (Systematic Theology, vol. I, London: Nisbet, See Ibn Rushd. 1953, 93). At best, it denotes ‘obedi- ence to the law of reason’ (ibid.). All the same, individual-centred autonomy remains ‘shallow’, just as See Ibn Sina. heteronomy (law imposed by another) can be oppressive. What is needed is to axiom avoid the ‘catastrophe’ of autonomy and the ‘destructive’ impact of hetero- Axioms are self-evident propositions or nomy by rooting both in ‘theonomy’: principles. They provide a premise or the threefold interaction or dialectic foundation on the basis of which inference between individual reason, social con- may be deduced. Aristotle defined straint and divine order, provide a axioms as indemonstrable propositions balancing ‘depth’ which one of these that cannot be doubted. They are akin to alone fails to yield (ibid., 92–96). postulates, except that postulates are (6) Controversy about the status of auton- capable of demonstration. Kant regarded omy has divided the two broad intel- axioms as a priori principles of . lectual approaches that might Plato, Descartes and Leibniz held the provisionally be described as the strongest views of axioms as ‘innate’ to the modern and the postmodern. human mind, but the term may also be Modernity inherits a philosophy of used in a less Absolute sense to denote individual capacities and rights inher- what is commonly held to be true. ited through Locke and Kant. Post- ‘Axiom’ should be distinguished from modernity inherits from Hegel, ‘axiom of choice’ as a technical term for a Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger mathematical postulate about sets, and (1889–1976) and Foucault also from ‘’ which explores issues (1926–84) the view that against the of value. (See also deduction.) enormous power-shaping factors of social and communal forces, indivi- Ayer, (Sir) Alfred Jules (1910–89) dual autonomy is illusory. (7) Religions, including the Christian reli- A.J. Ayer became Professor of Mind and gion, tend also to underline the power Logic at the of the social structures into which the (1946–59) and subsequently Wykeham individual is born, and to be less Professor of Logic at the University of optimistic than secular modernity Oxford (1959–1978). However, he made about the powers of individual reason. his name through the publication of Nevertheless, within a context of a Language, Truth and Logic (1936), later doctrine of divine grace and of revised in the light of criticism in a second human dependence upon God, they edition (London: Gollancz, 1946). This do not share the pessimism of some established his reputation as the leading postmodern thinkers. They do not British exponent of logical positivism. Ayer 30 ayer’s logical positivism verifiability’ (ibid., 48). Until we know how a proposition would be verified, the Ayer argued that all propositions are speaker ‘fails to communicate anything’ either analytic statements,which (ibid., 49). derive their truth from formal or ‘internal’ Although he had earlier demanded a logical validity, or statements about the principle or criterion of ‘verification’, Ayer world which can be verified by observa- recognized in his 1946 edition that it was tion and experience, i.e. are empirically sufficient for a proposition to be capable verifiable. He expounded this as a theory of verification ‘in principle’. Thus, for of meaning. example, in the era before space travel Propositions that are neither analytic the proposition ‘There are mountains on nor empirically verifiable, Ayer argued, do the far side of the moon’ remained not communicate genuinely propositional verifiable in principle, even in the era meaning. It does not make sense to ask when space technology had not reached whether they are true or false, since all the point where it could be verified in true-or-false propositions fall into one of practice. In principle the proposition was these two specified categories only. capable of verification, given the appro- Propositions about God or about ethics priate technology. are ‘non-sense’, since their meaning can- In his introduction to his 1946 edition not be tested and demonstrated by the Ayer states the point negatively: ‘If . . . no principle of verification. Such statements possible experience could go on to verify it as ‘To steal is wrong’ are not true-or-false [the proposition], it does not have any propositions; they are recommendations factual meaning at all’ (ibid., 15). concerning the adoption of values or critiques of the verification emotive expressions of approval or dis- principle approval. Ayer defines ‘non-sense’ as being Logical positivism looks back for its roots ‘devoid of literal significance’ on the to the Vienna circle, with its exagger- ground that the content of a supposed ated respect for the physical or natural proposition neither meets the criterion of sciences and its extreme distaste for verification nor depends on the validity of metaphysics. First, as many have internal logical relations within an analy- observed, not only metaphysics and theol- tical proposition. In the latter case, ‘the ogy, but no less ‘every single moral and validity depends solely on the definitions aesthetic judgement, any judgement of of the symbols it contains’ (Language, value of any sort, must be regarded as Truth and Logic, 2nd edn, 78). meaningless’ (G. J. Warnock, English Phi- religion, ethics and metaphysics losophy since 1900, Oxford: OUP, 1958, characteristically employ sentences that 45). This excludes a wide range of purport ‘to express a genuine proposition, discourse which seems to have genuine but . . . in fact, express neither a tautology communicative currency for very many nor an empirical hypothesis’ (ibid., 41). people, above and beyond merely expres- Hence they do not match up to the sing mere personal preferences or emo- proposed criteria of meaning. Ayer rejects tions. ‘the metaphysical thesis that philosophy Second, Ayer is unclear about why he affords us knowledge of a reality trans- gives such a privileged status to the cending the world of science and common principle of verification when it fails to sense’ (ibid., 45). meet its own criteria of meaning. For as a Ayer asserts: ‘The criterion which we proposition it is neither verifiable by use to test the genuineness of apparent observation of the empirical world nor is statements of fact is the criterion of it an analytic statement. J.L. Evans 31 Ayer described its self-defeating status as like ayer’s other works that of a weighing-machine trying to weigh itself. Although his reputation is most popu- Third, most seriously of all, Ayer larly known through his Language, Truth purports to be formulating a theory of and Logic, Ayer also addressed problems meaning and language but in practice concerning epistemology (thenatureof merely presents a positivist or materialist knowledge) in The Problem of Knowl- world-view disguised in linguistic dress. In edge (1956); and issues concerning per- the end it is no more than raw positivism sonal identity, freedom and causation, dressed up as a theory of meaning. and the relation between language and Fourth, in addition to these three states of affairs in Thinking and Meaning weaknesses, logical positivism too readily (1947) and Philosophy and Language divides all language into a simplistic (1960). dualism. Apart from propositions of logic, Heavily influenced by the empiricism language allegedly either describes obser- of Hume and the world-view of Russell, vable states of affairs (verifiable at least in Ayer came to represent a confident, principle) or expresses emotions, recom- ‘common-sense’, empiricist world-view in mendations, approval or disapproval. the English philosophy of the 1950s. Yet However, as virtually the whole of he also recognized the logical limitations Wittgenstein’s later work clearly shows, and fallibility of many empiricist claims to language and uses of language reflect a ‘knowledge’. ‘multiplicity’ that is ‘not something fixed’, In The Problem of Knowledge Ayer but functions with the diversity of a writes: ‘Claims to know empirical state- repertoire of tools in a tool-box to operate ments may be upheld by a reference to in many ways (L. Wittgenstein, Philoso- perception, or to memory, or to testimony, phical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, or to historical records, or to scientific Germ. and Eng., 1967, sects. 11 and 23). laws. But such backing is not always language in religion uses com- strong enough for knowledge. Whether it mands, declarations, promises, prayer, is so or not depends upon the circum- decrees, pronouncements, parables, and stances of the particular case’ (London: many genres which are best understood as Pelican, 1956, 31). This allusion to the performing a variety of speech acts.To particular case holds together the various ask which are either verifiable or analytic approaches associated with Ayer, Ryle propositions, and to dismiss the rest as and others, which often used to be called ‘non-sense’, ignores the genuine operative ‘Oxford philosophy’ in the 1950s and currency with which such language per- early 1960s. forms meaningful communicative acts. B

Barth, Karl (1886–1968) the subtlety and complexity of Barth’s thinking. Thus H.J. Paton portrays him as Many regard Barth as a towering figure in placing a ‘theological veto’ on language Christian theology of the twentieth cen- about God in philosophy of religion (The tury. A Swiss theologian and pastor, Barth Modern Predicament, London: Allen & opposed Hitler and Nazism in Germany. Unwin, 1955, 47–58). From 1935 he was professor at Basle, and Whereas in classical high modernity the is most widely known for his massive paradigm of ‘knowing’ is that of the active work Church Dogmatics. Although this human subject scrutinizing ‘objects’ of was never fully completed, the four main knowledge, Barth anticipates the view that ‘Parts’ run to some fourteen large volumes ‘objective’ apprehension is not value-neu- in English translation (Edinburgh: T & T tral. Rather, it is that which accords with Clark, 1956–77). the nature of the enquiry and its ‘object’. It In the context of philosophy of religion is not to be shaped exclusively by the Barth made an impact in several areas. (1) agenda of the human ‘subject’. In theology He attacked Enlightenment rationalism this exploration should be, as far as as a mind-set which exercised reductive possible, in accordance with God as ‘God’. and distorting influences on Christian barth’s critique of theology, especially in conjunction with enlightment rationalism liberal theology and natural theol- ogy. (2) He emphasized the part played by Barth does not simply reject all use of revelation in knowledge of God, and the ‘reason’. His target is the method infinite qualitative transcendence of employed widely in theology in the late God as ‘Other’. (3) He drew attention to nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the nature of Anselm’s formulation of the associated with such thinkers as A. Har- ontological argument as a confession nack. In one respect Barth anticipated the of faith rather than as a philosophical post-modern perspective that rational argument. (4) He questioned the way in enquiry is seldom value-neutral (see post- which Thomas Aquinas had formulated modernity). Because of human fallenness, theroleofanalogy in the use of he did not entirely reject Feuerbach’s language in religion. claim that all too often people project their Nevertheless, some works on philoso- wishes and ideals onto a ‘God’ who is phy of religion tend not fully to appreciate merely an idol of their own construction. 33 Barth, Karl

Liberal theology, in which Barth had former collaborator, appeared to affirm been educated and trained, largely focused as much in God and Man (1930) and in on Jesus as a teacher of ethical truths. In his work on ethics, although he also Harnack’s view, the heart of Christian emphasizes human guilt and fallenness. teaching lay in ‘the fatherhood of God, the This opened their debate about the legiti- brotherhood of humankind and the infi- macy of ‘natural theology’. nite value of a human soul’. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Barth found that this approach cut Barth led the stand of the Confessing little ice in his early work as a pastor. It Church in Germany under the theme also underestimated human sin, and the ‘Christ alone; Scripture alone’, stated in outbreak of the First World War the Barmen Declaration of May 1934. It (1914–18), even endorsed by some of his was in Rome, in deep concern about the German teachers, seemed further to ques- apparent blind eye of the Vatican towards tion any optimism about ‘progress’. He Hitler in 1934 that Barth attacked Brun- turned to a repeated and intensive reading ner in his work No! (Nein!). By making of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and theology more broadly based than ‘Christ discovered what he called ‘the Strange and Scripture’ wider traditions seemed to New World within the Bible’ (1917), in leave room for compromise and manip- The Word of God and the Word of Man, ulation. (1924, Eng. 1957, 43). In Church Dogmatics Barth also argues In 1919 Barth published his ground- that sin has so marred the image of God in breaking Commentary on Romans. This humankind that no ‘point of contact’ emphasized the distance between human- survives (I: 1, 273). Nevertheless, in grace ity and the transcendence and grace of and in faith such ‘contact’ may occur in God. A second edition (1922) drew more times and in ways of God’s choosing. This explicitly on Kierkegaard. The only is not to demand ‘a complete sacrifice of valid starting-point is revelation: ‘God is the intellect’ (Paton, The Modern Predica- known through God and through God ment, 51), or to ‘veto’ human language alone’ (Church Dogmatics, II: 1, sect. 27, about God by ‘theological positivism’ Eng. 179). parallel with Ayer’s logical positivism (ibid.). It is not ‘rejection of reason’ (ibid., revelation, reason, ‘natural 49). It is affirmation of the free sovereign theology’ and divine choice of God when or whether to speak transcendence through human reason or any other ‘’ in knowing God is deter- means. Barth approves of ‘critical’ reflec- mined by revelation in accordance with tion. the nature of the ‘Object’ of knowledge. barth’s reappraisal of anselm’s Or, conversely, God, not humankind, is ontological argument the subject who addresses humankind. ‘Religion’ in the sense of human religiosity Four years earlier Barth wrote Anselm: may be about discovery and attempting to Fides Quaerens Intellectum (Faith Seeking reach ‘upward’, but in authentic address Understanding, 1930, 2nd edn, 1958). In God’s Word is free, sovereign, and ‘from his preface to the second edition he states above’. In his earlier work (later modified) that this study provides a ‘vital key’ to the Barth had urged that God is ‘wholly Church Dogmatics. Anselm does not Other’. perceive knowledge of God as a human This gave rise to the debate to which striving upwards. Hence he does not use a Paton alludes. Is there a ‘point of contact’ posteriori arguments. Rather, knowing (German, Anknu¨ pfungspunkt) between God is a process that begins from, and God and man? , Barth’s ends in, God. behaviourism 34

This process is not irrational or illogi- 2, sect. 45, 220). This does not, however, cal, but derives from ‘inner’ necessity exclude communicative interaction. For in rather than external persuasion. Thus its an analogy of relation a human being may logical coherence serves to mark God as address God as ‘Thou’, rather than sub- ‘Other’ and transcendent. God is not part suming God within an analogy of being by of the empirical world, and cannot be over-ready uses of ‘he’, ‘she’, or ‘it’. This is ‘discovered’ within it. Nevertheless God not mere description but ‘encounter’ ‘speaks’, but ‘where and when’ God wills (ibid., 243–59). (Church Dogmatics, I: 1, sect. 4, 120). We Even among admirers or followers of do not say ‘God by saying “human Barth, some express reservations about person” in a loud voice’. As we observed whether his insistence on the transcendent in our introductory remarks for Barth, otherness of God has perhaps introduced a ‘knowledge’ must be in accordance with confusion of categories into the issue of the nature of its object, not imposed by the language in religion. As Ramsey urges, human subject ‘externally’. This is ‘objec- models have an important place, tivity’ in Barth’s sense. provided that they are qualified with sufficient care, and their validity rigor- barth’s reformulation of the ously assessed. traditional view of analogy As a system of Christian theology, Barth’s Church Dogmatics covers a huge Barth’s thought cannot be ignored, and it range of topics: revelation and the Word has profoundly influenced later European of God; the doctrine of God, the Trinity, theology. In the four areas in which it most and ; creation and humankind clearly impinges on philosophy of religion, (four large volumes in the English transla- it offers corrections to some shallow tion), yet more on reconciliation and assumptions, but at times may also risk redemption. Yet a constant theme remains ‘talking past’, rather than with, some ‘the Godhead of God . . . God is God’ contrary approaches. It remains challen- (Church Dogmatics, IV: 2, sect. 64, 101). ging, if also provocative, on method in Such a God is self-giving. Thus we see theology and in epistemology. glimpses of his self-giving Fatherhood in the derivative concept of human fatherli- behaviourism ness. Because God as Father loves and gives Some distinguish between behaviourism as himself, a child of God may ‘model his a strictly scientific method in psychology action on what God does’; yet ‘he cannot and behaviourism as a philosophical or give what God gives . . . The divine love psychological doctrine. The term was and the human are always two different introduced in 1913 by J.B. Watson things’ (ibid., sect. 68, 778). Thus human (1878–1958) to denote a view of the self qualities may reflect what God reveals in psychology that abandoned all data through divine actions, but Barth is derived from introspection or from sup- hesitant to endorse Thomas Aquinas’s posed mental states to account for the self. exposition of analogy, lest it risks extra- Rather, he approaches the self wholly and polation ‘upwards’ in too strongly exhaustively in terms of what can be anthropomorphic terms (see anthropo- observed (ideally as if under laboratory moprhism). conditions) concerning the self’s beha- Barth therefore accepts the notion of an viour. ‘analogy of faith’ but rejects ‘analogy of Watson’s works Behaviour (1914) and being’. ‘This is not similarity of being, an Behaviourism (1924) provide classic expo- analogia entis. The being of God cannot sitions of this view. A starting-point be compared with that of man (ibid., III: concerning the fallibility of introspection 35 belief is understandable, but Watson effectively belief perceives the human self as a mechanism belief and knowledge the activities of which may be reduced to biophysical, neurological responses to In everyday life we are familiar with a stimuli of an empirical nature only (see contrast between belief and knowledge. empiricism). Life abounds with practical examples of This becomes still more pronounced in the need to act upon beliefs for which the work of Watson’s fellow American B.F. evidence of their validity or truth is less Skinner (1904–90). Skinner presses Wat- than conclusive. In management theory, son’s school of psychology into ‘radical the manager who delays action until behaviourism’, arguing for the elimination budget forecasts, opportunities, or the of ‘mind’ as a philosophical and psycho- capacities of personnel can be known with logical doctrine. exactitude does not function as a compe- Skinner argued that the shaping of the tent, efficient manager. Humankind con- self was primarily by ‘operant condition- stantly needs to act with a judicious ing’, which reinforces behaviour patterns margin of risk. through stimulus and response especially The issue is whether such a margin of through pain and pleasure. In popular risk is reasonable. certainty is not thought Pavlov’s experiments in Russia secured by mere psychological certainty, with the application of stimulus and as if sheer intensity of conviction could response to dogs provides a well-known guarantee the truth of a proposition or model of this approach. state of affairs. Locke (1632–1704) While Skinner introduced a level of addressed this issue. ‘reasonableness’ rigour into his scientific work, to reduce generates an ‘entitlement’ to belief; sheer the mind, in effect, to instrumental com- intensity of belief does not. putation based on neurological processes Locke spoke of ‘assurance of faith’, but risks committing what Lovejoy termed distinguished it from knowledge. Even if I ‘the paradox of materialism’: how can have full ‘assurance’ of faith, ‘I assent to materialism claim a rational basis if any article of faith, so that I may steadfastly ‘rationality’ means only bioneurological venture my all upon it, [yet] it is still but processes or pragmatic success with believing. Bring it to certainty, and it ceases immediate ‘local’ enterprises undertaken to be faith’ (Works,12thedn,London, by the self (see pragmatism)? 1824, III: 274–5). Belief, for Locke, is based The philosophical doctrines of Rudolf on revelation.‘Faith is to assent to any Carnap (1891–1970) and Ayer (1910–89) proposition . . . upon the credit of the also offer reductionist views of the self. proposer, as coming from God . . .’ (ibid., This is to be distinguished from the more IV: xviii, 2). Knowledge, on the other hand, strictly genuine logical analysis of Ryle depends on perceptions of the world. (1900–76), who avoids ‘dogmatic’ beha- Wolterstorff convincingly argues viourism. that book IV of Locke’s Essay Concerning Although some regard Wittgenstein’s Human Understanding is Locke’s ‘centre attack on ‘private language’ as evidence of of gravity’. This seeks to offer ‘a theory of his sympathy with behaviourism, Wittgen- entitled [i.e. permitted, responsible] belief stein attacks only the traditional logic . . . There are norms for believing . . . applied to ‘mental states’. He seems to Beliefs are entitled if they do not violate deny that he is a behaviourist, and stands these norms.’ Locke therefore sought to aloof from both sides in terms of a produce a ‘regulative . . . epistemology . . . doctrine or world-view (cf. Philosophical what we ought to do by way of forming Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, beliefs’ (John Locke and the Ethics of sects. 281–317). Belief, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, xv–xvi). belief 36

This is a very different account of propositions. Bultmann uses the ambiva- ‘entitlement to believe’ from that sug- lent term ‘existential’ to convey this point gested by W. K. Clifford (1845–79) on (see existentialism). ‘The Ethics of Belief’ in his Lectures and V. H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Essays (1879). He argues that it is Confessions (Leiden: Brill, 1963) and D. immoral to believe without sufficient M. High, Language, Persons and Belief evidence. He uses the example of a ship- (New : OUP, 1967) bring out the owner who sends people to sea in a ship theological and philosophical dimensions concerning the seaworthiness of which he (respectively) of self-involving creeds and has well-founded doubts. Supposedly he confessions. These are both self-involving persuades himself to ‘believe’ that a kindly or existential (the speaker is nailing his or Providence will guard this against mishap. her colours to the mast) and declarative It is ‘wrong to believe on insufficient truth-claims about states of affairs (the evidence’. In principle Clifford rightly speaker is endorsing the proposition, for underlines, with Locke, the responsibility example, that Jesus of Nazareth was and public effects of belief. However, his crucified and raised, or that God created criteria go beyond Locke’s ‘reasonable- the world). Often the self-involving ness’ to a virtually positivist demand for dimension (e.g. living as a responsible unambiguous empirical evidence (see steward) presupposes a prepositional truth empiricism; positivism). (e.g. that God created the world). faith as volitional and dispositional accounts of existential? faith as venture belief An anti-rationalist tradition within Chris- H.H. Price begins his classic work Belief thought flows from Kierkegaard (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969) with a (1813–55) to Bultmann (1884–1976). recognition that ‘I believe’ and ‘We Kierkegaard blamed Augustine for con- believe’ are performative utterances fusing faith with belief, and thereby (see Austin). A mere descriptive proposi- transposing it into an intellectual system tion may simply be stated (‘p’) without the of propositions. In Kierkegaard’s view preface ‘I believe’ or ‘I know’. The latter faith is a voluntarist act, a venture, in pledges the speaker to guarantee or at least which the person of faith stakes his or her to ‘stand behind’ the utterance as credible. self. This is the meaning of his aphorism There is a valuationial aspect: ‘and I ‘subjectivity is truth’. attach importance to this’. Bultmann likewise perceives faith as Belief, Price urges, is not primarily to ‘venture’ and obedience. His view that be understood as a ‘mental state’ as such. historical research into the life of Jesus is It may more accurately be viewed as a misguided as a basis for faith stems from a disposition to respond in certain ways to particular way of interpreting the pietist certain circumstances. Thus I do not cease legacy of nineteenth-century Lutheranism, to ‘believe’ if I fall asleep or become which sees rational argumentation in unconscious. However, I will seek to support of faith as an ‘intellectual work’. respond with reasons to the contrary if Faith is trust in the bare Word of God (see someone presents to me arguments against pietism). my belief, and seek to ‘live out’ the The truth that Kierkegaard and Bult- practical entailments of my beliefs. mann seek to convey, but with misleadingly Price observes, ‘This “spreading” of one-sided formulations, is that faith and belief from a proposition to its conse- belief operate with a logic of self-invol- quences is one of the most important ways vement. Faith is not value-neutral assent in which such a disposition is occurrently to supposedly value-neutral descriptive manifested . . . Our beliefs are like stable 37 Berkeley, George landmarks’ (ibid., 293). The disposition God, he urges, works in and through the presupposed by a declaration of belief ‘is a process of evolution. God is a creative, multiform disposition, which is actualized dynamic force, a vital impetus (e´lan vital) or manifested in many different ways: not for livingness and movement. only in . . . actions and inactions, but also In philosophy of religion Bergson calls in emotional states such as hope and fear; into question a ‘static’ theism, but offers a in feelings of doubt, surprise and con- way of understanding God in dynamic fidence’, and also in intellectual operations terms compatible with evolutionary the- (ibid., 294). ory. God and humanity act with a creative, Such an approach goes back not simply purposive, freedom that transcends the or primarily to Ryle but more especially model of the machine. His works include to the later Wittgenstein. ‘What does it Creative Evolution (1907) and Thought mean to believe ...? What are the and the Moving (1934). consequences of the belief, where it takes Bergson’s work resonates with that of us . . . The surroundings give it its impor- subsequent thinkers who stress the priority tance’ (Philosophical Investigations, of temporal over spatial categories in Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, I, sects. 578 biblical theology (e.g. Oscar Cullmann, and 583). ‘I believe’ is not giving a report b. 1902) and in philosophical theology on my state of mind. ‘Believing . . . is a and narrative theory (e.g. Ricoeur,b. kind of disposition of the believing person 1913). His initial concern with evolution . . . shown . . . by his behaviour’ (ibid., II, owed much to the influence of Spencer 191). (1820–1903), but he rejected Spencer’s Price includes a plausible account of positivism and mechanistic world-view. ‘half-belief’. How is it that some believers ‘Duration’ is more than ‘clock-time’ (Time act in certain ways consonant with their and Free Will, 1890). beliefs ‘on some occasions’ but act very Bergson’s most lasting legacy is his differently ‘on other occasions’ (Belief, careful critique of Darwin’s theory. He 305)? The primary cause is that of keeping reaches the conclusion that biological beliefs ‘in a watertight compartment’ evolution, far from substantiating a where they fail to engage with the whole mechanistic or positivist world-view, of life (ibid., 311). Sometimes the path to transcends it and exposes its inadequacy. maturity is a gradual one, as a full This provided an impetus, in turn, for the integration of the self gradually emerges. process philosophy of Whitehead and All of the above aspects, with the Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. possible exception of Clifford’s over-harsh demand for empirical criteria, contribute Berkeley, George (1685–1753) something of value to our understanding of the conceptual grammar of belief, and Berkeley built upon the philosophy of of why it is not simply a ‘weaker’ form of perception in Locke (1632–1704), to seek knowledge. Issues of ‘entitlement’, reason- to establish an idealist metaphysics of ableness, self-involvement, and the visibi- ‘immaterialism’. He claimed that nothing lity of belief in the public domain all material exists, but only the ideas that belong to the grammar of belief in constitute what is perceived. An Irishman, religion. Berkeley was a philosopher and theologi- cal teacher, and also became a bishop. Locke had allowed that observations Bergson, Henri Louis (1859–1941) of solidity, extension, motion and num- Bergson’s philosophy expounds the pri- ber were sense-impressions (i.e. percep- macy of process and change over against tions mediated through the five senses, the place of static or solid objects in space. including sight, hearing and touch) and Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 38 were derived from the external world. Boethius, Anicius Manlius However, he argued that ‘secondary’ Severinus (c. 480–525/6) qualities (e.g. colour, sound, taste) are subject-dependent, or shaped entirely by Boethius is widely regarded as a bridge how the mind perceives them. Berkeley from the ancient philosophical legacies of extended Locke’s ‘secondary’ category to Aristotle, the Stoics and Neoplaton- include every object of human percep- ism, to the medieval Latin writers and tion. Existence is co-extensive with per- Scholasticism. A Roman patrician of ception, for ‘to be is to be perceived’ (esse high standing, he was accused of treason est percipi). and imprisoned. While awaiting execution Berkeley did not assume that all ideas he composed his work On the Consola- are merely a creation of the human mind. tion of Philosophy (524–5). He attempted Some ideas force themselves upon us as to bring together aspects of Hellenistic and unwelcome. These originate in sensations Roman philosophy with Christian or experience perceived through the senses thought. because they are derived from an infinite One of the most important conceptual divine mind. influences bequeathed by Boethius for For those unfamiliar with empiricism philosophy of religion was his formulation and idealism it may seem initially puz- of a logic of . Eternity was not to zling that Berkeley was both an empiricist be conceived of as ‘human’ time stretched and an idealist. However, the latter rests out in both directions. Boethius recog- on the former. As an empiricist Berkeley nized that it belonged to God. Eternity is a based his theory of perception on the view mode of reality that grasped ‘the whole’ of that the mind receives sense-impressions past, present, and future as a whole. through the avenue of the senses, but as an Eternity constituted most especially idealist he that these impressions God’s own mode of existence. This is enter the mind as ideas. ‘the complete possession all at once (totum Nevertheless Berkeley’s ‘subjective ide- simul) of an illimitable life’. Although alism’ (his own term was ‘immaterialism’) strictly eternity is not ‘everlastingness’ in is to be distinguished from the German the human sense of this term, because idealism of Fichte, Schelling and God is ‘infinite’, eternity remains ‘illimi- Hegel. They began from different start- table’, and in this special, qualified sense ing-points and asked different questions. ‘endless’. Two of the titles of Berkeley’s works A greater conceptual problem is raised illustrate his angle of approach: An Essay by the use of ‘simul’, at once, at the same Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) time. Is it conceivable that the living, and A Treatise Concerning the Principles dynamic, purposive, God would exclude of Human Knowledge (1710). ‘succession’ from eternity? Boethius might Berkeley’s claim in the second work see this as implicit in simul, but what that trees, tables, houses and lead weights currency remains? Yet the formulation of are no more than complex collections of Boethius has remained the classic formu- ‘ideas’ does not founder upon the com- lation in the tradition of classical Christian mon-sense objection that to kick a stone is theism (see God, concepts of). to feel its impact through pain (ascribed to Further contributions of Boethius Samuel Johnson). For pain itself is a include his identification of the Greek perception, which, in Berkeley’s world- term hypostasis with ‘person’. He also view, finds its ground, like all perception, places the transitory and of in the mind of God. Berkeley’s aim was to life in the light of the eternal values of produce a serious philosophy that coun- religion and philosophy. This ‘relativiz- tered the scepticism of the day. ing’ of evil provoked the protest of 39 Buber, Martin Mordechai

Dostoevsky’s Ivan, who sought a more contradictions. However, philosophical existential and less abstract approach to enquiry should aim at coherence. Behind the problem of evil (see existentialism). the partial and ever-shifting lies the There are themes in Boethius that may Absolute as the ground of reality. owe more to Neoplatonism than to Bradley shared with Hegel (1770– Christian tradition (e.g. on the flight of 1831) the notion of an Absolute revealed the soul). For a judicious assessment see in and through the finite, and also the H. Chadwick, Boethius (Oxford: Claren- belief that only the ‘Whole’ is real. This don Press, 1981). led to some insights, but also to certain incautious utterances. For example, if (c. 1217–74) ‘time is unreal’, why, G.E. Moore asked, do we usually take breakfast ‘before’ Bonaventure (John of Fadanza) developed lunch? a philosophy within the framework of The relation between diversity and an Christian faith, which combined elements underlying unity is largely the subject of of Neoplatonism with a Christian mys- his work Appearance and Reality (1893). ticism that culminated in post-mortal He also wrote works on ethics, logic and union with God. Philosophy may enhance truth. Some called him ‘the English Hegel’. , provided that it is directed by faith. Bonaventure studied at the University Buber, Martin Mordechai of Paris, and in 1257 was appointed (1878–1965) professor there (with Thomas Aquinas), In philosophy of religion Buber is most but the same year became Bishop of widely known for his relatively short but Albano and subsequently Cardinal. He influential masterpiece I and Thou (Ger- belonged to the Franciscan Order, and man, Ich und Du [1923], Eng., New York: published the Commentary of the Sen- Scribner, 2nd edn, 1958). This expounds tences of Peter Lombard (1250–1), On the the core of his philosophy of relationality. Mystery of the Trinity (1253–7) and The ‘The attitude of man is twofold . . . One Journey of the Mind to God (1259). primary word is the combination I–Thou. Every person, Bonaventure maintained, The other primary word is the combina- has an implicit knowledge or awareness of tion I–It . . . For the I, the primary word I– God. Philosophical and theological reflec- Thou is a different I from that of the tion may make this explicit, including the a primary word I–It’ (ibid., 3). posteriori arguments from the world to a In other words, the human self, or the First Cause (see cosmological argu- ‘I’, plays a different role, and is trans- ment for the existence of God). Anslem’s formed into a different kind of self, ontological argument rightly expresses depending on whether we construe ‘the the perfection of God. Mystical contempla- other’ as a mere object of knowledge (I– tion nurtures a less fallible, less contin- It), or as an Other who addresses us as gent, vision of divine ideas. The Journey to subject-to-subject (I-Thou). The latter the Mind of God traces an ascent of the nurtures reciprocity, dialogue, mutuality mind from contemplation of the world to and respect for the Other. contemplation of God. Buber was born in Vienna, and, in early years, influenced by the works of Kant as Bradley, Francis H. (1846–1924) well as drawn to religious . The Bradley taught at Oxford for most of his influence of can be seen in life, and did not shrink from viewing his appeal to the I–Thou relation as philosophy as an exploration of the nature treating persons as ends rather than as of reality. Surface appearances give rise to means (or as I–It objects). Equally, God is Buddhist philosophy 40 no mere ‘object’ of human thought, but Speaking ‘Thou’ and being in encoun- One who commands. When he was a ter with the Other are ontological (see student in Berlin, Wilhelm Dilthey also ontology): ‘reality’ appears between influenced him, and this laid foundations persons, or between God and human for a hermeneutical understanding of self persons in their address and response, and the Other. reciprocal listening and respect for the As a Jew, Buber involved himself in Other. This comes close to the core of Jewish affairs. He became Professor of hermeneutics. Dilthey, Buber’s teacher Jewish Religion at Frankfurt until Hitler’s in Berlin, spoke of understanding the ‘I’ in rise to power in 1933. His earlier work on the ‘Thou’, and subsequently Ricoeur mystical relations of immediacy gave way would speak of understanding the other- to a more dialogical relation with God as ness of the Other, and of Oneself as Other, and as Thou. In 1938 he left Another. Germany to become Professor of Social Buber develops his philosophy further Philosophy of Religion in the Hebrew in Between Man and Man (1947), Eclipse University in Jerusalem, until his retire- of God (1952) and other works. There are ment in 1951. resonances with other Jewish thinkers on The I–It relation is typical of scientific ‘the Other’, notably Franz Rosenzweig or empirical methods of observation (see and Levinas. empiricism). However, this attitude never His respect for ‘the Other’ led Buber tells the whole story. Persons may be to co-found the Yihud movement to viewed as objects in as far as they bear promote not only Arab–Israeli under- physical properties in the public world. standing, but also the ideal of Israel– They may be ‘observed’ in scientific study. Palestine as a bi-national state for Jews But persons are more than objects or and Arabs. things. A person is a ‘Thou’ who addresses Love is the responsibility of the ‘I’ for me, whom I encounter as a subject. the ‘Thou’. Divine love is elective: God It is fundamental for Buber that the ‘confronts me . . . being chosen and choos- two different attitudes affect the kind of ‘I’ ing . . . in one’. Revelation of God is not who I am. To regard all persons and the transmission of ideas about God, but objects in I–It speech and attitude is an event in which God speaks. Buber’s thereby to remain isolated and self-centred later work on the Bible stresses relation- in interpersonal terms. A non-relational ‘I’ ality and encounter in terms of a herme- is not fully a human ‘I’. Respect for life neutic of narrative. The Holocaust is a may even imply an I–Thou relation to moment when we witness an Eclipse of certain objects in the world. ‘Without It God (1952). ‘We await his voice’ (On man cannot live. But he who lives with It Judaism [1952], New York: Shocken, alone is not a man.’ 1972, 225). While human persons are primarily Thou but in certain contexts also It, God Buddhist philosophy is ‘the eternal Thou’. God is always Subject who addresses us. God is never The title ‘the Buddha’, ‘the Enlightened an It; never the mere object of observation One’ is given primarily to the historical or reflection. This is why Buber dismisses founder of Buddhism, Siddhartha Gau- arguments for the existence of God as tama. Estimates of his date of birth vary ‘foolish’ (cf. Kierkegaard’s ‘shameless between 563, c. 485 and c. 450 bce He affront’). God can never be the object of addressed as a main issue how to avoid speculative thought. Personal involvement suffering and dissatisfaction by escaping and openness to be addressed and com- the cycle of rebirth. Buddhist philosophy, mended are required. especially in Indian traditions, is largely 41 Buddhist philosophy derived from this concern. It seeks karma and enlightenment based on an understanding of human nature. More explicit philosophical investigations enlightenment and nirvana emerged in the Yogacara school of Bud- dhism (fourth century bce), also within Indian forms of Buddhist philosophy the Mahayana school. The Yogacara flourished especially during the early school, however, explores the nature of medieval era until the eleventh century. consciousness, perception, knowledge and Like some traditions in Graeco-Roman ontology. It concludes that in a nuanced Stoicism, this philosophy seeks to elim- sense consciousness is real only in terms of inate the ignorance that places too much convention, and is the cause of karma. value on that which causes and nourishes External objects do not exist, but are desire, or too much attention on that illusory. which invites aversion. Such desires and This school produced the most devel- aversions breed frustration and dissatis- oped and complex theory of perception faction. and epistemology in Buddhist philoso- The Buddha himself refused to address phy. Sacred texts bore such titles as speculative questions about the nature of ‘Elucidating the Hidden Connections’, reality, since these were thought to lead to and a notion of three natures of the self an attachment to views that were not was formulated. conducive to Enlightenment. Philosophi- The link between theoretical and prac- cal questions were first developed in tical philosophy is clearest in the concept various schools of the Abhidharma, of dharma, a Sanskrit term that covers a which expanded the early teachings of range of meanings including ‘teaching’, the Buddha into an analysis of all the ‘law’, ‘custom’, ‘justice’ and ‘religion’, as elements of experience and their inter- well as the order of reality, or even the dependence. constituents of that order. Suggesting The Buddha’s dying words are said to perhaps certain resonances with Western have been: ‘I take my leave of you. All the thought in Aristotle,thisislikea constituents of being are transitory; work principle of ‘orderedness’ in the world; a out your salvation with diligence.’ Central cosmic, and perhaps even (loosely) divine, to the early teachings was the view that principle. To follow dharma is the path to there is no abiding self apart from the Enlightenment: perhaps also release from arising of experience, and that transitory karma and reaching nirvana. experience arises through an interdepen- Buddhist philosophy in most of its dent cycle. forms retains themes of cessation of desire The extinction of all unproductive or through disengagement from causes of worldly desires is known as nirvana desire in the world, and the further goal (Sanskrit, ‘blown out’). This is related to of a cessation of ignorance, suffering and the elimination of greed, hatred and death. Yet there are also positive affirma- delusion. It is a permanent liberation from tions of a life of ‘balance’, for example the cycle of rebirth. Although it is between ascetic self-denial and self-indul- regarded as release, the Buddha pro- gence. These also resonate with Aristotle’s nounced that nothing can be positively ethic of the Mean, just as dharma may predicated about it that is true. In resonate perhaps with his notion ‘ordered- Mahayana Buddhism nirvana is thus ness’. regarded as indistinguishable from the Yet there are also entirely contrary cycle of rebirth. The emphasis of ‘Enlight- themes. Consciousness is not understood enment’ is in realizing the emptiness of as a stable individual consciousness in the constituents of existence. sense held by Aristotle, Augustine, Bultmann, Rudolf 42

Aquinas, Descartes and Locke. A phi- than that Jesus lived, proclaimed the losophy of the transitory and continuous kingdom of God, called followers to change applies to the self, to personhood follow him, and was crucified. and to post-mortal existence. Instead Bultmann was not troubled by this, of resurrection, rebirth may take place since for him faith cannot rest on histor- in a number of different realms resembling ical reconstruction. This would make faith different heavens and hells. dependent on intellectual success or The continuous rise and fall of the achievement, which would be equivalent being is determined by its karma, the to ‘justification by works’ in the intellec- results of its intentional actions. Only in tual sphere. Bultmann’s thought is domi- ‘Pure Land Buddhism’ is the goal not nated by a nineteenth-century version of nirvana as such, but rebirth in a heavenly Lutheranism, which goes further in this realm created by one of the Buddhas, reapplication of justification by grace achieved through calling on the Buddha to through faith alone than perhaps Luther transfer his merit. (See also mysticism; himself. Hindu philosophy; Na¯ ga¯ rjuna; On this basis, Bultmann urges, the Nishida; Nishitani; via negativa.) language of the New Testament must be ‘demythologized’. It must be extricated from any hint of serving to describe or to Bultmann, Rudolf (1884–1976) report. It ‘must be interpreted . . . existen- Bultmann exercised a very large influence tially’ (‘New Testament and Mythology’ on mid-twentieth-century Christian theol- [1941], in H.W. Bartsch, ed., Kerygma and ogy. His greatest significance for the Myth, vol. 1, London: SPCK, 1964). ‘God’ philosophy of religion lay in his proposals is not a ‘given’ object (eine Gegebenheit) for a programme of demythologizing within a system of ‘knowledge’ (Erkennt- the New Testament, his devaluation of nissen), as the ‘mythical’ form might seem history as a basis for religious faith, his to imply (‘What Does it Mean to Speak to dualist approach to faith and knowledge, God’ [1925], in Faith and Understanding, and the cognitive or descriptive and vol. 1, London: SCM, 1969, 60). Hence existential dimensions of language in ‘demythologizing’ is to remove a ‘false religion (see cognition; dualism; exis- stumbling-block’ for the reader. tentialism). Bultmann rightly seeks to restore the Bultmann studied at Tu¨ bingen, Berlin nature of the New Testament as self- and Marburg, and inherited from his involving address and existential chal- teacher W. Herrmann a Kantian disjunc- lenge. He uses Heidegger’s conceptual tion between fact and value. Relatively scheme, which distinguishes the human early he published his History of the (Dasein, being-there) from the language of Synoptic Tradition (1919, 1921; Eng., mere ‘objects’. However, he fails to 1963), which ascribed various settings recognize that these modes of language and forms to the material of the first three are not competing alternatives. Often Gospels on the basis of their function in language may address us and challenge the life of the earliest churches (their Sitz us precisely because it also embodies im Leben), in contrast to any historical truth-claims about states of affairs. role in recording facts about Jesus. Bultmann’s positive aims are vitiated This material, Bultmann insists, serves and flawed by a dualist view of language, such existential functions as proclamation and by a neo-Kantian dualism of fact and (kerygma), pronouncement, or challenge; value. ‘Religion’, for Bultmann, belongs it did not serve any interest of historical almost inclusively to the latter category. report. In historical terms, Bultmann He also failed sufficiently to recognize the believed, the sources reveal little more ambiguities and differences embodied in 43 Bultmann, Rudolf uses of the word ‘myth’. As a result he other times it denotes an ‘objectifying’ use oscillates between contradictory uses of the of language that needs to be ‘de-objecti- term. Sometimes it denotes analogy; some- fied’. This last reaches the heart of his times it denotes a primitive world-view; at concerns most closely. (See also Kant.) C

acci- categories categories of quality. Substance– dent, cause–effect and reciprocity are This term is one of the most slippery and categories of relation. Possibility, actu- variable in philosophical thought, because ality and necessity or contingency are it has been used in a variety of (often categories of modality. Kant used the term technical) ways by different major thin- ‘’ to denote the kers. Absolute claim of the moral imperative. Aristotle (384–322 bce)usedthe Hegel, Peirce and Russell use differ- term to denote a list of basic classifications ent systems of categories. Ryle expounds in ontology. ‘Being’ itself could be particular logical clarifications designed to classified most basically as substance expose ‘category mistakes’. In mathe- (Greek, ousia, being), to which other matics yet another nuance of the term categories served as attributes, for exam- denotes structures and transformations. ple, quantity, quality, location in time, location in space, action or being affected cause, causation by action. These are expounded in his work Categories, but the list is extended Traditionally a cause has been regarded as and developed further in his Topics. the necessary antecedent to an effect. This Kant (1724–1804) believed that the view was refined by Aristotle (384–322 structures that we perceive and of which bce), who distinguished between four we conceive within the everyday (‘phe- types of causes. Descartes (1596–1650) nomenal’) world are construed and shaped believed that a cause must contain the by the human mind. The mind uses reason qualities of the effect that it produces. On as a ‘regulative’ tool to organize the raw the other hand, Hume (1711–76) insisted data of sense and sensation into an that causality can never be the object of understandable order. We construe cate- empirical observation. Hume noted that in gories by means of which everything is strictly empirical terms we see only understood. repeated examples of constant conjunc- Kant postulated twelve categories, tion (see empiricism). grouped as those of quantity, quality, Kant (1724–1804) argued that cause relation and modality. Thus unity, plur- constituted one of the categories by means ality and totality are categories of quan- of which the human mind organizes sense- tity. Positive, negative and limited are data or objects of perception into an 45 cause, causation intelligible and ordered world, alongside world of perceptions on the ground that it the other categories of time and space. In lacked coherence. Moreover, his approach religious contexts some exponents of serves as a reminder in philosophy of Islamic philosophy together with more religion that just as time and space belong deterministic theologians in Christian and to the created order along with human other (especially Islamic) traditions seek to understanding, so caused causal connec- relate an Aristotelian theory of causality to tions and the cause–effect nexus of ‘nat- the status of God or Allah as General ure’ belong to this order. Yet this differs Cause (not merely First Cause), and verge from such metaphysical concepts as that on occasionalism (see ). of an Uncaused (or First) Cause (see Aristotle offers an analysis of cause metaphysics). (Greek, aitı´a) in terms of four sub-cate- This difference serves also to question gories. In building a house, for example, the validity of a logical step within the the material cause (Greek, hy´le¯, matter) cosmological argument for the exis- would be the wood or stone necessary for tence of God. The meaning of ‘cause’ in its construction. The efficient cause (arche` the major premise (caused cause) slides to teˆs kineseo¯ s, commencement of the that of another term in the conclusion motion) would be the impact of the tools (uncaused cause). of the builders. The formal cause (ousı´a, Both narrowing and broadening under- being) is the design-pattern or style appro- standings of cause have found expression priated by the architect. The final cause in the history of ideas. William of (telos, end) is the purpose that the house is Ockham tended to narrow Aristotle’s to serve. fourfold analyses to focus on efficient The Greek terms do not correspond cause as what we mainly understand by exactly with English parallels. Thus aitı´a, ‘cause’. However, in modern scientific cause, itself denotes that which is respon- discussions the Greek term aitı´a used by sible for a condition, including ground, Aristotle seems to have regained some of cause, reason, circumstances or basis. It its original scope as that which provides approaches the modern notion of ‘condi- necessary and sufficient conditions for tions for’. Hy´le¯ denotes the stuff or certain effects. material out of which something is made, This recalls the formulation of Leibniz i.e. ‘material’ in both senses of the modern (1646–1716) concerning ‘the Principle of English word. Ousı´a denotes what exists Sufficient Reason’. Nothing occurs with- and has substance. out sufficient reason for the occurrence. Hume exposes the fallacy that causality This derives in part, at least, from his is evidenced by strictly empirical observa- ontology of temporal continuity. tion. All that we can actually observe is More recent debates focus on how constant conjunction. In other words, so- cause (in the sense of a specific cause of called ‘laws’ of causality are not them- a particular event) relates to causality (as a selves based on the method of a poster- postulate about how a diversity of condi- iori scientific observation, even if tions may produce different types of successful prediction places causality at effects). On one side, ‘laws’ of causality the very top of the scale of probability of are understood by some scientists and explanation. philosophers in a mechanistic sense, as if Kant’s insistence that causality is an a to imply a positivist world-view (see priori category of the mind (see cate- positivism). On the other side, ‘laws’ gories) may find less than uncontrover- are regarded as ‘progress reports’ of an sial acceptance outside firmly Kantian ‘open’ universe; i.e. generalizations based traditions of philosophy. However, Kant on contingent events up to the present. was dissatisfied with Hume’s account of a A third group seeks to give due place to certainty and doubt 46

‘order’ in the world, but may perceive this in draft as one of his last works (1951). orderedness either as a ‘given’ in the world Wittgenstein examines the ‘common or as a ‘given’ of the human mind. sense’ claim of G.E. Moore that some everyday empirical truths are examples of what we can know with certainty. certainty and doubt Wittgenstein questions whether the Many ordinary religious believers imagine formula ‘I know . . .’ in such sentences as that they are ‘certain’ about a set of beliefs ‘I know that I am a human being’, or ‘I or claims to truth, and that to doubt them know that here is a hand . . . for it is my would be blameworthy or less ‘religious’. hand that I’m looking at’ serves genuinely Yet in the history of philosophical and to identify an epistemological certainty religious thought, certainty, in the episte- (ibid., sects. 1, 4, 6, 12, 19). mological sense of claims to knowledge, wittgenstein’s explorations in more readily characterizes those rational- on certainty ists who seek ‘clear and certain’ truths (even sometimes empiricist evidentialists) Against Moore’s arguments in ‘Proof of an than most religious believers. External World’ (Proceedings of the Brit- Indeed, in the tradition of Socrates ish Academy 25, 1939; repr. in Philoso- and the early dialogues of Plato, the phical Papers, 1959) Wittgenstein ques- purpose of dialectic was to expose tions whether ‘I know’ constitutes a claim firmly held opinions as subject to doubt, to knowledge based on ‘evidence’. It is, in order to move from opinion (Greek, rather, the kind of belief for which doxa) to knowledge (episte¯me¯). Without ‘grounds for doubt are lacking’ (On the experience of doubt, a person may Certainty, sect. 4). In genuine claims to merely remain secure within entrenched knowledge, one could say, ‘I thought I convictions, without testing them or knew . . .’, but not of Moore’s examples exploring further issues. (ibid., sect. 21). psychological, logical and In summary, Wittgenstein distinguishes epistemological certainty three types of utterance about ‘certainty’. First, he calls ‘subjective certainty’ what Locke (1632–1704) explored grounds for above (in connection with Locke) we reasonable belief. In this process he called ‘psychological certainty’ (ibid., sect. observed that mere intensity of personal 194). Mere intensity of a feeling of conviction need not entail the validity of conviction does not necessarily entail its what is believed to be the truth. ‘Psy- truth. There is no necessary correlation chological’ certainty alone does not con- between these, even of degree or prob- stitute grounds for ‘entitlement’ to believe, ability. if such belief is not reasonable. Second, often we say, ‘I am certain . . .’, Clearly ‘I am certain’ in a psychological or ‘It is certain that . . .’, when to doubt the sense needs to be distinguished from a belief or proposition is simply inconceiva- claim to certainty put forward on grounds ble. This is a conceptual point that moves of logical or epistemological demonstra- beyond mere psychological description of tion. The ‘certainty’ of the truth of an feeling or innerness. In the case of some analytic statement is that of the logical belief-claims, ‘doubt gradually loses its validity of stating what is simply true on sense’ (ibid., sect. 56). We move from the basis of a definition of terms. ‘subjective’ to ‘objective’ certainty ‘when a This complexity of the different uses of mistake is not possible [because it is] ‘certain’ and ‘certainty’ receives careful logically excluded’ (ibid., sect. 194). elucidation in Wittgenstein’s On Cer- Third, some expressions of certainty tainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969) written are to identify ‘hinge’ propositions. These 47 certainty and doubt are convictions that have ‘belonged to ‘doubt’ exposed by Socrates does not serve scaffolding of our thoughts (Every human to promote scepticism, any more than being has parents)’ (ibid., sect. 211). They Wittgenstein’s insistence that Moore does are like ‘the proposition “It is written”’ not address epistemological certainty (ibid., sect. 216). They are ‘hinges’ (sect. forms part of a sceptical attack on knowl- 343) on which other propositions turn. edge. Quite the reverse is the case. Both For ‘all confirmation and disconfirmation Socrates and Wittgenstein see doubt and . . . takes place already within a system’ knowledge in operational terms for daily (ibid., sect. 105). What is ‘certain’ seems to life. be ‘fixed . . . removed from traffic’ (ibid., In the sacred writings of several reli- sect. 210). gious traditions, claims to certainty may be put forward in the ways described the status of doubt above. Constructive methodological doubt This leads Wittgenstein to explore a rela- is often used to raise exploratory questions tion with the logic of doubt. ‘The child through such media as parables, aphor- learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes isms, dialogue or questions. In the New after belief’ (ibid., sect. 160, his italics). Testament Paul asserts the quasi-Socratic Doubt (no less than belief) requires maxim: ‘If any among you thinks they are grounds for doubting: ‘Doesn’t one need wise (Greek, sophos) . . . let them become grounds for doubt?’ (ibid., sect. 122). a fool (moros) on order that they might Wittgenstein comes close here to become wise’ (1 Cor. 3:18). A measure of Locke’s notion of ‘reasonable’ belief: doubt may begin a journey from illusory rational suspicion has ‘grounds’, i.e. ‘the complacency to wisdom. reasonable man believes this’ (ibid., sect. Friedrich Waismann examines the 323). He is closer to Locke than perhaps grammar of doubt and of questions. he is to Descartes: ‘One doubts on Sometimes ‘doubt is suppressed but not specific grounds’ (ibid., sect. 458). Except disarmed’ (Principles of Linguistic Philo- for a purely methodological exercise, there sophy, London: Macmillan, 1865, 17). needs to be reasonable doubt as well as ‘The question is the first groping step of reasonable belief. the mind in its journeyings that lead to ‘Negative’ activities (doubting, telling a new horizons. The great mind is the great lie) are parasitic upon belief and truth. questioner . . . Questions lead us on and They, too, are learned linguistic behaviour. over the barriers of traditions’ (ibid., 405). They belong to ‘systems’ of belief and On the other hand, ‘Questions seduce us, doubt. A belief-system is like a ‘nest of too, and lead us astray’ (ibid.). propositions’. Individual twigs can be cognition, cognitive doubted and removed; but if the system is an object of doubt from the first, the Cognition broadly denotes an act or nest itself has collapsed, and there is process of knowledge. Cognitive denotes nothing to doubt. that which involves an act or process of We should not use the word ‘doubt’ of knowing (Greek, gnoˆ sis, knowledge). The what had never been established. ‘Why is words occur in three main contexts of it not possible for me to doubt that I have thought. never been on the moon? And how could I First, in some writers on selfhood try to doubt it? . . . The supposition that and the philosophy of mind, cognition is perhaps I have been there would strike me said to entail, or to presuppose, an act of as idle. Nothing would follow from it’ judgement on the part of the self. To know (ibid., sect. 117). x means that the subject of cognition Our earlier allusion to Socrates now knows the object of cognition ‘as x’ (C.A. assumes a sharper significance. The Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood, Cohen, Hermann 48

London: Allen & Unwin, 1957, 41, and thought in Germany, but Neo-Kantianism more broadly 36–72). tended to go further than Kant himself in Many philosophers argue that cogni- questioning the notion of any ‘given’. tion involves perception, memory, intui- Cohen rejected the role assigned by Kant tion and judgement. This has implications to the concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’. He for the nature of the self and for the challenged Kant’s assumption that it is formation of concepts. However, this necessary to postulate a prior ‘givenness’ claim remains controversial, and some of sensations (Empfindung) that precedes empiricists would not ascribe to cognition thought. all of these aspects (see empiricism). With Paul Natorp (1854–1924) Cohen Second, another context of discussion argued that Kant had confused psycholo- arises from competing (or at least differ- gical consciousness (Bewusstheit)with ent) claims about cognitive and non- ‘consciousness’ as the ground of knowl- cognitive language in religion or in edge in a purely logical sense (Bewusst- ethics. Often the terms are used to denote sein). (respectively) language about facts or Neo-Kantian philosophy made a sig- states of affairs and other modes of nificant impact on mathematical physics linguistic communication. and the sciences of the day. Thus Hermann Here, expressive language that ex- von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz per- presses emotions, attitudes or choices is ceived the role played by ‘models’ (Bilder) non-cognitive. However, expressions of rather than only ideas or physical data in belief may include both a cognitive and scientific work. ‘Methods of presentation’ non-cognitive dimension because beliefs (Darstellungen) are carefully ‘constructed’ usually presuppose, or claim truth about, schemes that facilitate knowledge. Natorp states of affairs. declared: ‘Objects are not “given”; con- In ethics ‘non-cognitive’ approaches sciousness forms them.’ frequently suggest that ethical approval In theology, this radical Kantianism or disapproval is a matter of mere decisively influenced Bultmann,who preference, recommendation, convention devalued the possibility of descriptive or personal attitude. But a sharp polarity propositions in religion: ‘God’ cannot between fact and value, or between be ‘objectively given’ (eine Gegebenheit). cognitive and non-cognitive, often over- looks more subtle interconnections concept between the two. This over-neat contrast vitiates otherwise useful explorations in Almost any attempt to define ‘concept’ such theologians as Bultmann and will invite criticism from some quarter. George Lindbeck. Even among philosophers (e.g. Locke, Finally, a third distinct context is that Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein) there is a of cognitive psychology especially in difference of viewpoint and approach, as infants. It has emerged that conceptual well as areas of agreement. Further, the development is often earlier, more com- term also occurs in different contexts in plex, and more closely related to abstrac- psychology, Semantics, linguistics, lexi- tion than older empiricist theories might cography and logic. seem to suggest. Concept denotes more, but hardly less, than idea. While many reject a mentalist notion of ‘inner’ speech, in a more Cohen, Hermann (1842–1918) cautious and rigorous way the starting- Cohen was founder of the Marburg school point of Locke (1632–1704) remains of Neo-Kantian philosophy. The late nine- initially constructive. He attributed con- teenth century saw a revival of Kantian cepts to the human capacity to discuss and 49 conceptualism to distinguish relations between ideas in and (in semantics) between token and type. the abstract. Thus human beings not only We need not subscribe to a Platonic distinguish this book from that book as dualism between objects and forms to objects in the material, empirical, con- perceive that these represent two orders of tingent, everyday world, but also the language-users. The first of each pair is concept ‘book’ from the concept ‘pamph- grounded in a particular instance of the let’ as categories or classes which this second of each pair. book or that pamphlet instantiates. As a child learns to use concepts, an Relations between ideas, Locke urged, awareness of generality, differentiation give rise to complex concepts. Kant and categorization emerges that trans- (1724–1804) drew a distinction between cends the more elementary observation percepts and concepts. Conceptual thought concerning differences between objects of is not merely the perception of objects or different spatio-temporal locations. At its ideas but a structural ordering of what is minimum, concepts presuppose a method perceived in terms of such categories as of classification. At a higher level, con- those of unity, plurality (quantity); positive, ceptual analysis becomes the exploration negative (quality); substance, cause (rela- of logical grammar. tion); and possibility, actuality (see also Aristotle). Human imagination provides conceptualism the schemata of quality and causality (and other categories) to make understanding The term denotes a mediating position (Versta¨ndnis)possible. between more extreme forms of realism Hegel (1770–1831) developed this and nominalism in medieval scholastic notion of ‘critical ordering’ further. Con- philosophy. It is especially associated cepts are the fruit of critical reflection with the thought of upon difference and upon differentiation. (1079–1142). Concepts (Begriff) operate at the level of Nominalists held that universals (con- critical self-conscious awareness, in con- cepts, ideas or definitions that transcend all trast to pre-conceptual symbols, or particulars or specific cases, and have uni- myths, as mere representations (Vorstel- versal application) constitute nothing more lungen). The task of philosophy is to than linguistic signs or conceptual con- enhance conceptual awareness critically. structs. Universals are thus not ‘real’ entities, Wittgenstein (1889–1951) tends to use but only logical or semantic ‘names’ (Latin, concept not to denote the phonetic or nomen). The opposite view is held by ‘physical’ properties of language, but the realists. Realists believe that universals logical grammar of language uses, i.e. how possess a reality beyond mere thought and words and sentences are applied (Philoso- language (Latin, res, a thing, something of phical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, substance). (Realism also carries a second 1967, sects. 104–8). Again, we return to meaning: see realism) the contrast between a logical understand- Between these two extremes a spectrum ing and its practical instantiation: ‘If a of intermediate views exists. While Plato person has not yet got the concepts, I shall was a realist, Aristotle and Thomas teach him to use the words by means of Aquinas held a moderate or modified examples and by practice’ (ibid., sect. realism. attacked 208). ‘The application is . . . a criticism realism and is generally regarded as a of understanding’ (ibid., sect. 146). nominalist. This reflects the widely accepted dis- Abelard attempted a middle path, often tinction, especially in analytical philo- called conceptualism. This is the origin sophy, between words and concepts, of his celebrated saying that each side is sentences and propositions (or statements), right in what it affirms and wrong in what contingency, the contingent 50 it denies. Nominalists are right in perceiv- world and a ‘Prime Mover’, First Cause, ing the role performed by semantics, or Being of a different order, who is logic and conceptual construction. How- characterized by necessity and aseity. ever, realists are right to insist that reality Under the cosmological argument the consists in more than merely signs chasing view is examined that if the whole of (or denoting) other signs (see postmo- reality is contingent, we may in principle dernity). Reality is not exhausted by go back in time to a situation in which human concepts of reality, but concepts nothing (that which might not have been) do indeed entail logical construal and gives rise to nothing. If all of reality is construction. contingent, it appears that we postulate an It is just arguable that, for the philoso- infinite regress of finite caused causes, with phically informed, conceptualism offers a no ground beyond such a chain. Similarly, more ‘commonsense’ approach than either the ontological argument for the of the two extremes that it seeks to avoid. existence of God hinges in part on what Although modern critical realism emerged kind of necessity we ascribe to God, or to strictly in the context of theories of the concept of God. causality, critical realism shares the view Aristotle applied ‘contingent’ to of conceptualism that there is more to objects and to events, in contrast to reality than ‘what is known’ in concepts. Necessary Being in the context of ‘possi- Both perceive that description and con- bility’ as against actuality. He also applied ceptual construction are not entirely the term to propositions the truth or value-neutral, but also have some founda- falsity of which are contingent. In Leibniz tion in a reality external to the activity of and in Lessing this became modified in the mind. (See also non-realism.) terms of a contrast between the contingent truths of history, or ‘facts’,andthe ‘eternal’ or necessary truths of reason. contingency, the contingent In theology this had profound conse- Contingency may be said to apply to quences for Christology. objectsortostatesofaffairsorto propositions. The classic example of a corrigibility contingent proposition in philosophical logic is: ‘It is raining.’ It might or might The term denotes the quality of being not be true, and its truth may be verified or subject to subsequent correction, or the disconfirmed by evidential empirical capacity to be corrected. It stands in observation. contrast to that which is definitive and final. Some propositions, however, are hermeneutics poses a dilemma for necessary. The statement that the sum many religious people. For many, a sacred of the angles of a triangle amount to 1808 text is perceived as definitive, but it is remains true irrespective of what triangle I usually recognized that communities of draw. This is an example of an analytic interpretation are fallible. Hermeneutical statement, for it is true by virtue of the theory since Schleiermacher has logic entailed in the definition of a broadly underlined the progressive nature triangle. In this case we are speaking of of hermeneutical understanding as a deep- logical necessity. ening process. Earlier understanding may Can the terms ‘necessary’ and ‘contin- be more partial (in both senses of the gent’ be applied to persons or objects word) than later ‘divinatory’ and critical rather to propositions? The cosmologi- reappraisals and rereadings. Each act of cal argument for the existence of God understanding is corrigible in the light of depends on the distinction between con- subsequent engagements with the text, or tingent, finite, caused causes within the with that which is to be understood. 51 cosmological argument for the existence of God

Historical understanding and prag- that motion within the world presupposes matic theories of knowledge also point to some source of motion which is itself self- the corrigibility of progressive levels of moving and is not set in motion by some apprehending truth. The main dilemma of eternal agent or cause. This unmoved pragmatism is that what may seem to be mover does not belong to realm of the justified to a community as a claim to finite or contingent. It belongs to the truth may undergo substantial change and realm of soul, spirit, the gods or God. revision as history moves on. Aristotle (384–322 bce) also distin- Martin Luther’s emphasis on the clarity guishes between potentiality and actuality, (claritas) of scripture was arguably a and offers a careful analysis of the nature functional use of the term rather than a of cause and causation. These two inno- claim to ‘final’ understanding. His opposi- vative and distinctive themes in his philo- tion to provides the context for sophy come together in his formulation of this Reformation discussion. Erasmus the cosmological argument. argued that since all biblical interpretation On cause, Aristotle distinguishes was corrigible, frequently inaction is between efficient cause (in the example advisable in the face of uncertainty. Luther of a marble sculpture, the hammer and insisted that scripture is always sufficiently chisel); final cause (the purpose for which clear for the next necessary step of action the sculpture is formed); the material to be taken. cause (the potential of marble as matter) and the formal cause (the potential struc- cosmological argument for the ture and proportionality of the sculpture existence of God seen in terms of style or pattern). The causal agency that brings the argument from our experience of the world (a posteriori) potential into actuality cannot, Aristotle argues, presuppose an infinite chain of The cosmological argument for the exis- potentiality that never springs from, tence of God begins with a posteriori nor ends in, the actual. Otherwise the arguments from the nature of the world, in entire process is merely contingent or contrast to the ontological argument, possible rather than actual. Hence there which begins with an a priori analysis of is an actual, unmoved, originating Prime a concept, namely that of God (see God, Mover. arguments for the existence of). ‘If there is nothing eternal, there can be The use of the cosmological argument no becoming . . . The last member of the is not restricted to Christian theism. series [i.e. of causes and effects] must be Formulations can be found in Plato and ungenerated . . . since nothing can come Aristotle among the Greeks; in Islamic from nothing’ (Metaphysics, 999b). The philosophers such as al-Kindi, al-Gha- Prime Mover is ‘necessary’. The argu- zali and Ibn Sina; and in Judaism (e.g. ment is a posteriori because everything in Maimonides)aswellasinChristian the world, according to Aristotle, points theism (briefly in Anselm but most beyond itself to that upon which it depends. Aquinas especially in Thomas ). The most formulations in islamic notable opponent of the argument was philosophy Kant. formulations in plato and in Al-Kindi (c. 813–c. 871) and al-Ghazali aristotle (1058–1111) reflect a revival of interest in Aristotle in medieval Islamic philoso- Plato (428–348 bce) discusses good and phy. These two writers write within the evil, and in particular change and change- kalam tradition of Islam, which shares lessness, in the Laws.InLaws X he argues with Aristotle (and later Thomas Aquinas) cosmological argument for the existence of God 52 the view that an infinite regress of caused ontological argument, but strictly remains causes is impossible. The logical reason is a posteriori. that if such a chain were postulated, the a middle way: moses whole of reality, or the universe, in maimonides principle may never have come to be. (1135–1204) The reason in philosophical theology is This Spanish-born Jewish philosopher that the universe is finite, and has a engaged directly with the two versions of beginning. It is contingent, not ‘necessary’. the Islamic formulations represented This kalam argument reflects the dis- respectively by the kalam tradition (Al- tinction already advocated by Plato and Kindi and al-Ghazali) and the arguments Aristotle that only an intelligence, an of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. On one side, unmoved originating Mover, can possess the kalam tradition not only postulated a the status of a necessary Being. This is One beginning to the world, but a version of who is self-generated, or is characterized occasionalism, i.e. that God is the only by ASEITY (Latin, ase, of itself). true causal agent of every event. Maimo- Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) and Ibn nides argued that this reduces the regula- Rushd (Averroes, 1126–98) did even rities of nature to an arbitrary view of more to lead to a revival of Aristotle’s providence. thought in twelfth-century Europe. Ibn On the other hand, Maimonides firmly Sina stressed the importance of reason.A rejected the view of Ibn Sina and Ibn study of the world reveals that contingent Rushd that the universe had no beginning, objects or agents are finite entities for the since this flatly contradicts the biblical existence of which a reason can be accounts of creation in Genesis, and is also postulated. However, contingent beings rationally implausible and unnecessary. In do not constitute an infinite regress of Christian theology Thomas Aquinas also caused causes. follows this middle way. Contingent beings end in a necessary anselm and thomas aquinas Being. The difference from the kalam tradition of al-Kindi and al-Ghazali lies Anselm (1033–1109) is best known in in the exclusive dependence of their argu- philosophy of religion for his two formu- ment on logical inferences from the world lations of the ontological argument for the without postulating any temporal dimen- existence of God, and in Christian theol- sion. It does not require or presuppose the ogy for his Why God Became Man. notion of ‘the beginning’ of the universe. However, in the Monologion (Soliloquy Ibn Rushd aimed to integrate Aristote- or Meditation) Anselm argues from the lian philosophy with his Islamic theology. existence of ‘good things’ in the world to He is even more explicitly distanced from the existence of the source of all good. In the kalam tradition in claiming that both particular, ‘all that exists exists through a God and the world are eternal. Never- nature or essence that exists through itself theless, the world remains an effect of (per se)’ (Monologion, 13). This is the God’s power, created from eternity. Hence argument from the contingent to the he presses radically the distinction necessary. between logical and temporal arguments: A fuller discussion of the Five Ways of the world is eternal but caused; God is Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) is set out eternal and uncaused, since God is God’s under that entry, which need not be own ground, unlike the world, and is a replicated. We may summarize certain ‘necessary’ Being. selected features. The First Way takes up The emphasis thus falls upon the Aristotle’s arguments from the phenom- logical status of the One who controls all enon of potentiality. It is usually called the things. This comes close to the heart of the kinetological argument, i.e. an argument 53 cosmological argument for the existence of God from ‘movement’. It argues to a Prime since all are ‘dependent’ entities: only that Mover. However, the Latin motus is which of itself is non-contingent and broader than ‘motion’. Hence the argu- necessary. ment that all potential, or moving, objects Locke (1632–1704), Newton himself presuppose what set them in motion is not (1642–1727) and Leibniz (1646–1716) all wholly discredited by Newton’s law of defend such an argument. Newton’s obser- motion and inertia. vations about motion do not in the end The Second Way begins from the dissolve the logical gap between contin- phenomenon of efficient cause, and gent caused causes, and a necessary reflects the earlier arguments from Aris- uncaused cause. totle. It comes close to the Islamic kalam Hume (1711–76) challenges the argument. Appeal to originating causes assumption that the argument can offer has bequeathed the title ‘the aetiological an a posteriori inference from empirical argument’ to this Second Way. However, observation. We like to think that we we also noted Thomas’s endorsement of observe cause and effect, but strictly in the critique of the kalam tradition by empirical terms all that we can observe is Maimonides. ‘contiguity’, or ‘constant conjunction’. The Third Way is the cosmological What leads us to connect two continguous argument in the most specific sense of the events as cause and effect is merely habit term. If we look around us at the or custom: that is our usual experience. contingency of all finite events in this We experience a succession of impres- finite world, we are forced ‘to postulate sions; we do not experience the unifying something which is of itself necessary’ framework that we term ‘causation’. (ponere aliquid quod est per se necessar- ‘Upon examination . . . the necessity of a ium)(Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 3, art. cause is fallacious and sophistical’ (Hume, 3). It is based ‘on what need not be (ex A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739 (Cri- possibile [the contingent]) and on what tical edn Oxford: OUP, 1978, 79–94)). must be (necessario)’. Aseity is self- Kant (1724–1804) pressed this attack groundedness. further. Why should everything have a On details and replies see entry under cause? Notions such as ‘cause’ (together Five Ways, where the Fourth and Fifth with space and time) are merely ‘regula- Ways are also considered. Thomas appeals tive’ principles in terms of which the to the argument of Paul the Apostle in human mind comes to order the world. Romans 1 that the Being of God may be Hence virtually every stage of the cosmo- inferred from the works of God as logical argument falls under this critique. Creator. This does not provide demon- mill (1806–73) saw value in the strable proof of what God is, but has teleological argument from purpose rational force for the question that God is. or design, but in common with Hume saw no reason to reject the possibility of an clarke’s advocacy and infinite regress of caused causes the exclu- critiques from hume, kant sion of which lies at the heart of the and mill cosmological argument. This rejection of (1675–1729) defends the an infinite series may reflect ‘our’ experi- cosmological argument even in the light of ence, Mill concedes, but why should it be Newton’s formulation of laws of motion, true of all experience at any time? It is our gravity and inertia. In his work A Dis- own minds that demand a resting place. course Concerning Natural Religion more recent debates (1705) Clarke argues that even if we postulate an endless chain of causes ‘’tis Virtually all aspects of the debate continue manifest the whole cannot be necessary’, to receive logical exploration. Thus, for counterfactuals 54 example, W.I. Craig has revived consid- only to propositions that assert logical or eration of the kalam tradition within mathematical necessity. Islamic philosophy concerning the finite In the present context necessary Being history of the world (The Cosmological relates to aseity. Is it more reasonable to Argument from Plato to Leibniz, London: postulate a contingent universe which Macmillan, 1980). J.L. Mackie has might or might not have been (at any time attacked virtually every aspect of the whatever, but nevertheless is), or a con- argument (The of Theism, tingent universe the ground of which is a Oxford: OUP, 1982). G.E.M. Anscombe Being who does not share this quality of asks whether Hume’s claims about causa- contingency, but is of a different order? tion apply to every kind of cause in all For most theists, the issue amounts not to possible situations (‘“Whatever has a ‘proof’, but at the very least to ‘reason- beginning of Existence must have a able’ belief. cause”: Hume’s Argument Exposed’, Ana- lysis, 34, 1974; repr. in G.E.M. Anscombe, counterfactuals Collected Philosophical Papers, 3 vols., The term denotes conditionals in which Minneapolis: University of Minnesota the antecedent, or protasis, is false. An Press, vol. 1). example might be: ‘If America were as Some have sought to find new support small as England, I would travel to visit or new criticisms in modern post-New- you.’ Since the hypothetical condition is tonian physics, including the work of false, what is the truth-status of the Hoyle and discussions of ‘steady state’ utterance? theory, ‘the Big Bang’, and the second law Since in formal logic the inferential ‘if of thermodynamics and principle of p, then q’ lies at the heart of logical entropy. This merely shifts the ground to calculus, logicians explore the differences what kind of cause introduces conditions of status between factual, open, unful- adequate for matter to exist. filled, and contrary-to-fact conditionals. Such discussions also tend to expose a Some also allude to the ambivalent status fallacy of a purely logical nature if the of counterfactuals in discussions of the traditional version of the argument is of God. The projection of expressed in the form of a logical syllo- contrary-to-fact conditional scenarios gism as follows: (1) major premise: every raises problems of its own in this area of state of affairs has a cause; (2) minor discussion. premise: the world is a state of affairs; (3) conclusion: therefore the world has a cause. This fails because in a syllogism creation the terms of the three propositions must Three main approaches to concepts of retain the same meaning. But in this major divine creation of the universe invite premise, ‘cause’ means ‘caused cause’, comparison. The traditional Hebrew– while in this conclusion (unless it refers Christian–Islamic theistic view is that of to an infinite regress) ‘cause’ denotes creatio ex nihilo, creation out of nothing, ‘uncaused cause’. This is a different logical in the sense that God used no pre-existing term. materials. A second view draws on Neo- Most recent and contemporary discus- platonism and on some traditions of sion, therefore, focuses on the issue at the Hindu philosophy. The world is seen heart of the argument, present in Aristotle as an ‘emanation’ of or from God (Plo- and stated in Thomas’s Third Way, namely tinus, c. 205–70), or as ‘the body’ of God the relation between contingent being and (Ra¯ ma¯ nuja, c. 1017–1137). necessary Being. We may set aside the A third view presupposes that time is criticism that necessarily can be applied infinite, and therefore (with Aristotle, 55 creation

384–322 bce) that the world is eternal. Even if cosmology is to be traced to a Nevertheless, Aristotle infers from the ‘big bang’ or a cosmic explosion, or to distinction between possibility and actu- subatomic conditions, this would still ality that a Prime Mover imparts motion leave open the philosophical and theolo- to the world as a Changeless Unmoved gical question of ‘Whence?’ and ‘Why?’, Mover or First Cause. rather than ‘How?’ (see science and religion). Proposals for demythologi- creatio ex nihilo in western zation may well underestimate the role of theism states of affairs and description, but at In the Hebrew–Christian tradition God’s least they have the merit of placing the creation of the world from nothing is emphasis on theology and relationship expressed implicitly in the Bible in Genesis rather than cosmology. 1:2, but explicitly first in 2 Maccabees It was left in general to later theology 7:28; cf. Romans 4:17; Hebrews 11:3; 2 to formulate in more detail than the Baruch 21:4; 48:8. The Genesis account scriptural sources the continuing work of alludes in onomatopoeia to the chaos God in preservation and in providence, ‘without form and void’ (Hebrew, tohu apart from scattered texts (e.g. Colossians wabhohu ‘shapeless and without content’, 1:15–17). Thomas Aquinas devotes part Gen. 1:2). In Hellenistic Judaism this is of book III of the Summa Contra Gentiles accommodated to Greek philosophy as (ch. 64–77) to the subject of providence unformed primal matter (Wis. 11:17), as including God’s use of ‘secondary causes’ later in Justin (Apology, I: 10:2). (ch. 77). Barth speaks of God’s ‘holding If, as Pannenberg states, the original humankind from the abyss of non-being’. point was ‘simply that the world did not In Jewish and Islamic philosophy this exist before’, very soon in early Christian theme is implicit in ascribing God the theology it functioned ‘to exclude the attributes of Life, Power, Wisdom and dualistic idea of an eternal antithesis to Will. God’s creative activity’ (Systematic Theol- creation through divine ogy, vol. 2, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, emanations 1994, 14). No less important in the biblical Plotinus sought to remain faithful to accounts is the repeated act of differentia- Plato’s philosophy, but his Neoplatonism tion. ‘God separated light from darkness’ also embodies elements from Aristotle and (Gen. 1:4); ‘separated water . . . under the the Stoics. God is indeed above or firmament . . . above the firmament’ (1:7); beyond the contingent world, and is ‘to separate the day from the night’ (1:14); Absolute, transcendent and One. This ‘created . . . according to their kinds’ transcendence is preserved by a ‘bridge’ (1:21). Hegel (1770–1831) is among of intermediary agencies, who derive their those who associate ‘form’ with differen- being from God by emanation. Second- tiation, while the reality of ‘difference’ is a century postulates a broadly point of disagreement between S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ similar notion to bridge a sharp dualism. and Ra¯ma¯nuja in Hindu philosophy. Such intermediaries as Sophia play a key Finally, in the Hebrew–Christian–Isla- role in divine action, by descending into mic tradition of theism, the acts and the world. action of God call attention to a causal In Hindu philosophy the tradition of relation of dependency and origin; less, ‘modified’ or ‘qualified’ (the indeed very much less, on the ‘how’ of Visistadvaita school) represented espe- cosmological processes. These accounts cially by Ra¯ma¯ nuja, understands the have a quite different purpose from ‘scien- world as the ‘body’ of the Supreme Being. tific’ accounts of cosmological ‘origins’. This stands in contrast to the monism of critical philosophy 56

S´an˙ kara (788–820), for whom creation world is eternal. His defence of this view itself is an illusion based upon lack of in relation to the sovereign transcendence knowledge (veda). In as far as creation of Allah is that reality (including the exists, for both schools it is perceived (in world) for ever flows from God as the reality or illusion) as part of a cyclical Source of all being. process of rebirth and . Aquinas believed that it was reasonable Whereas Genesis pronounces creation to believe in the eternity of the world, ‘good ’, in Hindu philosophy it is more but that faith taught a doctrine of creation truly a source of imperfection, constraint ex nihilo. However, is the notion that and pain, as also in several Greek tradi- every ‘now’ implies a ‘before’ a good tions. reason for postulating the infinity of time In , Maimonides and the eternity of the world? (1135–1204) was aware of the differences Kant (1724–1804) formulates this between the biblical account of creatio ex issue as his first antinomy. The problem nihilo and the Platonic and Aristotelian may be explained more clearly with traditions. In formal terms he adopts the reference to space. Try to imagine the first, but interpreters express reserve about end or edge of space! Each time the whether he accepted one of these rather attempt is made, we need to fence off than another. the piece of further space the other side of In Islamic philosophy, al-Kindi (c. the edge or boundary. Is this because space 813–c.871) firmly stressed creation ex is infinite? Or is it not, rather, because nihilo, but he also believed that this was human beings always think in spatial compatible with ‘the One’ of Neoplaton- categories? Might it not be the same ism, and with Aristotle’s Prime Mover. By with time? Does this not simply tell us contrast, al-Ghazali (1058–1111) firmly that, in Augustine’s words, space and accepted the Qur’an’s emphasis upon time were created along with the universe creation ex nihilo, and saw this as exclud- (cum tempore, not in tempore)? ing both a Neoplatonist and Aristotelian view of creation. His view of providence critical philosophy perhaps leans towards occasionalism. al-Farabi (875–950) borders on an ema- The most widely accepted use of this term nationist view (see below). is to denote the philosophical method of Kant aristotle and kant: would (1724–1804). In contrast to the traditions of rationalism and empiri- ‘infinite time’ imply the cism eternity of the world? , Kant sought to re-establish the role of reason by offering a critique of its Aristotle argues that the world could have scope and status. no beginning – for every ‘now’ logically The issues are set out in the entry implies a ‘before’, ad infinitum. Hence he transcendental philosophy.Rather does not have a theistic view of creation in than asking simply ‘What do we know?’, the usual sense. However, if time measures Kant asked, ‘What conditions must obtain change, and change is eternal, motion for the very possibility of knowledge?’ The presupposes the causal agency of a Prime term ‘critical’ reflects the three titles of Mover. In this sense a Supreme Being may Kant’s major works: Critique of Pure be the Ground of Form within the world, Reason (1781, revised 1787); Critique of since without the Prime Mover, everything Practical Reason (1788); and Critique of wouldremaininastateofformless Judgement (1790). Critical philosophy potentiality. dates from this period. Against al-Kindi, in Islamic philosophy A little-used meaning of the term al-Farabi believed and taught that the originated with C.D. Broad (1887–1971). 57 Cupitt, Don

Broad reserved the term to denote the Cupitt’s middle period draws on the ‘ordinary-language’ realism of G.E. stock-in-trade of philosophy of religion Moore and Russell, in contrast to the lectures to promote the claims of ‘speculative’ philosophy of metaphysics Feuerbach and Freud about the or idealism. The term should also be reductionism not of atheism but of distinguished from critical realism and religion. He endorses their critique from critical theory. about religion’s encouraging infantile dependency, or diminishing human dig- critical realism nity, at least in its traditional theistic forms. By exposing ‘God’ as a human See realism. projection, Cupitt aims to rehabilitate ‘autonomy’ and to de-objectify the Cupitt, Don (b. 1934) notion of God. God is not a Being ‘out ’s work in philosophy of there’ (see non-realism). religion develops continuously, but may During this period Cupitt gave a series broadly be identified as emerging in three of talks on British television under the title stages. The groundwork for what would The Sea of Faith, which was immediately eventually emerge as a non-realist view of published (1984). He presented such God was laid out in works reflecting figures as Kant, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Kantian and Kierkegaardian themes Freud and Wittgenstein in such a way as (1968–79). The ‘middle period’ gave to make them appear partners who would Cupitt some notoriety in Britain as an support his own enterprise. Sympathizers ‘Atheist’ Anglican priest, with the pub- subsequently formed a ‘Sea of Faith Net- lication of Taking Leave of God (1980) work’ (from 1989). and subsequent works (1980–85). Third, From the late 1980s, Cupitt seems to from Life-Lines (1986) and thereafter have had second thoughts about the Cupitt has become involved in postmo- possibility of human ‘autonomy’ in the dernism and moves continuously in his light of a postmodern rhetoric of selfhood. interests. He writes, ‘There is no substantial indivi- Cupitt served as a curate in Salford dual self’ (Life-Lines, London: SCM, near Manchester, but from 1962 has spent 1986, 198). In Radicals and the Future his entire life in Cambridge, mainly as of the Church (London: SCM, 1989) he lecturer in philosophy of religion and observes: ‘We are anarchists . . . we love Dean of Emmanuel College. From the mobility’ (112). He even promotes early years he endorsed Nietzsche’s ‘manipulative’ rhetoric and deceit (ibid., maxim that there are no ‘givens’, only 111) on the ground that literary theory ‘interpretations’. exposes the ‘illusion’ of ‘absolute integrity’ The Leap of Reason (1976) took up as a myth (ibid., 107). Plato’s allegory of the cave. However, The period of the later works combines whereas for Plato the shadows point to a postmodernity, social constructivism and greater reality of Forms, of which they radicalism and attacks, alike, the conser- are mere contingent or empirical vative and the liberal in religion. Litera- copies, Cupitt’s cave is closed, and its lism has ‘collapsed’ under the impact of inhabitants live on the basis of ‘as if . . .’. postmodernist assessments of the self. They must make a ‘leap’ (since there is Cupitt’s following is less marked no opening) about how they are to among academic theologians and philoso- construe or construct data. In effect, phers than among clergy and laypeople Cupitt offers a critique of the limits of who are disenchanted with established, reason, in the tradition of Kant and institutional, orthodox religion. The style Kierkegaard. of his work has changed from argument to Cupitt, Don 58 rhetoric, in accordance with his postmo- theory than in most university depart- dern re-appraisal of reason. ments of philosophy. They appear to Most of Cupitt’s writings are, in effect promote pluralism; but in practice pro- and loosely, works of philosophy of mote a single voice, even if that one voice religion. However, they presuppose a view is ‘always on the move’. of reason found more frequently in critical D

Darwin, Charles Robert different stages of development in differ- (1809–82) ent environments. Darwin published The Origin of Spe- Darwin formulated a theory of evolu- cies in 1859, and The Descent of Man in tion on the basis of postulating a process 1871, among other works. Massive con- of selection by natural processes of ran- troversy was stirred at the time not only by dom changes in biological species. He the suggestion that explanations in terms himself spoke of ‘descent with modifica- of design or teleology could be replaced by tion’, but this became known as evolution those of natural, chance processes, but by natural selection. also by his insistence that the emergence of Two aspects of his thought identify the humankind depended on the same chance core of Darwin’s distinctive influence. mechanisms. First, he stressed that those mechanisms Darwin’s theories paved the way for of change that proved to be useful for ethical theories based on evolution, and survival were not those of purposive or for formulations of behaviourism. T.H. designed adaptation. Amidst the random Huxley (1825–95) argued that human variables of biological life, some changes beings are biomechanistic systems in led to degeneration and extinction. whom ‘consciousness’ is merely an epi- Others, equally the product of mere phenomenal or derivative byproduct. (See chance, had useful consequences which also empiricism; teleological argu- assisted survival and flourishing, some- ment; science and religion). times in ways that might not have been predicted. Survival and reproduction is a deduction, deductive competitive struggle for existence, pro- reasoning geny and flourishing, although it was Spencer (1820–1903) who popularized Deduction denotes the logical reasoning in the term ‘the survival of the fittest’. which a conclusion necessarily follows Second, Darwin formulated a biologi- from the premises, especially but not cal theory, which he sought to demon- exclusively reasoning from the general to strate in empirical terms. Thus, after his the particular. The process is fundamental degree at Cambridge, he undertook the for the logical theory of Aristotle five-year voyage in the Beagle to amass (384–322 bce). Deduction may follow by data relating to various life-forms at inference from a series of propositions in definition 60 sequence, from which in the final stage the in a particular way. These are linguistic conclusion is deduced. actions of assigning meaning for the The notion that deduction strictly purpose of a specific discourse or debate. defines inference from the general to the There is no guarantee that the definition particular reflects its conventional contrast will be accepted, still less that others will with inductive reasoning. In this latter case accept it subsequently, unless it proves reasoning begins with particular cases and useful for future purposes. seeks to establish a general principle. Ostensive definition is discussed in However, more strictly deductive logic an entry under its name. Wittgenstein need not begin with the general or axio- and Friedrich Waismann argue that osten- matic, as long as the conclusion follows sive definitions, for example ‘This is a necessarily from the antecedent proposi- pencil’ (as I point to it), presuppose a prior tion as a valid inference. (See also axiom; linguistic training or competency, and logic.) function only in limited ways with limited effects. This type of definition may work with ‘This is Jack’ (in an appropriate definition context), but ‘What about such words as Definitions remain important not only for “yes” and “no”, “can” and “may”, “true” avoiding misunderstanding and for sus- and “false”? These need to be explained in taining clarity, but also for ensuring a different manner’ (Waismann, Principles validity in certain operations of logic.If of Linguistic Philosophy, London: Mac- a logical term is used in more than one Millan, 1965, 94). The same principle way, this may undermine the validity of applies to the word ‘God’. the argument. Persuasive definitions are the stock-in- Traditionally, as in the philosophy of trade of propagandist rhetoric, mass Aristotle (384–322 bce), definitions advertising and manipulation in politics operated on the basis of genus and or religion. In first-century Corinth the difference. ‘A human being’ is defined as church evidently defined ‘spiritual’ (Greek, ‘a rational animal’ on the basis of the genus pneumatikos) in such a way as to link shared with the animal kingdom, with the approval and self-affirmation with their differentia of ‘rationality’ in the case of own attributes. Paul the Apostle humankind. The definition seeks to iden- responded by redefining ‘spiritual’ as that tify a common species or genus of a given which pertains to the work of the Holy type, but also specifies what is distinctive Spirit (hagion pneuˆ ma). He could address to the sub-type or to the particular. them as ‘spiritual people’ when they were For Aristotle this process was closely characterized by ‘jealousy and quarrelling’ bound up with a correspondence theory of (1 Corinthians 3:1–3). Politicians regu- Truth. A definition signifies the ‘essence’ larly define ‘moving forwards’ in terms of of what is to be defined, and is therefore what they are advocating, while adverti- true or false. However, such a view may sers define ‘what everyone loves’ along lose ground in the light of issues raised by similar lines. Both are examples of persua- nominalism, with the recognition that sive definition. relations between language and meaning Wittgenstein and John Searle demon- rest upon convention, which may change. strate the importance of contextual defini- That which is to be defined, the tion. How we define the words ‘exact’ or definiendum, may relate to the terms in ‘inexact’, Wittgenstein observes, will which it is defined (the definiens) in several depend on whether we are measuring ways. distances in astronomy (between stars) or Stipulative definitions state the propo- distances in joinery (between a dowling sal of a speaker or writer to define a word and a socket). Russell observes that this 61 becomes highly sensitive in recursive In keeping the mechanistic models of definitions, i.e. when a definition used in Enlightenment rationalism, deists saw one context is reapplied and reused in the universe in terms of a mechanism another. which God had set going, but in which Dictionaries regularly use lexical defi- God had no need to intervene. If the nitions, which define one word or set of mechanism had been made well, it needed words in terms of another. These become no correction or modification. ‘’ less productive if such definition becomes belonged to a naı¨ve view of the world circular, although specialists in theoretical (according to deists), since God leaves the linguistics insist that some degree of universe to run as a well-made self- circularity in intra-linguistic definition is regulating machine. unavoidable. The habit of giving a ‘med- In ancient philosophy Aristotle ical explanation’ by using a Greek term (as anticipates a deist view of God by insisting the professional name for the condition in that God is above, beyond, and separated question) may be useful only if both from material, contingent and changing, conversation partners presuppose the finite things (Metaphysics, bk XII). Con- same linguistic ‘background’ of medical versely, God is not immanent within the competency. world. This latter notion belongs in The subject is almost without limit, unqualified form to , and with because different contextual situations in qualifications also to theism. language render certain methods of defi- It is no accident that deism flourished nition more constructive than others, or in the era of rationalism. John Henry also more seductive than others. If we Newman describes the eighteenth century emphasize only the growth and fluidity of in England as the Age of Reason, when language, we may become daunted by a love grows cold. The nineteenth century postmodern, Derridean desire endlessly would replace such rationalism, especially to ‘defer’ indeterminate meaning. If we in Germany, with Romanticism, which remain in the realm of purely formal logic nourished an organic, rather than mechan- or referential language, we may expect istic, model of God’s relation to the world. a greater stability than living language Thomas Carlyle scathingly criticized the can provide. There is room for middle deist God as ‘an absentee God, sitting idle, ground. (See also Derrida; postmo- ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside dernism.) of his universe, and seeing it go’ (Sartor Resartus, 1834, bk II, ch. 7). Many trace the origins of deism to the deism writings of Lord Edward Herbert of In the sixteenth century the term was Cherbury (1583–1643). Herbert enun- sometimes used to denote belief in God ciated five principles which later were (Latin, Deus, God) in contrast to athe- known by some as the five articles of ism. However, this was quickly overtaken deism: (1) God exists; (2) as Supreme by a more important meaning. In the Being, God is worthy of worship; (3) piety seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and virtue characterize religion; (4) repen- deism postulated a view of God that stood tance expiates sin; and (5) justice demands in contrast to theism (Greek, Theos, reward or punishment in post-mortal God). Whereas theists believe in God’s existence. These are universal, rational active agency within the world, deism ‘common notions’ (communes notitiae)of denotes a rationalist concept of God as ‘natural’ religion (On Truth, 1624). This the Source of Creation who remains above prepares the ground for a natural and beyond it, but is not immanent within theology without the necessity of ‘spe- it (see immanence). cial’ revelation. Reason leads on to faith. demythologizing, demythologization 62

In the eighteenth century a more to express the other worldly in terms of radical form of deism was promoted by this world, and the divine in terms of Matthew Tindal (1653–1733). Tindal, like human life’ (‘New Testament and Mythol- Herbert, was an English deist, educated at ogy’ [1941], in H.W. Bartsch, ed., Ker- Oxford. He saw religion as eternal and ygma and Myth, vol. 1, London: SPCK, universal. The title of his work Christian- 1964, 141; German, vol. 1, 23). This ity as Old as Creation (1730) expounds verges on the straightforward use of even Christianity as an eternal, timeless analogy, as when God is spoken of as ‘natural’ religion, which is not dependent ‘high’ or as ‘sending’ a word or ‘God’s on special revelation, but only upon Son’. universal reason and . Second, Bultmann regards myth as the John Toland (1670–1722) sums up the explanatory pseudo-science of a primitive, deist outlook in the title of his book pre-scientific, view of the world. ‘The Christianity not Mysterious (1696). He cosmology [das Weltbild, picture of the insists that Christianity is fully compatible world] of the New Testament is essentially with reason, and indeed need be based mythical in character. The world is a only on rational reflection. three-storeyed structure, with earth in the During this period deism was mainly centre, the heaven above, and . . . the an English phenomenon, although in underworld’ (ibid., 1; German, 15). Here France Voltaire (1694–1778) was also appeal to the agency of demons or to the influenced by the English deists, and intervention of God may be perceived as Toland was of Irish descent. These writers ‘causal’ explanations for ills or for rescue reflect the rationalist and mechanistic from ill, supposedly equivalent in function spirit of the age. to ‘scientific’ causes such as a virus or The movement paved the way for aspirin in the modern world. rationalist assumptions in German biblical Third, and most important for Bult- criticism nearly a century later. In Eng- mann, myth presents in descriptive or land, however, the deists were highly ‘objective’ guises a form or content which controversial. A counter-movement of is intended not to describe but to address, reaction against a purely rational account to challenge, to involve, or to transform. of religion emerged in the pietism of the ‘The real purpose of myth is not to present Wesleyan revivals. Pietism expressed a an objective picture of the world (ein belief in, and longing for, the immediacy objectives Weltbild) . . . but to express of a God who is not remote, but is active man’s understanding of himself in the in human life. world in which he lives’ (ibid., 10; Ger- man, 23). Part of this understanding derives from his collaboration with the demythologizing, Jewish scholar , but even more demythologization from his Kantian and Neo-Kantian back- This term is associated closely with the ground (see Kant). work of Bultmann (1884–1976). His The first and third definitions seem seminal essay on demythologizing the incompatible, as R.W. Hepburn argued. New Testament (1941) proposed not the Analogy cannot be discarded; it is essen- elimination of myth but its reinterpreta- tial (see language in religion). How- tion in existential terms (see existential- ever, it is intelligible to seek to replace ism). language that is appropriate for the Bultmann defines myth in three ways, description of objects by language that which may well be incompatible with each calls the reader to respond by confession, other. First, myth is ‘the use of imagery [die change, affirmation or other self-involving Vorstellungsweise, mode of representation] attitudes. 63 Derrida, Jacques

It is here that Bultmann draws on Derrida, Jacques (b. 1930) Heidegger, who was also his colleague at Marburg. God is not an ‘object’ about Derrida, philosopher and literary theorist, whom discourse occurs; rather, discourse born in Algeria and educated in Paris, is flows from being addressed by God. God one of the most influential and notoriously is ‘wholly “Beyond”’ (der schlechthin controversial postmodernist thinkers. He Jenseitige: Faith and Understanding, vol. is closely associated with ‘deconstruction’, 1, London: SCM, 1969, 46; German, 14). a particular approach for undermining Hence he draws on Heidegger’s concep- and transforming both texts and tradi- tuality (Begrifflichkeit) to find ways of tional Western metaphysical systems of avoiding ‘objectifying’ language about thought. His greatest influence is among God or human persons. American literary theorists. The aim is understandable, but it is Deconstruction, as Derrida under- false to suppose that existential or self- stands it, is not mere demolition: it is an involving language can operate effectively ‘enigma’ (Psyche´, Paris: Galile´e, 1987, if it is disengaged from other language 391); but it involves exposing pseudo- that conveys cognitive truth. Thus the stabilities in texts that presuppose an over- performative illocutionary act ‘I forgive ready ‘presence’ of entities or determina- you’ depends on the state of affairs that cies of language. the speaker has authority to forgive sins. In his key works of 1967, especially This point is well made by Austin and Grammotology and Speech and Phenom- others. ena, Derrida reveals the influence of Proposals about demythologizing may Nietzsche (1844–1900), Freud (1856– in some cases recover ‘the point’ about 1939), Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and language in sacred texts. For example, the later Heidegger (1889–1976). The most language about the End functions to illusion of stable language, he argues, rests call to accountability or to reassure; it is on being centred on words as entities not usually a map of the sequence of end- (‘logocentrism’). By contrast, he appeals to events. However, the programme of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics for the demythologizing bases too much on a view that it is the differences between false linguistic dualism between descrip- what this or that sign denotes on which tion and or expression. meanings hinge. Thereby it tends to neglect the importance De Saussure illustrated the point with of history and the public world, and to colour-words (see semantics). The seman- ignore the multi-layered, multi-functional tic scope of ‘red’ is greater if its ‘difference’ character of language in religion. marks it off from ‘yellow’ than if it marks it off from ‘orange’. But all this depends on a prior system of signs (French, la langue), deontology from which the act or performance of sign The term denotes an understanding of selection for use (la parole) is taken. ethics in which an ethics of duty or Derrida proposes that because this system obligation is primary. The agent of moral is also variable, changing and interactive, decision and moral action is motivated by signs are ‘indeterminate’. Meaning is a duty to do what is right, in contrast to ‘deferred’. Prior meaning stands ‘under , or an ethic based on the erasure’ (sous rature). calculation of optimum consequences. The Hence ‘difference’ (French, diffe`r- issues surrounding deontology are dis- ence) yields ‘deferment’ (Fr. diffe`rance). cussed in detail in the long entry on ethics. However, Aristotle’s logic and Wes- (See also belief; Kant.) tern metaphysics, Derrida insists, is Descartes, Rene´ 64

‘logocentric’, and misleadingly conveys a 1644 he expounded his Principles of stability that invites decentring through Philosophy, which, he believed, showed ‘deconstruction’. Post-modern and Freu- that he did not contradict Aristotle. dian suspicion of human consciousness Finally, The Passions of the Soul appeared leaves the variable sign-system, without in 1649, a year before his death. the human subject, as that which generates Descartes was a French philosopher, meaning. who wrote in French. Jesuit teaching, for CriticsofDerridaarguethathe which he always retained a respect, neglects the role of the human subject in influenced his education. For a period of making choices about language uses. He years he also studied mathematics in subordinates la parole to la langue, the Holland, and from 1649 gave philosophi- abstract system. He reduces literary lan- cal instruction to the Queen of in guage to a ‘play’ of indeterminate signs, Stockholm. By 1619 he was already and reduces propositional logic to ‘perfor- speaking of his aim ‘to finish . . . an mances’ of roles or to mere semiotic absolutely new science’. operations. (See also postmodernism.) the argument in discourse on method Descartes, Rene´ (1596–1650) The full title is Discourse on the Method It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of of Properly Conducting One’s Reason and Descartes on the history of philosophy. in Seeking the Truth in the Sciences.In Many date the beginning of the modern part 1, Descartes reflects on the multi- era from his work. He initiated a new plicity and diversity of human opinions, rationalist philosophical method, in con- which offer ‘little basis . . . for certainty’ trast to the prevailing tradition of a (Discourse on Method, London: Penguin, posteriori argument, which had domi- 1968, 33). Theology (on the basis of nated most philosophical systems from revelation) and mathematics alone yield Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas. ‘certain’ truths. In the case of other In an early debate with Chandoux in disciplines, ‘nothing solid could have been Paris in 1628, Descartes attacked the view built on such a shifting foundation’ (ibid., that science could be based only on 32). probabilities. He insisted that knowledge In part 2, Descartes explains his aim: ‘I could be based on absolute certainty.He seek . . . to reform my own thoughts and to approached the sciences not primarily in build upon a foundation that is wholly my terms of drawing inferences from empiri- own’ (ibid., 38). He seeks to know of cal observation, but as a distinguished objects ‘clearly and distinctly’ (ibid. 43). mathematician seeking logical ‘clear’ Knowledge is also ‘ordered’ and interre- ideas. lated. To achieve this, however, it may be In 1637 Decartes published his famous necessary to ‘demolish an old house’ Discourse on Method, which was to serve, (ibid., 50). in effect, as a preface or prolegomena to a Descartes introduces his famous work on mathematics and the physical ‘cogito, ergo sum’ (‘I think, therefore I world. This contained three scientific am’) near the beginning of part 4 (ibid., treatises. Although Discourse on Method 53). He is searching for truth that is addressed foundational issues for his ‘absolutely indubitable’. That he is con- approach to epistemology, his major sciously aware of ‘thinking’ is ‘so certain work was to follow four years later, and so evident that the sceptics were not namely Meditations on First Philosophy capable of shaking it’ (ibid., 53–4). (1641), together with a series of six or seven Now, upon this certain foundation, Objections and Replies to Objections.In Descartes can begin to build the new 65 Descartes, Rene´

‘house’ of a new system of established Some criticize Descartes for also arguing truths. This is done in the second half of that ‘God’ is a clear, distinct and indubi- part 4 and in part 5. He believed that he table idea, which God himself has placed could establish the existence of distinctive within the mind. God is ‘infinite, external, human souls. To doubt this, he observes, is immutable, all-powerful, by which I myself the worst kind of scepticism, next ‘after and everything else . . . have been created’. the error of those who deny the existence There is ‘nothing that I should know more of God’ (ibid., 76). easily’ than God, except for human pre- Descartes concludes in part 6 by judice (Meditation,V,81). expressing the hope ‘that those who use The idea of God is so perfect that it only their pure natural reason’ will be able could not have originated with any agency better to judge his claims than ‘those who other than God. Descartes formulates his believe only the books of the ancients’ own version of the ontological argu- (ibid., 91). ment for God’s existence. ‘I cannot con- some consequences ceive of God without existence . . . Existence can no more be separated from This brief work lays down Cartesian the essence of God than the fact that the ‘method’ for a new kind of approach. En sum of its three angles is equal to two route it appears to disparage tradition and right-hand triangles can be separated from is clearly individualistic. It also places the the essence of a triangle’ (ibid., 78). self of the knowing subject at the centre Nevertheless Descartes’ treatment of of the epistemological task. ‘existence’ as a predicate at once provided Yet Descartes retains the aim of refut- a hostage for Kant’s critique of the logic ing sceptics by this method, and he does of this argument. Similarly, Descartes’ not intend to erode theological ‘revela- notion of cause as potentially carrying tion’. He has begun a new era. Difficulties its range of effects within it also raised for theism or for religions may more critical questions about both the ontolo- readily come from those who apply his gical and cosmological arguments for method without the limits that he carefully God’s existence. defines. Gadamer exempts him from The further argument that mind is a including all knowledge under methodo- substance whose ‘essence’ is thought logical doubt (H.G. Gadamer, Truth and alone, while body is a substance the Method, London: Sheed & Ward, 2nd ‘essence’ of which is extension alone, yet edn, 1989, 279). again brought its own problems. How does mind relate to body, and body to the meditations and other mind? Are we not on the brink of works: certainty, god and the Cartesian dualism? self Descartes did not doubt that a relation In his second Meditation Descartes modi- operates, especially in attitudes or emo- fies his promotion of methodological tions that involve both mind and body, doubt by stating, ‘once in a life-time’ we such as love, desire, joy and sorrow. All must ‘demolish everything and start again the same, the dualism of thought and right from the foundations’ (Meditations, extension leaves a sufficiently quasi-dual- La Salle: Open Court, 1901, II, 31). Then, ist view to invite Ryle’s parody of the ‘there remains nothing but what is indu- Cartesian ‘myth’ of the ghost in the bitable’ (ibid.). This does not imply a machine. Today most approaches are less constant dismantling of tradition. More- dualistic, certainly less individualistic, and over, as Gadamer observes, he exempts probably less centred on the self or subject ‘God’ and moral values from this process for an account of epistemology. (See also (Truth and Method, 279). empiricism; object; rationalism.) determinism 66 determinism dialectic At its simplest, determinism denotes the Dialectic denotes a largely exploratory belief that whatever occurs is determined rather than demonstrative use of logical by antecedent causes or conditions. It processes, especially those that involve appears that the future is already fixed. contradiction, opposition or paradox, to Spinoza (1632–77) believed that a lack of take us beyond an initial assumption or causal determination is an illusion. Every- opinion. The term is used in Greek thing ‘necessarily’ follows from the divine philosophy, but probably the most widely nature, which is also the ‘All’. known modern example is that of pro- Some approaches rest upon logical ceeding from a thesis, through a contrary arguments about the relation between a antithesis, to a ‘higher’ synthesis. This was true proposition and a proposition with first formulated in modern terms by the same content uttered at a different fichte (1762–1814), and developed by time in the past or in the future. Some Hegel (1770–1831), Fichte’s successor at theological arguments rest upon a notion Berlin. of predestination that places more weight Hegel postulated a dialectical process upon divine decree than the nature of the that ‘raises’ (German, erheben) the finite end destiny that such language generally and assimilates or ‘sublates’ it (aufheben) promises. Similarly, other versions of into the ‘higher’. Hegel distinctively pos- determinism view history as an irreversible tulates a parallel historical and logical mechanical process. Still others believe dialectic whereby what begins in radical that determinism is entailed by divine historical finitude and particularity omniscience. emerges as Absolute Spirit (Geist) unfold- ‘Soft’ determinism leaves room for ing itself into the Whole, which constitutes compatibilism (see freedom; free will). Reason, Reality and God as Absolute. Extreme or ‘hard’ determinism allows Marx (1818–3) replaced Hegel’s Mind or only for incompatibilist views, and some- Spirit by a dialect of socio-economic times invites occasionalism. While some forces. This system is known as dialectical insist that actions can be ‘mine’ only if I materialsim. freely choose to do them, (rather than to The term ‘dialectic’, however, first do other alternatives), J.L. Mackie and emerges in ancient Greek philosophy. some others hold that action can be both Aristotle attributed the origins of dia- ‘free’ and predictable. lectic to Zeno of Elea (490–430 bce). Whether quantum theory, Heisenberg’s Zeno defended the view of reality as a uncertainty principle and other develop- changeless entity, as propounded by Par- ments in post-Einsteinian physics provide menides, by postulating a series of para- new directions for this debate is still a doxes concerning space and motion. matter of controversy. However, they do The most famous is that of Achilles and seriously question the older mechanistic the Tortoise. If Achilles starts to run a race models on which earlier eighteenth-cen- from a given distance behind the tortoise, tury determinism was based. The mini- Achilles can never (supposedly) catch it mum that needs to be said is that divine up, for if the distance between them is omniscience provides no necessary argu- successively halved, the successive divi- ment for determinism, and that the human sions never reach zero (see Ryle). Hence consciousness that certain actions are Zeno concluded that the notions of freely ‘mine’ has moral consequences for succession and division are arguably illu- accountability that cannot be brushed sory. aside. (See also logic; science and In the thought of Socrates (470–399 religion.) bce) and Plato (428–348 bce) dialectic 67 Dostoevsky becomes a logical method of exposing including Camus, viewed him as an anti- false opinion and initiating constructive theist existentialist. The reason probably exploration especially through conversa- lies in his creative use of ‘polyphonic’ tion (Greek, dialektos, debate) and ques- voices in several of his novels (see exis- tioning. However, Aristotle (384–322 bce) tentialism). prefers the logic of demonstration and This ‘polyphonic’ feature was noted in non-contradiction. Indeed henceforward, 1929 by the Russian literary theorist with exceptions, until Fichte it begins to Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895– carry the nuance of ‘sophistry’, as later 1975). The mystery of God and the represented by the Second Sophistic of the complexity of human life cannot be first century ce. Kant (1724–1804) also conveyed simply through the lips of a viewed it in a negative light. single narrator or a single character. Such Dialectic also serves the heart of complexity requires a more subtle harmo- Kierkegaard’s work (1813–55) as facil- nic interplay between the different ‘voices’ itating his method of ‘indirect commu- of diverse characters representing different nication’. By presenting oppositions and viewpoints. paradoxes (even by opposing his own In this respect Dostoevsky follows work through the device of pseudonymous Kierkegaard’s method of ‘indirect’ com- authorship), he aimed to provoke his munication. This also takes account of an readers to active engagement, to participa- existentialist concern with the individual, tion and decision, rather than mere passive the contingent, the concrete, the parti- assent or disagreement. This facilitated cular, or human ‘being-there’ (cf. Heideg- ‘venture’ as the way of faith, and ‘sub- ger’s Dasein). jectivity’ as the ‘how’ (rather than the From the first Dostoevsky offered a ‘what’ of truth. critique of social oppression (Poor Folk, In the second half of the twentieth 1846), as well as expressing a disenchant- century ‘the logic of question and answer’ ment with the positivism or material- became increasingly important in herme- ism of Feuerbach (Notes from the neutics. The issue was made prominent Underground, 1864; and Crime and Pun- especially thorough the work of Gadamer ishment). In contrast to Mill’s utilitarian (1900–2002), who states that his work on ethics, Dostoevsky portrays Prince Mysh- hermeneutics owes much to his earlier kin in The Idiot as the ‘saintly fool’ of work on Plato. Gadamer also draws on Russian religious tradition, which reso- R.G. Collingwood for this ‘logic of ques- nates with some sayings of Jesus. ‘Good- tion and answer’. ness’ entails a kind of ‘powerlessness’, whatever the consequences. In , a poly- Dostoevsky, (Dostoyesvsky, phonic dialogue arises in the face of the Dostoevskii), Fe´ dor problem of evil. The ‘voices’ come from Mikhailovich (1821–81) Ivan, who expresses angry protest, the Dostoevsky is well known as the writer of Christian Alesha (Alyosha) and the church profound philosophical and social novels. elder Zosima. Dostoevsky’s own personal HismajorworksincludeCrime and life was marked by too much suffering and Punishment (1866), The Idiot (1868–9), tragedy to offer any glib, simplistic The Possessed (1871–2) and especially ‘answer’. His father was murdered by The Brothers Karamazov (1879–80). serfs; his mother died when he was fifteen; It may seem surprising that while he was imprisoned for supposed subver- Dostoevsky inspired religious writers in sion; was condemned to death and repri- Russia (notably Nikolai Berdiaev and eved only at the very last moment; and put ), some in the West, to forced labour in Siberia. doubt 68

Ivan rejects the suffering of one tor- ‘metaphysical’ dualism tured child for the sake of some ‘higher Metaphysical dualism is a theory of the harmony’ ( as Aquinas or Leibniz might nature of reality that splits all reality into have expressed it): ‘it is not worth the two independent orders or qualities of tears of that one tortured child’ (The being. Zoroastrianism (according to the Brothers Karamazov, New York: Norton Ga¯ tha¯ s, c. 1200–1000 bce revealed 1974, 226). through Zoroaster, or Zarathustra) held Yet has not Ivan’s very ‘rebellion’ the view that the Creator of the world presupposed his compassion? If all were (¯, also known as Ormazd) for ever well, what room could there be was opposed by a power of evil, perso- for compassion or active concern for the nified as Angra Mainyu, the hostile Spirit. other? Only dialogue, in the very process, The former (the Creator) represents light, can dare to address these issues, as the life, law, order, truth and goodness. The writer of the book of Job was well aware. latter (the hostile Spirit) represents dark- No single label can sum up the com- ness, death, chaos, falsehood and evil. plexity of Dostoevsky’s thought. He may The world provides a stage for the be called an existentialist, but he also battle between these two sets of opposed seeks a fresh, independent and construc- forces. However, since the forces of evil tive exploration of Christian truth and also represent and reflect negativity and ethics. This takes place broadly within the are viewed as ultimately parasitic upon the frame of the Russian Orthodox tradition. good, it may be argued that Zoroastrian- Dostoevsky, however, was never satis- ism offers only a relative dualism, not an fied with merely second-hand ideas. He absolute metaphysical dualism (see meta- was a creative and powerful thinker, physics). whose novels yield incisive insights into In more relative terms, Jewish and philosophical and social issues. He never Christian apocalyptic verges on a dualism lost sight of the concrete in the universal, of cosmic conflict between the forces of yet believed in that which is ‘beyond’ the evil and God as sovereign and good. The finite and tragic also. world may fall prey to domination by evil forces, but ultimately God and the good doubt will triumph over them, and such vehicles See certanty and doubt. of evil remain God’s finite creatures. A more thoroughgoing dualism can be dualism found in second-century and third-century gnosticism, in which ‘God’ is opposed by This term may generate confusion because the Maker of the Material World, or the in philosophy of religion it may denote ‘’. Marcion (c. 80–165) identi- several different types of radical opposi- fied the Demiurge with the Jewish God of tion between two contrasting principles, the Old Testament in opposition to the qualities or agents. It may denote, for God of Christ and the New Testament, but example, the sharp opposition between such a dualism was condemned by the good and evil in Manichaeanism (see Church Fathers as , and as false. Augustine) or in gnosticism; a parallel opposition between Yin and Yan in Tao- mind–body dualism and ism (in Chinese religion); or the contrast metaphysical dualism between the realm of Ideas (or Forms) and objects in the material or contingent Plato (428–348 bce) laid the foundations world in Plato. The dualism of mind and of mind–body dualism by his metaphysical body is attributed especially to Des- dualism between the realm of Ideas (which cartes. supposedly was universal, abstract, and 69 dualism the source and measure of truth) and the phenomena as illness or pain to affect the material, contingent realm of approximate mind. representations or copies. The ‘soul’ All the same, ‘body’ amounts to a belongs to the realm of Ideas, and is merely instrumental tool for transmitting immortal; the body belongs to the imper- information to the mind through signals, fect, contingent, finite realm of material and conversely for obeying the directives objects. The former is correlated with the of the mind in the public world. This gives ‘changeless’ and permanent; the latter rise, in turn, to a dualist epistemology, with change and decay. or dualist theory of knowledge. Intellec- Such an extreme of dualist principles tual, logical and mathematical ideas arise was largely avoided by Aristotle, who in the mind; perceptions of the world integrated form and matter in a different emerge through the senses. It is not way. His definition of ‘form’ was different difficult to see why the certainty of from Plato’s. Even Neoplatonism sof- Descartes’ ideas of God cohered, in his tened dualism by postulating ‘emanations’ judgement, with the a priori method of of the divine which in effect served as the ontological argument, rather than bridges between the two realms. a posteriori observations of the empiri- Descartes (1596–1650), however, re- cal world. established a sharper dualism between the critique or near-parody? ‘certainties’ of the realm of logic, mathe- matics, reason and ideas and the uncer- While the philosophical idealism of the tainties that beset and characterize the nineteenth century found relatively little material and contingent world. This is difficulty with a relative mind–body dual- related to the difference between mind and ism, this approach lost ground in the body. twentieth century with more rounded Body is extended in space (as res accounts of selfhood. In biblical scholar- extensa), and is conditioned by time and ship there was also a clear recognition that change. Mind is not ‘extended’, but mind and body in the sacred writings of ‘thinking’ (as res cogitans). This relates the main Judaeo-Christian religions to a metaphysical dualism also: ‘reality’ denoted modes of being and modes of consists of thought and extension. action of a single self rather than a Because he saw mind as rooted in a composite dual entity. different order of reality from that of body, Ryle (1900–76) attacked ‘Cartesian Descartes saw body and mind as logically dualism’ in The Concept of Mind (Lon- independent of each other, although he did don: Hutchinson, 1949). He parodies the allow for some causal interdependence of view of Descartes as promulgating the the kind that in our own day is often myth of ‘the ghost in the machine’. In thought of as a psychosomatic relationship particular he attacks the ‘’ of (Greek, psyche, soul or life; soma, body or Cartesian dualism that ‘there occur physi- bodily mode of existence). cal processes and mental processes . . . and ‘Thinking’, Descartes wrote, is ‘an mental causes of corporeal movements’, attitude of the soul . . . This alone is like a pilot controlling an aircraft with inseparable from me . . . I am, precisely levers and wires (in the pre-electronic era) speaking, only a thinking thing (res (ibid., 21–4). cogitans), that is, a mind (mens sive Ryleperceivesthisasa‘category animus) . . . or reason’ (Descartes, The mistake’ (ibid., 17–24) since it treats Meditations, La Salle: Open Court, 1910; mental phenomena as ‘processes’ to be 1988, II, 33). There is a relation of logical regarded in the same way as physical independence between mind and body, phenomena. ‘Mental happenings’ are not although causal dependence permits such ‘events’, Ryle urges, but adverbial ways of , John 70 describing how physical life in the public (384–322 bce) and Peter Lombard, but his domain is ordered. He parodies ‘Carte- contributions to metaphysics, theology, sianism’ (the legacy of Descartes) for epistemology and ethics were distinc- presenting the self as one who ‘lives tive and highly technical. He engaged through two collateral histories . . . The with, and endorsed, much of the work of first is public; the second, private’ (ibid., Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037), especially 13). The truth is that ‘mental’ language a realist understanding of essence and usually denotes a ‘complex of disposi- Being. tions’, not a ‘happening’ (ibid., 33). Scotus was a realist on the issue of Ryle’s method of approach was asso- universals. He conceded that these were ciated in the public mind with ‘analyti- derived from semantics, but that they cal’or‘Oxford’ philosophy. Without nevertheless rested on the basis of the doubt his incisive exposure of confused ‘thisness’ (Latin, haecceitas) of individual, uses of language through neglect of logical distinct entities. ‘Formal distinction’ or conceptual grammar brought a new applied still as an objective distinction to clarity and precision to language about the inseparable entities, and Scotus sought to self. Nevertheless, Stuart Hampshire is not apply this to the Christian doctrine of the alone in asking whether Ryle tries to prove Trinity. William of Ockham rejected this ‘too much’ (‘Critical Review’, in O.P. extended theological application. Wood, ed., Ryle, London: Macmillan, The reality of Being provides a uni- 1971, 17–44). versal foundation for knowledge of God. Language that relates to the mind need Scotus endorses arguments about the be neither (with Descartes) construed in contingency of the world, in contrast over-dualistic terms nor (with Ryle) to which God, as transcendent Prime reduced, in effect, to denote adverbial Mover, acts as efficient cause in crea- modes of human behaviour. The latter tion. This paves the way for an integrated almost verges on behaviourism, although approach to the argument for the exis- like the later Wittgenstein Ryle avoids tence of God. an explicitly materialist view of the self as Duns Scotus defends the cosmological a metaphysical theory. (See also logic; argument: God is Efficient Cause and First post-mortal existence.) Cause. He complements this by appealing to the role of Final Cause, as well as Efficient Cause in support of the teleolo- Duns Scotus, John (c. 1266–1308) gical argument. Yet the very contrast Duns Scotus was one of the most original between the First, Efficient, and Final and powerful thinkers of medieval scho- Uncaused Cause and the contingent world lasticism. Born in Scotland, he taught at supports, in turn, the logic of the Oxford, Paris and Cologne, and was a ontological argument. For how could such priest of the Franciscan order. He brought a Being be conceived except in terms of together in a distinctive way the cosmo- perfection? Thus the arguments embody logical, teleological and ontologi- an integrated logic. cal arguments for the existence of The realist epistemology of Scotus God. Many see him as a key link in disallows a disjunction between a univer- scholasticism between Thomas Aquinas sal concept and the sum of a composite (c. 1225–74) and William of Ockham ‘quidditative’ (or ‘what-ness’-quality) (c. 1287–1349). uniqueness that characterizes God as The writings of Duns Scotus include transcendent Being. (See also Five Ways; the expected commentaries on Aristotle object; realism; transcendence.) E

Eckhart, Meister Johannes ‘experience’ (cf. Greek, e´mpeiros; also (1260–1327) empeiriko´ s, experienced). Usually the term Eckhart, German preacher and mystic, more specifically denotes the view that taught in Paris, and was influenced espe- knowledge is derived primarily from cially by Albert the Great and by Thomas sense-data perceived or experienced Aquinas. His spiritual writings include through the five senses (sight, hearing, the Book of Divine Consolation (c. 1320). taste, touch, smell). epistemol- Eckhart’s mysticism finds expression in In practice empiricism in ogy rationalism such utterances as ‘All things are a mere stands in contrast to critical philosophy nothing.’ He speaks of the ‘emptiness’ that and to . Rationalists the soul may attain, which ‘gives birth to identify the primary source of knowledge God’. as the human mind in rational reflection. Eckhart’s philosophical significance lies Some versions of rationalism postulate the self in part in his exploration of union-and- existence of ‘innate ideas’ within the . Locke difference in relation to God. He drew on By contrast, (1632–1704) rejected the mystical traditions of Neoplatonism the theory of innate ideas, arguing that and Plotinus. Human persons are char- human beings begin with a blank sheet, a acterized by mere ‘is-ness’ in their relation tabula rasa, on which experience writes to God as divine fulness of Being. data. Kant The experience of ‘desert’ and ‘empti- (1724–1804) sought to change ness’ belongs to the tradition of Christian the terms of the debate by expounding his mysticism and mystical writers. Eckhart more complex critical philosophy, espe- was nevertheless condemned as heretical cially in contrast with the empiricism of Hume by the Cologne Inquisition of 1327. All (1711–76). Kant subjected to radi- the same, his influence on such figures as cal criticism both the scope and limits of reason Nicholas of Cusa and Martin Luther and the status of empirical obser- cannot be doubted. (See also via nega- vation. Neither is as straightforward as tiva.) pre-Kantian empiricists and rationalists might suggest. Locke was an empiricist, but recog- empiricism nized that ‘experience’ itself represents an At its simplest, empiricism denotes the amalgam of sensation and reflection. view that all knowledge comes through What is ‘experienced’ is more than raw empiricism 72 sense-data. The invention of the micro- (Aquinas and others) that appeals to the scope, for example, showed that what was role of sense-experience for the grounding ‘really there’ in the world, to be observed, of intelligible language. Locke might be depended at least in part on how and by placed in either category, for he addresses whom it was observed. epistemology, but has a carefully balanced Changes of light affect how we ‘see’ agenda. colours; indeed, what colours we see. the seventeenth century: john Hence Locke distinguished between pri- locke mary givens, such as solidity, extension, movement and numbers and secondary Locke has an altogether more sophisti- qualities such as colours, sounds and taste. cated approach. Although (as has been ancient and medieval noted above) he believed that knowledge empiricism enters the mind through the senses as if the mind were a tabula rasa, or blank sheet, Prior to Locke and the late seventeenth Locke acknowledges the relativities of century, empiricism took the form of an how we observe what we observe, and emphasis upon a posteriori observation, addresses the wider issue of ‘reasonable’ in contrast to a priori logical explora- belief. He seeks to enquire into ‘the tions. Democritus (460–370 bce) formu- certainty and extent of human knowledge’ lated an early version of empiricism by including ‘the grounds and degrees of arguing that perception is a physical belief . . . and assent’. process occurring by means of ‘images’ Locke attacks the rationalist theory of mediated through the five senses. Epicurus ‘innate ideas’ in book I of his Essay (341–270 bce) developed this approach Concerning Human Understanding further. William of Ockham (c. 1287– (1690). He comments, ‘When men have 1349) represents a broadly empiricist found some general propositions that approach in the medieval period. His could not be doubted, it was a short and advocacy of nominalism on the ground easy way to conclude them innate’ (I: 1, that general concepts arise from language 5). This ‘concluding’, Locke suggests, is rather than reality led to his emphasizing unfortunate because it tends to put an end so-called objective knowledge of particu- to enquiry concerning doubt. Locke’s own lar substances and qualities. agenda is both to curb the undue preten- Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) is often sions of illusory claims to certainty, and described as broadly ‘empiricist’, but he to show the possibility of genuinely does not hold a consistently empiricist reasonable belief. Both are relevant to theory of knowledge. This would not the prevalence of rationalism and English entirely cohere with his work on knowl- deism. edge of God. However, the source of Where knowledge is knowledge of concepts which we employ analogically external ‘objects’, this knowledge is to speak of God is our experience of the mediated through ‘sensation’ and sense- world. He attributes to Aristotle data. Perception of our own ideas, how- (although the specific source is not clear) ever, depends upon ‘reflection’. Locke the maxim ‘There is nothing in the suggests the analogy of a window that intellect which was not previously in the filters light into a dark room (ibid.: II: 11: senses,’ and endorses this maxim. 27). Ideas are then combined, so that This ‘limited’ empiricism has led a ‘from a few simple ideas’ can be generated number of philosophers to distinguish a reservoire ‘inexhaustible and truly infi- between ‘epistemological empiricism’ nite’ (ibid.: ch. 7, 10). (Democritus, William of Ockham, Hume Locke, therefore, does not expect the and Ayer), and ‘conceptual empiricism’ exhaustive, unqualified, ‘demonstration’ 73 empiricism sought by rationalists or by ‘extreme’ these in thinking’ (Treatise of Human empiricists. Numerous criteria may deter- Nature, 1739, I: I: 1). mine degrees of probability and the ‘Nothing is ever present to the mind reasonableness of beliefs. Empirical obser- but perceptions’ (ibid.: II: 6). Hume’s view vations provide one of these multiple of cause and causality illustrates the criteria. Locke’s empiricism is sometimes difference between actual observation called that of ‘English common sense’. (only constant conjunction or contiguity More detailed discussion occurs under the can be observed) and the construal of entry on Locke. what is observed by ideas (the principle of causality). In the end, Hume believes only the eighteenth century: habit and convention transpose these ideas berkeley and hume into systems of belief. But the only point Bishop (1685–1753) of reference remains that of sense-impres- built upon Locke’s empiricism. All the sions derived from raw sense-data. same, Berkeley is known chiefly as an Hume was an ‘extreme’ empiricist. He idealist. In his own language, Berkeley could not endorse Locke’s notion of ‘rea- sought to promote ‘immaterialism’, as a sonable’ belief, for reason is merely the philosophical defence of theism. Yet how slave of the passions; it operates only can empiricism embrace idealism? instrumentally. He rejected Berkeley’s meta- In the case of Locke, Berkeley and physical idealism, for ideas are untrust- Hume, the answer to the question, ‘How worthy copies of sense-impressions. He was do we know?’ is formulated in empiricist sceptical about the self; for the self is merely terms. We know through sense-impres- a bundle of perceptions. Thus, as he sions, even if reflection is also involved. concedes, his empiricism leads to a mod- The answer to the question ‘What do we ified scepticism, and verges on positivism. know?’ includes sensory experiences for the twentieth century Locke, but is more significantly ideas of what we perceive. Hence the second ques- Among those modern writers who expli- tion may be answered in idealist terms. citly own a kinship with the empiricism of Berkeley reviewed Locke’s distinction Hume, one of the most widely known between primary and secondary qualities. writers is Ayer (1910–89). Ayer’s logical He concluded that perceptions are funda- positivism is discussed under other mental not only for apprehending colour, entries (see language in religion). taste and sound, but for solidity, motion, Ayers’ promotion of a positivist world- number and all objects of knowledge. If view under the guise of a theory of everything depends on perception, ‘to be is language and meaning neither enhances to be perceived’ (esse est percipi). This nor diminishes its status as ‘extreme’ or need not imply that the world is a ‘radical’ empiricism. It is close to Hume, construct of the human mind. There is a and distant from Locke. In addition to ‘givenness’ about those ideas that is Language, Truth and Logic (2nd edn, uncontrived, since they may seem at times 1946), Ayer published Foundations of unwelcome. Indeed, behind them Berkeley Empirical Knowledge (1940) and The sees ‘the Divine Mind’. Problem of Knowledge (1956). Hume agreed with Locke and Berkeley (1842–1910) has been that ‘experience’ is a combination of associated with the name ‘radical empiri- sense-impressions and ideas. However, he cist’, but this relates mainly to his formula- reversed the flow of Berkeley’s thought: tion of criteria for his pragmatism.His ideas are derivative from sense-experience. maxims, also cited and endorsed by Rorty, Sense-impressions ‘enter with most force that ‘the true is only expedient in our way ... By ideas I mean that faint images of of thinking, just as the right is only the Enlightenment 74 expedient in the way of our behaving’, owes Germany, as well as differences of histor- more to pragmatism than to empiricism. ical timing. In England seventeenth- and Russell (1872–1970) argues that eighteenth-century deism exercised a sub- ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ is more stantial influence on subsequent thought. certain than ‘knowledge by description’. locke (1632–1704) combined empiri- Nevertheless, his philosophical thought is cism with a moderate emphasis on ‘rea- too complex to provide a model of sonableness’ of belief, and this both empiricist philosophy as such. encouraged individual responsibility in This sketch confirms that even within the beliefs and remained fully compatible with narrower compass of ‘the British empiri- theism. In order to avoid replication of cists’ Locke, Berkeley and Hume, there is no material, readers are referred to the entry single, easy, definition that can cover very on deism for earlier English Enlightenment diverse examples of empiricist . thought. Almost always we need to ask: ‘Empiricist – enlightenment thought in in what sense?’ Locke writes as an empiri- france cist with constructive questions for theists about belief; Hume suggests a more In France, Enlightenment thought was reserved, at times sceptical, view of knowl- more explicitly anti-establishment in mat- edge and selfhood. (See also metaphysics; ters of religion and in politics. The positivism; science and religion.) eighteenth-century Encyclopaedists worked on material edited by (1713–84). Diderot was influ- Enlightenment enced by Locke’s empiricism, but moved (1724–1804) formulated far beyond Locke towards a view of the a classic definition of ‘the Enlightenment’ world that bordered on materialism. The (German, Aufkla¨rung) as ‘man’s exodus thirty-five-volume Encyclopaedia, which from his self-incurred tutelage . . . [by included articles on history, philosophy, learning] to use your own understanding’. religion, and political theory, finally This throwing off of dependency in appeared in 1780. second-hand authorities and traditions Voltaire (1694–1778; pen-name of was based on a confidence in the power Franc¸ois-Marie Arouet) was influenced of human reason, an optimistic view of by Newton and by Locke. He shared humanprogress,andanagendathat their concern for empirical method, but questioned inherited political and religious arrived at more sceptical results. Newton structures and values. applied the constancy and universality of Many trace Enlightenment rational- rational ‘laws’ to the natural world, but ism to the methodological role of doubt remained a theist. Voltaire drew elements proposed by descartes (1596–1650) in his of scepticism from Michel de Montaigne quest for clear and certain knowledge. (1533–92). They rejected theological Helmut Thielicke and many theologians dogma and philosophical metaphysics. trace a line from Descartes to Lessing, but Voltaire’s is based upon this approach is less readily adopted among recognition of the fallibility of rationalist philosophers. Descartes spoke of applying and empirical knowledge. Hence his poli- this method ‘once in a life-time’, and tical philosophy stressed tolerance and exempted ethics and knowledge of God. autonomy. He retained belief in a good enlightenment thought in God, even if not in all the doctrinal and england institutional commitments of the religion of his day. The Enlightenment reflected different Voltaire’s position differs from that of emphases in England, France and the two French Enlightenment materialist 75 Enlightenment philosophers, La Mettrie (1709–51) and supernatural. Lessing (1729–81) also Paul-Henri-Dietrich d’Holbach (1723– represents Enlightenment rationalism. 1789). The title of La Mattrie’s work There is an ‘ugly ditch’ between reason Man the Machine (1747) exemplifies the and the historical (empirical) reconstruc- extension of Newton’s empirical scientific tions of mere probability, at most. method (appropriate to study of the The Jewish philosopher mendelssohn natural world) to the study of humanity (1729–86) was a friend of Lessing and a and a philosophical world-view. follower of Wolff’s rationalism. He Similarly, d’Holbach, one of the Ency- believed that human reason could lay the clopaedists, published a materialist System foundations for belief in God, and natural of Nature (1770) from which Voltaire religion. Mendelssohn represents ‘the Jew- explicitly distanced his own views. D’Hol- ish Enlightenment’, but arguably in Ger- bach derived all reality from motion and many it led to the broader, more diffused matter, and repudiated any metaphysical development of Reform Judaism. systems of thought. His Christianity Kant marks a distinctive moment of Unveiled (1756) attacked Christianity, transition in Germany. On one side, he revelation, and theism as the product stresses autonomy, the decision of the of myth and mythologization. ‘Science’ human will, freedom and progress. These offers liberation from all this. are core values of the Enlightenment. On It is a matter of debate whether we the other side his work on the limits of should include Jean Jacques Rousseau reason, especially in The Critique of Pure (1712–78) as a thinker of the French Reason (1781, rev. 1787), does not present Enlightenment. He was a man of feeling reason as the sovereign arbiter of the rather than an arid rationalist. He did not deists, or Enlightenment rationalism. attack religion, although he looks for a Further, the relegation of ‘order’ in the religion without priests or temples. It is world to a regulative principle of the ‘the people’ who are sovereign, through human mind in his Critique of Judgement ‘the will of all’ (volonte´ de tous) or ‘the (1790) does not promote the kind of general will’ (volonte´ ge´ne´rale). His call ‘natural religion’ found among some for liberty and equality influenced Robe- Enlightenment thinkers. spierre, but he was not an advocate of In spite of Fichte and Hegel, the age revolution, and in his Social Contract of Romanticism would soon overtake the (1762) private rights had to be yielded Enlightenment era after Kant. Further, by for the good of all. Like Voltaire, he the mid-twentieth century a certain posi- dissociated himself from d’Holbach and tive revaluation of tradition would be the Encyclopaedists. explored by such hermeneutical writers as Gadamer (1900–2002), and a reappraisal enlightenment thought in of reason take place through postmodern germany perspectives. The beginnings of the German Enlight- In theology, rather than in philosophy, enment are in general later than those in a reappraisal of the influence of Descartes England, although Christian Wolff (1679– is also important. Descartes, arguably, 1754) drew on the rationalism of Leibniz did not wish to establish the kind of for his concepts of religion and philoso- doubt often ascribed to Enlightenment phy. Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), understandings of theism. (See also whose ‘Wolffenbu¨ ttel Fragments’ were certainty and doubt; hermeneutics; published after his death by G.E. Lessing postmodernism; science and religion; in 1774–7, took up the threads of an positivism.) This entry is intended to earlier English deism. This included a be read in conjunction with that on rejection of miracles and notions of the rationalism. epistemology 76 epistemology cogito, ergo sum, ‘I am [conscious of] thinking; therefore I exist.’ Epistemology embraces a variety of the- Critical philosophy emerged in Kant’s ories of knowledge (Greek, episte´me´.It Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Kant saw constitutes a core sub-discipline within the need to raise transcendental ques- philosophy, alongside ontology, ethics, tions about knowledge, prior to addres- logic and other subject-specific areas sing the traditional agenda. Hence he such as philosophy of language. It includes asked: ‘What are the necessary conditions issues concerning the sources, limits and for the possibility of knowledge?’ How is nature of knowledge, and modes of it possible to know? This must be knowing. addressed before we ask how we know, Special sets of issues within epistemol- or what we know. It entails exploring the ogy include belief, scepticism and cri- nature of knowledge and the limits of teria for the justification of, or warrants reason. for, belief. However, the three main To explore the limits of reason is a streams of tradition at the heart of constructive rather than a negative exer- epistemology present the respective claims cise. For scepticism may arise out of a of empiricism, rationalism and criti- sense of disillusion generated by over-high cal or transcendental philosophy. expectations of what reason might empiricist, rationalist and achieve. Locke, on the nature and grounds transcendental approaches of reasonable belief, and Kant, on the limits of ‘pure reason’, both serve con- Empiricism investigates how knowledge structive rather than sceptical goals. derives from the sensory world outside the The details of this classic three-sided mind, how it is conveyed through the debate are considered more fully under the senses, and how it becomes processed as entries on empiricism, rationalism, critical the object of perception, or as ideas or philosophy, Kant and other individual reflection involving acts of cognition. thinkers within the empiricist and ration- Locke (1632–1704), Berkeley (1685– alist traditions. 1753) and Hume (1711–1776) represent the justification of belief the major early modern empiricists. Locke and Berkeley accord greater place to Wolterstorff argues convincingly that reasonableness and to ideas, whereas Locke introduced an ethical dimension Hume emphasizes perception. Their into the ‘reasonableness’ of belief, or method is that of observation and a ‘entitlement’ to believe, especially in book posteriori inference. IV of his Essay Concerning Human Under- Rationalism ascribes the starting-point standing (Wolterstorff, John Locke and for knowledge to a priori ideas, often the Ethics of Belief, Cambridge: CUP, regarded as innate ideas. Logical truth and 1996). the method of introspection provide a W. K. Clifford (1845–79) radicalized foundation for deductive inferences, Locke’s concern by formulating a more rather than the less certain and fallible brittle and inflexible ethical criterion for findings of sense-data gathered by obser- the justification of belief. He uses the vation of the contingent world. analogy of a ship-owner who sends Descartes (1596–1650), Spinoza emigrants to sea in a ship which he knows (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646–1716) are is unseaworthy, but salves his the major early modern rationalists. Des- with the thought that Providence will care cartes sought to find ‘clear and distinct’ for the ship if necessary. His belief that it is ideas which could not be doubted. Hence in order to send the ship to sea is immoral he began from the epistemological premise because it flies in the face of empirical 77 eternity evidence. Clifford’s criterion in his Lec- eternity tures and Essays (1879) has come to be Almost all theists draw a contrast between known as Evidentialism, and in effect the change and decay observable in the views belief as justified only when it may created order and the Being of God as be grounded in virtually foolproof empiri- ‘eternal’, or not limited by the passing of cal evidence. time. Nevertheless the word ‘eternal’ may Roderick Chisholm has defended denote at least three different ways of deontological (or ethically obligated) understanding the point at issue. notions of justification for belief, although In the tradition of Parmenides, Plato, William P. Alston refuses to identify ‘what and advaita (non-dualist) Hindu philo- is epistemically good’, in the sense of sophy, many regard eternity as timeless- maximizing rationality and truth with an ness, or Being without change. Some, by ethics of obligation. Foundationalists contrast, regard eternity as embodying distinguished the justification of ‘basic’ temporal sequence, but without limits of beliefs from those beliefs that are deriva- beginning or end. Others follow the classic tive from these. formulation of Boethius (c. 480–525) the questioning of that eternity denotes ‘the complete posses- epistemology sion all at once (Latin, totum simul)of illimitable life’. Postmodernism has tended to encourage Each approach brings its own pro- pragmatic criteria of belief. The American blems. If eternity denotes timelessness, tradition of pragmatism that can be how can God (or any being beyond this traced from William James (1842–1910) world order) experience duration, peri- through (1859–1952) to its odicy, sequence or progression? If eternity post-modern radical extreme in Rorty (b. denotes time ‘pulled out’ infinitely at each 1931) argues that in effect epistemology as end, does this not entail God’s being theory is dead. It has given way to conditioned by time, rather than Creator hermeneutics ‘as a way of coping’ of time? If eternity denotes totum simul, (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, might this not be understood to impose a Princeton: Princeton University Press, static mode of being onto God, who then 1979, 356; and 315–56). Rorty not only cannot act, or interact, purposively as a quotes and endorses William James’s view living and promissory God? that ‘the True’ is ‘only the expedient in . . . thinking’, but adds that there is no such eternity as timelessness task as ‘getting reality right’ because ‘there is no Way the World Is’ (Truth and This approach has a long tradition in Progress, Cambridge: CUP, 1998, 21 and Eastern and in Western philosophy. It 25). largely rests upon inferences drawn from Almost needless to say, however, Ror- a theology of creation. Augustine (354– ty’s own pragmatic, postmodernist claims 430) laid down a valid theological axiom demand exploration from that area of when he declared, ‘God created the world epistemology that addresses scepticism. In with time (cum tempore) not in time (in spite of Rorty’s claims that this misses his tempore).’ A moment’s reflection on the point, it is relevant to compare his views correlative roles of time and space as with those that come to light in the history categories interwoven in the created of scepticism since ancient Greek philoso- order adds weight to this, especially in phy. We may also question whether his the light of post-Einsteinian notions of appeal to hermeneutics in practice turns space-time. hermeneutics upside down. (See also We know from the theory of relativity ). that time accelerates or decelerates eternity 78 depending on the direction of spatial 1:8); past sins (Ps.25:7) or past mercies motion of an object at extreme velocity. (Ps. 98:3). Yet few would claim that space was ‘there’ While some references may be anthro- before God created the heavens and the pomorphic or metaphorical, these verbs earth, except for the minority who believe seem to play too great a part in disclosures in the eternity of the world. of the nature of God to yield an exhaustive In ancient Greek philosophical tradi- explanation of this kind (see anthropo- tions, Parmenides of Elea (fl. 510–492 morphism; metaphor). Richard Swin- bce) assigned change and motion to the burne regularly calls attention to such realm of mere ‘appearance’. Reality was passages in various philosophical contexts. ‘being’, not ‘becoming’. Plato (428–348 It seems too simple and too general (like a bce) separated a timeless, changeless Wittgensteinian ‘super-concept’) to char- realm of eternal Ideas or Forms from a acterize God’s eternity as ‘timelessness’. contingent, temporal, changing, empiri- Nevertheless some have defended this cal world which had the status only of a view in recent philosophical thought. Paul replicated or approximate copy of the Helm argues that it remains fully compa- non-temporal and eternal. tible with an understanding of creation Among Eastern philosophical tradi- and of omniscience, citing also the ear- tions, S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ (788–820) and the ‘non- lier tradition of Anselm (1033–1109) dualist’ Hindu philosophy of Advaita ‘that timelessness is among the greatness- held that cycles of rebirth and making or perfection-making properties of reincarnation, along with ‘difference’, God’ (Eternal God: A Study of God stood in contrast with ultimate reality as without Time, Oxford: Clarendon, 1988, uncharacterizable and undifferentiated 11). Nelson Pike similarly understands . Distinction and difference, this as a ‘value-making’ property (God along with temporal change, belonged to and Timelessness, London: Routledge, the world of illusion or deception (ma¯ya¯). 1970, 137). Helm relates this to divine If brahman–a¯tman is One and without immutability, and argues that it offers ‘a inner differentiation, nothing can change: metaphysical underpinning for God’s ultimate reality is timeless and eternal. functioning as a biblical God’ (Eternal This sits uneasily with Hebrew–Chris- God, 21). tian biblical traditions, however, where eternity as infinitely extended God is conceived of in more personal and time? purposive terms. The living God of Hebrew and Christian scripture is a The widespread unease shared by many at God who makes promises. (Ex. 12:25; the identification of ‘eternal’ with ‘time- Deut. 1:11, 6:3, 10:9, Hebrew, dabhar, less’ finds a focus in the doubt about ‘speak’, but contextually, ‘promise’); whether or how an event in the life of a waits, (Isa. 30:18, Hebrew, chakah); ‘timeless’ Being may ‘relate . . . to any foreknows, (Rom. 8:29, 11:2, Greek, temporal entity or event’ (E. Stump and N. proginosko); and even reconsiders and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’, Journal of Philoso- revises plans of action (Judg. 2:18; Jer. phy, 78, 1981, 429–58). The dilemma 15:6, Hebrew, nacham). Further, even appears to be: a ‘timeless’ God may seem allowing for the more objective, less unable fully to engage in the temporal mentalist meaning of ‘remember’ in drama of God’s world; a God ‘infinitely Hebrew, what are we to make of dozens extended’ in time seems to share too much of allusions to God’s remembering in the contingent qualities of what God (zakar) God’s covenant (Gen. 9:15, 16); has created. or individuals (Gen. 8:1, 19:29; Ex. defends the ‘com- 32:13); or pledges or promises (Neh. mon sense’ understanding of eternity as 79 eternity lack of temporal beginning and end, but ability has undergone some criticism and not lack of duration. God pre-exists modification. It is arguably a simplistic creation, but also: ‘There was no time at concept of ‘perfect’ if we argue that what which he did not exist . . . He is back- is ‘perfect’ at Time One is the same as wardly eternal’ (The Coherence of The- what is ‘perfect’ at Time Two. Indeed the ism, [1977] Oxford: Clarendon, 1988, Epistle to the Hebrews appears to imply 211). God ‘exists at any other nameable that teleiosis, being mature or perfect, time...willgoonexistingforever...he denotes a developing process (Heb. 2:10; is forwardly eternal’ (ibid.). Swinburne 5:9). These issues are expanded in the argues that this view is entirely ‘coher- entry on immutability. ent’, and shares a similar Can a ‘perfect’ God act in ongoing, view. dynamic, purposive ways which express God’s own nature, whether we conceive of the totum simul view of this as occurring ‘within’ this-worldly boethius: a possible time, or in a ‘non-human’ sphere, such as modification? ‘after’ the general resurrection? To express Augustine speaks of God as ‘the supreme it in a different way, does the heavenly or hub of causes’ (summus causarum cardo: eschatological realm in the biblical writ- On the Trinity, III: 9: 16). Henry Chad- ings seem more akin to a crescendo of wick comments, ‘Boethius suggests, there- glory than to a constant, static, everlasting fore, that as time is to eternity, so the circle fortissimo? Can God no longer do ‘new’ is to the centre . . . God looks out on the things, as the God of Abraham, Isaac world and arranges what is best for each and Jacob, without thereby forfeiting individual . . . For us, events fall into past, ‘perfection’? present, and future time. God is outside The simple distinction between eter- time. For him the knowledge of temporal nity and time is inadequate. In everyday events is an eternal knowledge in the sense life we distinguish between astronomical that all is a simultaneous present’ time, clock time, human time, narrative (Boethius, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, 242 time, opportune time, the timing that and 246). reflects a sociology of power and so on. Boethius contextualizes his concept of The issue is not whether God is condi- eternity then, within a doctrine of divine tioned by time. God is the Creator of providence and governance and the pro- time. However, creaturely human time- blem of divine omniscience (see entry on as-we-know-it is to be distinguished from omniscience for details). God’s infinite that temporality from which is derived awareness comprehends all at once what the very possibility of sequence, tempo, from a human standpoint is spread out in duration, periodicy and opportune time. time as past, present and future. (We may note that in Heidegger Zei- Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) endorses tlichkeit (temporality) is the condition for and develops this view. He declares, ‘The the possibility of time). notion of eternity follows immutability, as Perhaps it is logically possible to retain the notion of time follows movement . . . the basic contrast between human time Eternity is nothing else but God Himself and ‘eternity’ as that which characterizes . . . His eternity includes all times, and not God (as in Boethius), but with some as if He Himself were altered through accommodation to notions of progressive present, past, and future’ (Summa Theo- action and newness which are also neces- logiae, Ia, Qu. 10, art. 2). sary to the nature of the God in Western In contemporary Christian theology, theism and the Bible. (See also God, however, the concept of divine immut- concepts and attributes of.) ethics 80 ethics necessarily exploring issues of ethical validity, sometimes called ‘meta-ethics’, Ethics may be defined as the study of has arisen. R.M. Hare (b. 1919) and P.H. concepts and criteria of individual and Nowell-Smith (b. 1914) undertake such social human actions, attitudes and beha- explorations. viour in so far as these are deemed right or wrong, or good or bad. Ethics formulates ancient greek philosophy systems of value, of the good, or of the The era of the pre-Socratic Sophist philo- right in so far as these are, or can be, sophers included Protagoras (c. 490–420 instantiated in human lives or in social bce), widely known for his maxim ‘Man is groups. the measure of all things’ (Fragment 1). All types of ethical theory ethical criteria are subjective matters of convention: what is lawful in Athens may Those systems that focus mainly on be unlawful in Megara. Gorgias (late fifth criteria or goals of ‘right’ or ‘rightness’ century bce) also extends his metaphysical generally explore issues of duty and scepticism to ethics. obligation. Theories of necessary obliga- By contrast, Socrates, Plato and tion without regard to consequences are Aristotle expound a view of virtue. For also known as deontology. Those sys- Socrates, the acquisition of virtue begins tems that focus mainly on criteria or goals with knowledge. Further, virtue has social of ‘good’ or ‘the good’ generally explore implications, and transcends mere indivi- beneficial consequences. These may dualism. Plato bases his ethics on ontol- include self-realization, or , ogy,especiallyupontheAbsolute seeking the greatest good for the greatest ‘Form’ of the Good, from which good in number. However, utilitarianism may also the contingent world is derivative. His be subsumed within a theory of the right. four ‘cardinal virtues’ are wisdom, cour- Many deny that any objective criteria age, moderation and patience. can be found for establishing principles of Aristotle approaches ethics in terms of right conduct or the widest good. Sub- teleology and a theory of virtue. Well- jective theories of ethics often reduce the being (Greek, eudaimonia) lies not in ethical to a mere expression of preference, pleasure, honour or wealth, but in the or of approval or disapproval (see Ayer; fulfilment of the purpose for which Rorty). Such theories are sometimes also humankind exists, which expresses true called non-cognitive; but the latter term is human nature. In effect, this is explicated broader since it may also denote intui- as ‘the exercise of reason according to tionist theories. virtue’ (Greek, arete¯). Thus ethical norms Ethical intuitionism reflects the view that are not external to humankind, but entail ‘good’ cannot be defined by referring to self-realization. At the same time, Aristo- other concepts and to rational arguments. tle’s doctrine of the balanced ‘mean’ G.E. Moore (1873–1958) held this view. ensures that attention be given to will, ‘Good’ is a quality that cannot be analysed, habit and consequences for others. but is simply intuited. Like the colour modern thought from hobbes ‘yellow’, it is supposedly ‘simple’ and not to kant known through analysing arguments. To equate ‘good’ with some other quality is to Hobbes (1588–1679) argued that power commit ‘the ’. is the chief regulating principle in ethical Since these issues bring us into the judgements. ‘Good’ denotes little more realm of analytical philosophy and than the heightening of vitality in the self- logical grammar (see logic), the study of gratification that is made possible through conceptual problems in ethics, without power. Yet the application of reason to 81 ethics this situation of universal self-interest the footing of an Absolute. It is the results in a recognition of the need of civil ‘categorical imperative’ that comes from law to impose an ‘orderedness’ through beyond the world of the empirical and social contract. Hence a state of nature is contingent that is ordered and construed replaced by a variety of social contracts, by the human mind. ‘Ought’ expresses the and power is passed to a monarch. relation of objective moral law to the If Hobbes had denied the possibility of human will. disinterested action, Joseph Butler (1692– ‘Good’ is not a functional, relative or 1752) explored the threefold relation and abstract quality. Only ‘the good will’ can balance between ‘self-love’, ‘benevolence’ be called ‘good’, when it is directed by the and ‘conscience’. Although the interpre- moral law. The emphasis moves from tation of these is debated, the first denotes consequences (Hume) to motive. What regard to one’s interests and well-being; makes the good will ‘good’ is not what the second, a regard for others motivated consequences it brings about, but its by affection; the third, in Butler’s words, recognition of moral duty alone. The laws reflection by which human persons of ethical obligation apply to all univer- ‘approve and disapprove their own sally; hence they constitute a categorical actions’. Conscience is to ‘preside and imperative. This is the approach of deon- govern’, but proves to be congruent with tology. self-love and benevolence because of a This may be instantiated through the divine providential ordering of the world. application of a general moral law: ‘So act In the context of philosophy of reli- as to treat humanity in every case as an gion, while it may be more precarious to end.’ Other human persons are not argue from ethics or moral obligation to ‘means’ to the end of our own happiness. God (see moral argument for the The early Romantics, Johann Schiller existence of God), the different stances of (1759–1805) and Friedrich Jacobi (1743– Hobbes and Bishop Butler reveal the 1819) were quick to criticize this resolute difference that a theistic foundation may deontology of will as joyless and divorced make to the formulation of ethical theory. from goodness guided by love. Schiller However, critics of Butler ask whether the parodied Kantian ethics in satirical verse: weight that he places on conscience can ‘Willingly serve I my friends; but I account for the differing value systems do it, alas, with affection. found in the modern world. Hence I am cursed with the doubt, Hume (1711–76) regarded ‘the good’ virtue I have not attained.’ exclusively in terms of consequences. How- ‘This is your only recourse: you ever, these consequences are defined in must stubbornly seek to abhor terms of ‘all things either directly pleasant them; or indirectly conducive to pleasure, Then you can do with disgust that whether in their owners or in other men’. which the law may enjoin.’ This is a kind of subjective utilitarianism or Hedonism, but it is not egoism. Hume was Arguably, the more purely love guides, the unable to offer an ‘objective’ basis for less consciously is ‘good’ done through ethics, since he regarded the self as, in duty. effect, a bundle of sensations and emotions utilitarian ethics: bentham and served by reason only instrumentally: mill ‘reason is the slave of the passions’. An entirely opposite approach is (1748–1832) returned to adopted by Kant (1724–1804). In Hume’s emphasis on pleasure and pain: formulating his transcendental philo- ‘Man’s only object is to seek pleasure and sophy Kant places moral obligation on to shun pain.’ He is, in effect, the founder ethics 82 of modern utilitarianism: ethical action uous adjustment’ by which an organism aimed at the consequence of producing (or a person) adapts itself to its environ- ‘the greatest good’ (acquisition of pleasure ment. ‘Bad’ conduct hinders such adjust- and avoidance of pain) ‘for the greatest ment. number’. This maximizes the principle on Harmony with one’s surroundings and a social scale. environment brings pleasure; pain is a sign Bentham explored a theory of govern- of maladjustment. In effect, Spencer had a ment that would achieve this as far as utilitarian ethic. Since adaptation is possible by using potential punishment as always in process and never perfect, the deterrents, and reward for facilitating good is not absolute but a relative social happiness. preponderance over maladjustment and However, the calculation of ‘greatest’ is pain. problematic. Bentham took account of the Evolutionary development works from intensity, duration, certainty, purity and thesimpletothemorecomplexor extent of pleasure and pain. Yet what ‘higher’. At the complex level of the weight is to be given to each in relation to emergence of human life, ethical goals other, and how do we weigh intense entail co-operation to continue to adapt A pleasure for the few against diffused happier race will be produced. Spencer, it pleasure for the many? seems, coined the explicit phrase ‘the A further difficulty arises from our survival of the fittest’. If there is ‘duty’, it inability to know precisely what conse- is to be defined in these terms. quences will follow from a given act. Spencer attempted to apply Darwin’s Bentham recognizes the fallibility of such biological theories of evolution to other calculation, and even defines ‘vice’ as ‘a areas of human life. Yet he left unan- miscalculation of chances’. Many swered questions about the human would view this as hugely understated. Is agent’s initiative in adapting the environ- the notion of evil simply illusory? ment to human benefit, rather than more Mill (1806–73) also promoted ethical passively seeking to ‘fit’ contexts of utilitarianism, but also attributed to a nature. Can this provide adequate ground person of ‘properly cultivated moral nat- for a system of ethics, especially when ure’ the motivation of a feeling of unity ‘complexity’ and ‘higher’ forms of life are with fellow human beings. He was more defined in quasi-mechanistic terms? The optimistic than Bentham about an indivi- routine problems of utilitarianism still dual’s willingness to sacrifice happiness as face this theory. an ethical obligation if this gains happi- vocabulary and concepts of ness for a greater number. ethics Mill did not resolve the problems that face utilitarianism, however, in calculating Many of the above approaches could be the greatest happiness of the greatest identified as placing emphasis on one side number. Bradley, among others, criticizes on motive and intention (with Kant), or on the very logic of ‘multiplying’ happiness the other side on consequences (with by replicating the same experience of a Hume and Bentham). Both emphases given level by the number of such experi- bring their own problems. ences. It remains ‘this’ experience, even if Motive and intention have often been it is replicated. dismissed as matters of psychologistic : herbert ‘mental states’, the currency of which spencer can be determined only in the light of (1820–1903) public behaviour. However, intentions Spencer defined conduct as ‘good’ in so may also be defined in terms of what is far as it served to promote ‘the contin- willed, and what is reflected upon as an 83 ethics object of will. Motive may be rational religion. Hence this approach finds and cognitive: it arises from the thought support from Ayer (1910–89), and in of a desirable end. post-modern pragmatism from Rorty (b. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas expli- 1931). cate will in terms of habit or habituated Yet there are other conceptual under- qualities of will, namely as virtues. In standings of ethics. (b. 1921) recent thought G.E.M. Anscombe (1919– reformulates in terms of a more liberal 2001) and especially Alasdair MacIntyre tradition the notion of justice as ‘fair- (b. 1929) have proposed a return to ethical ness’. R.M. Hare argues that ‘prescrip- explorations based on a more serious and tive’ ethics invokes universal principles rigorous account of virtue-ethics. This that apply to classes of similar cases for includes continuity of habits of will and the status of moral imperatives. To do to continuities of moral traditions. others what we wish them to do to us is We have noted difficulties about the both universalizable and applicable as a calculation of possible consequences. A prescriptive rule. Alasdair MacIntyre narrower view, hedonism, holds that the (above) returns in part to an Aristote- goal of ethical action is that of seeking lian–Thomist tradition of ‘virtue’, but in pleasure for the self or for the greatest the context of late twentieth-century number. A broader view, consequential- relativism. ism, holds that any beneficial consequence further issues for debate offers a criterion of ethical action. Never- theless, the notion of calculating ‘units of Sometimes the notion that ethical norms benefit’ seems impossible. It is also impos- are to be transposed into subjective sible to propose a criterion of what some expressions of ‘preference’ or ‘approval’ term an ‘interpersonal utility comparison’ aredressedupeitherastheoriesof to rank people affected. language (as in and In addition to these problems, hedon- Ayer), or as entailments of a postmodern ism (seeking pleasure) may founder on world-view (as in Rorty). the paradox identified by Aristotle. Plea- However, since ethical relativism goes sure, he argued, emerges only as the by- back at least to Protagoras, it is more product of ethical action, just as running likely that this approach is simply a produces the bloom on the athlete’s correlate of a materialist or positivist cheek. (1838–1900) world-view. If nothing is normative, stable similarly argued that ‘the best way to or absolute except economic or military get pleasure is to forget it’, although he power, we should not expect to find any urged a modified utilitarianism based on grounding for a normative ethic. ethical principles. Even consequentialist and hedonist Charles Stevenson (1908–79) rejects theories, however, seem to imply a need the view that differences of ethical criteria for ethical rules or constraints. For in his and action arise from differences of insistence that self-gratification or pleasure cognitive belief. Rather, they reflect prior yields a criterion of ethics, Hobbes is differences of attitude. Although ethical forced to recognize that only the con- assertions may embody cognitive state- straints of government, ideally of monar- ments, the language of ethics is, he urged, chy, can prevent disintegration into primarily non-cognitive, expressing pre- anarchy. Only ‘civilization’ and political ferences, emotions, approval or disap- power can rescue humankind from a proval and rhetorical re-valuations or primitive level in which life is ‘nasty, definitions. brutish, and short’. This resonates closely with emotive, Many who reject Kant’s notion of the non-cognitive theories of language in ‘categorical imperative’ nevertheless evil 84 recognize the force of his maxim about he is malevolent. Is he both able and treating fellow humans as ‘ends’, and not willing? Whence, then, is evil?’ (Dialogues reducing them to mere ‘means’ to secure Concerning Natural Religion [1779], New one’s own goals and interests. This coheres York: Harper, 1948, pt. X, 66). with notions of personhood as a Thou or Within theistic traditions the most ‘Other’ in Buber, Marcel and Levinas. influential classic expositions of the issues ‘Orderedness’ in the world finds a include especially those of Augustine prominent place in the Aristotelian tradi- (354–430) and Thomas Aquinas tion, and is developed by Augustine and (1225–74). This is the case, even if Terence Aquinas. It leads on to positive and W. Tilley argues that Augustine does not constructive traditions concerning virtue. present a formal theodicy. Their argu- The potential of ‘virtue’ ethics is explored, ments turn on three focal points: (1) In we noted, by MacIntyre. what sense is evil an independent or Whereas non-religious systems of positive entity, or is it primarily absence ethics often overlap with those of reli- of good? (2) What logic is involved in gion, in many cases the motivation and calling God ‘perfectly good’? (3) What is basis is different. Most non-religious entailed in ascribing to God ‘’ philosophical theories formulate autono- or ‘Almighty-ness’? mous value-systems that are, in effect, Hume similarly portrays the traditional free-standing. By contrast, Christian Christian theist ‘Cleanthes’ in his Dialo- ethics, for example, constitutes a response, gues as affirming the Almighty-ness of to divine grace and the gospel. Given this God, God’s omniscience and God’s difference, points of overlapping content perfect goodness, which acts as a foil for also emerge. (See also metaphysics; Hume’s own argument through the lips of object; positivism; postmodernity; ‘Philo’. Philo argues that if all three of the subject.) propositions asserted by Cleanthes were true, evil would not exist. Yet evil does exist. Hence not less than one of these evil propositions is false or problematic. Alter- How can the reality and extent of evil and natively, the problem dissolves if God does suffering in the world be compatible with not exist. belief in God as omnipotent and as The work of Hume illustrates a shift in perfectly good? How or why did evil perceptions of the nature of the problem in originate? the eighteenth century. Up to the rational- ist Enlightenment, in theistic traditions formulations of the problem the main challenge presented by the Formulations of the problem of evil problem of evil was to defend the coher- predate even the rise of Christianity and ence of theism, as a matter of under- of Islam, although the Hebrew Bible (also standing. After the Enlightenment, with the Christian Old Testament) expresses the the rise of a more widespread atheism, problem in the book of Job. In the most the problem of evil challenges the exis- widely quoted and used formulation of the tence of a sovereign and good God as a problem, Hume (1711 –76) alludes to the matter of credibility. Both challenges awareness of the issues in the ancient remain today. Greek philosophy of Epicurus (341–270 bce differing modes of response: ). logical relations between the Hume writes: ‘Epicurus’ old questions three focal themes are not yet answered. Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is Responses to the problem of evil may be impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then divided into (a) those that mainly address 85 evil issues of logic and logical coherence; and to use the term ‘Almighty’ (van den Brink, (b) those that bring more practical or Almighty God, Kampen: Pharos, 1993). existential attitudes to the problem. We On the other hand, Swinburne (b. 1934) first consider the logical issues. defends the traditional use of ‘omnipotent’ Three broad strategies may be (The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clar- employed to try to soften the tensions endon, 1977, 149–61). or alleged inconsistencies generated by the simultaneous assertion of the sover- (B) Does ‘perfect goodness’ belong to eignty of God, the perfect goodness of God? Bradley (1846–1924) regarded God and the reality of evil. Expressed God as the Absolute, in the tradition of crudely, each of these three foci of Hegel. If God is identified with Reality- discussion may be qualified, modified or as-a-Whole and with ‘the Wholeness of erodedinsuchawayastodissolve the True’, Bradley rejects the possibility of tension between them. ascribing moral character to God. Divine will operates from the inner necessity of its (A) Is God Sovereign and Omnipotent? nature, not from moral criteria, especially At very least it must be pointed out that to as human persons perceive these. call God ‘Almighty’ does not entail God’s Most mainline theists will readily performing logically self-contradictory acknowledge the need for caution in acts. It is not an issue of sovereignty to judging how divine goodness relates to ask whether God can create a stone so human kindness. Hick urges that God heavy that God cannot lift it, or whether wants humans to be holy, not simply God can divide odd numbers in half to happy (Evil and the God of Love, 2nd leave two sets of integers (see omnipo- edn, London: Macmillan, 1977). Barth tence for details). However, this carries us insists that love on the part of God is not only the part of the way. mere benevolence, but embodies election Mill (1806–73) and subsequently the and covenant, and therefore also ‘jealousy, American philosopher Edgar S. Brightman wrath and judgement, God is also holy’ (1884–1952) speak of God as ‘finite’ and (Church Dogmatics, III: 3, 351). ‘constrained’. Divine sovereignty cannot, they urge, overrule human freedom. (C) Is evil real or illusory? What role does Affirming God’s ‘finitude’, Brightman it play? If it can be argued that evil is asserts that God has to work with evil- mere appearance or illusion rather than as-given, to which he gives the name reality, the problem becomes dissolved. ‘dysteleological surd’. Hinayana Buddhism tends to view evil, in Some types of evil (‘surds’) remain the sense of suffering, as a necessary part resistant to divine purpose (The Problem of life. To come to terms with it is to of God, 1930; A Philosophy of Religion, experience liberation, which leads to 1940). Mill saw ‘God’ as like an artist nirvana (see Buddhist philosophy). limited by his medium (Three Essays on In the quasi-pantheism of Spinoza Religion, 1875). However, such a view is (1632–77) neither God nor the world not readily held by such traditional could have been other than they are. Christian writers as Augustine and Aqui- Among ‘practical’ religious approaches to nas, and not by most theists. It also the problem Weil (1909–43) in her last contradicts doctrines of years affirmed a mystical acceptance of and Islam. God’s world in which the beauty of the In recent thought and storm at sea cannot but risk shipwreck by Gijsbert van den Brink have perhaps its very nature. God wants creation ‘to softened some misleading logical entail- find itself good’(Gateway to God [1939], ments of sheer ‘omnipotence’ by preferring 1974). evil 86

Hick approaches the problem of evil in Ought God to have granted this free the world by seeing it as providing an choice? This allows creatures freely to arena for the growth of human maturity choose God, but if their character becomes or ‘soul-making’ (the phrase is borrowed evil, their choices cannot but become evil from Keats). He urges that we look not to (On Free Will,II:1).InhisConfessions the past, blaming the Fall for the origin of Augustine traces in terms of autobiogra- evil, but to the future. God seeks the phical narrative that ‘self-will’ generates maturity and holiness of humankind, but evil; evil is ‘borne of self-interest which this presupposes the need for struggle, or generates conflict and competitiveness’. at least awareness or encounter with evil. Even a child has ‘a wish to be obeyed’ Yet this still might be said to suggest an (Confessions, I: 6: 8). Augustine has unacceptably ‘utilitarian’ role for evil (see embarked on an argument which has come the criticism from David Griffin in the Hick to be known as the free-will defence. entry). Is it acceptable that such extremes Aquinas argues that God bestowed of human suffering have to provide the freedom to angels and to human beings price for this goal that God, not human- as a gift, ‘for free choice expresses human kind, has freely chosen as the goal? dignity’ (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 59, The tradition of Augustine and Aqui- art. 3). Freedom from sin is ‘true’ freedom. nas, from which Hick often distances If ‘freedom’ were merely an illusion, himself, insists that evil is not an existent exhortations, commands and prohibitions ‘thing’ in its own right, and certainly not a would be ‘in vain’ (ibid., Qu. 83, art. 1). ‘thing’ created by God. God created only Only by grace can their freedom become the possibility of evil, which human beings positive. make actual by their choice and fallenness. ‘Evil is the absence of a good’ (Aqui- (B) The ‘privative’ view of evil. This nas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 49, art. subject was introduced above. Evil is a 1). ‘Evil has no positive nature, but is loss falling from the best. ‘Each single created of a good’ (Augustine, City of God, XI; thing is good . . . as a whole they are very 9). ‘Evil denotes the absence of good . . . good . . . What, after all, is anything we Thus privation of sight is called blindness’ call evil except the privation of good?’ (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 5, (Augustine, Enchiridion. ch. 3). The Latin art. 48). This ‘privative’ (negative) view of deprivatio is paralleled elsewhere by nega- evil forms a major strand in the traditional tio, corruptio and defectus (negation, Augustinian–Thomist approach to the degeneration, defect). Evil is not ‘a thing’ problem of evil. that God has created. Evil is a parasitic upon the good. For classic expositions of the example, telling a lie achieves its end only if ‘logical coherence’ response in truth is normally presupposed. ‘Evil is not a augustine and aquinas positive substance’ (City of God, XI: 11). Aquinas also argues that ‘If all evil (A) Origins of evil in creaturely will and were prevented, much good would be choice, not in God. Evil, Augustine absent . . . A lion would cease to live if insists, was not created by God, but arises there were no slaying of animals’ (Summa from ‘a wilful turning of the self in desire Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 49, art. 2). Creation from the highest good’. ‘The defection would be reduced to dull uniformity if (defectio) of the will is evil’ (City of God, there were no ‘grades of goodness’ (ibid, XII: 7). God therefore created only the Qu. 48, art. 2). possibility of evil by permitting created beings to make choices and to direct their (C) The principle of plenitude.The wills for better or for worse. principle of creation was ‘difference’: 87 evil

‘God divided day from night, light from Many, including Plantinga and Swin- darkness, earth from water’ (Gen. 1: 4, 7; burne, provide counter-replies to this cited by Aquinas, ibid. Qu. 47, art. 1). claim. Would such a prediction be neces- ‘The Divine Artist produces complexity, sary and certain? If we are speaking of diversity, hierarchy, inequality’ (ibid. art. God and the possibility of evil, certainty 2) ‘Difference’ transforms formless chaos and necessity would have to be of this into order. Strictly in formal terms the kind. However, if such could be imagined, ‘principle of plenitude’ suggests that would freedom still be ‘freedom’, and every genuine possibility is actualized. would human persons still be ‘humans’? In everyday life we use analogies Swinburne places several issues in the about the ‘tapestry’ of life and history context of omniscience and its logic. to account for unexplained darkness or Hick’s alternative account is drawn in sorrow as part of a wider many-coloured part, he argues, from and from whole. Augustine writes: ‘What is more Schleiermacher on the image of God beautiful than a fire? What is more useful and the Fall. Schleiermacher comes close with its heat and comfort . . .? Yet to viewing the ‘Fall’ as a loss of naı¨ve nothing can cause more distress than innocence that signals an acquisition of the burns inflicted by fire’ (City of God, positive maturity. Hick suggests that this XII: 4). anticipates his own view that to focus on Hick, however, attacks this view as an the future goal of divine providence rather ‘aesthetic’ response to the problem of evil, on a ‘mythological’ Fall in the past which places the ordered differentiation of provides a more satisfactory way forward. the universe above the well-being of We have not distinguished here human persons. ‘The traditional analogy between moral evil and natural disasters was based upon the visual arts . . . that cause suffering. Traditionally there contrasts arising from . . . the dark . . . the have been many diverse responses to such beauty of the whole’ (Evil and the God of phenomena as animal pain or destructive Love, 192; see 170–98). floods. That pain forms part of a learning Hick attributes this approach to an process for avoiding destructive situations over-concern about ‘orderedness’ in Neo- and forces may advance the argument. Yet platonism and Aristotle, but it is also a we still face the problem of seemingly biblical theme in Genesis, Leviticus, 1 disproportionate pain. Some theologians Corinthians and elsewhere. (For further allude to cosmic dimensions of the Fall, details, see the entries on Hick, Leibniz while others dismiss this as a symbol for and plenitude.) structural evil. A more theoretical criticism concerns (D) Criticisms and developments of the the alleged extent to which Augustine Augustinian–Thomist view. To trace even draws on Neoplatonism, and Aquinas the outlines of the debate would over- draws on Aristotle. However, origins of extend this single entry. Hence some of the ideas are less relevant than their validity, major criticisms are discussed in other and these claims, at least for Augustine, entries. are often exaggerated. The most fundamental and far-ranging ‘practical’ or existential of these is the criticism of A. Flew and J. L. responses to the problem of Mackie that ‘God’ could in principle have evil created free beings who always choose to do what is right. We might be able to Vincent Bru¨ mmer points out that to predict with certainty, for example, that present to someone the Augustinian–Tho- Mary would marry Tom, yet they could at mist approach in a time of affliction would the same time do this freely. be to exhibit ‘moral insensitivity’ evil 88

(Speaking of a , Cambridge: narrated his experiences in his autobio- CUP, 1992, 128–51). He concedes that graphical work Night. A central episode is this approach remains fundamental to that of a young Jewish boy who was retain as a background of understanding hanged at Auschwitz in front of thousands in more normal times. However, in who were compelled to file past the bodies moments of crisis, as well as in mature of the child and two adults hanged with thought, practical and existential him. The child’s torment lasted longer approaches may offer more to those who than that of the adults, prompting a are in the process of experiencing evil. spectator to exclaim: ‘Where is God now?’ Wiesel felt a voice within him reply, (A) Mystical resonances: Meister ‘He is hanging here on this gallows.’ Eckhart (1260–1327) and Simone Weil Wiesel’s narrative may be understood (1909–43). eckhart emphasizes the full- as a reply of protest, implying (with ness of God’s being. The human self is to Nietzsche) the death of God: God does empty itself like a desert, to become ‘full’ not exist in such a world. If this is its of God. Protest on behalf of the self is meaning, it is akin to the ‘protest’ response therefore excluded. Although God is of the Algerian existentialist atheist Albert ‘good’, because God is beyond speech Camus (1913–60). Camus also interprets God is also ‘beyond’ goodness. ‘If my life Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov is God’s being, God’s existence must be my as a protest against theism. Humankind existence . . . my “is-ness”’. devises its values from human solidarity, Eckhart is content to let ‘what-is’ not from such external values as ‘God’ disclose itself. The heart of his concern is (but see Dostoevsky). for ‘letting-go’ and ‘letting-be’; a letting-go The Christian theologian Moltmann of the interests of the self and a letting-be (b. 1926) expounds a theology of God of things as they are. who co-suffers with the prisoner, the Although she was well equipped to oppressed, the tortured. His answer ‘God lecture in philosophy in Paris, Weil chose is hanging on the gallows’ offers a to experience ‘affliction’ that ‘crushed the profoundly Christian post-Auschwitz spirit’ by factory work and in wartime theodicy. On the cross God co-suffers sacrifice and self-deprivation. In her last with Christ as Trinity, in solidarity with years she wrote of the need to ‘’ to all that is ugly or shameful. Thereby it the world as it is. The sea is ‘no less becomes possible to enter a new world of beautiful’ because ships are sometimes promise and new creation, inaugurated by wrecked because it is what it is. Weil resurrection and hope. suggests that ‘God is not satisfied with an attack on ‘theodicy’: finding his creation good, but rather wants tilley it to find itself good’. Evil is not illusory, however (see ‘The Love of God and In The Evils of Theodicy (Washington, Affliction’, in S. Weil, Waiting on God DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), Terrence W. Tilley substitutes an approach 63–78; also ‘Love of the Order of the based on speech acts of confession, World’, ibid., 97–116). Simone Weil died narrative, prayer, lament, commitment, in wartime London of malnutrition and or declaration for the abstract third- tuberculosis in 1943 at the age of thirty- person propositional discourses usually four. called ‘theodicy’. Tilley argues that ‘theodicy’ is a modern (B) Suffering God? Wiesel, Camus and notion ‘initiated in the seventeenth century Moltmann. The Jewish novelist Elie (coined by Leibniz in 1710). This ‘dry, Wiesel survived the Holocaust and measured, cool, calm, abstract’ discourse 89 evil threatens to marginalize all other more negative response of protest. He does, constructive approaches (ibid., 2). however, underline that a single, simple Tilley easily shows that the Hebrew– appeal to ‘the higher harmony’ is not good Christian classic source, the book of Job, enough. does not belong to this theoretical genre. It The dialogues of Alyosha, the priory embodies accusation, lament, reproach, monk, Dimitri, the debauchee, Ivan, the confession, declaration and so on. These supposed rebel, and Father Zozima, the are speech acts that transcend mere priest, move through paradox and com- propositional content. More distinctively plexity, dark and light, evil and compas- Tilley contextualizes Augustine’s varied sion. ‘We are each responsible to all for writings. The Confessions, for example, all.’ Dostoevsky commends neither athe- are acts of confession. Perhaps only the ism nor passive assent to Russian Ortho- Enchiridion is instruction through propo- doxy. It is through the dynamic wrestling sitions; but it remains an exposition, not a that a form of theistic belief and value may ‘defence’ of belief in God. ‘It is not an perhaps emerge. argument but an instruction’ (ibid., 121). more recent advocates of the Boethius, Tilley continues, offers a broadly augustinian–thomist therapeutic medicine against the poisons approach of falsehood. He redirects the mind-set of his reader, but this is not a ‘theodicy’. He A popular but well-argued version of the helps the reader to overcome a self- traditional approach has been the small dramatizing grief and despair, to be freed but influential non-technical book by C.S. to contemplate the Good (ibid., 152). Lewis, The Problem of Pain (1940). Lewis Again, this is a speech act, not an discusses the extent to which God’s self- argument. consistency brings logical constraints to the device of polyphonic God’s freedom. What kind of world would voices it be if God repeatedly intervened to make a wooden beam become soft every time we It is agreed for the most part that while chose to hit someone with it, but let it traditional logical and more maintain its hardness as long as it was used recent ‘practical’ responses may soften for buildings and furniture? What would it aspects of the problem of evil, no single be if God made air refuse to vibrate approach can solve it. In the end, as whenever we speak a lie? (ibid., 21). Plantinga asserts, it does not follow logi- God is good, Lewis affirms, but that cally that if God has reasons for permitting does not mean that God is content with evil, humankind should assume that we humanity as humans are. God’s ‘goodness’ therefore know what the reasons are. is not simply human goodness. However, At the same time, we may be open to if ‘goodness’ bore no relation whatever to hints and clues. These may require pro- what we conceive of as ‘goodness’, we cesses of exploration and listening, and the might as well worship the devil. preferred mode of genre for sustained to- Evil is real, Lewis adds, but we should and-fro questioning is a dialogue between not assume that every individual, as an ‘voices’. To explore possible scenarios individual, experiences all the combined these voices may belong to fictional corporate weight of every evil in every narrative. time and place. Lewis thus addresses in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov popular modern form the traditional three may be understood in this way. There is no foci of divine sovereignty, divine goodness indication that Dostoevsky himself wished and the nature of evil, as expounded more to use Ivan Karamazov as his mouthpiece, philosophically in the Augustinian–Tho- or indeed that Ivan expresses a merely mist tradition. evolution, theory of 90

In more technical philosophical terms entailed. Darwin argued that these ran- the free-will defence has been attacked by dom variables lead either to degeneration A. Flew and J.L. Mackie, and defended by and extinction or to survival and enhance- Plantinga and Swinburne. Swinburne pro- ment. vides sophisticated discussions of God’s In place of ‘design’ or ‘purpose’ the omniscience as well as God’s omnipotence criterion of usefulness for survival and and . flourishing moved a species forward in God is entirely free to act in sover- securing the best provision for its future. eignty, Swinburne argues, provided that Historically controversy became heated we recall that ‘a perfectly free person can because on one side sacred texts were only perform an action if he believes that interpreted as if they offered competing there is no overriding reason for refraining theories of ‘how’ creation emerged, while from doing it’ (The Coherence of Theism, on the Darwinian side empirical method 158–59). To apply Plantinga’s caveat to became transposed into a world-view Swinburne’s arguments, there may be rea- offering competing answers to the ques- sons why God refrains from certain actions, tion ‘Why?’ (The distinction between these but there are no grounds for assuming that two agendas is identified under science if we do not know them they do not exist. and religion) (See also existentialism.) Yet the most significant protest against Darwin arose from his later work The Descent of Man, in which Darwin expli- evolution, theory of citly stated that humankind had evolved ‘Evolution’ may be used in a number of through the same naturalistic random distinct senses. It does not necessarily processes as those of more primitive denote the particular version of evolu- biological life-forms, and was descended tionary theory formulated by darwin from them. It is arguable that a certain (1809–82). However, in widespread narrowness and brittleness on both sides usage the term most often denotes the about the incapacity of empirical data to theory that he expounds in The Origin of arbitrate on the uniqueness of human Species (1859), although greater tensions personhood as bearing the divine image with theistic belief probably emerge added confusion rather than light. from his later work The Descent of Man conditions for teleology: (1871). the potential for actual order the status and implications of darwin’s theory Darwin’s publications appeared to many to explode the ‘Why?’ explanation of Darwin claimed that his theory depended purpose behind the empirical data of the on inferences from empirical observations world. The Psalmist could say that God of data concerning different life-forms at ‘filled every living thing with plenteous- different stages of development in differ- ness’ only because starving creatures died ent environments. A large amount of or became extinct. Paley could say that empirical data was collected during the the eye was designed (like a watch) as a five-year voyage of ‘The Beagle’. mechanism for sight only because he was It is difficult to assess whether the key unaware that creatures who could not see point of the theory, namely that these had once lived and perished. changes were purely random variables is Yet this is too hasty. Tennant in his genuinely demanded by nothing other Philosophical Theology (2 vols., Cam- than empirical observation and deduction: bridge: CUP, 1930) and W.R. Matthews at very least a measure of inductive in The Purpose of God argued that reasoning and degree of probability is ‘gradualness of construction is in itself 91 evolution, theory of no proof of the absence of . . . design’ ‘Consciousness’ is merely a derivation (Tennant, Philosophical Theology, vol. 2, ‘epiphenomenon’ or by-product thrown 84). Design may be seen in the provision up by increasing ‘complexity’ in the of necessary conditions for the emergence evolutionary process. It is a short step of designed effects by whatever route. to the behaviourism of Watson and Today philosophers and physicists con- Skinner. firm the issue of how many ‘lucky Spencer (1820–1903) applied the accidents’ have to occur for the hypothesis notion of optimum adaptation to environ- of sheer randomness to seem to verge on ment to an ethical goal of pleasure. the unreasonable. Tennant anticipated Pleasure is a sign of effective adaptation; these kinds of phrases in 1930: ‘Lucky pain is a symptom of maladjustment. Co- accidents and co-incidences bewilderingly operation may be necessary because of accumulate’ until the idea of purpose may evolutionary complexity. seem no more unreasonable than a represents this nat- ‘groundless contingency’ (ibid., 79, 92, uralistic perspective today. ‘The only 93). watchmaker in nature is the blind forces and swinburne of physics, albeit deployed in a very review this kind of argument in the light special way . . . It does not plan for the of more recent knowledge. ‘Lucky acci- future . . . It is a blind watchmaker’ (The dents’ mount up. If the force of gravity Blind Watchmaker, New York: Norton, were slightly stronger, all stars would be 1986, 5). blue giants; if a little weaker, red dwarfs. All the same, have Huxley, Spencer and There is an infinitesimal, small balance Dawkins taken full account of what may between ‘the competing effect of explosive be inferred from empirical data, or from expansion and gravitational contraction scientific method, alone? There is a meta- . . . at the very earliest epoch . . . (. . .10\–43 physical ‘add-on’, namely that we can sec. after the big bang) . . . a deviation of slide into assuming that the data of one part in 10 to the sixtieth’ (Polkin- biology or physics provide a comprehen- ghorne, Science and Creation,Boston: sive explanation of the whole of reality, of New Science Library, 1989, 22). all that is, and that the ‘level’ of explana- Swinburne compares the potential for tion in question includes ‘why’ as well as ‘temporal order’ (regularities of succes- ‘how’. sion) and ‘spatial order’ (regularities of co- It is as if a physicist explained to a presence) with the more mechanistic musical audience that the sound-waves understandings of ‘order’ or ‘design’ that presented on an oscilloscope exhaustively shaped the thought of Paley and his explained ‘the whole of reality’ in a generation (The Existence of God, symphony performance. The musical Oxford: OUP, 1979, 36). Even if Darwin’s forms, the will and mood of the composer, theories seem to explode ‘design’ as Paley the joy or tragedy of the changing conceived of it, ‘evolution’ as empirical harmonies in major or minor key, are not observation and hypothesis does not ‘there’, so they cannot be ‘real’. A musical exclude design as an ultimate principle in audience would be inclined to think that response to the question ‘Why?’ such an explanation ‘misses the point’ of the concert, however accurate it may be at the debate after darwin its own level of explanation (On ‘levels’ Yet after Darwin many empiricist ‘scien- see J. Polkinghorne, The Way the World is, tific’ thinkers attempted to promote a London: Triangle, 1987, 17). (See also world-view based on Darwinian theory. creation; empiricism; materialism; T.H. Huxley (1825–95) argued for an metaphysics; teleological argument; entirely mechanistic view of humankind. theism; positivism.) existence 92

Hick existence constructively suggests that part of the functional currency of ‘exist’ is that Complex problems are raised by the the attribution of existence ‘makes a seemingly common-sense notion of ‘exis- difference’. Yet even Heidegger (1889– tence’. Much depends on the context of 1976), who speaks of ‘existentialia’, pre- argument. fers to speak of an ‘existent’ human being Traditional arguments for the existence as Dasein (being-there), in contrast to the of God serve to defend the validity of the bare existence of objects in the world. (See belief that God is ontologically real also existentialism; logic; nominal- rather than a fictitious or functional ism; ontology, realism.) projection or cipher of the human mind. Tillich However, (1886–1965) vigor- existentialism ously insists that ‘to argue that God exists some basic themes is to deny him’ (Systematic Theology,3 vols. London: Nisbet, 1953, vol. 1, 227). The basic themes that characterize exis- God is, rather, ‘the creative ground of tentialist writings include an emphasis essence and existence. The ground of upon the individual rather than the crowd being cannot be found within the totality (or tradition or community); and the role of beings’ (ibid.). of active personal engagement and deci- The contrast between essence and sion for life and for truth, as against existence reveals another problematic passive assent to systems or doctrines. facet of ‘existence’. Those who follow They include most especially an insistence Plato in elevating a sphere of Forms, upon starting from concrete human situa- Ideas or ‘above’ everyday exis- tions (‘existence’) as against pretentious tence associate existence with mere con- speculations about truth as universal or tingency and transitions. On the other abstract (‘essence’). hand, existentialist writers from Kierke- These themes can be found in Kierke- gaard (1813–55) to Sartre (1905–80) gaard (1815–55), who is often regarded as perceive ‘existence’ as the concrete stuff of the first ‘existentialist’ thinker. However, practical life, while ‘essence’ remains a Kierkegaard chose as his epitaph ‘That theoretical, remote, hypothesis, or at best Individual’, and viewed with distaste any a merely logical entity. notion of founding a ‘school of thought’. Logical questions about whether math- Truth, Kierkegaard stressed, is not ematical numbers or universals ‘exist’ handed down at second hand. Authentic raise issues in the debate between realists truth is that which the individual encoun- and nominalists. Further, in the ontolo- ters through wrestling, exploration, strug- gical argument for the existence of God, gle, decision and venture at first hand. We both sides of the debate address the issue encounter truth not by observing or of whether ‘existence’ constitutes a pre- speculating about what is abstract as dicate or attribute, or adds nothing to a passive spectators, but through first-hand proposition about the entity that is said to engagement and participation as active ‘exist’. This set in train a complex logical human subjects or agents. In this sense discussion from Descartes (1596–1650) ‘subjectivity’ becomes the ‘truth’ (Con- to Russell (1872–1970) and beyond. cluding Unscientific Postscript [1846] Russell’s theory of descriptions ‘brackets’ Princeton: Princeton University Press, the phrase ‘and it exists’ into a quanti- 1941, 306). fier or prefix which removes it from the Just as Kierkegaard wrote as an indivi- normal force of the proposition, and dualistic Christian Protestant with no love assigns a non-referential or non-predicat- for the Church, so Nietzsche (1844– ing role to it. 1900) represents the atheistic and 93 existentialism antitheistic side of existentialist writings. Against Hegel, Kierkegaard reminds us He claimed that ‘will to power’ is the most of the sheer finitude of human ‘existence’. fundamental drive in human persons. If truth could be viewed ‘theocentrically’, ‘God’ and ‘religion’ are to be unmasked Hegel might have a point; but ‘I am only a as manipulative devices which emerged poor, existing, human being’ (Concluding only to serve the power-interests of priests Unscientific Postscript, 190). He would or those who could work the system. His follow the fashion of admiring the System work was to ‘philosophize with a ham- ‘if only I could set eyes on it’ (ibid., 97). As mer’. it is, humans in this finite situatedness as Nietzsche’s suspicion of reason and of ‘mere’ individuals can only venture, metaphysics as merely instrumental choose and obey. devices to serve the power-interests of the Nietzsche turns these themes upside individual brings him close to the themes down. There is no universal or ‘theo- of other existentialist writers. All claims to centric’ system or word-view. However, in arrive at a rational understanding of Nietzsche this does not imply a call for essences, or of reality-as-a-whole, are faith. It merely unmasks the illusory basis illusory, and produced by more basic pre- of theism, God and Christianity. God rational drivers. Since ‘God is dead’, there is ‘dead’; therefore humankind is free to is no or ethics. Each person choose its own destiny and identity. ‘The must seek his or her own interests and the death of God’ reflects the unmasking of ‘values’ that serve these. the cultural crisis at the end of the nineteenth century, which gives way to further themes in ‘nihilism’ (Thus Spake Zarathustra, kierkegaard, nietzsche and 1883–5). dostoevsky While such relativism and nihilism Kierkegaard’s journey of independent feature in The Gay Science (1882) and decisions against convention and against other works, Nietzsche’s most violent anti- expected ‘ethics’ is traced as a vehicle of theist attacks emerge in Twilight of the faith and obedience in his Fear and Idols (1889) and especially in The Anti- Trembling (1843). His analogy between christ (1895). If rational philosophy and the story of Adam’s ‘hiding’ from God religion are ‘fictions’ and ‘lies’, what among the trees of the garden and the starting-point (or end) can there be except ‘evasion’ of ‘being hidden in the crowd’ to human situatedness and human will? This avoid an address from God (Purity of leads to a ‘re-valuation of all values’. Heart is to Will One Thing, London: Inherited value-systems are deconstructed Collins, 1961, 163) explicitly finds a place under ‘the hammer’. in the existentialist theology of Bultmann Dostoevsky (1821–81) retained his (1884–1976). Christian faith, nurtured in Russian The very notion of ‘Christendom’ as Orthodox traditions, but sorely tried and the multitude of those who have given tested in a series of personal tragedies not notional assent to an abstract system of of his own making. He begins the great doctrine in which they have no active tradition of the existentialist literary phi- stake is an illusion that verges on blas- losophical novel. phemy. Kierkegaard places the blame for Dostoevsky’s experiences of life were such a misapprehension initially upon too brutal and too contradictory to permit Augustine (354–430), for allegedly trans- either a bland second-hand theism or posing personal ‘faith’ into intellectual merely an atheism of protest, even if his ‘belief’. He also blames Hegel (1770– The Brothers Karamazov (1879–80) has 1831) for equating Christian faith with an sometimes been interpreted as atheistic abstract, universal ‘system’. protest (with , 1913–60). existentialism 94

By using at least three or more ‘voices’ of understanding. This takes place within in this profound novel, Dostoevsky shows the horizon of time and operates through that ‘solutions’ to the problem of evil the principle of the hermeneutical circle. cannot take the form of a single, neatly We begin with finite, corrigible, provi- packaged system, but require address from sional working assumptions, but these various angles of finite human life. Among become steadily corrected and filled out those often called ‘existentialists’, his (even if they remain provisional) by work stands as more subtle and sophisti- further dialogue with that which we seek cated than is usually allowed for. to understand. This circle is thus not ‘a vicious one’ that is to be avoided: ‘The ‘human being’ in heidegger and “circle” in understanding belongs to the in jaspers structure of meaning’ (ibid., I: 5, sect. 32, Although he rejected the designation 194–5). ‘existentialist’, Heidegger (1889–1976) Against Plato, Heidegger insists, ‘The began from the human situation of ‘being- “essence” of Dasein (being-there) lies in its there’ (Dasein) in his earlier period of existence’ (ibid., 42). There is no ideal Being and Time (1927) which he char- realm of universal essences. We explore acterized as Existenz, and to which he ‘existentialia’. Human anxiety, care, fall- applied the German adjective existentiell enness, guilt and the anticipation of death and the noun ‘existentiality’ (ibid., Intro- tell us more than substantival ‘categories’ duction, I, sect. 4). that are more appropriate for the descrip- Ontological enquiry concerns Being tion of value-neutral ‘objects’ of the (Sein) but this can be approached only natural sciences. by ‘ontic’ questions, i.e. questions about Yet Heidegger cannot move beyond concrete, human, existent beings in their ‘the human’ to ‘God’. Indeed, in spite of finite ‘thrown-ness’ (German, geworfen) his aim eventually to produce a philoso- into the world, their ‘facticity’ (German, phy of Being, or ontology, in his later Faktizita¨t) (ibid., pt I, ch. 5: Eng. Oxford: work on ‘Being’, philosophy tends to Blackwell, 1973, 174 (also Albany, NY: merge into the more visionary, pre-con- SUNY, 1996)). ‘Facticity’ is more than ceptual disclosures of art and poetry. Here ‘factuality’: it denotes historically finite he moves beyond existentialism, but ‘situatedness’ in time, place and ‘world’. explicitly gives up the project of ontology. Heidegger entitles this section ‘The Exis- Jaspers (1883–1969) wrote not only as tential Constitution of the “There”’ one well-versed in the history of philoso- (ibid.). phy, but also as one qualified profession- In relation to religious thought Heideg- ally in medicine and in . He ger’s work underlines at least two key wrote on selfhood, historicality (human points. First, we cannot adequately philo- situatedness within a historical time and sophize about humankind, selfhood or place), identity and self-transcendence, i.e. personal agency by drawing only on the transcendence of the everyday self in categories of substance observation as if particular revelatory experiences. we were concerned only with objects of Like Heidegger, Jaspers explores what description. The substantival categories of it is for the individual, as an individual, to Aristotle and Locke are more appro- face suffering, loss, guilt, isolation or priate to objects. Participatory language imminent death. The most extreme of that begins from an existential ‘there’ or these experiences he calls ‘limit-situa- ‘here’ of the human situation takes us tions’, or boundary-situations. When a further. human person is ‘on the edge’, second- Second, all human interpretation of life hand, conventional assumptions often and phenomena rests upon a hermeneutic become stripped away as illusions. The 95 existentialism individual finds what is authentic truth for Like Jaspers and Heidegger, Marcel him or for her. rejected the term ‘existentialist’, although Although for Jaspers ontology began as he is also credited with coining the word. ‘the fusion of all modes of thought aglow The reason why he is widely regarded as with being’, such ontology ‘is rent’ (Phi- an existentialist thinker, however, lies in losophy [1931], Eng. 3 vols., Chicago: his emphatic and powerful emphasis on University of Chicago Press, 1969–71, vol. personhood. Persons are not things. They 3, 143). In existential terms, the ‘encom- are not ‘statistics’ for the sociologist; they passing’ reality of the world can be are not mere ‘cases’ for doctors, for reached only indirectly through ‘polyva- psychiatrists or for pastoral care; they lent’ or multi-functional, multi-layered are not ‘numbers’ in a register or on a rota. language, which expresses the individual Marcel calls attention to the dignity disclosures experienced by individuals. and sacredness of persons-in-relation-to- This pluriformity of language, mean- Being, and in relation to one another. Here ing and truth prevents Jaspers from he differs from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, identifying too closely with any specific Heidegger and Sartre: persons are truly religious tradition, whether Catholic or persons in relation to other persons. In the Protestant. However, he values ‘religion’ language of Buber, a person becomes a as a liberating and often authentic truth. person when he or she addresses another ‘Freedom and God are inseparable’, even as ‘Thou’. if the term ‘freedom’ is often abused and In an incisive analysis of twentieth- widely misunderstood. In the light of century society in the West, Marcel sees both, I can ‘be myself’ (The Way of the reduction of ‘persons’ to instrumental Wisdom, 1950). roles as de-personalizing them by eroding away their capacities, as active agents, to individuality and personhood love, to hope and to wonder. Life in marcel and sartre, and becomes a journey without a goal. ‘Tech- existentialist attitudes to nomania’ leads to ‘technolatry’, as if religion natural science offers the only way of To include both Marcel (1889–1973) and knowing; the only path to reality. Tech- Sartre (1905–1980) is to see at once that nology has its value for humanity, but ‘existentialism’ is represented at every only in its proper place. point on the Christian–theist–agnostic– These themes are summed up in the atheist spectrum. Kierkegaard was a Pro- titles of several of Marcel’s books: Being testant pietist; Nietzsche, an aggressive and Having (1935); The Philosophy of anti-theist; Dostoevsky, an independent- Existence (1949); The Mystery of Being minded Russian Orthodox Christian; Hei- (1950); Men Against Humanity (1951); degger thought that the question of God and The Existential Background of could not be convincingly addressed; Human Dignity (1963). Jaspers valued ‘religion’, but not claims Sartre is widely regarded as the most for any one tradition against another; prominent of the French existentialists. He Marcel was a convert to Roman Catholic became a member of the Underground faith (in 1929); and Sartre remained an during the Nazi occupation, and some of atheist existentialist, although from his philosophical themes through novels around 1958 he turned increasingly to and literature reflect fear, suffering and Marxist political thought. His existential- dread. This aspect reveals the influence of ist axiom ‘Man makes himself’ recalls a Heidegger, as well as personal experience Nietzschean emphasis on individual will in war. to power without reference or recourse to Sartre’s emphasis upon the existential God. in contrast to the universal and abstract existentialism 96

finds expression in his aphorism ‘Existence for-itself’ (eˆtre-pour-soi) into a viscous, precedes essence’. He expounds this as sticky slime that engulfs, drowns and meaning: ‘that man first of all exists, destroys it. Conversely, being-for-itself encounters himself, surges up in the world (eˆtre-pour-soi) is the negation of being- – and defines himself afterwards . . . There in-itself (Being and Nothingness [1943], is no human nature, because there is no 4th edn, Eng., New York: Citadel, 1966, God to have a conception of it . . . Man is 55–81 and 535–46). nothing else than what he makes of postscript: existentialism in himself’ (Existentialism and Humanism jewish and christian [1946]; Eng., London and New York: theology Philosophical Library, 1948, 28). No value-system or ‘essence’ can be This area is discussed under separate derived from God. For Sartre endorses entries, especially those on Buber and Nietzsche’s declaration in Thus Spake Bultmann. In the case of Buber, it would Zarathustra that ‘God is dead’. Hence not be accurate simply to call him an the individual creates the rules that shape ‘existentialist’ thinker. For although he his or her own decisions and identity. With shares (e.g. especially with Marcel) a Kierkegaard and with Nietzsche, Sartre strong emphasis on the I–Thou dimension stresses the role of active decision as of the personal (in contrast to I–it lan- against passive assent. Convention leads guage of ‘objects’), Buber’s thought has away from authenticity. features that move beyond existentialism. Like Heidegger, Buber and Marcel, Bultmann is concerned to utilize a Sartre distinguishes sharply between the way of using language that does not modes of being of persons and of things. ‘objectify’ either God, humankind or An ‘object’ is complete, finished, and self- divine or human action, but uses existen- contained; it is ‘being-in-itself’ (eˆtre-en-soi). tial modes of expression. This gives rise to A person is always in process of making and his programme of demythologizing the shaping themselves as a self and an identity; New Testament. a person is ‘being-for-itself’ (eˆtre-pour-soi). Tillich is often described as an exis- Dread and nausea arise when the tential thinker. However, while he formu- individual is placed under pressure by lates ‘existential’ questions, Tillich’s society or a group by imposing upon that identification of God as ‘Being-itself’ and individual an already pre-shaped, mapped his concern for ontology renders this out, ‘closed’ future, which is not of the designation questionable as a description individual’s own making (see the entry on of his thought as a whole. (See also Kierkegaard). This submerges that ‘being- corrigibility; object; pietism.) F

fallibilism found in the midst of this process. Peirce comes close to the more popular notion of Fallibilism should not be confused with ‘fallibility’ as being unable to guarantee corrigibility. Fallibilism denotes the view lack of error. that a class or system of beliefs is not only open to correction and revision, but also falsification, falsifiability that virtually any set of beliefs or proposi- tions falls short of certainty.Radicalor This entry presupposes a familiarity with extreme fallibilism attributes uncertainty to the principle of verification, or verifiabil- every belief: modified or relative fallibilism ity, expounded in the entries on Ayer and exempts such propositions as those of (more briefly) logical positivism. Fal- logic or analytic statements. sifiability, likewise, developed in two Both forms of fallibilism reject a ‘strong’ different contexts: that of Vienna, form of foundationalism which regards although there more in terms of the primary or fundamental propositions as philosophy of science than the Vienna certain. The enterprise of Descartes circle; and that of English empiricism, (1596–1650) and his requirement for ‘clear led by Ayer, and (on falsifiability) John and certain knowledge’, in contrast to what Wisdom and . is ‘obscure and confused’ (in The Medita- In Vienna, Karl Popper (1902–94) tions, 1641), would be rejected. argued that in science falsification was a Fallibilism is often associated especially more constructive criterion of meaning with Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce and truth than verification. To be true- combined logical and semiotic theory to or-false and meaningful, propositions evolve his own version of pragmatism. must be capable of disproof by negative Part of a pragmatic approach entails the instances. ‘Confirmation’ merely repli- view that claims to truth may be justified cates, more narrowly, discoveries of the in relation to given stages or situations. past. ‘Falsifiability’ permits a process of No system of claims to truth can be exploration, conjecture and hypothesis, complete; hence there remains a provi- which remains open to rational criticism sionality and corrigibility and the elimination of error (Popper, The Given that self-interest and a sense of Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934). exploration or journey are never left This principle operates in parallel with behind, absolute certainty cannot be the axiom in semantics and linguistics al-Farabi 98 that meaning often derives its currency comparing the later Western contrast from what it excludes. It is less closely tied drawn by Hegel (1770–1831) between to a positivist or strictly empiricist world- the use of ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen) view to ask of language in religion, in religion and critical concepts (Begriff) ‘What does this assertion exclude or in philosophy. negate?’ It serves to filter out purely self- Because in Islamic philosophy Aristotle affirming understandings of such an utter- was often called ‘the First Teacher’, al- ance as ‘God is on our side’, from a use of Farabi’s close adherence to Aristotle the statement which would permit coun- invited the widespread designation of ter-evidence. him as ‘the Second Teacher’. However, In the English context John Wisdom he also studied and expounded the works expounded ‘The Parable of the Invisible of Plato, including the production of Gardener’. If two people disagree about commentaries on the Republic and the whether in a jungle a less ‘wild’ area Laws. suggests the activity of a gardener, one His view of the relativity of religious strategywouldbetowanttomake expressions has led to the assumption observations. If such a gardener never that he supported the Shi‘ite sect or appears, the ‘believer’ may insist that this tradition within Islam; but he avoided is because the supposed gardener is giving any offence to the more dominant invisible. A series of tests now takes place, Sunnite traditions. He was careful to which reveal that the gardener is also stress the affinity between the core under- inaudible, intangible and odourless. The standings of Allah in the Qur’an as One, ‘unbeliever’ now responds: ‘So what does as the First, as the source from whom all your assertion that there is a gardener creation proceeds; and Aristotelian, Pla- amount to, if nothing whatever can count tonic and Plotinian notions of a hierarchy against it?’ of Being. Hick points out that this constructively Nevertheless against al-Kindi, al-Farabi challenges those who use language in believed and taught that the world is religion to identify its cutting edge. If eternal, without beginning and without God ‘exists’, ‘exists’ must somehow ‘make end. He attempted to hold this together a difference’. If we cannot specify what with Islamic theology by arguing that would count against an assertion, what is reality (including the world) flows con- it asserting? (See also positivism.) tinually from God as Source of all levels of Being. Whether this synthesis can be genuinely held together is controversial al-Farabi (Abu Nasr, 875–950) and doubtful. Such a synthesis was Like al-Kindi, al-Farabi taught in Bagh- strongly opposed by al-Ghazali. A helpful dad, and wrote at length on Aristotle. resource is I.R. Netton, Al-Farabi and his He produced commentaries on Aristotle’s School (London: Routledge, 1992). (See works. In contrast to al-Kindi, however, he also Aquinas; Islamic philosophy.) praised the virtues of philosophy even above revelation in the Islamic tradition. Feuerbach, Ludwig (1804–72) Religious truth is expressed through symbols and images, and these may be Feuerbach is the founding figure of the relative to human situations and societies. movement that interprets God as a projec- The higher activity of philosophy brings tion of the human mind. religion in conceptual precision and rigour to the general projects the ‘infinity’ of human mind, and brings an awareness of the consciousness and the highest human conditions necessary for strict logical values onto a figure ‘out there’. The demonstration. It is difficult to avoid Christian religion, Feuerbach proposed, 99 Feuerbach, Ludwig projected a Trinitarian God from the and rational coherence as such, his works ‘infinite’ capacity of human reason, often embody ‘aphorisms’ rather than human will and human love. elaborate arguments. For the same reason Although Kant (1724–1804) had ear- Nietzsche would follow the same lier utilized the notion of projection, method in many works. One such aphor- Feuerbach first formulated this approach ism is: ‘Humanity is what it eats.’ Feuer- as an explicitly anti-theistic, materialist bach sums up his journey from theology to (some would say non-realist) system of philosophy; and then from Hegelian ide- thought, which very heavily influenced the alism to humanistic materialism in the anti-theist accounts of the origins of eloquent aphorism: ‘God was my first religion of both Marx (1818–83) and thought; reason, my second; humankind Freud (1856–1939). Feuerbach studied my third and last thought.’ under, and was influenced by, Hegel Many of Feuerbach’s aphorisms were (1770–1831). His published works explicitly anti-theistic: ‘Faith does not included Thoughts on Death and Immor- solve difficult problems; it only pushes tality (1830), The Essence of Christianity them aside’; (satirical comment on ‘Faith (1841) and The Essence of Religion moves mountains’); ‘Religion once reigned (1845). as lord of the head; but its realm is now restricted to the pit of the stomach’ god, realm and humankind (probably aimed at Schleiermacher). Feuerbach studied theology in Heidelberg, ‘What distinguishes the Christian from and in Berlin where Hegel taught. How- other honorable people? At most a pious ever, he became disenchanted with Hegel’s face and parted hair’ (‘Epigrams’ in identification of dialectic and reason Thoughts on Death and Immortality, with the Absolute as Absolute Spirit, or Berkeley: University of California, 1980, God. Hegel’s own school of disciples split 189, 191, 205); ‘Three things I would not apart into more theological or idealist like to be: an old hag, a hack in the ‘right-wing’ Hegelians, and the more academy, and finally a pietist’ (ibid., 216); materialist ‘young left-wing’ Hegelians ‘Sin came into the world with Christianity’ such as D.F. Strauss (1808–74), Bruno (ibid., 224). Bauer (1809–82) and Feuerbach, who Feuerbach found his studies at Berlin rejected Hegel’s principle of idealism or under Schleiermacher ‘odious to the point Absolute Spirit (Geist). of death’. Schleiermacher taught that the Hegel had attempted to wrestle with heart of religion was an immediate sense the problem of how universal reason, of utter dependence upon God. Christian mind or spirit was concretized in the theology, Feuerbach claimed, simply dialectic of history, and, at another level, masked the true human origin of religious logic. Feuerbach and Marx attempted to belief. It deified a ‘God’ at the expense of ‘demystify’ this dialectical process in reducing humanity to the unworthy and radically more concrete terms, as human the finite. ‘God’ is a mere hypostatization (Feuerbach) or socio-economic (Marx) or objectification of human needs (i.e. forces. The aphorism that Feuerbach and needs projected ‘out there’ onto a ‘Being’ Marx turned Hegel upside-down is widely as ‘real’ entities). cited; in their view they put Hegel’s feet on feuerbach’s essence of the ground. christianity Feuerbach began his critique of Ger- (1841) man (and Western) idealism (the primacy Theology, then, must be transposed back of ideas) with Thoughts on Death and into ‘anthropology’, i.e. into the study of Immortality, even before Hegel’s death. humankind. ‘God’ is not a transcendent Because, like Marx, he suspected ‘ideas’ reality (‘realism’), but a product of Feuerbach, Ludwig 100 projected human aspirations (‘non-rea- critique and assessments lism’). The status of God is not ‘objective’. In reaction against pietism and against A first problem, which also besets the Schleiermacher, Feuerbach rejected the theories of Freud, is the status of wish- entire notion of the ‘dependence’ of a fulfilment for issues of truth and reality. It finite humanity upon an infinite God: ‘The is entirely the case that merely to wish for interest I feel in God’s existence is one something does not bring it into being. with the interest I feel in my own Wishes do not amount to claims to truth. existence.’ Feuerbach shared with Hegel, Yet the reverse is also the case. It is not with Marx and with Nietzsche the view true that something cannot exist merely that critical thought should be liberating: because we also wish and hope for it to ‘God’ is to be unmasked as ‘a dream of the exist. In actuality, the status of human human mind’. wishes remains irrelevant to the ontologi- Feuerbach was assisted in his project by cal status of God, one way or the other. Hegel’s questionable maxim that whereas Feuerbach would need to demonstrate philosophy employed the critical concept that wishes, or projections of God, con- (Begriff), religions merely used ‘images’ stitute the exclusive and exhaustive (Vorstellungen) as proximate, uncritical grounds for ascribing ontological reality ways of seeking to express what some- to God, without remainder. times lay beyond accurate expression. Further, as Barth and Dietrich Bon- Thus such an image as ‘God is love’ may hoeffer insist, a ‘God’ who accords with well be a ‘religious’ but deceptive way of human wishes hardly corresponds with the celebrating the infinite power of love. God of the Jewish, Christian or Islamic However, this infinity remains a capacity scriptures. In particular, Bonhoeffer adds, of human nature; it need not be relegated a God who is ‘wished for’ is not the God to ‘God’, as if humanity were incapable of of the cross of Jesus Christ: ‘If it is I who such power and infinite worth by its own say where God will be, I will always find nature. there a God who in some way corresponds ‘Religion’ becomes a designed celebra- to me, is agreeable to me’; but the true tion of humanness, in which infinite God ‘says where He will be . . . That place human consciousness becomes transposed is the cross of the Christ’ (Meditating on into a finite consciousness of the infinite the Word, Cambridge, MA: Cowley, beyond humanity. Humanity’s wish-fulfil- 1986, 45). The Beatitudes in Matthew 5 ments result in ‘theism’. ‘Religion is do not declare ‘Blessed are the powerful’, consciousness of the infinite’; but this but ‘Blessed are the poor . . . the pure in disguises a human consciousness ‘not heart’ (The Cost of Discipleship, London: finite . . . but infinite ...’(The Essence of SCM, 1959, 93–176). Moltmann simi- Christianity, New York: Harper, 1957, 2). larly defines Christian discipleship as Like Marx, Friedrich Engels and following ‘the Way of Jesus Christ’ (The Nietzsche, Feuerbach saw all this as a Way of Jesus Christ, London: SCM, 1990, philosophy of liberation with social and 210). political consequences for the future. The A second major problem arises from new gospel is true humanism: love of Feuerbach’s claims about the ‘infinity’ of humankind; the unreduced dignity of human consciousness. Hans Ku¨ ng humankind; faith and trust in unaided observes, ‘A real infinity of the human humankind only. On the basis of an being or of the human species and its uncompromisingly materialist view of power . . . cannot be accepted without reality, humankind would not be side- question,’ especially since in other contexts tracked from infinite progress by its own Feuerbach infers that reality itself is finite. infinite capacities. ‘Nowhere did Feuerbach substantiate such 101 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb an infinity of the human powers . . . which Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, would then have no limits . . . he assumes 1792) and it was mistakenly attributed to it: it appears to be a pure postulate’ (Does Kant, Fichte’s reputation as a philosopher God Exist? London: Collins/Fount, 1980, was assured. 206). Fichte became a Professor at Jena in Third, it hardly corresponds to the 1794 at the age of thirty-two, with the facts to claim with Feuerbach (and with support of Kant and of Goethe. Develop- Nietzsche) that religion diminishes the ing Kant’s notion of the categorical moral stature of humanity. This is why Molt- imperative, Fichte saw ethics and ‘practi- mann, for example, insists that the gift of cal reason’ as the frame within which the Holy Spirit constitutes ‘a universal religion was to be understood. God affirmation’ in the face of Nietzsche’s remains a principle or presupposition for claims that the Christian religion is ethics, rather than a personal Being. ‘God’ ‘world-denying’ (The Spirit of Life: A is, in effect, a name for moral order. Universal Affirmation, London: SCM, At the foundation of the University of 1992, throughout). Courage, venture, loy- Berlin in 1810, Fichte became Dean of the alty and respect for the other are hall- Faculty of Philosophy, when Schleierma- marks of authentic religion, even if cher became Professor of Theology. Feuerbach and Nietzsche can readily point Pressing Kant’s Critique of Judgement to nineteenth-century and earlier historical radically further than Kant, Fichte saw distortions and abuses of religion. even the notion of ‘necessity’ in the world Barth strongly argues that true human- as the creation and projection of human ness is discovered in relation to God. The consciousness. Schelling described Fich- Jewish philosopher Buber sees religion as te’s thought as ‘subjective idealism’ (as offering a paradigm or model for relating against his own ‘objective’ idealism) since to ‘the Other’ as a ‘Thou’ in interpersonal the world assumes the status of that which terms of respect, listening and understand- the human mind posits as an act of ing, rather than as an instrumental ‘it’ in judgement. relation to the self. Does ‘religion’ genu- Fichte explored the concept of the ‘I’ as inely and necessarily detract from, and the principle of this Idealism. Supposed diminish, what is good or noble in human objectivity is derived from the subjec- endeavour? tivity of human ideas as the condition for As a critique of idolatrous or manip- the possibility of any knowledge. Hence it ulative religion, however, Feuerbach’s would not be inappropriate to describe his thought contributes a necessary critical philosophy as transcendental idealism; for dimension to the philosophy of religion. transcendental philosophy (initiated Alternative recounts of the ‘origins’ of by Kant) asks about the conditions under religion to those of classical theism require which knowledge or reason is possible at serious respect and examination. all. The most creative theme in Fichte occurs also in Hegel and in Schleierma- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb cher, in spite of their large differences. (1762–1814) Selfhood emerges as an intersubjective Fichte not only confessed himself an Phenomenon: the self emerges as ‘I’ only in unqualified admirer of Kant, but also, in relation to other finite rational subjects. spite of Kant’s apparent indifference to the This is a turning-point in the history of ideas of the young Fichte at their meeting ideas, which is widely, if still insufficiently, in 1790, set himself to extend Kant’s taken for granted today. However, Fichte philosophy a step further. When his name is often regarded first and foremost as the was omitted from his first work (An founder of German idealism. fideism 102

fideism that ‘there are five ways in which one can The term is generally used pejoratively to prove that there is a God’ (Latin, Dicen- denote the view that a given system of dum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari religious beliefs cannot be tested by any potest,inSumma Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 2, criterion external to itself, including that art. 3). a poster- of rational assessment. The five ‘ways’ operate as iori This view has been attributed to arguments from our experience of the (c. 160–225) and to Kierke- everyday world. The first three constitute, cosmo- gaard (1813–55). It is possible that the in effect, different, versions of the logical argument term was first coined in a positive sense by for the existence of the French protestant theologian Auguste God. The fourth way argues from grada- Sabatier (1839–1901) to denote an tions or degrees of being, to the notion of a emphasis on religious feelings and a ‘superlative’, or ultimate, who is God. The relative indifference towards rational- fifth way argues from the ‘ordered’ or ism or the constraints of reason. purposive character of the world to an Controversially the term has also been intelligent creator or designer whom we applied to the theology of Barth (1886– call God. Thus the fifth way constitutes a teleological argument 1968) on the ground mainly of his version of the rejection of natural theology, and his for the existence of God. principle that ‘God is known by God the first way alone’. However, his emphasis on the critical function of theology and the The first way is variously described as the complexity of his thought give grounds argument from change or movement for hesitation. (motus) within the world, but in view of Aquinas’s Similarly, some claim that Wittgen- conscious revival of Aristote- stein’s view of language games and his lian thought may more accurately be hostility to ‘theory’ rather than description regarded as an argument from potentiality. provides grounds for fideistic belief. How- The Latin motus is broader than ‘move- ever, his language games are not self- ment’. The traditional name, the kineto- contained or autonomous, and it is doubt- logical argument, simply reflects the Greek ful whether this is more than a possible word for motion, from which our term but one-sided interpretation of his ‘kinetic energy’ is also derived. Whatever thought. is in motion, or in a process of change, A variant meaning of the term arises within the world, has been set in motion from the condemnation of ‘fideism’ by by something else. Thus, for example, Pope Gregory XVI in 1840, against the wood has the potentiality to become quasi-mystical thought of Louis Bautain heated and to burn to ash, but it is fire (1796–1867). Bautain rejected rational that causes this to occur. The actuality (in argument as a basis for belief, on the actu) of burning cannot at the very same ground that faith and feeling alone are time (simul) be the potentiality (in poten- adequate for knowledge of God. (See tia). ‘We must stop somewhere, otherwise autonomy; mysticism; reasonable- there will be no first cause of the change, ness). and as a result no subsequent causes.’ This first cause of change or movement is ‘not itself changed by anything, and this is Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas what everybody understands by God’ These have been introduced under God, (Summa Theologiae, Blackfriars edn, 15, arguments for the existence of, Ia, Qu. 2, art. 3). which provides a broader introduction to In his earlier work Summa contra this subject. We noted there his statement Gentiles Aquinas appeals in more detail 103 Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas to Aristotle (Physics, H 241b–242b) for On whether an infinite chain of causes reasons why an infinite series of con- can be plausible see the entry on the tingent causes cannot be postulated. In cosmological argument. One dilemma that the pre-modern world this argument emerges is that if ‘God’ as first cause is seemed to carry perhaps the most weight conceived of as the beginning or end of the of the five, but it has been argued in chain of caused causes, God appears to be recent times that Newton’s law concern- located conceptually ‘within’ the world; if ing motion ‘wrecks the argument of the God is ‘above’ the causal chain, how does First Way . . . Uniform motion of a body God’s agency operate and have we now can be explained by the principle of also changed the meaning of ‘cause’? inertia in terms of a body’s own previous Further, from an empiricist standpoint motion without appeal to any other Hume (1711–76) argued that what we agent’ (A. Kenny, TheFiveWays, Lon- observe is not efficient cause but only don: Routledge, 1969, 28). Further, constant conjunctions of events. Bergson (1859–1941) and Whitehead From the standpoint of critical phi- (1861–1947) argue philosophically that losophy, Kant (1724–1804) viewed process is fundamental both to the world cause–effect as structural categories andtoGod,andinChristiantheology imposed on what we observe in order that Moltmann (b. 1926) argues that the the human mind can order what it ongoing living God of the Bible is not perceives by means of intelligible con- simply the static ‘changeless’ God of cepts. ‘Categories’ derive from human philosophical theism. judgements. They are ‘regulative’, not ‘constitutive’ of the world itself. Recently, the second way Anthony Kenny has argued that the This rests on an exploration of the relation second way involves ‘equivocation between cause and effect. Strictly Aquinas between “first = earlier” and “first = appeals to efficient cause, as against unprecedented” to show that this series formal or final cause, and this is some- [of causes] cannot be an infinite one’ (The times known as the aetiological argument Five Ways,44). (from Greek aitı´a, cause). Aetiology often the third way seeks causes ‘behind’ effects, characteris- tically to do with origins. For Aquinas ‘a The argument depends on the distinction series of causes must . . . stop somewhere’ between possible or contingent and neces- (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 3, art. 3): sary objects, persons or states of affairs. In ‘Non est possibile quod . . . procedatur in the language of Aquinas, ‘the third way is infinitum.’ Therefore we are forced to based on what need not be (Latin, ex suppose ‘some first cause, to which every- possibili) and on what must be (neces- one gives the name God (aliquam causam sario)’. If every object or event were efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum contingent (i.e. might or might not be or nominant)’. have been), or subject to generation and to As first cause, God does not only corruption, we could in principle go back initiate causal processes, but also keeps far enough in time to reach a state of affairs them in being. In Barth’s language, God in which nothing existed. However, the holds his creation ‘from the abyss of non- totality of all that exists cannot be of this being’ (Church Dogmatics, I: 1, Edin- kind, for if this entailed the non-existence burgh: T & T Clark, 1975, 388). The of everything at any point, however rejection of an infinite chain of caused remote, nothing could subsequently have causes closely parallels the argument of come into existence. ‘One is forced, there- the Islamic philosopher Ibn Sina (or fore, to suppose something which must be Avicenna, 980–1037). of itself (ponere aliquid quod est per se Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas 104 necessarium)’. Such a thing (God) necessa- Plato believed that relative degrees of rily exists ‘of itself’ (Latin aseessegives gradation or attributes in the world rise to the philosophical notion of aseity pointed to a ‘superlative’ or perfect Form (i.e. having its own necessary ground). or Idea. However, for Artistotle things The distinctions between the first three rather than Ideas or Forms exist, and ways are fine. The first hinges on potenti- Aquinas follows the logic of Aristotle to ality to become; the second, also on argue that the superlative ‘highest degree’ efficient cause to maintain in being; the to which other things approximate third concerns all contingent, possible, or (appropinquant) in varying degrees is finite being as a whole. Kenny argues that ‘therefore something that is the truest their apparent failure lies in the extent to and best . . . and most in being (igitur which they are rooted in the conceptual aliquid quod est maxim verissimum et assumptions of the medieval cosmology of optimum et . . . maxime ens)’. ‘This we call the day. God.’ All the same, by the beginning of the This argument brings us at once into modern era some thinkers were still the complexities of an ancient logical developing these arguments. Samuel debate about the status of universals Clarke (1675–1729) focuses especially on (derived especially from Plato’s realm of a re-formulation of this third way. He Ideas). By contrast, nominalism perceives considers the status of ‘all things that are these not as real entities, but as names or or ever were in the universe . . . The whole semantic constructs used to denote classes cannot be necessary’. Hence he postulates rather than particulars. The debate ‘one immutable and independent being’ (A between nominalists and realists became Discourse Concerning Natural Religion, acute in the Middle Ages. 1705). More recently Richard Taylor (b. Wittgenstein (1889–1951) suggests 1919) has argued that whatever the that Platonic Forms and Ideas (cf. Aqui- argument might appear to claim about nas’s superlatives) may constitute para- an act of creation, the heart of the matter digm cases of what makes the quality or is to expose the issue of dependence on the attribute what it is. Many believe that the part of finite or contingent being (Meta- formulation of Aquinas owes too much to physics, 3rd edn Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Plato’s theory, in spite of his normally Prentice Hall, 1983). In contrast to the Aristotelian sympathies. It has been phenomenon of dependence in the world, argued that so great is his debt here to it is not irrational to conceive of a Being Anselm’s prior notion of God as Uni- who is dependent on nothing other than versal that this fourth way constitutes a itself. On the other hand Mill (1806–73) (disguised?) version of the apriori insisted that an infinite regress of finite ontological argument, even though Aqui- causes is more reasonable than the notion nas begins with degrees of attributes of a ‘first’ cause. within the world. Many theists regard the fourth way as the fourth way failing to provide an argument for divine This also begins (a posteriori) from our existence, but as underlining both conti- experience of the everyday world. In nuities and contrasts between the charac- everyday experience we come across ter of God and certain related qualities degrees of beauty, degrees of intelligence, found within the everyday world. Other degrees of truth, degrees of size or weight. theists, however, question whether the The argument is based ‘on the gradation ‘bottom up’ use of analogy does adequate found in things (ex gradibus qui in rebus justice to the transcendence or otherness inveniuntur)’.Thisisoftencalledthe of God, from whom human qualities in a henological argument. fallen world are both derivative and for 105 Foucault, Michel themostpartflawed(see analogy; specific tradition should not, however, language in religion). detract from the teleological argument as reformulated by more recent writers. the fifth way Again we allude to Kenny’s claim that This is the version of the teleological many of their limitations, even failures, argument for the existence of God advo- arise from their rootedness in the medieval cated by Aquinas. It is ‘based on the cosmology of the day. They represent a guidedness (or governance) of things in the significant stage in an ongoing debate world (ex gubernatione rerum)’. Aquinas about the status of the three main argu- believed that events and states of affairs ments for the existence of God, which has within the world do not occur by chance not yet reached a definitive conclusion. or accident (non a casu), ‘but tend to a (See also empiricism; possibility; rea- goal (sed ex intentione perveniunt ad lism; theism.) finem)’. Hence, just as a purposive occur- rence such as the flight of an arrow Foucault, Michel (1926–84) presupposes an archer, so everything in nature (omnes res naturales) is directed to Foucault, French postmodernist and phi- its goal (ordinantur ad finem) by someone losopher, believed that systems of knowl- with understanding. edge served, and were served by, systems Aquinas appeals to Augustine for his of power. He was particularly concerned view of God’s ‘ordering’ the world in with systems of bureaucratic and social sovereign goodness (Enchiridion, XI). control, or ‘regimes’. He calls in question ‘Nature (natura) works for a determinate the ‘innocence’ of ‘thinking’ in Des- end at the direction of a higher agent’, cartes: ‘I think’ already operates within whom Aquinas identifies both as ‘God’ a pre-given situatedness that belongs to an and as ‘the first of all causes . . . unchange- ‘order of things’, with its power and able and self-necessary’ (immobile et per control (The Order of Things, New York: se necessariium). Random House, 1970, 324; French, Les The validity of this approach is dis- mots et les choses, 1966). cussed below in the entry on the tele- The way in which social control shapes ological argument. The three most concepts is illustrated in Foucault’s A problematic general factors arise from History of Madness (1961) translated into Hume’s empiricist critique of causality English as Madness and Civilization (on which this argument still rests); on (1965). In classical Greece and Rome, Kant’s notion that ‘order’ is seen to be an madness was perceived as ‘unreason’. organizing or regulative category con- Most ‘mad’ people were treated as irra- structed or construed by the human mind; tional animals; a few were regarded as and the developmental behaviourism of ‘inspired’. By the nineteenth century mad- which Darwin’s theory of evolution is the ness was perceived as a mental illness, and most influential popular example. asylums were initially intended as places More specifically to Aquinas is his of sanctuary. In Marxist regimes in the notion of ‘natural law’, drawn in part Eastern bloc, ‘madness’ was attributed to from Aristotle and the Stoic notion of ius those whose views deviated from sup- naturale. Aquinas expounds his notion of posed public norms of ‘reality’, namely law as ‘an ordinance of practical reason’ in dissidents. which ‘the whole universe is governed by In his middle period Foucault pub- the divine reason . . . the eternal law . . . lished Discipline and Punish (1975; Eng- natural law’ in Summa Theologiae, Ia/Iiae, lish, 1977). ‘Surveillance’ is the power-tool Qu. 90–1, esp. Qu. 91, arts. 1–3 (Black- of the prison service, the police, the army, friars edn, vol. 28). The difficulties of this hospital authorities. Manipulation may be foundationalism 106 disguised by ‘the smiling face in the white ‘self-evident’ knowledge that Descartes is coat’, but privileged information gives aware of himself thinking (cogito, ibid., power for control. There is no room for 53), on the basis of which it is also negotiation, for bureaucrats hold all the demonstrable that he exists (ergo sum, cards. ibid.). The late period concludes with The By contrast, human opinions offer History of Sexuality (3 vols., 1976–84). ‘little basis for certainty’ (ibid., I, 33). Individuals, Foucault argued, are con- Descartes in fact uses the very metaphors trolled in part by self-perception and self- of ‘foundation’ and ‘house’. ‘Once in a scrutiny, but these are distorted percep- lifetime’ we must demolish the house and tions inherited from society. A comparison ‘start right from the foundations’ (Med- with Greek and Roman sexuality reveals itations, La Salle: Open Court, 1901, the socially contingent nature of sexual II, 31). In principle belief in God is also concepts. These are masked as ‘unsur- ‘an indubitable idea’, although this may passable’ by those whose power-interests be clouded by human prejudice (Medita- cohere with them. tions,V). Much of Foucault’s work reveals the Descartes is foundationalist in the full influence of Nietzsche (1844–1900). sense of the term. However, is his the only This is strengthened with a rhetoric of possible kind of foundationalism? postmodernity and a theory of social Plantinga (b. 1932) and Wolter- constructionism. All the same, Foucault storff (b. 1932) see Descartes as a takes his place alongside the ‘masters of ‘classical’, ‘narrow’, or ‘strong’ founda- suspicion’ (Marx, Nietzsche and Freud), tionalist. Plantinga points out that in identifying a false innocence in much ‘’ arose as a traditional epistemology, and its indivi- response to the challenge of evidentialism, dualism. i.e. the demand that belief is supported or warranted by demonstrable evidence. Otherwise, it was claimed, it is not foundationalism ‘reasonable’ or ‘entitled’ belief. Theists in The proper context of the word is that of the Reformed tradition argue that if epistemic justification, or issues in the theistic belief has itself to be ‘based upon’ justification of belief. Foundationalists some prior evidential or rational datum, see a belief-system as like a building that belief in God has been redefined as other rests upon a set of ‘basic’ or ‘foundational’ than ‘basic’ for the theist. beliefs. These are self-evident or self- Hence Plantinga proposes a ‘softer’ or justifying. Hence other ‘non-basic’ beliefs ‘broader foundationalism’ that postulates will be justified beliefs (or ‘entitled’ not prior or ‘basic’ beliefs of demon- beliefs) if they may be inferred from, or strable certainty but a ‘basic’ belief in are otherwise supported by, these basic, God which retains rationality or ‘rea- foundational beliefs. The belief-system sonableness’ on its own ground. Wol- will, in effect, take the form of a tiered terstorff was earlier perhaps less hierarchy. committed to speaking positively of foundationalism, but by the 1990s two types of foundationalism? expressed strong sympathy with the Descartes (1596–1650) provides a model broader ‘foundationalism’ of Locke for foundationalist rationalism.He (1632–1704). Wolterstorff ‘had attacked’ sought truth that is ‘absolutely indubi- classical foundationalism, but subse- table’; ‘truth so certain that sceptics were quently observed: ‘Our attack remained not capable of shaking it’ (Discourse on too superficial’ (John Locke and the Method, pt IV, 53–4). This begins from the Ethics of Belief, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, 107 freedom xi). He adds, ‘In Locke’s foundationalism Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff, eds., Faith there is revealed, more clearly than in and Rationality, Notre Dame: University Descartes, that depth for which I was of Notre Dame, 1983). looking’ (ibid.). While a ‘coherence’ view of truth In spite of differences of emphasis would normally not readily find room between Plantinga and Wolterstorff, both even for ‘soft’ foundationalism, other might very broadly be described as models have also been suggested. Witt- ‘broad’, ‘soft’, or perhaps ‘quasi’-founda- genstein’s modelofthe‘nestofproposi- tionalists. They avoid the supposed tions’ may allow for a ‘basic’ interweaving, ‘demonstrable certainties’ of either to which more things could be added. The rationalism (which implies a natural nest collapses if too much is taken away. A theology) or of empirical evidentialism. ‘soft’ coherence dimension holds it Both of the latter would impose a ‘basi- together, supported by the basic materials cality’ more foundational than theistic with which it began. belief. Nevertheless they reject the claim Yet too much should not be read from a that belief in God is groundless or irrational. metaphor or simile. It is worth recalling that Descartes’ house and foundations also anti-foundationalism and non- remain a metaphor. The tendency to use this foundationalism terminology to force a heated polemic over It might seem surprising that Plantinga epistemic justification may at times distract andWolterstorffseeksocarefullyto participants from the actual job in hand. To rescue a version of foundationalism, until debate the status of natural theology or the we note what ‘anti-foundationalism’ and grounds for reasonable belief is the prior ‘non-foundationalism’ usually denote in objective, and perhaps may not require these America. Anti-foundationalism is too labels. (See also certainty and doubt; often taken to imply either fideism, revelation; scepticism.) relativism or a rejection of epistemology, often on the basis of postmodernism. freedom Some promote a ‘narrative theology’ which transposes ontological and episte- Freedom is defined and understood differ- mological truth-claims about God into ently, sometimes by different thinkers, narratives about theistic communities. sometimes in different universes of dis- This kind of shift is as far from course. Freedom generally denotes the traditional theism as ‘hard’ or ‘classical’ capacity to act without external compul- foundationalism is in the opposite direc- sion, constraint or coercion. Yet this does tion. In Britain regret is sometimes not address the question of whether a expressed that these terms are used so given individual, unfettered by external widely, and often in dubious contexts, in coercion, is also free to choose any course America. Yet, given their prevalence, it is of action unfettered by internal constraints valuable to have precision from Plantinga upon that individual’s will to choose. and Wolterstorff, and their attempts at Larger philosophical issues are raised what looks like a necessary middle ground by the relation between freedom and for rational theists. determinism. Most people are likely to It is not clear, however, what we might accept responsibility for an action only conclusively infer from Plantinga’s discus- if they believe that they could have acted sion of criteria for ‘basicality’. While he otherwise. Yet some hold a determinist rejects the rationality of a hypothetical view that whatever occurs is determined belief in ‘the Great Pumpkin’, he defends by a chain of antecedent causes or the theist’s ‘reasonable belief’, but ‘not . . . conditions. ‘Hard’ determinists who on the basis of other propositions’ (A. believe that determinism excludes free-will defence 108 freedom are often designated as ‘incom- In theology and ethics freedom is patabilists’. often defined in terms of freedom to do By contrast, ‘compatabilists’ argue that the good, in contrast to that which proves sufficient freedom of action to give cur- harmful or self-destructive. Augustine rency to does not defines as the ‘purpose for which God exclude every kind of determinism. Yet gave free will’ as ‘in order to do right’ (On often determinism erodes the concept of Free Will, II: 1: 3). Aquinas declares that freedom to some such concept (among grace enables choice; sin restricts choice some compatibilists) as ‘free to choose in (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 83, arts. 2–4). accordance with the agent’s desires or character’. Augustine (354–430) sees no free-will defence reason to ‘think our free will is opposed to God’s foreknowledge’ (On Free Will, III: The free-will defence provides a response 4: 10). to issues that arise from the problem of evil, and finds classic expression in concepts of freedom Augustine (340–430) and Thomas Aqui- In practice, at least three distinct concepts of nas (1225–74). Evil, these theologians freedom are held. The liberty of indifference argue, is not the responsibility of God, denotes the view that an agent is free to for it originates in ‘a wilful turning of the choose either of two or more alternative self in desire from the highest good . . . It is courses of action, in effect in virtual the evil will which causes the evil act . . .’ equilibrium. Augustine ascribes such a free- (Augustine, City of God, XII. 6). dom to humankind before the Fall, but God gave free will to humankind as a argues that the presence of sin in the world gift to provide the possibility of doing suggests a need to modify this definition. right. However, by definition such free will Meanwhile, ‘it is a sufficient reason why thereby also permits the possibility (but [humankind] ought to have been given it not necessarily also the actuality) of evil [freedom], because without it humankind choice. ‘God’s gifts are good gifts’, but could not live aright’ (ibid., II: 1: 3). Pelagius humankind may choose to misuse them (c.360–c. 420) believed that all persons for purposes for which they were not possess this freedom of equilibrium. given. ‘God compels no-one to sin . . . Our Liberty of choice (sometimes called will would not be “will” unless it were in liberty of spontaneity) denotes the free- our power’ (On Free Will, III: 3: 8). dom to express the agent’s choice, desire, Over the years, many, including espe- will or character, even if internal habits, cially Plantinga, have supported and predispositions or concerns shape the developed the free-will defence argument. nature of this choice. This view is compa- Yet J.L. Mackie insists, ‘All forms of the tible with notions of autonomy:the free will defence fail’ (The Miracle of emphasis is upon self-direction. Aquinas Theism, Oxford: Clarendon, 1982, 176). writes, ‘Man has free choice, or otherwise Mackie notes that reluctance to accept counsels, exhortations, commands . . . determinism often arises from the belief would be in vain’ (Summa Theologiae, that if my actions were ‘predictable’ they Ia, Qu. 83, art. 1). wouldseemnot‘tostemfrom my will’, but The relation between character, habit, to ‘be mediated through it’ (ibid., 169). will, wish and desire makes this complex. Such an assumption, Mackie argues, is An agent may make a ‘free’ choice, and mistaken. An action is not ‘more mine’ if observe, ‘I was not “myself” when I no causes that could make it predictable decided to do that.’ Do circumstances that can be identified (ibid.). For example, a encourage action ‘out of character’ con- couple may freely reach ‘their own’ stitute an external constraint? decision to marry each other, yet all of 109 Freud’s critique of religion their close friends could have predicted mechanistic terms. He criticizes the view what would occur. For God to create that people ‘make[s] the forces of nature was ‘a hell of a risk’, . . . into persons . . . [even] into gods’ (The Mackie observes, when divine foreknow- Future of an Illusion, London: Hogarth ledge would tell what (at least) might Press, 1962, 13). occur, and a more restricted ‘freedom’ Freud was led to through could have ensured conditions for ‘right a study of hysteria. In particular he action’ with less risk (ibid., 162–76). explored the effects of hypnosis on this Nevertheless, others reject the notion condition. His first main work was pub- of ‘freedom’ that would be entailed if ‘all lished co-jointly with J. Breuer under the people freely to choose to do the right’. title Studies in Hysteria (1895). This was Perhaps the analysis of ‘concepts’ of free- soon followed by The Interpretation of dom (above) does not go far enough. Dreams (1899). Here Freud postulated that Colin Gunton argues that the ‘freedom’ what rises to expression in dreams provides given by God as gift entails ‘space between a mid-point of access to unconscious desires God and the world whereby God, by his and conflicts through the interpretation or action, enables the world to be truly itself’, hermeneutical process of ‘unscrambling’ but in terms of ‘personal integrity’ for what a person recounts as ‘the dream’. human agents that ‘gives due place to the The dream-as-dreamed, however (‘the other’. For ‘freedom’ is most construc- dream-thoughts’), is transposed by the tively defined ‘as for and (deriving) from human mind into the ‘dream-as-remem- the other’ (God and Freedom, Edinburgh: bered’ (‘the dream-content’). This serves T & T Clark, 1995, 132, 133). to hide the true desires or conflicts that Hick and Vincent Bru¨ mmer also retain may become exposed in the dream. a personal, or interpersonal, focus in this Thereby they are hidden both from the context, while Hick explores the related self and from the psychiatrist. concept of ‘epistemic distance’ (Hick, Evil Hence the dream-content may be a and the God of Love, London: Macmillan, ‘condensation’ of the dream-thoughts. It 1966 and 1977; Bru¨ mmer, Speaking of a may be edited to make it ‘brief, meagre, Personal God, Cambridge: CUP, 1992, and laconic’, and may embody ‘displace- 128–51). Bru¨ mmer believes that attacks ments’ of sequences and images for the upon the free-will defence are misplaced purpose of disguise. ‘Psychoanalysis’ seeks when they fail to see ‘that the free-will to recover the deeper ‘text’ below the defence is based on the love of God rather dream-content, or dream-as-recounted. than the supposed intrinsic value of neurosis, disguise, and psychoan- human freedom and responsibility’ (ibid., alysis: 144). (See also Swinburne.) In an incisive appreciation and critique of Freud, Ricoeur points out that Freud Freud’scritiqueofreligion evolves, in an effect, a hermeneutics of (1856–1939) developed the suspicion (Freud and Philosophy: An theory and medical practice of psychoana- Essay in Interpretation,NewHaven: lysis in Vienna, which centred on probing Yale, 1970). Freud takes psychological beneath consciousness and more shallow data that are capable of being inter- explanations of human behaviour to pre- preted at a number of levels, in a number conscious and unconscious drives and con- of ways, and sometimes many times over flicts. These seemed to offer more probing (technically, ‘overdetermined texts’) and explanations for human desires and actions. seeks to get to the bottom of what is Pre-conscious drives are construed by really being ‘said’ (the sub-text, or deep Freud in naturalistic or, in effect, text). Freud’s critique of religion 110

The problem, from the point of view of unacceptable to society, the ‘repression’ theism or religion, is that Freud regards of such desires and drives (i.e. pressing these drives or disguised motivativations them down into pre-conscious depths until as purely ‘forces’, or the product of forces. they are hidden from self-awareness) Such psychological processes as repres- causes damaging neurosis. sion, displacement or the investing of Psychoanalysis uses the interpretation energies in another are regarded as bio- of dreams, explorations of early childhood physical forces. Hence Freud borrows ‘memories’, and ‘free association’, to such a term as ‘cathexis’ from economics trigger unconscious ‘give-aways’. These to denote ‘investing’ sexual energy in produce awareness of disguises and con- another person. flicts. This process may be painful; but On the other side, Freud convincingly only if the source of neurosis and its exposes the ‘opaqueness’ of human con- condition are recognized can the neurotic sciousness, even to the self. The self is conflict of opposing forces that saps the driven by drives and desires that it seeks to energies of the self begin therapeutic hide and to disguise even from itself. This resolution. raises no difficulty for theism or for Without such psychoanalytical therapy religion. The Hebrew scriptures and Paul the repressed content of the mind festers the Apostle concur that the human heart away, preventing sublimation (or creative deceives both itself and others about its re-channelling) of these frustrated desires motives and intentions (Jer. 17:9; Rom. into more fruitful goals pursued by a 7:11; 1 Cor. 4:4, 5). Freud saw the uncon- united self. Looking to his early work on scious as ‘the centre of resistance of truth’. hysteria, Freud diagnoses hysteria as a Why should the unconscious constitute frequent effect of the emotional shock a mechanism of disguise and deceit? This produced by a collision between deeply emerges in Freud’s middle and later works, repressed wishes within the self. including Totem and Taboo (1912–13), religion as a ‘universal The Ego and the Id (1923) and The Future obsessional neurosis of of an Illusion (1927). The ‘superego’ acts humankind’? as a censor or moral judge that reflects the expectations of society (in childhood All of the above considerations set the years, of parents and teachers). The ‘id’ stage for understanding the nature of is the source of the drives of the into Freud’s critique of religion. Religions, the psyche. It energizes the self especially especially theism, provide a mechanism, through sexual energy and desire. Freud claims, for projecting the inner The third factor within the self is the conflicts of neurosis upwards and out- ‘ego’, the rational, conscious self that is wards away from the self. torn by conflict and by pressure, on one This cannot offer a ‘final’ or authentic side to obey the directions of the superego solution, because in Freud’s view religion as censor and judge; on the other side, by tries to solve a problem of disguise by the powerful drives of the id to seek means of the even deeper disguise that satisfaction for the sexual energies and projects inner states into a god-figure. This drives that power it. occurs in religious myths and stories. When this conflict becomes sufficiently However, if religion appears to ‘comfort’ acute to cause discomfort and potential some, this is because it may soften, or damage, this condition is one of ‘neurosis’. seem superficially to soften, the neurotic The person needs treatment and therapy conflict that would otherwise be unbear- as a ‘neurotic’ patient. Although it may be able. healthy to ‘suppress’ (i.e. to channel, By initial over-simplification (qualified control or sublimate) desires that are below) we might say that in infancy the 111 Freud’s critique of religion human person may project upwards or recognition of infantile sexuality. ‘The outwards on one side the sanctions and Oedipus complex’ denotes sexual feelings discipline represented by the figure of the toward the parent of the opposite sex. father-parent, and on the other side the Freudalsoelaboratedacorporate father-figure’s love and protection. The socio-historical theory at the level of the father’s affirmation of both the superego human race rather than the individual. He and also in part certain desires for the acknowledged that he was attracted by the gratification of the self (food, protection, theories of Darwin and Spencer on comfort, security) are projected onto a evolution. Further, the works of E.B. ‘God’ of judgement and grace. The father Tylor on cultural anthropology, W. who gazes into the cradle is magnified into Robertson Smith on totemism and J.G. infinity as ‘God’. Frazer on ‘primitive’ religion provided However, Freud’s hypotheses are more fertile soil for Freud’s theories. In 1907 complex than this. In accordance with the Freud argued that religious rites are intellectual fashions of the late nineteenth similar to neurotic obsessive actions, and early twentieth centuries, Freud draws working this out in Totem and Taboo. heavily on developmental and evolution- The ‘totem’ animal protects the primi- ary theories of the human race and of the tive tribe or group; on the other side individual. ‘Religion’ is associated with murder and incest constitute the main the ‘infantile’ stage of human person, and prohibited ‘taboos’. This appeared to also with the stage of totem and taboo in Freud to offer an ethnological parallel to the evolution of the human race. Each of the duality and conflict of the infantile these draws upon ‘myth’. Oedipus myth and Oedipus complex. In relation to the infant Freud appeals The strength and power of human to the Oedipus myth, in which the ‘hero’ wishes may generate ‘illusion’, but not of the myth directs sexual desire (uncon- ‘delusion’ (difference explained below). If sciously) to his mother, and kills the father religion utilizes such illusion to soften the who stands in his way. The father-figure is conflicts of neurosis, the price that is paid ambivalent: on one side, a source of help is the tendency towards infantile regres- and love; on the other, a threat to sion. This may include ‘longing for a independence and self-gratification. Sub- father . . . [as] defence against childish mission and rebellion struggle. Hence the helplessness’ (The Future of an Illusion, projection of the ‘God-figure’ permits 20). This may hinder genuine maturity ‘forgiveness’ for sexual and self-centred and growth. desires and gives help and grace, while the Yet in his latest writings Freud does not ‘worshipper’ regresses into childhood presume to pronounce on the truth or dependency. falsehood of these ‘illusions’. Illusions are without foundation, but they are not false religion, infantile regression delusions. ‘To assess the truth-value of and human maturity religious doctrine does not lie within the In his earliest writings Freud allowed scope of the present enquiry. It is enough himself to speculate about repressed mem- for us that we have recognized them as . . . ories of pre-pubertal sexual assaults by illusions’ (ibid., 29). fathers, which gave rise to hysteria until difficulties about some of psychoanalysis yielded the ‘cathartic dis- freud’s claims charge’ of the disguised, buried conflict- traumas. He later abandoned this theory, It cannot be denied that many religious but remained convinced that psychic people show signs of regression into energy arose primarily from sexual desire. immature attitudes. Faith may serve as a Life-force is Eros. His theories demand the psychological crutch, as Nietzsche also Freud’s critique of religion 112 observed. However, it is not the case that some further assessments this applies to all, or even perhaps to most, religious people, or that it begins to Freud does not carefully compare alter- approach the stereotypical. native models of the nature of religion. His Dietrich Bonhoeffer insists that Chris- views remain selective and speculative. tian people, for example, would never This does not detract from, or fail to choose a religion of the cross to gain recognize, the huge advance in under- ‘comfort’; it serves the reverse: the nurture standing that Freud made possible, and of courage, affirmation of life, and living on which others have built. It cannot be life to the full in the service of the other. denied that human wishes and motiva- Moltmann responds in the same way. tions are often disguised. Indeed religions, The life of the Spirit, he asserts, is one of as we have noted, often agree on this ‘universal affirmation’ to life; not of point. Further, the dividing-line between retreat or self-protection. ‘child-like’ and ‘childish’ is often mis- Second, speculation about a father- judged in religion. figure cuts both ways. It is well known (1870–1937) and Jung that Freud had a damaged relationship (1875–1961) also offer very different with his own father. Might his own accounts of the ‘drives’ and desires of account of religion, on his own premises, human persons. Adler ascribes this not to have something to do with expelling ‘the the urges of the id which are in conflict Father’ from the realm of ontological with the superego, but to a striving for truth-claims as a wish-fulfilment? power. Neurosis arises from a sense of Third, a counter-reply would apply inferiority. Jung stresses even more both to the second point and to Freud’s strongly the interpretation of human entire theories. As he came to see at the ‘wholeness’, and offers a more construc- close of his career, does wishing either for tive account of religion as furthering this the truth or for the falsity or of religion, integration. make any difference at all to its actual As in our assessment of Nietzsche, we status as true or false? Does it offer a may acknowledge the contribution of both criterion about ‘illusion’? thinkers as ‘masters of suspicion’ in Fourth, the first point may be extended exposing abuses and manipulative strate- to emphasize the enormous variety of gies in some forms of religion. This has temperaments, psychological conditions, provoked such thinkers as Bonhoeffer and expectations, personal histories and ethnic Moltmann to respond with sober critiques histories of those who are ‘religious’. Can of inauthentic religion. Nevertheless, as all these diverse characterizations fit into Freud seemed to recognize in his latest the category of neurosis and obsession writings, it falls beyond the scope of concerning which Freud speculates? empirical sciences to offer a definitive Fifth, Freud is too heavily influenced by verdict on the truth or falsity of religion the naturalistic bioneurological explana- as an ontological world-view. Freud’s tions and metaphors which he assimilated empirical observations remain valuable, from Breuer, and subsequently only mar- but are certainly not an exhaustive ginally modifies. Can the human mind be account of ‘religion’. ‘explained’ exhaustively as a neurological Although other schools of psychology cause–effect mechanism? Even if Freud at and psychiatry have overtaken much of times seeks to go beyond the neuro- Freud’s theory, the clock can never be put physiological to the genuinely psychologi- back behind his influential work, whatever cal, how far does he succeed in recogniz- the evaluation of details. ing the genuine agency of human persons Constructive and sympathetic critiques as human persons? of Freud’s critique can be found in 113 Freud’s critique of religion

Ricoeur’s Freud and Philosophy, and Hans existence or non-existence of God’. Even Ku¨ ng, Does God Exist? (London: Collins/ if some religions may be illusions, ‘it need Fount, 1980), 262–340; also Ku¨ ng, Freud not be’ (ibid., 77). ‘A real God may and the Problem of God (New Haven: correspond to the wish for God’ (ibid., 78). Yale, 1979). Ku¨ ng cites Freud’s own Religion is more than a quest for the ‘modest’ admission that he provides only satisfaction of personal needs, and where ‘some psychological foundation’ to Feuer- ‘religion’ is understood mistakenly in this bach’s materialist and anti-theistic theory way, a critique of such religion is of projection. required. We have noted that in the case Ku¨ ng comments, ‘Freud took over of Christian religion, Bonhoeffer and from Feuerbach . . . the essential argu- Moltmann, among others, have provided ments for his personal atheism (Freud and such incisive critiques. (See also empiri- the Problem of God, 75). Ku¨ ng adds, ‘No cism; hermeneutics; ontology; conclusions can be drawn about the science.) G

Gadamer, Hans-Georg Eng. 2nd edn (from Ger. 5th edn.), (1900–2002) London: Sheed & Ward, 1989). He uses the word ‘method’ negatively and ironi- Together with Ricoeur Gadamer is one of cally to indicate that the method of the two most influential writers on her- ‘science’ from Descartes to the Enlight- meneutics in the twentieth century. His enment lays down criteria of rationality in importance for philosophy of religion is advance of specific historical situations of manifold, but three points deserve parti- enquiry in life, and thereby restricts and cular note. distorts dimensions of understanding that First, like Hegel and Heidegger may surpass these criteria. (under whom he studied) Gadamer insists In part I of Truth and Method Gada- that knowledge and understanding are mer compares the shallower individualis- rooted in time and history. Second, he tic ‘Cartesian’ or ‘Enlightenment’ distinguishes between technical ‘reason’ rationalist tradition with deeper, commu- for functional tasks and ‘wisdom’ (phron- nity-orientated, historical understanding, eˆsis), which is generated by corporate from Roman times to Vico and beyond. historical experience and transmitted in Being immersed in a work of art or in play terms of its effects within tradition. Third, offers a richer paradigm within which the he stands at the border between enlight- art or play ‘speaks’ as subject, unrest- enment rationalism and postmoder- ricted by the prior dictates of individual nity, viewing neither as adequate. consciousness. ‘Art cannot be defined as In his earlier writings Gadamer pro- an object of aesthetic consciousness . . . duced a number of studies of Plato,in It is part of the event of being that occurs which he emphasized the productive in presentation’ (ibid., 116). ‘Play draws importance of asking questions. This also him [the player] into . . . a reality that shows the importance of dialectic in the surpasses him’ (ibid., 109). Art, not the sense of conversation. Bare propositions mind, becomes the active, transformative, may lend themselves to abuse as propa- ‘subject’. ganda; ‘the logic of question and answer’ In part II Gadamer traces the ‘pre- gives rise to exploratory discovery. history’ of hermeneutics in Romanticism, Gadamer’s most widely read and influ- Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and its ential work is Truth and Method ([1960]; blossoming in Heidegger. The key notion 115 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid of the ‘history of effects’ of successive al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid processes of understanding (German, (1058–1111) Wirkungsgeschichte, often translated ‘effective history’) takes account of histor- Al-Ghazali was associated with the Bagh- ical distance between different times, but dad centre of Islamic philosophy (see also permits a partial ‘fusion of horizons’ al-Kindi and al-Farabi). However, between those of the person who seeks to within this tradition he strongly opposed understand (including his or her agenda of al-Farabi’s belief in the eternity of the questions) and the horizons of that of world, and any accommodation with the which understanding is sought. This his- Plotinian and Neoplatonic notions of tory of effects traces a relatively stable divine emanations. God created the uni- core of tradition. verse out of nothing, and gave it its In part III Gadamer explores the nature temporal beginning. of language as that which is both inherited The eternity of the world, al-Ghazali and transmitted as an ontological ‘given’ maintained, was both contrary to the (as well as shaped and shaping) that is Qur’an and philosophically indefensible. always on the move. It provides the He affirmed that post-mortal existence ‘universal’ horizon within which historical involved not only the immortality of the and finite particular events, texts, objects soul, but also the resurrection of the body. or persons are understood. The titles of several of his works exemplify It is widely recognized that Gadamer his strong reaction against privileging succeeds in calling into question a ‘ration- philosophy over revelation, e.g. The Inco- ality’ or rationalism that is based on herence of the Philosophers. ‘timeless’ individualism, or individual sub- Not surprisingly, therefore, al-Ghazali jective consciousness alone. He anticipates attacked with no less force the claims of the post-modern emphasis on ‘situated- al-Farabi to grant this privilege of philo- ness’ and pluralism, but does not travel sophy over religion. In positive terms he down a relativist road. He also emphasizes aimed to reverse this error in such works (against postmodernism) the stability and as The Revival of the Religious Sciences continuity of traditions as transmitters and and in his autobiography The Deliverance filters of truth. from Error. Truth, for which he spent his Nevertheless, it is also recognized that life in life-long quest, remains a gift of in spite of the magisterial stature of his divine grace. work, Gadamer leaves virtually all The core of al-Ghazali’s philosophical questions about criteria of truth to be theology remains, in harmony with the worked out retrospectively or post hoc Qur’an, his emphasis on divine sover- from case to case in ways that too readily eignty. He pressed this to its most radical evaporate. Further, Ju¨ rgen Habermas and limit, arguing that effects in the world others criticize his work for inadequate spring not from mediate, efficient causes attention to social values and social but directly from the will of Allah or God. interests. This leads him into a formulation of Gadamer’s major contribution is to Occasionalism. raise questions that arise from the relation Al-Ghazali’s quest for truth led him to of history and tradition to human under- resign from his post in Baghdad, to standing, and to demonstrate that such embark on the solitary life of the mystic. questions are unavoidable. His work con- As a Sufi (the mystical strand within stitutes a turning-point (among others) in Islam), he wandered for some ten years the history of ideas, and makes a funda- through many centres of Islamic learning. mental contribution to philosophical her- Although in his last years he returned to meneutics. teaching, he stressed especially divine God, arguments for the existence of 116 grace and human fallibility. (See also emphasizing the ‘otherness’ or transcen- mysticism; Neoplatonism; Plotinus.) dence of God. They underline the logical impropriety, for example, of asking such a God, arguments for the question as ‘Who made God?’ existence of On the other hand, if ‘God’ is God, what kind of evidence might we expect to two kinds of arguments find for God’s existence? Kierkegaard Broadly, arguments for the existence of (1813–55) declared that to try to prove the God have rested on either or both of two existence of the God who addresses us is a different approaches. The cosmological ‘shameless affront’. Buber declared that argument and teleological argu- next to the foolishness of denying God is ment begin from our experience of the the folly of trying to prove God. If God everyday world, and draw inferences from were logically demonstrable, would such a these data and observations to seek to God be God? establish the reasonableness of the belief Tillich (1886–1965) argued that to that God exists. This is an a posteriori ascribe ‘existence’ to God amounts to argument. By contrast, the ontological reducing God to a mere object of thought. argument for the existence of God Rather, God is ‘Being-itself’ (Systematic begins from the very concept of God as Theology, vol. 1, London: Nisbet, 1953, God, and seeks to show that by internal 261). Where the arguments fail most logical necessity this concept carries sharply, some believe, they help to exhibit with it divine existence or Being. This is the peculiar way in which God is elusive, an a priori argument. transcendent, ‘Other’ and Beyond. These arguments may also be expressed While the cosmological and other a in negative terms, and this may give them posteriori arguments may fail because they greater plausibility. The first approach risk embracing ‘God’ too closely within postulates that the everyday world cannot the chains of cause and effect that constitute the ground of its own existence, characterize the world, this approach unless we resort to the implausible hypoth- may nevertheless help to underline the esis of an infinite chain of contingent or historical and temporal dimensions of finite causes. The second approach postu- God’s action within the world. lates that if we conceive of God as God, By contrast the ontological a priori the denial of God’s existence results in argument may seem to fail because it risks logical self-contradiction. perceiving God as a timeless abstraction of logic, divorced from the real world. Yet can the arguments serve a this approach nevertheless presupposes the purpose if they are not unique ‘otherness’ of the God who trans- valid? cends all phenomena within the world. The logical implications and complexities ‘God’ is not the kind of Being who might of these arguments have fascinated many be located’ by means of space flight or thinkers who nevertheless remain uncon- theories of cosmology. This would be a vinced by them. They have even been logical mistake. It is perhaps what Ryle turned on their head as disproofs of God’s would call a ‘category mistake’. existence. The first approach, however, One reason why Buber, Jewish philo- finds a place in ancient Greek philosophy, sopher of religion, regards these argu- andinJewish,ChristianandIslamic ments as misleading is that he understands theism. God as a ‘Thou’ or ‘You’ who addresses A number of theologians who reject the us, while seeking to prove God’s existence logical validity of the arguments as seems to turn God into an ‘It’, or passive ‘proofs’ nevertheless see value in them as object of thought. However, while many 117 God, arguments for the existence of theists agree that ‘God’ cannot be logically motus); the second on efficient cause demonstrable, the traditional arguments (causae efficientis); and the third on the tend cumulatively to suggest that belief in contrast between contingency (possible God’s existence is not irrational. At very being) and necessity (ex possibili et neces- least, it is no less reasonable a belief than sario; Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 2, art. atheism or agnosticism. 3, London: Blackfriars edn, 1963, vol. 2, 13–15). a posteriori arguments from ‘A thing in process of change cannot our experience of the world itself cause that same change’ (ibid.). In We often seek to draw inferences from the contrast between the potential and the everyday observations or experience to actual ‘a series of causes must . . . stop something which we infer from these (a somewhere’ (ibid.). Strictly this ‘second’ posteriori). If on a walk, for example, we way is accorded the term ‘the cosmologi- find a single glove on the ground, it is cal argument’, but all of the first three of reasonable to infer 1) that a passer-by the five ways are variant forms of it. God preceded us; and 2) that they dropped and is God’s own ground (see aseity). lost a glove. Theists find many ‘clues’ Descartes (1596–1650) attempted a within the world that point to divine reformulation of the cosmological argu- agency, activity or Being. ment, although few would accept his In ancient Greek philosophy Plato, distinctive view of cause. Hume (1711– (428–348 bce)inLaws X, and Aristotle 76) questioned whether efficient causality (384–322 bce), in Metaphysics XII, could be established by empirical observa- argued that the finitude or contingency tion, and Kant viewed causality as a of objects or events in the world (objects category in terms of which the human or events that might or might not have mind ordered the world. Hence neither been) could not provide adequate grounds Hume nor Kant accept the validity of this for the world’s coming into being. An argument. endless chain of contingent or finite The fifth way of Thomas Aquinas causes, they argue, remains implausible. represents a version of the teleological Similarly movement or change within the argument for the existence of God. Aqui- world points to a Being who is changeless, nas calls this the argument from the or the ground of change; to a Being who is ‘guided’ nature of the world (gubernatione ‘necessary’ rather than contingent. rerum), or from purposive or ‘final’ causes Aristotle’s approach was revived in that presuppose a goal (ad finem). Islamic philosophy by Ibn Sina (Avi- In the eighteenth century the classic cenna, 980–1037) among others, and in exponent was Paley (1743–1805). How- Christian thought most notably by Tho- ever, since Paley’s era, many argue that the mas Aquinas (1225–74). Ibn Sina under- combined force of Kant’s Critique of lined the implausibility of an infinite chain Judgement, which ascribed ‘order’ to a of contingent causes, in contrast to the projection of the human mind, of Darwin more reasonable explanation that behind (1809–82) and of biodevelopmental the- all finite causes stood the One Necessary ories of evolution, transposed the debate Being, who is neither caused nor contin- into a new key. gent. an a priori argument from Thomas Aquinas declares, ‘There are the logic of the concept of Five Ways in which one can prove that god there is a God’ (Latin, quinque viis probari potest). Of these the first three argue a The ontological argument for the exis- posteriori. ‘The first way is based on tence of God rests on purely logical (a change’ (Latin, Prima via sumitur ex parte priori) considerations, not on observations God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of 118 drawn from experience of the world (a concepts of god: god as posteriori) arguments. In Proslogion 2–4 transcendent and immanent Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) In theism the distinction between God and declares that God is ‘that than which no the created order finds expression in divine greater can be conceived’ (Latin, a liquid transcendence, namely the belief that God quo maius cogitari possit). Barth rightly is ‘Other’, and ‘Beyond’ the world. Some, emphasizes that this utterance occurs in including Kant, argue that God is beyond the context of worship rather than of human thought. Linked with this notion theoretical argument. Anselm continues: of transcendence as ‘other’ is the notion of ‘You alone, of all things, exist in the truest God as holy and sovereign, but this takes and greatest way’ (Latin, verissime et us into the area of the ‘attributes’ of God. maxime esse). On the other hand, Barth relates this Nevertheless, Anselm begins to draw an divine transcendence to God’s surpassing inference from this paean of praise. The very of all human definition and characteriza- notion of ‘maximal greatness’ in every tion. Only divine self-revelation allows respect must include existence in reality, human persons to have even analogical since if ‘God’ were to exist only ‘in the mind’ concepts of God. this would not constitute maximal great- Islamic philosophy especially ness. Over the centuries some have endorsed emphasizes the prohibition of images or the argument, provided that it is applied representations of God. In general Juda- uniquely to God alone. Others perceive a ism and Christianity share this reserve on logical fallacy that confuses existence of a two grounds: first, God cannot be com- concept with existence of a reality. prehended or objectified in this way (see Barth is typical of those theologians objectification); second, God created who perceive it not as an argument about humankind to show forth God’s image God’s existence, but as primarily under- through holy human personhood. Many lining the transcendence or Otherness of Christian theologians, notably Eberhard the sovereign God in contrast to the Ju¨ ngel (b. 1934), argue that the ‘think- world. For more detail see entries on ability’ or ‘conceivability’ of God turns cosmological, teleological and ontological ultimately on the enfleshment of God in arguments. (See also empiricism; logic; Jesus Christ (God as the Mystery of the possibility; reason; syllogism.) World, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, and Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983, 105– God, concepts and ‘attributes’ 225). of Yet if God is ‘beyond’ the world, God is also said to be near; indeed God is present This entry summarizes a number of key ‘within’ the world, animating and sustain- issues under this heading to provide a ing it moment by moment. This view is general perspective on, or overview of, this known as that of divine immanence (God large subject. More specific and detailed remains, or dwells, within the world). problems that arise under each section are pietism, mysticism and warm devotional treated in other entries. Thus concepts of religion perceive God as closer than God may be differentiated in more detail human heart-beats. under such headings and entries as pantheism, deism and theism, and also concepts of god: god in transcendence and immanence. ‘Attri- relation to the world butes’ of God include especially divine omnipotence, omnipresence and The main traditions of theism in Judaism, omniscience as well as eternity and Christianity and Islam, therefore, place a immutability. dual emphasis upon the transcendence and 119 God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of immanence of God. For God is not to be Thomas Aquinas reflects the Hebrew– equated with creation, even the whole of Christian–Islamic tradition when he creation (as in pantheism); but God is not asserts that to declare ‘God is One’ has so far ‘above’ the world that God does not practical consequences. To assert the act within it (as in deism). Hebrew Shema from Deuteronomy 6:4, Deist concepts of God tended to ‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one flourish in the seventeenth and eighteenth God’, carries three implications or corol- centuries in conjunction with quasi- laries. ‘First, . . . God is simple’, i.e. ‘to be mechanistic models of the world. The God is to be this God’. ‘Second . . . God’s world was viewed as if it were a machine perfection is unlimited’, in contrast to that God had set in motion. To intervene , in which ‘something belong- in the workings (e.g. by ‘miracles’) might ing to one God would not belong to the imply that God had created an imperfect other’. Third, the one God is ‘the primary machine that required repairs. Hence the source of unity and order’ (Summa Theo- deist picture is that of a God who watches logiae, Ia, Qu.11, art. 3). This coheres the universe, as if from a distance, without with the biblical emphasis upon the unity, taking further action within it. coherence and integrity of life committed Pantheistic concepts of God tend to to one God as one Lord. flourish either in Eastern religions, espe- concepts of god: god as a cially Advaita Vedanta schools of Hindu- human projection? ism, or in conjunction with organic, non- mechanistic, models of the world. Thus No less fundamental a question concerns Spinoza (1632–77) argued that we may the basis of human concepts of God. speak either of ‘God’ or of ‘nature’ (Deus, Feuerbach (1804–72) believed that sive Natura), since either term denotes an Christian theology masked the true human infinite reality. J.G. Herder (1744–1803) origin and nature of belief in God. With and Johann W. Goethe (1749–1832), at Hegel, he saw philosophy as a critical the dawn of the Romantic era, when advance upon religion, which dealt with rationalism hadpasseditszenith, images rather than critical concepts. ‘Con- stressed the organic, anti-mechanistic sciousness of God is self-consciousness . . . aspect of Spinoza’s pantheism. Anthropology [is] the mystery of theology’ In contrast to pantheism, (Essence of Christianity [1854], New stresses that God is present and active in York: Harper, 1957, 12, 336). Human all created things, although God is also consciousness projects outwards and more than God’s creation. Process phi- upwards ‘the infinity of consciousness’ to losophy offers one example of such hypostatize or objectify a God-figure as if thought, but such a notion is also ‘out there’ (ibid., 2, 3). expressed co-jointly by ancient Greek As Hans Ku¨ ng observes, this is the first writers and the New Testament (Acts instance of a ‘planned’ atheism (Does 17:28): ‘In God we live and move and God Exist? London: Collins/Fount, 1980, have our being.’ 192–216). It confuses claims about the Even more fundamental, however, are force of wishing with truth-claims. Yet the contrasts between and Feuerbach laid the foundation for Karl polytheism, and between theism and Marx (1818–83) and his account of dualism. Theism has been defined as ‘God’. ‘belief in one God, the Creator, who is Marx reinterpreted Feuerbach’s cri- infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal tique of religion in social and political . . . perfect, omniscient and omnipotent’ terms. The basic origins of concepts of (H.P. Owen, Concepts of Deity, London: God and the practice of religions lay in Macmillan, 1971, 1). socio-economic conditions. Against God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of 120

Feuerbach, Marx dismissed the primacy of concepts of god: ‘non-realism’ ‘consciousness’, and replaced it by the or revelation? primacy of social and economic condi- tions, especially of labour, exchange-value More recently the English philosopher of and power. Religion provides a ‘moral religion Cupitt has offered a ‘non-realist’ sanction’ for oppression of the poor. view of God, which shares with Feuerbach Because of its other-worldly and illusory and with Freud the notion that ‘God . . . prospect of eternal ‘reward’, it serves to and his attributes are a kind of projection’ sedate the masses: ‘It is the opium of the (Taking leave of God, London: SCM, people’ (Collected Works, vol. 3, New 1980, 85). ‘I do not suppose God to be York: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, 175). an objectified individual over and above Marx, like Nietzsche, ascribes the gen- the religious requirement’ (ibid., 87). His esis or promotion of ‘God’ to vested main difference from Feuerbach and Freud interests of power and control. is that the projection is generated by being Marx correctly perceived the impor- ‘religious’, even if God is not ‘there’. There tance of social forces as against mere is ‘nothing beyond’ human beings (A. theory or abstract ideas. However, as Freemen, Faith in Doubt: Non-Realism with Nietzsche’s analysis, the observation and Christian Belief, London: Mowbray, that many abuse religion for purposes of 1993, 7). class interest or for socio-economic Nevertheless, all the major theistic power does not invalidate authentic traditions claim not that God is ‘reached’ theistic belief as such. Marx’s views of by sheer intellectual effort alone, but that history, economics and religion fall short God initiates a relationship with human- through monolithic generalization. (For a kind by choosing to disclose divine pre- fuller critique, see Marxist critiques sence and action. Revelation unveils what of religion.) would otherwise remain unknowable, as Freud (1856–1939) perceived the divine gift. This may occur through sacred origins of concepts of God to lie in the writings, events in the world, disclosure- projection upwards and outwards of situations, or, for Christians, through Jesus the inner conflicts of neurosis within the Christ. Islam stresses the inspired gift of human mind. The conflict between the the Qur’an; Judaism, the Hebrew scrip- drive to fulfil personal gratification (espe- tures; Christians also stress the role of the cially sexual drives) and the repression of Bible. these drives by society and moral con- It has been suggested that a ‘god’ who ventions can be softened by projecting waits to be demonstrated by human them ‘upwards’ onto a ‘God’ of judge- reasoning from the nature of the world ment and grace. This ‘God’ is both judge (a posteriori), or a conceptual ‘god’ who and comforting father. Especially the emerges from purely axiomatic reasoning projection of a perfect, affirming father- (a priori) would not be God (see God, figure enables human persons to cope arguments for the existence of). with these inner conflicts through this Kierkegaard, Buber and Barth take this illusory device of projection and externa- view. Barth further argues that a truly lization. sovereign God who is ‘Other’ chooses A closer study of Freud exposes the where, when and how to disclose and to limitations and speculative nature of some communicate God’s own Being and nat- of his theories of the human mind. He also ure. Such a God, he argues, has more confuses (like Feuerbach) what wish-fulfil- authenticity as God than any projection ment may project with issues of truth. from human consciousness. Can ‘wishing’ in itself make what is More precisely, Pannenberg (b. 1928) wished for either true or false? insists that otherness and universality 121 God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of belong so inextricably to the concept of Indeed, ‘God alone is good by nature’, God that ‘the term “God” . . . serves to bonus per suam essentiam; ibid., Qu. 6, interpret what is encountered in it . . . The art. 3). situation is expressed as encounter with The notion that God is infinitus (Latin) Another . . . The word “God” is used for may be translated as ‘God is infinite’ or as this Other’ (Systematic Theology, vol. 1, ‘God is unlimited’. Following Aristotle, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991, 67). Aquinas considers several objections to Pannenberg concedes that part of this this assertion. How can the summit of ‘Otherness’ consists in ‘the unity and perfection be ‘limitless’? totality’ entailed in the concept of God. This introduces what today we might ‘If the word [God] is like a blank face to call the logical grammar of the assertion us, it reminds us by its very strangeness of that the infinity of God is internal to God’s the lack of meaning in modern life, in nature as God. In an obvious sense, which the theme of life’s unity and totality everything other than God derives from is missing’ (ibid., 71). However, he under- God. God is infinitus in the sense of stands the concept of God as implying a aseity. God is also infinitus in the sense ‘totality’ that confronts and addresses that God possesses unlimited power. This humanity as ‘Other’, not merely as an will be noted further in the next section extension of human consciousness. (but see the entry on omnipotence). ‘Infinity’ finds expression in the tem- ‘attributes’ of god? perfect, poral dimension through language about good, infinite, eternal, one God as eternal. However, ‘calling God Our use of inverted commas signals eternal does not imply his being measured reserve but not outright rejection of the by something extrinsic’ (ibid., Qu. 10, art. conventional use of the term ‘attributes’ to 2). God has neither beginning nor end, denote features of distinguishing charac- and is not capable of decay into non- teristics of God, especially those that are existence (ibid., art. 4). Yet eternity is inseparable from, or internal to, God’s more than ‘human’ time stretched out own nature as God. The problem about indefinitely at both ‘ends’. Boethius the word derives from its use by Aris- offers the classic model when he insists totle to denote the properties of objects that eternity belongs to God, since time is understood as categories of space, time a property of the created order. and relation. God, however, is not an Boethius conceived of eternity as ‘the ‘object’; still less an object in space and complete possession all at once [Latin, time. Only when we exclude inapplicable totum simul] of an illimitatable life’. Past, static and objectifying overtones can the present and future are grasped simulta- term properly be applied to God. neously. This is a metaphorical way of Thomas Aquinas follows his section accommodating the limits of human con- on the ‘Five Ways’ (on the existence of cepts and conceivability, for is there no God) by expounding God’s nature as succession, apart from within the created (Latin) ‘simplex’, i.e. ‘simple’ in the sense world order? In Hebrew–Christian theol- of transcending all ‘classes’ (genera)of ogy God is living and purposive. beings, and manifesting ‘perfection simple Time, Aquinas asserts, is a measure of and single’ (perfectio . . . in uno simplici: change; but he also argues (in opposition to Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 3, arts. 6 and serious questioning today) that God is 7). Further, ‘the perfections of everything incapable of change. In Aquinas’s view, exist in God . . . He lacks no excellence of eternity measures not time but existence any sort’ (ibid., Qu. 4, art. 2). Aquinas itself. Like Boethius, he sees it as gathering notes that here he follows ‘Averroes’, i.e. together past, present and future. Such a the Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd. view of the logic of ‘eternal’ is controversial, God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of 122 but has the merit of distinguishing it from Swinburne retains the traditional term, the time God has created, and by which but insists that it denotes ‘an ability to God is not conditioned. Nevertheless, it is bring about any (logically possible) state not without problems, and it tends to of affairs’ (The Coherence of Theism, predetermine how Thomas Aquinas Oxford: Clarendon, 1977 and 1987, 150). approaches the related problem of divine When all has been said, however, a key omniscience (see further on eternity.) factor is that God may choose to limit The belief that God is one also derives, divine powers as a sovereign act of as we have noted, from God’s nature as renunciation prompted by self-giving love. God. ‘To be God is to be this God’ (ibid., Barth and Moltmann underline this Qu. 11, art. 3). In the modern era, point. Any resultant self-chosen constraint Pannenberg convincingly relates this to is then not a denial of omnipotence but an the dual use of Elohim,‘God’,and expression of it. YHWH,‘this God’ (i.e. as a proper name) The logical complexity of omniscience in the Hebrew scriptures. becomes most problematic when it is applied to divine knowledge of a future the so-called metaphysical that has not yet occurred. Is anything attributes of god ‘there’ yet, of which God can (logically Traditionally in philosophy of religion the can) have knowledge? Almighty-ness or omnipotence of God, If we answer in the affirmative we seem God’s presence throughout the created to risk presupposing determinism. If God order, or omnipresence, and God’s full knows that I will choose a given commod- and complete knowledge of what can be ity or course of action, how can I be free to known, divine omniscience, constitute the choose another? Augustine responds by ‘metaphysical attributes’ of God. Aquinas insisting that my choice would still be expounds God’s existence ‘in everything ‘freely mine’, even if God knows it and it is . . . everywhere’ following his exposition of destined to occur. Aquinas distinguishes God as infinite (ibid., Qu. 8). between the contingent necessity of a The logical complexities of these con- state of affairs, and the logical necessity of cepts are so great that we reserve detailed a proposition that describes the state of discussion for the entries on omniscience, affairs. Ryle suggests that a phrase such as omnipotence and omnipresence. If there ‘It was to be’ simply confuses the ‘partici- are no logical constraints upon their pant’ logic of an agent with the retro- scope, these terms result in self-contra- spective logic of an ‘observer’ (Dilemmas, diction. For example, would it enhance the Cambridge: CUP, 1954, 15–35). ‘almighty’ power of the omnipotent God Swinburne eases the problem by apply- to assert that God can lie; or that God can ing the same logic to omniscience as that divide odd numbers into two sets of which he applied to omnipotence. Omnis- integers; that God can change what cience, he urges, is not ‘knowledge of occurred in the past; or that God can everything true, but (very roughly) . . . make a stone so big that God is unable to knowledge of everything true which it is lift it? logically possible to know’ (The Coher- It is not part of the logical grammar of ence of Theism, 175). ‘P. is omniscient if divine omnipotence to claim that God can he knows about everything except those perform logical contradictions, can per- future states . . . which are not physically form self-contradictory acts, or can act in necessitated by anything in the past’ ways contrary to God’s own nature as (ibid.). loving, wise and good. Hence Peter Geach Indeed, in Swinburne’s view, even God and Gijsbert van den Brink insist that would not be truly free to make chosen ‘Almighty-ness’ is a preferable term. sovereign decisions and decrees if the 123 grace nature of every future decree were trans- loving kindness and gracious, unmerited parent at every point. Hence biblical love-gift. As biblical theology develops, it passages use analogical language about becomes clear that this means not simply a God’s change of purpose (e.g. Gen. 18: Ex. gift of love separable from God, but God’s 32), especially in relation to human inter- gift of God’s own self. cession or human repentance. Swinburne In certain technical debates, for exam- urges an ‘attenuated sense’ of the term ple that between Augustine (354–430) ‘omniscient’. Hartshorne adopts a simi- and Pelagius (c. 360–c. 420) prevenient lar approach, but Plantinga takes a grace came to be seen as God’s granting of different path (see the entry on omnis- a power or capacity to respond to God’s cience). love and salvation. In Aquinas and in Omnipresence as a concept shares Roman Catholic theology it became some of the logical problems discussed almost reified as an infused power. under ‘omnipotence’. Also placed else- Since the active presence of God where is the issue of the ‘personhood’ of ultimately has this effect, this view simply God. Is such a term as ‘supra-personal’ shifts the emphasis in Christian theology. perhaps less misleading, or would this lose However, ‘divine grace is best understood more than it might gain? (See also as a mode of God’s action towards, or analogy; logic; metaphysics; self.) relatedness to, the creature, and not as some kind of substance that God imparts God, transcendence of to the creature’ (Colin Gunton, God and Freedom, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995, See transcendence. 126). In debates about grace and free- dom, it is more helpful to ask how divine grace action relates to human freedom, than to In the biblical writings the Hebrew chen speculate about the nature of some reified and Greek charis denote respectively quality. H

Hartshorne, Charles (1897–2000) justice to God’s ‘perfection’. ‘Theism’, he argues, tends to stress immutability and An American philosopher, Hartshorne eternity over against change and time; exercised wide influence as a distinctive activity and sovereignty over against the thinker who combined a rational defence capacity to experience and to respond. But of theism with an advocacy of process ‘perfection’ embraces both sides of these philosophy and the notion of God as di-polar contrasts. ‘always becoming’, rather than as ‘Being’. Like Moltmann, Hartshorne believed He was educated at Harvard, and taught that there is a sense in which God co- at the University of Chicago, Emory and suffers with the world, but as a necessary Texas University at Austin. He was influ- entailment of divine ‘perfection’. To enced by Whitehead (1861–1947) and restrict God to eternal ‘Being’, rather than by C.S. Peirce (1839–1914), whose Col- to ‘always becoming’, is to reduce divine lected Papers he co-edited. perfection. God is involved in the lack of Hartshorne is probably most widely symmetry between the past that has been known on both sides of the Atlantic for his actualized and the future that remains logical defence of the ontological possibility. argument for the existence of God, This points not to pantheism, but to together with those of Malcolm and panentheism. Omniscience denotes the Plantinga. Yet he also regarded the three capacity to know what is ‘knowable’. classical arguments for the existence of God’s permanent ‘being’ consists in faith- God as mutually reinforcing one another, ful, steadfast goodness exhibited through like strands of a rope. Further, he ‘everlasting becoming’. expounds a distinctive view of God, sometimes called a ‘neo-classical’ view. the defence of the second form of the ontological god as ‘always becoming’: the argument ‘di-polar’ approach to divine perfection Hartshorne addresses the nature of neces- sity in the second formulation of Alongside his defence of the ontological Anselm’s argument. He concedes that argument, Hartshorne also expounds a Anselm did not have at his disposal the distinctive view of God as ‘di-polar’: God resources of modern logic.However, is Absolute, but this alone does not do Anselm’s second formulation states that 125 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

God’s necessary existence is so self-evident identification of the absolute with the that to deny it constitutes a contradiction. moral categorical imperative, rather than By modal logic Hartshorne sharpens the with reason or mind (German, Geist, also negation: it is necessarily not true that Spirit). ‘God exists necessarily’ strictly implies Hegel equally opposed Schelling’s that God does not exist. Hence either beginning with human consciousness. ‘God exists necessarily’, or ‘it is necessary ThisHegelseesastoosubjectivefora that God does not exist’. However, the unified theory of reality. He also attacked proposition ‘God does not exist’ cannot be Schleiermacher’s giving central privi- a necessary proposition (i.e. it is not lege to the immediate sense of absolute ‘necessary’ that God does not exist). The dependence upon God. This he saw as remaining unexcluded logical alternative giving hostages to Romanticist ‘feeling’ is that ‘God exists necessarily’. as against the rigour of conceptual The value of the ontological argument, thought. Hartshorne concludes, is to show that it No less, however, Kierkegaard makes no sense to predicate ‘possible attacked Hegel’s emphasis upon a univer- existence’ of God, while it is false to assert sal ontology as impossible, except in that God’s existence is of necessity not logic alone. He also attacked Hegel’s possible. Hence ‘God exists necessarily’ tendency to replace religious faith by may be accepted as the only remaining conceptual philosophical thought. Feuer- option. This coheres with Hartshorne’s bach and Marx replaced Hegel’s notion of logic of perfection. (See also God, con- Absolute Spirit or Absolute Mind (Geist), cepts and attributes of.) with the notion of humanity (Feuerbach), or with the socio-economic forces of history (Marx: see Marxist critique of Hegel, Georg Wilhelm religion). Friedrich (1770–1831) Kant phenomenological, historical Hegel’s dissatisfaction with and dialectical reason (1724–1804), especially with the status that Kant accorded to reason, gave rise to Hegel’s attempt to offer a unified ontol- a complex and highly original system of ogy, or theory of reality, can be under- thought. Hegel rejected Kant’s separation stood most readily in the context of his of the rational from the universal or two parallel notions of development: Absolute. The rational, for Hegel, is historical and logical. At the level of ‘the real’ in its wholeness and universality. history, Absolute Reality unfolds its Hegel’s influence is seen mainly in his nature not only through individual enti- exposition of ‘historical’ reason, or, in ties or persons, but through mental, other words, the notion of reason as a social and political phenomena. Hegel developmental process simultaneously shared this starting-point in part with anchored in processes of history but also Schelling in the early period of their exhibited in the dialectical process of collaboration. Their common question logic. concerned the emergence of conscious- Yet Hegel’s influence is also seen in his ness. Self becomes self-aware in relation differences from those whom he opposed, to what is not-self. or who opposed him. He opposed Kant’s In his The Phenomenology of Mind notion that reason yielded only an ‘order- (1807) Hegel uses Mind or Spirit (Geist) ing’ or regulative principle, which, in to denote the finite human being as an effect, operated only in terms of experi- inter-subjective (or related-to-an-other) ence of the phenomenal, or contingent, reality. Ultimate reality is God as absolute world. He opposed Kant and Fichte’s Spirit, and also as telos, or End. God (the Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 126

Absolute) is the telos of the process of thus entails both opposition, negation, or rational self-awareness as this unfolds separation (antithesis) and mediation itself through the ‘ladder’ of historical (synthesis) that is a negation of negation. development and logical dialectic. The process ‘raises’ (German, erheben) the The Phenomenology of Mind and the finite and ‘sublates’ or assimilates it Science of Logic (1812–16) focus respec- (aufheben) into what is ‘higher’. tively on the historical and logical aspects hegel and religion of Hegel’s system. The term ‘phenomenology’ in the first From the standpoint of the Christian title (from Greek phainomai, I appear) theist, Hegel’s system is simultaneously underlines that Mind or Spirit first appears an attack on religious faith (as Kierke- in finite form in the contingent, historical gaard judged it to be) and yet also a or phenomenological world. This is partly vindication of a Trinitarian philosophical also Kant’s phenomenological world, theology of history. ordered by categories, but is at the same On one side, Hegel drew a contrast time in process, as moving beyond the very (already hinted at by Kant) between the confines that Kant proposed as a priori simpler, less critical ways of representing categories of the mind. God and religion among the devout Through historical and logical trans- through uncritical ‘representations’ (Vor- cendence beyond a prior constraint and stellungen), and a more rigorous, critical finitude, the logical idea becomes trans- use of the ‘concept’ (Begriff) in philoso- cended as the Universal Principle of phical reflection. Philosophy is ‘higher’ Reason, in which only ‘the Whole’ is than religion. ‘Reality’. As a wholeness, as a completed The former (Vorstellungen) include All, Reason is Reality, and Reality is images, myths and stories. They relate to Reason. the mode of ‘immediacy’ of awareness of If nature were absolute, this would be a God advocated by Schleiermacher, which reductive ‘’. If individual con- Hegel explicitly attacks as primitive and sciousness were absolute (as in Schelling) uncritical. The processes of historical and this would be subjectivism. If the moral logical development lead to an entirely imperative were absolute (as in Kant and rational and conceptual differentiation Fichte), this would be moralism. However, between finite modes of expression, in an the ‘objective idealism’ of objective logic attempt to reach beyond them through a exhibited as the spiritual, historical and rigorous application of conceptual developmental principle of historical rea- thought. D.F. Strauss (1808–74) would son does lead on to reason as absolute later apply this contrast to biblical ‘myth’ reality. with disastrously negative consequences However, ‘historical reason’ as such for religion. takes account of the radical historical On the other side, however, Hegel finitude or ‘situatedness’ of human minds believed that a Christian doctrine of the within the phenomenological ascent or Trinity entirely cohered with his philoso- ‘ladder’ of dialectic. These ‘placings’ phy of history, logic and reason. The within history give rise to a dialectical ‘thesis’ of creation and the religion of process of differentiation, or even opposi- Judaism () became tion. Thus Hegel presses further the logical ‘negated’ in the ‘antithesis’ of the incarna- resources first proposed by Fichte and tion and the cross (God the Son). The Schelling of moving from ‘thesis’ to cross, in a dialectical sense, was the ‘death’ ‘antithesis’, and thence (in the light of this of God. Resurrection and Pentecost, how- awareness of ‘the other’) to a synthesis ever, now (historically and logically) begin which takes thought ‘higher’. Dialectic the of freedom (the Spirit of 127 Heidegger, Martin

God). The particularism of Judaism We do not have space to note the legacy becomes universalized. of Hegel’s political and , These two respective attitudes toward and we have already alluded to his impact religion are less contradictory than might on Strauss, and by way of reaction, on appear. For Hegel writes, ‘In thinking,I Kierkegaard and in a different direction on lift myself up into the Absolute . . . I am Feuerbach. At the beginning of the infinite consciousness while I remain at the twentieth century Hegelian thought was same time finite self-consciousness . . . It is represented in England partly by Bradley in myself and for myself that this conflict (1846–1924) and in America partly by and this conciliation take place’ (Lectures Josiah Royce (1855–1916). In Christian on the Philosophy of Religion [1832], theology the panoramic scope of Hegel’s Eng. 3 vols., London: Kegan Paul, 1895; thought and his respect for the rational vol. 1, 63–4 (my italics)). Religion moves find powerful resonances especially in the from feeling (Gefu¨ hl) through representa- work of Pannenberg.(See also idealism; tion (Vorstellung) to concept (Begriff) and immanence; objectivism; theism.) thinking (Denken) or knowledge (Wissen) (ibid., vol. 1, 155–99). Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976) Similarly, within the divine life of God, life, writings and periods of the Absolute as Spirit encounters the truth thought of historical, finite otherness in the incar- nation of God the Son and the cross. Heidegger taught at Freiburg before Thence God becomes the immanent and becoming Professor of Philosophy at transcendent Spirit; the Spirit proceeds Marburg from 1923, where his colleague from God to work both within the finite as Professor of New Testament was world and beyond the finite as Universal Bultmann. He subsequently returned to Reality in relation to history-as-a-Whole. Freiburg, one year after the publication of The key principle is teleology. his most famous work Being and Time further influence (1927). Initially he supported Hitler when he was Rector of Freiburg University Too often credit (or blame) for a develop- (1933–4; cf. The Self-Assertion of the mental view of the world and of religion is German University, 1933). However, with given to the particular versions of biolo- the occurrence of more radical political gical evolution associated with Darwin or developments he withdrew from the Uni- ethical evolution associated with Spencer. versity, and worked in relative seclusion in However, Hegel’s complex exposition of the Black Forest. historical reason and historical dialectic Heidegger’s work initially focused on reaches beyond the nineteenth century (in the notion of human situatedness in time, materialist form in ) to our own place and history, for which he regularly era. used the term Dasein, Being-there. Under- In the 1950s the understandable atten- standing and interpretation proceed from tion given to ‘the particular case’ in British within the temporal and practical horizons and Anglo-American analytical philo- that bound the ‘world’ of Dasein. This sophy did not find Hegel congenial as a perspective is traced through his magister- dialogue partner (apart from J. N. Findlay’s ial Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). work). Nevertheless Hegel remains a This work was originally intended as powerful influence upon European philo- merely the first stage toward a philosophy sophy and modern Christian theology. His of Being, i.e. an ontology that drew its emphasis on ‘historical situatedness’ is roots from existential givenness in human presupposed in discussions of postmoder- life and in time. Although he rejected nity and even in gender studies. Edmund Husserl’s concern with ‘essences’, Heidegger, Martin 128

Heidegger was heavily influenced by his understanding of Being, and in terms of phenomenology, which featured promi- temporality as the Being of Dasein,...’ nently in Being and Time. However, how (Being and Time, Eng., Oxford: Blackwell, was he to move from Dasein (Being-there) 1962, 39). ‘Being cannot be grasped in time to a genuine ontology of Being except by taking time into consideration’ (Sein)? (ibid., 40). Heidegger began to wrestle with In practice this means suspending preliminary problems in What is Meta- ontological questions about being while physics? (1929) and Kant and the we focus first on ‘ontic’ enquiring about Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Never- concrete ‘existents’ in time; i.e. beings, theless, he became increasingly convinced especially human beings, not their being. that philosophical thought, as such, had This is the ‘mode of Being’ that charac- become trapped in the dualism of the terizes the human. This requires the Platonic tradition. From Plato to Hegel existential analytic of Dasein (ibid., 34). philosophers were obsessed with ‘con- This leads to an exploration of philo- cepts’. Yet this generated only a self- sophical hermeneutics. ‘Meaning’ is a constructed illusion whereby ‘technical’ projected ‘upon which’ in terms of which conceptual moves only served to hide a we understand an entity or mode of tragic human ‘fallenness’ out of ‘Being’. existence as what it is, through anticipat- Western philosophical language had ing (as far as possible) a provisional and fallen into a malaise of circularity and preliminary ‘seeing-beforehand’ (Vor- atomistic fragmentation. sicht), or pre-conception (Vorgriff), or The more fruitful way forward was ‘pre-understanding’ (Vorversta¨ndnis; ibid., through the creative poets, who trans- 191–3). cended ‘concepts’. The turning-point Several features mark the difference (Kehre)camewithHo¨ lderlin and the between the language of objects (cate- Essence of Poetry (1936), On the Essence gories) and that of the human being of Truth (1947), What is Thinking (Eng- (existentialia). The latter (Existenz) does lish also as Discourse on Thinking (1954)) not have ‘properties’, but possibility. and especially On the Way towards Moreover, objects can be replicated; but Language (Unberwegs zur Sprache, 1959). Dasein as human-being is in each case ‘mineness’ (Jemeinigkeit), an ‘I’ (ibid., 68). the ‘existentialist’ period of In biblical studies Bultmann draws on this ‘being and time’ analysis to show (rightly) that ‘body’ and Heidegger’s greatest contributions were 1) ‘soul’ are not ‘components’ which human- to explore a non-substantival, non-objec- kind ‘have’, but what they are, in the given tive mode of conceptual expression for the modes of their existence. human in contrast to the language of The ‘world’ of the human self is not objects and properties more appropriate to merely physical or geographical, but is things; and 2) to explore the horizon of defined and bounded by given human time (and ‘temporality’ as the basis for the interests, concerns and horizons of under- possibility of time) as a fundamental standing. Important experiences that dimension of human ‘existence’ and of relate to engagement with truth include the way of understanding this existence. dread and confrontation by death. A new Heidegger thus anticipates post-mod- depth, taking us beyond Kierkegaard,is ern and gender-related notions of human given to ‘subjectivity’ and to the distinc- ‘situatedness’. He began not with Being tion between objectivity and objecti- (Sein) but with existential Being-there vism. (Dasein). Further, ‘Time needs to be In terms of a philosophy of religion a explicated . . . as the horizon for the number of older questions are placed in a 129 hermeneutics new light. For example, Dasein is char- contingent order), authentic art reaches acterized by potentiality-for-Being (Sein- back pre-conceptually to enact the whole ko¨ nnen). Yet humankind begins from the work as an event in time. In summary, situation into which they were born (or poetry and art may be ‘eventful’. This ‘thrown-ness’, Geworfenheit, ibid., 74). discloses Being not as a static entity Bultmann exploits a correlation between (Seiendheit), but as dynamic being-as- the existentialist notion that who a person event (Anwesen). ‘is’ derives from their ‘thrown-ness’ into Heidegger explores a number of exam- the world and their own subsequent ples of eventful art. Van Gogh’s painting of decisions. This is related to ‘bondage’ in a peasant’s boots, far from atomizing the Epistles of Paul, while the ‘possibility’ ‘concepts’, brings together-into-one the or ‘potentiality’ that lies ahead is related to ‘world’ of the peasant: ‘her slow trudge ‘freedom in the Spirit’. through the . . . furrows of the field swept by raw wind . . . the silent call of the earth poetry and art in heidegger’s . . . uncomplaining anxiety as to the later works certainty of bread’ (‘The Origin of the Many philosophers have little time for his Work of Art’, in Poetry, Language and works after 1936, although in Germany Thought, New York: Harper & Row, and among theologians they remain influ- 1971, 33–4). ential, and contribute to the philosophy of Whether this is ‘philosophy’ remains a art. Heidegger believed that the Western matter of controversy. However, Heideg- language-tradition had become flawed, ger has gone some way to show the and had sunk to little more than a potential circularity of some Western technical, technological or instrumental philosophical ‘concepts’. For philosophy vehicle of pragmatic communication. In of religion, the themes of ‘disclosure’ or short, ‘we have fallen out of Being’ (Sein: revelation, of conceptual schemes Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven: appropriate to the human and the perso- Yale, 1959, 36–7). He accepts nal, of ‘possibility’, of non-dualistic Nietzsche’s analysis of ‘evaporating rea- wholeness, and of eventfulness-in-time, lity’ and cultural crisis: ‘the transforma- offer resources for further exploration. tion of men into a mass . . . suspicion of (See also existentialism; possibility; everything free and creative’ (ibid., 38). postmodernity; pragmatism.) The wonder of ‘Being’ has become stifled by ‘dreary technological frenzy’: hermeneutics by ‘gadgetry’ in America and by ‘regimen- tation’ in Russian Marxism. The result is Hermeneutics denotes much more than ‘the standardization of man, the pre- ‘rules for the interpretation of texts’, even eminence of the mediocre’ (ibid., 42). This though it first emerged in this form in the is largely due to the ‘chasm’ left by Plato’s ancient world and the pre-modern period. dualism. Christianity settled down in it: Philosophically the subject enquires into ‘Nietzsche was right in saying that Chris- what conditions pertain for the under- tianity is Platonism for the people’ (ibid., standing of ‘what is other’; that is, of what 106). lies beyond ‘my’ world of immediate Heidegger sought wholeness in place of concerns. dualism and fragmentation. Perhaps only The term ‘hermeneutics’ seems to have art and poetry can bring ‘a new coming- been used first by J.C. Dannhauer in his to-speech’ of this Whole. Whereas ‘aes- Hermeneutica Sacra (1654). As a method thetics’ divides ‘concepts’ of beauty (still of interpreting texts, the subject goes back within the realm of Ideas) from sensuous to first-century rabbinic thought, and to representations of beauty (still within the the interpretation of Homer by Stoic hermeneutics 130 thinkers. Schleiermacher (1768–1834) the later twentieth extended its scope to found it as a discipline century of the modern university. It explored the nature of human understanding. Gadamer (1900–2001), however, attacks Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) used the both of these thinkers for placing too term to denote the understanding of ‘lived much weight on the ‘subjectivity’ of experience’ (Erlebnis). He sought to human consciousness. This subjectivity replace Hegel’s emphasis on Mind or can be ‘a distorting mirror’ (Truth and Spirit (Geist) by a more concrete concern Method, 2nd rev. Eng. edn, London: Sheed for ‘life’ (Leben). The importance of ‘life’ & Ward, 1989, 276). Gadamer insists that and ‘history’ for all understanding clearly the historical conditioning of traditions emerges in the work of Gadamer. surround both the one who seeks to Anticipating Gadamer, Dilthey attacks understand and that of which understand- Enlightenment, rationalism and ing is sought, and that these demand prior empiricism with the comment: ‘No real exploration, or ‘pre-understanding’ (Vor- blood runs in the veins of the knowing versta¨ndnis) and ‘pre-judgements’ (Vorur- subject that Locke, hume and Kant teile). He uses such analogies as the active constructed’ (Gesammelte Schriftem,vol.5, impact of a work of art, a game, or a Leipzig: Teubner,1962, 4). Dilthey’s applica- festival, to clarify his point. tion of hermeneutics to social institutions Ricoeur (b. 1913) takes a mediating paves the way for its place in sociology. position between Schleiermacher and Schleiermacher asserts, ‘Hermeneutics Dilthey on one side, and Gadamer on the is part of the art of thinking’ (Hermeneu- other. He convincingly criticizes Gadamer tics, Eng. Missoula: Scholar Press, 1977, for collapsing the ‘critical’ or ‘explanatory’ 97). All understanding is rooted in the axis wholly into that of ‘understanding’. concrete diversity of life. It requires a His own hermeneutics revolve around the ‘divinatory’ pole (divinatorische, denoting twin principles of ‘a hermeneutics of more, but not less than ‘intuitive’), and a suspicion’ (which depends primarily but comparative or rationally critical pole not exclusively on ‘explanation’) and a (ibid., 150). He called these the ‘feminine’ ‘hermeneutic of retrieval’ (which primarily and ‘masculine’ poles, which were com- depends on ‘understanding’). plementary for hermeneutics. Ricoeur states, ‘Hermeneutics seems to Schleiermacher was perhaps the first me to be animated by . . . double motiva- fully to appreciate that understanding is tion: willingness to suspect, willingness to not simply a matter of the human ‘subject’ listen; vow of rigour, vow of obedience . . . mastering some passive ‘object’ of knowl- Doing away with idols . . . to listen to edge, but of inter-subjective, interpersonal, symbols’ (Freud and Philosophy. An Essay listening and evaluating. It is like seeking on Interpretation, New Haven: Yale, an empathy between two friends. Under- 1970, 27). standing should not be reduced to ‘how I Under the term ‘radical hermeneutics’ see it’. To understand one must step ‘out the discipline has entered into full engage- of one’s own frame of mind’ to engage ment with postmodernity. However, with ‘the other’ (ibid., 42, 109). more interpersonal and more traditional Both Schleiermacher and Dilthey stress studies continue. These are bound the distinctive character of understanding together in a common recognition of the (Verstehen) as against mere ‘knowledge’, limitations of Enlightenment rationalism since (for Dilthey) the former entails and empiricism, the importance of com- ‘empathy’ (Einversta¨ndnis) or ‘re-living’ munity, traditions and history, and the (nacherleben) the life-experience (Erleb- dimension of the inter-subjective or inter- nis) of ‘the other’. personal. Emilio Betti, another late twen- 131 Hick, John Harwood tieth-century exponent, insists that herme- Since the 1970s Hick has become neutics nurtures tolerance and the capacity increasingly involved in controversial to listen to ‘the other’ in mutuality and issues about Christianity, pluralism and a reciprocity. theism which, while respecting the role of Jesus Christ, also rejects any hint of Hick, John Harwood (b. 1922) Christocentric or Christogically exclusive theism. life and thought Again, there is a link with his earlier John Hick took degrees in law and works. In Faith and Knowledge he writes, philosophy at Hull and Edinburgh, and ‘In making a Christological study of the undertook research at Oxford under H.H. central data that God has revealed him- Price. He trained for Presbyterian ministry self to men in Christ, we are not asking at Cambridge, where he was influenced by which, if any, of the various Christologi- H.H. Farmer. Born in Yorkshire, he taught cal theories erected upon it is correct’ in England at the universities of Cam- (p. 220). bridge and , and in the USA at Hick’s book Evil and the God of Love Cornell, Princeton Theological Seminary embodies a doctrine of universal salvation, and Claremont Graduate School, Califor- which is developed in Death and Eternal nia. Life (1976). However, he goes further in Hick’s first book, Faith and Knowledge his controversial work (ed.) The Myth of (London: Macmillan, 1957) recognizes God Incarnate (1977), in God has Many ambiguity in the world, and attributes Names (1980) and in An Interpretation of theistic or non-theistic belief to experien- Religion (1989). cing the world in different ways. More Hick also produced a brief textbook on strictly, a cognitive decision is based on philosophy of religion under the title: whether we ‘see’ the world as the creation Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, of a good God, or whether we ‘see’ it as a NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963) with subsequent chance product of material forces. This revisions. This remains a clear and useful ambiguity generates more than one possi- introduction to the subject. We shall ble way of seeing the world. However, it focus, however, on the book that has results, in Hick’s view (following Kant) played the most influential role in this from God’s respect for human freedom. subject. Traces of the influence of Kant and evil and the god of love Schleiermacher,aswellasWittgen- stein on ‘seeing ... as ...’, can be Hick’s central argument is that the pro- detected here. He writes, ‘In each case blem of evil is best addressed not by we discover and live in terms of a following Augustine and Thomas particular aspect of our environment Aquinas who look back to some ‘mytho- through an appropriate act of interpreta- logical’ event of the past, the fall of tion . . . [However,] the theistic believer humankind, to explain the origins of evil. cannot explain how he knows the divine Looking forward to the future, however, presence to be mediated through his to the ultimate goal for which the experi- human experience’ (ibid. 118). ence of evil may be a necessary condition, Hick’s most widely read book, Evil and provides a better way. This good goal or the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1st end consists in a fuller relationship with edn 1966; 2nd edn 1977), also draws on God. Schleiermacher’s account of human fall- Hick cites examples in human life enness and human development, although where the experience of opposition, dis- Hick more especially emphasizes the appointment, frustration or suffering can influence of Irenaeus (see below). contribute to the process of maturing Hick, John Harwood 132 character. He borrows from the poet John an ‘alternative strand of Keats the allusion to life as ‘the vale of christian thinking’? soul-making’ (2nd edn, 259, esp. n. 1; also 253–61). He is content to describe his new Hick presents his approach as an ‘alter- starting-point as ‘an ’, or native strand of Christian thinking’, built as ‘soul-making’ theodicy (see J. Hick, ‘An on the ‘minority report’ of the nature and Irenaean Theodicy’, in S. T. Davis (ed.) story of humanity (‘An Irenaean Theo- Encountering Evil, Edinburgh: T & T dicy’, 41). He claims to follow a two-stage Clark, 1981, 39–68, for an exposition, distinction in Irenaeus (120–202) between critique and reply; also Evil and the God humanity as created in the ‘image’ of Love, 2nd edn, 259). (Hebrew, tselem; Greek, eiko¯ n) of God, This coheres with Hick’s account of the and the goal of entry into God’s ‘likeness’ development of humanity from a state of (Hebrew, demuˆ th; Greek, homoio¯ sis). naı¨ve innocence, which included an unself- Irenaeus distinguished ‘image of God’ conscious immaturity, through a difficult as intelligence from ‘likeness to God’ as learning process, which entailed pain, to moral holiness or goodness. Crucially he an ultimate goal of maturity and relation- writes that God could not give moral ship with God. perfection to humankind ‘as the latter was However, this does not fit easily with only recently created’ (Irenaeus, Against the Augustinian and traditionally ortho- Heresies, IV: 38: 2). At first humankind dox notion of humanity prior to the Fall as was ‘infantile’, because ‘not exercised in fully in relationship with God (‘original discipline’ (ibid., IV: 39: 1). righteousness’) followed by a fall into a Schleiermacher’s theology hinges upon state of alienation and sin. Hick rejects a a direct, immediate consciousness of ‘historical’ reading of the Genesis account, dependence upon God. Yet this emerges which he regards as ‘myth’; ready-made in the context of development through goodness is a contradiction in terms. fallenness and guilt. The Fall is part of a Hick appeals to what he calls ‘another process leading to salvation. His critics and better way’, namely not the ‘majority have characterized it satirically as a fall report’ of the Augustinian tradition, but ‘upwards’. In Schleiermacher’s view sin is ‘the minority report’ of the Irenaean what ‘has arrested the free development of tradition’ (Evil and the God of Love, the God-consciousness’ (The Christian 2nd edn, 253). This ‘better’ picture allows Faith, 2nd edn, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, for evolutionary development: ‘Man is in 1989, sec. 66, 271). process of becoming the perfected being Without doubt Hick’s emphasis on goal whom God is seeking to create’ (ibid., and futurity brings fresh perspective to the 256). problem of evil and complements some of The parental analogy is suggested in the emphases of the Augustinian–Thomist which God, like a parent, delights in approach. Hick also strenuously criticizes humanity, but does not merely desire for the privative account of evil as absence of humans ‘unalloyed pleasure at the expense good in the ‘major’ tradition, even if we of their growth in such even greater values may hesitate to dismiss it (with Hick) as as moral integrity, unselfishness, compas- no more than ‘a semantic conjuring trick’ sion, courage, . . . capacity for love’ (ibid., akin to describing a glass of water as half 258). ‘This world must be a place of soul- full rather than as half empty (Evil and the making’ (ibid., 259). Hick insists that God of Love, 2nd edn, 38–58). humankind begins not with ‘original right- Nevertheless, Hick may at times over- eousness’, but with a lack of cognitive state what he perceives as deficiencies in awareness of God as God, to which he Augustine, including the extent of alien gives the name ‘epistemic distance’. influences upon him and his use of the 133 Hindu philosophy principle of plenitude. Hick’s insistence accord less status to the Vedas, but are that this ‘aesthetic’ approach is utilitarian generally Buddhist or Jainist. has been turned on its head by his critics. early sources for Thus David Griffin attacks ‘the utility of philosophical reflection soul making’ as presupposing God as inflicting pain in order to produce crea- The Vedas embody four collections of tures who accord with God’s own goals, texts: the Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur- i.e. treating persons as means not as ends Veda and Athavna-Veda. Although early (‘Critique’ in Davis, ed., Encountering Vedic hymns address gods and goddesses Evils, 53–55). and Vedic material includes rules about Hick’s counter-reply is to underline sacrifices, from around 800 bce philoso- that everything is for the ultimate welfare phical reflection begins to understand of humankind. Yet other critics ask these not in explicitly polytheist terms, whether the proportion of experience of but either as symbolic representations of evil is necessary for this end, and whether ultimate reality, or (in other traditions) as the argument could be sustained without aspects of a supreme Being. the presupposition of a doctrine of uni- The foundation texts for later philoso- versal salvation. phical reflections are especially the Upani- Hick may perhaps also overstate his s´ads (c. 800–500 bce). These 108 Sanskrit differences from Augustine and Aquinas. texts count as Vedic scripture, but are In the end it is difficult to avoid seeing primarily philosophical treatises concern- Hick’s critique of Augustine’s free-will ing especially the relation between a¯tman defence as weakening his own case. (true, inner, Self) and brahman, ultimate Hick, it might be argued, has enriched reality. ‘What is brahman?’ remains a the traditional approach with fresh strands central question, which provides a point of arguments, and placed question-marks of departure for later philosophical tradi- against certain traditional assumptions. tions. While the emphasis differs, we need not The Vedanta (‘end of the Veda’) focus perhaps regard Hick’s approach as a particularly on a¯tman–brahman in terms fundamental ‘alternative’ rather than as a of the question about ‘liberation’ or modification and supplement. ‘release’. These reflections are later devel- oped in two directions by the two most significant Hindu philosophers of the Hindu philosophy medieval age. S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ (c.788–820) The philosophical traditions of Hinduism interprets brahman along the lines of a address major issues of ontology ‘monist’, ‘anti-dualist’ philosophy (including the respective claims of mon- (Advaita Vedanta); Ra¯ ma¯ nuja (c. 1017– ism, dualism and the nature of ultimate 1137) develops the theme of the Vedanta reality), epistemology (including the in terms of a (clearly) ‘modified’ monism nature of perception), philosophy of lan- (Visista-advaita Vedanta). guage and the nature of inner selfhood. The Bhagavad Gita (‘Song of God’), They also concern the practical issue of emerging initially from around the third ‘release’ (moksha) from a cycle of rebirth century bce but perhaps edited over some and reincarnation (samsara). five centuries, is a short philosophical In spite of very wide differences of dialogue in poetic form, also on the theme ‘viewpoint’ or philosophical emphasis, the of liberation (moksha) of the true Self astika (Hindu) schools of philosophy find (a¯tman). The divine figure of Krishna, their common roots in the Vedas (c. 1500– disguised as a charioteer, urges Prince 800 bce), which have the status of sacred Arjuna to seek liberation by deeds of scripture (s´ruti). The Nastika schools selfless action and by religious devotion. Hindu philosophy 134

Although this has the status of post- desire and passion, prepare the way for scriptural sacred tradition (smrti), in liberation in which the Self becomes practice it is treated as scripture (s´ruti), identified with brahman.InAdvaita and is regarded as revelation. Vedanta an appeal is made to the aphor- Again, the two schools that follow ism ‘You are that’ (Tat Tvam Asi) for the S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ and Ra¯ma¯nuja respectively adopt identification of the self with brahman (in a different emphasis on the basis of the the Chandogya Upanis´ad). same source-text. S´an˙ ka¯ra¯, whose philo- By contrast, the strongly ‘modified sophical concern lies with an eventual monism’ (Visista-advaita) that finds nota- identification of the self with brahman, ble expression in Ra¯ma¯nuja accepts that stresses self-less deeds as the path that differentiation and distinction need not be leads on to liberation. Ra¯ma¯nuja, whose illusory. The early distinctions between philosophy allows for a more characteriz- different gods and goddesses in the Vedic able Supreme Being, emphasizes the path hymns need not be understood in a of religious devotion. polytheistic way. They may (to reapply ’s term) come to express a monist ontology (advaita ‘refracted’ theism; a theism that perceives vedanta) and modified monism God to have many characterizable faces or (visista-advaita vedanta) aspects, even if none characterizes God The metaphysical question ‘What is brah- alone or fully. man?’ remains foundational for numerous In most theistic religions, anthropo- less basic philosophical viewpoints and morphic imagery is used to represent religious practices. If brahman is viewed, certain aspects of the character of God, with S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ and the Advaita Vedanta or even if these are duly qualified, in turn, monist tradition, as a virtually uncharac- either by negation or by other images. If, terizable Ultimate Reality with which the in monism, ultimate reality is ‘All’, in true inner Self (a¯tman) may be united, two modified monism God may be, in one consequences then follow. sense, all-pervasive, but as in panenthe- First, Ultimate Reality is an impersonal ism rather than pantheism. Moreover, re- Absolute,withnopersonaldefining birth may be release into the heavenly qualities. It may be perceived as ‘undiffer- realm, rather than release into absorption entiated consciousness’ (nirguna brahma). in the All. ‘Difference’ within the Absolute is an Issues about boundaries of identity are ‘illusion’ (avidya¯; sometimes also ma¯ya¯). complex. For example, some view the Second, the way to find liberation from figure of Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita as the pain and fragmentation of earthly an incarnation of the deity Vishnu. Shiva existence, rebirth and reincarnation is is a destroyer god in Bhakti (devotional) through the identity of the self with Hinduism. Hinduism has retained a sacri- brahman. This may come about, in due ficialsystemfromearliesttimes,and time, by attaining the ‘knowledge’ (vidya¯) numerous ‘representations’ of deities. In that overcomes ignorance and sees illu- philosophical terms these may be regarded sion as illusion or ignorance (avidya¯)or either as instrumentally useful but onto- deception (ma¯ya¯). logically illusory (broadly, Advaita In this tradition, passion, emotion and Vedanta and S´an˙ ka¯ra¯) or as provisional, strong desire nurture illusion. For exam- fragmentary, anthropomorphic and sym- ple, a fearful concern for the self may lead bolic (very broadly, Visista-advaita and to the misperception of a harmless rope as Ra¯ma¯nuja). a harmful snake. By contrast, careful, When we survey the spectrum of disciplined, dispassionate habits of mental ‘schools’ in Hindu philosophy, it emerges concentration and of disengagement from that S´an˙ ka¯ra¯,andRa¯ma¯nuja do not 135 Hindu philosophy constitute opposite ends of the spectrum. As we noted, however, a fourth posi- ‘Radical’ or ‘Pure’ monism (Sudhadvaita- tion stands even nearer to absolute mon- vada) goes further than S´an˙ ka¯ra¯; dualist ism than S´an˙ ka¯ra¯. Vallabha¯ca¯rya (1479– (Dvaitavada) ontology (in Madhva) makes 1531), the last of the ‘classical’ Vedanta a more clear-cut differentiation than does philosophers, promoted a ‘pure monism’ Ra¯ma¯nuja. or ‘pure non-dualism’ (Sudhadvaita). Yet even so, he was more ready to speak of a philosophical schools and Supreme Being than was S´ankara. developing traditions ˙ ¯ ¯ As traditions of Hindu philosophy S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ offers some attempt to mediate developed, there emerged a number of between the two main traditions by a ‘schools’, which differed not only in where complex use of the contrast between they placed the emphasis, but also in their appearance and reality. At a ‘lower’ level specific range of interests or agendas. It of knowledge, the level of mere appear- has become conventional to identify six of ance, religious devotion to gods or a God these as the main schools, and usually they has a certain relative validity. Neverthe- are categorized as three pairs. less, ‘higher’ knowledge reveals that both The Nya¯ya school, or the ‘Logic’ the notion of God and religious devotion school, reflects an earlier era in which fall under the category of illusion (ma¯ya¯). philosophical reflection grew out of oral Brahman is revealed as undifferentiated debate. It is concerned with method, or Reality with whom the a¯tman is identical method of proof, but still serves the and united as One, but perceived to be so liberating goal of practical ‘knowledge’ only in a state of avidya¯. Cognitive or (juana or vidya¯). It addresses the agenda conceptual discourse may obscure this identified below as epistemology, includ- insight. ing the nature of perception. Linked as the In contrast to notions in the early Vedic other of a pair is the Vaisesika, or Atomist, hymns of release and rebirth into a school. This is concerned to identify heavenly realm of gods and ancestors, in irreducible constituents within the world this tradition ‘release’ (moksha) does not that account for difference. ‘Distinction’ mean rebirth into a new kind of existence (vis´esas) or distinctive characterization but escape from the cycle of existence and and its criteria, possibility and grounds reincarnation altogether, to become undif- provide the main, but not exclusive, ferentiated a¯tman/brahman. Universal, agenda. The nature of causality forms ultimate, Reality has embraced the Self part of this agenda. as itself. A third school, Sa¯nkhya or the ‘Enu- ˙ A third tradition, alongside those of merationist’ school, conceives of a self- S´anka¯ra¯ and Ra¯ma¯nuja, emerges in the sufficient universe, which leaves no need philosophy of Madhva (c.1238–c.1317). or room for God. The school is ancient Madhva is said to have founded the school and explicitly atheistic. It ‘enumerates’ the of Dvaita Vedanta. Although technically facts of the world or reality to explain this denotes a dualist ontology, it is components and categories. It is paired ‘dualist’ in the sense that Madhva asserts with the school of Yoga, which is arguably an absolute difference between God (the issue is disputed) not atheistic. Yoga (¯ıs´vara) and human souls (jı¯va). This is explores disciplines of the body and the not the difference between creator and a mind, with the aim of disengaging from created order. As ‘souls’, humankind distraction and attaining a disclosure of coexists as a second eternal principle. the essence of the soul (parusa). Nevertheless, it supports ‘devotion’ Of the remaining two˙ schools, (bhakti) to a God who is transcendent by Mima¯msa is the ‘’ school, con- virtue of ‘difference’ (bheda). cerned with Vedic texts and their Hindu philosophy 136 significance for life and devotion. The language. More questionably, he insists traditions of the school with which it is that the basis of language is ‘natural’, paired, the Vedanta, have already been drawing on innate ideas, rather than explored in some measure (above) with resting upon convention. reference to the Upanis´ads and the differ- The Schools of Mima¯msa (Exegesis ˙ ent of monism and qualified school) and (in part) Nya¯ya (Logic school) monism focused by the themes of brah- formulated what amounts to criteria for man and a¯tman. This continues to be an the currency of meaning. Words convey important, major, tradition. Trevor Ling, meaning not only as words but also in among others, calls it ‘the most influential’ terms of what Saussure, in the modern era for modern Hindu philosophy. (1913), would call ‘syntagmatic relations’. ‘Tusk’ derives its meaning-currency partly epistemology, philosophy of from its contextual juxtaposition to ‘ele- language and philosophies of phant’, and so on. The term ‘syntactic the self relations’ comes near to ‘syntagmatic Hindu philosophy gives particular consid- relations’, with even a rudimentary hint eration to three sources of knowledge: of what in the modern era would be called perception, inference and first-hand verbal linguistic ‘competence’, or, in John Searle, testimony. Perception may begin with ‘Background’. sense-perception. However, most philoso- Questions relating to the self include phical traditions recognize the contribu- debates about the stability or illusion of tion of mental or intuitive perception, personal identity. Is it the same self who while some include the heightened percep- sleeps, dreams, wakes and reflects on the tion that may arise through mystical self? If someone is ill, is ‘the self’ ill? Is the contemplation or ascetic techniques. self ‘subject’ of all experience, or witness Inference utilizes a posteriori argu- of all experience, or both? Does the self ment when direct perception is excluded. provide grounds for differentiated identity, Some perceptions may invite inferences or is the self a manifestation of a universal about what is currently not perceived, in consciousness? Does the same ‘self’ the way that Aristotle in Greek tradition experience reincarnation in successive and Aquinas in Christian tradition drew modes of existence, as different as the inferences from observed occurrences or existence of human persons, animals, phenomena in the world. Some schools of demons or angels? philosophy elaborate syllogismsfor This brings us back full circle to the valid inference. These include a five-term discussion of the relation between a¯tman syllogism where two of the terms formu- and brahman. Assessments of selfhood are late positive and negative examples, ana- bound up with ontologies: with monism logies or applications. with modified monism, with pure monism First-hand testimony may include the or with an eternal dualism. Similarly, the testimony of sacred writings on the basis respective of appearance, illu- of their status as revelation. A problem sion, deception and reality also serve as a may arise here, however, in relation to major part of the framework for this classical claims that the Vedic texts are debate. timeless and without human authors. comparisons with independent In the period of the fifth century parallels or resonances in Bhartrhari formulated a kind of philoso- western philosophy phy˙ of language. It includes, but goes beyond, questions of grammar. In positive It is widely accepted that Eastern philo- terms he argues that cognitive awareness sophies repay study not only for their of concepts depends on prior use of own sake, but also because they often 137 Hobbes, Thomas formulate issues that resonate with pos- ancient Greek philosophy to the modern sible parallels in Western philosophies, period, the debate about monism con- from an independent and often unex- tinues in Spinoza (1632–77), while the pected angle. Another ‘viewpoint’ may distinction between Appearance and Rea- throw fresh light upon both sides. lity provides the title of a major work by Although we may briefly mention Bradley (1846–1924). Parmenides and Democritus on ontology, It would be misleading to see global an outstanding example comes from philosophy as sustaining a broadly Plato (428–348 bce), especially in the empirical tradition even when we have Phaedo. Plato writes: ‘The body (Greek, to exempted such ‘minority’ writers as soˆ ma) fills us with passions and fears Plato, Kant, Hegel and Bradley. Eastern (epithymoˆ n kai phobon) . . . It makes it traditions convey a different impression, impossible for us to think . . . We must be as well as different methods and differ- free of the body to behold the actual ent approaches. (See also anthro- reality with the eye of the soul apart from morphism; atheism; empricism; the body (he psyche . . . cho¯ ris tou language in religion; metaphysics; so¯ matos)(Phaedo, 66, c and e). mysticism; Na¯ ga¯ rjuna; Nishida; We noted above, by way of compar- Nishitani; symbol.) ison, the passage in the Chandogya Upanis´ad that desire and fear could Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679) nurture illusion (for example in misper- ceiving a rope as a snake), while the soul An English philosopher, educated at or inner, true self (a¯tman) belongs to the Oxford, Hobbes made his most influential realm of brahman, or changeless, ultimate contributions to , espe- Reality. Release (moksha) from the body cially through his work Leviathan (1651). and from the cycle of rebirth and reincar- This grew out of the earlier disputes nation into any ‘body’ is sought by between Royalists and Parliamentarians disciplines of the mind and by ‘knowl- prior to the Civil War. edge’. Even the maxim of Socrates In relation to philosophy of religion, (470–399 bce), that ‘virtue is knowledge’ however, Hobbes also promoted a has a loose resonance. strongly materialist view of the world Arguably, even if less closely, philoso- and humankind. Mental phenomena are phical debates about ontology, including epiphenomenal. The idea of spirit or soul, cosmic atomism and the nature of Being or Hobbes asserted, is self-contradictory, as if Reality, find some parallels. Thales of one were to postulate the existence of Miletus (c. 624–546 bce) and Democritus ‘immaterial material’. (c. 460–370 bce) formulate an atomism The world and humankind are gov- that offers resonances with the school of erned, Hobbes believed, by causal forces. Vais´esika, the Atomist school. Parmenides Humankind is moved by appetites and of Elea (fl. c. 510–492 bce) argued that passions. It is ignorance of second causes, ultimate Reality is Being, while ‘coming Hobbes asserted, that gives rise to notions into being’ is illusory, on the ground that of ‘religion’, together with the effects of we can assert ‘that it is’, while to try to fear and superstition. However, some assert ‘that it is not’ presupposes or entails argue that in spite of his critique of a self-contradiction from which ‘none can ‘popular’ religion, Hobbes merely found learn’. no place for ‘God’ within philosophy, but Bhartrhari’s question concerning was not committed to an explicit athe- whether˙ language is ‘natural’, or based ism. This issue remains disputed. on convention, is the main subject in Ethics can be formulated only in Plato’s Cratylus. Further, if we move from terms of the pursuit of self-gratification Hume, David 138 and heightened vitality. Nevertheless, respected and admired natural science, Hobbes concedes that an anarchy in including the work of Newton. which ‘might is right’ would be destruc- Hume’s other works included An tive. This is the context of his well-known Enquiry Concerning Human Understand- dictum that in the distant past, before the ing (1748), The Natural History of Reli- rise of ‘civilization’, humankind lived gion and (published after his death) lives that were ‘solitary, poor, nasty, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion brutish, and short’. (1778). He also produced a six-volume A social contract is needed whereby history of England. He confessed to ‘an ‘natural’ powers to seize from aversion to everything but the pursuits of others are replaced by a voluntary con- philosophy and general learning’. tract to subordinate personal power to a The Enquiry Concerning Human governing body, preferably a monarch. Understanding is largely a re-working of Thereby ‘order’ may be achieved, and the Treatise. The Treatise ‘fell dead-born provide a framework to constrain human from the press without . . . excit[ing] a appetites. This ‘sovereign power’ is the murmur’, and Hume was convinced that ‘soul’ of Leviathan, the state, that is a this was because of its presentation rather ‘mortal God’. (See also cause, material- than its content. However, The Treatise, ism.) book I still stands in its own right, and book I, part 2 does not appear in the Enquiry. Hume, David (1711–76) sensations, perceptions, Hume is the most radical and thorough- impressions, and self, in the going of the major British empiricists, treatise and enquiries following on the empirical traditions of Locke (1632–1704) and Berkeley Hume begins both the Treatise and the (1685–1753), but differing from both. Enquiries by distinguishing between ‘dif- He differs from Locke on the powers and ferent species of philosophy’. The methods scope of reason, and from Berkeley on of ‘natural’ philosophy (i.e. science) tell us the latter’s ‘immaterialist’ ontology. most about ‘the objects of our senses’; Although he called his Treatise of speculative philosophy is ‘uncertain and Human Nature (1739–40) ‘sceptical’, chimerical’; ‘scepticism . . . is subversive of Hume was too cautious in refraining speculation’ (Enquiries, 3rd edn, ed. P.H. from going beyond firm data to be Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon, 1975, sect. called a ‘sceptic’ in the epistemological I, para. 8). Sense-data enter the mind as or fullest technical sense of the term. This ‘impressions’ of sensation. Impressions are is not to deny that he had a sceptical cast ‘all our more lively perceptions’ (sect. II, of mind. para. 12). The ‘less lively’ are ‘Thoughts’ A Scottish philosopher and historical or ‘Ideas’ (ibid.). The core of Hume’s writer, Hume was born and educated in empiricist argument is ‘that nothing can Edinburgh. He served as a librarian and ever be present to the mind but an image administrator rather than as a professional or perception . . . the senses are the only teacher of philosophy. His central philo- inlets’ (ibid., sect. XII, pt I, para. 118). sophical theme was that we cannot go This leads to inferences about the self. beyond ‘experience’. He published A ‘The mind has never anything present to it Treatise of Human Nature at around the but the perceptions, and cannot possibly early age of twenty-eight, to which he reach any experience of their connexion appended the sub-title ‘Being an Attempt with objects’ (ibid., para. 119). Hence to Introduce the Experimental Method of Hume concludes that the ‘self’ is no more Reasoning into Moral Subjects’. He than a bundle of perceptions. 139 Hume, David

Even causality cannot be ‘observed’, Philo questions whether Cleanthes rests only constant conjunction; while ‘reason- toomuchon‘anthropomorphism’ ing’ a priori provides no knowledge of (ibid., pt IV). As the Dialogues proceed cause and effect (ibid., sect. IV, pt I, paras. Demea appeals, in vain, for some rational 23–6). Hume acknowledges that in prac- foundation (e.g. pt VI); while Philo insists tice daily life depends on assumptions upon the lack of ‘data’ on which any about causality, space and time, and the system may be built (pt VII). independent existence of the external Part IX raises the question of a divine world, but these things are not empirically nature, and X–XI provide Hume’s classic demonstrable, and no other avenue of discussion of the problem of evil. Hume’s demonstration is available. cautious ‘scepticism’ emerges: there simply is not enough firm evidence to establish an dialogues concerning natural argument from design, although he cannot religion, and ‘of miracles’ in utterly exclude it; the problem of evil enquiries generates as many counter-arguments Hume admits in his essay on miracles against design on the part of a good God that ‘he could not let alone’ issues of as whatever ‘evidence’ Cleanthes may try religion, even though he did not assent to cite in its support. to any version of received religion. He did Evil is real: it ‘embitters the life of every not believe, in effect, in miracles, or in living being. The stronger prey on the special revelation,orinpost-mortal weaker and keep them in perpetual terror’ existence. ‘God’ remained for him ‘a (ibid., pt X, 62). Hume observes: ‘Epi- variable, an enigma, an inexplicable mys- curus’ old questions are yet unanswered. Is tery’. The explicit aim of ‘Of Miracles’, [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? however, was ‘to silence . . . bigotry and Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not superstition’. (Enquiries, sect. X, pt I, willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both para. 86; cf. paras. 87–101). able and willing? Whence, then, is evil?’ Indeed in The Natural History of (ibid., 66). Religion (1757) Hume expresses the view In his essay ‘Of Miracles’ Hume is that ‘monotheism’ encourages intolerance. sceptical about the degree of genuine Sometimes more popular religion, he evidence offered in support of miracles in claims, by contrast remains more poly- Judaeo-Christian tradition. He is overtly theistic and more tolerant beneath its sceptical about evidence for the resurrec- official formularies. Hume’s target is not tion of Jesus Christ as the foundation of so much ‘religion’ as ‘organized’ religion. Christian faith. The Dialogues were completed before However, this merges into a second line 1761, but waited seventeen years for of argument. Since we are considering not publication. Hume preferred ‘to live regularities within the world but, by quietly’. The characters in the Dialogues definition, virtually unique effects alleged are based on Cicero. ‘Demea’ is an to be caused by a clearly unique Agent, it exponent of orthodox rationalism; is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive ‘Cleanthes’ defends teleology and philoso- of what might count as adequate evidence, phical theism; ‘Philo’ probably represents even if it existed. We have no experimental a viewpoint similar to Hume’s own. analogies which would allow induction Demea claims that by abandoning the a from experience. priori ideas of rationalism, Philo and Yet the whole of Hume’s work con- Cleanthes are selling out to scepticism, cerns what may be based upon empiricist (Dialogues, pt I). Cleanthes appeals to criteria alone. The question about religion observation of the world for inferences to boils down to the argument: granted that the existence of design (ibid., pts II, III). there is no revelation, what kind of natural Hume, David 140 religion can built upon ‘experience’ since this an undogmatic, cautious, scepticism ensues. is mediated solely through the senses and (See also belief; cause; empiricism; ‘perception’? On the basis of Hume’s epis- science and religion; teleological temology, then, it is scarcely surprising that argument.) I

Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–98) became widely known as ‘the Com- mentator’ (i.e. on Aristotle). Some of his Averroes is the medieval Latin name for commentaries are short paraphrases; the Arabic form transliterated as Ibn others are detailed exegetical expositions. Rushd. He represents the greatest figure He also wrote a commentary on Plato’s of Arabic or Islamic philosophy in the Republic, again seeking synthesis or inte- context of its late Spanish school. He was gration between Aristotelian and Platonic born in Cordoba, and served as lawyer, perspectives. physician, judge and diplomat in Cordoba A significant point of resonance and Seville. In his philosophical writing he between Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Rushd and produced an extensive range of commen- the Christian philosophy of Augustine taries on texts of Aristotle and a reply to and Thomas Aquinas is their common al-Ghazali’s attack on the privileging of emphasis on the ‘ordered’ nature of the philosophy over revelation and religion. universe as an organic, rational, purposive He entitled the latter The Incoherence of hierarchy embodying differentiations of the Incoherence. form or levels of being. Whereas in modern philosophical As for al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, such thought it is customary to note substan- beliefs as the eternity of the world and the tial differences between Plato and Aris- superiority of philosophical thought invited totle, like al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd drew on tension with the Qur’an. Hence Ibn Rushd both traditions almost as if they were postulated a hermeneutics of sacred texts one. Like Ibn Sina (Avicenna), he some- adapted to varying capacities of their times drew on Plotinus and Neopla- readers. Philosophical minds could ‘see’ tonism, but he preferred Aristotle’s idea more than others in the Qur’an. He of the eternity of the world to Ibn Sina’s supports this by his philosophy of intelli- scheme of emanations flowing from the gence and of language. Not surprisingly, it First Cause, Prime Mover, God or Allah. appears that around 1195, three years Plotinian mysticism also features in before his death, a conservative reaction positive terms. provoked his retirement. Nevertheless he If al-Farabi was known among Arabic remains a highly influential figure for philosophers as ‘the Second Teacher’, and in the West. (See also Ibn Sina as the ‘third Aristotle’, Ibn Rushd evil; language in religion; plenitude.) Ibn Sina 142

Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Abu ‘Ali through the senses; retention and memory; al-Husayn (980–1037) imagination and evaluation. In effect, he allows for empirical and rationalist the- Ibn Sina (the Arabic form of the name ories of knowledge supported by under- known widely in the West as Avicenna) standing and judgement. was born in Persia, showed early brilliance The subtlety of Ibn Sina’s distinctions of mind, and became vizier and physician between universals and particulars, to several sultans. He formulated a system between possibility and existence, between of philosophy that reflects, but does not the necessary and contingent served to merely replicate, his careful reading of stimulate the high scholasticism of the Aristotle. Of all the medieval thinkers of West in the twelfth and thirteenth centu- Islamic philosophy, his is the most ries. It is likely that this influence was felt detailed, complex and probably, influen- in the University of Paris and perhaps tial work. The translation of his writings Oxford in the thirteenth century. from Arabic to Latin had a huge impact on Possible beings, Ibn Sina argued, the revival of Aristotelian philosophy on required a cause that determines whether the twelfth- and thirteenth-century West they exist. God, however, is uncaused and, (see Thomas Aquinas). in the sense suggested by this contrast and If al-Farabi was often called ‘the context, a ‘necessary’ Being. This is not to Second Teacher’ in the Arab world (after be confused with the merely conceptual Aristotle as ‘the First Teacher’), Ibn Sina necessity of Plato’s Forms. God is pure was widely known as the ‘Third Aristotle’, Intelligence, who is perfectly good and even if his philosophy did not merely transcendent. Arguably Ibn Sina’s conces- replicate Aristotle’s. He was also influ- sion to the notion of ‘emanations’ serves to enced by Plotinus and Neoplatonsim, underline divine transcendence, as well as by al-Farabi’s work on Aristotle. although it is difficult to reconcile with Much of Ibn Sina’s work was in the the Qur’an (or with Hebrew–Christian area of medicine. He was entirely familiar scripture). Doubtless Ibn Sina would reply with the writings of Galen, and his work that every level of being is derived from The Canon of Medicine attempted a the One Being, God or Allah. synthesis of Greek and Arabic medical Although he denied bodily resurrec- traditions expounded as a coherent tion, Ibn Sina argued for the immortality ‘science’. of the soul. A virtuous soul has actualized Ibn Sina wrestles with the central its possibility, and therefore continues to problems of philosophy: with God and exist in this form. Ibn Sina remains closer Being (ontology); the nature of knowl- to al-Farabi than to al-Kindi or certainly edge (epistemology); causation; evil; al-Ghazali in his estimate of the privi- creation and logic. Some argue that his leged role of philosophy. It is scarcely distinctive development of Aristotle’s dis- surprising that al-Ghazali attacked his tinction between actuality and possibi- work as moving too far from Islam and lity even anticipates the more modern the Qur’an. (See also empricism; post- contrast between essence and existence. mortal existence; rationalism). For reason opens the way to travel further details see L.C. Goodman, Avi- through various levels of understanding, cenna (London: Routledge, 1992). and ultimately may lead to God. Ibn Sina develops Aristotle’s contrast between ‘pas- idealism sive’ knowledge (the reception of data through the senses and ‘active’ knowledge Traditionally in philosophy the term (relating data to construct ideas and denotes the school of thought that regards concepts) into four elements: perception the mind and ideas as more primarily 143 idealism constitutive of reality than the material or Revelation (1792) and his work on the empirical world. Leibniz (1646–1716) nature of philosophy (1794) expounded may have been the first to use the term an idealism in which ‘reality’ is grounded as a philosophical designation, which he in the self and self-consciousness. Schel- applied to Plato’s thought. ling called this system, therefore, ‘subjec- One predictable problem arises from tive idealism’. the different contrasts in relation to which In spite of Fichte’s influence on Schel- the term idealism is used. When idealism ling, the latter sought to ground his system stands in contrast to the phenomena of the of idealism in a philosophy of nature material or contingent, Plato is rightly (1797). This seemed to Schelling to be a seen as an idealist. However, if idealism is more ‘objective idealism’. Nevertheless, allied with nominalism against realism, Schelling’s version of idealism changed the term would cease to apply to Plato, quickly, repeatedly, and radically, to the since in a broad sense he may also be consternation of Hegel, who had been his regarded as a realist. collaborator in early years. Hegel criti- In , Locke (1632– cized his lack of conceptual rigour and 1704) and more radically Berkeley pantheist leanings, in which, by dissolving (1685–1753) regard the sense data that is conceptual differentiations, he created ‘a empirically perceived as objects of reflec- night in which all cows are black’. tion as, in effect, constituting ‘ideas’. Thus Hegel sought to ground his own their empiricism turns out to be compa- idealist system in history and logic. The tible with, even to imply, idealism. Locke absolute, or absolute Idea, or ‘God’, was both an empiricist and an ‘epistemo- manifests itself through a double dialec- logical idealist’. For Berkeley, however, all tic of history and of logic. There is also a perception took the form of ideas: ‘To dialectic between the finite and the Whole. exist is to be perceived.’ He termed his Yet it was precisely Hegel’s identification own idealism ‘immaterialism’. Hence he of the Absolute with Mind or Spirit might be thought of as ontologically ‘an (German, Geist) that provoked the reac- immaterialist idealist’. tion of the ‘left-wing’ ‘young’ Helegians, In German philosophy, idealism Feuerbach (1804–72), Strauss, and Marx becomes more dominant, following (1818–83) to replace ‘Spirit’ by human- Kant’s emphasis (1724–1804) on the kind or by material, socio-economic activity of the mind in shaping what we forces. Hegel is sometimes described as perceive through cognition and a struc- an ‘absolute idealist’. turing through the categories that the In England, Bradley (1846–1924) mind brings to bear in order to understand drew a contrast between the self-contra- and to ‘order’ perception and understand- dictions that constitute ‘appearance’, and ing. Although he produced a ‘Refutation ‘Reality’, which comprises an all-inclusive of Idealism’, Kant’s postulating a reality totality, or the absolute (Appearance and external to the mind still remains a Reality, 1893). ‘Only the Whole is Real’; presupposition required by the mind. Kant ‘the Real is the rational’. He has been is sometimes called a ‘transcendental called ‘the English Hegel’. Sometimes he is idealist’. also classed (with Hegel and Royce) as an The three most distinctive and char- ‘Absolute Idealist’. acteristic German idealists are Fichte In America Josiah Royce (1855–1916) (1762–1814) Hegel (1770–1831), and combined aspects of Hegel’s idealism with Schelling (1775–1854). Fichte dispensed a pragmatic view of history and commu- with Kant’s ‘things-in-themselves’ to pro- nities. He held to the notion of ‘ultimacy’ pose a more radical idealism than that of in the sense of unsurpassability, and saw Kant. Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All ideas as the moving dynamic of history. In identity 144 theory, much rests on the premises of In relation to epistemology, ideologi- Hegel’s idealism. Yet Royce’s notions of cal criticism (often written as the German progress as instantiated in community and Ideologiekritik) assumes that rational ‘interpretation’ may suggest that ‘prag- reflection is never value-neutral but always matic idealism’ might be a more revealing guided by ‘interest’. Nietzsche regarded classification than ‘absolute’ idealism. this ‘interest’ as a manipulative power- Over-easy labels are often seductive interest; Habermas accepts a broader rather than constructive, tempting readers notion. In hermeneutics it has become towards a simplistic pigeon-holing of thin- a tool used in the critical reading of sacred kers. Nevertheless, to qualify different texts. (See also freud’s critique of versions of idealism (after Plato) as episte- religion; reason.) mological (Locke), immaterialist (Berkeley), transcendental (Kant), subjective (Fichte), immanence objective (Schelling in his early–middle period), absolute (Hegel and Bradley) and In philosophy of religion this term is most pragmatic (Royce), serves to convey the characteristically applied to God in con- major point that idealism is not a single trast to divine transcendence.More philosophy, but a network of loosely strictly, in theism (especially in Judaism, interrelated systems. (See also epistemol- Christianity and Islam) it complements ogy; materialism; objectivity; ontol- divine transcendence. It moves in the ogy; pantheism; subjectivity.) direction of pantheism, or more accu- rately panentheism, but is not to be identity identified with pantheism. It denotes God’s presence and action within the See self. world and in the world order, in contrast to notions of divine action ‘from beyond’ ideological criticism or ‘without’. In Marxist traditions the term ‘ideology’ In a secondary sense immanence may is used pejoratively to denote systems of be used more narrowly as a term in ideas or beliefs, or a ‘false consciousness’ Kantian philosophy to denote what lies that serves to perpetuate and to underpin entirely within the limits of possible capitalist attitudes and values. In the social experience. Here ‘immanent’ stands in sciences it is used more generally (either contrast not with transcendent but with pejoratively or neutrally) to denote sys- transcendental. Also in scholastic phi- tems of belief that are consciously or losophy ‘immanent action’ denotes that unconsciously invoked to underpin parti- action the effects of which do not reach cular political or social structures, institu- ‘beyond’ the subject or agent of the action. tions and practices. Normally, however, immanence refers Hence ideological criticism denotes the to divine presence and agency within the epistemological and hermeneutical process world, and often, but not always, goes of bringing these beliefs and the dynamics hand-in-hand with a mystical, pietist, or of their application to the surface. ‘De- modified pantheist approach to God. ideologization’ belongs to the family of Fundamentally it denotes the nearness or processes that includes demythologiz- indwelling of God, especially as animating ing (Bultmann); demystifying (Roland an organic universe in omnipresence. Barthes, Derrida), deconstructing (Der- Theism holds together divine trans- rida), ‘emancipatory critique’ (Habermas) cendence and divine immanence. For and ‘criticism of ideology’ (T. Eagleton) as God is ‘beyond’ the world and any the exposure of deceptive or false beliefs contingent network of causes within drawn from society. the world, yet God is also ‘within’ the 145 immutability of God world working through such causal net- Aquinas grounded the immutability of works. Expressed most sharply, a truly God in his doctrine that God is ‘simple’ transcendent God remains free to choose and ‘perfect’ (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. to be immanent within God’s world, 3 and 4). The currency of divine ‘simpli- whereas a wholly immanent God would city’ is that ‘God is’ (ibid., Qu. 3, art. 4). be caught up in determined patterns Change would add to, or subtract from, imposed by the world. (See also deism; this Being, and render it ‘becoming’. God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of; Further, God ‘lacks nothing of the mode mysticism; pietism; transcendental of . . . perfection’ (ibid., Qu. 4, art. 1). philosophy.) Change would imply either movement from ‘less than perfect’ or to ‘less than immortality of the soul perfect’. See post-mortal existence of the self; swinburne’s ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ soul. immutability In contemporary discussion, however, it is immutability of God customary to distinguish, with Swin- If the immutability of God is defined as the burne, between the ‘weaker’ sense of assertion that ‘God cannot change’, in ‘cannot change in character’, and ‘stron- what sense are we using the word ger’ sense of being, in effect, disengaged ‘change’? When the sacred texts of Juda- from time, or temporal succession, on the ism, Christianity and Islam speak of God basis of ‘divine timelessness’ (Swinburne, as ‘unchanging’, the emphasis seems to fall The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clar- first of all upon God’s never-ending, ever- endon, 1977, 212–15). ready, presence, and God’s faithfulness to Swinburne argues that if God ‘fixed his remain consistent with God’s self-revela- intentions “from all eternity”, he would be tion and character. a very lifeless thing, not a person who arguments from ‘perfection’? reacts to man with sympathy . . . pardon or plato, boethius and aquinas chastening because he chooses there and then’ (ibid., 214). ‘The God of . . . Juda- Plato (428–348 bce) draws a sharp line ism, Islam and Christianity . . . is a God in between the realm of appearance, change continual interaction’ with human persons and imperfection and that of Ideas or (ibid.). Forms, perfection and God. On this basis Pannenberg similarly insists that the to say that God could change would unity and eternity of God represents one logically imply that we locate God in the of two dimensions: God is ‘intrinsically contingent, empirical, imperfect world differentiated unity’ (Systematic Theology, of change, rather than to ascribe to God 3 vols.; vol. 1, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, the changeless perfection that charac- 1991, 405). Pannenberg endorses Barth’s terizes the realm of Ideas or perfect emphasis upon ‘order and succession’ in essences. the life of God. Barth called for ‘a revision Boethius (c. 480–525) and Augus- of the traditional opposing of time to tine (354–430) recognized that time eternity. Eternity does not mean time- belongs to the created order as part of lessness’ (ibid., 407). that which God has created. Hence God Moltmann goes further. He speaks of cannot be conditioned by time, but is God’s ‘giving himself’, even ‘serving’, and characterized by eternity as the very choosing to participate in the world’s grief condition and ground for time. If God is and redemption in ‘the history of God’ (cf. ‘beyond’ time, how can God undergo The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, change? London: SCM, 1981, 33, 35, and through- incommensurability 146 out). ‘God empties himself in creation, in Kuhn’s work embodied the fundamen- presentation and redemption . . . God’s tal insight that the history of science is not history with the world is played out . . . merely the history of a set of value-neutral in the changing efficaces of the divine observations of unselected, raw, value- Persons’ (Experiences in Theology, Lon- neutral data, but includes a social dimen- don: SCM, 2000, 310, 311). sion that reflects the conceptual expecta- Many Thomist theologians will not tions of scientists. These conceptual wish to go as far as Moltmann. Further, expectations or conceptual frames change those Islamic thinkers (see Islamic Phi- particularly at the nodal points of scien- losophy) who also retain a more Aris- tific ‘revolution’ or ‘paradigm-shift’. totelian approach will also tend towards a The most familiar ‘revolutions’ include ‘hard’ concept of immutability alongside a the transition from a pre-modern geo- strong doctrine of the providential will of centric concept of the universe after Allah operative within the world. In Copernicus (1473–1543) noted that data Hindu philosophy the Advaita Vedanta appear differently in accordance with the tradition of S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ would reject any position of the observer, and after Galileo notion of ‘self-differentiation’ within, let (1564–1642) noted that the sun, not the alone differentiation from, brahman as earth, is the centre of the solar system. Ultimate Reality. ‘Change’ would be illu- Stars are perceived as other suns, and the sory. relation between motion and force is explored. Similarly, the work of Newton process philosophy: whitehead (1642–1727) on gravity and motion pro- and hartshorne vided the overriding model or paradigm of In the distinctive perspective of process gravity, mass and movement until Albert philosophy God is ‘always becoming’. Einstein (1879–1955) demonstrated pio- Hartshorne (1897–2000) argues that the neering work on the relativity of space and notion of God as Absolute tells only half time. of the story. God is temporal as well as Einstein moved beyond the Newtonian eternal, world-inclusive as well as trans- concept of an ‘absolute’ space and time, cendent. The ‘maximal greatness’ of Per- and postulated their interdependence and fection may be what it is at different times. theoretical unity. The energy of any mass As ‘di-polar’, God is both absolute and is the product of the mass multiplied by relative to change. (See also empricism; the square of the speed of light (E=mc2). god, concept and attributes of; Mass increases as an object approaches omnipotence; omniscience; transcen- the velocity of light, while time slows as dence.). velocity increases. This ‘special theory of relativity’ (dat- ing from 1905–7) also demonstrates that incommensurability an event appears differently from within The term derives from the philosophy of different systems. For example, within an science, notably from the earlier work of inertial system measurements and even Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–96). In 1962 Kuhn clock-time will become different from how published The Structure of Scientific Revo- they appear under conditions of extreme lutions (2nd edn, Chicago: University of velocity. The General Theory of Relativity Chicago Press, 1970). He interpreted the (1916) relates gravitational forces to history of science not as a single linear space–time ‘curvature’. development of observation and ideas, but None of this suggests that Newtonian as a series of scientific traditions shaped physics is ‘wrong’ for everyday observa- and moulded in terms of the prevailing or tions of space, time, gravity and motion. dominant ‘paradigm’ of the era. We still use Newton’s assumptions (or 147 instantiation

‘paradigm’) daily. However, Einstein‘s words and vocabulary have different con- ‘paradigm’ overtakes it when more sophis- ceptual currency, there are ways of under- ticated theories are addressed about the standing and overcoming these differences nature of the universe. (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Kuhn points out that there is no value- Scheme’ in Davidson, Truth and Interpre- neutral external criterion of reference by tation, Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, 183– which to adjudicate between such differ- 98). ent paradigms. For the applicability of A spectrum of philosophical thinkers each paradigm largely depends on the take up a variety of standpoints on these nature of the system or agenda for which issues. Paul Feyerabend is probably more it is called into play. relativistic than the earlier Kuhn. H. Sankey reviews the range of responses in radical and moderate under- The Incommensurability Thesis (Sydney: standings of incommensur- Averbury Press, 1994). However, whatever ability: misapplications? the pragmatic and relativist overtones, Kuhn’s work has often been misinter- Kuhn succeeds in showing the condition- preted in theology. It is often taken to ing of scientific advances by the agenda of imply that self-contained ‘conceptual scientific communities and the illusion of schemes’ can operate side by side without entirely value-free knowledge. ‘Secular’ any reference at all to a common ration- approaches are often no more value-free ality, on the basis of their ‘incommensur- than ‘religious’ ones. ability’. To be sure, Kuhn argued that different instantiation paradigms in science ‘work in different worlds’ (ibid., 134). However, Kuhn him- Instantiation denotes providing instances, self disowned the more radical relativistic especially of a property or class. Some and anti-rational implications that some books on a desk may instantiate the draw from his work. He advises caution property of being red or blue. about its applications in his 1970 ‘Post- Russell (1872–1970) in effect con- script’ to the second edition of his work of firms Kant’s response to Descartes that 1962, and more emphatically in his work in the context of the ontological argu- The Essential Tension (1977). ment ‘existence’ is not a predicate. ‘Exis- Rorty takes up Kuhn’s notions of tence’ is more strictly thought of as incommensurability and paradigms to providing instances of that of which the argue that philosophical debate rests not word is predicated, i.e. by instantiation. In on rational adjudication, but on a prag- the ontological argument is ‘Being’ instan- matism of ‘nudging old problems aside’ tiated? (Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cam- The broader context is Russell’s work bridge: CUP, 1989, 264). Yet Rorty seems on logical form, which allows ‘exist’ to be to allude only to Kuhn’s earlier work, and bracketed in such a form as ‘For all x, x is it may be doubted whether Kuhn’s work y’. Instantiation is expressed in logical as a whole provides currency for Rorty’s notation through the use of a quantifier. post-modern pragmatism. To replace Instantiation need not be tied to re- argument by rhetoric does not strictly formulations in logic. Instantiation may derive from Kuhn. clarify more general or abstract debate, Donald Davidson utilizes the argument such as claims for the principle of from inter-translatability between the falsifiability or the status of univer- texts of diverse cultural communities to sals. wittgenstein’s explanation of show that the radical version of incom- ‘Now I understand . . .’ as ‘Now I know mensurability will not hold water. Even if how to go on . . .’ (in a mathematical rule ‘Ireanaean’ theodicy 148 or formula) is not wholly unlike recogniz- and reason, and stressed the transcen- ing the role of instantiation as a criterion dence of God as the Absolute. Less of understanding. clearly, there is a correlation, if not identification, of Allah as described in ‘Ireanaean’ theodicy the Qur’an with the Supreme Being of Aristotle, and the One of Neoplatonism. See Hick. Al-Kindi attempted to combine the Neoplatonic philosophy of emanations Islamic philosophy with the Islamic (and Jewish and Chris- The foundations of Islamic thought cannot tian) doctrine that creation arises by the be separated from the work of the Prophet sole initiation of the divine will, from (Muhammad) and the sacred texts of the nothing. He also expounded a broadly Qur’an (broadly 610–32; sometimes in Aristotelian theory of the nature of human older works the Arabic word is Anglicized knowledge. as the ‘Koran’). More details can be found Al-Farabi moved more clearly in the under entries for leading Islamic philoso- direction of Aristotle, except for his phers, including al-Kindi,(c. 813–c. retention and development of the Neopla- 871); al-Farabi, (875–950); Ibn Sina tonic and Plotinian notion of emanations. (Avicenna, 980–1037); al-Ghazali He could accommodate the Islamic (1058–1111); and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, emphasis on divine transcendence by 1126–98). postulating that reality flows continually The great Islamic philosophers thus out of the One Source of perfection. belong to the period from the ninth to If there are rudimentary anticipations the twelfth centuries, when Islamic influ- of modern process philosophy in this ence and culture flourished from Central one simple aspect, it might be suggested Asia to parts of Spain and North Africa. It also that in placing philosophy, or at least would be a mistake to limit ‘medieval the rigour of logic, above religious reflec- philosophy’ to such Christian Western tion, al-Farabi anticipated Hegel on this thinkers as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, issue. Those who are without philosophy Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. understand truth only through symbols, Indeed it was Islamic and Arabic philoso- in contrast to the strict logical demon- phy that rescued ancient Greek philoso- stration that rational philosophical phy, especially and thought can offer. Al-Farabi also Neoplatonism, from decline and obscur- expounded Plato’s Republic, perceiving ity. the role of philosophical thought for Works by Aristotle and politics and society. had been translated into Syriac by the the height of the movement school of Edessa in Mesopotamia, but more significantly these were translated, in Abu ‘Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna) was born in turn, into Arabic, including some books Persia, and is often regarded as the great- by Plotinus mistakenly attributed also to est of the medieval Islamic philosophers, Aristotle. Thus the ‘revived’ Aristotle in spite of the high reputation of al-Farabi. represented an Aristotle who also embo- His is the most detailed, complex and died Platonic and Neoplatonic elements. extensive account of the nature of God ontology founding thinkers and Being (i.e. ). He also worked out an epistemology, or theory Al-Kindi held a position in the court of of knowledge, which coheres with this. Baghdad and is widely regarded as the first Reason embraces sense-perception, mem- great Arabic or Islamic philosopher. He ory or retention, imagination, and evalua- emphasized the coherence of revelation tion, estimation or judgement. 149 Islamic philosophy

Ibn Sina also develops Aristotle’s dis- platonism and theological motivations, tinctions between the actual and the which had clouded some of the work of possible – almost, some have agreed, as his predecessors in Arabic philosophy. if to hint at the more modern contrast Ibn Rushd attended to the issues that between existence and essence. A ‘neces- impinged from Islamic theology by for- sary’ entity exists by virtue of its essence. mulating a hermeneutical theory of ‘levels The existence of possible beings implies of interpretation’ of the Qur’an (see the existence of a Necessary Being who is hermeneutics). He therefore remains God (see cosmological argument for the closest to Aristotle of all the great the existence of God; and Five Ways of medieval Arabic or Islamic philosophers, Thomas Aquinas). God is, in effect, taking up especially Aristotle’s notion of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. the intellect in De Anima, book III. In combining this Aristotelian perspec- influence tive with Islamic theology Ibn Sina arrives at an ontology in which all events that It is to these Islamic and Arabic philoso- occur do so necessarily. God remains phers that the Jewish and Christian beyond this kind of necessity as Ground philosophers of the Middle Ages (e.g. of all (see aseity). Maimonides, 1135–1204; Albert the Al-Ghazali, however, considered that Great, c.1200–80; and Thomas Aquinas, Ibn Sina, and still more seriously al- 1225–74) owe the climate of interest in Farabi, had assigned too privileged a place Aristotle that their earlier translations had to philosophy over Islamic theology. In nurtured. Arabic texts were translated into particular he rejected any attempt to Latin in Spain in the twelfth and thirteenth defend the notion of the eternity of the centuries. world as both philosophically self-contra- Other directions of Islamic philosophy dictory and contrary to the Qur’an. during this period take their points of Further, Ibn Sina’s notion of explaining departure from concerns about medicine, ‘necessity’ in terms of causal relations of science and logic in ancient Greek philo- possibility or actuality violated the sophy, or in a different direction explora- notion of God’s universal causative will tion of mysticism, often related to the (see occasionalism). Almost anticipating traditions of Neoplatonism and Plotinus. Hume, but in a different context, al- The main thrust, however, runs parallel Ghazali questions the very status of with some of the later Christian philoso- philosophical assumptions about cause. phical concerns of Aquinas. Can the southern spain sacred texts of the faith be reformulated in ways that accord with some of the The Islamic culture of southern Spain also conceptual issues of Greek philosophy, provided a Western centre for Arabic especially with reason and wisdom as philosophy. Among these philosophers these feature in Aristotle? These centuries Ibn Rushd (Averroes) was the most sig- yield the golden age of Islamic and Arabic nificant. He wrote a series of commen- philosophy. (For a useful introduction, see taries on Aristotle. He attempted to Oliver Leaman, Brief Introduction to disentangle a more authentic understand- Islamic Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, ing of Aristotle from the lenses of Neo- 1999.) J

Jaspers, Karl Theodor empirical subject); (2) consciousness as (1883–1969) being (Bewusstsein u¨ berhaupt); and (3) Geist (Mind or Spirit). All these are Jaspers graduated as a doctor of medicine ‘immanent’ modes. However, beyond at Heidelberg in 1909; practised psychia- these basic experiences of givenness or try and lectured in psychology; and situatedness within the world, lies the became Professor of Philosophy at Heidel- possibility of a transcendent mode. berg in 1921. He was deprived of his chair While he distanced himself from Hei- during Hitler’s years of power (1937–45), degger, Jaspers wrote: ‘Existential philo- after which he was reinstated. He regarded sophy has to keep consciousness free for his three-volume Philosophy (1932) as his possibility’ (Philosophy [1932], Chicago: major work, and wrote on Nietzsche, University of Chicago Press, 1969, vol. 2, Descartes, myth, transcendence, guilt 342). Truth, for Jaspers is never static: and freedom. ‘Truth is not a property, but something Although he was unwilling to accept that is present as we search for it’ (ibid., the description ‘existentialist’, Jaspers vol. 1, 37). began with the human situation. As a Life involves ‘struggling and suffering medical psychiatrist and academic psy- . . . I cannot avoid guilt . . . I must die’. chologist, he was well aware that a human Jaspers calls these ‘boundary situations’ person could be considered as an empirical (ibid., vol. 2, 178). Because such situations entity within the world, about whom confront the human subject with ‘an observations could be made. However, he indeterminate possibility, I must search explored the distinctive nature of human for being if I want to find my real self’ consciousness (Bewusstsein), and most (ibid., vol. 1, 45). The ‘object-like’ conven- especially and characteristically how tions and standardizations of the empirical human finite incompleteness points to a world and repressive traditions of religion transcendent ‘beyond’. or other value-systems peel away as I face More technically, the human subject, as ‘truth’ in the authentic mode ‘for me’. Here empirical subject open to observation, as the transcendent impinges on the immanent logical subject who thinks, and as agent with authenticity. who experiences freedom, yields ‘modes of Jaspers distinguishes between rigid, encompassing’. Jaspers respectively desig- fixed, dogmatic forms of religious expres- nates these as (1) Dasein (Being-there, sion and ‘the cipher [or symbol] that 151 Jewish philosophy allows men’s boundless yearning for the ancient philosophy: the real presence of God to be satisfied in an writings of philo instant so to speak . . . God remains inevocably hidden’ (Philosophical Faith Philo of Alexandria (c.20bce –50ce) and Revelation, New York: Harper & was a well-informed intellectual, who led Row, 1967, 341). Authentic revelation of the embassy to the Roman emperor Gaius truth and authentic faith will never take on behalf of the Jews of Alexandria. away human freedom. Modern estimates of him are divided. A positive view of ‘God’ or ‘religion’, Yet without doubt he held together therefore, is held together with a pluriform genuine loyalty to the traditions of view of truth and a multi-valent, or many- Hebrew scripture with a firm desire to level, account of language. This and other help the educated Graeco-Roman world features are noted under the entry on of his day to perceive the rational existentialism. In his later works Jaspers coherence and value of these traditions applies some of these issues to politics, for life. where he defends ‘freedom and the rights In order to facilitate this task of of man’. The English title The Future of establishing the rational credibility of Mankind (1961) first appeared as a work Jewish thought about God and the world, in German as Die Atombome und die PhilodrewuponavarietyofGreek Zukunft des Menschen (1958). (See also philosophical sources. He drew upon empiricism; immanence.) Plato’s notions of the eternal and of Ideas: upon Stoic views of the world, especially their method of allegorical read- Jewish philosophy ings of classic foundation-texts; and even Jewish philosophy has taken a variety of on Pythagorean notions of the world, forms, ancient, medieval and modern, but including theories of numbers. in general has sought to integrate insights This is not simply, as some have into the human, or into the relation claimed, the undisciplined ransacking of between God and the world drawn from sources by an eclectic polymath, but an Jewish sacred writings, traditions and attempt to draw on a variety of conceptual experiences, with wider systems of and logical tools to expound Hebrew– rational thought and philosophy. Jewish texts and traditions in the most Among key Jewish philosophers who rational and intelligible light. still retain considerable influence Maimo- It is no longer customary to draw a nides (1135–1204) holds together the sharp dividing-line between ‘Palestinian’ transcendence and perfection of God and ‘Hellenistic’ Judaism, not only with issues arising from the problem of because of difficulties of terminology, but evil, the use of anthropomorphism and also because Martin Hengel and other analogy in Hebrew scripture (the Chris- scholars have demonstrated the fluidity of tian Old Testament), debates about the this line. Nevertheless, Philo has a very nature of creation and the eternity of different approach from that of pharisaic the world, and issues of providence and and rabbinic Judaism, which flowered in human freedom. the Mishnah and later in the Jerusalem In more recent years Buber (1878– and Babylonian Talmuds. 1965) and Levinas (1906–95) have A good example of Philo’s work on explored the distinctively personal dimen- language in religion and hermeneu- sion of human selfhood, and the nature tics is his treatment of anthropomorph- of God as the God who addresses human- isms in the early chapters of Genesis. As a kind as ‘Thou’, and who gives ‘without transcendent, spiritual Being, God did not utility’ as well as in other ways. ‘walk’ in the Garden of Eden; indeed even Jewish philosophy 152 tilling the ground has a secondary mean- and its agenda to a remarkable degree. ing in the cultivation of virtue. Ibn Gabirol (c. 1021–57) wrote The book of Exodus and the legislative in both Hebrew and Arabic, and material in Leviticus, Numbers and Deu- explored Neoplatonism as his broad teronomy, reveal Moses as the supreme philosophical frame. Thomas Aquinas philosopher before Plato. His directions and Duns Scotus were aware of his are not, as they may appear, trivial work Source of Life (Fons Vitae), written comments about animal sacrifices, but in Arabic. underlying axioms for a healthy life of The importance of Ibn Gabirol’s philo- wisdom (see entry on Philo for details). sophy is as an example of minimalist Judaism. Indeed, so broadly does it share, early medieval jewish through Neoplatonist themes, a common philosophies agenda for philosophical discussion in In the early medieval period al-Favvumi Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions, Saadiah Gaon (882–942) brought together that for several centuries it was assumed to reason, tradition and experience, to be either Muslim or Christian. It stands in establish a systematic Jewish philosophy. clear contrast to Saadiah. These themes are expounded in his work (c. 1110–80) also The Book of Beliefs and Convictions wrote in Spain, and in Arabic. He drew on (longer title, Critically Chosen Beliefs the metaphysics of Islamic philosophy, and Convictions). especially of Ibn Sina (980–1037), but at Saadiah attacked scepticism as self- the same time emphasized, with Saadiah defeating and parasitic upon belief about Gaon, the distinctive continuity of Israelite the scope of experience and knowledge. and Jewish tradition. Yet again, however, Hence reason, sense-experience and tradi- the influence of Neoplatonism also makes tion constitute valid bases for an episte- itself felt. mology . He convincingly expounds, the later middle ages: long before a modern awareness of jewish rationalism and historicality and historical reason, the maimonides continuity of a tradition handed on by a people over time. Here only the most general outline of the These treatises also defend the unity thought of Maimonides is offered, since a and incorporeality of God, a doctrine of separate entry on him offers more detail. creation, human freedom and the phe- Abraham Ibn Daud is usually perceived as nomenon of evil in terms of trials or tests paving the way for Maimonides. of character. Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed Saadiah also undertook careful biblical stands in the tradition of Philo as facil- exegesis based on both Hebrew lexicogra- itating a reconciliation between loyalty to phy and semantics, and accorded this a the Hebrew scriptures and later rabbinic role in his philosophy. The multiform (Talmudic) traditions, and the search for character of the scriptures, which combine rational coherence, integrity, credibility political, intellectual, aesthetic, erotic, and intelligibility. procreative and moral goods, reveals that Above all, in the tradition of Philo in human well-being lies in no single ‘good’ the context of his own day, Maimonides alone, but on this rich diversity of gifts of draws not only on Greek philosophy but God. It was in the context of his work in also on Islamic philosophy, and even on a Baghdad that Saadiah came to bear the composite synthesis of Aristotle and title ‘Gaon’ (Hebrew, ‘Eminence’). Neoplatonism. Judaism in medieval Muslim Spain That God is transcendent and perfect is collaborated with Islamic philosophy not undermined by biblical anthropo- 153 Jung, Carl Gustav morphism. These are accommodations to political philosophy. His work The Star of our human understanding. Thus, by the Redemption (1921) proposes that the twelfth century, issues of cultural relati- ‘givens’ of human experience are God, vism were being explored, as Philo had the self and the world. Divine revelation anticipated more broadly. The philosophy takes the form of a ‘presence’ rather than of Maimonides became widely known, not statements in sacred texts. least by Leibniz (1646–1716) and Spi- Buber’s I and Thou (1923) is a pro- noza (1632–77). It represents the tradi- found, if brief, exposition of the distinctive tion of Jewish rationalism. dimension of interpersonal address and Within the later pre-modern period, personhood. The self is subject, not mention must also be made of Levi ben merely object; and God is always subject. Gerson, usually known by his Latin His subsequent works, including Between name as (1288–1344). Man and Man (1947) and Eclipse of God Although much of his work was on (1952), make profound contributions to scriptural texts, his main philosophical the interface between philosophy and work, The Wars of the Lord,owedmore religion. Buber is discussed under a to Plato than to Genesis for its under- separate entry. standing of creation. Mordecai Kaplan (1881–1983) is an Maimonides and Ibn Rushd (Aver- example of a philosophical thinker who roes) were probably the two greatest saw the essence of Jewish identity more in influences upon Gersonides’ thought. Phi- terms of patterns of social life than in losophy not only supplemented scriptural religious beliefs. Abraham Joshua Heschel revelation; it was coextensive with it. (1907–72) has been an influential figure in Indeed he was less critically aware than American Jewish philosophical theology. Maimonides of the limits of human Levinas offers profound philosophical reason. Gersonides provided so extreme reflection on human relationality to ‘the an example of Jewish rationalism that he Other’, especially in relation to transcen- provoked reactions against it. dental questions about the self in Other- wise than Being (1981). the modern period No single theme has dominated the The modern period reveals a hugely wide modern period, except perhaps what it is range of interests, agenda, positions and to be human and to have a certain identity. outlooks among Jewish philosophers. Yet most of these philosophers have Mendelssohn (1729–86) followed the placed their questions within a firm frame- rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff. He work of theism and Jewish tradition. (See defended and developed the arguments also existentialsim; reason; self.) for the existence of God. His philosophy is discussed under a separate entry. Jung, Carl Gustav (1875–1961) With Paul Natorp (1854–1924), Cohen (1842–1918) led the Marburg Jung is regarded as one of three major school of Neo-Kantian philosophy, which founders of psychoanalytical theory, with influenced thought about ‘constructs’ and Freud (1856–1939) and Adler. However, about ‘models’ in the natural sciences. he broke with Freud in 1913, not least Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) and because of his more positive evaluation are sometimes known as of religion and broader understanding Jewish existentialist philosophers, but of the drives generated by the uncon- their approaches differ, except in their scious. Jung stressed the ‘collective’ shared rejection of idealism. unconscious as the repository of the Rosenzweig wrote on Hegel (Hegel archetypes and symbols that are buried and the State, 1920) with reference to his within it, but nevertheless transmitted. Jung, Carl Gustav 154

He rejected Freud’s negative view of jung on religion symbols. A native of Switzerland, Jung gradu- In contrast to Freud, who saw religion as a ated in medicine from Basle, and projection outwards and upwards of inner became Professor of Psychiatry at neurotic conflicts, Jung regarded religion Zu¨ rich. He believed that archetypal positively, as a force for good. Also unlike patterns and symbols precede the formu- Freud, he did not attempt to press lation of ideas and concepts.Like scientific method into a theology or anti- Ricoeur (b. 1913), he argued that theology. Empirical method, he insisted, symbols give rise to thought, rather than cannot pronounce upon whether religious express thought. belief is true, although it can note its life- symbols and archetypes enhancing effects. Religion is ‘one of the earliest and most Symbols also combine ‘double meanings’, universal expressions of the human mind’ in the way that interactive metaphor also (Collected Works,20vols.,Princeton: brings together two or more worlds. Princeton University Press, 1953–78, vol. Integration, rather than fragmentation, is 11, 5). Hence no serious psychology can a positive concern of Jung’s ‘analytical avoid noting its importance for so many. psychology’. This drive towards whole- The human psyche, in fact, is ‘natively ness influenced Tillich (1886–1965), religious’ (naturaliter religiosa)’ (ibid., vol. together with Jung’s estimate of symbol 12, 13). Humankind needs ‘that which the as pre-conceptual. living religions of every age have given’ Symbols allow us to explore beyond (Modern Man in Search of a Soul,New the finite horizons of thought to rise York: Harcourt Brace, 1933, 229). towards the Ultimate. Jung writes, Religions, no less, provide the pre- ‘Because there are innumerable things conceptual, pre-cognitive symbols that beyond the range of human understand- serve to heal the rift between conscious- ing, we constantly use symbolic terms to ness and the unconscious, or between represent concepts that we can’t define or divided parts of the mind. Archetypal fully comprehend’ (Man and his Symbols, models include, for example, the image New York: Doubledays, 1971, 21). of the stone or rock, ‘eternally the same’, In Jung’s view the self is not auton- which may be found in ‘God’ or in other omous. It has been created by what flows religious sources. from the past history of the human race, Jung’s method stands in sharp contrast including the archetypal patterns and to that of Freud, especially in acknowl- imagery that cross the boundaries of edging the limits of empirical method. He times and cultures. Often the self’s own contributes an enriching awareness of pastneedstoberecalledtointegrate ‘depth’ in the dimension of the human self, unbalanced fragmentation. One example and of the healing potential for reintegra- would be the recovery and positive tion through that which lies beyond the reassimilation of the ‘Shadow’ side of a instrumental concepts of science and tech- personality that has been neglected or nology. (See also auntonomy; empricism; repressed. science and religion.) K

Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804) This also strikes the keynote of trans- cendental philosophy. Whereas traditional Kant’s critical philosophy forms a epistemology asks, ‘How do we know?’ watershed in the history of philosophy. and ‘What do we know?’, transcendental He moved beyond both empiricism and philosophy asks: ‘What are the grounds rationalism, by expounding a trans- and conditions for the very possibility of cendental philosophy. He was born in knowledge?’ Ko¨ nigsberg in Prussia, and taught at Kant also stressed the notion of auton- Ko¨ nigsberg University. omy. He defined the enlightenment as Kant was influenced by the rationalism ‘man’s exodus from his self-incurred tute- of Leibniz (1646–1716) but appreciated lage’ to a position of freedom where serious difficulties which Leibniz had persons are ‘to use your own understand- identified. Similarly, he respected the work ing’. Freedom was a pre-condition for the of Hume (1711–76) in the empiricist moral Absolute expounded in his Cri- tradition, but was even more dissatisfied tique of Practical Reason. with some of the sceptical inferences that critique of pure reason: the had to be drawn from Hume’s conclusions analytic, synthetic and (see scepticsim). Hume awoke him ‘from transcendental his dogmatic slumber’. The three great Critiques of Kant were Kant agreed with Hume that some things all written in his mature years: The seem neither to be analytical truths a Critique of Pure Reason (1781); The priori, nor synthetic, empirical truths a Critique of Practical Reason (1788); and posteriori.‘Cause’, for example, cannot The Critique of Judgement (1790). The strictly be observed; only constant con- first critique is often published in two junction. Yet it is hardly a priori, since its columns: the original 1781 edition as the denial is not self-contradictory. Are these ‘A’ editions: and the revisions that led to things, then, partly ‘synthetic’ truths, and the second main edition of 1787 as ‘B’ partly a priori truths? How could this be? material. In between these Kant wrote a It would not be acceptable, Kant defence of his claims, Prolegomena to any argued, simply to postulate that synthetic Future Metaphysics (1783) in which he a priori truths (both) are metaphysical identified as his central issue ‘whether such truths. The issue is more complex. There a thing as metaphysics is possible at all’. are transcendental conditions: grounds or Kant, Immanuel 156 conditions for the possibility of experi- critique of practical reason encing the world as we experience it. They and other works express conditions for understanding the phenomenal world. In the period between the first and second Kant subdivided three conditions Critiques Kant produced Groundwork of between correlations and types of under- the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in standing. Thus synthetic a priori truths preparation for his Critique of Practical within the empirical realm provide condi- Reason in 1788. Kant had been educated tions necessary for inferential or discursive in the tradition of pietism and high moral thought. This was called ‘the transcenden- duty, and it was in the realm of the moral tal analytic’. Propositions within the imperative that he found the Absolute that ‘metaphysical’ realm provide conditions offered a framework for his notions of necessary for regulative reason and under- ‘God, freedom and immortality’. standing in ordering the world. This is ‘the Kant regarded his Critique of Pure transcendental dialectic’. Reason as parallel with the ‘Copernican We experience the world as we experi- Revolution’. In relation to objects in the ence it because these regulative concepts empirical world, and to reason in the and regulative ‘ordering’ are constitutive traditions of rationalism, there was no of the experience construed by our minds. longer any self-contained world, compar- Kant identified certain ‘antinomies of able with a pre-Copernican world-view. reason’ that illustrate what is at issue. This ‘pre-Copernican’ perspective treated One antinomy is ‘the beginning of objects as ‘things-in-themselves’ (Dinge an time’, or ‘the edge of space’. How can sich). we conceive of the edge of space or the Only in the realm of ethics, Kant beginning of time without being seduced argued in his Critique of Practical Reason, into letting our ‘edge of space’ fence off do we leave the realm of the relative for ‘more space’ beyond it, or seduced into the Absolute, unconditioned ‘Categorical asking, ‘What was going on “before” time Imperative’ of moral duty. This goes began?’ further in The Metaphysics of Morals The antinomy, paradox or self-contra- (1797). The ‘absolute’, apart from the diction arises because it is our minds that categorical imperative itself, is ‘the abso- insist upon ordering the world in spatio- lutely good will’. This is the autonomous temporal categories. We cannot be will of ‘deontological’ ethics, or an ethic of otherwise. C.E.M. Joad once offered the duty. over-simple but useful analogy of seeing a Kant permitted the moral dimension to blue world through blue spectacles. Since enter the realm of metaphysics because he we cannot remove the spectacles, we viewed the ideas of God, freedom and cannot know whether the world is ‘really’ immortality as postulates of practical blue; indeed, it is hardly possible to reason. The virtuous person, he believed, respond to the question. deserves happiness, and only God can The Critique of Pure Reason, then, resolve the disharmonies that appear to shows the limits of reason. In Kant’s view, conflict with such an expectation. it is an essentially regulative, ordering In Religion Within the Limits of vehicle. Antinomies emerge when we try Reason Alone (1793) it becomes clear to push it beyond this function. Reason- how far Kant’s view of God differs from ing about God yields the antinomy that what he calls that of ‘ecclesial’ religion God is either ‘outside’ the world as First and ‘divinity schools’. God is not a Cause and Absolute, or inside the world personal agent who acts within the world. as acting within it. Kant saw these as Prayer is merely self-adaptation and irreconcilable. mediation, without the hope of changing 157 Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye states of affairs. That would be ‘ecclesial’, arises from his emphasis on the individual not ‘rational’ prayer; indeed it would be in contrast to convention; on will and ‘superstition’. decision, in contrast to abstract reason; This coheres with The Critique of and on ‘subjectivity’ in the sense of Judgement (Urteilskraft). The ‘ordering’ venturing one’s own stake in truth,in of the mind regulates the subjective as contrast to objective content (see objec- aesthetics, and the logical or objective as tivity). In the context of religion, teleology. But these are how the world radicals lay claim to appeal to his attack appears in ‘our’ experience. There is no on mere orthodox belief, while pietists ‘experience’ that rests wholly upon what is no less appeal to his emphasis on personal ‘given’; experience also embodies within it commitment rather than rational argu- what the mind brings to it as categories of ment. understanding and ‘order’. Hence Kant’s life and writings third Critique did much to undermine the teleological argument, even if Kant Born and educated in Copenhagen, Kier- himself still respected it. kegaard grew up under the influence of a some effects of kant’s legacy domineering father, who encouraged him to read theology in preparation for ordi- We cannot put the clock back to the pre- nation. When this authority-figure became Kantian era. Schleiermacher recognized guilty of a serious moral lapse, Kierke- that Kant’s philosophy required new gaard determined to disengage himself thinking in theology. For the philosophy from all second-hand inherited values, of religion Kant raises complex questions and to live life and seek truth for himself. about ‘experience’. Can we separate what Yet he found no fulfilment in moral we think that we experience from how our decline, and by his own independent minds order and interpret that experience? decision resumed theological studies. Reason also plays an ambivalent role in A crisis of personal confidence led Kant. On one side, Kant opens up the im- Kierkegaard to break off his engagement portance of transcendental questions. These to be married, precipitating a parallel have to be asked. Yet is there the difficulty withdrawal from initial pastoral ministry. that in the end Kant holds to a regulative He perceived this as following a path of and thereby ‘instrumental’ role for reason, obedience to God’s will which transcended not much different from Hume’s,exceptfor the ethical obligations of promises. In Fear the purposes that it serves? and Trembling (1843) he invoked the Finally, ‘God’ is squeezed into a role story of Abraham’s ‘sacrifice’ of Isaac in that performs what suits Kant’s philoso- Genesis 22 as a supposed model. The phical system, including an implausible command to slay the son through whom notion of providing a backstop for expec- divine promise would be fulfilled seemed tations about the reward due to the ‘good to contradict both ethics and logic, but will’. Kant concedes that his philosophical still demanded obedience in face of all God is hardly the God of the ‘divinity this. school’, let alone the God of most religious Kierkegaard eventually retreated into a believers. (See also dualism; God, argu- measure of isolation from society and ments for the existence of.) from the Danish Church. He saw suffering and obedience as his Christian vocation, believing that whereas Hegel and other Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye thinkers talked about Christianity, his own (1813–1855) work was to live it. Kierkegaard is credited with being, in All this profoundly affected the style, effect, the father of existentialism. This method and content of Kierkegaard’s Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye 158 many writings. To provoke decision rather being ‘dulled into a third person’ by mere than shallow assent to ideas he attacked passive assent to what is ‘objectively’ his own work under pseudonyms (Point of described (Journals, Princeton: Princeton View for my Work as an Author, Prince- University Press, 1938, 533). ton: Princeton University Press, 1941). He ‘The objective accent falls on WHAT is called this ‘indirect’ communication in said; the subjective accent on HOW it is continuity with Socratic irony and the said . . . Thus subjectivity becomes the subversive parables of Jesus. He also truth’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, wrote from the contrasting angles of a 181; Kierkegaard’s capitals). shallow ‘aesthetic stage’ which centred on rejection of equating truth passing pleasure, a deeper ‘ethical’ stage, with a rational system of and a ‘religious’ stage that moved beyond, ideas and even ‘suspended’ the ethical. Trans- formative decisions change life, and they Kierkegaard passionately rejected the ide- lie beyond general rules. alism of Hegel. Hegel, in effect, identified the individual and thought with reality. In Kierkegaard’s view ‘subjectivity’ this approach contained several flaws. First, it presupposed some detached, Kierkegaard rejects the way of searching world-surveying, viewpoint from which for truth by following the crowd. ‘The ‘the whole’ could be constructed as a most ruinous evasion of all is to be hidden system. Second, it substituted mere passive in the crowd . . . to get away from hearing assent to a system of ideas for genuinely God’s voice as an individual’ (Purity of participatory and self-transformative Heart is to Will One Thing, London: engagement with truth. Thereby, third, it Collins, 1961, 163). In Christian theism elevated intellect or reason above will and this approach is taken up by Barth and decision. Everything remains purely spec- Bultmann, and in atheistic versions of ulative, without existential, concrete existentialism by Camus and Sartre. involvement. In his satirical Attack on ‘Christendom’ Hegel portrayed history-as-a-whole as Kierkegaard insists that ‘Christianity has Absolute Idea in a process of self-manifes- been abolished by expansion’. ‘These tation. Kierkegaard diagnosed this as millions of name-Christians’ are merely ‘world-historical absent-mindedness’: those who passively assent to the rites and Hegel has forgotten what it is to be doctrines of the Danish state Church: human. ‘I should be as willing as the next ‘God . . . cannot discover that He has been man to fall down in worship before the hoaxed, that there is not one single System, if only I could set eyes on it’ Christian’ (Attack on ‘Christendom’, (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 97). Oxford: OUP, 1940, 127). If a person Kierkegaard observes drily that he might can pay the priest’s fee for burial ‘there is have been persuaded if the truth could be no help for him – he is a Christian’ (ibid., ‘viewed eternally, divinely, theocentrically 197). . . . [But] I am only a poor, existing, human However, all this has little to do with being’ (ibid., 190). ‘truth’. For ‘subjectivity is truth’ (Conclud- A system of mere logical concepts is ing Unscientific Postscript [1846], Prince- indeed possible. However, Kierkegaard ton: Princeton University Press, 1941, 306). continues ‘an existential system is impos- ‘Subjectivity’ does not mean the unfounded sible’ (ibid., 107). If humankind is personal opinions of subjectivism, nor does grounded, located, and conditioned by it denote introspection. It is how and when ‘existence’, we cannot assume that an individual stakes his or her life on thought and reality are coextensive. Deceit something in first-person decision. It is not generates such a view. 159 al-Kindi further consequences for were written in Danish, he remained little philosophy of religion known outside Denmark until Barth drew attention to his writings especially in his Clearly Kierkegaard’s critique of thought second edition of his Romans (1922). and reason suggests the fruitlessness of arguments for the existence of God. al-Kindi Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub Ibn Ishaq Indeed, to use them is ‘a shameless (c. 813–c. 871) affront’. Further, faith is seen in voluntarist The first of the great Islamic philosophers terms as a matter of decision, will or of the classical period, al-Kindi, constitu- existential commitment and venture. Kier- tes a bridge between Greek, especially kegaard’s critics accuse him of fideism, Aristotelian, philosophy and Islam. In the i.e. of separating the truth of religion from court of Baghdad he served as tutor to the wider issues of rationality and truth. son of the caliph. He strongly advocated While his emphasis on the individual the importance of reason, and urged the encourages active engagement and compatibility between Islamic faith based accountability rather than passive assent on the Qur’an and the philosophical to conventional beliefs, Kierkegaard has concepts of Aristotle and the drive underestimated the part played by the towards a coherent Arabic ‘science’. Church or communities of shared beliefs Initially al-Kindi inherited access to in maintaining and supporting tradi- Aristotle in part through Syrian transla- tions through time. Hence although his tions, which had included some works of Journals record moments of Christian joy Plotinus as if these were parts of the and assurance of faith, more often he was writings of Aristotle, although some texts tortured by doubt in his lonely, self-chosen were already in Arabic. Up to 250 works isolation from fellow believers. have been accredited to him, but some 200 All the same, Barth recognized in have been lost. In his work On First Kierkegaard’s writings a prophetic witness Philosophy, he argues that knowledge of to the transcendence of God and to the First Truth and First Cause constitutes human finitude. Concrete human exis- the central and most blessed and noble tence is creaturely. Barth’s aphorism that part of philosophical inquiry. one cannot say ‘God’ by saying ‘human- In contrast to many later Islamic kind’ in a loud voice reflects this resonance philosophers, al-Kindi stressed the finite with Kierkegaard. and contingent nature of the universe. Kierkegaard insisted that he did not God is Absolute and transcendent. God wish to found a ‘school’, but to leave only created the universe from nothing (ex the epitaph ‘That Individual’. Neverthe- nihilo), and in due course the universe less, he deeply influenced Christian and would perish. Also in contrast to those of anti-theist existentialists, pietists who his successors who would privilege philo- agreed about faith as decision and venture, sophy over revelation (notably al-Far- radicals who attacked Church orthodoxy abi), al-Kindi stressed the importance of or belief-systems of ‘Christendom’, the Qur’an and its responsible interpreta- Barthian theologians who stressed trans- tion. However, the Qur’an’s witness to cendence and revelation, and the Bult- Allah is compatible with Aristotle’s mann school, which combined Lutheran Uncaused Cause or Prime Mover, and pietism with historical scepticism. more broadly with the ‘One’ of Neopla- Among nineteenth-century theological tonism. thinkers, Kierkegaard is widely regarded Al-Kindi develops an ontological as the third major alternative to Schleier- account of Aristotle’s categories of form, macher or to Hegel. Yet since his works matter, motion, place and time, as primary al-Kindi 160 substances of the created world, i.e. Metaphysics in Arabic, and wrote on categories of ‘what is’. He also utilizes astronomy, astrology, mathematics, music Aristotle’s distinction between ‘passive’ and politics A useful resource is G.M. intellect, in which the mind receives Atiyeh, Al Kindi: The Philosophy of the impressions of sense-data through the Arabs (Islamabad: Islamic Research Insti- senses, and ‘active’ intellect, in which the tute, 1967). (See also Aquinas, God, mind relates such data coherently to form concepts and ‘attributes’ of; Islamic ideas and concepts. He also produced The philosophy; transcendence.) L

language-games language in religion The term ‘language-game’ was used by Whether language about God has genuine Wittgenstein from 1932 onwards. It communicative currency, and if so, how it underlines that using language is an action acquires it, belongs to those core issues or activity, and that language operates that lie at the heart of the philosophy of with constitutive ‘rules’, namely the con- religion. It ranks in importance alongside straining regularities of logical grammar. arguments for the existence of God, and In the Philosophical Investigations the problem and nature of Evil. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) Wittgenstein variety of objections to the writes: ‘The term “language-game” genuine currency of language (Sprachspiel) is meant to bring into in religion prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity (Ta¨tigkeit), (1) Some argue that ‘religious language’ or of a form of life (Lebensform)’ (sect. bears no relation to the currency of 23). A language-game is a ‘whole, consist- language in ordinary life, since its ing of language and the actions into which function is merely expressive or com- it is woven’ (ibid., sect. 7). mendatory. It may serve to express The grounding of language in life and feelings of reverence, awe, or wonder, communal behaviour suggests that pro- or commend religious attitudes appro- blems arise when questions are asked in priate to finite, created beings. How- the abstract ‘outside a particular language- ever, it allegedly fails to communicate game’ (ibid., sect. 47). Sometimes Witt- truth about events or states of affairs. genstein invents or compares model lan- In more technical terms, it is non- guage-games for exploratory purposes, for cognitive and expressive rather than example that of ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ cognitive. (ibid., sect. 2). The term may have This objection will be examined originated from Wittgenstein’s uses of more closely below. It was advocated, analogies from chess. The point here is for example, by the Cambridge philo- not the shape of the chess-piece, but the sopher R. B. Braithwaite in his work rules that define how the piece operates An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of (ibid., sect. 31). (See also language in Religious Belief (1955). Well-known religion; speech acts.) examples of religious claims that may language in religion 162

often lack cognitive context include, for falsity of a proposition? Does the example, ‘God is on our side’; ‘We shall presence of horrendous evils in the overcome’. Nietzsche argued at the world count as a criterion that invali- end of the nineteenth century that such dates, or demonstrates as false, the uses of language were often manipula- proposition ‘God loves the world’? If tive: ‘The salvation of the soul’, he someone asserts ‘God is on our side’ observed, may express a feeling of self- whatever may be discovered about the satisfaction: ‘The world revolves moral claims of the other side, does around me’ (The Antichrist, in Com- the proposition count as ‘true’? plete Works, London: Allen & Unwin, In philosophy of religion the so- 1909–13, vol. 16, 186, aphorism 43). called parable of the invisible gardener (2) The view that language in religion is (used by John Wisdom and Antony without cognitive truth-content Flew) illustrates the point. If two receives added force when questions people disagree about whether a less are raised about criteria to determine wild patch of the jungle has actually what truths, events or states of affairs been tended as a garden by a gardener, it communicates. they can wait and observe whether The most widely known objection such a gardener ever comes. However, from this angle is that formulated by if such a person never appears, and Ayer (1910–89) in his Language, one of the two asserts that the Truth and Logic (1st edn, 1939; 2nd gardener may nevertheless be invisible, edn, London: Gollancz, 1946). His a process of tests to falsify the claim view, known as logical positivism, may be set in motion. The gardener and building on the positivism of the cannot be heard, and leaves no traces Vienna circle, centres on the maxim of bodily presence. If the ‘believer’ that the meaning of a proposition insists that the gardener must be must be verified (or verifiable in invisible, inaudible, intangible and principle, 2nd edn) by observation or odourless, what remains of the origi- experience, unless it is logically true as nal proposition? It has died the ‘death an analytic statement. of a thousand qualifications’, it may be While propositions of mathematics argued. may be ‘true’ in this analytic sense, (4) Many argue that the operational and propositions of sciences or of currency or logical grammar is so most everyday life are open to verifia- different in ‘religious language’ from bility by observations of the states of that of ‘ordinary’ language that such affairs to which they refer, the lan- language functions only within an guage of religion and ethics falls into ‘insider’ group that uses highly coded neither area. It is ‘non-sense’: because linguistic concepts. Wittgenstein it is unverifiable, it remains without observes: ‘You can’t hear God speak- truth-content. ‘God loves the world’ ing to someone else (That is a gram- or ‘it is wrong to steal’ merely express matical remark).’ (i.e. it is about the attitudes on the part of speakers. logical currency of ‘hearing’ God), (3) A more nuanced and more convincing (Zettel, Germ. Eng. Oxford: Black- version of this approach appeals to the well, 1967, sect. 717). principle of falsification or falsifia- Wittgenstein himself, however, bility, utilizing the insights of Karl recognizes that there are ‘overlappings Popper (1902–94) on falsifiability in and over-crossings’ that provide science, e.g. in The Logic of Scientific bridges between uses of the same word Discovery (Germ. 1934; Eng. 1959). even when logical currency varies. What would it take to demonstrate the There is some link between ‘hearing’ 163 language in religion

God and hearing sound-waves, even if cally (univoce) of God’, i.e. as if the this requires conceptual exploration of meaning were identical with ordinary the different roles performed by the language. ‘No word when used of God word in different settings or in differ- means the same as when it is used of a ent ‘surroundings’. The orientation of creature’ (ibid.). He concludes: ‘Words are much of the debate about language in used neither univocally nor purely equi- religion turns on this problem. Its vocally of God and creatures, but analo- recognition, however, leads to a gen- gically’ (ibid.). eral preference to speak not of ‘reli- In what sense and on what basis gious language’ (a term popular in the religious believers use analogy in talk of 1950’s), but of how language is used in God, however, remains highly controver- religion or in religious contexts. sial. Thomas Aquinas finds the basis in a theological doctrine concerning ‘the per- traditional ways of fections that flow from God to creatures’ addressing the problem: (ibid., art. 9). Thus there is a genuine analogy ‘analogy of being’ (analogia entis) between The sacred writings of Judaism, Christian- ‘wise’ or ‘good’ as applied to finite human ity and Islam all warn against constructing persons and as these terms are applied to images of God. This is not only because God. From the viewpoint of humanity, the humankind as such is intended to exhibit use of analogy may therefore work the divine image of wisdom and goodness, ‘upwards’ to God (via eminentiae). but also because God is beyond ready or This view has been the dominant exact compare with persons or objects approach in Roman Catholic thought within the world. Exodus 3:13, 14 reflects and in Neo-. However, many reluctance to offer any easy characteriza- Protestant theologians, most distinctively tion of God: ‘I will be what I will be’ Barth, hold that this presupposes an (Hebrew uses future or ‘imperfect’; ‘I am’ appeal to natural theology,asif comes from the Greek translation of the analogy of being were a ‘given’ apart from Hebrew). divine revelation. It would depend, Much language about God uses the Barth argues, on some inherent ‘likeness’ way of negation (via negativa): God is between God and humankind, when in ‘immortal’, ‘immutable’, ‘infinite’ (see actuality the initial gift of ‘the image of concepts and ‘attributes’ of God). Tho- God’ has become corrupted and distorted mas Aquinas observes: ‘It seems that no by human sin and alienation. word (Latin, nomen) can be used literally Advocates of the view of Aquinas insist of God (dicatur de Deo proprie)’, for that an appeal to ‘the analogy of propor- ‘every word used of God is taken from our tion’ (especially in Cajetan) allows suffi- speech about creatures’. Nevertheless ciently for the reality of a mixture of ‘such words are used metaphorically match and mismatch in his use of analogy (Latin, metaphorice) of God, as when we in talk of God. call him a “rock”’ (Summa Theolgiae, Ia, Within the Protestant tradition, how- Qu. 13, art. 3 Blackfriars edn, 1964, vol. ever, some argue for a greater distance 3, 57). between God and humankind on philoso- Aquinas conceded that metaphorical phical grounds (following Kant); while uses do not represent a perfect correspon- others argue for this on theological dence or match. Nevertheless, they are not grounds (following Calvin and Barth). used ‘equivocally’ (aequivoce), as if Kant (1724–1804) believed that ‘God’ lies ambiguous and unrelated to the ordinary beyond the realm of human conceptual uses of words (ibid., art. 5). ‘It is thought. God cannot be grasped by finite impossible to predicate anything univo- human minds. ‘Religion within the limits language in religion 164 of reason’ (to use Kant’s term) would escapes the peril of cognitive concepts in hesitate to place too much weight on attempting to define ‘God’ in terms of analogy, since it drifts towards anthro- some prior conceptual grid, or system pomorphism. constructed by human thought, which Barth does not reject every ground for cannot reach, let alone encapsulate, God. the use of analogy, but rejects any notion In addition to the of of an ‘analogy of being’ (analogia entis). Jung, Tillich shares with the existentialist Rather, he urges, when humankind philosopher and psychiatrist Jaspers responds to God’s revelation in faith, part (1883–1969) the view that myth and of this response entails understanding and symbol, unlike conceptual thought, help hearing God on the basis of ‘an analogy of to bridge and to integrate the levels of faith’ (analogia fidei). Hence in the end conscious and unconscious in humankind Barth relies also on the use of analogy for with healing and revelatory effects. the currency of language in religion, but God, Tillich declares, ‘is being-itself . . . on a different basis from that of Aquinas. Nothing else can be said about God as One reason why Barth pursues his God which is not symbolic’ (Systematic causes so relentlessly stems from his Theology, vol. 1, London: Nisbet, 1953, reluctance to apply the term ‘person’ to 365). Thus he rejects such a cognitive God, preferring to speak of the divine proposition, even in an analogical sense, ‘mode of being’ (Seinsweise; he rejects the as ‘God exists’ or ‘God is the highest German, Person). However, in the tradi- being’. When applied to God, superlatives tion of the Orthodox Church John Zizou- become diminutives. They place him on las places emphasis on ‘person’ as the the level of other beings while elevating concept that can most properly be him above all of them (ibid., 261). applied on the basis of analogy both to By contrast, ‘symbols . . . point beyond God and to human persons. The distinc- themselves’. Further, a symbol ‘partici- tiveness, if not uniqueness, of ‘person’ pates in’ that to which it points (unlike a adds force to this view (see also self). mere sign), and ‘opens up levels of reality An incisive, positive, and critical eva- which otherwise are closed to us . . . a level luation of the issues on Aquinas and Barth of reality which cannot be reached in any is offered in Alan J. Torrance, Persons in other way’ (Dynamics of Faith, London: Communion (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, Allen & Unwin, 1957, 42). Symbols ‘open 1996). Since nothing of positive content up hidden depths of our own being’ (ibid., could be conveyed exclusively though the 43). Thereby they are ‘double-edged’, via negativa (what God is not), while the revealing both God and the hidden depths danger of projecting human constructs of the human self. ‘onto’Godremains(asKantinsisted) Symbol, Tillich explains, is akin in James Ross described the use of analogy these respects to art, poetry, pictures and as a middle way between anthropomorph- to ‘myths’, which operate in the same way ism and agnosticism. but by telling a story or narrative. ‘Myths are symbols of faith combined in stories other traditional resources: about divine–human encounters’ (ibid., symbol, myth and metaphor 49). Although the ‘Ultimate’ is beyond Tillich (1886–1965) insisted on the time and space, myth points to divine unique importance of symbol for lan- reality by using stories set within time and guage that seeks to convey truth about space. Hence myths inevitably demand God. Drawing especially on Jung (1875– critique and reformation, since they 1961), Tillich urges that symbol reaches merely ‘point’ to the Beyond. Thus Tillich through to the depths of the pre-conscious agrees with Bultmann that myth and unconscious in humankind, and demands demythologizing, but not in 165 language in religion terms of merely descriptive concepts or solves, and could be abandoned without propositions. undue loss. Jung, Jaspers and Tillich rightly under- Metaphors are sometimes used as line the power of symbol and myth to substitutes for what might be said in other reshape human perceptions, to involve the ways. These are generally ‘dead’ meta- self in a participating way (not as a mere phors, which perform little more than spectator) and to resonate with patterns or illustrative, didactic or rhetorical func- longings often buried deep within the self. tions. As Max Black and Ricoeur rightly However, they are insufficiently rigorous show, creative metaphor, in an important about criteria, which may establish rather than trivial sense, depends on whether certain symbols and myths con- interaction between words or concepts vey truth or merely reflect projected drawn from different domains of speech human values, longings or aspirations. and understanding. The of an ordinary object The metaphor ‘The Lord is my Shep- with symbolic power may in some sur- herd’ produces an interaction between the roundings be constructive. A wreath of whole semantic field of what it was to be poppies may have symbolic resonance in a shepherd in the ancient Near East and remembering and honouring those who the different semantic field of how human fell in war on behalf of their country. On persons experience the providential activ- the other hand, there are cases of mental ity and presence of God. When Jesus illness and instability where a person may warns Nicodemus of the need to be ‘born perceive such an ordinary object as a table again’ (Jn 3:3–7; which may also be or a random drawing as a personal threat. translated ‘born from above’), the seman- What criteria distinguish the two cases? tic domain of a mother giving birth to a Tillich argues that symbols grow and die child interacts with the role of new in a corporate context, but does this take beginnings in mature life. Like symbol, us beyond mere descriptive pragmatism? metaphors function with more creative Symbols belong to the constructive power and resonance than analogy alone. resources for the effective use of language However, for that very reason attention in religion, but also require the kind of must be paid to criteria for their appro- safeguards discussed in the entry on priate use. analogy and especially in models and qualifiers Ramsey a more recent proposal: ian and . Similarly, ramsey on models and neither Jung nor Tillich adequately qualifiers explores issues of conceptual grammar (see above, and the entry on Wittgenstein). Ramsey attempted to refine the issues Myth also brings problems into the discussed above by proposing that lan- discussion. This is chiefly because the very guage in religion employs ‘models drawn term ‘myth’ is regularly used in quite from everyday life and the empirical different, even contradictory, ways (see world, but in conjunction with “quali- the entries on myth, demythologizing and fiers” which ensure that their employment Bultmann). Sometimes it is used to denote carries with it a distinctive logic appro- a sequence of analogies or symbols pre- priate to religion’ (Religious Language, sented in narrative form. Sometimes it is London: SCM, 1957). This God is ‘cause’ associated with a ‘pre-scientific’ world- (model) but ‘first’ (qualifier) cause of the view. Sometimes it functions in contrast to universe. God is ‘wise’ (model), but description, report or history-embedded ‘infinitely’ (qualifier) wise (ibid. 61–6). narrative. Unless it is beyond question Ramsey saw the use of a logic that is how the term is being used, the word ‘odd, peculiar, and unusual’ as setting in ‘myth’ causes many more problems than it motion a creative experience such as that language in religion 166 of which we might say ‘light dawns’ or language is merely ‘emotive’, just as for ‘the penny drops’; the language ‘comes R. B. Braithwaite it is merely the language alive’ in a situation of ‘disclosure’ (ibid., of approval and recommendation. The 19–21). It is like suddenly ‘seeing’ the language of religion is neither that of shape presented by an enigmatic puzzle- straightforward empirical statement nor picture as a Gestalt, or whole (ibid., 24). that of formally internal analytic statement. The model ensures that religious belief Within a decade of Ayer’s writing, has an ‘empirical place’. The qualifier however, philosophers were beginning to functions like a logical operator (ibid., ask what category Ayer’s own principle of 54–6). Ramsey is prepared to attribute to verifiability fell into. It is not an empirical God such an everyday term as ‘purpose’, assertion, but it is not a self-evident but qualifies it as ‘eternal purpose’ (ibid., internal analytical statement of formal 75–89). logic. As the 1950s progressed, it Although he does not fully stipulate became increasingly clear that Ayer sim- criteria for ‘seeing’ when religious believ- ply presented a positivist world-view (i.e. ers perceive a Gestalt (he acknowledges that only the data that comes through the e.g. that we may ‘see’ a ‘face’ in a cliff), five physical sense constitutes ‘reality’), Ramsey nevertheless offers some broad but presented this world-view as a theory guidelines that go further than most, of language. H. J. Paton called it ‘positi- including Tillich, for example in the use vism in linguistic dress’ (The Modern of symbols. Predicament, London: Allen & Unwin, Critical rational reflection does not 1955, 42). demand the elimination or reduction of The principle of falsification carries symbols. The reverse is the case. We may more weight. However, it tends to over- use symbols of God and of divine activity look the point (emphasized by Wittgen- provided that these symbols are also stein in On Certainty) that belief-systems qualified by other complementary sym- are more like a ‘nest of propositions’ than bols. Symbols of judgement may lead to a series of isolated or independent verifi- distortion and potential error unless these able or falsifiable belief-statements. The are complemented by symbols of tender question, Wittgenstein observes, then care, love, compassion and grace. Espe- becomes how many twigs can be removed cially in his later writings, Ramsey empha- before the nest as such collapses and sizes the need for a wide repertoire of disintegrates (On Certainty, sects. 142– linguistic models and tools, citing Witt- 4). The principle of falsification has its genstein’s emphasis upon the multi-func- uses, but not as a comprehensive criterion tional resources of language in action. The for the truth of a belief-system and the Christian hymn ‘Crown him!’ is accepta- currency of all of its language. ble because it qualifies a sequence of models by their very variety. ‘The Virgin’s other recently explored Son’ is ‘mystic rose ... the Root . . . the linguistic resources Babe’ as well as victorious warrior (Chris- Much of this present subject may be tian Discourse, Oxford: OUP, 1975, 19). explored under such separate headings as brief reconsideration of non- analogy, falsification, logical positivism, theistic objections Ramsey and so on. However, three more important topics must be mentioned for We noted above the formulation of Ayer’s an overview of the subject as a whole. principles of verification and subsequently verifiability, on the grounds of which he (1) Count-generation, or ‘counting x as y’: dismissed the language of religion and Stuart C. Brown (Do Religious Claims ethics as ‘non-sense’. For Ayer such Make Sense? London: SCM, 1969) 167 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm

and more especially Wolterstorff Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (Divine Discourse, Cambridge: CUP, (1646–1716) 1995) attack the preoccupation with Leibniz was born in Leipzig, and educated single words and a single object of at Leipzig, Jena and Altdorf. During his reference as the key to meaning, rather lifetime he was best known for his than asking (with the later Wittgen- innovative contributions to mathematics. stein) what role multiple references He and Newton (1642–1727) indepen- might play. To use an example from dently discovered the infinitesimal calcu- Wolterstorff, a human agent may per- lus, although each was convinced that the form action ‘A’ (moving an indicator other had plagiarized his work. button) in order to perform action ‘B’ In addition to his work in mathematics, (communicating that he or she is logic and philosophy, Leibniz contribu- about to turn left or right). To press ted to law, historical enquiry, natural the button of the indicator counts as science and politics, and served as a the conveying of information and diplomat and librarian in the court of warning about the decision to turn. It Hanover. ‘counts as signalling for a turn’ In the context of philosophy of reli- (Divine Discourse, 79). gion, Leibniz’s most original and distinc- Religious contexts provide inex- tive work was his ontology, coupled haustible examples of such count- with the optimistic response to the pro- generation. To read a command in blem of evil that God had created our Jewish, Christian or Islamic sacred world order as ‘the best of possible texts is frequently for a believer to worlds’. He also explored the nature of count the words as a command of God creation and issues of continuity, identity or Allah. Wolterstorff alludes to the and change. He published his Theodicy in parallel of ‘deputized discourse’, in 1710. which what a secretary writes, with due authorization, counts as the words ontology: body, substance and of an executive or director. ‘monads’ (2) Hermeneutics (exploring the relation between understanding and language) Leibniz’s ontology is extraordinarily com- emerged from earlier writers, but has plex. Initially much of his concern arose come into greater prominence in the from dissatisfaction with the legacy of context of language in religion and Descartes (1596–1650) that ‘bodies’ philosophy of religion more recently. have extension. If bodies had extension, It is considered under a separate entry such extension must be infinitely divisible, in this volume. and ‘units’ of reality never defined or (3) Speech-act theory is also reserved for identified. a separate entry, but the comments If the ‘units of one’, or ‘monads’, of (above) from Wolterstorff presuppose reality are the smallest ‘indivisible’ this approach, as, in effect, the work (atomic) units of an ontology, they cannot of the later Wittgenstein does in by definition be spatial, or extended in embryo. Such utterances as ‘I pro- space. For if they were, they would not be mise’, ‘I repent’, ‘I confess’, or even indivisible atoms. perhaps ‘I believe’, do not function to Leibniz turned, rather, to the notion of inform God or others of what they monads as units of ‘force’. Against Des- might already know, but to perform cartes, he argued that force was not acts of promising, repentance, confes- generated merely by quantity of move- sion, or affirmation of belief. (See also ment (mass x velocity), but mass x the empriscism; existentialism.) square of velocity. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 168

As non-spatial units, monads do not notion of infinite analysis suggests that interact directly with one another: ‘Mon- such analysis cannot be exhaustive and ads have no windows’ (Monadology, sect. final. Hence, if it is not final, there is room 7). Nevertheless, they have a capacity for for contingency, freedom and possibility, quasi-perception, or ‘apperception’. ‘Min- alongside stability and continuity. The ute perceptions’ are perceptions of which a ‘labyrinth of freedom’ has also been very is unaware. Yet this perception carefully addressed. allows for the possibility of a monad’s god and theodicy: necessity, ‘mirroring’ another monad. Further, to a possibility and creation greater or lesser degree, a monad may mirror the nature of reality as a quasi- Leibniz endorsed the value of the onto- microcosm of the universe. logical argument and the cosmologi- Why is such a complex ontology neces- cal argument for the existence of God. sary? This emerges partly through logicical Since God ‘is without limits, without rigour: Descartes’ notion of ‘extension’, for negation . . . without contradiction’, it is example, results in self-contradiction, valid to define God as including ‘all unless the world were to have no stable perfections’ (Monadology, sect. 45). The continuum. This introduces the two ‘labyr- ground for the existence of contingent inths’ of confusion out of which Leibniz objects or events in the world lies outside seeks to escape to coherence. themselves, and points to the existence of ‘The labyrinth of the continuum’ is the a ‘necessary Being’ (ibid.). Without God, first. Leibniz seeks to explain individual- there would even be ‘nothing . . . possible’ ism without losing the notion of a stable (ibid., sect. 43). ontological continuum. As length, area God created the world by free choice, and volume, the continuum of the world is because God chose to create the best of all infinitely divisible. But if monads (unlike possible worlds. Evil exists in this world, ‘extensions’ in Descartes) are not inert but but since it is ‘the best possible’, evil must active, and do not collapse into endless be necessary to a ‘best possible’ world. assimilation (‘monads have no windows’), Without the possibility of evil, it would we seem to arrive at an ontology that not be the best possible. provides a ground for both continuity and Leibniz coined the word ‘theodicy’ to change. His monadology appears to solve describe this vindication of ‘a sufficient the problem of ‘the continuum’. reason’ for God’s creation of this world, Second, how can an ordered plurality even in the face of evil. The interplay of of monads find room for contingency possibility and necessity is rational, and is and freedom? For ‘identity’ rests upon based upon ‘the Principle of Sufficient continuity over time in which subsequent Reason’. The contrary (or logical denial) states are caused by preceding states that of a contingent event does not entail occur within the existence and activity of contradiction. The Fall of Adam is in this the monad. respect not ‘necessary’. On the other hand, Leibniz’s central concern remains that the contrary (logical denial) of a necessary of logic. As in later logical atomism, he proposition or event does result in a held that the truth-value of all proposi- contradiction. Its affirmation is true ‘in tions is the sum of the truth of all all possible worlds’. At one level ‘the best elementary propositions. But how is it possible world’ is thus necessarily the best possible that, given action and change, possible. some propositions are true that might Yet Leibniz is equally insistent on have been false? God’s freedom to choose whether or what Leibniz’s ontology also rests on con- God creates. Here, again, his infinitesimal siderations from mathematics. For his calculus offers a way forward. For since an 169 liberal theology infinity of ‘possible worlds’ is in view, interpretation. This looks to Hebrew what can be asserted about infinity Wisdom rather than to Greek reason. remains incapable of the ‘closure’ of Levinas (with Bonhoeffer and Molt- necessity. mann) gives the lie to Nietzsche’s mis- Many will be dazzled, if not intimi- understanding of ‘religion’ as world- dated, by the complexity and subtlety of denying. ‘Love of life’ includes working, Leibniz’s thought. It may appear esoteric thinking, eating and drinking. ‘To enjoy because it seeks a unified understanding of without utility . . . gratuitously . . . this is a large spread of interlocking areas, from the human’ (ibid., 133). mathematics and metaphysics to physics In Otherwise Than Being (1981), and theology. He remains in the rationalist Levinas holds together a dialectic of tradition of Descartes and Spinoza, but responsibility between retaining self-iden- his innovative thought is in part provoked tity and sacrificing the self for the sake of by his awareness of where both thinkers the Other. However, he never moves fall short and commit fallacies that need to beyond the concreteness of Totality and be rectified. (See also God, arguments Infinity. For example, to be open to the for the existence of; rationalism; Other manifests itself in such modes of reason; truth.) humanness as giving hospitality. (See also Jewish philosophy.) Levinas, Emmanuel (1906–1995) liberal theology Born in Lithuania, Levinas subsequently settled in France. He, with others, intro- Strictly, it is necessary to distinguish duced some of Heidegger’s themes into between the technical use of the term in French philosophy. However, more signif- modern Christian theology in the aca- icant is his own creative work as a Jewish demic world and a wider, popular, less philosopher, drawing on the thought of rigorous understanding of the term, which Franz Rosenzweig and Buber. Many of is more widespread. his themes resonate also with the Catholic In Christian theology the era of liberal- and ‘human’ existentialist themes of Mar- ism flourished from the last two decades of cel (1889–1973). the nineteenth century to the first quarter In Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: of the twentieth century. Adolf Harnack Duquesne University Press, 1969) Levinas represents the peak of this movement. He develops the I–Thou theme (of Buber and portrays Jesus as a teacher who taught a Marcel) in terms of a face-to-face relation minimal core of ‘basic’ truths: the father- as a foundation for an ethical way of life. hood of God, the brotherhood of human- Having suffered grievously under the Nazis kind and the infinite value of the human as a Jew in France in the war years, Levinas soul. He viewed Christian doctrine as a offers a critique of the dehumanizing way movement towards complication which of violence. In contrast to the assertion of arose when Christianity moved onto self or of oppressive regimes, it is ‘the Greek soil. Other’ who places my demands and self- The key characteristics of liberal pro- interests in question (see the discussion of testant Christianity around 1890–1925 ‘availability’ in the entry on Marcel). were that Christian truth is ‘teaching’, Such ‘human’ qualities as ‘the face’, rather than proclamation of a saving ‘the home’, ‘hospitality’, ‘patience’ and event; the basic, core teaching is ‘timeless’; even the work of ‘carers’ say more about doctrine is secondary; and, where it is ‘being human’ than abstract philosophical disputed, largely dispensable. There is systems. Much of this springs from reflec- relatively little about the proclamation of tion on classical rabbinic biblical the cross as an atonement for human sin. linguistic philosophy 170

More broadly, however, ‘liberal theol- This is widely thought of as a founda- ogy’ is also used to denote a means of tion text of English empiricism, but it has holding together theology with changes in been rightly argued (for example by D.J. culture or in world-views. It is often O’Connor and by Wolterstorff) that associated with particular respect for while books I–III expound an empiricist intellectual integrity and honesty, espe- epistemology, book IV expounds reason- cially in relation to the claims of other able belief, with a focus upon reason branches of knowledge. It is in principle and reasonableness. Wolterstorff observes: tolerant, although some would claim not ‘Locke’s main aim in Book IV was to offer always so in political practice. a theory of entitled (i.e. permitted; respon- In this sense ‘liberal theology’ may be sible) belief’ (John Locke and the Ethics of applied also to religions outside Christianity belief, Cambridge: CUP, 1996, xv). to denote willingness to change with the Locke also wrote constructively on the times, retaining only certain identifiable relation between reason and Christian ‘core’ truths. This stands in contrast with belief. He attacked both scepticism ‘orthodox’ or ‘conservative’ attitudes, which and intolerant dogmatism alike. He pub- retain traditional doctrines, sacred writings, lished his Reasonableness of Christianity creeds and practices, as far as possible (1695), and concluded book IV of An virtually as they stand. It stands at the Essay Concerning Human Understanding opposite end of the spectrum to ‘fundament- with chapters on faith and reason, ‘enthu- alism’. The more strictly defined liberalism siasm’ and related topics. of Harnack and the period 1890–1925 In ‘Of Enthusiasm’ he observed that should be distinguished from this wider use. intensity of conviction, or ‘firmness of Especially with the rise of postmoder- persuasion’, is no proof that a proposition nity, liberalism is now to be defined or belief is ‘from God’: ‘St Paul believed equally in contrast to radicalism as to that he did well and that he had a call to it conservative orthodoxy. Liberalism retains when he persecuted the Christians’ (Essay, a confidence in human reason which, for IV: 19: 12). Locke also published a sane different reasons, radicals and conserva- exegetical work, A Paraphrase and Notes tives do not. Cupitt insists that ‘Radicals’, on the Epistles of St Paul to the Gala- of whom he is one, are far from ‘Liberal’. ,1&2Corinthians,Romans,and (See also Bultmann; hermeneutics; Ephesians (published after his death, in Jewish philosophy; natural theol- 1707). His Miracles also appeared late ogy; revelation; Schleiermacher.) (1716). the purpose of locke’s essay linguistic philosophy concerning human See analytical philosophy. understanding Locke’s Essay is clearly divided into four Locke, John (1632–1704) books, each a series of chapters which Locke was born in Somerset, in England, are divided, in turn, into sections. Book and educated at Christ Church, Oxford. I begins with his ‘Introduction’. He His early philosophical influences included writes, ‘My purpose [is] to inquire into most especially Descartes. He wrote on the original [origins], certainty, and political philosophy, publishing The Letter extent of human knowledge, together on (1689) and Two Treatises with the grounds and degrees of belief, on Government (also 1689). However, his opinion and assent’(Essay,I:1:1).In major work, which was twenty years in particular this entails searching out ‘the the writing, was An Essay Concerning bounds between opinion and knowledge’ Human Understanding (1690). (ibid., 3). 171 Locke, John

This is no mere theoretical exercise. To This leads to Locke’s distinction know ‘the powers of our own minds’, and between primary and secondary qualities. no less also their limits, provides ‘a cure of ‘Primary qualities’ are ‘utterly inseparable’ scepticism’ (ibid., 6). In his preface, from their sources: ‘solidity, extension, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, he points out that figure, mobility’ (ibid., 8:9). Secondary an understanding in advance of what lies qualities ‘produce various sensations in us beyond the scope of our minds will disarm . . . colours, sounds, tastes’ (ibid., 10). It premature scepticism, while to appreciate was left to Berkeley (1685–1753) to such limits equally closes the door against subsume both categories into the single undue dogmatism. Locke, as Wolterstorff class of immaterial ideas. Locke suggests implies, provides in this respect a model that with powerful microscopes ‘colour’ for the value of such reflection in the might disappear; but not extension. context of religious belief. As in much pre-Kantian empiricist rejection of ‘innate ideas’ epistemology, Locke construes the mind as passive in the process of necessary The remaining chapters of Book I success- sense-perceptions and ideas, on the ana- fully attack the notion of ‘innate ideas’ logy of a blank sheet of paper (tabula inherited from Descartes and other ration- rasa). Once the data has been received, alists. First, ‘universal consent proves reflection may process the raw data. nothing innate’ (ibid., 2:3). Children need personal identity and to learn what many philosophers regarded language as ‘innate’ (ibid., 5). ‘Moral rules need a Proof; ergo not innate’ (ibid., 3:4). Ideas Towards the end of book II Locke con- are ‘not born with children’ (ibid., 4:2). siders the problem of personal identity sources of knowledge: ‘ideas’ (ibid., 27). The identity of ‘man’, like that and primary and secondary of animals or vegetables, is seen in its qualities ‘organized body’ (ibid., 6). But in the case of ‘personal’ identity, ‘consciousness makes Book II is entitled ‘Of Ideas’. An ‘Idea is personal identity’ (ibid., 10). If the ‘soul’ of the Object of Thinking’ (ibid., II: 1: 1). a prince entered the body of a cobbler, a ‘All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflec- distinction between public perception of tion’ (ibid., 2). Perceptions arise through bodily identity and introspective perception the senses as perceptions ‘of things’; but as of inner identity would become unavoid- soon as we identify these as ‘yellow, white able (ibid., 15). Yet the issue of identity . . . soft, hard’ these become ‘sources of the turns in the end on the ‘justice of reward ideas we have, depending wholly upon our and punishment’ (ibid., 18:19). senses’ (ibid., 3). The view that ‘experi- The same strongly modified dualism ence’ is the source of knowledge (ibid., 2) charaterizes Locke’s philosophy of lan- is empiricism. However, for Locke and guage (ibid., III: 1–11). ‘Words’ serve as Berkeley the ‘how’ also implies ideal- ‘sensible marks of ideas’ (ibid., 2: 1). ism. Locke holds an ‘ideational’ view of lan- ‘Experience’ is sub-divided into ‘two guage, as against a purely referential or . . . fountains of knowledge’ namely functional view. Words represent reality; ‘external . . . objects’ of the world of the but through the medium of the ideas that senses, and ‘reflection’ within ourselves enter the mind, which words then identify (ibid.). When the mind reflects upon the by means of stable signs, or semiotic ideas which it perceives, ‘simple’ ideas markers. They ‘signify . . . the ideas that may be combined together to form ‘com- are in the mind of the speaker’ (ibid., 11). plex’ ideas (ibid., 3: 1, 2; 4: 1–5; II: 6 and Today all the criticisms that are II: 7). brought against referential and logic 172 representational theories of meaning ‘Enthusiasm’ in the sense of ‘I believe would apply to Locke’s account of lan- because it is impossible’, or zeal for the guage. ‘Ideas’ merely insert a ‘middle’ term irrational, is as morally disturbing as within a theory of reference. His view of undue scepticism or undue dogmatism. language is also ‘expressive’, which covers ‘Boundaries . . . between faith and reason’ only a segment of the ways in which are necessary to contradict enthusiasm language is used, with the implication that and the intolerance that ‘divides mankind’ language may also fall short of ‘prior’ (ibid., 11). ‘Enthusiasm’ nourishes thought (ibid., 10, 11). Rorty, especially, ‘groundless opinion’ by unprepared attacks this ‘representationalist’ view. minds, and enthusiasts fancy this as ‘illumination from the Spirit of God’ knowledge, opinion and (ibid., 19:6). Irrational impulses are ‘entitled’ belief deemed to be ‘a call or direction from Recent interpretations of Locke have heaven’ (ibid.). acknowledged that book IV is different The problem about all this is that it in tone and stance from books I–III. arises from a disproportionate undervalu- However, they are less inclined to dismiss ing of ‘evidence’. ‘God, when he makes the its value than were earlier interpreters. prophet, does not unmake the man . . . Indeed, Wolterstorff reached the conclu- Reason must be our last judge and guide in sion that book IV, especially its second everything’ (Locke’s italics, ibid., 19:14). half, held a depth that addressed or Wolterstorff finds Locke’s greatest ori- generated ‘the making of the modern ginality at the point at which he addresses mind’ (John Locke, xii). Plato’s questions about the respective The heart of the matter, for Wolter- roles of doxa, opinion and episteme¯,or storff, is ‘the interweaving of the language knowledge (Republic, bk VI; cf. Wolter- of rationality with the language of obliga- storff, John Locke, 218–26). An intellec- tion . . . What we ought to believe has tual inheritance may not rank as ‘certain something intimate to do with reasons, knowledge’, but it is not worthless. In and/or reasoning, and/or Reason’ (ibid., many cases, argumentation becomes more xiii). ‘Locke was the first to develop with important than demonstration (ibid., profundity and defend the thesis that we 223). are all responsible for our believings, and Doxa is of use, provided that is that . . . reason must be one’s guide’ (ibid., regulated. ‘Regulated opinion’ has its xiv). Book IV offers ‘a theory of entitled place in life. ‘Governance is a central . . . belief’ (ibid., xv). theme in Locke’s epistemology’ (ibid., Locke recognizes that ‘reason’ has 238). In particular, Locke, Wolterstorff different significations (Essay, IV: 17: 1). concludes, suggests that ‘When we are We need reason ‘for the enlargement of obligated to do our best in the governance our knowledge, and regulating our assent’ of beliefs, then too we are to listen to the (ibid., 2). The ‘syllogism’ may be a voice of Reason’ (ibid., 241). This entails a restrictive tool, inhibiting enlargement critique and control of the self.(See also (ibid., 4–7). Reason is ‘the discovery of pietism.) certainty ... by deduction’, whereas ‘faith . . . is the assent to any proposition logic . . . upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God’ (ibid., 18:2). Never- Traditionally, formal logic attempts to theless, ‘revelation cannot be admitted provide a system for determining valid against the clear evidence of reason’ (ibid., inferences from one proposition or propo- 5). Faith may also concern things ‘above sitions to others, based upon the relations reason’ (ibid., 7). between the propositions. One of the 173 logic earliest formulations was Aristotle’s propositional logic system of propositions and the syllo- (propositional calculus) gism , but this remains a sub-area within Sentences that find variable expression in modern logic, which nowadays plays a less different natural languages need to be prominent role than in earlier centuries. expressed as propositions of logic. This Leibniz (1646–1716) saw the need for a logical form may now become apparent. logical notation that transformed sen- These are represented by the signs or tences into logical propositions, and which symbols of logical notation. Convention- exposed their logical form. ally p, q,andr are used to denote The logic of the relations between prepositional variables. propositions, or propositional calculus, Propositions are then qualified by con- remains only one of several areas of nectives, to begin to form a calculus, or modern logic. It failed to distinguish system. The most basic are four: ‘and’, adequately between different types of ‘or’, ‘not’ and ‘if . . ., then . . .’ Conjunc- predicates. With the development of tions are represented by ‘.’; disjunction quantifiers existential and universal ,a usuallyby‘v’;negationby‘*’; and second area of predicate calculus emerged conditional implication by ‘?’orby‘)’. as a refinement of basic propositional These four types of logical connectives are logic. examples of ‘logical constants’. The third area, and third stage of In his earlier work Wittgenstein saw development, was the formulation of a the origins and basis of logical necessity in systematic logic of classes. Leonhard Euler the determinacy of the relations between (1707–83) represented class relations by elementary propositions: ‘A proposition is means of diagrams, including the now a truth-function of elementary proposi- well-known distinctions between ‘A’ pro- tions’ (Tractatus, London: Routledge, positions of universal affirmation, ‘E’, of 1961, 5; cf. 5–11). On this basis he universal negation, ‘I’, of existential (or constructed ‘truth-tables’. ‘If all true ele- particular) affirmation, and ‘O’, of exis- mentary propositions are given, the result tential (or particular) negation. is a complete description of the world’ The foundation of a modern logic of (ibid., 3.24). classes came more fully with George If ‘p’and‘q’ represent elementary Boole (1815–64) and his algebraic logic propositions which may be combined to of classes; with John Venn (1834–1923); produce the ‘complex’ proposition ‘p.q’, with C. S. Peirce (1839–1914); with Georg the following truth-table could be pro- Cantor (1845–1918); with G. Peano duced to indicate the truth-value ‘true’ (T) (1858–1932); and especially with Frie- or ‘false’ (F) under each combination of Rus- drich Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), propositions: sell (1872–1970) and Alonzo Church (1903–95) ‘p’‘q’‘p . q’‘p v q’ (exclusive A fourth main area is that of modal TT T F disjunction, i.e. logic either one or . Clarence I. Lewis (1883–1964), an TF F T American pragmatic philosopher and logi- the other, but cian, moved beyond a logic of assertion to FT F T not both) that of possibility, impossibility and FF F F logical necessity. More recently Hart- shorne Plantinga and have utilized predicate logic (predicate modal logic to address the claims of the calculus) ontological argument for the exis- tence of God and (in Plantinga’s case) also Here we move beyond relations between the problem of evil. propositions as a whole to distinguish logical grammar 174 between types of predication within them. Although the two tasks are not the In this notation x, y,andz usually same, there remains an overlap. Ry le represent the subject of a sentence trans- (1900–76) explored the ‘logical grammar’ posed into a general propositional form. A of issues about the mind–body relation- capital letter often represents the predi- ship and of long-standing paradoxes. cate. Thus ‘Fx’ may represent ‘the man is Strawson (b. 1919) argues that informal French’; ‘Gx’ may denote ‘God is good’. logic can often take us further than formal The purpose of the existential quanti- logic (Introduction to Logical Theory, fication ‘(Ex)’ or ‘(Ax)’ to denote ‘for some 1952). x’, or ‘for at least one x’ is explained in the Yet, while the logic of classes relates entry on quantifiers, alongside the uni- most closely to set theory in mathematics, versal quantifier (x) ‘for all x’. Hartshorne and Plantinga have drawn Russell showed that through the use of constructively on modal logic to illumi- quantifiers it was possible to avoid the nate ‘necessity’ in the ontological argu- self-contradictory implication that state- ment, and ‘possible worlds’ in the problem ments about the non-existence of ‘a round of evil. (See also belief; reason.) square’, or about attributes predicated of ‘the present King of France’ assumed the logical grammar reality of what the propositions denied or See logic. described. In logical translation ‘a round square does not exist’ could be reformulated as ‘it logical positivism is false to assert that an x exists which is Positivism denotes primarily a commit- such that “round” and “square” can be ment to an empiricist or natural-scientific predicated of it simultaneously’. In sym- world-view, and a rejection of metaphy- bolic notation this might take some such sics. Logical positivism seeks to harness a form as: ~ (Ex)(Fx.Gx). . .’ theory of logic and language that will support and strengthen these views. logical grammar or ‘informal’ logic The movement broadly originated in Austria and Germany in the 1920s, Wittgenstein recognized that part of the centring on the Vienna circle, which genius of Russell was to probe behind was led by Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap natural language to identify an underlying and others. In England the movement was logical form. Yet in his later work his own represented especially by Ayer (1910–89), explorations reveal an increasing prefer- whose Language, Truth and Logic ([1936] ence for returning to uses of language in 2nd edn, 1946) reached a very wide settings in life to explore the ‘logical audience. It is regarded as a classic of grammar’ of concepts without the cast- logical positivism. Ayer’s edited volume iron fetters of logical calculus. Logical Positivism (1959) contains a This gave rise in due time to a selection of relevant essays. recognition of the explorations of ‘infor- The heart of the philosophical doctrine mal logic’ as a more flexible tool for is that all propositions, to be true-or-false examining the almost infinite variations of rather than ‘non-sense’, must be verifiable an ever-moving language in ordinary life. by empirical observation and empirical The logical grammar of ‘hearing God evidence, with the exception of analytic speak’, for example, owes more useful statements, or the propositions of formal explanation to Wittgenstein’s ‘grammati- logic. In his second edition Ayer modified cal’ question: ‘why cannot we hear God this criterion to that of ‘verification in speaktosomeoneelse?’thanallthe principle’, i.e. capable of being verified if a apparatus of modern formal logic. hypothetical observer could gain such 175 Lyotard, Jean-Franc¸ois evidence in principle rather than necessa- Lyotard uses the term ‘metanarrative’ to rily in practice. denote any ‘grand’ narrative of metaphy- It became steadily recognized that the sics, of theology, or of religions that linguistic dimension was merely a quasi- purports to offer an overall understanding disguise for positivism in linguistic dress. of the ‘local’ or particular narratives of By what criterion was the principle of individual persons or of specific social verification true-or-false, since it was groups. In his view, any attempt to offer neither a descriptive, verifiable proposi- trans-contextual criteria of meaning and tion, nor a proposition of formal logic? truth is based on illusion, naı¨vety or self- Moreover, to dismiss all propositions of deception. religion, ethics and metaphysics as This calls for a radical reappraisal of mere ‘emotive’ expressions of approval philosophy, ethics, liberal or totalitarian or disapproval, or of preference or distaste politics and religious truth-claims that (let alone as ‘non-sense’) failed to do speak beyond a severely limited context. justice to the complexity of life. Indeed, he transposes the task of philoso- In spite of Rorty’s postmodernist, phy as that of bearing witness to fragmen- pragmatic claims about ‘justification’ and tation, discontinuity and heterogeneity in ‘ethnocentric’ criteria, few regard murder, a postmodern era, which has ‘seen theft or rape as merely ‘less preferable’ through’ the pretensions of modernity to forms of behaviour than others, about overlook these discontinuities. which more could not be ‘said’ with Foucault’s emphasis upon the disconti- operative meaning-currency. (See also nuities of history offers a case study of empiricism; falsification; language such an approach in philosophy. Further, in religion; postmodernism; pragma- Derrida’s attempt to eliminate ‘closure’ in tism. The longer of these articles contain all but everyday texts resonates with more details.) Lyotard’s emphasis on the non-representa- tional character of literature and art. logical syllogism The emphasis on the ‘local’ (or radi- cally relative) is reflected in the American See syllogism. postmodernism of Rorty (b. 1931), except that American postmodernity is Lyotard, Jean-Franc¸ois (b. 1924) more progressive, optimistic and prag- Together with Derrida (b. 1930) and matic. Rorty perceives himself as ‘splitting Foucault (1926–84), Lyotard is widely the difference’ between Habermas’s ‘uni- known as one of the leading French versal pragmatics’ and Lyotard’s antipathy philosophical exponents of postmodern- towards all ‘theory’ (‘Habermas and Lyo- ism. His definition of the postmodern is tard on Postmodernity’ in R. Bernstein, one of the most frequently quoted: ‘I ed., Habermas and Modernity,Cam- define postmodern as incredulity towards bridge: Polity Press, 1985, 161, 174). metanarratives’ (The Postmodern Condi- (See also pragmatism; truth.) tion, Minneapolis: University of Minne- sota, 1984, xxiv). M

Madhva (c. 1238–c. 1317) independent reality (brahman). (See also Buddhist philosophy; ontology; Madhva’s work in Hindu philosophy is panentheism; pantheism; theism.) characterized by a so-called dualist emphasis within the Vedic tradition Maimonides, Moses (Dvaita Vedanta). His ‘dualism’ is (1135–1204) usually set in contrast with the monism or ‘non-dualist system’ of S´ an˙ ka¯ ra¯ Maimonides (Rabbi Moses ben Maimon) (c. 788–820), the Advaita Vedanta is known especially for his work Guide of school. Indeed, in Hindu legend Madhva the Perplexed. Broadly in the tradition of was an incarnation of Va¯ya, sent to Philo of Alexandria, it facilitates a destroy the monist philosophy of S´an˙ - rational understanding of the Hebrew ka¯ra¯ and S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s appeal to ‘illusion’ scriptures and rabbinic traditions that (ma¯ya¯), seen as a Buddhist commandeer- permits the perplexed enquirer to retain a ing of Hinduism. loyalty to the traditions with rational Madhva also differs from Ra¯ ma¯ nuja’s integrity. ‘qualified monism’ (Visista-advaita), even As in Philo, a wide range of conceptual though Ra¯ma¯nuja rejects S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s appeal tools are drawn from Greek philosophy, to ma¯ya¯ as a way of explaining ‘differ- but also in the twelfth century from ences’ or ‘differentiation’. Ra¯ma¯nuja did Islamic philosophy. Some Islamic thin- not assimilate the world or the individual kers had used Arabic texts that filtered self into a single, uncharacterizable, Aristotle through Neoplatonism, and ultimate Reality. However, Madhva Maimonides also incorporated Neopla- asserts an absolute difference between tonic elements within his own thought. God (¯ıs´vara) and human souls (jı¯va), His Guide of the Perplexed was written in which goes far beyond Ra¯ma¯nuja’s ‘qua- Arabic. lified’ or ‘modified’ monism. Although he was born in Cordoba in Like S´an˙ka¯ra¯ and Ra¯ma¯nuja, Madhva 1135 Maimonides was forced to flee to wrote commentaries on the Brahma-Su¯ tras Cairo, where he served as physician to the and on the Bhagavad Gita. His writings vizier of Saladin. In addition to medical consciously oppose S´an˙ka¯ra¯ and Ra¯ma¯- treatises, he wrote his Commentary on the nuja. The created order of souls and bodies Mishnah. In parallel with Philo on the remains dependent upon a self-existing, laws of Moses, Maimonides sought wider 177 Marcel, Gabriel rational purposes behind more particular- Second, like Wittgenstein, Malcolm ist rabbinic legislation. worked on the logical grammar of con- Maimonides defends a doctrine of sciousness, mind, belief and related con- divine creation against the contentions cepts. He opposed both a dualist account of al-Farabi and others that the world is of mind and body and also a behaviourist eternal. He also attacks occasionalism account of selfhood.HisDreaming on the ground that it implies an irrational (1958) and work on consciousness and understanding of causes within the world. memory (in Knowledge and Certainty, Like Philo, he uses allegorical interpreta- 1963 and Memory and Mind,1976) tions of the sacred texts if or when they explore selfhood and philosophy of mind. seem unduly irrational or inconsistent, Malcolm places some question-marks and translates anthropomorphism into against cruder behaviourist or materialist more acceptable conceptual expressions. explanations. Third, most widely known Symbolic interpretation is utilized to in philosophy of religion is his sympathetic the utmost to facilitate the notion of God attempt to reformulate the ontologial as perfect, simple, immutable and trans- argument for the existence of God. He cendent. The philosophy of Maimonides employs arguments from the nature of was respected by Leibniz,andasan logical necessity to reply to some of its example of Jewish rationalist philosophy critics. This work, together with that of is still widely influential. (See also con- Plantinga, should make us hesitate to cept; eternity; Jewish philosophy; yield too hastily to those who dismiss the Mendelssohn; rationalism; transcen- argument as a mere logical trick. (See also dence.) behaviourism; dualism; language in religion; logic.) Malcolm, Norman (1911–90) Marcel, Gabriel (1889–1973) Malcolm was an American philosopher, who taught for most of his life at Born in Paris, Marcel was raised by an . However, from 1938 agnostic father and (after his mother’s to 1940 he received a Harvard fellow- death when he was aged four) an aunt, ship and worked closely with Wittgen- also agnostic, whom his father married. stein in Cambridge. In philosophy of He described his childhood as a ‘desert religion his thought is significant in three universe’, made all the worse by being main areas. subjected to a ‘dehumanizing’ demand for First, Malcolm’s interpretation of Witt- academic achievement. genstein offers a valuable resource in its Just as Kierkegaard sought personal own right for understanding the latter’s authenticity beyond the imposed demands approach to language and to the logical of his early life, so Marcel sought a currency or ‘grammar’ of concepts. His humanity, humanness and personal . A Memoir (1958) value-system that nurtured respect, love singles out examples of Wittgenstein’s and openness to ‘the Other’. In 1929 understanding of how language is Marcel became a convert to Roman embedded in contexts in life. His essay Catholicism. Nevertheless he did not ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investiga- follow the Neo-Thomist philosophy of tions’ (1954) and another long article on many Catholic theologians. The cognitive, Wittgenstein (in Paul Edwards, ed., The intellectual, and inferential, in his eyes, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols., New touched only the surface of human life. York: Macmillan, 1967, vol. 8, 327–40) Music, art and spiritual ‘availability’ remain important sources, as well as his (disponibilite´) to fellow human beings more recent Nothing is Hidden (1986). were fundamental in Marcel’s life. In the Marxist critique of religion 178

Socratic tradition he saw philosophy as a projection and human construct. Religion, continuous quest for practical wisdom, they argue, is not based on an encounter not as resourcing a system of speculative with a transcendent or ‘objective’ personal reason. God (see object; transcendence). It is Like that of Dostoevsky and Buber, not the effect of divine revelation. Marcel’s philosophy might be called the Marx proposes, rather, that projected human face of existentialism. ‘Avail- beliefs about God come to be utilized by a ability’ to ‘the Other’ entails recognizing ruling or ‘establishment’ class to promote that human persons are more than case submissive contentment, or at least studies, numbers on a file, or mere objects acquiescence, on the part of the oppressed of study in the empirical world. Human masses. Religion is the ‘opium’ of the persons become a focus for the dignity and people. The short Communist Manifesto sacredness of Being. Their capacity to (1847), written jointly by Marx and trust, to hope and to love constitutes part Friedrich Engels (1820–95) included as of their identity as human beings. its last line the well-known slogan: ‘Work- In his work Being and Having (1935), ers of all countries unite’ (Communist Marcel associates the aspect of ‘having’ Manifesto, London: Penguin, 1967, 121). with objects, objectification (treating per- The proletariat must throw off their sons or art as ‘objects’), I–It relationships chains, including capitalism and religion. (like Buber) and abstraction. By contrast, If this is the primary focus of relevance ‘Being’ is associated with presence, mys- to philosophy of religion, there is also a tery, I–Thou relationships and participa- second one. Marx regarded the material tion. The drive to ‘possess’ stems from a conditions of production as a more funda- desire to control. However, this in turn mental force for change and authenticity depersonalizes the one whom (nowadays) in the process of human history than we might call ‘consumer-driven’. True ‘ideas’. Ideas, including and personhood retains a sense of wonder, philosophical idealism, often embody and permits ‘availability’ to the other. myths that perpetuate and replicate elitist Marcel, some might suggest, paves the establishment attitudes. way for the thought of Levinas Exchange-value for labour, economics (1906–95). and social class constitute the bedrock of Love, reverence and communion all what is foundational for life and action, presuppose fidelity (Creative Fidelity, thought and (above all) political action. 1940). Since Being (ontology) is rooted Later Marx would write: ‘The philoso- in mystery, it is not illogical to speak of the phers have only interpreted the world in disclosure of Being (The Mystery of Being, various ways; the point is to change it’ 1950). Yet humankind constantly trivia- (‘Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach’ [1845], in lizes the richness of Being and humanness Early Writings, London: Pelican, 1975, in its preoccupation with objects and 423; further also in The German Ideology possessions (The Decline of Wisdom, (1845–6). 1954; and The Existential Background of writings Human Dignity, 1964). Marx’s Paris manuscripts from his earlier period reflect a humanism that later Marxist critique of religion became more militant. All the same Marx Karl Marx (1818–83) stands alongside asserts, ‘Atheism is humanism mediated . . . Feuerbach (1804–72) and Freud through the suppression of religion; com- (1856–1939) as one of the three most munism is humanism mediated . . . through significant advocates of a theory of reli- the suppression of private property’ (Eco- gion in which they view ‘God’ as a human nomics and Philosophic Manuscripts 179 Marxist critique of religion

[1832], 1844). Private property, he (1809–82). With Marx, these all rejected declared, divides one person from another. the notion that either ‘God’ or idealism Marx published The Holy Family in constituted the true ground for the 1845, jointly written with Friedrich temporal and contingent changes of Engels. They assess ‘the young Hegelians’, and within history. As we note in the attacking the inadequacy of their social Feuerbach entry (above), Feuerbach philosophy as insufficiently radical. In The moved from thoughts about ‘God’ to a German Ideology Marx criticizes Feuer- critical appraisal of ‘reason’, and finally bach for seeking to address the human reached his ‘last thought’ which focused situation in terms of thought rather than everything on humankind. He postulated action. In his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (the as ‘infinite’ human consciousness, which famous Eleventh Thesis is cited above) projected outwards and upwards an Marx made his point less emphatically; ‘infinite’ God. here he distances Feuerbach’s ideas from Marx disputed whether ‘consciousness’ German socialism but retains Feuerbach’s sufficiently addressed the problems materialist account of the world and bequeathed by Hegel. Although Hegel reality. In 1847 he produced the short was politically conservative, Marx argued Communist Manifesto to prepare the that the ‘young’ Hegelians failed to see ground for the hoped-for revolution in how socially radical were the implications France of 1848. of Hegel’s work on historical and tem- Marx’s classic work is Capital (Das poral change. He addressed these issues in Kapital, 3 vols, 1867, 1885, 1895). This The Holy Family. The key forces were expounds a view of history in which the social and economic. The politics of exploitation of the working class leads to working-class movements in Britain, ‘expropriating the expropriators’ through France and Germany offered a more revolution. The dehumanizing competi- accurate and focused vision of forces for tiveness of capitalism is first replaced by change. state socialism; then looks toward an Such economic forces were more of genuine communism in powerful and more significant than which each will give according to ability ‘human consciousness’, which still left and receive according to need. the issues too much in the realm of ‘ideas’. Ideas could distort and disguise the philosophical roots: relation realities of class, exploitation, labour, to hegel and to the ‘young’ price and value, and oppression and free- hegelians dom. Even Hegel had intended his philo- Although he was not a ‘professional’ sophy to perform an ‘emancipating’ philosopher in the sense of teaching function for society. Marx promoted a philosophy, Marx’s younger years were philosophy of action. Hegel spent in an atmosphere in which ’s marxist philosophies of philosophy and politics dominated intel- history lectual discussion. In place of Hegel’s Absolute as Geist (Mind or Spirit) At the beginning of The Communist unfolding itself in the dialectical concrete Manifesto Marx and Engels assert: ‘The expression of history and of logic, the so- history of all hitherto existing society is the called left-wing ‘young’ Hegelians (‘left’, history of class struggles. Freeman and ‘centre’ and ‘right’ seem to have been slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, coined by D. F. Strauss) postulated a guild-master and journeyman, in a word, driving-force of material causes. oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant These Hegelians included Feuerbach, opposition to one another, carried on . . . a D. F. Strauss (1808–74) and Bruno Bauer fight’ (ibid., 79). Each struggle ended either Marxist critique of religion 180 in ‘common ruin’ or in ‘a revolutionary re- critiques of religion in marx constitution’ (ibid.). and in marxism The next few pages of The Communist Manifesto (80–94) sum up in the shortest Marx did not follow Feuerbach in all compass the philosophy of history that is things, but in many. As Nicholas Lash set out more fully elsewhere. The classical observes, he followed him especially in the age of oligarchy gave way to the feudal ‘inversions’ of traditional accounts of society of the Middle Ages, establishing cause and effect, or the primary and ‘new classes, new conditions of oppres- secondary. Thus Marx writes, ‘Man makes sion’ (ibid., 80). The industrial era estab- religion, religion does not make man’ lished in its place the opposition between (Early Writings, 244; cf. Lash, A Matter capital and labour; between property- of Hope: A Theologian’s Reflections on the owning bourgeoisie and the oppressed Thought of Karl Marx, London: Darton, class of the proletariat. Longman & Todd, 1981, 156–68). Reli- As capitalists seek to exploit larger and gion ‘is the opium of the people. The larger world markets, the plight of the abolition of religion as the illusory happi- oppressed workers deteriorates. This can ness of the people is the demand for their be halted only by class struggle issuing in real happiness’ (Early Writings, 244). revolution. However, it was Engels rather Marx’s most practical objection to than Marx who explicitly used the term ‘religion’ was that by illusory promises of ‘dialectical materialism’, and made pri- ‘reward’ for acquiescence and obedience, mary use of the logical and historical institutional faith blocked the way to structure of thesis, antithesis and synth- action on the part of the masses towards esis. their liberation from oppression by social, Some insist that Hegel himself made political, and violent revolution. Religion little or no use of the thesis-antithesis- encouraged respect for the ‘order’ of the synthesis triad. However, Hegel’s notion establishment powers, disguising their role of a process in history or logic reaching a as oppressors. ‘nodal’ point at which change may be After 1919, Russian Marxism flour- marked or identified, and a ‘higher’ posi- ished as a system under Vladimir Lenin tion on the ladder of dialectic ‘sublating’ (1870–1924) and under Stalin (1879– (or assimilating) a lower stage into itself 1953). Lenin underlined even more force- with effects for change, comes very close fully materialist features in Marx, but sat to such a formulation (see the entry on loose to his notion of ‘dialectic’. The Hegel for his explicit German terms). This constraints and even repressions of state is not to ignore earlier versions in Fichte. socialism, which Marx had regarded as If Engels believed that this formula penultimate in the progress of history, applied to every level of reality, Marx was became virtually absolutized. more certain than Engels that processes of Lenin transposed Marx’s more com- history were determined by historical passionate concern that religion might necessity. Hence Marx could propose a tranquilize the oppressed into a more communist eschatology. Only when the aggressive attack on bourgeois religion as conflict with capitalism had ushered in the ‘ideology’ serving as an anodyne dispen- era of state socialism, which involved sing opium produced by the oppressors for constraints on behalf of the masses, could the oppressed. Religion, Lenin insists, is history eventually lead on to a non- not an ‘intellectual’ question; it is a tool of coercive end of true communism, when class struggle manipulated by the bour- each would choose to give according to geois oppressors. Thus he comes nearer to ability; each would receive only according the kind of anti-religious critique offered to need; and all goods would be shared. by Nietzsche than perhaps Marx himself 181 materialism does. The atheism of Lenin and Stalin beyond human conscious reflection, on becomes more militant. what ground may we reach any rational decision about the supposed validity of some further assessments materialism? Presumably the brain regis- As Helmut Gollwitzer observes, Marxist ters not rational evaluation, but the effects criticisms of religion may well apply to of neuro-physical forces. A materialist certain examples of the phenomenon of world-view ‘cannot be demonstrated’ religion in the empirical life of faith- (Hans Ku¨ ng, Does God Exist? London: communities or churches. However, on Collins/Fount, 1980, 244). what grounds can this critique be applied Philosophical reflection cannot be as a universal explanation of all religion at reduced to the effects of mere social all times? (The Christian Faith and the conditioning. This would border on the Marxist , Edinburgh: radical edge of postmodernity except St Andrews, 1970, 28). The reply is similar for the fact that Marxism makes universal to that addressed to Nietzsche: the origins claims about truth. It offers neither the of religion should not be defined in terms rational evaluations of religions and phi- of the reasons for abuses of religion. losophies nor the relativizing pluralism of Yet the practical concern for the dignity post-modern devaluations of rationality. of humankind is common ground between In a largely post-Marxist world, it appears Marx (and, to a lesser extent, later Marx- to have the worst of both worlds. ist regimes) and most world religions. Nevertheless, the Marxist recognition Marx’s refusal to identify a human person that interpretation of the world remains as a mere unit of production does strike a less than the ultimate need for its trans- genuine chord with the ethics of the great formation yields an insight which, again, theistic . Whether, however, the offers common ground with most reli- regimes that have been founded on Marx- gions. In the Christian tradition the ism have also shared that vision in practice theology of Moltmann makes consider- may be doubted. ate use of this fundamental insight. Yet in Indeed, the respective roles of human historical reality, the world still awaits the sin in Marxist and in religious systems promised fulfilment of the transformation may be compared with profit. It is not once offered by Marxist systems. merely generated by social inequity. Hence even in the era of state socialism con- materialism straint, law and governmental control becomes even more necessary. The col- Materialism denotes an ontology in lapse of such mechanism in post-commu- which it is postulated or inferred that only nist states illustrates the point further. material entities exist. It stands in contrast Religion sees the issue as one of the need to idealism and to dualism, as well as to to transform the whole person as a human more subtle and complex ontologies person. which allow room for, or allow for Most serious for philosophies of reli- interaction with, non-material realities. gion is Lenin’s disparagement of religion Materialism is closely allied with beha- as lying beyond intellectual matters. If viourism (a psychological version of reason, ideas and intellect are subordi- materialism) and positivism (a version nated to the power of the merely social, of materialism based on a world-view economic and historical, we reach what arrived at by restricting all enquiry to has been called ‘the paradox of materi- scientific or empirical method alone). alism’. If this view of the world has not Arguably, positivism and behaviourism even arisen from ‘conscious’ reflections, are subcategories within materialism. but is merely the result of brute forces Some writers distinguished materialism materialism 182 as answering the question ‘Of what is the most part these principles are models reality composed?’ from a form of ‘mate- of material objects as forces. rialism’ that yields a wider version of Two major issues emerge from Graeco- ontology. Roman materialism which anticipate modern thought. First, how may we ancient and pre-modern account for any supposed ‘threshold’ that periods: east and west leads to mind, cognition, or conscious- In Greek philosophy Democritus (460– ness? Or is consciousness a mere complex- 370 bce) held that the ultimate constitu- ity of the physical? If so, what is ents of reality were simple, solid, material rationality? Second, does materialism in atoms. These atoms (smallest indivisible this period rest on a pre-scientific eviden- units) were thought to be in motion, and tialism? If so, is it not a circular theory to capable of combination to form larger construct an ontology that derives from objects. Since these atoms differ only taking cognizance of strictly material quantitatively, it is not entirely clear how evidence only? Democritus accounts for qualitative dif- modern debates: some issues ference, except that ‘fire’ or ‘fire atoms’ make possible the emergence of ‘life’. Much of the subject matter under discus- Consciousness, perception and sensation sion may be found in fuller detail under are at bottom physical experiences, and no such entries as behaviourism, positivism, survival of a being after death is concei- self, science and religion and Hobbes. vable. Hobbes (1588–1679), however, has been Epicurus (341–270 bce) was influenced described with justice as less an explicit by Democritus. His insistence on ‘factual materialist than a cautious sceptic with a evidence’ anticipates in some measure materialist cast of mind. He did indeed later empirical evidentialism. His ontology reject the concept of ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ as a of atoms is similar to that of Democritus. self-contradiction, on the basis that this The two principles of efficient causality seemed to imply ‘an immaterial material’. are that the atoms are in motion, and that Humankind is governed by physical appe- chance may lead them to collide or to tites and passions (see scepticism). connect together. This random feature Yet Hobbes acknowledged that even if provides the sense of freedom human reason is more like instrumental ‘com- persons have, while ‘mind’ is merely a putation’ than a broader rationality, this term to denote finer, faster-moving atoms. capacity to compute presupposed not In Roman philosophy (c. simply physical impulses but ‘ideas, 99–55 bce) stands in this same ‘atomic’ whicharetakenupintolanguage’.The tradition. Since matter and space are very language about ‘what we can con- infinite, atoms of matter are of an infinite ceive’ betrays his possible awareness that number. The emergence of an ordered a thoroughgoing materialism leaves no pattern of atoms led to the beginning of grounds on which to promote thought our world by natural causes. and argument that is other than arbitrary. In Eastern philosophy, Chang Tsai Hobbes remained ambivalent on this (1020–77) took up the two dualist princi- matter. ples of Chinese Confucianism, yin and The eighteenth-century French materi- yang, but understood both principles as alists, especially Julien Offroy de La powers of material force. It is material Mettrie (1709–51) and the encyclopae- forces that provide the balance of material dists Denis Diderot (1713–84) and Paul- reality. This is a narrower understanding Henri d’Holbach (1723–89) take us into a of yin–yang dualism than is found gen- different world. Their premise is that erally in Chinese philosophy, although for indicated by the title of the well-known 183 Mendelssohn, Moses work by La Mettrie, Man the Machine Lovejoy concluded that, ‘non-physical (1747). Mechanistic models provided the particulars’ are indispensable means to key to their view of the self and their any knowledge of physical realities. With- ontology. In the case of human beings, all out these, to speak of rational argument is accounted for, including consciousness, verges on paradox. by physiological processes. Speech consists Yet from simpler versions of positivism in physical sounds, which may generate there has emerged a more sophisticated ‘images’ within the brain. ‘physicalism’. Sceptics view it as merely a In relation to La Mettrie, Diderot is a version of epiphenomenalism, but some more moderate materialist; but d’Holbach writers (notably J. J. C. Smart and Daniel is an even more radical one. Diderot’s Dennett) explore parallels between human conception of matter bordered upon consciousness and the mechanical and ascribing to it supra-material properties electronic processes of information tech- to account for consciousness. D’Holbach nology. Are these computation, or rational insisted that the whole world is a machine, processes? Is ‘reason’ (to take up the point an autonomous system of material parti- from Hobbes) no more than a sophisti- cles that required no ‘machinist’. ‘Knowl- cated version of ‘computation’, which can edge’ is derived from sensation. be simulated by machine? Increasingly in the nineteenth and The debate on religion and science twentieth centuries materialism may seem throws up issues about ‘levels’ of explana- to stand or fall with developments in tion and understanding. For example, how empirical science. The challenge of evolu- does what is displayed on an oscilloscope tionary themes is discussed under separate relate to the appreciation of the form, entries. So also is emergence of behaviour- purpose, design and mood of a musical ism as a purely functional account of the performance? This entry on materialism human mind in terms of internal observa- now merges into issues explored under tion. Sometimes this is associated with several other entries, especially that on ‘epiphenomenalism’, the view that mind is science and religion as well as on the merely ‘thrown up’ when organisms reach teleological argument and on self. a given level of physiological complexity. (See also Darwin; empiricism; evolu- With the rise of modern science, materi- tion; logical positivism; marxist cri- alism tends to take the form of positivism. tique of religion; Vienna circle.) After Einstein, on one side it may be argued that matter is more complex than Mendelssohn, Moses (1729–86) writers formerly realized, and may be interrelated with other properties to Mendelssohn is perhaps the first major account for consciousness. On the other Jewish philosopher of the modern period side, the former, naı¨ve, view of value- to follow very broadly in the rationalist neutral observation and innocent ‘eviden- tradition of Maimonides (1135–1204). In tialism’ is hardly still viable. his Morning Hours, or Lectures on the At all events, we seem to be left with Existence of God (1785) he endorsed and the ‘paradox’ formulated by Arthur O. defended the ontological argument Lovejoy (1873–1962) about rationality and the teleological argument for and consciousness. If ‘reason’ is a matter the existence of God. of physical processes, on what rational Mendelssohn drew especially upon the basis can I argue for an ontology that philosophies of Leibniz (1646–1716) and reduces reason to manipulating or ‘com- Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Both of these puting’ counters purely on the basis of thinkers stood in the rationalist tradition physical impulses? Can a materialist gen- associated with Descartes.Inhis uinely philosophize on a rational basis? ‘Phaedo’, or Concerning the Immortality metaphor 184 of the Soul (1767) he attempted to deduce transposing the characteristics of the the immortality of the soul from its nature, exploratory fiction ‘to reality itself’ (Inter- in effect as an aprioriargument. pretation Theory, Fort Worth: Texas In tune with much eighteenth-century Christian University Press, 1976, 67; also thought, Mendelssohn argued for indivi- in The Rule of Metaphor, London: Rou- dual freedom of thought as well as tledge, 1978, 6). , and urged that Judaism Aristotle (384–322 bce)laidthe did not demand acceptance of certain foundation for this understanding in the . He insisted that Judaism is to be Poetics. Poie¯sis (making) uses interactions defined not as a set of doctrines but as a set between mime¯sis (a description of reality) of practices. In religious terms, Judaism is and mythos (plot). It stands on the border an aspect of a universal religion of between persuasive rhetoric and poetics. reason. Metaphor is ‘giving the thing a name that Understandably, Mendelssohn is often belongs to something else’ (Poetics, considered to be ‘the’ Jewish philosopher 1457B, 6–9). of enlightenment rationalism.(See Above all, metaphor is not wooden and also Jewish philosophy; Philo.) static, but entails a movement (Greek, phora) from current usage. Ricoeur insists that Aristotle anticipates an interactive metaphor (rather than merely substitutionary) the- Metaphor may sometimes be used as an ory: it is ‘to see two things in one’ (The illustrative or aesthetic device, but this is Rule of Metaphor, 24). only of secondary significance for philo- In the mid-twentieth century Owen sophy or for the use of language in Barfield (1947) and Philip Wheelwright religion. The constructive and creative (1954) called attention to the ‘tensive’ use of metaphor is neither ornamental, nor power of metaphor to stretch language didactic, nor illustrative. It is not a mere through ‘double language’. Barfield com- substitute for what may be known or pared the creative use of legal fiction in communicated by non-metaphysical lan- law to cover new or exceptional cases. guage. Fundamentally it draws upon Black (1955, 1962), Ricoeur (1976, 1978), symbol; and more especially it operates Mary Hesse (1966) and Janet Martin by interaction. It extends non-metaphysi- Soskice (1985) show conclusively that cal linguistic resources by drawing on two metaphor has power not only to extend or more semantic domains interactively. language creatively, but also to commu- Max Black is probably the classic nicate cognitive truth, including truths of exponent of the interactive theory. He science. writes: ‘A memorable metaphor has the This demonstrates the value of meta- power to bring two separate domains into phor as a serious resource for language in cognitive and emotional relation by religion. It combines the capacity to using language directly appropriate for involve those who speak and are the one as a lens for seeing the other’ addressed as participants with the power (Models and Metaphors, Ithaca, NY: to convey cognitive truth beyond more Cornell, 1962, 236). conventional or pre-established frontiers Ricoeur (b. 1913) endorses this of conventional language. account, and agrees that like a good The problems of metaphor include the theoretical model it provides ‘a way of overuse of ‘dead’ metaphor when its seeing things differently by changing our creative power and original contexts have language about the subject of our investi- become lost from view. Then, as gations. This . . . proceeds from the con- Nietzsche, Barthes and Derrida point struction of a heuristic fiction’ by out, they can become reservoirs for the 185 miracles transmission of uncritical mythologies. Although initially he favoured and (See also models and qualifiers; myth; sought to refine the utilitarian ethics of Ramsey.) Jeremy Bentham (1784–1832), Mill became disenchanted with Bentham’s metaphysics quasi-materialist refusal to distinguish between physical and spiritual pleasure. In Aristotle the treatise from which He advocated a qualitative distinction ‘metaphysics’ accidentally derived its between types of pleasure in seeking to name addressed ‘large’ philosophical ques- promote the greatest happiness of the tions. These included the nature of poten- greatest number. tiality and actuality, of becoming and If pleasure or happiness is defined in being, and of causality and substance. It terms of moral improvement, it becomes was consciously ‘general’. Today the term both a duty and a political right to seek usually denotes the exploration of ontol- the greatest happiness of the greatest ogy, ultimate reality or reasons why such number. Even a measure of self-sacrifice explorations may or may not be under- may be required, in contrast to the egoistic taken. hedonism of Bentham. Mill appears to The accidental origin of this meaning have believed in the existence of a cosmic came from fact that in the classification of designer, but not necessarily in the perso- Aristotle’s works in the first century bce nal God of Theism. All of our ideas, he (by Andronicus of Rhodes), the treatise in believed, derive from sense-experience. question follows ‘after’ (Greek, meta) the (See also empricism; God, concepts work entitled Physics. ‘Meta’ does not and ‘attributes’ of; materialism.) denote ‘beyond’ physics, except in the sense of coming next in a list. In practice, the word ‘metaphysics’ is miracles often reserved for ‘systems’ that seek to In ancient texts and modern thought the address the nature of reality. It embraces term tends often to focus upon that which both ontology (the nature of reality) and produces wonder, awe or insight. Never- epistemology (how or whether we have theless especially in the biblical texts knowledge of what we seek to know), criteria for the miraculous may include since to ask whether we are in a position issues of agency and for what purpose the to know any reality beyond that of the miracle was performed. empirical is itself a metaphysical question. Generally the ultimate cause is attrib- Positivists reject metaphysics as meaning- uted to God, but this may leave open less, but many argue that this rejection is attributions of second, or mediate, causes itself an instance of a metaphysical asser- which answer the question ‘How?’ As tion. (See also Absolute empricism; indicated under the entry science and cause, positivism.) religion, in theology or religions a miraculous event relates to the question Mill, John Stuart (1806–73) ‘Why?’ more readily than to the scientific Born in London, Mill was an English or empirical question ‘How?’ empiricist thinker, known chiefly for his Accounts or stories of miracles occur in ‘qualitative’ version of utilitarian ethics. many religious traditions. They are asso- However, in addition to Utilitarianism ciated with Moses, Elijah, Buddha, Jesus (1863), he wrote on logic and on Christ and the Prophet Muhammad. political philosophy. He defended free- Although it is widely assumed that doms in On Liberty (1859) and his miracles are invoked to generate faith or political theory in On Representative belief, many of the sacred texts, including Government (1861). biblical Judaeo-Christian texts, regard miracles 186 miracles as precisely not performed to Miracles’, Enquiries Concerning Human fulfil this function. In the Gospel of John Understanding, 3rd edn, Oxford: Claren- ‘seeking a sign’ (Greek, semeion) is dis- don, 1975, sect. X, pt 1, para. 90). The couraged, although if faith discerns a ‘uniform experience’ e.g. that dead men do miracle, faith is duly strengthened. not come to life ‘amounts to a proof, from In the Christian tradition, however, in the nature of the fact’ (ibid.). ‘No testi- this single respect the resurrection of mony is sufficient to establish a miracle Jesus Christ provides an untypical counter- unless its falsehood would be more mir- example. The resurrection is seen as a aculous’ (ibid., para. 91). divine vindication and corroboration of Nevertheless, Alastair McKinnon the identity and effective work of Christ, writes, ‘The idea of suspension of natural and evidence is adduced for its occurrence law is self-contradictory . . . If we sub- (1 Cor. 15:1–11; also by inference, stitute the expression “the actual course of 15:12–34). events”, miracle would be defined as “an event involving the suspension of the miracles and ‘laws of actual course of events”’ (‘“Miracle” and nature’ “Paradox”’, American Philosophical Augustine (354–430) was aware that Quarterly, 4, 1967, 309; also cited by R. miracles could be perceived as disrupting Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle, the regularities of nature. Yet he saw both London: Macmillan, 1970, 20). the natural order (i.e. its ‘orderedness’) Swinburne develops this further. After and miracles as expressions of the will and considering detailed examples of statistical decree of God. Hence he concluded that ‘laws’ in the context of quantum theory, miracles were not ‘against’ nature (contra Einstein’s equations of general relativity naturam) but only conflicting with our andKepleronplanetarymotion,he knowledge of the operations of nature. comments, ‘One must distinguish between ‘We give the name “nature” to the usual a formula being a law and a formula being common course of nature . . . but against (universally) true or being a law which the supreme laws of nature, which is holds without exception’ (The Concept of beyond knowledge . . . God never acts, Miracle, 28). any more than he acts against himself’ John Polkinghorne offers parallel (Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, 26: 3). observations. ‘Science simply tells us that Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) defines these events are against normal expecta- ‘miracle’ as that which is ‘sometimes done tion . . . The theological question is: does by God outside the usual order assigned to it make sense to suppose that God has things . . . because we are astonished acted in a new way? . . . In unprecedented (admiramus) . . . when we see an effect circumstances, God can do unexpected without knowing the cause’ (Summa things . . . The laws of nature do not Contra Gentiles, III, 101). ‘God alone change . . . yet the consequences of these can work miracles’ (ibid., 102). For only laws can change . . . when one moves into the Creator can initiate ‘what is not in its anewregime’(Quarks, Chaos, and [nature’s] capacity to perform’. Miracles Christianity, London: Triangle, are thus ‘beyond’ the natural order, but 1994, 82). not ‘against’ it. Polkinghorne, distinguished as both a Hume (1711–76) defines ‘miracle’ quite physicist and a theologian, concludes: differently: ‘A miracle is a violation of the ‘Miracles are only credible as acts of the laws of nature.’ Hence, since ‘unalterable faithful God if they represent new possi- experience established these laws’, argu- bilities occurring because experience has ments against miracles are as conclusive as entered some new regime’ (ibid., 88). any argument from experience can be (‘Of Hence he finds the resurrection of Jesus 187 modal logic

Christ credible because (for Christians) it propositions. A syllogism offers an signals the beginning of a new reality in inferential form that works from a premise God’s dealings with the world. to a conclusion through a logical relation to a middle term, which must be common miracles and divine creativity (without change of meaning) to two of the propositions of the syllogism. Proposi- Miracles, then, are perhaps not best tional calculus works with such operators defined simply as that which evokes or logical constants as those of conjunc- ‘wonder’, although this has been a tradi- tion (and); disjunction (either . . . or . . .); tional entailment of the concept If they do negation (not), and material implication evoke wonder, this is within the frame- (if . . . then . . .). work of divine action as a signal of Modal logic builds on this foundation, newness, purpose or ‘beyondness’. In but develops it to include finer distinc- theistic traditions the nature of an authen- tions of logical necessity,logicalpossi- tic miracle will be to serve and to advance bility, and different levels of implication. the purposes of God in accordance with It investigates the validity not only of the nature of God. ‘Idle’ portents may be such propositions as ‘If . . . then . . .’ but suspected as such by theists as by anti- also ‘It is possible that . . .’. In philosophy theists. of religion, Malcolm, Hartshorne and From very different angles of approach Plantinga utilize modal logic to clarify A. Boyce Gibson and Pannenberg attack the logical force of the ontological the positivist assumption that any unique, argument and (in Plantinga’s work) also once-occurring, event is somehow formulations of the problem of evil.In excluded by ‘experience’, as Hume tends ethics modal logic is sometimes used to to imply. Gibson writes: ‘The dogma that formulate the possibilities and necessities nothing that happens only once, or for the of logic in deontology,ordeontic first time . . . can ever be caused, or a logic. cause’ is a Humean dogma that limits In addition to the notation used in creative agency (Theism and Empiricism, basic propositional calculus, for example, London: SCM, 1970, 149). Can nothing p V q (for ‘either p is the case or new ever happen for the first time? (alternatively) q is the case’, or ‘* p’ (it Pannenberg points out that a mechan- is not the case that ‘p’), modal logic uses istic, positivist model of the universe as a the symbol ‘&’ to express necessity (‘& p’ closed system no longer reflects the more denotes ‘p is necessarily true’) and the recent advances of the natural sciences, on notation ‘^’ to express possibility (‘^ p’ one side, and inhibits ‘the freedom of denotes ‘p is possibly true’). If ‘p’is God’, on the other. The ‘biblical belief in necessarily true, it may be said to be true God as the Creator . . . finds in the in ‘all possible worlds’. Thus in the incalculability and contingency of each example considered under counterfac- event an expression of the freedom of the tuals, ‘America’ might be smaller than Creator’ (Systematic Theology,vol.2, ‘England’ in a possible world, but this Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994, 46). (See could not be literally so. also creation; empricism; immanence; ‘Possible worlds’ may be said to help to omnipotence; positivism; theism.) clarify the logic of possible hypotheses, counterfactuals or projected scenarios, although some reject this claim. The modal logic American philosopher Clarence I. Lewis Traditionally Western logic explicates the (1883–1964) urged the pragmatic value of conditions of valid inference, especially interpretative structures, and formulated what may be inferred by deduction from eight systems of modal logic with a view models and qualifiers 188 to distinguishing ‘strict’ implication from Campbell developed a philosophy of other levels of implication. models in science in Physics, the Elements (1920), and Max Black, Mary Hesse and Ron Harre´ have undertaken further logi- models and qualifiers cal explorations of models in the philoso- This phrase is associated especially with phy of science. the work of Ramsey. Ramsey aimed to The upshot of this work is to demon- enter into constructive dialogue, especially strate the value of models not only for at Oxford, with empiricists and logical exploration but also to convey cognitive positivists concerning the currency of truth. Yet in both science and religion, language in religion. models also convey negative resonances Models provide ‘object language’, that need to be discarded. In Ramsey’s which permits ‘an empirical placing of terms, all models require some kind of theological phrases’ (Ramsey, Religious qualifier. (See also empricism; logical Language, London: SCM, 1957, 19–48). positivism; metaphor; myth; science These provide points of engagement and religion; symbol.) between ordinary language and disclosure of the divine. Moltmann, Ju¨rgen (b. 1926) However, models would mislead us Born in Hamburg, Moltmann was con- about God if they are not duly ‘qualified’. scripted into the German armed forces in Thus the ‘models’ of cause, wisdom, 1943 at the age of seventeen. He saw his goodness and purpose need to be used in city destroyed by allied bombing, and speaking of God’s action as Creator, or of many horrors of war. In February 1945 God’s character as pure love, or of God’s he was taken prisoner of war, and it was purposive designs. All the same, each only in the prison camps that he learned of needs to have an appropriate ‘qualifier’ the further Nazi horrors of Auschwitz, attached to it: first cause; infinitely wise; Belsen and the Jewish Holocaust. infinitely good; eternal purpose (ibid., This, Moltmann writes, was ‘the death 49–89). of all my mainstays’, producing a sense of The biblical writings exhibit this logic. ‘daily humiliation’. With little or no Thus Jesus uses the model of ‘birth’, but church background, he came upon the also explains to Nicodemus the distinctive Psalms that spoke of God as with those of logic with which ‘birth’ is used (Jn 3:1– ‘broken heart’. He perceived God as not 10). Jesus is ‘living [i.e. running] water’ the lofty God of ‘theism’ in love with his (Jn 4:10), but needs to explain to the own glory, but as a co-suffering God on woman of Samaria that it is not the kind ‘his side of the barbed wire’. Moltmann of water that can be made available in a declares, ‘A God who cannot suffer bucket (Jn 4:11–15). Wittgenstein cannot love either’ (The Trinity and the observes that logical grammar is distinc- Kingdom of God [1980], London: SCM, tive when the model of ‘hearing’ God 1981, 38). speak is used. In Neo-Kantian philosophy the notion (1) In philosophy of religion this presents of construing scientific states of affairs an influential but not altogether tradi- through the use of models was explored by tional view of God. ‘A God who is Heinrich Hertz (1857–94). In more recent eternally in love with himself . . . is a work the heuristic or exploratory function monster’ (Experiences of God, [1979], of theoretical models and analogues in London: SCM, 1980, 16). Rather, God science has helped to break down a shares in the suffering of the cross of simplistic contrast between ‘facts’ and Jesus Christ, and no human suffering frameworks of interpretation. N.R. ‘is shut off from God’. 189 moral argument for the existence of God

(2) Knowledge of God is not to be monists. On the other hand, although determined on the basis of ‘what is’, Leibniz (1646–1716) postulated ‘units’ of i.e. from a ‘static’ theism. In common force without extension (‘monads’), since with the Marxist philosopher Ernst these are all of one kind some have Bloch, Moltmann stresses hope, but characterized Leibniz’s philosophy as a also promise. ‘From first to last . . . relative or ‘attributive’ monism. Christianity is hope, is forward-look- In practice the term is capable of too ing and forward moving . . . trans- many applications to be very useful. In the forming the present’ (Theology of context of discussion specifically about Hope [1964], London: SCM, 1967, God, little can be said about monism that 16). Against Nietzsche’s ‘God is is not more constructively debated under dead’, Moltmann distinguishes between such headings as pantheism or divine absence and divine hiddenness panentheism. For examples of monism in the present. Future promise will in Eastern thought, see also Hindu philo- enact ‘a conquest of the deadlines of sphy, and especially S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ . death’ (ibid., 211). (3) Moltmann seeks to address the pro- moral argument for the blem of evil in terms of a ‘post- existence of God Auschwitz’ theology of God. ‘Even Auschwitz is taken up into the grief of This approach does not rank in comparable the Father, the surrender of the Son, importance alongside the other three main and the power of the Spirit’ (The arguments for the existence of God (see Crucified God [1972], London: SCM, God, arguments for the existence of), 1974, 278). ‘Unless it apprehends the namely the ontological, cosmological pain of the negative, Christian hope and teleological arguments for the can never be realistic and liberating’ existence of God. Philosophically it (ibid., 55). He draws on the ‘negative emerges with full seriousness most specifi- dialectic’ of Adorno on Jewish–Chris- cally with Kant, (1724–1804), whose tian and Marxist–Christian dialogue, critique sought to demonstrate the limits andonatheologyofGodwho of ‘pure’ reason. Pure reason, for Kant (as genuinely ‘feels’ and ‘suffers’ by God’s for Hume) could not address transcenden- own choice. (See also anthropo- tal questions, which went beyond contin- morphism; God, concepts and gent or finite phenomena within the world. ‘attributes’ of; omniscience; evil .) immanuel kant: god as a ‘postulate’ of practical monism reason The term stands in contrast to dualism Kant argued that only the absolute moral and to pluralism and very broadly denotes imperative (the ‘categorical imperative’ of the view that all reality is a unity, or single moral obligation) in terms of ‘practical ‘substance’ (Greek, monos, alone, i.e. the reason’ could relate to such unconditional only entity within a class). Christian Wolff notions as ‘God’. Rather than pointing (1679–1754) appears to have coined the directly to God, absolute moral imperative term to describe systems of thought that presupposes a correlation between the rejected a dualism of mind and body as good will, or virtue, and human happiness two different entities, and sought to or the reward of worthiness, which only resolve them into one. God or a Supreme Being could ensure. Parmenides (fl. 515–492 bce), Spinoza This is not, however, a formal argu- (1632–77) and Bradley (1846–1924) ment either a priori or a posteriori, offer landmark examples of thoroughgoing since if it were it would relapse into the moral argument for the existence of God 190 realm of theoretical reason. Kant has The force of Kant’s argument seems to already exposed the limits and inadequacy operate more successfully at a popular of such theoretical reason to establish the intuitive level. Is everything, including existence of God. More succinctly, the moral obligation and ‘God’, exhaustively very notion of ‘the highest good’ (sum- explained in terms of the relativities and mum bonum) presupposes ‘God’ and contingencies of the everyday empirical human freedom. God, freedom and world? Is all morality and religion no immortality are ‘postulates’ of ‘Practical more than a behavioural response to the Reason’ (Critique of Practical Reason, variable challenges of natural environment 1788, bk II, ch. 2). A ‘postulate’ is a or human society? demand or claim that is neither axiomatic nor strictly demonstrable. the counter-argument: In Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason it different accounts of moral is far from clear that ‘God’ denotes any- obligation thing other than a supposedly absolute Kant’s approach depends on an absolute moral law, exempt from the contingencies notion of moral obligation as that which of the empirical and phenomenal world. transcends the contingent and variable. Kant’s ‘God’ is hardly personal, and in However, the reveals Religion Within the Limits of Reason he numerous theories that account for moral criticizes as ‘superstitious’ the view of obligation in other ways. prayer that assumes governmental or providential responses to prayer within the (1) Hobbes (1588–1679) held to a theory world. ‘Freedom’, ‘immortality’ and ‘God’ of psychological hedonism, namely are ‘postulates’ for the following reasons. that all human persons experience a Freedom is a postulate because the compulsion to gratify their own achievement of the highest good is, in desires. However, since society itself Kant’s view, ‘the necessary object’ of the brings benefits, a half-conscious social good will that is shaped by absolute moral contract subordinates these desires to law. In turn, the good will, which is a societal power (e.g. a king), who will wholly good, presupposes the possibility hold the ring in face of competing of ‘infinite progress’ in goodness or in interests, and restrain society from holiness, yet this also presupposes ‘an breakdown into anarchy. infinitely enduring existence and person- (2) Hume (1711–76) argued that ‘reason ality of the same rational being’. is and ought only to be the slave of the This is the immortality of the soul passions’, and everything is directed (ibid.). However, the notion of ‘happiness towards the achievement of pleasure proportional to that morality’ must also and the avoidance of pain. Sub-cate- postulate the existence of God. What Kant gories of pleasure and pain are woven calls ‘the supreme cause of nature’ is to be into a supposed system of ethics or ‘presupposed for the highest good’. To utility, complicated by the pleasure of assume the existence of God is ‘morally social approval and the pain of social necessary’ (ibid.). disapproval. This version of hedonism At times Kant seems explicitly to arises naturally from within the world concede that the existence of God is no and embodies no absolute. more than a ‘need’ for his account of duty (3) Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and and moral imperative. Even in his high Mill (1806–73) equated ‘morality’ ethical account of human persons and the with the principle of ‘the greatest good will as ‘ends’, not means, he adds happiness’ of the greatest number. that even God cannot have ‘ends’ higher Bentham more empirically spoke of than the ‘end’ of a human person. degrees of pleasure and pain. Mill 191 mysticism

introduced a more complex and less persons are the focus of moral issues. This reductive criterion of ‘higher’ or requires more than ‘Autonomy’, mere ‘lower’ pleasure: ‘It is better to be a self-regulation. He sees a sense of the Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satis- moral as a ‘sign’ that points beyond itself fied.’ For some this remains firmly to God (ibid., 43–6). The logical currency within behavioural utilitarianism; for of ‘obedience’ in Judaism, Christianity and others this seems to open the door for Islam becomes illusory on the basis of the kind of value-system that might naturalistic theories (ibid., 54–60). suggest a ‘beyond’, such as in principle Owen does not endorse Kant’s formu- religion and God. Mill himself had lation in terms of ‘postulates’ and pre- sympathy for the existence of some suppositions. Nevertheless, he agrees with kind of ‘limited’ deity. Kant that in principle goodness and good (4) Nietzsche (1844–1900) accounted character point beyond mere contingen- for ‘morality’ largely in terms of self- cies and relativities in human life. interest and ‘will to power’. His view At the beginning of the twentieth of ethics is that the approval of society century Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924) or power generates all the manipula- insisted similarly that there is something tive and instrumental strategies that ‘unconditional’ about duty or moral law serve the self. The notion of absolute (The Theory of Good and Evil, 2 vols., moral obligation is part of the decep- Oxford: Clarendon, 1907). We cannot tion and illusion manipulated by some dismiss ‘value’ as the mere interest of a to control others. specific group. Otherwise, what are we to (5) Ayer (1910–89) and Rorty (b. 1931) make of the stable tradition of virtues as sought to redefine moral goodness in qualities of a good character from Plato terms of a vocabulary of approval or onwards? If it is not ‘unconditional’, it is disapproval by a group within society. not ‘morality’. There can be no talk of absolute moral Today there is more widespread scepti- imperatives. cism about ‘morality’. Arguments that moral codes reflect the interests and can the argument be conventions of societies and are variable reinstated? rashdall and owen have gained ground. Nevertheless the view In The Moral Argument for Christian that often in the past the word ‘moral’ has Theism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965) been overextended may not necessarily H. P. Owen attacks naturalistic explana- imply that all instantiations of moral tions for the experience of moral obliga- character and moral virtue are merely tion. It is impossible to derive an contingent and without universal ground- evaluative moral ‘ought’ from merely ing. This belief would not inevitably lead naturalistic factors or to treat a good to a belief in the existence of God. It conscience as a gratified wish. Against might, however, seem to imply a source of Ayer and others he insists that morality is value beyond the merely contingent in the irreducible, and not a mere matter of everyday life of societies. (See also empiri- corporate or individual approval or dis- csim; ethics; transcendence.) approval. Is it enough to say that the Nazi Holocaust is merely a matter for ‘disap- mysticism proval’, rather than a violation of moral values? The term broadly denotes a feeling of Naturalistic theories, Owen argues, immediacy and oneness with God (or depend on restricting ‘morality’ to acts with Ultimate Reality) on the part of the rather than to will and habituated char- self. In extreme forms of mysticism, the acter. He agrees with Kant, that will and self almost seems to merge with God; in mysticism 192 more traditional forms, the self experi- It is well known that Ra¯ ma¯ nuja (c. ences a oneness of communion which 1017–1137) drew on the Upanis¸ad for a appears to dissolve the ‘objectified’ nature ‘qualified’ non-dualism (Vis´ista¯-advaita of a subject–object mode of knowing or Vedanta), which tended towards a more perceiving. theistic direction. Ultimate Reality, he One problem about the term is that it taught, is not ‘undifferentiated conscious- may denote, especially for those who use it ness’ (nirguna bra¯hma). Religious devo- pejoratively, a heightened psychological tion (bhakti) looks beyond the self. state induced by self-hypnosis or other Nevertheless in the Bhagavad Gita, bhakti manipulative techniques. A low sugar serves alongside ‘freedom from the content in the blood, induced by fasting, thought of an “I”’ (18:62). Even Ra¯ma¯- may facilitate self-generated visions or nuja teaches a ‘qualified monism’. hallucinations. On the other hand, an In traditions in which bodily existence, ethical and devotional self-forgetfulness rebirth, and reincarnation look towards in contemplation of the Other who ‘release’, a mystical colouring is inevitable. becomes also One may denote a spiritual Yet for many it is ‘not yet’, and its degree mysticism of authentic experience. Ger- and significance varies within traditions in man distinguishes clearly between these Hinduism. two uses by reserving the word Mysticis- In Buddhist philosophy an emphasis mus for the first and Mystik for the upon ‘emptiness’ may reflect a parallel second. ambivalence. Na¯ga¯ rjuna (c. 150–200) Some insist that the core of mystical expounds psychological and ontological experience remains the same whatever the emptiness, but a mystical interpretation context. Yet there are differences between has to be qualified by his concern for Hindu, Christian and other traditions of logic at the ‘conditional’ level, even mysticism that deserve note. though he renounces conceptual thought at the ‘final’ level. rejects the hindu and buddhist mysticism ¯ ¯ validity or applicability of assertion or The Upanis¸ads embody mystical denial of Ultimate Reality. Hindu philosophy approaches in and christian mysticism religion, especially in the later interpreta- tions of the monist school of Advaita Again, much depends upon the scope of Vedanta and S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ (788–820). The the term. This is a case where definition goal of knowledge is to attain liberation by means of examples can assist us. The or release (moksha) from individual iden- classic mystics include Pseudo-Diony- tity and all that entails bodily life, rebirth sius (c. 500), Bernard of Clairvaux or reincarnation, in order to become (or (1091–1153), Hildegarde of Bingen be shown to be) One undifferentiated (1098–1179), Meister Eckhart (1260– consciousness as Ultimate Reality/Self 1327), (1342– c. (bra¯hman–a¯tman). 1413), the author of The Cloud of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ can readily quote ancient Unknowing (c. 1350–95); Teresa of Avila Upanis¸ads to support this. ‘All Bra¯hman (1515–82); (1542–91) is . . . myself within the heart . . . smaller and Jacob Boehme (1575–1624). than a mustard seed . . . greater than the In The Divine Names, Pseudo-Diony- earth . . . the sky’ (Cha´ndogya Upanis¸ad sius urges that God is beyond all under- 3:14); ‘The Self is to be described by “No, standing, and can be apprehended, if at no”’ (Brhada¯ranyaka Upanis¸ad III:9:26). all, only through indirect, non-conceptual ‘Thou art woman, thou art man . . . Thou symbols. The beauty and light of God art the thunder-cloud, the seas . . . infinite prompts love and yearning for union with . . .’ (S´veta¯s´vetara Upanis¸ad IV:3:4). God (ibid., 4). In his Mystical Theology he 193 myth uses the via negativa because God is are underpinned by a monist ontology, beyond assertion and denial. The concep- whether ‘qualified’ or not. Many tradi- tual is derived from God, but God is above tions seek to overcome the subject–object and beyond conceptual thought. God’s split in knowing or in relationality. Here, love enfolds all. however, it is not exclusively a property of Unlike the monism of Hindu mysti- mysticism to share with Buber an under- cism, Pseudo-Dionysius draws both on a standing of God as ‘Thou’. quasi-monist Neoplatonism, but also Some, like , explore the upon a Christian version of Platonism heightened perceptions of mysticism as that retains notions of hierarchy and part of an epistemology. Yet the main- order. He speaks of ‘a holy order’ (The spring seems to remain a longing for union Celestial Hierarchy, III: 1). with God (or Ultimate Reality) in which Bernard of Clairvaux is usually ‘knowledge’ differs from ‘reason’. Gen- described as ‘mystic’, but he also exercised eralization is impossible. Perhaps in the a fine theological mind. Meister Johannes end, the enhancement of awareness to Eckhart speaks more characteristically as which most mystics lay claim must be a mystic: the soul attains ‘emptiness’, balanced against the claim of locke that which ‘gives birth to God’. Eckhart’s reason needs to retain a ‘control’ or ‘desert’ becomes in John of the Cross a ‘governance’ for ‘entitled’ belief.(See ‘night of the senses’ and ‘dark night of the dualism; panentheism; pantheism; spirit’, which disengage the soul from the religion; theism.) world to be filled with love for God and union with God. myth Although Adolf Deissmann wrote of Paul the Apostle as a mystic, more recent Strictly the term denotes stories or narra- Pauline research is virtually unanimous in tives told about God or divine beings, rejecting this understanding of ‘being-in- narrated in a communal setting as of Christ’. The phrase primarily refers in Paul permanent or repeated significance, and to a shared solidarity of status especially believed to be true within the community denoting that of being ‘raised with Christ’. in question. Each of these terms carries Paul uses the phrase in a number of ways. weight:narrative,deity,community, jewish mysticism truth-status and community. However, the term retains little of this strict defini- The roots of Jewish mysticism may be tion in popular usage, and is used in a traced to prophetic experiences of being variety of ways, some contradictory with overwhelmed by God (Is. 6:1–6) and the others, even among philosophers and notion of the shekinah (presence or glory theologians. of God). Some trace potentially mystical First, the widespread popular applica- elements in Philo’s assimilation of Helle- tion to polytheistic myths of the ancient nistic thought, but Philo is too ‘rationalist’ oriental, Greek and Roman worlds should to merit the term ‘mystic’. The period of not mislead us. Although in the modern mysticism, in the narrower sense, emerges West (and elsewhere) ‘myth’ is used here in in the medieval kabbala, especially in the contrast to ‘truth’, these stories are called Zohar. Poetic literature also speaks of ‘myths’ because they were once believed to spiritual love, for example in be true among the communities within (c. 1095–1143). which they first emerged. The modern use of ‘myth’ to denote what is not true has philosophical significance little to do with the more serious, techni- This varies from tradition to tradition. cal, use of the term (see M. Eliade, Myths, The major traditions of Hindu mysticism Dreams and Mysteries, 1960). myth 194

Second, myth applies to divine actions task of the interpreter, Strauss argues, was portrayed in narrative form. This stands in to ‘de-historicize the supernatural’. contrast to such categories as legends, This provides a bridge between two of which may apply to human heroes. Only a Bultmann’s understandings of myth: that minority of writers regard myth as neces- of a primitive, pre-scientific world-view, sarily polytheistic. Most include mono- and that of a false ‘objectification’ or theistic religion and theism (e.g. John descriptive report that needs to be ‘de- Knox, Myth and Truth, 1964 and 1966). objectified’. However, this cannot hide the This narrative form of myth is what contradictions in Bultmann’s account of permits both a personal and self-involving myth. dimension, which draws the hearers or If myth merely denotes analogy,we readers in; but at the risk of an objectify- cannot demythologize at all. If ‘myth’ ing tendency, that is, the risk of looking denotes the pseudo-scientific explanatory like pseudo-scientific or pseudo-explana- hypothesis of a primitive world-view, is this tory description or report. really how ‘myth’ operates, if at all, in the Third, this last characteristic has given New Testament? How do either of these rise to proposals about demythologiz- relate to the need to restore an existential ing sacred texts, most notably Bult- thrust to the language of sacred texts mann’s proposals to demythologize the without destroying their simultaneous New Testament. In effect, they seek to claims about the truth of certain states of transpose all hints of description and affairs? (see the entry on Bultmann). report into modes of language that pro- On top of all this, Pannenberg (b. claim, address and challenge the reader to 1928) identifies a fifth problem. Myth existential response. usually relates to what is repeated, espe- On this basis, ‘myths’ of creation,of cially to cyclical views of time and of the resurrection or of the gift of the ritual. However, the biblical writings of Holy Spirit ‘coming down’ serve, it is Hebrew–Christian theology stress the argued, not to make truth-claims about novel, the unique, the purposive, the states of affairs, but to call readers linear. Only in a non-mythic sense does (respectively) to responsible , the repetition in liturgical celebration of to new life and to liberation from past these unique events occur. bondage into the ‘futurity’ of new possi- We cannot put the clock back to bilities represented by the Holy Spirit. dispense with the word ‘myth’. However, Fourth, David F. Strauss (1808–74) extreme caution is needed in assessing defined myth as ‘the expression of an idea whether or when the word is applicable in in the form of a historical account’ (Life of Jewish, Christian or Islamic contexts. At Jesus, [1835–6], Philadelphia: Fortress, best, myth denotes a sacred narrative 1972, 148). He drew on Hegel’s contrast which through its symbolic resonances between the rigorous critical concept used invites participation and self-involvement by philosophy (Begriff) and the suppo- on the part of a community for whom the sedly uncritical methods of ‘representa- narrative is true. (See also existential- tions’ (Vorstellungen) used in religion. The ism; truth.) N

Na¯ga¯rjuna (c. 150–200) Reality lies hidden behind ordinary experi- ence and conceptual description. Only Born in South India, Na¯ga¯rjuna became enlightenment makes it accessible to faith. the greatest and most influential dialecti- Thepracticeof‘wisdom’(prajna¯ ) cian in Mahayana Buddhism, and perhaps therefore remains important, and for in Buddhist philosophy. He founded Na¯ga¯rjuna this also presupposes faith. the Ma¯dhyamika school and exercised Compassion coheres with Buddhist doc- deep influence over the development of trinal teaching (dharma) on opposing evil Buddhism in South and East Asia. and promoting good. At the heart of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophy Nirvana is both a psychological state in stood a distinctive understanding of the which passions and karma (karma kles´a¯t- Middle Way of the Buddha as ‘emptiness’ makam) disappear, together with suffer- of all things. One of his two most important ing. But nirvana also ontological space: all writings is ‘The Fundamental Verses on the things have departed to leave ‘emptiness’. Middle Way’ (Mu¯ lanadhyamaka¯ rika¯ The use of dialectic is fundamental to Prajna¯). The other is ‘The Septuagint on Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophy. (See also Hindu Emptiness’ (S´unya¯tasapatati). philosophy; metaphysics; mysticism; The silence invited by emptiness shows ontology.) itself perhaps most readily by restraint from possible answers to a metaphysical natural theology question, namely to withhold ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘both’ and ‘neither’. Silence avoids the Natural theology seeks to establish truth self-contradictory paradox of scepticism, about God through the natural resources but allows a sceptical restraint from of human reason, in contrast to revelation assertions or denials that may be out of by means of such special sources as sacred place. writings and ecclesial traditions. Such Na¯ ga¯ rjuna aimed to follow valid resources of human reasoning are in logic, but for his teaching also to cohere principle available to all human beings with good Buddhist teaching and practice. without regard to time or place. It has been said that Ma¯dhyamika Bud- Depending on how broadly or narrowly dhism is a particular Buddhist ‘yogic form the term is defined, different thinkers may of moral and intellectual purification’ be cited as advocates or exponents of (Christian Lindtner). An ineffable Ultimate natural theology. Some suggest that Plato natural theology 196

(c. 428–348 bce) argues for divine reason examples of natural on the basis of general rational principles. theology in a fuller sense Aristotle (384–322 bce) offers a more of the term explicit natural theology: ‘God is perfect A more specific and inclusive natural . . . is One . . . Therefore the firmament that theology emerged in the seventeenth and God sets in motion is one.’ That is to say, eighteenth centuries. Paley (1743–1805) reason discerns a divinely grounded ‘orde- argued for the existence of God on the redness’ of unity and diversity in the basis of observations of evidence of design world. in the world. Paley’s famous analogy of broader understandings of the finding a watch on a heath features as a term: the role of reason classic exposition of the teleological argument for the existence of God. The If natural theology is defined very broadly titles of two of his works, Evidences of simply to allow for strong continuity Christianity (1794) and Natural Theology between philosophical reasoning and (1802) underline the aim and assumption divine revelation, then a number of of these writings. ‘borderline’ examples might be included. The most extreme reliance on human (c. 150–215) saw reason and rejection of a need for ‘special’ philosophy as a positive testament to the revelation emerged in English deism. Greeks to prepare them for the Gospel, Reason is the only valid instrument just as the law prepared the Jews. Yet he through which God’s existence and nature acknowledged that philosophical reason- can be known. Any appeal to special ing remains incomplete without the gift of sacred writings or traditions would com- faith, and further revelation. promise the universality of the Creator- In Islamic philosophy, Ibn Rushd God whose creation left no room for a (Averroes, 1126–98) built upon Aristotle’s need for special interventions of provi- notion of the ‘ordered’ nature of the dence or the miraculous. Arguably the universe as a rational, purposive hierarchy deists believed that anything else would of differentiation and unity. Al-Farabi also compromise the sovereignty of God. and Ibn Sina also urged the superior value of philosophical thought, but retained the the barth–brunner debate religious conviction that reason cohered with the revelation of the Qur’an. Barth (1886–1968) is the most outspoken Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–74) opponent of natural theology in modern believed that in principle philosophical times. Barth believed that natural theology reasoning could establish the existence of compromises the sovereignty of God in a God. However, human blindness prevents different way. God chooses when, where this reasoning from giving such knowledge and how God will make himself known equally to all. ‘Natural reason is common (Church Dogmatics I: 2, Edinburgh, T & to the good and the bad . . . Knowledge of T Clark, 1956, sects. 13–19). God God, however, belongs only to the good’ ‘speaks’, ‘where and when God by this (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu.12, art. 12). activating, ratifying . . . the word of the ‘God is known to the natural reason Bible and preaching lets it become true’ through the images of his effects’, but ‘by (ibid., I: 1, sect. 4, 120). grace we have a more perfect knowledge Barth’s specific attack on natural theol- of God than we have by natural reason’ ogy was written in 1934, a year after (ibid., art. 13). Indeed, if God’s existence Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. may be apprehended through reason, His Swiss colleague Emil Brunner had knowledge of God’s nature and character attempted a tentative defence of a ‘soft’, or depends upon revelation. minimal, version of a natural theology. 197 necessity, the necessary

Barth rejected this, and entitled his short agnostics simply agree that in practice it work Nein! (No!.) Barth’s chief contention is unsuccessful. Others argue that the was that human fallenness had left no ‘infinite qualitative difference’ between ‘point of contact’ between sinful, alie- God as transcendent Ground of the Uni- nated, humanity and the ‘wholly other’ verse, and finite, contingent phenomena transcendent God. He wrote his work in within the world, would not lead us to Rome, where he attributed a vacillating expect easy success for ‘natural theology’. papacy in the face of Nazism to a failure Yet a third group subject the capacities of to adopt the motto ‘Christ alone; scripture human reason to radical criticism, whether alone’. These phrases became the badge of from the viewpoint of conservative theol- the ‘confessing’ German Church in the ogy, from the perspective of pietism,orin face of this same pressure. the light of secular or theistic postmo- Emil Brunner argued that if human sin dernism.(See also agnosticism; athe- had damaged the image of God in ism; ontological argument; theism.) humankind, the Fall had not totally destroyed it. Citing Irenaeus, Brunner necessity, the necessary drew a contrast between the ‘formal’ image of God (including reason), which Necessity may be attributed to a proposi- was left almost intact, and the ‘material’ tion when the denial of this proposition image (that of moral character), which results in a logical contradiction. In was seriously damaged. Moreover, if there modal logic this is sometimes expressed were no ‘point of contact’, how could by asserting that the proposition ‘p’is repentance be possible, let alone the true, and its denial ‘~p’ is false, in all possibility of moral action? Repentance possible worlds. The early Wittgenstein and the benefit of such divine ordinances wrestled with the nature of necessity in his as the state and marriage were signs of work on the philosophy of logic, espe- ‘general grace’. Humankind retains a cially on relations between propositions capacity to respond to God. and on logical constants. Barth dismissed such arguments as In addition to this meaning in logic, blurring the distinction between the especially in modal logic,theterm transcendence of God and God’s free- ‘necessary’ may also be applied to condi- dom to determine when or where to tions or causes. Whereas in logic, address humankind, on one side, and the necessity may stand in contrast to con- extent of human fallenness and blindness, tingency, in the sphere of causality, on the other. Nevertheless this response necessary cause stands in contrast to should not be equated with a crude sufficient cause. fideism, as some philosophers of religion Leibniz (1646–1716) wrestled with have in effect suggested (H.J. Paton, The highly complex relations between neces- Modern Predicament, London: Allen & sity and possibility. God is necessarily Unwin, 1955, 47–58). Paton even attri- morally perfect, Leibniz maintained, since butes Barth’s approach to ‘his zeal for to deny this is to contradict what is religion’ (ibid., 57) when Barth has strong entailed in God’s being ‘God’. Hence it reservations about applying the very word seems that of necessity God chose to create ‘religion’ to the Christian faith. ‘the best possible world’. The world is levels of discussion actual by necessity. But how, then, can God’s creative action be God’s free choice? The debate is more complex than a short Leibniz invokes his infinitesimal logical article can convey. There are quite differ- calculus. Since there is an infinite number ent reasons for unease with natural of ‘possible’ worlds, it is not possible for theology. Some theists, atheists and this range of options to reach closure by Neoplatonism 198 necessity. This allows a space for free is the highest emanation, next below ‘the choice. One’. As the chain unfolds we reach the This invites reflection upon whether we level of the ‘World-Soul’ (also found in are obliged to conceive of necessity in Stoicism), and finally the material world more than one way. Plantinga and itself. This eternal process of ‘outflow’, Hartshorne elucidate this approach in radiating-generation, or emanation, pro- their respective expositions of the onto- vides structure and unity to reality and the logical argument; and Plantinga also in world. Matter does not exist as an end in his work on the problem of evil. itself, but as a vehicle for ‘soul’. Plotinus includes a mystical dimension in his thinking and reflection. Neoplatonism Porphyry emphasizes this mystical ele- Neoplatonism represents a modification of ment, stressing the preparation of the soul aspects of Plato’s thought (428–348 bce), for union with ‘the One’. He compiled a but bridges Plato’s dualism between a diagrammatic ‘tree’ of a hierarchy of levels higher order of Ideas and the lower realm reaching through five ‘species’, down to of empirical, material objects in the world matter. More readily than Plotinus, but by postulating a chain of intermediate perhaps closer to Plato, he saw ‘matter’ as beings between the highest and lowest in a a source of evil. Porphyry exercised a wide unified order. influence, and Augustine and Boethius Above Plato’s realm of eternal Ideas is were attracted to aspects of his thought in ‘the One’, who is perfect, immutable, their earlier years. simple, and in effect ‘God’. ‘The One’, or A second major development was the ‘God’, is wholly transcendent. From the Syrian school of Iamblichus (c. 245– One there flow emanations in the form of 325). A complex and elaborate ‘chain of a hierarchy of intermediate beings, who being’ was postulated with admixtures of mediate from the power of the One quasi-polytheistic Graeco-Roman divi- through a series of levels down to the nities and components from magic. lowest, namely to the material world. The A ‘Baghdad school’ (c. 832) emerged whole hierarchy constitutes a unified and after several centuries in Syria, which unifying ‘order’, without compromising translated the Greek writings of Plotinus, divine transcendence. Porphyry, Plato and Aristotle into The earliest roots of Neoplatonism Arabic, sometimes as seen through Neo- began to grow shortly after Plato’s death, platonic eyes. This made some impact on but the first flourishing of Neoplatonic medieval Islamic philosophy,includ- philosophy occurs with Plotinus (205– ing al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and 70) and his pupil, Porphyry (c. 233–304). others. Porphyry transcribed the classic source, Finally, a minor revival of Neoplaton- Plotinus’s Enneads, after the latter’s death. ism occurred in an Athenian school of the Prior to Plotinus, Philo of Alexandria fifth and sixth centuries, but the school (c.20bce–50 ce) anticipated Neoplatonic was closed in 529. The broader influence themes. Thus he regarded the God of of ideas continued in other forms, how- Judaism as fully transcendent, but found ever, through the period of the Renais- scriptural precedent for the notion of sance to the Cambridge Platonists. (See divine agencies as mediators or intermedi- also Jewish philosophy; mysticism.) aries, from Moses to the figure of Wisdom and the Divine Word (or Logos). Newton, (Sir) Isaac (1642–1727) In the hierarchy postulated by Plotinus ‘the One’ stands above even thought or Newton worked out in his Mathematical mind, but Nous (‘the Mind’, ‘Intelligence’) Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) a 199 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm formulation of the mechanics of motion Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm and theory of universal gravity. His find- (1844–1900) ings remain fundamental for modern Born in Ro¨ cken, Prussia, Nietzsche physics, even if they have been partially studied at Leipzig, and became professor overtaken by post-Einsteinian formula- at Basle in 1870. His first book was The tions in relation to specific contexts and Birth of Tragedy (1872). In 1879 he purposes within the discipline. ‘Newto- resigned from his Chair because of poor nian mechanics’ remains a foundational health, and from 1879 to 1889 produced contribution. numerous writings, including The Gay Newton was educated at Cambridge, Science (1882), Thus Spake Zarathustra became an eminent physicist, mathemati- (1883–5), Beyond Good and Evil (1886) cian and public figure, and was a close and Twilight of the Idols (1889). In friend of Locke (1632–1704). Newton 1889 his mental health collapsed, and and Leibniz (1646–1716) seem to have he did not recover before his death eleven discovered infinitesimal or differential years later. However, during this period calculus independently. Each, however, his most aggressively anti-theistic book accused the other of plagiarizing his work, was published, namely The Antichrist and their rivalry extended to several areas (1895). of sharp disagreement. One strength of Newton’s work was his early work: the rebirth of care to distinguish between clearly estab- dionysian tragedy lished results in sciences and speculative hypotheses or conjectures. He also made From the start, Nietzsche sought in advances in optics and in the composition Schopenhauer and in ancient Greek tra- of light. gedy and pre-Socratic philosophy a prin- Newton was in broad terms a theist, ciple of the affirmation of life. A basic and saw the unified system of motion, ‘driving’ force is not the same as a force, gravity and mass not as excluding ‘directing’ force. He developed this theme the agency of God, but, rather, as a further in The Gay Science. divinely created order. On the other hand, Driving force can be seen as raw energy his work had the effect of encouraging the in Euripides’ tragedy The Bacchae. The typical eighteenth-century model of the figure of Pentheus represents the ‘Apollo- universe as a machine, which held sway nian’ principle of restraint, harmony, until the rise of Romanticism invited a rationality and moderation. Through more organic model of understanding. Aristotle’s logic and ethics of ‘the Further, as Leibniz anticipated, although mean’, this had been largely associated Newton’s most creative work was widely with the spirit of ancient Greece. How- celebrated and in due time vindicated, his ever, Euripides portrays the Bacchae, the notion of time and space as absolutes female worshippers of Bacchus or Diony- could not be sustained. sius, as ‘Dionysian’: life-affirming, exotic, Newton’s three laws of motion (espe- frenzied celebrants for whom life is not cially the first) are claimed by many to restraint and rationality, but assertion, joy undermine the ‘kinetological’ version of and self-will. the cosmological argument.Every Nietzsche identified himself with the body continues in a state of rest or of Dionysian, although he concedes that this uniform motion unless forces intervene to drive may be focused or harnessed by change this. Others dispute whether this Apollonian direction or instrumental rea- disrupts the argument. (See also enlight- son. These two principles reflect Schopen- enment; five ways; science and reli- hauer’s contrast between will and gion; theism; time.) representation. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm 200

From his student days at Leipzig until Affirmation’ (the subtitle of Moltmann’s their friendship ended in 1879 over The Spirit of Life, London: SCM, 1992). Nietzsche’s cultural and political critique Nietzsche insists that ‘Nothing is of him, Nietzsche’s emphasis on affirma- “given” as real except our world of desires tion, life and driving force also drew and passions . . . We can rise or sink to no vitality from Richard Wagner’s operas other “reality” than the reality of our and Wagner’s use of mythic sources. By drives . . . Thinking is only the relationship 1879 Nietzsche was far more radical than of these drives to one another’ (Beyond Wagner. In Nietzsche’s view, Wagner Good and Evil, London: Penguin, 1973 helped to prop up the cultural degenera- and 1990, sect. 36). If one insisted on an tion that Nietzsche wished to abolish ‘intelligible’ account of this, ‘it would be altogether. It should be leading, he “will to power” and nothing else’ (ibid.). believed, through new birth, to nihilism. ‘It is the rulers who determine the concept He termed this ‘philosophy with a ham- “good”’ (ibid., sect. 260). mer’. last period: further critiques later middle period: the gay of language and religion science , beyond good and (1882) ‘All that exists consists of interpretation evil (1886), and the twilight of the idols (The Will to Power, vol. 2, aphorism 493, (1889) Nietzsche’s italics (in The Complete Both The Gay Science and Thus Spake Works, 18 vols., London: Allen & Unwin, Zarathustra look ahead to the end of 1909–13, vol. 15)). If this is so, Nietzsche nihilism, which will follow upon the concludes, ‘We shall never be rid of God, declaration that ‘God is dead’. During this so long as we still believe in grammar’ period Nietzsche not only increasingly (The Twilight of the Idols, in ibid., vol. 16, emphasizes ‘will’ over rational systems, 22, aphorism 5). This is why he must but identifies systems of Western philoso- ‘philosophize with a hammer’. phy and religion as ‘fictions’ and ‘lies’. In The Antichrist Nietzsche presses Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings, what today we should call an anti-theistic ‘always darker emptier, and simpler’ (The ‘ideological critique’ of language in Gay Science). religion. He writes, ‘The “salvation of In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche the soul” – in plain English “the world distinguishes between a ‘master’ morality revolves around me”’ (ibid., 186, aphor- of self-assertion and a ‘slave’ morality ism 43). ‘A priest or a pope not only errs, rooted in resentment and the desire for but actually lies with every word that he compensatory rewards. The ‘master’ mor- utters’ (ibid., 177, aphorism 38). ‘Supreme ality is worked out in due course in terms axiom: “God forgiveth him that repen- of the Will to Power. These two principles teth” – in plain English, “him that are associated with proportionate drives submitteth himself to the priest”’ (ibid., and directions in different peoples and 161, aphorism 26). cultures. Nietzsche has now moved beyond Addressing the culture of his day and ‘’ to an ideologi- the traditions of Western philosophy and cal critique of language which prepares the religions Nietzsche calls for a ‘re-valuation way for the post-modern suspicion of of all values’. Religion, and in particular Roland Barthes, Foucault and Derrida. Christianity, tend towards a servile ‘nega- Nevertheless, in the hands of such tion’ that diminishes humankind. It is theological writers as Bonhoeffer and against this background that Bonhoeffer Moltmann this becomes not a critique and especially Moltmann portray an that unmasks all theism as illusory, but a authentic Christianity as ‘Universal selective filter that exposes the illusory, 201 nominalism self-deceptive nature of those inauthentic Nishitani, Keiji (1900–90) forms of religion that are motivated by If Nishida was the founder of the Kyoto self-assertion and a will-to-power. school of modern Japanese philosophy, Just as Nietzsche’s early The Birth of Nishitani is regarded as the leading Tragedy brought to our attention the thinker of its second generation. Like important contrast in Greek thought Nishida, he also draws upon both Zen between the Apollonian and Dionysian, thinkers and concepts, and also on mys- but also involved dubious classical philolo- tical and existentialist philosophers of the gical scholarship, so also The Antichrist Western tradition. brings to our attention a sharp critical tool Western mystical influences include to distinguish inauthentic religion from Meister Eckhart, while Western existen- authentic religious truth, but is open to the tialist writers include Dostoevsky (1821– criticism of the very kind of generalizing and 81), Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Hei- mythologizing that it seeks to undermine. degger (1889–1976). The influence of atheism; postmodernism (See also .) Zen thinkers embraces both Chinese and Japanese traditions. With these conceptual Nishida, Kita¯ro¯ (1870–1945) resources Nishitani explores the problem of nihilism. At bottom the self is ‘noth- Nishida has been described as the fore- ingness’ (nihil, or mu); but of such a most Japanese philosopher of the twenti- nature that an exploration of nothingness eth century. His importance for the can become ‘fertile’. The underlying con- philosophy of religion derives from his cepts build upon a logic of ‘affirmation in being probably the first philosophical negation’, alongside ‘nothingness’. exponent of Buddhist traditions to engage Nishitani published Religion and in a distinctive and original way with the Nothingness in 1962. There are certain problems of Western philosophy. resonances here and there with Heideg- Nishida explores Zen not only in ger’s ‘Dialogue on Language between a traditional Eastern ways, but more espe- Japanese and an Inquirer’ in his On the cially through terms and concepts drawn Way to Language (New York: Harper & from Western thought. Basically he seeks Row [1959], 1971, 1–54). Heidegger (‘the subject–object to move behind the split Inquirer’) attributes operative language to epistemology of Western and the series ‘the call of Being’ (ibid., 5), in contrast to of disjunctions to which he believes this the Western dualist seduction of ‘photo- dualism split leads. This includes the of graphic objectification’ (ibid., 17). ‘We Plato ; the Kantian legacy of a split must leave the sphere of the subject–object between fact and value (which permeates relation behind us’ (ibid., 40) ‘The fare- Bultmann ’s theology); and the split well of all “It is” comes to pass’ (ibid., 54). between individual and universal, with There are also parallels with his Gelassen- Leibniz which wrestled. heit (1959; Eng., Discourse on Thinking, Among Western philosophers on whom 1966). (See also Buddhist philosophy; Nishida drew more positively were Wil- dualism; existentialism; monism; mys- Bergson liam James (1842–1910) and ticism; S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ ; via negativa.) (1859–1941), and his explorations of Neo-Kantianism combined positive dialo- gue with critique. He is known as the nominalism founding father of the Kyoto School of The term refers especially to the intense modern Japanese philosophy. (See also debate in the medieval period about the Buddhist philosophy; Heidegger; ontological status of universals,orof Hindu philosophy; monism; Nishi- language about essences, in contrast to tani; via negativa.) language about particular objects or states non-realism 202 of affairs. The term stands in contrast to non-realism realism and to conceptualism. Nomin- alists argue that language about universal The term, especially in British thought, concepts is no more than a linguistic or often denotes a particular set of views semantic construction (Latin, nomen, associated with the ‘middle’ period of name). It does not denote an independent Cupitt’s writings, especially in his Taking extra-linguistic reality, as realists claim. Leave of God (1980) and The Sea of Faith William of Ockham (c. 1287–c. (1st edn, 1984; 2nd edn, 1994). ‘For us 1349) is often regarded as the most God is no longer a distinct person . . . God thoroughgoing nominalist. Ockham con- is the religious requirement personified, ceded that language that denoted particu- and his attributes are a kind of projection lar objects, qualities or events referred of its main features as we experience them’ beyond itself to the external world. Even (Taking Leave of God, London: SCM, within particulars, however, denotative 1980 and New York: Crossroad, 1981, signs are absolute or univocal (see ana- 85). God is not to be objectified as ‘out logy); connotative signs represent quali- there’. ties in a derivative or secondary sense. Following BBC broadcast television However, in appearing to refer to talks under the title The Sea of Faith,a abstract essences or universals, language loose ‘Sea of Faith Network’ was estab- may serve to bestow ‘a name’ (Latin, lished by Cupitt’s sympathizers. The key nomen) without guaranteeing any object points were expressed in Cupitt’s three of reference beyond language itself. The themes during the period 1980–6, namely formulation of the ‘general’ is a feature of ‘internalizing’ (God is the sum of our the mind and of language, rather than of values within); de-objectifying (God is not something beyond the mind or beyond ‘out there’); and ‘autonomy’ (religion must language. grow out of immature ‘dependency’ upon After the medieval period, nominalism God). ‘God is the sum of all our values, in modified forms is closely associated representing this ideal . . . mythologically’ with a number of philosophers who urge a (The Sea of Faith, London: BBC, 1984, suspicion of language. Hobbes (1588– 269). 1679) warned his readers of ‘phantasms’ Several small books followed in the which language might suggest. In modern same vein. Anthony Freeman, for exam- philosophy Nelson Goodman (b. 1906) ple, argued that ‘God’ is a human con- explored extensionality, synonymy, and struction in his God in Us (1993). A more inductive reasoning, and concluded that thoughtful approach from this angle is ‘universals’ are nothing more than an David Hart, Faith in Doubt: Non-Realism aggregate of particular assertions categor- and Christian Belief (1993). ized extensionally, i.e. by extension. A Cupitt acknowledges affinities with ‘pure’ universal, then, can be no more than Eastern philosophies, especially with Zen a linguistic construction. Buddhism. Nishida (1870–1945) Willard Quine (b. 1908) addresses a explores experience prior to any sub- similar range of problems, and his thought ject–object split. In Advaita Vedanta is perhaps too complex to permit easy (non-dualist) Hindu philosophy S´an˙ - classification as a nominalist. However, his ka¯ra¯ argues that the self is separated distinction between meaning and refer- from bra¯hman (undifferentiated Ultimate ence, his rejection of a priori knowledge Reality) only by illusion (ma¯ya¯). This and his fallibilism (the view that each Ultimate Reality cannot be characterized. belief in a system is revisable) point in this A broader use of the term non-realism direction. (See also language in reli- also occurs to denote its contrast with gion; ontology.) classical realism. However, the more 203 numinous usual term for this would be nominalism, or ethical, especially in terms of a sense of together with the mediating approach of awesome wonder and self-awareness as conceptualism.(See also atheism; Bud- merely creative, finite and vulnerable. dhist philosophy; Feuerbach; Nishi- The content of the term is best under- tani; theism.) stood by consulting the work of Otto (1869–1937), who made extensive use of this term. The numinous, he urges, numinous includes both the element of godly fear The term broadly denotes the sense of and trembling in the presence of the Other reverential awe that a finite or creaturely (mysterium tremendum) and the fascina- human person experiences in the presence tion of the holy love that draws the of God, the transcendent, or the sacred. It worshipper to participate in the mystery signifies a dimension of religious experi- of the numinous (mysterium fascinosum). ence that surpasses the rational, conceptual (See also transcendence.) O

object, objectivism, and their own active agency by objectifi- objectivity, objectification cation. Bultmann (1884–1976) has the con- The definition of each of these terms structive aim, whatever its failings in bristles with problems, mainly because execution, of seeking to ‘de-objectify’ changes of context shift the meaning of language that treats God as an object. each. Further, each of these four terms revelation, he claims, is not primarily carries a largely different meaning from ‘about God’; but ‘address from God’. the other three, or at least from some To demythologize is to translate a others. In very broad terms, for example, vocabulary and conceptual grammar that ‘objectivity’ tends to carry with it over- appears to speak of God as an entity in tones of approval; ‘objectivism’ and which objective categories inhere into a ‘objectification’ frequently, but not conceptual scheme more appropriate to always, imply an inadequate, distorting, interpersonal activity. Myth, he claims, or reductive use of language. reduces everything to description and Further complications arise from varia- report. A better, less ‘objective’, mode of tions in a universe of discourse. In discourse is borrowed from existentialist epistemology we may speak of a know- thinkers, especially from Heidegger. ing subject having knowledge of a known One problem with Bultmann’s propo- object. In a rationalist or empiricist pre- sals is his failure, among other things, to Kantian scheme, the subject is active, and note that often existential or self-involving knows a passive object. language operates on the presupposition can a person be an ‘object’? that certain states of affairs are true (see performative utterances). In a universe of discourse that concerns objectivism or objectivity? God or persons such thinkers as Buber (1878–1965), Levinas (1906–95) and ‘Objectivism’ is often used to denote the others insist that the ‘I–Thou’ language use of language which the language users of interpersonal address regards ‘the consider to be value-neutral or ‘objective’, Other’ as more than an ‘object’, or an but which others consider to be no less ‘it’. To reduce the personal ‘Thou’, ‘You’ value-laden than other language-uses. One or ‘God’ to the status of an epistemologi- side will consider that its language embo- cal ‘object’ is to reduce their personhood dies commendable objectivity; the other 205 object, objectivism, objectivity, objectification side may doubt whether ‘dispassionate’ not an ‘Objekt’, for God is ‘non-objective, language does more than claim to be invisible, ineffable, incomprehensible’. objective, and may denounce pseudo- Yet as One who ‘stands over against’ objectivity as objectivism. (Gegensta¨ndlichkeit) our own human acts A notorious example is the language of of cognition, God may be called Gegen- the natural sciences. Those who regard it stand, ‘Object’ (ibid., 186–7). as straightforward value-neutral descrip- Barth asserts, ‘God is known by God, tion of the world will be inclined to call it and by God alone’ (ibid., sect. 27, 179). In ‘objective’, and view it as satisfying con- other words, God is not the ‘passive’ ditions for objectivity. Those who regard object of anyone else’s scrutiny, other than the propositions of natural science as through the medium of God’s own active heavily dependent upon the particular self-disclosure in acts of revelation. contingent conditions of time, place, These acts of disclosure primarily take resources, agenda, and the histories of the form of address. Barth and Bultmann scientific communities may speak of cer- hold this in common. tain pretensions to value-neutrality as behind the subject–object objectivism. split? Just as Locke (1632–1704) argued that mere intensity of conviction is no guaran- From Kant (1724–1804) onwards the tee in itself of certainty, so others insist previously more clear-cut contrast that disengagement from emotion or between subject and object in rationalist personal involvement is, equally, no guar- and empiricist epistemology becomes less antee of truth either.Thereis,for sharp. No longer does a pure Cartesian example, no adequate warrant for assum- subject look out at pure ‘objects’; for in ing that a ‘secular’ world-view is any more Kant there are no ‘pure’ objects, unshaped ‘objective’ than a religious one. by the regulative or orderly principle of reason object (objekt) and ‘object’ or the human mind. (gegenstand) in theology A number of diverse thinkers, ranging from the subjective idealism of Schel- Indeed, if God is ‘the Subject who is never ling (1775–1854) to the Hindu philoso- Object’ since God is not at the beck and phical monism of S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ (788–820), call of human scrutiny, revelation and seek to reach behind the subject–object theology, Barth claims, are ‘objective’ in split. S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ argues that the distinction is the sense that this method of enquiry has ultimately illusory (ma¯ya¯), even if it is to be in accordance with the nature of the operative at a lower, everyday level. ‘object’ of enquiry. Tillich (1886–1965) also understands German makes a distinction between God to be ‘Being-itself’ prior to any two senses of ‘object’. Barth’s Church distinction between subject and object. Dogmatics speaks repeatedly of ‘Gott als The complexities of the debates that Subjekt’, but hardly anywhere, if at all, of stem from these varied contexts and ‘Gott als Objekt’. All the same, faith (and standpoints should encourage caution sometimes enquiry) is directed towards before we use such terms as ‘objective’ Gegenstand (‘object’ in a sense yet to be or ‘objectivity’ in any over-easy, suppo- explained), and theology is characterized sedly context-free, way. (See also by Gegensta¨ndlichkeit (objectivity). ‘As demythologization; empiricism; exis- knowledge, it [faith] is the orientation of tentialism; Hindu philosophy; man to God as an object (Gegenstand)’. incommensurability; Marcel; mysti- (Church Dogmatics, II: 1, Edinburgh: cism; Na¯ ga¯ rjuna; science and reli- T&TClark,1957,sect.25,13).Godis gion; via negativa.) occasionalism 206 occasionalism eignty make us hesitate to resort to such generalized theories. Peter Geach and Two versions of occasionalism have Gijsbart van den Brink, for example, argue emerged. The more general version that ‘Almighty’ does better justice to ascribes all causes to God alone. This biblical and theistic traditions than ‘omni- effectively eliminates causal agency from potent’ (Almighty God, Kampen: Pharos, human persons, and causal efficacy from 1993). (See also deism; evil; God, con- objects or states of affairs within the finite cepts and ‘attributes’ of; Islamic world. God is directly responsible for all philosophy; omnipotence of God; events. theism.) A more specific version concerns cau- sation within the self. It questions any omnipotence of God causal relation between mind (or soul) and body. The ‘metaphysical attributes’ of God, if (1638–1715) this term is suitably qualified, are dis- combined these two versions. According cussed in very broad terms under God, to him, on every occasion when the mind concepts and ‘attributes’ of. However, or soul to, or wills, a movement the logical grammar (see logic) of divine of the body, God causally initiates such a omnipotence is so complex that the sub- movement, since the mind alone cannot. ject invites more attention under this Human will provides occasions for divine separate heading. causal action. Theists usually presuppose that God Malebranche brought together two sustains the created order by an animating contexts of thought. A French philoso- all-powerful providence. Barth speaks of pher, he developed further the dualism of God’s holding humankind ‘from the abyss mind and body inherited from his fellow- of non-being’. Moreover, if God invites countryman Descartes (1596–1650). trust, God, it is affirmed, has the almighty Ryle (1900–76) attacked and satirized resources to act in ways that justify such this dualism of mind and body as that of trust. It is assumed that God has power to ‘the ghost in the machine’. fulfil God’s promises. As a Catholic priest, Malebranche For Thomas Aquinas God’s almighty interpreted the sovereignty of God in as power puts ‘into execution what [God’s] radical a way as possible, in conjunction will commands and what knowledge with divine omnipresence (in The Search directs . . . All confess that God is omni- after Truth, 1674). potent; but it seems difficult to explain in In the seventeenth and early eighteenth what this omnipotence precisely consists’ centuries occasionalism seemed to some to (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 25, arts. 2 address both problems of causation and of and 3). the mind–body relationship in an era Aquinas cites Luke 1:37, ‘No word when matter was often understood as shall be impossible with God’, but passive and inert, under a mechanistic acknowledges that issues about logical rather than organic model (see rational- and contingent possibility and neces- ism). For some theists, it also seemed to sity may yield possible contradictions if pay honour to the sovereignty of God. ‘omnipotence’ is not qualified. His answer In our era, however, occasionalism has is that ‘whatever implies a contradiction’ widely fallen from favour, in part because cannot be a word; more broadly, ‘the of a deeper understanding of psychoso- omnipotence of God does not take away matic interaction within the self. Further, from things their impossibility and neces- more careful accounts of divine sover- sity’ (ibid., art. 3). 207 omnipotence of God omnipotence and paradox: omnipotent being. God may choose to power to perform self- limit and to contain divine power in the contradictory acts? interests of goodness and love, and such a choice is itself an act of omnipotent, In the modern era several models of self- sovereign, free will. contradiction have been used on both To attribute unqualified logical neces- sides of the debate to demonstrate the sity to ‘omnipotence’ questions the con- coherence or incoherence of divine ‘omni- cept from a different angle by eroding the potence’. J. L. Mackie appeals to some sovereignty of divine free choice. As a traditional paradoxes to argue for its well-known writer on modal logic incoherence: Can God make a stone that Plantinga distinguishes between necessary is so big that God cannot lift it? An propositions, which are indeed logically assertion negates God’s power to lift the necessary, and supposedly necessary qua- stone; a denial negates God’s power to lities or things, to which the application of make the stone. logical necessity is more problematic. A series of examples turns on acts of In spite of the insistence of Descartes logical impossibility: Can God divide odd that God can transcend what is logically numbers in half in such a way that the impossible, most writers accept that ‘a result is a set of integers? Can God change logically impossible action is not an action the past, as if the past never was? Can God . . . It is no objection to A’s omnipotence do evil or tell falsehoods, given that God that he cannot make a square or circle’ is necessarily good? (Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Thomas Aquinas sees no contradiction Theism, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977 and in these supposed paradoxes on the 1986, 149). Omnipotence denotes ‘an ground that to do what is logically ability to bring about any (logically impossible is not an act of power at all, possible) state of affairs’ (ibid., 150). but an irrational, self-contradictory sce- This, Swinburne persuasively argues, nario. If God were conceived of as excludes both logical contradictions and performing it, God would be an irrational, that which God could not do without self-contradictory being; but God is not an contradicting God’s own nature as God, irrational, self-contradictory being. Hence for example, make a thing equal to omnipotence must denote ability to do himself. whatever is in accord with God’s own omnipotence and almightiness: nature. Thus to tell a falsehood or to ‘power over’, or ‘power for’? retract a promise would not spring from omnipotence, but would entail logical Although Swinburne and Plantinga are contradiction if God is necessarily good. content to retain the term ‘omnipotent’ One counter-reply would be to argue derived from Aquinas and the mainly that if these acts are contingent rather than Latin tradition of theology, Peter Geach necessary, logical contradiction is avoided. and Gijsbert van den Brink insist that we A person can make an object that he or she should go behind the Latin term omnipo- cannot lift. However, the point of the tens to the Greek term from which it argument concerns the applicability of the derives, namely pantokrator, the Almighty concept of God, for whom goodness and One. This New Testament term denotes power (however qualified by analogy or ‘the capacity for, not the exercise of, by models and qualifiers)remain power’ (van den Brink, Almighty God, necessary characteristics. Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1993, 47). ‘Omni- Plantinga also qualifies the concept of potens is to be found in the sphere of omnipotence by arguing that omnipotence “having power over”’; but there are other itself need not be a necessary quality of an ways of understanding ‘power’ also. omnipotence of God 208

In an analysis of the logical grammar of Philosophy, 3: 10). This naturally leads the concept van den Brink distinguishes on to the formulations about maximal between power as authority, power as greatness and perfection formulated by ‘back-up’ and power as capacity. Plato, Anselm (1033–1109) in Proslogion 2–4, the Stoics and the New Testament all which have now become foundational for underline ‘the sustaining power of the discussions of the ontological argu- divine providence’ (ibid., 51). ‘The ment for the existence of God. Like Almighty One’ underlines God’s ‘capacity Aquinas, Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) as Father and creator’ (ibid., 57). How- also noted that this maximal greatness must ever, this does not denote ‘all power’ in an remain logically without contradiction. exclusive sense, as if God left no power for How does this approach in terms of others, since God’s power sustains and ‘perfect being’ cohere with the claims of enables creation. van den Brink, Moltmann and others The logic of power embraces a family about differences between biblical and of concepts in which ‘almighty’ more philosophical perspectives? Perhaps a readily denotes an enabling power that complementary comparison will suggest springs from love than ‘power over’ that that each approach constructively serves may sometimes suggest domination, to qualify the others. oppression or taking power from the Pannenberg (b. 1928) seeks to hold a other. view that does justice to both approaches. This coheres more readily with Paul the He writes as both a systematic and Apostle’s redefinition of power as the philosophical theologian. Pannenberg power of the cross, which is of a different relates omnipotence not simply or primar- order from ‘worldly’ power (1 Cor. ily to ‘perfection’, but to infinity, creativity 1:18–25). Indeed, if love seeks the best and holiness. Infinity, as Hegel noted, possible for ‘the other’, divine love, to be denotes in the first place that which is not effective, presupposes ‘power for’. finite. In other words, whereas the finite is Almightiness is that quality by virtue of defined and sustained by something else, which divine goodness and love brings the infinite is its own Ground (see aseity). about what God ‘wants to bring about’ The meaning ‘without end’ (in the context (ibid., 271). of temporality) remains secondary to this. ‘The biblical notion of divine almighti- Like van den Brink and Moltmann, ness’ does better justice to theological Pannenberg recognizes that ‘the abstract tradition and to conceptual analysis than idea of unlimited power’ may too easily ‘the philosophical notion of divine omni- lead to a ‘one sided . . . excessive omnipo- potence’ (ibid., 274). Moltmann (b. tence of tyranny’ (Systematic Theology, 1926) expresses the same reservations vol. 1, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991, about ‘theism’ as too often understood: 416). God’s power is ‘for’ a goal, since ‘A God who is eternally only in love with ‘only as the Creator can God be almighty’ himself, and therefore without any con- (ibid.). Creation, resurrection and cern for others, is a monster, an idol . . . salvation constitute such goals of almighty God himself has gone through the experi- power. He includes resurrection, for ‘only ence of Christ’s cross’ (Experiences of the Creator can awaken the dead’ (ibid., God, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980, 16). 417). Holiness expresses an awesome dimen- omnipotence, infinity, creation sion of divine almighty power, for it leads and ‘perfection’ to destruction or to salvation. Further, the Boethius (c. 480–525) wrote that God is God of theism is not the deist God who such that nothing greater than God is even watches the world without intervening conceivable (see The Consolation of within it or reshaping it from within. Only 209 omnipresence of God a positivist ‘closed system’ could suggest 139:7–10). ‘“Do not I fill heaven and that the almighty God could never act in earth”? says the Lord’ (Jer. 23:24). its world with novelty and surprise to do Just as omnipotence denotes the ‘new things’. capacity of not being limited in power Nevertheless, coherence and rationality except in terms of what may constitute are also sustained by divine providence as self-contradictory acts or acts contrary to characterizing the created order. Thus God God’s own nature, so also omnipresence acts with consistency, without self-contra- denotes a total lack of any limitation that diction, but in the Christian tradition this might supposedly be imposed by spatial leaves room for God’s almighty acts in the distance or any other possible property of incarnation and resurrection of Jesus space. Thus the attempt of the prophet Christ. This instantiates divine omnipo- to flee from God’s presence by tence as a creative power for good, within taking ship to a distant location becomes this tradition. an object of satire (Jon. 1:1–3). The satirist In the Islamic tradition Ibn Sina and also notes that, apparently unaware of the Ibn Rushd hold to the idea of God as a contradiction, Jonah exclaims equally: ‘I perfect Being. However, they also seek to worship the God of heaven, who made the qualify what this entails, and express sea’ (1:9). caution about the nature and scope of the In very different ways Barth, Tillich, knowledge that might be involved in moltmann and Pannenberg all explore divine omniscience. There are parallels ways in which divine omnipresence may concerning the logical paradoxes or be understood for religious faith. For puzzles raised respectively by the Tillich, God is the Ground of Being, or concepts of omnipotence and omnis- Being-itself, not merely ‘a Being’. God is cience. (See also Absolute; Islamic therefore ‘the depth of reason’, i.e. the philosophy; omnipresence; positi- transcendental Ground of reason and vism; transcendence.) rationality itself ‘which precedes reason and is manifest through it’ (Systematic Theology, vol. 1, London: Nisbet, 1953, omnipresence of God 88; cf. also 227). He also expounds Psalm Theists reject the sense in which God is 139 in The Shaking of the Foundations. ‘present everywhere’ in pantheism on the In a more existential way Moltmann ground that God is not to be identified explains how even ‘the experience of exhaustively with the ‘All’ of creation. misery and forsakenness can build up into They also reject the view of Spinoza that, an experience of God . . . God’s presence in like matter, God has indefinite ‘extension’ the dark night of the soul: “If I make my on the ground that Spinoza’s attribution of bed in hell, behold, Thou art there”’ (Ps. both Spirit and matter to God depersona- 139, cited above). God is not confined to lizes and decharacterizes God, who is ‘religions’ or to ‘churches’. God is present intelligent will. God is not a spatial entity in the cross of Christ, in suffering and who merely ‘extends’ God’s Being. death; even in the suffering and death of Nevertheless, the omnipresence of God Auschwitz (Experiences of God, Philadel- is firmly rooted in the tradition of the phia: Fortress, 1980, 7–17). ‘Nothing is Hebrew scriptures, or the Christian Old shut off from God’ (ibid., 16; cf. The Testament. ‘Where can I flee from your Crucified God, London: SCM, 1974). presence? If I ascend to heaven, you are Pannenberg relates the concept of there; if I make my bed in Sheol you are God’s omnipresence to that of God’s there. If I take the wings of the morning omniscience and to God’s enabling and settle in the farthest limits of the sea, power, love and salvation. ‘Those who even there your hand shall lead me’ (Ps. would flee from the presence of God have omniscience of God 210 nowhere to hide. The creature of God has toward a qualified pantheism. (See also no real reason to flee from him (Ps. analogy; existentialism; logic; the- 139:13–16) . . . [God’s] remembrance of ism; transcendence.) them is a comfort to the righteous’ (Systematic Theology, vol. 1, Edinburgh: omniscience of God T & T Clark, 1990, 379). All the same, there are two persistent Philosophically this concept abounds in philosophical problems about the concept complexities and difficulties. Yet most of divine omnipresence. The first arises in major theistic sacred writings and tradi- relation to the theist’s claim that God is a tions ascribe a quality broadly of ‘know- person. Even if we call attention to the ing all things’ to God. Psalm 139, analogical use of ‘person’ by asserting that common to Jewish and Christian tradi- God is ‘personal’, but not ‘a person’, does tion, embodies within its detailed ascrip- this fully address the problem of how a tion of omnipresence to God the words: personal agent can be omnipresent? Sec- ‘Thou knowest when I sit down and when ond, Aquinas addresses the objection: I rise up’; no one can hide from divine ‘One cannot be both in everything and awareness (verses 2 and 13–16). above everything’ (Summa Theologiae, Ia, The Qur’an in Islamic tradition Qu. 8, art. 1). exclaims: ‘Peace be to Allah, to whom Aquinas responds to both problems by belongs all that the earth contains . . . He is asserting that God’s existence or presence the Wise One, the All-Knowing. He has ‘in everything’ (in omnibus) denotes not knowledge of all that goes into the earth being part of a universal substance or and . . . all that comes down from heaven’ accident (pars essentiae vel sicut accidens), (Surah. 34). In the New Testament ‘God but as ‘as an agent is present to that in . . . searches the heart’, which is the seat of which its action is taking place’. ‘God is pre-conscious desires (Rom. 8:27). active in everything’ (Deus operantur in difficulties of the concept of omnibus) (ibid.). divine omniscience To be present ‘everywhere’, Aquinas continues, is not to be understood as One major problem arises from the ‘dimensional’ space, but as universal necessary difference of kind and degree activity and agency. Omnipresence relates between ‘knowledge’ as ascribed to God to the unlimited scope of God’s ‘operative and human knowledge. ‘Our experience of power’ (ibid., art. 3). Although objections awareness and knowledge . . . can give us have been brought against the medieval only a feeble hint of what is meant when formulations of Aquinas, Swinburne we speak of God’s knowledge’ (Pannen- defends their broad thrust in outline berg, Systematic Theology, Edinburgh: T against some of these criticisms (The & T Clark, vol. 1, 1990, 380). This is Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon difficult enough; but to speak of knowl- 1977, 1986, 97–125). edge of ‘everything’ is totally beyond A philosophical discussion of ‘attri- analogy with human experience. butes’ remains valuable, but the concept Perhaps the only hint of a human of omnipresence permits its logical gram- experience that resonates with the concept mar and currency to emerge most clearly is that of a retrospective view of ‘the whole’ in the kinds of contexts identified by which has been explored in different ways Moltmann and Pannenberg. The concept by Wilhem Dilthey (1833–1911), Hegel plays an active role in the traditions of (1770–1831) and Pannenberg (b. 1928). Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In Hin- Dilthey argued that only at the end of life, duism, depending on what sub-tradition when an individual can look back, can a we are exploring, it may move sometimes fuller ‘understanding’ (Verstehen)emerge 211 omniscience of God of what at the time is more fragmentary. seems difficult both to assert ‘God fore- Pannenberg appeals to the eschatological knows all things’ and at the same time to content of the resurrection event of Jesus assert ‘there is free will’. God’s fore- Christ as strictly an ‘end event’ in order to knowledge cannot allow a flexibility propose a provisional understanding of the which might permit the possibility of ‘wholeness’ of a ‘universal history’ which is ‘mistaken’ foreknowledge, for this would yet in process. not be foreknowledge. Yet, if this is so, A second problem arises from whether ‘there is no freedom . . . The divine mind, ‘knowledge’ necessarily affects the agent foreseeing without error, binds ... to actual or one who knows. However, if the occurrence’ (On the Consolation of Phi- created order ‘contributes’ to divine losophy, sect. 3). experience, how does this cohere with On further reflection, however, ‘Wis- the ‘prior’ aseity of God, or with what dom’ (or ‘Lady Philosophy’) provides a has been termed divine immutability? counter-reply. ‘Foreknowledge is not the A third difficulty has preoccupied cause of any necessity for future events’ philosophers and theologians over the (ibid.,sect.4,myitalics).Thefree centuries, especially since Augustine decisions of agents will these occurrences. (354–430) and Boethius (c. 480–525/6). The reason why there is no conflict arises Does the notion that God knows the from the different viewpoints of God who future, as well as the past and the present, is eternal, and of human reflection, which necessarily yield a determinist view of conceives of a temporal future, which it both human decision and even the divine seeks to impose on the God who is will? Augustine, Boethius, Thomas Aqui- unconditioned by time. nas (1225–74), and more recently Plan- The traditional ‘solution’ runs as fol- tinga, J. L. Mackie and Swinburne (b. lows: in eternity, or in the eternal realm, 1934) debate this issue as one of major God’s knowledge surveys the whole of importance. created reality in a simultaneous vision of Within this debate several different what in time would constitute ‘past’, components are involved. For example, ‘present’ and ‘future’ modes of occurrence. can knowledge of the future be said to be Hence Boethius suggests that ‘foreknow- knowledge as such, if the future does not ledge’ (praeventia) might better be called yet exist and remains subject to retro- ‘providence’ (proventia). Thus within the spective or present knowledge only at a contingent, temporal world order, willed later point in time? Does the necessary actions and events are willed freely. How- truth of propositions concerning the future ever, the very same act or event ‘when it is on the part of an omniscient Being related to divine knowledge is necessary’ presuppose or entail that consequent pre- (ibid., sect. 6). In summary, neither God dictability must exclude the freedom of nor God’s knowledge exists in time. human agents to generate this future? If If the factor of temporal succession is the world order is ‘in time’, but God removed, it would not occur to us to creates the temporality that is the condi- argue, ‘If I know that this paperweight is a tion for time, can we disengage divine gift from my colleague, my colleague’s gift prescience from God’s knowledge of the was not fully given but was determined by whole as the vantage-point of eternity? necessity.’ However, if God created time as These issues invite consideration here. well as space along with the whole created order, how can it be valid to apply to God does ‘certain’ knowledge of a logic in which ‘God knows x’ at Time the future yield determinism? 1 or at Time2? Omniscience, therefore, does Boethius acknowledges that he has not exclude the contingency of events, nor become initially ‘confused’ because it freedom of will. omniscience of God 212

The approach of Boethius finds echoes Swinburne develops an account of in Anselm, in Thomas Aquinas, and in omniscience ‘along similar lines, not as Leibniz. Currently it retains resonances knowledge of everything true but (very also in the writings of Paul Helm and roughly) as knowledge of everything true Eleonore Stump, although Helm is more which it is logically possible to know’ cautious about ‘simultaneousness’ than (ibid.). In practice, this includes all those Stump (Helm, Eternal God, Oxford: future events that are predictable by exact Clarendon, 1988, 23–40; cf. 109–70). physical or causal necessity or by divine Thomas Aquinas begins a broader decree or promise, but not those events discussion of God’s knowledge with the concerning which God chooses to permit assertion that ‘God has knowledge (scien- created agents to make free choices of will. tia)’, and has it ‘in the perfect way’ (in Deo Even God, Swinburne urges, may will perfectissime est scientia: Summa Theolo- to preserve room to make free choices of giae, Ia, Qu. 14, art. 1). Paul exclaims, ‘O God’s own; and in this case ‘which free the depth of the riches of the wisdom and choices he will make and what will result’ knowledge of God’ (Rom. 11:33). will lie outside the limits of divine On the more specific question of free, omniscience (ibid., 176). Thus in the contingent events, Aquinas also argues example of Abraham’s intercession for that what God knows in eternity is known Sodom (Gen. 18) or the intercession of not in temporal terms as past, or future, Moses for Israel (Ex. 32) God chooses to but in terms of the wholeness of eternity. leave room for God’s own changes of plan. He distinguishes two different senses of Similarly, ‘God often makes, as well as ‘necessary’. One is applied to proposi- absolute promises . . . conditional pro- tions; the other, to ‘things’ (de re vel de mises . . . Yet there would be no need for a dicto). ‘The statement, “A thing known by conditional promise if God already knew God is” is necessary’. On the other hand how men would act’ (ibid., 1). we may apply the word to a thing: this Keith Ward makes a parallel distinc- might suggest that whatever God knows is tion. ‘An omniscient being, if it is tem- a necessary thing. Only this second appli- poral, can know for certain whatever in cation would entail the view that there is the future it determines . . . but not no free will (ibid., art. 13). absolutely everything. If this is a limit on omniscience, it is logically unavailable for in what sense ‘knowledge of any temporal being’ (Rational Theology the future’? and the Creativity of God, Oxford: Swinburne and Keith Ward do not accept Clarendon, 1982, 131). that ‘knowledge of the future’ necessitates Paul Helm takes the very different view this disjunction between time and eternity. that ‘only timeless eternity prevents the Both writers argue that ‘knowing every- degeneracy of divine omniscience and thing’ is no more an absolutist, unqualified divine immutability into the idea of a concept than ‘power to do anything’ turns God who changes with the changing out to be in a parallel study of omnipo- world and who is surprised by what he tence. Under the entry on omnipotence it discovered . . . Divine timeless eternity becomes clear that it gains nothing for the does not commit one to logical determin- concept to include within it the supposed ism’ (Eternal God, 142). It is clear that the capacity to perform self-contradictory acts. scope and logical grammar of omniscience In Swinburne’s words, omnipotence is bound up closely with the logical denotes ‘not . . . the ability to do anything, relation between creation, time and but (roughly) . . . the ability to do anything eternity and our understanding of them. logically possible’ (The Coherence of The- Plantinga provides a critique of Nelson ism, Oxford: Clarendon, 1977, 1986, 175). Pike’s view that divine foreknowledge 213 omniscience of God would eliminate freedom by applying a In the modern debate this issue is modal logic of ‘possible worlds’, as he explored further under the entry on the does in addressing the problem of evil free-will defence. J. L. Mackie and (God, Freedom and Evil,NewYork: Antony Flew insist that God could have Harper, 1974, 66–72). He begins by created beings who would always freely distinguishing different applications of choose to do the right. However, what ‘necessary’, and expounds the notion of kind of predictability would this be? It has ‘essentially omniscient’. The issue turns been suggested that if a group of friends not on what God knows, but on God‘s predicted with certainty that Mary would knowing ‘true propositions’ from the marry John, and in fact they became vantage-point of ‘possible’ worlds. married, this would in no way imply any lack of freedom in this mutual decision. ‘middle knowledge’, free will However, this case suggests only that and predictability freedom is sometimes or often compatible (1535–1600), a scholas- with predictability. tic Spanish Jesuit philosopher, attempted Mackie and Flew demand a narrower to hold together predestination or deter- definition of freedom which applies only minism and a compatible freedom of the to choices that can always be predicted. will through a concept of ‘middle knowl- Mackie is willing to shift his ground, but edge’ (scientia media). Molina postulated as John Hick urges, his modified argu- that divine omniscience included within its ments do not fully address what a human scope knowledge of how contingent cre- nature would entail that is capable of ated beings would respond under different resisting temptation and affirming good- circumstances. God knows what human nes. (Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd persons will freely choose to do. If God edn, London: Macmillan, 1977, 268–1). knows how a person would freely act the controversial status of the through God’s ‘middle knowledge’, God concept and its reformulations may create such a person with a range of choices or options in place, and yet also In comparison with exploring the logic have knowledge of future events that of omnipotence, the concept of omnis- would (both necessarily and conditionally) cience seems to yield more problems occur. than constructive insights and reformu- How far this takes us is doubtful, and lations. Even if we remain unconvinced only a minority of thinkers appear to by his conclusions, Norman Pike’s reser- endorse or to develop this approach. vations about arguments of the form ‘If However, without its scholastic frame- it is true that God knows at Time1 ...’ work, it looks back to Augustine’s view may be justified. On the other hand, a that God knows how human persons will God who is locked into the ‘timeless’ freely choose. Augustine asks: ‘Why do realm ‘above’ or beyond created time you think our free will is opposed to God’s may seem closer to Plato than to the foreknowledge? . . . If you knew in dynamic, purposive, active God of the advance that such and such a man would Hebrew scriptures and Christian Old sin, there would be no necessity for him to Testament, even if Helm addresses some sin’ (On Free Will, III: 4: 10). of these issues. Augustine argues that it is not specifi- In classical theism, especially among cally divine foreknowledge that suppo- many Catholic philosophical theologians, sedly raises the problem, but whether the traditional uses of the term (with sheer ‘predictability’ (on the assumption varied nuances from Augustine, Boethius that it is accurate and certain) imposes a and Aquinas) retain widespread currency. deterministic view of the human will. This is not least because they cohere with ontic enquiry 214 the concept of God as ‘perfect’, impassible existentialism and Heidegger (1889– and immutable. 1976). In modern Protestant circles, however, On the other hand Willard van Orman many questions have been raised about Quine (b. 1908) and some other American ‘impassibility’ and ‘immutability’, for writers speak of ‘ontic theories’ as little example by Moltmann among others. different from metaphysical systems. The use In the process philosophy of White- of ‘ontic’ here, however, permits a plurality head and Hartshorne divine knowledge of such systems. (See also metaphysics.) does have an ‘effect’ upon the Being of God. In some thinkers three factors lead to ontological argument for the a near-abandonment of the traditional existence of God term, or at least the traditional sense of an argument from the concept the term. Emil Brunner (1889–1966) of god places the concept in the context of personal encounter rather than of perfec- The ontological argument begins a priori tion and eternity. Hence he tends to from a concept of God, in contrast to the reapply the term to denote God’s unfailing cosmological argument for the exis- love, through which God fully under- tence of God, which begins with our stands the created other. Gustav Aule´n experience of the world and constitutes (1879–1977) defines it as ‘love’s sovereign an a posteriori argument. This contrast and penetrating eye’. is explained in this context under God, The view that since it is not yet actual, arguments for the existence of, and the future may not necessarily ‘count’ as more broadly in the entries on a priori an object of divine knowledge at least and a posteriori. deserves some consideration. Still more a confessional central is Swinburne’s modification of the acknowledgement of divine scope of the concept on the basis of transcendence? parallels with the exclusion of logical contradiction from the notion of omnipo- Many theologians point out that in the tence. Whether the larger boundaries of first formulation of the ontological argu- the concept suggested from Boethius to ment by Anselm (1033–1109) in Proslo- Helm are tenable will depend upon our gion 2–4 the ‘argument’ emerges as a conclusions about the nature of eternity, paean of praise that God is who God is, and the relation between God, eternity rather than strictly as a rational argument. and time. These complex issues demand Barth (1886–1968) insists on this in his an exploration of a large family of book on Anselm’s formulation, Fides concepts, such as eternity, immutability, Quaerens Intellectum (1931). omnipotence, transcendence, creation, Faith (fides), in seeking understanding time, aseity, free-will defence; God, (intellectum) of God, perceives the wholly concepts and ‘attributes’ of. Other or transcendent nature of God in contrast to the contingent, creaturely and finite status of the world and of all ontic enquiry objects within it. God alone holds the Ontic enquiry is to be distinguished from world ‘from the abyss of non-being’. If ontology or ontological enquiry. While Barth is correct, the ontological argument ontology concerns reality or ‘Being’ (in has value not primarily as an ‘argument’, Heidegger, German, Sein), ontic ques- but as an expression of a believing tions concern ‘existents’ or ‘entities’ (in acknowledgement that the Being of God Heidegger, das Seiende). This distinction is is of a different order from that of the observed in the tradition of German contingent world (see transcendence). 215 ontological argument for the existence of God debates over the logical status Plantinga’s more helpful translation) of the argument ‘maximally great’, does not make sense if it is applied to such contingent objects as By contrast, many philosophers continue islands: size, number of trees, lengths and to perceive the argument as an intriguing numbers of rivers are not entities to which exercise in logic, or (in Plantinga’s view) it is intelligible to apply ‘maximal great- especially of modal logic (the logic of ness’. possibility). It is perhaps no accident It is precisely because ‘maximal great- that after Anselm those philosophers who ness’ applies uniquely to God as non- held a particular interest in pure mathe- contingent, omniscient, almighty and per- matics were more inclined than others to fect in wisdom, goodness and love that the accord it logical seriousness as an a priori transparent force of the argument argument, notably Descartes (1596– emerges. Hence Anselm seeks to show 1650) and Leibniz (1646–1716). the irrelevance of Gaunilo’s reply. Some Although Kant (1724–1804) and Rus- additional paragraphs to Proslogion 4 sell (1872–1970) advanced devastating declare that anything in principle may be logical arguments against it, in the twen- ‘conceived not to be’ except God, whose tieth century Hartshorne, Malcolm order of Being is unique. Anselm replies and Plantinga have defended reformula- explicitly to Gaunilo in his Liber Apol- tions of it. ogeticus pro Insipiente. However, is this anselm’s two distinct argument convincing or circular? formulations did thomas aquinas reject the argument? Anselm begins Proslogion chapter 2 with praise: ‘O Lord, you give understanding The attitude of Thomas Aquinas (1225– to faith . . . We believe that you are that 74) is controversial. In Summa Theolo- than which nothing greater (nihil maius) giae (Ia, Qu. 2) he seems to argue that can be conceived (cogitari possit)’. He God’s existence can only be inferred from then alludes to the utterance of ‘the fool effects that God brings about (Rom. who says “there is no God”’ (Ps. 14:1), 1:20). Hick, Plantinga and most modern to argue that if he genuinely understands philosophers see Aquinas as rejecting the who God is, the fool would not utter a ontological argument. On the other self-contradictory statement, since if hand, a minority see the argument as God were not to embrace existence, implicit in Aquinas’s fourth way, from God would be ‘less’ than the ‘greatest’ degrees of Being (see Five Ways of or ‘maximal’ Being. For to exist in Aquinas, and E. J. Butterworth, The actuality (in re)is‘greater’(maius)than Identity of Anselm’s Proslogion Argu- to exist exclusively in the mind (in ment for the Existence of God with the intellectu), as a mere concept Via Quarta of Thomas Aquinas, Lamp- The monk Gaunilo replied that such eter: Mellen, 1990). reasoning is patently absurd. He could re-formulation by descartes: readily conceive of an island with all the does this give the game away? ‘greatest’ possible attributes of an island (more trees, rivers, mountains, springs, Descartes, not least in view of his interest sand, grass than any other) without this in in pure mathematics, was concerned with the least affecting the issue of whether ‘certainty’ and ‘certain’ knowledge. In his such an island actually existed. Meditations V he states that it is ‘certain’ Anselm, however, has a counter-reply. that ‘I find no less the idea of God . . . the At this point praise turns into argument idea of a supremely perfect Being in me also. The concept of ‘greatest’, or (in than that of any figure or number . . . ontological argument for the existence of God 216

Eternal existence pertains to this nature.’ or qualities as ‘is wise’, ‘is good’, ‘is He continues: ‘I clearly see that existence loving’ (or in the case of objects, ‘is green’, can no more be separated from the essence ‘is white’, ‘is heavy’). We simply do not of God’ than can a triangle have three say: ‘Look! This hammer is heavy and it angles other than together being equal to exists.’ two right angles. Similarly, ‘mountain’ Kant insists: ‘Being is evidently not a carries with it logically and conceptually real predicate . . . that can be added to the the idea of ‘valley’. concept of a thing.’A hundred dollars that Critics of the logic of the ontological exist are not ‘greater’ than a hundred that argument believe that in his effort to might or might not exist. Hence the denial defend the argument Descartes has let of the existence of God is not logically the cat out of the bag. He is explicitly self-contradictory. ‘Existence’ does not recognizing that the argument is merely an ‘add’ one more quality of the same kind analytic statement or proposition. It to others already listed. belongs to that class of statements the development of kant’s critique: truth of which is arrived at merely by russell on ‘instantiation’ definition. These are of the class: ‘all bachelors are unmarried’; ‘2 + 2 = 4’; ‘the Russell clinched Kant’s argument that angles of a triangle add up to 180o’; ‘water ‘existence’ is not a predicate by arguing boils at 100o C’. This ‘truth’ is indepen- that existence is best thought of in terms dent of what specific bachelors say, or providing instances, i.e. as instantia- what calculations I make, or how well I tion. A triangle adds up to 180o, and it draw triangles, or what kettle and heater I is instantiated ‘there’ on the blackboard. use. The ontological argument raises the logi- The relation between analytic state- cal question: is the concept of the ‘great- ments and predicateshasnowbeen est’ Being instantiated or not? brought out into the open. Is ‘existence’ This insight is linked with Russell’s a predicate of that to which analytical a work on the logical form that ‘brackets’ priori truth has been ascribed? Are instantiation or existence, usually ‘unmarried’ and ‘exist’ the same kind of expressed in the form: ‘For all x, x is y.’ predicate to ascribe to bachelors? Such a complex rewriting of a logical form If we define an orange analytically, do permits us to ascribe meaning to a the statements ‘it is coloured orange’ and proposition which may be true-or-false ‘it is sticky’ lead on along the same without smuggling in the presupposition analytical level to ‘it exists’? The argument of its truth. The often-repeated example in backfires, as Kant perceived, by demon- logic is: ‘the present King of France is . . .’. strating that it addresses not ‘existence’, Instantiation is often expressed by logi- but the logic of concepts alone. cians through the logical notation known quantifier kant’s critique: existence not a as the use of a . predicate the argument as a ‘disproof’ of god’s existence Kant re-examined the traditional logical model subject/predicate (as discussed In the 1950s J. N. Findlay attempted an under Aristotle); for example, the typi- ingenious logical argument that turned the cal logical form: ‘The grass’ (subject) . . .‘is traditional argument on its head. His green’ (predicate). He then argued that the argument has three stages: (1) the ontolo- ontological argument could hold only if gical argument portrays God as One ‘existence’ is regarded as a predicate, or a whose non-existence is unthinkable, i.e. property or attribute to be ascribed to God as a logically necessary Being. However, or other entities alongside such properties (2) what is logically necessary is true 217 ontology merely by analytical definition, and cannot action and history. Yet critics will continue be said to exist or not to exist contingently to urge that it contains elements of (i.e. it does not ‘make a difference’ outside circularity. His arguments can be found the realm of conceptual logic). Hence, (3) in The Logic of Perfection (La Salle: Open to claim that ‘God exists’ (other than as a Court, 1962). concept) is self-contradictory. Malcolm and Plantinga also subject the A. G. A. Rainer, among others, claims, negative evaluations to rigorous logical however, that Findlay confuses the ‘neces- scrutiny. It is inconceivable that ‘God’ sity’ of God with the ‘necessity’ of what might not have existed, or ‘God’ would be we assert about God. What is logically less than God. Hence if God does not necessary applies to assertions, not to the exist, this denial must be a necessary Being of God. The very same confusion proposition. However, it cannot be shown that besets many formulations of the that the denial of God’s existence is ontological argument, he concludes, lead logically necessary. We face the dilemma: to the failure of the attempt to turn it into either logically necessary’ or (exclusive a disproof of the existence of God. alternative) the denial of the logically necessary. This may be expressed in logical further twentieth-century notation: Nq V ~ Nq). This formulation debate: hartshorne, malcolm appears to exclude such denial (see the and plantinga entries on logic and modal logic). Hartshorne sets out a detailed argument in Plantinga extends the modal logic of which he deploys modal logic in defence Hartshorne and of Malcolm to argue that of the ontological argument. In effect he ‘maximal greatness’ is not just ‘possibly’ argues that while Kant and Russell may instantiated, but instatiated or exemplified counter Anselm’s first formulation, their in actuality. For it is not the case that to work on predication (or instantiation) still ascribe omnipotence, omniscience and leaves Anselm’s second formulation intact. perfect goodness to God is no more than Hartshorne argues that, first, God’s a logically necessary proposition. Logical necessary existence is so undeniably self- necessity does not exhaust the multiform evident that to deny it constitutes a self- sense in which we may speak of God as a contradiction. Second, it is necessarily not ‘necessary’ Being (Plantinga, The Nature true that ‘God exists necessarily’ strictly of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). implies that God does not exist. Hence, The debate about the logical status of third, either: ‘God exists necessarily’; or: the ontological argument continues. ‘it is necessary that God does not exist’. Although many dismiss it as merely But ‘God does not exist’ cannot be a confusing the concept of God with the necessary proposition. existence of God, it would be over-hasty to Hartshorne also provides a further set aside either the conceptual significance modal argument. If God is the absolute identified by Barth, or the logical complex- maximum, God will be the absolute ities that continue to occupy the applica- maximum in each time. This entails a tion of modal logic (the logic of panentheism, in which God’s almighti- ‘possibility’) on the part of such rigorous ness and perfection embrace the whole logicians as Hartshorne, Malcolm and world, including both necessary Being and Plantinga. contingent existence. For a fuller discussion see the entry on ontology Hartshorne. His logical analysis in the context of dynamic process philosphy is Ontology denotes the study of being, or of valuable in restoring a possible relation what-is (from Greek, ta onta, the articular between the ontological argument, divine neuter plural participle, the things that ordinary language 218 actually exist, the things that are). As such Hegel (1770–1831) formulates an entire it features alongside epistemology, system of an ontology of the Absolute as ethics and logic as part of the core of this unfolds in history and in logic. traditional philosophy. As a technical Materialism, pantheism, deism, mon- philosophical term, the word seems to ism and theism are all ontologies. (See have originated during the seventeenth also Hindu philosophy.) century. It is used by Leibniz (1646– 1716) and by Christian Wolff (1679– ordinary language 1754). See analytical philosophy; Austin; Initially the term was used interchange- Oxford philosophy. ably with metaphysics, while some regarded ontology as a subdivision within metaphysics. Strictly, the latter is more ostensive definition accurate, since metaphysics may include It is often assumed that people learn questions of epistemology, but the two language by pointing to the object to terms are now often used synonymously. which a word refers, and uttering the In the modern era Heidegger (1889– sound used to denote it. This is the method 1976) chastised the Western philosophical of ostensive definition: a person points to tradition for having ‘long fallen out of an object and utters the sound that Being (Sein)’ (An Introduction to Meta- denotes it in a language. The reason for physics, New Haven: Yale, 1959, 37). He the plausibility of this account is, first, that sought to address the question, ‘How does itmayseemtoworkwitheveryday it stand with Being’ (Wie steht es um das physical or natural objects (‘this is bread’; Sein? ibid., 32). In different words, ‘Why ‘this is a tree’); second, it is widely used in are these entities (Seienden) rather than teaching a second language to someone nothing?’ (ibid., 1, 2, 12, 22). This is ‘the who already grasps how language is to be most fundamental of questions’ (ibid., 6). interpreted. Yet Heidegger himself, in effect, gives Wittgenstein argues that this method up the attempt, and attributes blame for can work within strictly limited confines. our inability to answer these questions to A builder may point to slabs, pillars, Plato’s dualism of appearance and blocks, or beams, and call out their names reality. He concedes that genuine ontology (Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: emerged in pre-Socratic philosophy (e.g. in Blackwell, 1967, sects. 2–6). However, Parmenides), and today, it occurs if at all this model in which ‘naming something is in poets, art, and in Eastern non-dualist like attaching a label to a thing’ (ibid., philosophies. sect. 15) falls down for wider and more Heidegger is too sweeping. Duns Sco- complex (indeed many) examples. tus (c. 1266–1308) believed that the task If I point to two apples, and say ‘two of intellectual enquiry was to examine apples’, how do I point to ‘two’, and what Being (realitas), even if not in Heidegger’s is to stop someone understanding ‘two’ as unusual sense of the term. William of a name for this group to which I point? Ockham (c. 1287–1349) based his ‘Ostensive definition can be variously semantics on substances and qualities. interpreted in every case’ (ibid., sect. 28). Leibniz explored the ‘sufficient reason’ for This method presupposes an understand- everything in the world; a world consti- ing of how language operates. ‘Point to a tuted by ‘monads’, namely irreducible piece of paper. – And now point to its ontological units which make up reality. shape – now to its number (that sounds In his early period Kant addressed queer). How did you do it?’ (ibid., sect. ontology as including the difference 33). It is like pointing to a chess-piece, as if between spiritual and material beings. the physical properties were what defined 219 Oxford philosophy it, rather than how it moves in accordance expresses the complementary principle of with rules (ibid., sects. 30–50). being drawn by holy love. The mystery of In philosophy of religion this suggests the numinous or holy embraces both that a failure to identify ‘God’ or other mysterium tremendum, the ‘Beyond’ who religious realities in this way is entirely invites reverential fear, and mysterium unsurprising, and no indicator of their fascinosum, the fascination or enchant- lack of intelligibility or truth. Ostensive ment of a holy love beyond compare. definition performs a severely limited role Otto describes the wholeness of this whether in ordinary or in religious uses of dual experience as ‘a strange harmony of language. Like the referential theory of contrasts’ that reaches far beyond merely meaning, its application is valid only rational explanation. The numinous can- within limits. not be explained exhaustively in rational or ethical terms. Religion cannot be reduced to the level of a mere belief- Otto, Rudolf (1869–1937) system or system of ethics or values. Otto’s most widely known work is Das Divine holiness is not simply ‘moral’ Heilige (Ger., 1917; 25th edn, 1936; Eng., holiness, but also ‘majesty’ holiness. The Idea of the Holy, Oxford: OUP, In Pauline language, ‘What no eye has 1923). The central theme of this book is seen nor ear heard nor the human heart an exploration of the numinous – the conceived . . . God has prepared for those feeling of awe and wonder that takes hold who love him’ (1 Cor. 2:9). With Kant and of a worshipper before God or before the Tillich, Otto saw experience of ‘the holy’ sacred. Otto was influenced by Kant and and ‘the Beyond’ as transcending human by Neo-Kantian philosophy, and wrote concepts in a sense of wonder. (See also extensively on the philosophy of religion. God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of; One component of the experience of omnipotence; transcendence; via the numinous lay in ‘fear of God’ or ‘godly negativa.) fear’ in a sense that surpasses a bare psychological fear of objects. In ‘primitive’ Oxford philosophy religions, into which Otto also undertook research, the numinous may be perceived The term is seldom used today, except to as that which causes the worshipper to denote a particular period in the history of tremble or to stand aghast. In ‘higher’ philosophy at Oxford, namely from religions this may take the form of mystic around the late 1930s to about 1960. awe, which may invite some such religious Especially in the 1950s it denoted a style or liturgical response as prostration before and method of philosophy largely but not God. exclusively associated with Ryle (1900– The Hebrew scriptures, or Christian 76) and several of his Oxford colleagues. Old Testament, reflect this in Isaiah’s In his autobiographical essay Ryle recalls vision of Isaiah 6:1–5: ‘I saw the Lord that in that period his ‘chief . . . interest in . . . High and lofty . . . Seraphs were in linguistic matters focussed on such dic- attendance . . . and said, “Holy, holy, holy, tions as were (or . . . were not) in breach of is the Lord of hosts . . .” The pivots of the “logical syntax”.’ He explored especially thresholds shook . . . I said, “Woe is me! I ‘the trouble-makers and the paradox-gen- am lost . . . My eyes have seen the King, erators’ (‘Autobiographical’, in O.P. Wood the Lord of hosts.”’ Similarly, the book of and G. Pitcher, eds, Ryle, London: Mac- Exodus portrays God as a consuming fire. millan, 1970, 14). While chapters 4–5 of The Idea of the Some used the term approvingly to Holy expound this theme of fearsome awe denote that area of thought which asks the at the presence of ‘the Other’, chapter 6 most rigorous and searching questions Oxford philosophy 220 about ‘logical grammar’ (ibid., 7). Others dominated Oxford philosophy up to used the term more pejoratively, to denote 1960, and probably also comes under this a kind of philosophy that seemed always term. A turning-point was reached in the to be ‘tuning up’ rather than playing the broader concerns of Strawson (b. 1919), tune. Although Ryle’s approach was dif- who used the term ‘descriptive metaphy- ferent from that of Austin (1911–60), sics’ of some of his own work. (See also Austin’s careful linguistic analysis also language in religion; logic.) P

Paley, William (1743–1805) was the implications of the theory of evolution through chance and random Paley was educated, and taught, at Cam- change formulated by Darwin (1809–82) bridge, and then served in the Church of that blunted Paley’s argument. Reformula- England ministry, becoming Archdeacon tions of the argument that address evolu- of Carlisle. His published works include tionary theory have been offered by The Principles of Moral and Political Tennant and Swinburne, among others. Knowledge (1785); Evidences of Chris- (See also science and religion; theism.) tianity (1794); and Natural Theology (1802). panentheism Apart from his work in ethics and moral philosophy, Paley’s contributions to The term stands in contrast with panthe- philosophy of religion left their mark in ism. If pantheism identifies God with the two main areas. First, he was a major whole of reality, panentheism denotes the advocate of natural theology. He had a belief that the reality of the world and the high regard for the capacity of human whole created order does not exhaust the reason to draw theistic inferences a reality of God without remainder. Yet it posteriori from the natural world. also holds in common with pantheism that Nevertheless, he also believed in the God’s presence and active agency perme- necessity of revelation in the scriptures ates the world, actively sustaining it in for a grasp of specific doctrines of the every part. It expresses the omnipresence Christian faith. of God as immanent in the world. Second, Paley’s name is closely asso- Panentheism is still more sharply to be ciated with the teleological argument distinguished from deism, which tends to for the existence of God. He coined the exaggerate a one-sided emphasis on divine well-known analogy of finding a watch transcendence in such a way as to make during a walk on heathland. Even if it God remote from the world and from were broken or damaged, the watch daily life. Panentheism stresses first and would provide evidence of design. Its foremost divine immanence, but without machinery would point to the originating excluding divine transcendence. agency of a designer. Hartshorne explicitly insisted that Problems in Paley’s work were in part God is an eternal, world-inclusive and anticipated by Hume (1711–76), but it conscious Being, but also holds to Pannenberg, Wolfhart 222 panentheism, stressing that ‘God is in all’ Apostle] in no way spared himself think- (Greek, pan+en+theos), while excluding ing and enquiry’ (Basic Questions in all notions of any identity between God Theology, London: SCM, vol. 2, 1971, and the world. He rejected any idea that 34–5). ‘God is all’ (pantheism). Following On meaning, Pannenberg argues that a Whitehead (1861–1947) he held an retrospective ‘looking back’ often commu- organic view of the universe, in which nicates more than our attempts to under- God is understood in terms of constant stand the meanings of events and creativity: ‘God is not before, but with, all utterances while we are in the process of creation’ (Process and Reality, 1929). living through them. Hence he is sympa- Against Decartes, Hume and Kant, thetic with the work of Hegel on history Whitehead and Hartshorne evolved a as a universal horizon of wholeness (Basic process philosophy in which God is Questions, vol. 3, 1973, 201). In theolo- involved in the world’s ‘becoming’. The gical terms this invites special emphasis on Stoics tended towards a blend of the resurrection of Jesus Christ as an panentheism and pantheism, depending aspect of the ‘End’ provisionally breaking on individual schools and writers. The into history. Acts of the Apostles ascribes to Paul the This short entry cannot do justice to use of a panentheistic quotation from the the power, coherence and complexity of Stoics (perhaps Epimenides): ‘In him Pannenberg’s theology, but simply aims to [God] we live and move and have our identify two of the points at which its being’ (Acts 17:28). relevance to the philosophy of religion is most far-reaching. Pannenberg also pub- lished Theology and the Philosophy of Pannenberg, Wolfhart (b. 1928) Science (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976) Pannenberg is one of the most eminent and Metaphysics and the Idea of God Christian theologians of the late twentieth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990). century. Of his numerous publications his three-volume Systematic Theology pantheism (Germ., 1988, 1991, 1993; Eng., Edin- burgh: T & T Clark, 1991, 1994, 1998) The term embraces a variety of different constitutes a magisterial climax. He has views bound together by a common belief written on almost every aspect of theol- that God and all that exists are identical. ogy, including theological method, with Crudely, word history suggests that short- rigour and precision. hand: ‘God is all’ (Greek, pan, all; theos, Pannenberg’s broadest impact on the God). However, this does not entail the philosophy of religion has been twofold. belief that each individual part of the First, he vindicates the role of reason and universe (or of nature) is ‘God’. Rather, rationality, in theology and religion with- ‘God’ is the full totality of all existent out dispensing with the equal necessity for things. revelation. Second, he approaches the Pantheism may be said to stand in some issues of meaning in terms of the widest kind of contrast to each of the following possible horizons of history. six terms. It stands in contrast to atheism On faith and reason Pannenberg (although some dispute this: see Spinoza); declares, ‘An otherwise unconvincing mes- to polytheism (the belief that there are sage cannot attain the power to convince many gods); to deism (the view that God simply by appealing to the Holy Spirit . . . created the world but does not intervene in Argumentation and the operation of the it, and is not immanent within it); to Spirit are not in competition with each theism and to monotheism (the belief in other. In trusting the Spirit, Paul [the one God, who is distinct from the created 223 pantheism world, both transcendent beyond it and Some regard Neoplatonism as immanent within it). pantheistic because everything derives The finest distinction, but an essential from God’s own Being rather than merely one, is between pantheism and panenthe- from God’s agency and action. However, ism, the belief that God is in (Greek, en) the fundamental belief that what proceeds all created things. The analogy has been from God does so through emanations or suggested of a saturated sponge: liquid intermediate degrees of Being also assumes might permeate the whole sponge, but is a transcendence on the part of God which not to be identified with the sponge. does not cohere with thoroughgoing Different writers among the ancient pantheism. Stoics ranged on a spectrum between Similarly, while some identify mystical pantheism and panentheism. pietism with religious pantheism, a rever- The most fundamental distinction ential and mystical feeling that ‘God is all’ within pantheistic thought is that between tends to reflect an existential attitude religious pantheism, which stresses such rather than a metaphysical statement of an intense awareness of divine presence pantheism. In practice, this stands nearer that it places too much emphasis upon to panentheism. divine immanence at the expense of divine western examples of pantheism: transcendence, and philosophical panthe- the modern world ism, which arises out of monism, i.e. the philosophical world-view that everything The classic representative of pantheism in is a unity; that all is One. the West is Spinoza (1632–77). Although a western examples of pantheism: Jewish philosopher, Spinoza was excom- in the ancient world municated from the synagogue in 1656 after being accused of atheism. More Whether Parmenides of Elea (fl. 510–492 strictly, he held to a philosophical mon- bce) should be characterized as a panthe- ism. ist or as a monist is open to debate. He Since God is ‘absolutely infinite being’, argued for the unity of all things, espe- God is coextensive with the whole of cially for the unity of being and thought. reality. Yet it is equally the case that if The material and contingent is mere there is only one ‘substance’, this sub- appearance behind which thought is con- stance is the whole of reality. God and stant and invariable. The ‘paradoxes’ substance are the same, namely the Whole. identified by his student Zeno of Elea The respective goals of philosophy and (490–30 bce) were formulated to try to religion are therefore the same. defend this position. One of Spinoza’s most notorious max- Stoic philosophy in the Graeco- ims was that on this basis we may speak Roman world included different strands either of ‘God’ or of ‘nature’ (Deus, sive of thought, but in general assimilated the Natura) without denoting different enti- early Stoic view that the world is ordered ties or realities. Either term denotes by its own ‘world-spirit’ or ‘world-soul’ infinite reality, which is One. which permeates it with the rational and This identification invited the charge of the good. By contrast, Paul the Apostle ‘naturalism’ on the basis that Spinoza dissociates the transcendent (as well as could hardly claim to believe in the immanent) ‘Spirit who comes forth from personal God of theism. Nevertheless, God’ (i.e. from the beyond) (Greek, to Spinoza had been brought up with a pneuma to ek tou theou, out from God) knowledge of the Hebrew scriptures and from ‘the spirit of the world’ (world-spirit) rabbinic writings, and could claim that he (Greek, to pneuma tou kosmou, 1 Cor. took as his starting-point the Jewish belief 2:12). in the unity of God (‘Hear, Israel, the Lord pantheism 224 is One’) and also in God’s infinity. Indeed, and accused Lessing of holding to such a he had also been given the designation view. By contrast J.G. Herder (1744–1803) ‘God-intoxicated’. Spinoza endorsed two and Johann W. Goethe (1749–1832) urged principles about God: ‘God necessarily that, to the contrary, Spinoza offered an exists’ (Latin, Deus necessario existit); and anti-mechanistic, organic view of God and ‘that God is one’ (Deus esse unicum). nature. In Goethe’s words, he acknowl- The formula Deus, sive Natura (either edged ‘the highest reality . . . Being is God’. ‘God’ or ‘Nature’) derived in part from He was to be praised as ‘theissimum’, Spinoza’s deep concern to resolve the thoroughly theist. dualism bequeathed by Descartes, his Some view Hegel (1770–1831) as a older near-contemporary (1596–1650). If pantheist, since he identified the ‘All’ as substance–God–nature is All, either prin- Absolute Divine Spirit (Geist) unfolding its ciple can be formulated as a Whole; not as Being in and through historical and logical a component of a duality. God is not a dialectic. However, in the light of the mind excluded from the realm of sub- part played by concepts and by differ- stance or matter; nor is God an incomplete entiation in Hegel’s philosophy, his thought will striving for something ‘more’. is too complex to suggest more than This, in turn, provides a basis for leanings towards a qualified pantheism. ethics. Ethics arises not from seeking to Bradley (1846–1924), the ‘English accord with God’s ‘desire’, for God is Hegelian’, may more readily be called a complete and without lack. However, pantheist. He argues that change and finite human persons are to aim to differentiation are mere unreal appear- transcend the limits of the partial; ‘to live ance, and that only the Whole is real under the aspect of eternity’, or the Whole. (Appearance and Reality, 1893). The It was in part Spinoza’s crusade against the whole is the Absolute. constraints of the partial in religions, and Josiah Royce (1855–1916), the ‘Amer- his defence of secular ‘freedoms’, that ican Hegelian’, was no more pantheist contributed to his highly controversial than was Hegel. He did indeed stress the status as a thinker during his lifetime. reality of the Whole, against the fragmen- Without question Spinoza left an tary (The Conception of God, 1897). But uneasy balance between belief in an history moves toward a single ‘community impersonal God who is All and a natur- of interpretation’, not an undifferential alistic monism which leaves no room for a Absolute. personal, characterizable God who may pantheism in the east act in freedom. On one side, he reflects the emphasis on the unity and infinity of God Whereas in the West, pantheism has never found in Judaism; on the other side he obtained a clear foothold because of the draws on the confused ontology of difficulty of treading a path between Parmenides and the paradoxes of Zeno, theism and naturalism, pantheism lies and offers an unconvincing resolution of deep within the roots of Hindu traditions. the dualism of Descartes. The early Upanis¸ads (c. 700 bce) identify Not surprisingly after his death the the divine with inner human consciousness ‘Pantheism Controversy’ (Pantheismus- or the inner self. In the Advaita (non- streit) erupted concerning whether Spino- dualist) Vedanta, bra¯hman is impersonal za’s ‘pantheism’ was a thin disguise for divine being and consciousness. atheism or whether it offered a viable Even so, within schools of the Vedanta, conception of God. Dvaita Vedanta conceives of the bra¯hman In 1785 Friedrich H. Jacobi published as being characterizable qualities (saguna), an attack on Spinoza’s pantheism as while Advaita Vedanta sees bra¯hman as deterministic and rationalistic monism, without such qualities (nirguna). 225 performative utterances

The Indian Hindu philosopher S´an˙ - said to lean towards pantheism, with its ka¯ ra¯ (788–820) defended the pantheistic emphasis on the ‘unity of Being’. All monism of the Advaita Vedanta against mystical traditions tend in this direction, the dualism of some Buddhist traditions. but most would claim to represent The self (a¯tman) is undifferentiated con- panentheism rather than pantheism. (See sciousness. Avidya¯, illusory perception, is also existentialism; Hindu philoso- not unlike what Bradley terms ‘appear- phy; immanence; Jewish philosophy; ance’: it is how we perceive individual metaphysics; mysticism; occasional- particulars and differentiation, but this ism.) masks the total reality of undifferentiated consciousness, nirguna bra¯hma, which is performative utterances the All in reality. Ra¯ ma¯ nuja (c. 1017–1137) modified This term is especially associated with the teachings of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ by a ‘qualified Austin (1911–60). Although he intro- monism’ (Visista-advaita). Difference is duced the term in 1946 in ‘Other Minds’ more than appearance or illusion (avidya¯). (in Philosophical Papers, 1961, 44–84), Bra¯hman is not to be identified with the Austin’s main exposition of the subject All, but is its origin and animating centre. occurs in his 1955 lectures later published There are affinities here with the quasi- under the title How to Do Things with pantheist ‘world-soul’ of Stoic philosophy, Words (Oxford: OUP, 1962). and the extent of ‘reality’ remains ambiva- Performatives are distinguished from lent. Bhakti devotional Hinduism derives statements, which are ‘true’ or ‘false’. from the Visista-advaita tradition. It has Rather, performative utterances enact been described as both ‘emanationist’ and actions either ‘operatively’ and effectively ‘relativist’ pantheism or monism. or ‘without effect’ as null and void (ibid., Some traditions of Chinese philosophy 10–11). Given that ‘I baptize . . .’ is a stand in contrast to those of Indian Hindu performative utterance, we do not speak philosophy in stressing an explicitly dual- of a baptism as ‘true’ or ‘false’, but as ist world-view. The most striking example ‘valid’ (if appropriate) or ‘inoperative’ (if is the yin–yang tradition of Taoism, in it merely ‘went through the motions’). If, which the yin is said to denote the Austin suggests, the officiating minister feminine, weak or destructive and the says, ‘I baptize this infant 2704’ rather yang the masculine, strong or construc- than ‘I baptize this infant John’, is the tive. Some sub-traditions also propose a baptism operative or void (ibid., 35)? ‘rotation of dominance’ between the two Austin makes a distinctive point when principles, but this is far from pantheism he insists that a conventional procedure and monism. must normally be assumed. I cannot say Na¯ga¯rjuna (c. 150–200), an Indian ‘My seconds will call on you . . .’ with Mahayana Buddhist, held to the unity performative effect if duelling is no longer and non-duality of the Absolute on the an accepted, conventional way of solving a basis of the relativity of change and dispute. I can write, however, ‘I give and unreality of matter. (For a fuller account bequeath my house . . .’, as long as the of Buddhist thought, however, see under house is mine to bequeath, the house is Buddhist philosophy.) correctly identified and (for the act to take Islamic philosophy normally stresses place) I become deceased. the transcendence of God. However, Performatives may also be sub-categor- occasionalist views of divine action can ized into ‘illocutions’ (distinctively perfor- lend themselves to a relativist, or modified, mative) and ‘perlocutions’ (performative pantheism. Perhaps only the mystical only in a causal or rhetorical sense). A tradition of Sufism within Islam can be clear example of an illocutionary act persons, personal identity 226 occurs in the first-person use of ‘I pro- Philo represents Hellenistic or Alexan- mise’, when I pledge myself to undertaking drian Jewish philosophical religious to carry out the promise. This is an act (i.e. thought, rather than rabbinic Judaism. of promise) performed ‘in’ the saying of it. However, how representative even of Perlocutions occur when an act is per- diaspora Judaism he is has been disputed. formed ‘by’ the saying of an utterance, as E. Goodenough (An Introduction to Philo when a speaker persuades another of Judaeus, 1940) regards him as a repre- something through words. sentative figure of Hellenistic Judaism; The former case reflects an ‘asymmetry’ H. A. Wolfson sees him as a system- of logical operation between first-person builder (Philo, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA: and third-person linguistic acts. ‘I promise’ Harvard, 1947); G. F. Moore sees him as commits me to action and makes a promise Stoicizing Platonist (Judaism, 3 vols., in a way that ‘he promises’ does not. The Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1927, vol. 1, asymmetry between ‘I believe’ and ‘he 211). believes’ provides a parallel example. In Against Flaccus and Embassy to Language in religion makes exten- Gaius Philo recounts his leadership of a sive use of performative utterances, espe- five-man delegation to Rome to plead for cially in liturgy and worship. ‘I repent’, ‘I the Jews on the occasion when the Roman believe’, ‘I praise’, are acts of repentance, prefect Flaccus imposed cult-images of the declarative acts of confession of faith; emperor onto the Jews of Alexandria. acclamations or acts of praise. They do Civil unrest, disorder and massacre had not represent pieces of information resulted. However, all of his other near- addressed to an omniscient God. forty treatises are either expository or In the era after Austin, the term ‘speech philosophical apologetics. acts’ came to replace ‘performatives’, expository works especially in the work of John Searle, Wolterstorff, Terrence Tilley and Nearly nine treatises offer allegorical others. However, even before Austin, interpretations of Genesis or the ‘five Wittgenstein had noted the logical books of Moses’ (the Pentateuchal tradi- asymmetry between ‘I believe’ and ‘he tions from Genesis to Deuteronomy). believes’. He writes, ‘If there were a verb Philo places his own philosophical inter- meaning “to believe falsely”, it would not pretation on the biblical traditions of have any significant first person present creation. The ‘six days’ of creation, for indicative’ (Philosophical Investigations, example, denote not duration but ‘order’. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, ii, 190). (See Before the material world, the incorporeal also belief; speech acts.) world existed as an Idea in the mind of the Designer, as divine reason. Moses is persons, personal identity portrayed as the first great philosopher. The laws of Exodus and Leviticus relate See self. not to local issues about sacrifices, but enunciate cosmic ideas. Philo of Alexandria (Philo Allegorical interpretation as a vehicle bce ce Judaeus, c.20 – c.50 ) for the removal of Anthropomorphism Philo’s work combines loyalty to the was already a familiar tool to Stoics, who Jewish scriptures (the Christian Old Testa- were embarrassed by the polytheism of ment) with the aim of utilizing Hellenistic Homer’s writings, and reinterpreted con- and ancient Greek philosophy for the flictsamongthegodsasaccountsof expression of his ideas. He produced the natural elements or abstract principles. largest body of Jewish writings prior to Philo does not always utilize this allego- the second century. rical method, but frequently resorts to it 227 pietism, Christian when he believes that the sacred text Moses legislates through constructive would seem crude or offensive to educated laws that coincide with philosophical Hellenistic readers. Where possible, he Good. God can be known indirectly from expounded ideas about God and ethics nature, and this leaves no moral excuse for by more straightforward exegesis of the the folly of idolatry. Like the Wisdom of text. Solomon and Paul the Apostle, Philo apologetics: god and the logos draws on this ‘homily’ theme that idolatry leads to disorder, to vice and to inbuilt Philo draws on ideas from Plato and judgement (Wisd. 14, 22–31; cf. Rom. Platonism, from Stoicism and from Neo- 1:18–32). Yet God is patient (Wisd. 15, Pythagoreanism, to present ideas about 1–6; cf. Rom. 2:4–11). God; the Logos, or divine Reason; and Even if he selects at will from a ethics. God is nameless, invisible and multiplicity of philosophical sources, Philo incomprehensible. Hence Moses’ request stands in the tradition of those religious for God’s name elicits only ‘I am that I am’ philosophers who have sought to expound (Ex. 3:14, where the Greek Septuagint the transcendence of God and the value version uses a present to translate the of sacred texts through the medium of more dynamic Hebrew verb ‘I will be’). ideas and thought-forms which were the God is a unity (Allegorical Laws 2: 2, 3); common currency of the day. His work is eternal (Decalogue 41: 64); perfect and largely philosophical apologetics for a omnipresent; and Father (Of the Confu- Hellenistic or heterodox Judaism. sion of Languages 63, 146). The Logos is the agent of God in pietism, Christian creation, the ‘firstborn’ (protogonos), eter- nally begotten (Allegorical Laws 1: 2: 5). The term is used in both a positive and a From Platonism Philo draws the notion of pejorative sense. Positively it denotes a the Logos as ‘archetype’ of creation. Since warm, committed, religious devotion. In God is perfect and the world is material the eighteenth century when deism and and contingent,theLogos acts as rationalism were at their height, an era mediator between God and the world, (according to ) when and between God and humankind. The ‘love became cold’, the Wesleyan revivals Logos is the bond that binds the universe manifested a pietist counter-reaction. together (cf. Col. 1:17, ‘in Christ the Pejoratively, the term also denotes an universe coheres’). undue disparagement of reason and jewish and greek sources: critical reflection in favour of feeling and religious ‘experience’. ethics Whereas deism and rationalism are Philo did not have to draw exclusively on often associated with more mechanistic Greek sources for these ideas. The Hebrew views of the world order, pietism coheres tradition of Wisdom as mediating divine more comfortably with an organic world- agent is found in Proverbs, in the Wisdom view,oftenwithanemphasisonthe of Solomon, and in other documents of indwelling of the Holy Spirit and divine Hellenistic Judaism. The tradition of a immanence. In the nineteenth century its ‘chosen people’ relates closely for Philo to relation to Romanticism was more than ethical obedience. However, this is often accidental. Both stressed first-hand crea- expressed less in biblical terms than in tivity in contrast to wooden replication of philosophical terms as subordination to routinized doctrines or practices. Reason, although there is common ground A founding figure of pietism was in the appeal to ‘virtue’ between Plato and Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705). His the Wisdom traditions of Judaism. main emphasis included the study of the Plantinga, Alvin 228

Bible, the priesthood of all believers, College, Grand Rapids, and from 1982 at practical discipleship, a simple style of the University of Notre Dame. life, and the superiority of love over Some dozen books from Plantinga’s argument. Spener was supported espe- pen mainly explore different avenues cially by August Francke (1663–1727), surrounding epistemology, founda- who added a further emphasis on the need tionalism and warranted belief, but also to be ‘born again’ (Wiedergeburt). the problem of evil, the nature of God In the eighteenth century, leading and the ontological argument for the figures included Friedrich Oetinger existence of God, drawing on conceptual (1702–1782) and Count Nicholas Ludwig and logical tools which include those of von Zinzendorf (1700–60) in continental modal logic and ‘possible’ worlds. Europe. Because he insisted on greater rationality and warranted critical engagement with philosophy (espe- belief cially with Kant) and with biblical criti- cism, but retained a pietist warmth, Plantinga’s earliest book-length publica- Schleiermacher (1768–1834) called tions were Faith and Philosophy (Grand himself ‘a Pietist of a higher order’. His Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964) and (ed.) The religion had at its centre a relationship of Ontological Argument (New York: Dou- utter dependence upon God, a sense of bleday, 1965). However, the direction of immediacy and a ‘love of the Saviour’ his most creative thinking on epistemology (Heilandsliebe), but he wrote important and theistic belief began to take shape in works of philosophy and hermeneutics. his God and Other Minds: A Study of the In England in the eighteenth century, Rational (Ithaca: Cornell, 1967; also pietism broadly took the form of the 1990). Methodism of John and Charles Wesley, It is difficult to set out a conclusive which began a reform movement for demonstration of the existence of other revival within the . minds, but most of us consider such a There are also parallels with quietism as a belief to be eminently rational, almost as a reform movement within the Catholic ‘pragmatic’ but nevertheless rational Church in the southern Mediterranean. belief. Yet, Plantinga argues, there are The Wesleys were directly influenced by scarcely fewer factors that may be Zinzendorf. regarded as suggesting ‘rational’ belief in God, even though, like belief in other minds, this belief does not rest upon Plantinga, Alvin (b. 1932) conclusive demonstration. If belief in Plantinga writes as a first-rank analytical other minds is rational, is not theistic philosopher who is also a robust and belief also no less rational? explicit theist. With Wolterstorff and This approach coheres with Plantinga’s with Swinburne, he is among those who conclusions in God, Freedom and Evil have made an exceptionally important (New York: Harper, 1974, and Grand impact upon the debate about the ration- Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978) and The Nature ality of theism and about warrants for of Necessity (New York: OUP, 1974, rpr. theistic belief. 1990). The appeal to modal logic as a Plantinga (with Wolterstorff) is closely counter-reply to objections to the ontolo- associated with what has been called gical argument, as well as to defences of ‘Reformed epistemology’, which questions the ‘best possible world’ in the context of the validity of natural theology, but the problem of evil, yield not a knock- does not thereby withdraw from discus- down conclusive demonstration of the sions about warrants for Christian belief. existence of God and theistic responses He taught from 1963 to 1987 at Calvin to evil, but sufficiently compelling 229 Plantinga, Alvin arguments to justify calling such theistic In relation to theism, it also appears odd belief rational. It is rational rather than (and theologically questionable) to suggest irrational, and probable rather than that belief in God is logically dependent implausible. for its justification or validity on the truth In 1984 Plantinga published, jointly of other propositions within a humanly with Wolterstorff (b. 1932), Faith and constructed system of epistemology. Rationality: Reason and Belief in God By contrast, Plantinga insists that since (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame). ‘God as conceived in traditional Chris- This emphasized the point, already impli- tianity, Judaism, and Islam: an almighty, cit in their work, that in the tradition of wholly good, and loving person who has ‘Reformed epistemology’ neither natural created the world and presently upholds theology (in a rationalist tradition) nor it’, it makes rational sense to claim that evidentialism (in an empiricist tradition) ‘belief in such a being is properly basic’ could provide a ‘basic’ foundation as the (‘Reformed epistemology’). However, if basis of which the validity of theistic belief this is true, the objections of such anti- could be demonstrated. theists as Antony Flew and Russell that Plantinga developed this theme in his theistic belief is irrational or unreasonable three-volume exploration of warrants for because there is not enough ‘evidence’ beliefs. The first volume (first delivered as become open to question. the 1987 in the Univer- Plantinga exposes the lack of grounds sity of Aberdeen) was published under the for a ‘deontological’ (ethical) assumption title Warrant: the Current Debate (New behind evidentialism that a believer has a York: OUP, 1993). What might accord to ‘duty’ to restrict belief only to that which ‘belief’ the status of ‘knowledge’? Plan- is based in conclusive evidence, especially tinga examines and rejects, in turn, foun- in the extreme form promoted by W.K. dationalism; ‘internal’ warrants relating to Clifford. Further, what kind of world and the person of the believer; the epistemol- everyday reality must be postulated if we ogy of Roderick Chisholm; and issues of insist upon the non-existence of God? Are evidence. None of these epistemological human persons merely part of nature? approaches can provide conclusive war- What day-to-day realities that we accept rant for theistic belief. as realities through the network of In his second volume, Warrant and assumptions that we live by now have to Proper Function (New York: OUP, 1994, be placed on one side as equally ‘irra- based on the Wilde Lectures at Oxford in tional’? 1988), Plantinga develops this theme Wittgenstein alludes to what forms further. If even coherence provides no ‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’ as the conclusive demonstration, we reach the background against which we count cer- conclusion that theism stands on its own tain beliefs as rational or irrational, and feet as a ‘basic’ belief (or one that does not arguably there is a partial parallel with rest upon arguments of a different kind as Plantinga’s common-sense appeal to how a condition for regarding theism as a we form other beliefs that serve as markers properly warranted belief). This leads to and boundaries for life as well as for the argument of the third volume of the thought. trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief (New Perhaps the most controversial issue York: OUP, 1999). arises from Plantinga’s attempt to offer criteria for the ‘basicality’ of beliefs. He basicality and foundationalism writes: ‘A proposition P is properly basic In his earlier and middle periods Plantinga for a person S if and only if P is either self- rejects the ‘classical foundationalism’ of evident to S or incorrigible to ‘S’ (first the twin pillars of Descartes and Locke. expounded in ‘The Reformed Objection to Plato 230

Natural Theology’, Christian Scholar’s task of philosophy as that of distinguish- Review, 11, 1982, 187–98; also in Plan- ing between mere opinion (Greek, doxa) tinga and Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and and true knowledge (episte¯me¯). ‘The Rationality; and most recently formulated philosopher is always in love with knowl- in A. Plantinga, Warranted Christian edge of the unchanging’ (Republic, book Belief, New York and Oxford: OUP, VI). For ‘opinion’ changes with the chan- 1998, 35–5, 175–7 and 345–53). For ging world; but ‘knowledge’ cannot devi- some, both ‘to S’ and ‘incorrigible’ raise ate from what is established as true. difficulties. It is less far-fetched than might seem to Few other philosophers of religion, be the case at first sight to attribute to the however, have explored the very central respective sources of the changing and issues of philosophy of religion and unchanging their belonging to two differ- theistic belief with such innovation, inci- ent worlds. Everything within our own siveness and robust engagement with all contingent, empirical world of change comers. It is scarcely surprising that many and decay falls short of perfection. Thus regard him as one of the two or three most every circle that is drawn in a school influential thinkers in this area. (See also classroom falls short of perfect circularity. empiricism; reason; solipsism; revela- Yet all can conceive of a perfect circle, tion.) with its exact geometrical and mathema- tical qualities. In book VII of The Republic, Plato Plato (428–348 bce) portrays people who live in a cave, in Plato was born in Athens into a distin- which they can face only away from the guished family, and came strongly under mouth, with a fire at their backs: ‘They see the influence of Socrates (470–399 bce). nothing of themselves but their own His earlier thoughts of a political career shadows, or one another’s . . . The only were abandoned for the pursuit of philo- real things for them would be the sha- sophy after the death of Socrates. dows.’ Plato then compares the changing, The medium of Plato’s extant writings imperfect, time-conditioned world of is that of dialogue. In the earliest dialogues appearances with a ‘higher’ world of it is difficult to distinguish between the reality outside the cave. Thus ‘the real voice of Socrates, who plays a leading role world’ is outside the cave; the realm of in the dialogues, and Plato’s own views. appearances is that of copies, shadows and Steadily, however, a distinctive Platonic images. philosophy emerges as we move through In his own more distinctive philosophy, the middle and late dialogues. Plato identifies the perfect realm of Forms Themostcharacteristicfeatureof with Beauty, Goodness and Truth. Human Plato’s thought is a dualism of appear- persons and objects in the everyday world ance and reality, of change and perma- approximate towards these ideals (or nence, of opinion and knowledge, of body Ideas) to a greater or lesser degree. and soul, and of earthly ‘copies’ or Geometrical figures approximate to true ‘images’ and Forms or ‘Ideas’ (Greek, circularity or triangularity; expressions of eidos) of which the world of sense yields opinion approximate towards knowledge mere copies, shadows or imperfect imita- of truth; those deemed more or less tions. beautiful approximate to perfect beauty to varying degrees. time is a ‘moving opinion and knowledge: images image’ of eternity. and forms In the Timaeus the eternal One, as It is entirely understandable that as a eternal God, is characterized by changeless disciple of Socrates, Plato should see the Being. The ‘World-Soul’ is characterized 231 plenitude, principle of by a process of Becoming and change. (To subsequent thinkers, and the difference of what extent the Forms or ‘Ideas’ (eidos) the direction of his thought from that of are independently actually ontological Aristotle. Their respective understand- entities seems to vary in different writings ings of the relation between universals at different dates.) and particulars offers one of several examples. social ethics and the soul The greatest difficulty of Plato’s legacy The Socratic questions ‘What is virtue?’, is caused by his dualism. Heidegger ‘What is justice?’ develop into ‘Why is speaks of the ‘chasm’ that split Western justice what it is?’; ‘Why is virtue what it philosophy, while Nietzsche parodies is?’ Plato’s theory of Forms suggests Christianity as ‘Platonism for the people’. that justice is what it is because it derives In some Western religion traces of a its character from Justice as an Ideal world-denying dualism have proved diffi- Form. The abstract defines the particular. cult to eradicate. Judaism, Christianity Since philosophers are most skilled in and Islam all insist upon the fundamental handling abstract universals, philoso- goodness of the material world. Even if pher-statesmen in principle would be the some Eastern religions are closer at this most suited to guide and to lead a ‘just’ precise point (their view of matter) to society or state. Humanity is otherwise Plato, few Eastern philosophies move in a chained, like those in the cave, to illusory dualist, rather than a monist, direction. opinions. Plato’s influence has extended far and Plato firmly believes that the body wide. Within Western philosophical tradi- (soˆ ma) and soul (psyche¯) belong as two tions, the Alexandrians Clement and Ori- distinct entities respectively to the two gen, and the Neoplatonists, including orders of the phenomenal world of the Plotinus, reflect this influence in the empirical, and the true world of the real. ancient world. The Cambridge Platonists The soul awaits release from the body. of the seventeenth century, including In the Republic and in Phaedo the soul (1617–1688) who was is portrayed as unchanging. Yet in the broadly Neoplatonic, but sought to defend Phaedrus and in Laws, the immortality of rational theism against Hobbes and the soul is grounded in the soul’s capacity Spinoza, begin a series of those whom for self-motion. The weight of the contrast Plato influenced in the modern world. (See shifts from body-as-changing and soul-as- also Absolute; creation; God, argu- changeless to the body’s having only ments for the existence of; God, derived motion, and the soul’s providing concepts and ‘attributes’ of; ideal- its own motion. ism; immutability; Neoplatonism; The Laws presents a social philosophy nominalism; realism.) or social ethics. Legislation ensures the good of all citizens, and education is plenitude, principle of essential. Truth is closely related to virtue, which includes courage, self-control and This principle is formulated in more than justice. Justice, however, sometimes has a one way. In Plotinus (205–70) and in technical meaning, namely balance of the Neoplatonism the differentiation of ‘parts’ of the soul. Arete¯, virtue, is closely Forms is seen in terms of a series of levels, related to the ideal of harmony in an which give the universe its necessarily ‘ordered’ society, in which person fulfils diverse character. Plotinus observes that his or her proper function. ‘the One’ (God) exhibits a fullness or From the viewpoint of philosophy of plenitude of superabundant productivity religion perhaps the most important which thus characterizes ‘the best of all feature about Plato is his influence upon possible worlds’. Plotinus 232

Augustine endorses this view of ‘rank- Plotinus (c. 205–270) ings’ within the world as a concomitant Plotinus is the founder and leading figure aspect of its fullness bestowed by God as of Neoplatonism. His pupil Porphyry (c. Creator. ‘Animals are ranked above trees 233–304) collected and edited his sub- . . . Humankind above cattle . . . these are stantial range of writings under the title the gradations according to the order of Enneads (i.e. nine tractates in six nature’ (City of God, XI: 16). A world volumes). He combines elements from without form would be mere changing Plato (428–348 bce), Aristotle (384– flux and chaos. God’s gift of creation 322 bce) and the Stoics. Plato’s realm of actualizes conceptual possibilities concre- Ideas is presided over by ‘the One’, who is tely in the diversity of the world. Black beyond human thought and conceptual and white, light and shadow, exhibit a characterization. ‘ranking’ (ordinatio) among created enti- The highest emanation of ‘the One’ is ties (ibid., XI: 23). Nous (mind, intelligence), which occupies Without such differentiation, richness, the place of Plato’s realm of forms. The fullness or plenitude would be dimin- second-level emanation is the ‘world-soul’ ished, just as the rich harmony of a of the Stoics. This then yields the world harmonic triad or a polyphonic chord itself, the material ‘body’ of the world- would be diminished if only one single soul. Thus Plato’s dualism has been note could be sung or played. ‘Good’ is bridged, but his fundamental contrast even ‘richer’ against the background of between the perfect Forms and the con- what is ‘other’. tingent, empirical world remains the Aquinas Thomas (1225–74) develops structure of Plotinus’ thought. the same principle. ‘The perfection of the Humankind is seen as both longing for universe requires that there should be the eternal realm and trapped within the inequality in things, so that every grade body of matter. In this respect Plotinus has of goodness may be realized’ (Summa failed to expel a dualism of mind and Theologiae I, Qu. 48, art. 2). Thus body, even though he perceived his system creation is the work of the whole Trinity, as a unity. (See also Monism.) to whom belongs ‘a kind of order’ (ibid., Qu. 45, art 6). ‘God divided the day from the night’ (Gen. 1:4) (ibid., Qu. 47, art. 1). positivism Aquinas explicitly quotes Augustine’s The origins of the term lie in the work of appeal to the model of the Creator as French social theorists who wished to Divine Artist (ibid., art. 2). restrict methods on the study of econom- In Augustine and in Aquinas this ics, politics and human social life to the principle serves to expound themes not methods of empirical or natural sciences. only about God and creation, but also The term was popularized by Auguste about the origins of evil. Unevenness, Comte (1798–1858). difference, and inequality, which are It seems, however, that Claude Henri necessary to the fullness of a good crea- Saint-Simon (1760–1826) introduced the tion, can be misused as a pretext or term prior to Comte, to denote broadly catalyst for possible evil. the same meaning. Both writers rejected as In Spinoza, Leibniz and modern illegitimate what went beyond ‘observa- rationalism the principle of plenitude tional’, evidential, empirical criteria. The was taken to suggest that every genuine attitudes, as well as the methods, of possibility is actualized. Everything that sciences were to be applied to human could exist has come, or will come, to affairs. exist unless there is sufficient reason that it In common with Spencer (1820– should not exist. 1903), Comte placed his philosophy and 233 postmodernity, postmodernism ethics within a materialist evolutionary a ‘mover’, or ultimately a Prime Mover. framework. Societies necessarily pass This gives rise to the kinetological argu- through a metaphysical or theological ment in the Five Ways of Aquinas, and stage, when extraneous causes are postu- influenced the thought of the medieval lated for what is not yet scientifically Islamic philosophers. understood. But they are on the way to a Third, Leibniz (1646–1716) argued positive, scientific stage of valid explana- that the eternal mind of God contains tions. ideas of an infinite number of possible Comte’s lectures on ‘Positivism’ were worlds that God might have created. In delivered in 1826. Over the next century actualizing a world in creation, God chose other uses of ‘positivism’ emerged, ‘the best possible world’, which he cre- included a use by Schelling quite differ- ated. These ‘alternative’ worlds are coher- ent from Comte’s. But by the 1920s the ent in themselves as ‘possible worlds’, or term resumed its tightly empiricist, evi- possible totalities of finite things. dential, observational dimensions with the This principle has been explored and emergence of the Vienna circle and developed almost in a fourth sense in logical positivism. Ayer’s criterion of modal logic. Plantinga (following verification (or more strictly, verifiability) Leibniz) uses it strikingly to explore the comes close to Comte’s concerns, although problem of evil. As Saul Kripke shows, without his evolutionary hypothesis. (See ‘possible worlds’ may provide models for also behaviourism; empiricism; materi- understanding problematic concepts. A alism; metaphysics; science and reli- logically necessary truth is true in all gion.) possible worlds. (See also eternity; god, arguments for the existence of; isla- mic philosophy; logic; ontological possibility argument.) This term has a variety of technical nuances in philosophy, but perhaps three postmodernity, or four carry particular significance for postmodernism philosophy of religion. First, logical possibility must be dis- Postmodernity has been defined in a large tinguished from real, contingent, variety of ways. Richard Bernstein calls it empirical or actual possibility. Often in ‘a rage against humanism and the the English language the weight of this Enlightenment legacy’ (Bernstein, ed., distinction may be lost through the use of Habermas and Modernity, Cambridge: the innocent-looking word ‘can’. ‘Can Polity Press, 1985, 1–34). Norman Denzin God lie?’ marks the issue of whether for argues that it signals a loss of trust in the God to lie would constitute a logical capacity of the self to control its destiny, contradiction with God’s nature or stated with concomitant byproducts of ‘anger, promise to be true and faithful. ‘God alienation, anxiety . . . racism and sexism’ cannot . . .’ frequently denotes logical, (Images of Postmodern Society, London: rather than actual, limitations, imposed Sage, 1991, vii). by God’s own decision to act self-consis- Probably the most widely known, tently, or ‘rationally’. although perhaps not best understood, Second, Aristotle (384–322 bce) definition is that of the French post- drew a fundamental distinction between modernist philosopher Lyo t a r d (b. ‘substance’ (ousia)as‘thatwhichis’, 1924): ‘I define postmodern as incredulity namely form, and potentiality, the power towards metanarratives’ (The Postmodern to become, which resides in matter. To Condition, Minneapolis: University of actualize the possible or potential requires Minnesota, 1984, xxiv). postmodernity, postmodernism 234

‘Metanarratives’ are ‘narratives’ of an Nevertheless, he urges the radical histor- overarching view that attempt to explain ical finitude of human beings as Dasein, the meaning of other more ‘local’ narra- being-there, where prior forces of history tives. Thus if Judaism, Christianity or have ‘thrown’ them. Their horizons are Islam attempts to offer a ‘grand’ narrative shaped by the place in which history has of God’s dealings with the world which placed them, and by the practical concerns provides a frame of reference for under- of the projects that lie to hand. standing ‘local’ (e.g. personal or commu- Although in other cultural contexts the nity) stories of guilt, suffering, redemption, dating of the rise of postmodernity may be love, joy, folly or whatever, this falls under different, for philosophy and religion the suspicion as an imperializing instrument work of Roland Barthes (1915–80) in the for power that is in actuality no less ‘local’, 1950s and of Derrida (b. 1930) and but purports to be the story of the world, Foucault (1926–84) in the 1960s marks an ontology or an epistemology. a turning-point away from ‘modernity’. The particularities of social forces No less than three of Derrida’s major ‘throw’ us (to borrow Heidegger’s word) works were published in 1967: Of Gram- into pre-given finite ‘situatedness’ within matology, Writing and Difference and prior worlds of meaning. The epistemolo- Speech and Phenomena. gical subject of traditional philosophy is Derrida explicitly recognizes the influ- no longer an active, ‘innocent’, observer, ence of Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger as but already a victim of the socio-economic three of his four main sources, adding also forces and ‘interests’ that predetermine the Husserl. The attack on the primacy of limits of this human subject. human consciousness and thought as subject to deception, manipulation and the background to distortion, and as radically historically postmodernity: suspicion of conditioned, seemed to demolish not only the self, knowledge and logic the rationalist, subject-centred epistemol- The earlier influence of the ‘Masters of ogy of Descartes, but also the critical Suspicion’ Nietzsche (1844–1900) and philosophy of Kant. Both Descartes and Freud (1856–1939) will be apparent. Kant stand, in different ways, as models of Nietzsche saw most of the ‘narrative’ of high ‘modernity’. religion and philosophy as projection of In place of the ‘Speaking Subject’, disguised power-interests. The phenom- Derrida fills the stage with the shifting enon of guilt and confession, for example, sign-system in which the human person serves the interests of the priesthood to becomes less an active agent or subject control the people. Marx (1818–83) than a role. Even the traditional distinc- shared such suspicion, but Marxism is tion or differentiations of logic are itself a ‘grand narrative’ and ‘metanarra- ‘deconstructed’ in a process of ‘de-cen- tive’, and is therefore in that respect a tring’ the word as ‘presence’. Language is child of ‘modernity’, not of postmodernity placed ‘under erasure’. Marxist critique of religion (see ). the ‘mythology’ of grand Freud played his part in diminishing narratives and fragmentation the epistemological role of the human into plurality subject. The human agent is not ‘inno- cent’, but brings illusion and self-decep- Derrida shares Nietzsche’s view that Wes- tion to the epistemological task. The self tern metaphysics rests upon treating ‘a is, rather, a ‘role’ within a mechanistic mobile army of metaphors’ as a definitive system of ‘forces’. body of truth. In practice, it is an illusion Heidegger (1889–1976) plays a less that needs to be exposed as myth. There is direct role than Nietzsche and Freud. no stable world-view that may claim any 235 post-mortal existence of the self privilege over others. The whole tradition ‘fragmentation, indeterminacy and intense of Western philosophy must be dismantled distrust of all universal or “totalizing” and ‘re-read’ in the light of historical and discourse’ (The Condition of Postmoder- social relativity. Derrida expounds this nity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 9). theme in ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in Harvey also links this mood with the the Text of Philosophy’ in his Margins of recovery of pragmatism, and with Fou- Philosophy (New York and London: cault’s emphasis on discontinuities in Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982). history. Further, there is a tendency to see To Barthes and Derrida must be added all reality not only as socially constructed, the name of Foucault. He also displaced but as virtual reality constructed by the human subject from the central role arbitrary, distorting or manipulative uses that it played in humanism and in of signs. Such a philosophy (if philosophy modernity since the Enlightenment. Sys- it is) coheres well with the era of computer tems of thought are contingent, and simulation and programmed ‘worlds’. relative to a changing history of social Naturalistic versions of postmodernity situatedness. The works of Foucault are verge on replacing philosophy and episte- discussed in the entry under his name. mology by the study of social history, In the entries on pragmatism and including studies of class, race and gender. Rorty, the focus on the pluralist, local Does ‘rationality’ transcend these bound- and ‘ethnocentric’ emerges clearly, espe- aries, or is it constructed by them? cially in the work of Rorty (b. 1931). Religious versions of the post-modern Postmodernity finds a fertile soil in Amer- may readily collapse into fideism. This ica, where a pragmatic tradition which may generate an illusory sense of freedom elevates ‘effects’, ‘success’, ‘progress’ and from pressure to argue for reasonable ‘flourishing’ is linked with consumerist belief, but a heavy price has to be paid. notions of free-market pluralism and (See also rationalism; reason; science choice by consumer preference. and religion.) American postmodernity is altogether more optimistic than that of France, for it post-mortal existence of the appears to cohere with progressivism and self to remove potential conflicts between local sub-traditions by making none ‘more Philosophical arguments about the post- “right”’ than others. mortal existence of the self are usually Nevertheless in the entry on pragma- considered under the heading ‘the immor- tism, more sinister implications concern- tality of the soul’. However, on one side ing pseudo-tolerance come to light. Once anti-theist writers such as Antony Flew truth is ‘made’ rather than discovered, question the possibility of the post-mortal what cannot be done in the name of survival of the self on the ground that socially constructed truth? There is also a ‘soul’ is a meaningless designation of the false appeal to the notion of incommen- self. On the other side, many theologians surability, which has a special meaning in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic in the philosophy of science not wholly traditions insist that these traditions await compatible with Rorty’s appeal to the not the immortality of the soul but the earlier work of Kuhn. resurrection of the self into a fuller, It now becomes clear in what sense transformed mode of existence. David Harvey’s characterization of post- In several Eastern traditions the hope modernity is accurate. He perceives it as a of what event or change will occur at reaction against ‘the standardization of death may take the form of release knowledge’ generated by a naı¨ve privile- (moksha) of the self from a repeated cycle ging of science; but, in turn, replaced by of existence and reincarnation into either post-mortal existence of the self 236 yet another form of existence, or release excluded a priori, why should the absence from ‘existence’ altogether. The Advaita of such evidence be said to confirm or to (non-dualist) Vedanta tradition of Hindu strengthen disbelief in post-mortal exis- philosophy represented by S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ looks tence? It is as much up to the sceptic as to for the explicit assimilation of the self the believer to specify what kind of (a¯tman) into bra¯hman, or Ultimate Rea- evidence would support their view. It lity, which has been hidden by illusion may be argued that the denial of post- (ma¯ya¯ ). This might not be conveyed mortal existence is neither verifiable nor entirely easily by language about the ‘soul’ falsifiable (see Ayer, falsifiability; (although see the entry on the soul). logical positivism; scepticism). In Western traditions, especially those Admittedly some (notably Paul Bad- of Judaeo-Christian thought, two philoso- ham) appeal to evidence of a quasi- phical problems may be distinguished empirical kind in terms of ‘near-death’ from each other. First, the issue of post- experiences. Such evidence is often anec- mortal existence raises the problem of dotal, but is also often replicated. People credibility. How can we believe in that report an experience of lying on their which (by definition) lies beyond the death-beds when they perceive themselves boundaries of evidences drawn from daily as somehow leaving the body, looking at it life? Second, can the notion of such as if from above or from elsewhere, and existence retain intelligibility? What does eventually ‘returning’. it mean to speak of post-mortal existence? Even if such accounts can be corrobo- The incisive objections of Antony Flew rated, however, would this be a strictly bring these two together. He writes, post-mortal experience? On the admission ‘Unless I am my soul, the immortality of of many who appeal to it, it is often my soul will not be my immortality; and described as ‘near’-death experience. the news of the immortality of my soul Within the framework of a theology of would be of no more concern to me than resurrection, this would, at best, not be the news that my appendix would be resurrection but mere restoration to con- preserved eternally in a bottle’ (Flew, tinuing life in an earthly, this-worldly, ‘Death’, in A. Flew and A. MacIntyre, body. Such narratives as the ‘raising’ of eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theol- Lazarus in John 11:1–44 do not recount ogy, London: SCM, 1955, 270). resurrection, but a parable of resurrection, since Lazarus in the narrative returns to the credibility of the notion: life under this-worldly conditions, pre- what kind of evidence would sumably to ‘die’ again in due course. count? The Christian tradition, especially the The objection that once a self is dissolved Pauline writings, couple the probability of in death nothing can count as evidence of belief in the resurrection of the dead with the survival is, at best, double-edged. For the nature of belief in the Creator God and some, death is ‘not an event in life’ divine promise. Logically, Paul argues, (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6–4311). In belief in the God who has the power to other words we do not live to ‘experience’ design modes of being for every kind of death (only the process of dying); we environment entails the view that such a simply reach an end. If death destroys God would readily have the power and the self, no evidence of its survival can resourcefulness to create modes of being exist a priori. appropriate to a post-mortal resurrection Nevertheless, this argument can be order of being (1 Corinthians 15:35–49). turned on its head to yield the opposite For Paul, the credibility and intelligibility conclusion. If even the possibility of of belief in the resurrection of the dead empirical this-worldly evidence is hinges on whether ‘some people have 237 post-mortal existence of the self

[knowledge or] no knowledge of God’ distracted by unconvincing or flawed (15:34). accounts of personal identity. In earliest pre-Pauline Christian tradi- Plato (428–348 bce) saw the ‘soul’ as tions (1 Cor. 15:3–5, well before 51 ce) the seat of permanence, and the body as the transmissions of a corporate testimony bound up with change. Hence stability or to the death, burial and resurrection of continuity of identity remain dependent Christ were perceived to be the funda- on the soul, while such bodily conditions mental basis for belief in the resurrection as illness, ageing, damage or loss of body- of the dead, alongside belief in the God parts are irrelevant to the identity of the who performs promise. self. Among sophisticated modern theolo- Socrates believed that the unity and gians who expound this dual logic, special eternity of the soul entail its immortal, mention may be made of Moltmann (b. infinitely extended existence. On the other 1926) and Pannenberg (b. 1928). hand, the Stoics associated the soul with Although some theologians had relegated universal reason, which is not a fully the tradition of the empty tomb to later personal identity. sources, Pannenberg largely re-established Locke (1632–1704) attempted to com- its fundamental importance for the cred- pare notions of personal identity that ibility of the earliest Christian preaching, depend respectively on the criterion of while Moltmann established the basic ‘the same body’ and the criterion of importance of hope and promise as key ‘internal memory’. His parable of the theological themes. cobbler-prince, in which each awakes in the body of the other, appears to favour the intelligibility of post- the criterion of memory, demonstrated mortal transformation and through patterns of action which draw continuation of the self on this memory. However, Locke fails to H.H. Price explored the intelligibility of solve the problem, and even he has the notion of post-mortal existence hesitations about both ‘solutions’. through a common-sense appeal to the Ricoeur (b. 1913) more convincingly role of imagination. If only physical modes calls attention to the categories of respon- of existence are intelligible, how do we sibility, entitlement and accountability. A come to imagine and to ‘image’ what young man may begin to invest for a might be beyond sense-perception? (‘Sur- personal pension. However radically his vival and the Idea of Another World’, character or physical appearance may Proceedings of the Society for Psychical change, it is he who is entitled to draw Research, 50, 1953, 1–25). the pension that results from his sustained We experience concepts that may per- agency. This entirely coheres with Chris- form the ‘same function as sense-percep- tian eschatology, in which destiny is tion performs now by providing us with closely related to earlier attitudes and objects about which we could have action. thoughts, emotions, wishes’. The notion Equally to the point, in contrast to the that we are ‘alive’ only in the body philosophical traditions from Plato to confuses ‘life’ with ‘bodily experiences’. Locke, since Schleiermacher, Hegel Is it more logically compelling to conceive and Schelling, selfhood has been seen of all experience as ‘body-dependent’ increasingly as a matter of intersubjectiv- rather than as ‘mind-dependent’? ity, i.e. how the self relates to an Other. The biggest question raised by the This coheres well with the notion of a present subject, however, concerns con- resurrection community rather than a lone tinuity of the identity of the self if the self surviving ‘soul’, or absorption into the survives after death. Many have been ‘All’. It allows for an understanding of postulate 238 personal identity in a transformed mode of of release (moksha) from the body, or even existence in encounter with others. for release from any differentiated identity While memory does not adequately on the part of the self. Such hopes may be sustain such continuity in abstraction found in certain traditions of thought in from these inter-subjective factors (for both Hindu and Buddhist philosophies. example accountability), as a presupposi- In the non-dualist Advaita Vedanta tion for cognition rather than mere school of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ the self (a¯tman), which perception, this concept has a part to play. is separated from the All of Ultimate Thus, against Hume’s notion that the self Reality (bra¯hman) only by illusion (ma¯ya¯) is a mere bundle of perceptions, C.A. looks for full assimilation into undiffer- Campbell points out that we do not entiated consciousness (nirguna bra¯hma). construe the striking of a clock at nine By contrast, in Madhva’s dualist (Dvaita) o’clock as merely a nine-fold replication of Vedanta tradition release (moksha) may be the single chime that would signify one into a heavenly realm of bliss, an abode of o’clock. The self, by its very nature, happy souls (jı¯va). embraces continuity and succession. In Buddhist and Zen traditions the It is thus not self-contradictory to nature of nirvana also takes different conceive of a continuity of personal forms. In early Buddhist thought and often identity that reaches through death to a in more popular thought it denotes a state transformed and different mode of exis- of ‘awakening’ or ‘enlightenment’ into tence, which nevertheless remains the unclouded perception, but in Na¯ga¯ rjuna ‘same’ self. Indeed Paul the Apostle brings (c. 150–200) any attempt to define a together judgement, resurrection and for- return to reality can be expressed only in giveness of past sin with the infinite terms of negation. resourcefulness of God as Creator of Some concepts of karma are linked diversity and difference (1 Corinthians with a ‘timeless’ ontology with the 15). result that in principle cycles of reincarna- In philosophical terms these considera- tion might be endless, like the turning of a tions serve to elucidate the coherence and wheel. On the other hand, some traditions intelligibility of belief in the post-mortal imply that this cycle is without beginning survival and transformation of the self. but not necessarily without end. This Whether such ideas are also credible is carrying forward of the consequences of closely liked with a view of the nature of good and bad actions into the next mode God and of the currency of divine of existence (karma) is a characteristically ‘promise’. It may be acknowledged that Indian mode of thought. the mere wish for post-mortal existence is It is arguable that this stands as far as not an argument for its basis. possible conceptually from the Christian connection of ‘internal logical grammar’ eastern thought: release in which justification by pure grace and (moksha), nirvana, or re- resurrection by divine favour belong incarnation? together to the discourse of sheer unmer- The hope concerning what change may ited gift. (See also dualism; science and occur at or after death takes a variety of religion; Zen; Zoroastrianism.) forms in different Eastern traditions. Sub- traditions within both Hindu philosophy postulate and Buddhist philosophy also vary respectively. All the same, a core belief in The term generally denotes a proposition most Eastern philosophies associates suf- which is laid down as the starting-point of fering and pain with existence in the an argument or an enquiry. It is weaker material body, and hopes for some form than an axiom, but is laid down as 239 pragmatism working a belief. It does not require of American pragmatism include Hilary demonstration for the purposes of the Putnam and especially Rorty. Robert exploration that follows. Corrington relates the movement to a Aristotle (384–322 bce) identified a distinctive American hermeneutic of family of terms that may initiate debate in ‘effects’ in contrast to ‘givens’. different ways: axiom, hypothesis, defini- tion the pragmatism of peirce, james , postulate. He viewed postulates as and dewey capable of demonstration, but as not requiring demonstration within the The earlier work of Peirce reflects a enquiry that they initiate as postulates. different emphasis from his later work. Kant (1724–1804) used the term more He introduced the term ‘pragmatism’ in loosely. Postulates, he argued, are not 1878 primarily as a theory which defined necessarily capable of demonstration, but meaning in terms of practical conse- are not laid down without good reason. quences. In a later essay, ‘What Pragma- For Kant, God, freedom and immortality tism Is’ (The Monist, 15, 1905, 161–81, are ‘postulates’ of practical reason. This rpr. in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders takes us close to the original Latin behind Peirce, 6 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard, the English word as conveying some such 1931–5, vol. 5) he shifted the emphasis to meaning as ‘requirement’ or ‘demand’. a philosophy of action. The earlier work on meaning depicted meaning in terms of what, so to speak, it pragmatism might buy as cash-currency. There are no Pragmatism denotes the belief that ‘givens’ except linguistic signs and human ‘truth’ is validated or justified in so far behaviour. In his later work Peirce as it proves to be useful in relation to the expresses concern about how his work criteria of a community or communities. has been understood, and makes it clear ‘Results’ determine what is counted as that (pace Rorty) his ‘pragmaticism’ (as he true. now calls it) does not replace all questions This unavoidably relativizes what is of epistemology, but expands them. accepted as true, since what counts as It was largely through James that the ‘useful’, ‘successful’ or productive is likely pragmatism of Peirce became known to a to vary over time. Since it will also vary wider public, although Peirce held strong from community to community, one of its reservations about the version of pragma- major advocates, Rorty (b. 1931) prefers tism promoted by James. This reservation to speak of ‘local’ criteria rather than lay behind his renaming his own thought ‘relativism’. ‘pragmaticism’. James’s major work was In practice, advocates of pragmatism The Principles of Psychology (1890); but prefer not to use the words ‘true’ and his essay ‘The Will to Believe’ (1897) ‘false’ except in certain contexts. For the stresses the need to take risks in matters of recognition that what an earlier genera- belief, and his Varieties of Religious tion regarded as ‘true’ may be overtaken Experience appeared in 1901–2. by new agendas and new criteria of James’s Pragmatism (1907) conceded usefulness may be said to render the earlier that, in effect, pragmatism ‘makes’ rather view ‘obsolete’ rather than ‘false’. than ‘discovers’ truth.‘Truth... As a philosophical tradition pragma- becomes true; it is made true by events.’ tism remains distinctively rooted in Amer- ‘Reality’ is ‘malleable’, for humankind ican philosophy. It traces its roots shapes it in terms of what proves to be especially to Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), the case, or proves to be true. ‘The true is William James (1842–1910) and John the name of whatever proves itself to be Dewey (1859–1952). Recent exponents good in the way of belief’ (Pragmatism pragmatism 240 and the Meaning of Truth, Cambridge, Unfortunately Rorty’s Philosophy and the MA: Harvard, 1975, 42). Such claims Mirror of Nature lists a very large number were highly controversial and met with of ‘allies’ who, in his own particular strong protest at the time, especially from ‘reading’ of them, lead cumulatively to British thinkers. his own view: Wittgenstein, Heideg- Dewey addressed a range of issues and ger, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryl e, areas in philosophy, but all in relation to Malcolm and Kuhn, as well as Peirce, human life and activity. He was interested James, Dewey and Putnam. Much depends in the progress of the sciences, and his on how these thinkers are ‘read’. concerns combined a background of nat- The final two chapters of this work uralism, progressivism and instrumental- question the viability of epistemology as ‘a ism or functionalism. Rorty observes, way of knowing’; all that we can hope for ‘Dewey anticipated Habermas by claiming is to use philosophy (he uses the term that there is nothing to the notion of ‘hermeneutics’ in a particular way) as ‘a objectivity save that of inter-subjective way of coping’ (ibid., 356). argreement’ (Truth and Progress, Cam- Rorty attacks ‘representational’ views of bridge: CUP, 1998, 6–7). Rorty sums up language, and reformulates truth as an issue Dewey’s view of truth as: ‘Truth as what of ‘justification’, or more strictly as what a works is the theory of truth it now pays us democratic liberal society or local (‘ethno- to have’ (ibid., 305). centric’) community accepts as a justification. Dewey’s The Theory of Inquiry (1938) Theories of truth that involve metaphysics, well reflects the American culture of the ontology or trans-contextual epistemology era of progressivism, optimism and con- are candidates for the ‘rubbish-disposal sumerism. Inquiry addresses practical pro- projects’ of American pragmatism (Truth blems of science, politics and ethics, and and Progress: Philosophical Papers,Cam- serves to create satisfaction, advantages, bridge: CUP, vol. 3, 1998, 10). goods and solutions. Older ‘theories’ of With Nietzsche, Rorty believes that truth were distractions from the business ‘what is believed to be true’ has the of practical ‘progress’ and ‘success’. ‘highest importance’; while ‘what is true’ remains a matter of indifference postmodern neopragmatism: (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, London: Pen- richard rorty guin, 1990, aphorisms 13, 23). For ‘justi- Rorty traces bridges between James and fication is always relative to an audience’ Dewey and his own thinking through (Truth and Progress, 4). ‘Truth is not a Wilfrid Sellars (1912–89) and Hilary goal of inquiry’ (ibid., 6). Ethics now Putnam (b. 1926). Sellars attacked what becomes a matter of raw consequential- he called ‘the myth of the given’, and ism; in the end, of "preference’. promoted a naturalism that bordered on a Rorty’s engagement with the post- linguistic version of behaviourism. Rorty modern emerges most clearly in his states, ‘Sellars’ attack on the Myth of the recognition that if ‘communities’ have Given seemed to me to render doubtful the become the arbiters of what counts as assumptions behind most of modern phi- ‘true’, this varies from community to losophy’ (Philosophy and the Mirror of community. Hence he combines pragma- Nature, Princeton: Princeton University tism with an emphasis on the ‘local’, or Press, 1979, xiii). ‘ethnocentric’. ‘I have tried to sketch the Putnam also queries whether tradi- connections between antirepresentational- tional notions of ‘warranted assertible ism, ethnocentrism, and the virtues of the truth-claims’ can be sustained. Truth, in socio-political culture of the liberal the end, can denote only inter-subjective democracies’ (Objectivity, Relativity and consensus on the part of communities. Truth, Cambridge: CUP, 1991, 16). All of 241 prayer this, he adds, stands in continuity with Logically, however, if it is the Spirit of Dewey. God who prompts prayer, the desires that Space prohibits counter-arguments are articulated include especially God’s here, although we may wonder whether own desires for the world, implanted in Rorty’s grand programme of ‘rubbish- the human heart by God’s Spirit. Hence disposal’ may look in twenty years’ time prayer cannot but include the expression like the proposals of Ayer about removing of a loving and caring concern for others ‘nonsense’ twenty years after Language, and for the world, which we call inter- Truth and Logic. cessory prayer on their behalf. Much stems from the particular culture Those religions that give a serious place of ‘success’, ‘winners’ and consumerism, to human fallenness and sin necessarily in some strands of liberal American recognize the role not only of confession culture. Ironically what appears to be a or acts of repentance, but also a longing tolerant pluralism has no ethical structures for a higher and better state. The Hebrew– to avoid ‘preferences’ in which in the Jewish Psalms express such longing strongest community ‘might is right’. As repeatedly: ‘As a deer longs for flowing Christopher Norris and Cornel West point streams, so my soul longs for you, O God’ out, under the pluralist surface lies a (Ps. 42:1). potentially authoritarian philosophy, prayer as ‘therapeutic which permits whatever a ‘strong’ group meditation’ or as ‘sharing wishes to be defined as ‘truth and pro- god’s providential action’ gress’. (See also postmodernity.) ? Philosophical questions arise when we prayer begin to ask whether the expression of prayer as address: varied types such longings constitutes more than of address religious or therapeutic self-adjustment through thought or thought and lan- In the broadest sense of the term, prayer is guage. Kant saw prayer as ‘conversing indispensable in religions that conceive of . . . really with oneself’ if this denotes the God in personal (or supra-personal) terms, prayer of ‘purely rational faith’ (reiner especially in Judaism, Christianity and Vernunftglaube (Religion within the Lim- Islam. For, to borrow Buber’s language, its of Reason, Eng., New York, 1960, if a relationship with God is conceived of 185). This understanding of prayer he as an I–Thou or I–You relationship (not saw as rationally acceptable. However, he merely as an I–It relationship) address viewed the ‘churchly faith (Kirchen- from God to human persons and address glaube)’ view of prayer, in which prayer from human persons to God take centre- was thought to invite changes of states of stage in a personal relationship with God. affairs within the world, as a ‘super- Address to God may take numerous stitious illusion’. forms: praise, confession, worship, adora- In Kant’s philosophical system this tion, thanksgiving, confession, lament, view is entailed by his belief that God complaint; request and intercession repre- does not act ‘within’ the supposed causal sent only two of ten selected modes of network of events that we call ‘the world’. address. Prayer in its highest sense is Indeed the very notion of cause and effect prompted not only by desires for benefit is a merely regulative principle in terms of or blessings, but by desire for God as God. which the human mind seeks to under- In many sacred writings this desire is stand the world as ‘ordered’. D.Z. Phillips ascribed to the action of God’s own Spirit, stresses the importance of self-adjustment who brings this desire to prayerful speech in prayer (The Concept of Prayer, Lon- (e.g. Rom. 8:15; Gal. 4:6). don: Routledge, 1965, 63, 64). prayer 242

If Kant is right, however, the constantly asking? Edgar Brightman voiced the criti- recurring address ‘Thou’ or ‘You’ becomes cism that petition may seem to imply that a merely fictive device for focusing med- we request God to ‘improve’. itation and self-adjustment. Vincent Bru¨ m- First, some kinds of may mer argues that its use would be not only perhaps fall into this category. These are illusory but also logically self-contradic- the kinds of prayers discussed below under tory and a denial of much religious ethical objections and the problem of experience (What Are we Doing When manipulative prayers. we Pray? A Philosophical Enquiry, Lon- Second, if God inspires the articulation don: SCM, 1984, 16–28). What is at issue, of prayer and longing through God’s own Bru¨ mmer argues, is quite simply whether Spirit, as Bru¨ mmer argues (above) prayer it makes sense to conceive of God as a may be understood as a co-sharing in personal agent. seeking the good of the world (What Are Several of Bru¨ mmer’s works explicitly we Doing When we Pray, chs. 5–7, 60– argue for this view of divine personal 113). If, then, God seeks ‘the best possible agency (e.g. Speaking of a Personal God, for the world’, ‘the best possible’ is not a Cambridge: CUP, 1992; The Model of fixed a priori quantity. In Brightman’s Love, Cambridge: CUP, 1993). It is no words, ‘The best possible when men pray accident that for Kant notions of God turn is better than the best possible when men on issues of reason and law, whereas do not pray’ (A Philosophy of Religion, Bru¨ mmer sees love as standing at the heart London: Skeffington, n.d., 236). of a mutual, reciprocal relationship Hence human self-involvement and between God and humankind. Hence shared concern for God’s reign and for prayer not only expresses the adoration the well-being of others becomes a neces- and desires of love, but also leads to events sary constituent in what God wills as ‘the that enhance its experience. best’. Brightman alludes to the role of ‘a God chooses to act, Bru¨ mmer argues, praying community who sighs and yearns within a context of mutual concern, of with the yearning compassion of the heart which the very act of asking provides of his (and our) world’ (ibid., 237). This evidence. Indeed, ‘intercession is a prayer lies behind injunctions to pray in all the in which the person who prays both asks great theistic religions. God’s Spirit places God to act on behalf of the [other] person a ‘divine discontent’ within, which prayer . . . and also makes himself available as a articulates (cf. Rom. 8:15–16, 22–7). secondary cause through whom God could ethical objections to act in answering the prayer’ (What Are we petitionary and intercessory Doing When we Pray? 57). Prayer is prayer sharing God’s providential action within the world. It has long been urged that prayer may be why pray to an omniscient, all- used to try to impose subjective notions of wise, all-loving god? good and evil, prompted by self-interest, onto the governance of the world. Hobbes If God already knows the needs of (1588–1679) declared, ‘Every man calleth humankind, and if God already wills the that which pleaseth “good”; and that best for humankind, why is prayer neces- “evil” which displeaseth him’ (Human sary or appropriate? Is it not self-contra- Nature, 1650, VII: 3). More sharply, dictory to call God omniscient and to tell Nietzsche (1844–1900) saw religion, God of our needs? Is it not an affront to including prayer, as a manipulative device ask God to act in goodness when God is employed to secure power: ‘The “salva- already all-loving? If God is all-wise and tion of the soul” in plain English [German] all-good, will not God give without our “the world revolves around me”’ (The 243 prayer

Antichrist,inComplete Works, 18 vols., issues of logic, personhood and address London: Allen & Unwin, 1909–13, vol. which such a view bypasses or contradicts. 16, 186, aphorism 43). God, it is argued, The issue turns on different under- is transposed into a means to achieve the standings of divine action. Keith Ward ends of one who prays. convincingly argues that even as Creator It is easier to apply this criticism to of a billion galaxies whose reality we certain petitionary prayers for the self than cannot fully grasp, God nevertheless to intercessory prayers for others. Never- relates to humans ‘by knowledge, feeling theless, even prayer for others can be and will . . . by complete empathy’ and ‘loaded’ to serve either self-interest or also through divine action (Divine Action, fallible misjudgements, and in triumphal- London: Collins, 1990, 155). The vastness ist religion prayer for power, money, of the universe and the mysterious trans- possessions – ‘success’ in various forms – cendence of God, far from disengaging has occurred from the Magical Papyri of divine action from the world, suggest that the ancient Hellenistic mystery religions to such a transcendent, intricate mind com- sectarian religions (often associated with prehends every detail of the created uni- commercial media) today. verse (cf. Mt. 6:25–32). A prayer is selfish, however, only if, in The notion that God acts in the world Brightman’s phrase, ‘it seeks to take a only by ‘suspending’ so-called laws of benefit from another or to exclude another nature rests on a mechanistic model of from a benefit’. Ethical objections do not the universe as a ‘closed’ system. Keith address authentic prayer, prompted by Ward examines the inadequacy and dated God or by desires implanted by God’s status of such an approach in his chapter Spirit. They address only the abuse of ‘The Death of a Closed Universe’ (Divine prayer for self-centred or manipulative Action, ch. 5). Technical scientific support ends. It may be that this criticism implies that defends notions concerning the plas- a warning against undue specificity in ticity of a post-Newtonian, post-Einstei- precisely defining in human terms what nian universe can be found in Arthur R. we seek from God. Peacocke, CreationandtheWorldof Finally, the claim that placing issues in Science (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979). the hands of God weakens moral effort If ‘laws of nature’ are prescriptive runs counter to the public findings of the rather than descriptive, as Boyce Gibson varied phenomena of religions. To claim, observes, ‘Nothing that ever happens only for example, that Jesus, Paul the Apostle, once or for the first time . . . can ever be Augustine or Luther diminished moral caused or a cause’ (Theism and Empiri- effort because they placed everything in the cism, London: SCM, 1970, 149). Pannen- hands of God runs counter to the trans- berg applies this principle to the event of parent facts of the matter. Examples could the resurrection of Jesus Christ, which be multiplied from other religions also. is normally held to be definitive for Christian belief. Even the classical pre- prayer and divine action in the modern theologians (e.g. Augustine and world Thomas Aquinas) insisted that divine We noted above that Kant dismissed action within the world is not ‘contrary ‘ecclesial prayer’ (i.e. that which church- to nature’ (contra naturam) but utilizes people ‘superstitiously’ think will contri- natural regularities to work ‘through bute change within the world) because his nature’ (per naturam). view of God as ‘outside’ the world could prayer and speech-acts not accommodate it. ‘Rational’ prayer, Kant believed, consisted primarily in self- The personal dimension of I–Thou address adjustment through meditation. We noted provides the overarching context in which predicate, predication 244 prayer may be understood as embracing a principle of falsification as empirical or multitude of functions, e.g. praise, thanks- ‘scientific’ tests for the efficacy of prayer. giving, confession, petition, intercession, He writes: ‘The only claim that would be meditation, lament, expressions of long- open to falsification would be the claim ing. The problem of divine omniscience that God invariably grants whatever we not only involves problems and counter- ask’ (What Are we Doing When we Pray, replies identified above, but is also seen in 5). However, prayer is misunderstood if it a new light when the concept of speech is viewed mechanistically, almost as a acts is applied to many (not to all) matter of cause and effect. functions and types of prayer. The very attempt to test it in this way In such an example as ‘I confess . . .’ or would presuppose that it is thought of as a ‘I repent . . .’ the utterance does not serve manipulative device in which God to inform God of what God may already responds, in effect, to human wishes and know. It constitutes an act of confession, control. However, all that has been said or an act of repentance. More profoundly, about prayer suggests the very reverse of it may be compared with how the utter- this. Prayer involves the self in a shared, ance ‘I love you’ usually serves not to co-operative vision for the good of the inform the addressee about an attitude or whole of God’s creation. A mechanistic emotion, but as an act of love. Hence to view would obstruct, and detract from, reply ‘I know that already’ is to demon- the role of God’s freedom, goodness, strate that the force of the utterance has sovereignty and love. been misunderstood. Frequently it invites reciprocal linguistic action: ‘And I love predicate, predication you’. ‘Predicate’ denotes what is asserted of a To portray prayer as a communicative subject. The proposition ‘God is good’ act in many (but not in all) contexts is predicates ‘good’ of God. In the formal thereby to be reminded that the ‘therapeu- logic of categorical propositions, the tic meditation’ approach does not embrace logical form ‘S is P’ (subject is predicate) all valid forms of prayer. On the other allow the variables of sentences to be ex- hand, as Phillips reminds us, self-involve- pressed as the logical form of a proposition. ment and self-adjustment constitute an In the context of other systems of important part of distinctive logical gram- logical notion, the symbol ‘F’ may be mar of prayer. It is not simply ‘asking for predicated of the variables x or y.(Fx.Fy) things’. might represent ‘Paul is good, and Seneca Most of the philosophical difficulties of is good’. ‘Predicate calculus’ in formal this subject relate not to God-inspired or logic moves beyond propositional logic to to Spirit-inspired prayer, but to abuses or include quantifiers, connectives or other misuses of prayer merely for personal logical constants and functions or rela- enhancement or even for manipulatory tions. (See also syllogism.) purposes. Above all, in the major theistic religions it constitutes a co-sharing and co- desiring for God’s will for the world, as process philosophy well as adoration and the expression of If process philosophy is defined simply as acts of devotion and love. a philosophical approach which empha- can the efficacy of prayer be sizes ‘becoming’ and change rather than ‘being’, it might appear that tested empirically? (c.540–425bce) and perhaps Hegel Bru¨ mmer, among others, demonstrates (1770–1831) are process philosophers. why we cannot expect to be able to apply Yet, with additional themes in modern either the principle of verification or the thought, such an emphasis upon change 245 Pseudo-Dionysius and event rather than upon states of One strength of process philosophy is a affairs and objects does provide a com- simultaneous desire to reconcile contra- mon thread through various examples of dictions and apparently conflicting argu- process thought. Typically, Whitehead ments or inferences from evidence, while (1861–1947) and Hartshorne (1897– at the same time avoiding ‘timeless’ 2000) are core figures of this philosophy. abstraction. In philosophy of religion, Such thinkers as Bergson (1859–1941), probably the most creative and construc- Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) and perhaps tive of the Process philosophers for refor- John Dewey (1859–1952) stand in a mulating concepts of God remains broader relation to the movement. Hartshorne. (See also matrerialism; Whitehead, Bergson and Hart- omnipotence; omniscience; science shorne are discussed in fuller detail in and religion; teleological argu- the entries under their respective names. ment; transcendence.) Morgan saw the organic life of the world as ‘emergent’. ‘Emergents’ appear through Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) discontinuities in process of evolution. Following the model of Whitehead he The author of the writings traditionally sought to combine natural science and attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite philosophy to formulate a notion of an (convert of Paul, cf. Acts 17:34) is ongoing cosmology in process. unknown, even if the traditional ascrip- Whitehead’s ‘event ontology’, tion to Dionysius was accepted until the expounded in his Process and Reality modern era. The writings combine Neo- (1927), is perhaps the nearest to a classic platonism and mysticism, with a strong text of process philosophy. Process thin- appeal to the via negativa in language kers tend to follow Whitehead in throwing in religion. their net widely to embrace all experience, The four treatises and ten letters that are including that of natural science as well as extant present a view of the world and of logic and philosophy. In accordance with mystical perfection, and emphasize divine Bergson’s e´lan vital and ‘open’ systems, transcendence. God is beyond human process thinkers tend to reject a determin- language and beyond conceptual thought. ism that traces every event to an ante- Nevertheless, God is light that is shed upon cedent cause. the All, and love that enfolds all. Either misplaced abstraction or ‘mis- The via negativa, or way of negation, placed concretion’ can lead respectively to ensures that God, the First Cause, is not a static ontology or to a materialist world- reduced to the status of ‘a being’ among view. While process philosophy rejects other beings. However, Christian scripture materialist ontology, ‘God’ is not usually also reveals positive insights, and Pseudo- identified with the personal, transcendent Dionysius combines the via negativa with God of classical theism. Certainly God is pre-conceptual mystical theology. not unilaterally sovereign, as if to deny Within the world there is ordered some reciprocal interaction between God ranking and conceptual distinction. How- and the world. Nevertheless, there are ever, light and love, rather than conceptual important differences within the process knowledge, lead beyond the world to God. approach. Whereas in Whitehead, ‘God’ Order and hierarchy within the world tends to be a limiting boundary to limitless reflect a ‘celestial hierarchy’ that is a ‘holy possibilities, in Hartshorne we come closer order’ (The Celestial Hierarchy, III: 1): to the God of theism, except that in the seraphim, cherubim, dominions, powers, dialectic of becoming and perfection archangels and angels. there is no room for a ‘hard’ doctrine of The Christian Platonism of Pseudo- divine immutability. Dionysius influenced , Pseudo-Dionysius 246

Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and knowledge of God is reached through Peter Lombard, while his hierarchies find negation of all that is less than God and resonances in Dante and in Milton. Unity by mystical understanding (Pseudo-Diony- and order are derived from God, but sius, The Mystical Theology). Q

some philosophers’ or ‘for at least one quantifiers philosopher’. The logical notation would Quantifiers are logical operators in the then read (Ex)(xT). Its negation would formal logic of predicate calculus. An read: (Ex)(~xT). The universal quantifier existential quantifier serves to indicate that is usually denoted simply as (x). Thus (x) a proposition of formal logic states some- (xT) states the logical form of ‘for all thing about ‘at least one thing’. A universal philosophers, philosophers are theists’, or quantifier serves to indicate that the pro- ‘All philosophers are theists.’ The logical position states something about ‘every- form of its denial is (x)(~xT). thing’, or more strictly, about everything This introduction of quantification that is instantiated by the entity within the develops propositional calculus into proposition that the quantifier ‘binds’. predicate calculus by recognizing that Traditional formal logic frequently dis- predication is not all of one kind. By also tinguished between universal assertions or serving to ‘bracket out’ the issue of universal denials and particular assertions existence from the central proposition, and particular denials. These are Euler’s Russell (1872–1970) developed this well-known ‘A’ and ‘E’ logical classes of logical device to limit the logical scope of propositions respectively (‘All philoso- terms in such examples as ‘a round square phers are theists’ and ‘No philosopher is does not exist’ (i.e. it is false to assert a theist’) and also respectively ‘I’ and ‘O’ that an x exists which is such that ‘round’ propositions (‘Some philosophers are the- and ‘square’ can be predicated of it ists’ and ‘It is not the case that some simultaneously). Russell applies this philosophers are theists’). further in his theory of definite descrip- If the logical variable (‘philosophers’) is tions (e.g. ‘The present King of France is represented by the logical symbol x, and . . .’). For a critique of Russell on descrip- the predicate (‘is/are theist’) is denoted by tions, see the entry on Strawson.(See T, the existential quantifier may be also instantiation and further details symbolized by (Ex)or( E x) to signify ‘for under Russell.) R

Ra¯ma¯nuja (c. 1017–1137) (moksha) is not finally dependent on the absorption of the true, inner, self (a¯tman) Together with S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ (788–820), Ra¯ma¯- into the All by sheer identification with it. nuja remains one of the two most influen- Against S´an˙ ka¯ra¯,Ra¯ma¯nuja insists that tial thinkers of Hindu philosophy of his the phenomenon of ‘difference’ (bheda)or era. In contrast to S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s exposition ‘differentiation’ does not necessarily arise and defence of ‘non-dualist’ monism (the from ‘illusion’ (ma¯ ya¯ ). ‘Knowledge’ Avaita Vedanta school), Ra¯ ma¯ nuja (vidya¯) reveals more than the negative expounds and defends a ‘qualified mon- property of ‘superimposing’ (adhya¯sa) ism’ (Vis´ista¯ dvaita, or Vis´ista-advaita misleading perceptions onto genuine ones. Vedanta). This permits a more theistic version of ontology than is possible ra¯ ma¯ nuja’s commentary on the within S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s system. brahma-su¯tras opposition to monism and to Among the nine or more of Ra¯ma¯nuja’s writings the Sribha¯sya, his commentary on s´an˙ ka¯ ra¯’s method of defending ˙ it the Brahma-Su¯ tras of Badarayana, is gen- erally recognized as among the most Both Ra¯ ma¯ nuja and S´ an˙ ka¯ ra¯ remain important, together with the Gita¯-Bha¯sya, within the tradition of Hindu sacred his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita˙ , scripture (s´ruti), namely the Vedic texts, and the Veda¯rthasangraha, his commen- including the Upanis¸ads. However, actual tary on the Upanis¸ads. (On these terms, and potential ambiguities and ambiva- see the entry on Hindu philosophy.) lences in these sacred texts permit wide The Su¯ tras embody succinct aphorisms, divergences of philosophical interpreta- which can yield a diversity of interpreta- tion and ‘re-reading’. Hence Ra¯ma¯nuja tions. Prior to the work of Ra¯ma¯nuja, strenuously opposes the monist view of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s commentary supported the tra- brahman that S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ expounds on the dition that bra¯hman, or Ultimate Reality, basis of these texts, and founds a very is absolute Oneness, Spirit or conscious- different tradition of interpretation. ness, beside which, and within which, Ra¯ma¯nuja opposes S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s ontology ‘difference’ was either illusory, or at best, in which Ultimate Reality is uncharacter- part of a provisional, non-ultimate, phe- izable as ‘undifferentiated consciousness’ nomenal world. The external world (nirguna bra¯hma). Liberation or ‘release’ belongs to this provisional order, but the 249 Ramsey, Ian Thomas spiritual self in humankind may become had emphasized the role of ‘selfless deeds’. identified with bra¯hman. There is a sense in which it is possible to Ra¯ma¯nuja denies neither the reality of speak of ‘the will of God’. Bhakti requires the world nor the reality of the indivi- meditation on God, not ecstatic states duality of self. He questions the notion of which bypass consciousness on the part of an all-pervasive impersonal monism that the self. excludes a theistic God. He promotes an Although he stressed ceremonial duties understanding of the second aphorism of in religion less explicitly than may char- the Brahma-Su¯ tra that interprets it to acterize much Hindu thought today, mean that bra¯hman is ‘the supreme Person Ra¯ ma¯ nuja’s philosophy coheres more who is ruler of all, whose nature is readily with such practices than a number antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes of other older philosophical traditions. It come true, who possesses infinite . . . has been suggested that his philosophy, qualities such as knowledge . . . who is more than most in Hindu traditions, omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merci- offers a foundation that coheres with ful’. ‘devotional theism’. (See also Absolute; Buddhist philosophy; dualism; God, commentaries on the upanis¸ads concepts and ‘attributes’ of; objec- and on the bhagavad gita tivity; omnipotence; omnipresence; Ra¯ma¯nuja’s commentary on the Upani- omniscience; panentheism; pantheism; s¸ads, the Veda¯rthasangraha, is more expli- theism.) cit. In the S´veta¯s´vetara Upanis¸ad, monism is ‘modified’ because bra¯hman is genuinely Ramsey, Ian Thomas differentiated by instantiation respec- (1915–72) tively in the empirical subject (bhokr), the objective world (bhogya), and the˙ Ramsey, born in Bolton in England, taught power of initiating agency or causation at Oxford and Cambridge, and became (preritr). professor at Oxford in 1951, and also ˙ Since all of these instantiate bra¯hman, Canon Theologian of Leicester Cathedral. Ra¯ma¯nuja does not fully abandon mon- His aim at Oxford was to engage in ism, in contrast, for example, to the constructive dialogue initially with logical Dvaita (dualist) tradition of Madhva (c. positivists and their demands for empirical 1238–1317). Yet it is a carefully qualified criteria of meaning, and later with a or modified monism (Visista-advaita), in broader linguistic philosophical move- contrast to ‘monism’ (Advaita Vedanta) or ment, while demonstrating the intelligibil- the ‘pure’ or ‘radical’ monism (Sudhad- ity of language in religion concerning vaita) of Vallabha¯ca¯rya (1479–1531). the God who is beyond the empirical Matter in all its forms constitutes, in world. effect, ‘the body’ of God. In accordance Ramsey’s book Religious Language with most Vedic traditions, individual bore the subtitle An Empirical Placing of ‘souls’ are ‘eternal’ (nitya), and may Theological Phrases (London: SCM, experience successive stages of reincarna- 1957). Religious language utilizes every- tion. The status of non-sentient matter is day ‘object language’, but through the use less clear, but ‘release’ (moksha) is more of ‘strange qualifications’ is extended and akin to a heavenly mode of being than to modified in such a way that it commu- S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s notions of absorption into, and nicates disclosures of God (ibid., 19–48). identity with, brahman. By means of interaction between the two In his commentary on the Bhagavad universes of discourses a ‘disclosure situa- Gita,Ra¯ma¯ nuja stresses the path of tion’ may occur of the kind of which we religious devotion (bhakti), where S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ say ‘the penny drops’, ‘the ice breaks’, ‘it rationalism 250 came alive’ (ibid., 23). It is like the selfhood; or, yet differently again, to experience of ‘seeing’ components ‘as’ a postmodernity. Gestalt (ibid., 24). This approach antici- In the history of ideas a fundamental pated some insights of Ricoeur (b. 1913). philosophical contrast can be drawn A central chapter expounds ‘models between the rationalism of Descartes and qualifiers’ (ibid., 49–89). Thus we (1596–1650), and more broadly of may apply ‘cause’ to God as a model of Spinoza (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646– divine creation; but must qualify this as 1716), and the empiricism of Locke ‘first’ cause (ibid., 61–5). God is ‘wise’ (1632–1704), Berkeley (1685–1753) (model), but ‘infinitely’ wise (qualifier) or and Hume (1711–76). The former stress ‘infinitely good’ (ibid., 65–71). ‘Purpose’, a priori deductive reasoning; the latter, a applied to God, is ‘eternal purpose’. The posteriori inferences from experience remainder of this work explores this and observation. However, Locke also principle in biblical and theological or stresses ‘reason’ and ‘reasonableness’ as a doctrinal language. major criterion in contrast to sheer feeling, In 1966 Ramsey became Bishop of while Hume explores ‘instrumental’ rea- Durham, the year in which he gave the son as ‘the slave of the passions’. lectures Models for Divine Activity (Lon- rationalism in contrast to don: SCM, 1973). While Bishop of Dur- empiricism ham he continued to explore language and models (Words about God, London: SCM, From the thought of Descartes flow two 1971) as well as work on religion and types of rationalism. First, as a distin- science. His unstinting hard work as guished mathematician, he sought ‘clear bishop and academic may have contrib- and distinct’ ideas, which were certain. By uted to a premature death in October contrast, sense-experience (experience 1972 (cf. David Edwards, Ian Ramsey, mediated to the mind through the five Oxford: OUP, 1973; and Jerry H. Gill, Ian senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and Ramsey: To Speak Responsibly to God, smell) appeared to be ‘obscured and London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). (See also confused’; it is fallible and capable of analytical philosophy; Ayer; empiri- deception (see certainty and doubt). cism; God, concepts and ‘attributes’ Second, Descartes employed the meth- of; logical positivism; myth.) odological tool of doubt in order to peel away those inherited assumptions drawn from history and tradition that were less rationalism certain, upon closer scrutiny, than many Loosely and broadly rationalism denotes assumed. At least ‘once in a life-time’, we the view that human reason constitutes must ‘demolish everything and start again the major arbiter or court of appeal (or at right from the foundations’, in order that very least, a major arbiter) for determining ‘these remain nothing but what is certain whether a given system of beliefs or set of indubitable’ (Meditations, La Salle: Open propositions is true or false. However, this Court, 1901, II, 31). broad definition is of little value until we After all has been stripped away, specify to what it stands in contrast. Descartes cannot doubt that he exists as In philosophy of religion this may be in a ‘thinking being’ (cogito ergo sum, ibid., contrast to empiricism (to the criterion of II). Hence the rationalism of Descartes sense-experience); to revelation (to stands in contrast equally to empiricism divineself-disclosureasgift); totraditions (sense-experience) and to inherited value- (to inherited systems of belief); or to systems and traditions. On the other hand, post-Enlightenment concerns about as Gadamer points out, the ‘ideas’ Des- history, life and inter-subjective cartes submits to this method of doubt do 251 rationalism not include ‘God’ and moral values: a work of the Deists, Matthew Tindal point that is often overlooked in discus- (1653–1733) and John Toland (1670– sions of his thought. Gadamer urges that 1722), and the philosophical and social this method is largely appropriate to the critiques of Voltaire (1694–1778). Voltaire sciences. waged war against intolerance in the name In the eighteenth century this episte- of humanism, but also tended in the mological device (i.e. a way of exploring direction of a relativistic individualism the foundations of knowledge) over- and non-mechanist view of the world. stepped the boundaries of a theory of locke, reasonableness and the knowledge to become, in effect, a world- framework of human life view, often associated with deism or even anti-religious attitudes. It came to elevate Locke remained an empiricist, but on individual autonomy over against either matters of the justification of belief firmly revelation or the supposedly privileged stressed that ‘entitlement’ to believe knowledge derived from doctrines or from depends on the ‘reasonableness’ of what inherited institutions. is believed. Reason and argument test kant and enlightenment claims to truth; not mere intensity of rationalism conviction or rhetoric. As a theist who wrote a commentary on Paul’s Epistles, he Kant (1724–1804) provided a classic is not far from the multiple Anglican definition of what is meant by the criteria of scripture, reason and tradition ‘Enlightenment’ (Aufkla¨rung). It is ‘man’s or common sense, and can be called exodus from his self-incurred tutelage. ‘rationalist’ only in a moderate and Tutelage is the inability to use one’s relative sense in promoting a concern for understanding without the guidance of ‘reasonableness’. another person . . . “Have the courage to In 1960 Gadamer published his semi- use your own understanding”: this is the nal work Truth and Method (2nd Eng. ed., motto of the Enlightenment’. In due 1989) on hermeneutics. In this work a course such a spirit, whether in terms of further nuance emerges in understanding reason (Voltaire) or feeling (Rousseau) ‘rationalism’. Gadamer pointed out that nurtured the sense of individual free while the major stream of philosophy thought and autonomy that was related followed Descartes until the end of the in ethics and politics to the French nineteenth century in stressing reason, Revolution (1789). logic, individual consciousness, deduc- Whether Kant himself can or should be tive reasoning, abstraction and knowl- called a rationalist is debatable. On one edge, a minority tradition sought to side he rejected Hume’s account of sense- recover the kind of insights represented experience, and wrote: ‘Philosophical by (1668–1744). Vico knowledge is knowledge gained by reason stressed the importance of history, life, from concepts’(Critique of Pure Reason, community experience, inherited value, 1781). On the other hand his notion of traditions and wisdom. reason as a mere ‘rule, prescribing a Hermeneutics acknowledges the role of regress’, or ‘a regulative principle’, reduces reason, but regards Enlightenment ration- its nature and scope substantially from alism as individualistic, abstract and shal- that assumed by Descartes, Leibniz and low. It overlooks questions of time and most pre-Kantian writers. history, which Hegel, Dilthey and others In place of the rationalism of Descartes, raised. Even appeals to ‘authority’, Spinoza and Leibniz, Enlightenment Gadamer asserts, are not a matter of rationalism emerged as more sceptical ‘tutelage’ (in the pejorative sense in Kant), and critical. We need only compare the but of making a rational and reasonable rationality 252 assumption that ‘others may know more independently of the human mind, i.e. in than I’ about what I seek to understand. the external world? This entirely healthy insight had begun Plato (428–348 bce) assumes the to gain some recognition when it was truth of realism in his doctrine of Ideas. overtaken, and given a new direction, by Ideas that enter the mind are like shadows postmodernity. Here ‘reason’ became sub- or images cast on the wall of a cave by an ordinated to historical situatedness. Issues external reality outside the mind (Repub- of race, class, gender, culture and histor- lic, bk VII). The real world is outside the ical era that shape the frame within which cave. The universal and abstract provides reason operates become more important the perfect Forms of which human repre- than reason itself. sentations in language or in art are mere Philosophical claims concerning rational copies, which fall short of the original and reflection now risk assimilation into a Absolute. sociology of knowledge, and even philoso- A plausible example comes from geo- phy of religion would risk becoming sociol- metry. A perfect circle transcends any ogy of religion if all claims for the validity particular approximation to a perfect of rational reflection were subordinated to circle that might be drawn in everyday social and historical forces. In post-modern life or even by an architect. A beautiful approaches ‘rational’ tends to become a person or beautiful object approximates in devalued term, as against its overvalued role terms of degree to the perfect beauty of the in Enlightenment rationalism. Ideal Form of Beauty that constitutes the Rationalism, it appears, is a slippery universal. word, the very diverse meanings and Few philosophers, however, have held assessments of which need to be carefully such an unqualified realism. From Aris- distinguished, especially in the light of totle to Abelard a series of modified different contexts of thought. (See also versions of realism have been formulated epistemology; theism.) (see conceptualism). Some role must be accorded to ways in which human ideas rationality and concepts shape and construe what we perceive. The climax of this line of See reason. thought occurs in Kant (1724–1804), who understood the categories of our realism, critical realism understanding as regulative mechanisms The slippery term ‘realism’ has at least of the mind that ordered and shape two or three different contexts of thought thought and experience. This becomes that shape its meaning differently. Its radicalized partly in Fichte and fully in classical meaning stands in contrast to non-realist postmodernism. nominalism, and belongs primarily but With the dawn of the modern period, not exclusively to the period of philosophy several other contexts of thought have from Plato to medieval scholasticism. served to redefine realism, although gen- The point at issue in this first context erally with shared features. If the contrast concerns the status of ‘universals’, i.e. between realism and nominalism turns concepts, ideas or definitions that seek to largely on the status of language about identify essences rather than depending for universals, the contrast between realism their meaning directly on particular and idealism turns on the status of ideas objects, events or cases. Are such univer- in epistemology, or theories of knowl- sals anything more than mental, logical, edge. Idealism (as a broad term) proposes semantic or conceptual constructions of that material objects as we perceive them the human mind? Do they convey genuine do not exist but are derived from our reality (Latin, res, a thing) that exists consciousness of them. 253 reason, reasonableness

This epistemological idealism gener- rationalism. Even the word ‘reason’ car- ated a counter-reactive realism at the ries multiple meanings. ‘Reason’ is often beginning of the twentieth century among used to denote the capacity to pass from such thinkers as G.E. Moore, Russell and premises to logical conclusions. Kant William James. Moore’s ‘Refutation of (1724–1804) sets this discursive or infer- Idealism’ (1903) represented what has ential reason in contrast to human under- been called ‘Common-Sense Realism’ or standing and judgement. object ‘the New Realism’. An of knowl- theoretical and ‘practical’ edge, Moore urged, does not depend upon reason a subject–object relation of knowledge. Such concepts or ideas as Bradley’s claim The distinction between ‘theoretical’ rea- that ‘time is unreal’ is undermined by our son and ‘practical’ reason is explicit in habit of always taking breakfast ‘before’ Kant, but has an earlier history which lunch, both in logic and in reality. reaches back to Aristotle (384–322 Idealists were quick to point out that bce). It also features implicitly in the the ‘raw’ object of perception, or ‘raw’ Judaeo-Christian biblical writings. On sensation, was not a series of pre-shaped one side, positively, reason cannot and ‘objects’, but a bare sense-datum awaiting should not be equated with wisdom interpretation. There is nothing ‘common (Hebrew chokmah; Greek, phrone¯sis and sense’ about thoroughgoing realism that sophia). A person may be skilled in logic, minimizes or evaporates the role of the but lack wisdom and judgement in daily ‘ordering’ of sense-data or ‘experience’ by life. On the other side, this paves the way the mind. (See the entry on conceptual- for a purely instrumental role for reason. ism, where it is suggested that intermedi- Hume (1711–76) accords to it the status ate positions may be more akin with of being the ‘slave of the passions’. ‘common sense’). This instrumental use is conveyed by The related term ‘critical realism’is the narrow Greek term techne¯, which no less slippery. The term properly denotes stands in contrast to phrone¯sis. In modern the belief that there is more to reality than philosophy this distinction is explored by what we perceive or know. In one sense it Gadamer (1900–2002) in hermeneutics reflects a commonsense acceptance of the and by Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929) in view that for finite beings epistemology is moral philosophy and ‘virtue’ ethics. unlikely to be necessarily co-extensive historical reason with ontology. Further, as a small step in the direction of conceptualism, it A turning-point is reached not only with suggests that some general terms (for Kant, but no less with Hegel (1770–1831). example ‘society’) denote more than the Reason is not ‘instrumental’ for Hegel, but particulars that contribute to it (in this explains the nature of reality. This in itself example, individual persons). In theology is not the turning point, for it reaffirms a there is a danger that the term is becoming theme of ancient philosophy. More to the overextended (like ‘foundationalism’ point, reason manifests itself as historical and ‘praxis’). (See also Cupitt; Berkeley; reason within finite human life. Its nature Duns Scotus; Hegel; logic; non-rea- and operation are conditioned by its lism; Schelling; semantics.) situatedness in the historical flow of life, in which social and cultural factors shape its capacities and its horizons. reason, reasonableness Ironically, Hegel’s elevation of reason, Reason and rationality should not be side by side with his recognition of confused with the philosophical move- ‘historicality’ (how human thinking is ments of rationalism or Enlightenment radically conditioned by one’s place within reason, reasonableness 254 history) led to a devaluation of reason by faith and reason’ are needed to contradict the ‘left-wing’ Hegelians, and paved the uncontrolled ‘enthusiasm’ and intolerance way for a radical underestimate of the that ‘divides mankind’ (ibid., 18: 11). capacities of reason in many examples of Locke defines ‘enthusiasm’ in religion as postmodernism. Radical post-modern ‘zeal for the irrational’, when ‘groundless thinkers tend to place more emphasis on opinion’ is fancied to be ‘illumination the constitutive and regulative power of from the Spirit of God’ (ibid., 19: 6). A social, political, gender-generated and rational understanding of what it is economic forces. In extreme form, tradi- ‘reasonable’ to expect to know also tional philosophy is almost replaced by a addresses some false assumptions behind quasi-causal sociology. sceptism – for scepticism often arises when inflated claims to knowledge cannot be ‘reasonableness’, rationality sustained. and reason: locke reason and tradition Nevertheless, the importance of human rationality and criteria of ‘reasonableness’ Wolterstorff points out that Locke sus- surface repeatedly in the histories of tained a broader view of the relation philosophy and religion, and in philoso- between inherited tradition and critical phy of religion. A hugely important, but reason than did descartes (1596–1650). often unduly neglected, figure in this Descartes approached the issue of the need context is Locke (1632–1704). Wolter- for certain, demonstrable knowledge most storff has drawn attention to this in his especially in the natural sciences. Hence John Locke and the Ethics of Belief the tradition of rationalism in a narrower (1996). sense may be traced loosely from Des- Towards the end of book IV of his cartes through Leibniz to the Enlight- Essay Concerning Human Understanding enment thinkers of the late seventeenth (1690), Locke points out that mere inten- and eighteenth centuries, including the sity of conviction is no criterion for the deists and the French Encyclopaedists. truth of a belief. Prior to his conversion, Descartes himself does not fully advo- Paul the Apostle was passionately con- cate the autonomy that characterized vinced of the need to stamp out the Enlightenment attitudes and Kant. Never- emerging Christian community (ibid., IV: theless, in spite of his theism, his meth- 19: 2). odological individualism made way for it. Locke recognized that ‘reason’ has On the other side, by contrast, Hegel’s multiple meanings (ibid., IV: 17: 1). In a emphasis on historical processes disen- purely logical, inferential, sense, and tied gaged issues about reason from this ‘time- to the ‘syllogism’, reason may prove to less’ individualism centred on the subject be restrictive by appearing to confine all of the knowledge. ‘knowledge’ to that smaller segment of Gadamer insists that it is entirely utterly ‘certain’, demonstrable truths of reasonable and rational to give due regard rationalism (ibid., 4–7). On the other to tradition and to inherited knowledge. hand, used as a critical, regulative tool to To pretend to strip away the tested beliefs permit exploration within critical limits, of others is mere impoverishment, since we need reason ‘for the enlargement of our reason itself, as Locke affirmed, could act knowledge and regulating our assent’ as a critical filter for ‘reasonable’ (rather (ibid., 2). than wholly demonstrable) belief. It is Reason, Locke argued, is of major widely recognized today that even in the importance in resisting both scepticism natural sciences the part played by com- and undue dogmatism, as well as religious munities and social resources cannot be ‘enthusiasm’. ‘Boundaries . . . between ignored. 255 religion, religious experience reason and faith sentence, statement, or longer stretches of Expressed in these terms, Locke and language – as the basic unit of meaning. A Gadamer provide a wider framework second problem arises from the fact that it and context for understanding the relation may work well (or appears to do so) only between reason and faith than the more in certain segments of language. In his ‘two-storey’ model towards which even later work Wittgenstein observes that if Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) is in danger ‘naming something is like attaching a label of veering. On the other hand, Aquinas to a thing’, this may work for nouns such expresses the view common to Judaism, as ‘table’, ‘chair’, or ‘bread’, but what Christian theology and Islamic philoso- about exclamations, abstractions, or phy when he distinguishes between truths mathematical formulae (Philosophical accessible to humankind only through Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1957, revelation (especially in scriptural texts) sects. 15, 27; broadly sects. 1–49)? Third, and truths about the existence of God, ‘One has already to know . . . something in which cohere with ‘natural reason’ order to be capable of asking a thing’s (Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 2, 11; and name’ (ibid., sect. 30). Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 12, arts. Wittgenstein’s last point is that the 1–13). satisfactory operation of referential Aquinas concludes: ‘God is known to meaning presupposes a more sophisticated the natural reason through the images of prior level of linguistic competency, from ostensive his effects . . . Knowledge of God in his which it is a derivation (see definition essence is a gift of grace . . . Human ). knowledge by the revelation of grace’ In philosophy of religion, two opposite (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 12, art. 13). misunderstandings are to be avoided. One Further issues are discussed under is the assumption that if a word such as natural theology.(See also certainty ‘God’ is not at once clear in meaning as an and doubt; deism; Ibn Sina; al-Farabi; ‘object of reference’, this by no means al-Kindi.) implies that there are no other ways of explaining the meaning. The second mis- take would be to eliminate all referential referential theories of language and meaning. Reference to the meaning external world has a necessary place in In its simplest form this theory proposes language in religion. But it does not that the meaning of words lies in the provide a comprehensive theory of mean- objects to which they refer. Words ing. (See also ramsey.) operate like labels for their referents, or objects of reference. Ryle dubbed it the religion, religious experience ‘Fido’-Fido theory: ‘Fido’ denotes the dog, Fido. Until around the middle of the twentieth The theory has been advocated with century a number of textbooks on the various levels of complexity and nuances philosophy of religion began with a of logic: by Russell (‘The Philosophy of section under some such title as ‘Defini- Logical Atomism’, rpr. in Logic and tions of Religion’. The complexity and Knowledge, 1956); by Rudolf Carnap, difficulty of attempting such a task was (The Logical Syntax of Language, 1934); recognized increasingly towards the end of and in a particular ‘logical’ version by the the twentieth century. At least three early Wittgenstein (in the Tractatus, difficulties have been noted in late moder- 1921). nity and in post-modern thought. One major problem is that this theory One factor has been a growing under- gives privilege to the word, rather than the standing of diversity and pluralism, and a religion, religious experience 256 reaction against over-easy generalization. to be illusory (ma¯ya¯). From this viewpoint, In philosophy the later work of Witt- Judaism, Christianity and Islam might genstein and analytical philosophy appear to verge on the dualistic. Further, have encouraged this emphasis on ultimate reality in this Hindu tradition is particularity. beyond form, and therefore hardly What common traits, if any, might be personal or entirely theistic. Yet, again, said to exist not only between the ‘Abra- traditions within Hinduism vary (see hamic’ traditions of Judaism, Christianity dualism). and Islam (which is not an impossible Some strands within Hinduism, for question to address), but also between example in parts of the Bhagavad Gita, these and Hinduism, Buddhism, Confu- perceive the divine as personal, all-good, cianism, Taoism, Sikhism, Shinto and and loving. While there may be sugges- tribal or aboriginal religions? tions of polytheism in some popular A second difficulty arises from the Hindu religious traditions, there is also a recognition that it is difficult to go as far notion of a tripartite hierarchy of Brahma, as we need in terms of supposedly value- the creator; Vishnu, the sustainer; and neutral knowledge, let alone value-neutral Shiva, the destroyer. Further, Sikhism tried understanding. Hermeneutical approaches toencouragecommongroundinthe may help. However, too many older sixteenth century between Hindus and studies have failed to avoid prematurely Muslims. assimilating ‘the other’ in religions to the Buddhism appears also to be ambiva- horizons of the enquirer, whether those lent about ‘theism’, not least because of horizons have been those of modern its different traditions. Most Mahayana secularism or of a specific religion. By Buddhists believe that the ‘dharma-body’ way of example, we cite below the incisive of the Buddha (the dharmakaya) is abso- criticisms against J. G. Frazer formulated lute reality. In this case such a tradition by the later Wittgenstein. comes close to monism, or even arguably Third, especially in post-modern to a modified theism. Yet in some tradi- thought the view that religions serve tions the absence of a genuinely abiding vested interests of social power has led self and the emphasis on a cycle of rebirth some to substitute a sociological or marks it off from much in the ‘Abrahamic’ ‘ideological criticism’ approach for more religions. philosophical or theological approaches. how far can a ‘phenomenology’ We examine these critical approaches later of religion take us? in this entry, as well as in more detail under Marxist critique of religion, If one signal of a general cultural and Nietzsche and Freud’s critique of intellectual shift in the mid-twentieth religion. We begin with the first two century arose from suspicion of undue problems. generalization, another emerged from the do attempts to find a common recognition that few definitions of religion ‘definition of religion’ from the nineteenth century onwards were founder on the problems of genuinely value-neutral, in spite of some pluralism, diversity and claims to the contrary. particularity? Wittgenstein criticized Frazer’s The Golden Bough for offering ‘explanations’ Whileinthethreegreat‘Abrahamic’ of the beliefs and practices of other religions the relation between God and cultures and other religions as if these creation is paramount, in the Advaita were practised by ‘men who think in a Vedanta traditions within Hinduism, the similar way to himself’. Frazer too readily created order of space and time is deemed ‘explained’ them in such a way as to make 257 religion, religious experience them seem ‘stupidities’, because he It remains possible, and within philo- abstracted them from the life-context that sophy of religion appropriate, to compare made then intelligible (‘Bemerkungen u¨ ber both theistic and anti-theistic accounts of Frazers The Golden Bough’, Synthese, 17, religion, and to suspend final judgements 1967, 235–6). Even though he did not about the truth-claims of each, without regard himself as ‘religious’, Wittgenstein resorting to disguising the world-view of accused Frazer of a ‘narrowness of spiri- one culture as ‘value-neutral’ and another tual life’ which flawed his supposedly as ‘primitive’. The world-view of mechan- value-neutral observations. In effect they istic materialism may be equally value- form the agenda of a white, male, late laden as some claims of theism, as the nineteenth-century intellectual. entries on Feuerbach, Marxism and This criticism applies strikingly to Freud tend to confirm. those writers (many in vogue from around Nevertheless, if a phenomenological 1890 to 1939) who saw ‘the origins and study of religion is informed by a herme- nature of religion’ through the lenses of a neutical awareness, it remains possible to nineteenth-century evolutionary progressi- gain an understanding of where certain vism. One well-known example is that of emphases are placed in seeking to under- the evolutionary theory of E.B. Tylor, who stand patterns of religious belief and held that all religion evolved from a practice. Indeed these three terms (belief, primitive animism (see also anthropo- experience and practice) go a substantial morphism) and uncritical confusions way towards recovering the more con- between dreams and wakeful reality. structive elements in a phenomenology A third of George Galloway’s textbook and hermeneutic of religion. The Philosophy of Religion (1914) (200 of ‘feeling’ of dependence? ‘sense 600 pages) deals with ‘the Nature and of immediacy’ of relationship? Development of Religion’ from the ‘tribal’ stage of ‘primitive man’, viewed as analo- Schleiermacher addressed the nature of gues to infantile consciousness, to more religion in his Speeches on Religion of ‘developed’ ‘national’ religions. Tylor’s 1799. Many, he urges his Berlin audience animism, spiritism, magic and hypotheses of ‘cultured despisers’ of religion, mistake about pre-conscious needs all take their ‘the trappings’ of religion for ‘religion place in this story of supposed develop- itself’ (On Religion: Speeches to its Cul- ment. tured Despisers, London: Kegan Paul, What does such a genetic account, even 1893, 1). ‘No room remains for the eternal if it were valid, tell us about the nature of and holy Being that lies beyond the world’ ‘religion’? It is impossible to bracket out (ibid.). issues of I–Thou relations and encounters, To be sure, Schleiermacher expounds such as are discussed under Buber, or the the psychological and anthropological experience of the numinous ‘Other’, aspects of religion in human life: ‘the discussed under Otto, and to persuade innermost springs of my being . . . the ourselves that thereby we arrive at a value- highest’ are unlocked (Speech I, ibid., 3). neutral ‘phenomenology’ of religion; that But ‘the Nature of Religion’ is far more is, how it appears (Greek, phainomai)toa than ‘a way of thinking, a faith, [or] a way supposedly disengaged observer. If we of acting’ (Speech II, ibid., 27). define ‘religion’ solely in terms of what Religion is not ‘craving for a mess of appears on the outside alone, we shall metaphysical and ethical crumbs’ (ibid., make the mistake identified by Schleier- 31). Because of its outward forms, it never macher in his Speeches on Religion appears ‘pure’; yet it is ‘a revelation of the (1799) of confusing ‘religion’ with reli- Infinite in the finite’ (ibid., 36). Culture gious practices alone. and art are ‘self-produced’; but religion is religion, religious experience 258

‘sense and taste for the Infinite’ (ibid., 39). Hegel, however, responded dismis- Because it entails an immediate experience sively to Schleiermacher’s notion of reli- of ‘the Beyond’, it cannot be confined gion. If religion is primarily an immediate within ‘miserable systems’ (ibid., 55). sense of utter dependence on what lies Rather, the Deity offers ‘a foretaste of all beyond me, my dog, Hegel declared, is love’s forms’ (ibid., 72). ‘religious’ to a remarkable degree. In In psychological and ontological terms, Hegel’s view, the ‘representations’ or ‘ima- all pure religion is creative (Speech III, gery’ (Vorstellungen)neededtobetested ibid., 119–46). Further, it transcends and supported by the more rigorous con- individual consciousness, promoting rela- ceptual thought of philosophical enquiry tionality between persons and between (Begriff). Philosophy is ‘higher’ than reli- human persons and God (Speech IV, ibid., gions for Hegel, but Christianity is per- esp. 155–73). Here Schleiermacher ceived as absolute truth in pictorial form. reaches the heart of the matter. It is more, Such intellectualist understanding of but not less, than a feeling (Gefu¨ hl)of religion, however, was vigorously attacked absolute (schlechthinig) dependence by Kierkegaard. A conceptual system or (Abha¨ngigkeit) on God. For Gefu¨ hl logical system, he urged, has nothing to do denotes not only ‘feeling’ (in a psycholo- with a fully engaged human subjectivity gical sense) but also immediacy (in an in which the self is at stake. It is a ontological sense). This becomes clearer in ‘religion’ only in name, as Kierkegaard his mature work The Christian Faith,of makes clear in his satirical Attack on 1821, (esp. sects. 4, 12–18). ‘Christendom’. In the final speech (Speech V) Schleier- Indeed, as John Henry Newman macher ascribes consciousness of God in observed, the eighteenth century, the some degree to all major religions, but ‘Age of Reason’, was an age ‘when love insists that in the person of Jesus Christ grew cold’. Formal religion, as a system of this ‘God-consciousness’ was most fully doctrine, or alternatively as a natural instantiated. In The Christian Faith he theology, invited the counter-reactions repeats: religion is ‘neither a knowing or a of pietism, in England especially in the doing, but a modification of feeling or of form of Wesleyan Methodism, but else- immediate . . . consciousness’ (sect. 3, 5). where as revivalism or quietism. He espouses a panentheistic pietism: God In the history of religious thought this is ‘in all that lives and moves, in all growth dual emphasis always coexisted. In the and change’ (ibid., 36) (see panenthe- early centuries the Christian apologists ism). Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215) and (c. 185–254) saw a profound claims for truth, rationality kinship between the Christian religion and coherence? and a Christian philosophical world-view. Schleiermacher did not dismiss issues of On the other hand Tertullian (c. 160–225) truth and rationality. His emphasis on saw no necessary coherence between ‘immediacy’ was in part pietist, in part an Christianity and human reason. The reli- attempt to respond to Kant’s demands for gion of the cross was ‘foolishness’ to the transcendental foundations for any claim sage. concerning ultimacy. Indeed, because he Parallel divergences feature in the refused to surrender the critical and medieval period in Christianity and in comparative pole of hermeneutics, Islam. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153) Schleiermacher described himself as a believed that revelation received ‘pietist of a higher order’, i.e. one not through grace, faith and love was primary. content to rest on untested ‘experience’ or Reason merely served instrumentally to on ‘feelings’ alone. clarify what was already believed. Thomas 259 religion, religious experience

Aquinas (1225–74) accorded a more parallel differences of significant role to reason. Knowledge of emphasis in islam, judaism and God’s existence might be perceived other religions? through rational reflection, but the char- acter of God and God’s Being as Trinity Islamic philosophy and religion may be could only be revealed by grace (see also said to exhibit in their historical instantia- Five Ways.) tions a broadly parallel duality of empha- In the modern period similar tensions, sis on reason and other aspects of religious or at least differences of emphasis, occur. faith and observance. Al-Kindi (c. 813 – In Protestant Christianity the existential c. 871), al-Farabi (875–950), Ibn Sina approach of Bultmann minimizes any (Avicenna, 980–1037) and Ibn Rushd role ascribed to systems of propositions, (Averroes, 1126–98) generate resonances placing the whole weight on address, with Augustine and especially with Tho- grace, existential challenge, faith and mas Aquinas in affirming a religious self-understanding rather than on history, world-view that coheres with a religious states of affairs, description, report or philosophy and philosophical ontology coherence. This reflects one side of the or metaphysics. dualism of Neo-Kantianism, the concep- On the other hand, al-Ghazali tual scheme of Heidegger, and the anti- (1058–1111) attacked what he perceived rational reaction of Kierkegaard. as a tendency to assimilate genuine Islamic By contrast Pannenberg (b. 1928) religion and observance into a philosophi- insists that if religion speaks of God as cal world-view that seemed to owe more Creator, theology has an intellectual obli- to Aristotle than to the Qur’an. The gation to engage with issues of universal titles of some of his works, such as The truth and coherence. If divine action Self-Destruction of the Philosophers and occurs in the world, this is not merely The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ‘inward’, but concerns the public domain. reveal his outright condemnation of The very meaning of religious assertions attempts to harmonize Islamic religion depends on their wider interconnectedness with a philosophical world-view that also with traditions, with open systems, and drew on other sources. with the wholeness of truth. Nevertheless, the radical monotheism The currency of religious belief, for of Islam and its reverence for the content Pannenberg, depends on distinguishing of the Qur’an revealed through the Pro- mere credulity from serious credibility. phet Muhammad (570–632) ensure that Faith would become mere credulity if cognitive truth-claims for its doctrines of there were not reasons to believe in the God and the world lie at the heart of trustworthiness of that in which one Islamic religion. trusts. Far from detracting from revelation The sovereignty and transcendence and faith, this places them on a foundation of Allah (Arabic for ‘God’) and Islam’s that is not merely arbitrary. Theism seeks emphasis on divine omnipotence and a coherent view of the world. omniscience (which led some Islamic Here Pannenberg stands in the classical thinkers into occasionalism) constitute tradition of Origen, Augustine, Aquinas core truth-claims of a rational nature, and many modern theologians. The ten- alongside such practical observances and dency to oppose ‘the religion of the heart’ practices as prayer, worship, almsgiving, to rational argument and to philosophical fasting and pilgrimage. world-views stems from a reaction (as in Judaism also reflects both a concern for pietism) against an undue intellectualizing rational coherence and truth and no less of religion, or from the anti-doctrinal an emphasis upon right practice (ortho- reaction of liberal Protestantism. praxy, rather than, more primarily, religion, religious experience 260 orthodoxy). To be sure, common religious Tefillah) ... religious ethics ... table practices undergird the world-wide unity blessings . . .’ (ibid., 110–12). Jewish of Judaism. Nevertheless, Judaism monotheism was not reached ‘by specula- includes examples of . tion on the unity of Being . . . the We need think only, by way of example, of metaphysical approach of . . . philosophy’ Philo of Alexandria (Philo Judaeus, (ibid., 115). c.20bce–50 ce), and Maimonides Yet neither side should be overstated. (1135–1204). Such thinkers do not The Wisdom literature of the Hebrew obscure the emphasis on right practice, scriptures shares certain common agendas rather than only right belief, that marks about the nature of God and of human- several strands in Judaism. kind with questions explored in Hellenis- Philo gives a cosmic and universal tic philosophy, and the ritual observance significance to Moses, to Jerusalem, to of the Passover liturgy was based on the Temple and to the Sabbath. The law of theological corporate memory of the acts Moses functions to underline the ‘ordered- of God. The issue of a personal relation- ness’ of the universe, and exhibits the ship with God was founded on a doctrine coherence of the divine principle of reason of the covenantal grace of God, and the in the world. Moses is no mere particu- Torah embodied revelation of God as well larist legislator or prophet of a specific as required observances. nation, but a philosopher for the world, a In most traditions of Hinduism and of mediator between God and humankind Buddhist philosophy, cognitive or pro- (Deut. 5:5). positional claims to rational truth take a Philo saw Moses’ ascent to Mount less central place. However, they remain a Sinai as an ascent into the divine realm backcloth to religious belief and practice. (Life of Moses 1:158). He mediates in Indeed, in Eastern religions one funda- rational form the revelation of God, the ‘I mental distinction, namely that between am’, ‘the One Who is’. As the embodiment ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’, has been pro- of all knowledge and wisdom, Moses minent in certain eras of Western philoso- mediates, in effect, a world-view of phy from Parmenides and the ancient religious philosophy. Philo is a system- Greeks to Bradley. Thus in the Advaita builder. This aspect of this controversial (non-dualist) Vedanta, space and time are figure is emphasized by H.A. Wolfson regarded as ultimately illusory. (Philo, 2 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard, In broad terms, the rational, cognitive 1947). or intellectual aspect varies in weight not Others see Philo as an idiosyncratic only from religion to religion, but, as we borrower of ideas from a variety of have seen, within the same religion. Chris- sources (Plato, the Stoics, Pythagorean tianity and Islam even find virtual replays thought, biblical exegesis often in highly of similar debates about the relation allegorical forms). They question how far between revelation and philosophical he represents first-century Alexandrian world-views or rational coherence. We Judaism. Further, G.F. Moore argues that consider under a separate entry the nature the ‘unity and universality’ of Judaism of belief, including religious belief (see also ‘was not based on orthodoxy in theology those on reason, natural theology). but upon uniformity of observance’ (Juda- religious experience: ultimacy ism [1927], 2 vols., Cambridge, MA: and the penultimate or finite Harvard, 1966, vol. 1, 111). Moore writes, ‘Wherever a Jew went Swinburne calls attention to the variety he found the same system of . . . obser- and diversity of what people count as vance in effect . . . the dietary laws . . . ‘religious experience’, distinguishing five forms of service . . . prayers (Shema’ and core examples (The Existence of God 261 religion, religious experience

[1979], Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Otto (1869–1937), a philosopher with 249–53). Kantian sympathies, perceived both the In a first group, an ordinary ‘non- rational and suprarational dimensions of religious’ object or event is ‘seen as’ an religious experience, but believed that the address by God, a sign from God, the latter had been too often neglected in handiwork of God, or as that which points favour of the former, as in deism. A ‘non- to God. Wolterstorff illustrates in the rational numinous feeling’, which is inde- context of speech-act theory how the pendent of theoretical reason or theoreti- voice of a child could count as the voice of cal thought, lies at the heart of religion, God in Augustine’s experience of hearing even if rational reflection on the experi- the words, ‘Take up and read.’ This ence of the numinous follows. ‘counted as’ a divine command to read The vision of the majestic holiness of part of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans God in Isaiah 6:1–10 provides a paradigm (Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflec- of such numinous experience as its peak: ‘I tion on the Claim that God Speaks, saw the Lord, sitting on a throne, high and Cambridge: CUP, 1995, 1–8 and 9–21). lofty, and the hem of his robe filled the In a second group divine address or temple. Seraphs were in attendance above divine encounter is mediated through him . . . they covered their faces . . . and some unusual object or event. Swinburne said “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts includes among ‘unusual public objects’ or . . .” And I said, “Woe is me! I am lost . . . events the resurrection appearances of My eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Jesus, or (we might add) the burning bush hosts”.’ in the revelation to Moses. We must allow for the poetic imagery Swinburne’s third and fourth groups as the quasi-rational reflection on a pre- include examples of various ‘private’ rational, intuitive, ‘divinatory’ experience manifestations to individuals, for example of the kind that Otto termed ‘Mysterium Joseph’s dream in Matthew 1:20–1, or the Tremendum’; blank wonder at the wholly experiences of mystics which might Other, who is both awesome in terror and include visual or auditory sensations. infinitely attractive in grace. A person who Finally, a fifth group need not involve encounters such majesty can only become any mediating object, event or sensation. prostrate before it. A person may become aware of God, or Nevertheless, as Schleiermacher and become aware of some transcendent rea- Tillich insist, the infinite can be revealed lity that impinges upon his or her life. only through the finite (Schleiermacher); In the sacred writings of Judaism, the ultimate, only through the penultimate Christianity and Islam, it is unnecessary (Tillich). to assume that such awareness need be action, practice and religious induced by ‘preparation’ of a psychologi- institutions cal kind. Contrary to the proposals of Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Freud, a pro- Some writers have tried to equate religion phet may receive a revelation that goes, in with religious practices alone. Kant effect, against his or her expectations, declared, ‘Religion is (considered subjec- hopes, wishes and interests. tively) the recognition of all our duties as Late twentieth-century research on the divine commands.’ Yet we observed account of the conversion of the Apostle Schleiermacher’s response that religion is Paul suggests that the Christophany on the ‘neither a knowing nor a doing but a Damascus road, far from presupposing modification of . . . immediate . . . con- psychological preparation, came to him as sciousness’ (The Christian Faith, 1989 a compulsion, against all his prior expec- edn, sect. 3, 5). Like Schleiermacher, tations and wishes. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) resurrection 262 also attacked fossilized, routinized, insti- believing, feeling or experiencing, acting tutional religion. William Law earlier or observing, and self-transcendence or distinguished ‘praying’ from a routinized encounters with the Other, in religion. If ‘saying prayers’. God is perceived and worshipped as Nevertheless, most religions derive perfect love, practices of loving other ethical implications from the nature of human persons are hardly ‘penultimate’, God for daily conduct. Moreover, creeds, but flow from this mutual reciprocity of rituals and repeated or ‘routinized’ pat- loving ‘the Other’. terns of worship, institutions and public The major religions, for the most part, conduct provide mechanisms for the pre- perceive the Object of worship as both a servation and transmission of continuity Thou (Buber) and an Other (Otto). If and often the ‘corporate memory’ of ‘God’ or the Ultimate were merely a wish- founding events in religion, especially in fulfilment or extension of myself, the anti- Judaism, Christianity and Islam. theistic critiques of Feuerbach and Freud In Judaism and in Christianity respec- might be valid. However, encounter with tively the formulaic ‘remembrance’ of the the Other and address by the Other is founding events of the faith (the Passover perceived in the major religions as more and the Lord’s death) provide one such than merely affirming: they are transfor- key mechanism of corporate memory mative. Among modern Christian theolo- which nurtures the transmission of an gians, Barth, Bonhoeffer and Moltmann identifiable belief-system and its concomi- emphasize this aspect. tant practices. Such address and encounter, therefore, Institutions within religion (synago- will inevitably result, in authentic religion, gues, churches, mosques; liturgies; pil- in what Bonhoeffer calls ‘costly’ disciple- grimages, fasting, dietary observances) ship. Religious practices such as almsgiv- provide systems of transmission that pre- ing and intercessory prayer follow. To serve identity and stability. Nevertheless, begin with the external phenomenology the springs of creativity (as Schleierma- may risk missing the point behind the cher, Coleridge and Tillich insist) lie in the practices; on the other hand, this approach experiences of the Ultimate rather than the may serve as a reminder of the diversity of penultimate, even if the Ultimate is most phenomena which lie before us. A herme- often encountered through the penulti- neutical approach will formulate a mate. conversational dialectic between the When Nietzsche argues (or asserts) that particular and the more universal in religion is a manipulative device that religion and religious experience. (See also merely serves human power-interests, this atheism; existentialism; God, con- criticism usually falls first on the institu- cepts and ‘attributes’ of; Hindu phi- tions of religion, and second on abuses of losophy; Islamic philosophy; Jewish religion. Yet these institutions also serve philosophy; postmodernism; prayer.) not only to keep central the ethical values and obligations of religions, but also to resurrection nurture its corporate and communal dimensions. For the Abrahamic religions, In terms of conceptual grammar and God has redeemed ‘a people’. logical context, doctrines of the resurrec- the whole person in encounter tion of the body (Greek, soˆ ma, a broader term than the English) differs from the with the beyond as transcendent ‘other’ grammar and context of ‘the immortality of the soul’. The latter doctrine is usually In the end, however, it is artificial to draw grounded in the capacity of an eternal too clear a distinction between knowing or aspect or part of the self to survive death 263 revelation and to enter the eternal realm. Resurrec- the first sample of that of which more is tion is conceptually grounded in a creative yet to come. The new resurrection mode of and transforming act of God which will existence is raised in glory and power, and change the whole self into a transformed is fully transformed by the Spirit of God mode of existence consonant with the (Greek,soˆ ma pneumatikon, 1 Cor. 15:44), holiness and glory of God. and characterized by being ‘in the image’ Hope of future resurrection emerged in (eikon, 1 Cor. 15:49) of Christ. Jewish apocalyptic, although the Hebrew These issues are conceptual as well as scriptures for the most part conceived of theological. For Paul the Apostle is at life after death as a bodiless existence in pains to rest the argument for the cred- the shadow-land of She’ol. By the first ibility and intelligibility of the future century, however, pharisaic Judaism held resurrection upon belief in the creative to a notion of resurrection, although it power of God, not in the innate capacities appears that in that period the Sadducees of the ‘soul’. If God can provide a diversity did not believe in resurrection. Some of ‘modes of existence’ for every type of pharisaic traditions believed in the literal environment in creation, can God not be reassembly of the parts of the body at the trusted to provide a mode of being final resurrection. appropriate for the end-time (1 Cor. In Zoroastrianism the belief is found 15:33–44)? that in the final cosmic conflict Mazda¯ and The Greek word soˆ ma denotes more the spenta powers will overcome evil, and than ‘physical’ body. The emphasis lies on souls will be brought back to earth from a mode of being that is capable of heaven and hell to enter their resurrected communication, experience and self-iden- bodies. With those still living these will tity in the public domain. Above all, it is face a last judgement. capable of relating to others. This meaning The resurrection of the body is a in New Testament and Patristic Greek has Qu’ranic doctrine in Islam, but while al- moved beyond its empirical meaning in Ghazali (1058–1111) chastised philoso- classical Greek and in Plato, where the phy for not allowing room for that ‘body’ (soˆ ma) is viewed as a restrictive doctrine, Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) tomb, rather than a communicative argued that the soul is incorporeal and enhancement. cannot be destroyed. Just as in Islamic and Jewish traditions, In Christian theology belief in the there are divisions of opinion about future resurrection of the body is para- immortality and bodily resurrection, so mount, at least in the New Testament and the ‘official’ doctrine of resurrection is in major traditions. The doctrine is declared in the Christian creeds, but has based on the belief that Jesus Christ was not found full expression in every Chris- raised from the dead. First Corinthians tian writer. 15:3–6 is a very early pre-Pauline formula, In Hindu philosophy, since the ulti- which also predates the writing of the mate goal is liberation from cycles of accounts in the Gospels. Christian believ- existence, we should not expect to find a ers are said to be ‘in Christ’, and hence to comparable parallel with the resurrection of derive the basis and pattern of their future the body. (See also creation; eternity; resurrection from Christ’s resurrection. Islamic philosophy; Jewish philosophy; Both events are explicitly described as acts post-mortal existence; transcendence.) of God, the creator of life (Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 15:38–57). revelation For this reason Christ’s resurrection is called ‘the firstfruits’ (Greek, aparche)of It is not surprising that virtually every the future resurrection (1 Cor. 15:20); i.e. major religion finds a necessary place for revelation 264 revelation. In traditional Jewish–Christian Many Protestant theologians accord and Islamic theism, if God is transcendent less scope to natural theology, and and ‘Other’, it is not to be taken for insist that not least because of human granted that God is accessible to unaided fallenness, divine revelation is needed even human reason. God is not necessarily an to be aware that God exists. Barth object to be ‘discovered’. Further, if God (1886–1968) lays stress on the revelatory is omnipotent or Almighty, it may be the Word of God as God’s gift in a threefold case that God wills where and when God form: the Word (proper) is the revelation may be known. Many Eastern religious of God through the person and work of traditions are also rooted in appeals to Jesus Christ; the Word written is the word scriptural texts as revelation. of sacred scripture; the Word proclaimed is the eventful communication of that revelation in different word in preaching and other ways, as the traditions Spirit of God actualizes it in communica- Within each of these three Western tradi- tive events. tions, the relative emphasis placed upon In Hindu philosophy and religion the respective roles of revelation and wide differences of ‘viewpoint’ find their reason has varied. In Islamic philoso- common roots in the Vedas (c. 1500–800 phy, al-Kindi and the predecessors of bce), which have the status of sacred al-Farabi viewed the Qur’an as para- scripture (s´ruti). The 108 Sanskrit texts of mount in authority and in its capacity as the Upanis¸ads (c. 800–500 bce) count also revelation, but al-Farabi (c. 875–950) as Vedic scripture, even though their argued that at very least knowledge of content has become more philosophical. human nature came through reason (‘aql). That these scriptures are regarded as Traditional Judaism looks back to the revelation is confirmed by the fact that the two major sources of revelation identified Bhagavad Gita (‘Song of God’) is con- in the Hebrew scriptures: the gilluy sidered sacred tradition, a little ‘below’ shekinah, or manifestation of the glory Vedic scripture, but together with Vedanta of God by some wondrous revelatory act; is clearly also regarded as revelation. and revelation through the gift of the law, modes of revelation the prophets and the writings. The law expresses revelation of the divine will Arguably, if revelation is regarded as the through instruction and commandment; self-disclosure of God to humankind, this the prophetic utterances summon and self-disclosure proceeds from a free act of promise; the Wisdom literature and other the divine will. It remains as free an act, writings explore, lament, praise or per- and as much a free gift of loving self- form varied speech acts. As Judaism expression as God’s free act of creation. develops in history, Maimonides (1135– In Hebrew, Christian and Islamic 1204) affirms the revelation of the sacred traditions, it is God who invites human- texts, but also the accommodation of kind to approach God’s holy presence. scripture and tradition to the varied Humanity may not force its way into this backgrounds of its recipients and to presence as of ‘right’. Hence the divine rational coherence. communicative act is one of sovereign In the Christian tradition Thomas grace and initiative. This is simply an Aquinas (1225–74) argues that it is in aspect of the ‘coherence’ of a theism principle possible to perceive that God which conceives of God as holy and exists through the right use of human transcendent as well as gracious. reason, but to apprehend the nature or Different thinkers have emphasized character of God presupposes and requires four different possible modes of revela- divine grace and the gift of revelation. tion. Such writers as Oscar Cullmann and 265 Ricoeur, Paul

Pannenberg (b. 1928) have emphasized scripture in the Judaeo-Christian tradition the unfolding of divine self-disclosure in performs many more functions than history. Cullmann places the weight on description, and performs numerous ‘sacred history’ (Heilsgeschichte); Pannen- speech acts. Address to God in poetic berg, on a more ‘public’, universal history psalms, and working out the meaning of in the world. Others, notably Barth, stress parables, belongs no less to revelation the mystery of divine self-disclosure of than ‘teaching’. Yet behind this debate lies address ‘where and when God wills’, the valid recognition that revelation embo- although usually through the medium of dies cognitive truth, ontology and refer- Christ, scripture and proclamation. ences to states of affairs. (See also God, Yet others urge the importance of concepts and ‘attributes’ of; omnipo- viewing the communicative act, or speech tence; transcendence.) act, of revelation as a process that necessarily entails human response, and Ricoeur, Paul (b. 1913) remains otherwise merely formal; or in effect, empty. Hence Bultmann (1884– With Gadamer, Ricoeur is the most 1976) calls attention to the existential important thinker in philosophical her- dimension of revelation. meneutics of the late twentieth century. Such an approach, with more equal Whereas Gadamer is concerned almost balance on ontology, was anticipated by exclusively with ‘understanding’, Ricoeur John Calvin (1509–64), when he urged in pays equal attention to explanation (Er- his Institutes that God’s revelation of God kla¨rung) and understanding (Verstehen). carries with it as a necessary corollary a These two dimensions of hermeneutics, simultaneous revelation of the nature of the critical and the creative, entail respec- humankind. ‘The knowledge of God and tively ‘willingness to expose and to abolish the knowledge of ourselves are bound idols’ and ‘willingness to listen with open- together by a mutual tie’ (Institutes I, 1, ness to symbolic and indirect language’. 3). Thus to disclose that God is Creator is Ricoeur was a student in Paris of thereby to disclose the creaturely, finite, Marcel (1889–1973), from whom he dependent status of humankind as stew- learned the importance of interpersonal ards of the world. To reveal Christ as understanding. Persons are not objects, Lord is to reveal the status of Christ’s but presences. During the Second World people as belonging to Christ in trust and War he became a prisoner of war in obedience. Germany, and used this period to study A fourth emphasis arises from the Jaspers, Edmund Husserl and Heideg- transmission of revelation that has been ger. Heidegger’s notion of ‘possibility’ received. Catholic tradition in particular became central for Ricoeur’s notion of calls attention to the role of ecclesial fictive narrative worlds of projected pos- structures and a delegated role in regulat- sibility and re-figuration. ing the tradition as part of the wholeness from human will through of the process. Other Christian traditions symbol to hermeneutics also see the creeds and sacraments as ways of preserving corporate memory and con- Ricoeur’s earliest works were on human tinuity. will and finitude. This led to The Symbo- Within these aspects writers as diverse lism of Evil ([1960]; Eng., 1969) in which as Swinburne (b. 1934), and among he examined symbols of guilt, burden and conservative American writers Carl Henry, bondage as ‘double-meaning expressions’. retain discussions about revelation as With Jaspers, he saw symbols as trans- ‘propositional’ (Swinburne, Revelation, empirical, creative and multi-layered: ‘The Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). Clearly symbol gives rise to thought.’ Romanticism 266

In 1965 Ricoeur explored Freud’s replicate or refer; they project ‘possible theory of psychoanalysis as an example worlds’ of reconfiguration, and transcend (albeit a severely reductive one) of diag- the merely empirical. nostic, hermeneutical, readings of the A stable self is the human agent who ‘texts’ of the human psyche and its holds together memory, attention and dreams. (Fr., De l’interpretation: Essai hope, and Ricoeur explores interpersonal sur Freud; Eng., Freud and Philosophy, selfhood and will in Oneself as Another New Haven: Yale, 1970). An overlapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, of multiple, intermixed signification 1992). Echoing Buber and Marcel, requires interpretation that is both crea- Ricoeur stresses the ‘Otherness’ of the tive and critical. Other, in relation to whom (not to which) ‘Hermeneutics seems to me to be ‘the idea of myself appears profoundly animated by this double motivation: will- transformed, due solely to my recognizing ingness to suspect, willingness to listen; this Other’ (ibid., 9). vow of rigor, vow of obedience. In our Ricoeur thus rejects the total objecti- time we have not finished doing away with fication of the self in positivism or idols, and we have barely begun to listen empiricism; he rejects the isolation of the to symbols’ (ibid., 27, Ricoeur’s italics). individual self in the rationalism of Both dimensions require inter-disciplin- modernity; and he rejects the undervaluing ary inputs. Ricoeur draws on theories of of the self as active agent in postmoder- metaphor, narrative theory, semiotics, nity. In place of these more one-sided structuralism, philosophy of language, perspectives, he expounds a creative, philosophy of the will and of selfhood. interdisciplinary hermeneutic of selfhood, Progressively he moves from explanation discourse and textuality. (See also lan- of human will, through structuralism, to guage in religion; symbol; time.) The Conflict of Interpretations, The Rule of Metaphor, Time and Narrative (3 vols., Romanticism Eng. 1984–8), and Oneself as Another (1992). The importance of this movement for philosophy of religion lies in its contribu- metaphor, narrative, time and selfhood tion towards displacing the largely mechanistic and rationalist world-view ‘Conflicts’ of interpretation cannot be that dominated much of the eighteenth avoided because interpretation is multi- century. Romanticist thought emphasized form, multi-layered and pluralist. Ricoeur not replication and mechanical models rejects totalitarianism whether in philoso- within a causal system, but personhood, phy or in hermeneutics or in politics. creativity and human agency. ‘Metaphor’ applies creative power to Whereas seventeenth-century ration- sentences in ways parallel to the power alism provided the soil in which deism of symbols for words. Metaphors operate could readily take root, Romanticism by interaction between two domains. emphasized conditions in which panthe- ‘Narrative’ combines coherence with dis- ism might be perceived as part of an tension of a temporal nature. organic world-view. Models of machines Ricoeur draws on Aristotle for the in science and engineering yielded some notion of the coherence of plot, but this is place to a greater emphasis on creative art not merely static, logical coherence. Con- and human agency. versely, he takes up Augustine on disten- In the seventeenth and eighteenth sion or tensiveness in time, which entails a centuries ‘romance’ often carried negative unity-in-difference of memory, attention connotations of fanciful imagination, sen- and hope. Narratives do not simply timentality or melancholy. However, J. G. 267 Romanticism

Herder (1744–1803), Johann Schiller symphonies show the formal elegance of (1759–1805) and Friedrich von Schlegel Haydn and Mozart. From 1801 there are (1772–1829) brought to German litera- hints of a new intensity, when love and the ture and poetry a new emphasis on beginning of deafness came in the period individual creativity over against bland of the Moonlight Sonata. The break- system. Freedom and struggle found through occurs with the third symphony expression in the theme of Sturm and (the Eroica, 1804). Thereafter Beethoven’s Drang (storm and stress) in Germany from life of ‘storm and stress’ is never far below the 1780s. the surface of his music, reaching its literature climax (after the fifth, 1807) in the ninth symphony (1821). In 1812 he met Goethe, By the beginning of the nineteenth century, but each was disappointed with the other’s Romanticism was on the verge of becom- manner. ing a widespread cultural phenomenon, Carl Weber (1726–1826) also made the spreading beyond literature, poetry and transition only in his latest works from philosophy, to music, painting and reli- 1815; but Richard Wagner (1813–1883) gion. The great German Romantic poet was a romanticist in the fullest sense. His Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832) utilization of German folk lore and perceived God ‘within’ the vibrancy of legends was to articulate tragedy, joy, nature, but rejected a ‘God’ who was conflict and psychic drama. He influenced ‘pushing it from outside’. ‘In study of Richard Strauss, Gustav Mahler and nature we are pantheists . . . morally we Anton Bruckner, but provoked also a are monotheists.’ reaction of abstract and In England William Blake (1757–1827) neo-classicism, seen perhaps in Stravinsky. compared the free and creative life of the Nietzsche, one-time friend of Wagner, spirit close to rural land with the ‘dark drew a contrast between the ‘Apollonian’ satanic mills’ of routinized life under culture of order and control and the industrialization (1808). ‘I will not reason ‘Dionysian’ culture of freedom, creativity, and compare; my business is only to self-assertion and emotional abandon- create’ (1809). William Wordsworth ment. Painting offers a world where wrote in 1798: contrasts between formalized order and more self-assertive expressions through Sweet is the lore which Nature bright colours and individualist angles of brings; view may readily be perceived. Our meddling intellect John Constable (1776–1837) began a mis-shapes the beauteous forms of new period only after 1811 (Dedham things – Vale, 1811, in bright sunlight; Flatford We murder to dissect (‘Up, Up, my Mill, 1817; Salisbury Cathedral, 1823, Friend, and Quit your Books’). with quasi-impressionist technique). George (Lord) Byron (1788–1824) became Eugene Delacroix (1798–1863) was more almost an international symbol of Roman- clearly a French Romantic painter from ticist colour, wit and melancholy. Human- 1822, expressing colours, force, passion, kind is ‘half-dust, half deity, alike unfit to even violence. sink or soar’. Tension and passion replaces philosophy and theology formalism and system. music and painting Philosophy, we noted, had already moved within the eighteenth century in some Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) quarters. Thus Jean-Jacques Rousseau embodies the transition to Romanticism (1712–78) emphasized the place of human within his own work. The first two feeling over human reason. If God were Rorty, Richard McKay 268 to be found, God was ‘within myself’. Dewey, Quine and Sellars. The last two Humanity needs ‘no temples, no rites, no chapters trace the inevitable demise of doctrines’. Schelling (1775–1854) epistemology, which is to be replaced by taught at Jena and spent time with Schiller ‘hermeneutics’, not as a new discipline and Goethe, when Jena had become the but as ‘another way of coping’ (ibid., 356); centre of German Romanticism. (On not as a way of ‘attaining truth’ (ibid., 357). Schelling’s rapidly changing views, how- After his Contingency, Irony and Soli- ever, see the entry on him.) darity (1989), Rorty produced three schleiermacher (1768–1834) em- volumes of Philosophical Papers (Cam- phasized both creativity and the emptiness bridge: CUP, 1991 and 1998) culminating of mere second-hand replication in religion in Truth and Progress: Philosophical (especially in the Speeches, 1799). He also Papers, (Cambridge: CUP, vol. 3, 1998; expounded the immediacy of a sense of articles from 1992 to 1998). He endorses utter dependence upon God. He was William James’s verdict that ‘the true’ is strongly influenced by pietism and Roman- ‘only the expedient in the way of thinking’ ticism, but also expressed firm reservations (ibid., 21). There is no task of ‘getting about aspects of Romanticism that were reality right’, because ‘there is no Way the incompatible with authentic religion. World Is’ (ibid., 25). Justification of beliefs In England, Samuel Taylor Coleridge is always justification to a community, and (1772–1834) may be said to have what counts as this can be decided only in respected reason and system too much to pragmatic and pluralist terms. be classed as ‘Romanticist’. Further, he Inevitably Rorty has to anticipate the distinguished carefully between pantheism criticism that pragmatic theories of truth and Trinitarian Christian faith. Yet he are widely regarded as relativist. He found a major creative theological vehicle accepts what lies behind this claim, but in imagination. Coleridge the poet assisted prefers to see it as a defence of the ‘local’ Coleridge the theologian to bridge the split over against an illusory appeal to the between subjective and objective trans-contextual or universal. through the creative use of imagination. One common criticism is that ethics (See also cause; enlightenment.) has now become grounded in sheer ‘pre- ference’, and truth becomes the possession of ‘the winners’. Rhetoric ‘wins’ over Rorty, Richard McKay (b. 1931) argument. This, however, exposes the Rorty combines American pragmatism post-modernist dilemma. Pluralism with radical postmodernism. He is well appears to be liberal and tolerant; but known as a public figure of pragmatic ‘winners’ are the strong rather than the philosophy in the United States. His earlier good, the truthful or the right. An work embraced linguistic philosophy (ed., authoritarian appeal to tanks and dollars The Linguistic Turn, 1967), but he became lies hidden under a rhetoric of the ‘local’ known especially for his attack upon as arbiter. (See also reason.) representational views of language and also upon traditional epistemology in Russell, Bertrand (Third Earl, his major work Philosophy and the Mirror 1872–1970) of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Born in Monmouthshire, Russell was Rorty’s attack on traditional epistemol- educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, ogy and on ‘privileged representations’ wherehethentaughtasFellowand takes us through the history of philosophy subsequently as lecturer in Philosophy to ‘forms of life’ in Wittgenstein,andto until 1916. He produced his most influen- issues of analycity and justification in tial work in those early years, from 1900 269 Russell, Bertrand to about 1919, most notably on ‘philoso- often confuse us concerning the logical phical logic’ (a term which he coined) form of the propositions that they ambiva- and on the foundations of mathematics as lently express. Wittgenstein notes in the a logical system. Tractatus, ‘It was Russell who performed During this early period Russell taught the service of showing that the apparent Wittgenstein (1889–1951), and formu- logical form of a proposition need not be lated the device of logical quantifiers its real one’ (4.0031) (although F. Mauth- as part of his Theory of Descriptions and ner’s work also explored this point before his general disengagement of ‘logical form’ Russell). from the confusions generated by natural Two examples among others seized language. His work on mathematics Russell’s attention. First, often the inno- focused also on logic and on issues of cent-looking word ‘is’ functions differ- classes, in the context of which he ently at the level of formal logic from formulated his theory of types. what may appear to be the case on the Probably the most important published basis of its use in natural language. Its work (out of very many publications) is propositional functions may differ from its his Principia Mathematica (3 vols., 1910– sentence function. Second, ‘definite 13, written jointly with Whitehead descriptions’ may perform deceptive roles (1861–1947), but each as author of his in natural sentences. Does the phrase ‘The own respective contributions). This is not present King of France’ refer to an entity to be confused with Russell’s earlier (even if this entity does not exist)? Principles of Mathematics (1903). His Everyday grammar might suggest that theory of descriptions appeared in part such expressions as ‘the present King of (as an interim report) in ‘On Denoting’ France’ or ‘a round square’ denote entities (Mind, 1905, 479–93; also rpr. in R. C. to which language refers, even if their Marsh, ed, Logic and Knowledge, Lon- ‘existence’ is negated. But this is as don: Allen & Unwin, 1956); and his fallacious as Lewis Carroll’s satirical theory of types in ‘Mathematical Logic parody about an entity called ‘Nobody’, as Based on the Theory of Types’ (Amer- who passed the messenger on the road, ican Journal of Mathematics, 1908, also and therefore should have arrived first. rpr. in Marsh, ed., Logic and Knowledge). Russell proposed that the use of an From 1916 onwards Russell’s concern existential quantifier should clarify the turned to political issues, including a point that reference and denotation are leaflet on conscientious objection during not entailed by the strictly logical form of the First World War (1916), election to the proposition behind the sentence. An Parliament in 1922, visits to China, Russia existential quantifier generates some such and the United States, and anti-nuclear forms as ‘For at least one x, there is an x demonstrations in the years after the such that x is F (King of France)’; or ‘there Second World War. This absorbed much is at least one x such that x is F (x is of his energy, although he continued to round) and x is G (x is square)’. The form produce substantial works of philosophy. (Ax)(Fx.Gx) is discussed under the entry Some of these were addressed to a wider, on quantifiers. Strictly, the form would be more popular audience, and he became a negation: ~ (Ax)(Fx.Gx). well known as a figure in public life. logical atomism, classes in logical form, definite mathematical logic and description, and russell’s developments quantification In his very earliest work Russell was Russell firmly believed that the gramma- influenced by Bradley (1846–1924) and tical forms of everyday natural languages other philosophical idealists, although Ryle, Gilbert 270 from the first he rejected Bradley’s mon- While Wittgenstein began to move in a ism. Russell’s Essay on the Foundations of different direction during his ‘middle’ Geometry (1897) reflects aspects of this period of around 1929–33, Russell very early but short period. By around retained the same basic approach, but 1898 he was moving away from this extended its application to epistemology approach. and to a wide range of questions. The With G. E. Moore, Russell moved to a height of his innovative work appeared realist position, which is reflected in part (with Whitehead) in the three-volume in his Critical Exposition of the Philoso- Principa Mathematica (1910–13), which phy of Leibniz (1900) and fully in his passed the basic theories that mathematics Principles of Mathematics (1903). At this is grounded in logic. stage Russell began to draw upon Peano’s In 1914 Russell produced Knowledge symbolic logic, and argued that the whole of the External World, which explored our of pure mathematics rested upon the knowledge of material objects, and related foundations of logic, from which it could issues in physics to this problem. In 1916, be derived. Russell’s political writing led to his dis- This raised issues, however, about missal from Cambridge, although he whether the whole of the logic of classes continued to work on the philosophy of could operate in this way, especially mind. questions about ‘the class of all classes’, Russell’sapproachtothescopeof or more precisely, logical forms that human knowledge and the nature of mind implied self-referential functions. Russell’s very broadly reflects sympathy with Hume ‘mathematical logic as based on the and the empiricist tradition. However, Theory of Types’ (1908) sought to avoid with increasing commitments to public the paradoxes generated by their pro- life and political issues, Russell’s later blems. work commanded less influence than his We may note that these two elaborate earlierwritingsonlogic.In1950he theories (the theory of definite description received the Nobel Prize for Literature, and the theory of types) appeared to be and remained active in campaigning for necessary only because Russell understood civil rights. (See also empiricism; ideal- the whole of logic and language to be ism; ostensive definition; positivism; referential, rather than only certain spe- realism; referential theories.) cific instances of language. Hence the later Wittgenstein and subsequently especially Ryle, Gilbert (1900–76) Strawson questioned the assumptions that appeared to warrant these theories. Ryle was educated at, and taught at, This position appeared plausible to Oxford, where for many years he was Russell because he retained the theory of recognized as a leading exponent of that logical atomism as a comprehensive theory form of ‘linguistic analysis’ which sought of meaning when most others had per- to disentangle and to elucidate conceptual ceived its limitations. It should also be confusions and logical grammar. His most noted that in the Tractatus the ‘atoms’ that important book was The Concept of Mind made up elementary propositions were for (London: Hutchinson, 1949). the early Wittgenstein purely logical enti- the concept of mind and the ties, whereas for Russell they entailed more ‘ghost in the machine’ than logic. It was Russell’s preface to the Tractatus, and Russell’s influence, that led Ryle attacked the logical confusions that many to interpret the Tractatus (against he perceived to lie at the heart of language Wittgenstein’s intention) as a quasi-positi- about the body and the mind within the vist account of logic and language. philosophical tradition inherited from 271 Ryle, Gilbert

Descartes (1596–1650). He wrote: ‘I and body are not independent entities. To shall speak of it, with deliberate abusive- assume this is to elevate an adverbial mode ness, as “the dogma of the Ghost in the of behaviour (e.g. acting intelligently) into Machine” . . . It is one big mistake . . . a a ‘thing’ (e.g. called Intelligence, as if it category mistake. It represents the facts of were an entity rather than a quality). mental life as if they belonged to one dilemmas, paradoxes and logical type or category . . . when they confusions actually belong to another’ (ibid., 17). Ryle compares the conjoining of terms Among Ryle’s other writings, Dilemmas of different types that occurs in zeugma; for (Cambridge: CUP, 1966), the Tarner Lec- example, ‘She came home in a flood of tures for 1953, deserves special mention. tears and a sedan chair’ (ibid., 23). Hence, Ryle considers a number of traditional while he does not deny that ‘there occur paradoxes and apparent logical dilemmas, mental processes’, Ryle insists that ‘there for which he offers a series of conceptual occur mental processes’ does not ‘mean the elucidations. same sort of thing’ as ‘there occur physical One very constructive example is that processes’ (ibid.). It makes ‘no sense’ either of Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the to conjoin or to disjoin the two. Tortoise. At the level of common sense, In logical terms, the conceptual gram- Achilles as the faster runner must overtake mar of ‘exist’ does not remain the same the tortoise. However, suppose that we when this is predicated of minds as when calculate the distance that Achilles has to it is predicated of bodies. It is as different, run to catch up with the tortoise, by the Ryle asserts, as the meaning of ‘rising’ time Achilles has reached the marker, the when applied to a ‘rising’ tide and to tortoise has moved on ahead, however ‘rising’ hopes (ibid., 24). slowly. Mathematically, it seems Achilles Descartes, Ryle insists, speaks as if can never catch up with tortoise, even mental and physical causes and events though he whittles down the distance each constituted ‘two collateral histories’. It is time that a measurement is made. as if the body were an outer engine, Zeno believed that the paradox controlled by an interior mini-engine revealed the illusory nature of change. called ‘the mind’. But the mind is not an Ryle shows, by contrast, that the paradox ‘entity’ within the body. rests upon confusing two different opera- What is often presented as a Cartesian tions: ‘We have to distinguish the question entity within or alongside the body is “How many portions have you cut off the better viewed as an adverbial mode of object? ” from the question, “How many ascribing a dispositional character to portions have you cut it into?”’ (ibid., 46). bodily behaviour. Ryle resists the implica- One is the logic of the observer; the other tion that this makes him a behaviourist, is the logic of the participant. although equally he is reluctant to dismiss This provides an excellent model for behaviourism as untenable. His major unravelling some common misconcep- target is the presentation and formulation tions. In religion, although Ryle does of language about the mind in such a way not attempt to explore this, it might be that it seems to constitute a mind–body used to address the question of whether dualism. there is an ‘intermediate state’ or direct This ‘dualism’ rests upon a conceptual transformation into the divine presence, in or logical confusion. The mental requires . The former may to be understood in terms of what can be suggest the use of ‘observer’ logic; the observed in the public world. Some have latter is ‘participant’ logic. used the term ‘logical’ behaviourist to Ryle equally constructively addresses denote this approach. At very least, mind the logical puzzle generated by such an Ryle, Gilbert 272 utterance as ‘It was to be’. The problem interest in linguistic matters focussed on arises when we apply the logic of ‘what is’ such dictions as were (or . . . were not) in to that to which has not occurred, about breach of “logical syntax” . . . and the which certain beliefs are held in the paradox-generators’ (O. P. Wood and G. present (ibid., 31–2). Pitcher, eds., Ryle, London: Macmillan, In an autobiographical observation 1970, 14). (See also logic; self.) Ryle declares, ‘My chief, though not sole, S

S´ an˙ ka¯ra¯ (traditionally 788–820) the scriptural framework of the Vedic writings and the Upanis¸ads. S´ an˙ ka¯ ra¯ is probably the single most The theme of moksha or liberation of influential thinker in Hindu philosophy, the inner self is taken further in the although the influence of Ra¯ ma¯ nuja (c. Bhagavad Gita, or ‘Song of God’, which 1017–1137) is perhaps comparable. He originates from the third century bce wrote commentaries on the ten principal onwards. The Brahma-Su¯ tra consists of Upanis¸ads, on the Brahma-Su¯ tras and the four chapters of material expressed in Bhagavad Gita. His main aim was to show terse aphorisms, which invite comments, that these Vedic scriptures taught or interpretations and commentaries. implied a monist ontology. S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ and the Adaita Vedanta tradi- In effect, S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ stands as the founder tion appeal to the aphorism in Chandogya and main representative of Advaita (non- Upanis¸ad VIII: 8, ‘That is the Self, the dualist) Vedanta. These terms are immortal . . . Bra¯hman’, and more espe- explained in the entry on Hindu philo- cially to ‘You are that’ (Tat Tvam Asi). sophy, but a brief summary may also be Freed from passion, strong desire and fear, outlined here. the a¯tman may become identified with S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ intended his philosophy to be bra¯hman as undifferentiated Oneness, faithful to the Vedas (c. 1500–800 bce)as without ‘difference’ (bheda), as absolute, Hindu scripture (s´ruti). Within this scrip- Ultimate Reality, no more to descend to tural tradition also stand the Upanis¸ads (c. ‘existence’ as an independent self. This 800–500 bce), a collection of 108 Sanskrit indeed is moksha. sacred texts, which embody more expli- Nevertheless, philosophical reflection citly philosophical reflection, or at least demands an answer to the question: why invite philosophical commentary. does differentiation appear to characterize Vedanta, ‘the ends of the Veda’, everything that is perceived, if Ultimate expounds how the inner, true self (a¯tman) Reality is one? S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ expounds the may become one with Ultimate Reality principle that ‘knowledge’ (vidya¯) begins (bra¯ hman). Thereby the self attains to uncover ‘appearance’ as illusion (ma¯ya¯) ‘release’ (moksha) from painful and repe- even if this includes practices of religious titive cycles of existence, rebirth and devotion. We may imagine that we per- reincarnation (samsara). Advaita Vedanta ceive a dangerous snake when we are is a non-dualist, monist philosophy within prompted by fear; but dispassionate Sartre, Jean-Paul 274 knowledge will reveal that the illusory confusing the Real with illusion or the snake is a harmless rope. Unreal. Adhya¯sa entails a presentation of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s commentary on the Brahma- the attributes of one thing as if it were Su¯ tra also expounds the sole, exclusive another. For example, mother-of-pearl reality of Absolute Spirit. The external may be misperceived by its being pre- world of objects is construed as ‘reality’ sented as silver (like the ‘superimposition’ through lack of ‘knowledge’. Perception of the snake-appearance onto the rope- does relate to good or bad action (karma), reality). as the first aphorism of the Brahma-Su¯ tra The ‘objective’ world stems from such seems to suggest. processes of superimposition. It has a Again, apparent contradiction need not practical function, and is (relatively) real be self-defeating. The ancient Vedic tradi- for practical purposes. In actuality, or in tion embodied sharp debate of opposing metaphysical terms, however, only brah- viewpoints. As we note in the entry on man has real existence as Ultimate Reality. Hindu philosophy, S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ found a way The world of objects is unreal. Reincarna- of respecting religious devotion to a higher tion denies any notion of a single creation, being, even if this found its place as a although a succession of rebirth and ‘lower’ level of knowledge. In ‘higher’ reabsorption into bra¯hman may appear knowledge, anything beyond the oneness to take place, but on the level of ma¯ya¯ or of brahman is ma¯ya¯. like a dream. Such reasoning may not be entirely S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ accepts the main widespread without parallel in modern Western phi- epistemology of Hindu philosophy, losophy. Both Hegel (1770–1831) and except for one very major difference. The Kierkegaard (1813–55), for all Kierke- first three sources of knowledge in most gaard’s passionate opposition to Hegel as Hindu philosophical traditions are percep- a mere theorist, expound a dialectic tion, inference or a posteriori reasoning, which allows for ‘levels’ (Hegel), or and word or testimony. The first is the ‘stages’ or ‘viewpoints’ (Kierkegaard). primary mode of knowing. However, These offer frameworks within which S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ stresses the adequacy of the Vedic what was acceptable within one might be texts in such a way as to exclude inference denied in another. In Hegel’s case, ‘higher’ from perception as an authentic path to philosophical concepts (Begriff)might the apprehension of reality. undermine imagery (Vorstellung)that S´ an˙ ka¯ ra¯ also appears to accept a was acceptable in religion. In Kierkegaard, traditional view of karma. Acts of a prior the ‘stages’, respectively, of the aesthetic, incarnation may condition the range of ethical and religious, might reveal truth- good or evil, or scope of possibilities, for a claims differently from different ‘points of self who is reborn into a world order. Yet view’. in principle release, moksha, lies within This must not seduce us into under- the capacities of the self to attain, with due standing S´an˙ ka¯ra¯’s philosophy in Western knowledge. (See also Buddhist philoso- terms. S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ appeals to ‘illusion’ and phy; dualism; Madhva; metaphysics; ‘superimposition’ (adhya¯ sa). S´ an˙ ka¯ ra¯ monism; mysticism; pantheism.) writes in his commentary on the Brahma-Su¯ tras: ‘It is wrong to super- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980) impose onto the subject (whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere Sartre was born in Paris, and studied in the notion of the “I”) the object whose Paris and Freiburg. He was taken prisoner sphere is the notion of the “Not-I” . . .’ We of war in the Second World War, and should not ‘superimpose’ subject upon became a member of the resistance during object or object upon subject, thereby the Nazi occupation of France. He is 275 scepticism generally regarded as the most important may seem contradictory: existentialism is of the French existentialists. individualistic, Marxism is socio-eco- It is customary to divide Sartre’s nomic, with a grand narrative of history. philosophy into two periods. In his earliest Nevertheless Sartre’s analysis of the works he draws from Husserl and Hei- ‘situatedness’ of the human as ‘given’ by degger a phenomenological analysis of age, class, sex, race, war-or-peace and so human consciousness. Initially, in The on coheres with a Marxist interpretation Transcendence of the Ego (1936), his of the human and of history as driven by work is partly one of psychological socio-economic forces. Sartre attempted to analysis. His first novel, entitled Nausea reconcile existentialism and Marxism (1938) and first story, ‘The Wall’ (1939) in his Critique of Dialectical Reason reflect his own partly autobiographical (1960). (See also Marxist critique of experiences of anguish, dread and the religion.) prospect of imminent death, which appear in Jaspers and Heidegger as existential scepticism ‘Boundary Situations’ and as ‘Being- towards-Death’ respectively. Scepticism assumes a variety of forms and The first-hand character of Sartre’s different kinds of doubt. In broad terms, it quasi-autobiographical writing is more denotes doubt about whether claims to authentically ‘existential’ than Heidegger’s human knowledge amount to more than treatise style. ‘The Wall’ recounts the mere opinion, or whether there can be extreme dread of military interrogation: grounds for assuming that human knowl- ‘The major . . . scanned the list . . . You will edge is reasonable, justifiable, or war- be shot tomorrow morning.’ ‘There was a ranted. Radical scepticism demands big puddle between his feet.’ ‘My life was suspension of belief and judgement. closed, like a bag, yet everything inside it Moderate scepticism denies the possibility was unfinished’ (rpr. in W. Kaufman, ed., of human certainty. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, As a philosophical system, scepticism is Cleveland: Meridian, 1956, 226, 232, usually attributed first to Pyrrho of Elis (c. 234). 360–270 bce). Pyrrho is reported as The main themes in Sartre’s major stating that it is impossible to know the existentialist treatise Being and Nothing- nature of anything, not least because every ness (1943) are outlined in the entry on proposition can be opposed by its contra- existentialism, including the contrast dictory. Therefore we must preserve sus- between ‘objects’ (being-in-itself, eˆtre- pension of judgement (Greek, epoche¯), en-soi) and human being (being-for-itself, andkeeptoanuncommittedsilence eˆtre-pour-soi). The latter is consciousness (aphasia). Opinions merely reflect conven- that is conscious of itself, and thereby tion or chance. aware of a kind of mobile freedom. The It has been suggested that this attitude human battle is that of retaining the was prompted historically by a sense of struggle against loss of freedom by becom- disappointment or disillusion in the after- ing the ‘object’ of the constraints imposed math of the higher expectations nurtured by others. by the philosophies of Plato (428–348 ‘God’ cannot fit into either category. If bce) and Aristotle (384–322 bce). The God is ‘personal’, God is not Being-in- era marked the break-up of Greek city- itself; but Being-for-itself remains incom- states, and the beginnings of the Stoic call plete. ‘God’ does not exist, either in for fortitude and lack of passion or concepts or for reality. engagement (Greek, ataraxia) in the face The second period is one of Sartre’s of uncertainty. Times of cultural crisis and exploration of Marxism. At first these two change nurture scepticism about the Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 276 competing claims of assertions, possibly possibility of knowledge, how do I know paralleled by some post-modernist strate- that I cannot (with more exploration) gies today. know? Does this not entail a logical Carneades (214–129 bce) also antici- contradiction? Second, is not scepticism pates elements in the Sophists and post- parasitic upon what it doubts? Wittgen- modernity, by exalting a rhetoric of the stein observes that doubt comes ‘after’ ‘plausible’ against the possibility of argu- certainty. (See also agnosticism; corrig- mentsforthetrueorfalse.Heused ibility; Locke; reason; Swinburne; rhetoric to unmask alleged contradictions Wolterstorff.) in theistic belief, and attacked ‘justice’ as a viable concept, in part by exploiting the Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm limits of language. Joseph von (1775–1854) Sextus Empiricus (third century ce) defended the scepticism of Pyrrho. He Prior to 1794 Schelling began his earliest called attention to the variety and diver- work on the nature and language of myth. gence of opinion found on many issues. However, in 1794 his interests turned to the He also viewed as illogical the process of philosophy of religion. His complex constantly correcting and re-correcting thought developed through several distinct corrigible beliefs. Whatever is asserted phases, in general beginning with the can with equal reason be denied. ‘subjective’ idealism of Fichte,moving In Western thought these sceptical towards and through ‘objective’ Idealism formulations lay dormant, in general, until which entailed an awareness of the Abso- the Renaissance. Richard H. Popkin (The lute in history, and finally arriving at a pre- History of Scepticism from Erasmus to conceptual view of God as the Ground of Spinoza, Berkeley: University of California Being beyond subject–object distinctions. Press, 1979) sets out issues during this This had a strong influence on Tillich. period clearly. Pyrrho’s works were redis- Schelling’s interest in art, nature, myth covered, and his arguments redeployed. and creativity earned him in some quarters Martin Luther’s famous claim against the title ‘the philosopher of the Romantic Erasmus that scripture is ‘clear’ (Latin, movement’. He studied in Tu¨ bingen with claritas) meant in this context that they Hegel and Ho¨ lderlin, and became friends were sufficiently clear to counter the claim with Schiller, Goethe and Schlegel. of Erasmus that divided opinions In early years Schelling co-edited a demanded lack of action (ibid., 1–41). journal with Hegel, but there came a Michel Montaigne (1533–92) devel- parting of the ways. Hegel eventually oped Pyrrhonian scepticism and an early observed, ‘Schelling carried on his philo- theory of cultural relativism. For him sophical education before the public, and many of the issues turned on the difficulty signalled each fresh stage with a new of formulating criteria for truth. book’ (Hegel, Sa¨mtliche Werke, rpr. Stutt- In more moderate forms, Hume (1711– gart: Frommann, 1965, vol. 19, 647; more 76) develops some of these themes, with loosely, W. Kaufmann, Hegel, London: particular reference to issues of cause, Wiedenfeld & Nicholson, 1966, 279). probability and the self. Hume explicitly Schelling was concerned with how called himself a sceptic, but recognized consciousness emerged as consciousness that consistent sceptics would be diffident of the self. He found the key in the about their beliefs and their doubts. He contrast or polarity between self and not- uses sceptical arguments to attack dogma- self, or between self and Other. Encounter- tism and to encourage cultural reform. ing otherness is a precondition for under- Two standard criticisms are made of standing the self, as Schleiermacher scepticism. First, if sceptics deny the urged in his hermeneutics, followed by 277 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst

Dilthey and recently Ricoeur. Against experience rather than doctrine, and on Fichte, Schelling saw ‘nature’ as part of the consciousness of a personal relation- this ‘Other’. ship with God. However, from his days at For Schelling this is the transcendental theUniversityofHallehewelcomed ground for the possibility of understand- rigorous critical reflection, appropriate to ing. However, in his Philosophy of Art ‘pietism of a higher order’. He sustained (1803) he perceived all reality as also both approaches throughout his life. As sharing an identity that eclipsed the professor at the University of Berlin and subject–object contrasts of conceptual also as pastor of Trinity Church, he thought. This is what provoked Hegel’s published thirty volumes of works: ten caustic criticism of a monism or panthe- volumes on philosophy; ten on theology; ism as like ‘the night . . . in which all cows and ten of church sermons. are black’. Prior to more recent translations of his Schelling’s view of God and nature now work, Schleiermacher was credited with verged on the mystical, in contrast to defining religion as a ‘feeling of absolute Hegel’s high regard for critical concepts dependence on God’. However, although and differentiation within the Whole. For he uses the word ‘feeling’ (H.R. Mack- Schelling, God is the outflowing, out- intosh’s translation), as J. Macquarrie and spreading, self-giving ground of all that others urge, this is not ‘feeling’ in a purely is. God is beyond the realm of conceptual psychological sense. thought. Hence language in religion Schleiermacher viewed this experience needs myth and symbol, which transcend as an ‘immediacy of awareness’ (in a concepts (against Hegel). (See also God, quasi-ontological sense) of ‘being utterly concepts and ‘attributes’ of; mysti- dependent upon God’ (German, das cism; transcendence.) Gefu¨ hl schechthinner Abha¨ngigkeit: The Christian Faith [1821–2], Eng. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989, sect. 62, 261). Schleiermacher, Friedrich In his early On Religion: Speeches to its Daniel Ernst (1768–1834) Cultured Despisers ([1799], Eng., New In older textbooks on philosophy of religion York: Harper, 1958) Schleiermacher made Schleiermacher is often portrayed as an it clear that this addressed a transcenden- advocate of defining religion in terms of tal issue, not a mere contingent mode of ‘feeling’. This distorts his significance, and experience. The basis of piety is not overlooks his main concerns. ‘craving for a mess of metaphysical and Schleiermacher marks the beginning of ethical crumbs’ (ibid., 31). Religion is ‘a ‘modern’ theology, not least because he sense and taste for the infinite’ (ibid., 39). was the first theologian seriously to seek to Doctrines are derivative from experi- come to terms with the transcendental ence. ‘Ideas, principles, are all foreign to philosophy of Kant, especially Kant’s religion’ (ibid., 46). Indeed, religion is ill- Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Just as served by ‘miserable love of system’ (ibid., Kant sought grounds for the very possibi- 55). This at once marks off Schleiermacher lity of thought, Schleiermacher explored both from Kant and from Hegel (1770– the basis on which theology and religion 1831), who was Professor of Philosophy at were possible. Berlin while Schleiermacher was Professor of Theology. immediacy of relation to god as finite to infinite the founding of modern hermeneutics Schleiermacher had been nurtured in a pietist tradition, and never lost the central Schleiermacher’s distaste for system and pietist conviction that religion rested on his emphasis on the interpersonal and scholasticism, scholastic philosophy 278 experimental led him to formulate the first Scholasticism included the major goal ‘modern’ theory of hermeneutics that of exploring and demonstrating the coher- did not transpose hermeneutics into a ence of faith-beliefs and the conclusions of mere sub-discipline designed to serve or rational enquiry within a single unified (worse) to justify some prior system of system. The method of Aquinas in the theology or of philosophical thought. He Summa Theologiae was to present a defined hermeneutics not as a ‘theory of systematic, scientific treatise through interpretation’ but as ‘the art of under- questions, articles, objections, replies and standing’; it is not ‘mechanical’ (Herme- counter-replies. This characterizes the neutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, method of scholastic philosophy. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1977, 175). Scholastic methods were applied to The subject matter to be understood theology, philosophy and law, and drew embodies that which is ‘strange’ or ‘other’; on Greek philosophy, especially Aristo- hence the person who seeks to understand tle. In the seventeenth century scholasti- needs a ‘divinatory’ (intuitive, person-to- cism was too readily portrayed as a body person) capacity. Nevertheless, contrary to of common doctrine. In content, it could popular misunderstandings of him, Schleier- embrace diverse views, but its unifying macher insists that a ‘comparative’ or factor was its common method, especially ‘critical’ dimension is no less necessary. disputation and commentary, and the The first is ‘the feminine strength in know- common attempt to expound a coherent, ing people’; the second, the ‘masculine’ rational, ‘scientific’, philosophical theol- strength of classifying and criticizing: ‘each ogy or view of God and the world. needs the other’ (ibid., 150–1). On Schleier- From the schools of the twelfth cen- macher’s development of ‘the hermeneutical tury, often based in the great cathedrals, it circle’, see the entry on hermeneutics. was a short step to the founding of the Hegel criticized Schleiermacher for an earliest universities of the thirteenth and over-churchly, inadequately conceptual fourteenth centuries, including Paris and and critical approach to religion. Yet his Oxford. Bonaventure (c. 1217–74), influence remains. Some suggest that Professor of Theology at Paris, John Duns Schleiermacher, Hegel and Kierkegaard Scotus (1266–1308) of the universities of represent the three main nineteenth- Oxford and Paris, and William of Ock- century figures who have shaped three ham (c. 1287–1349) of Oxford may all be distinctive mind-sets in twentieth-century included among the great scholastic theology. (See also ontology; panenthe- philosophers and theologians. ism; Romanticism.) Typically William of Ockham retained and developed the scholastic concern with scientific system. Scientia rationalis scholasticism, scholastic included philosophy and logic; scientia philosophy realis included physics. The drive towards These terms allude to the period of the unified system lies behind his well-known great schools of late medieval Western ‘principle of economy’ (Ockham’s razor) Europe, especially in the twelfth and whereby multiplicity is not to be assumed thirteenth centuries. The Latin scholasti- unless it is unavoidable, i.e. rejected if cus denoted the master of a school, and ‘without necessity’. would have included such figures as Peter Abelard (1079–1142), Peter Lombard Schopenhauer, Arthur (1100–60) and Hugh of St Victor (1096– (1788–1860) 1141). The flowering of the movement came with Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) Schopenhauer’s contribution to philoso- and his magisterial Summa Theologiae. phy of religion, in contrast to his influence 279 science and religion on the history of ideas, is difficult to science and religion calculate. Even in the nineteenth century, In the earliest, pre-Socratic, period of his impact on philosophy was not great. Greek philosophy, principles of explana- His influence was felt rather by Richard tion for the world and its elements formed Wagner and part of the study of philosophy. Thales (1844–1900), and he explores distinctive (c. 624–546 bce) held that everything was affinities with Eastern thought. derived from water. Anaximander Schopenhauer’s major work was The (610–547 bce) ascribed the origins of the World as Will and Representation (often world to a boundless, moving material, translated Idea, but German Die Welt als out of which the world emerged by a Wille und Vorstellung, 1818, with a ‘separating’ of opposite qualities. second volume in 1844). The world is Aristotle (384–322 bce)defined perceived as will, or as will to live, in the ‘science’ as ‘demonstrated knowledge of form of an unconscious striving which the causes of things’. However, ‘cause’ finds expression in a multiplicity of was sub-categorized into four kinds: effi- instantiations. cient cause, material cause, formal cause The thinkers in Western philosophy and final cause. The first three, in effect, whom Schopenhauer most respected were address a question about cause by answer- Plato (428–348 bce) and Kant (1724– ing ‘how’; the fourth, by addressing the 1804), but he was perhaps the first modern question ‘Why?’ Western philosopher to engage seriously Two writers, among others, who are with Eastern thought, especially Indian both established physicists and also theo- philosophy in the tradition of Hindu logians, insist that ‘science is essentially philosophy and Buddhist philosophy. asking, and answering, the question Although he looked to Kantian thought “How?” By what manner of means do to try to find both metaphysical and things come about? Religion, essentially, empirical support for his concept of the is asking, and answering, the question world as will as it presents itself to the “Why?” Is there in a meaning and purpose mind, Schopenhauer’s pessimism about at work behind what is happening?’ (John the struggle of existence, its pain and Polkinghorne, Quarks, Chaos, and Chris- suffering, and the hope of ‘salvation’ in tianity: Questions to Science and Religion, self-renunciation and denial of will owes London: Triangle, 1994; similarly, Ian G. perhaps more to resonances with themes Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, found in Eastern philosophies (see empiri- London: SCM, 1966, 23–6). cism; metaphysics). The contrast is a useful one because it In the end, it remains unclear whether begins to explain how truth in the natural Schopenhauer’s complex discussion of sciences and truth in religion is often Kant genuinely saves his system from the complementary, and need not be competi- status of a speculative world-view, tive; yet at the same time they are not although he wrestles seriously with how compartmentalized as if they addressed the mind construes its succession of different, self-contained segments of reality. perceptions and cognitions. For philoso- phy of religion the emergence of a notion why do conflicts exist? from of the unconscious prior to Freud is the side of ‘religion’ significant, and his resonance with some themes of Eastern philosophical thought On both sides there have been mispercep- about bodily suffering and the discipline tions that have generated confusions and of renunciation for ‘salvation’ offers unnecessary tension, even hostility. Gali- another unexpected facet in a Western leo (1564–1642) was a devoted Catholic, thinker of the nineteenth century. and found no tension between his scien- science and religion 280 tific advances and religious belief. Yet the A memorable example of the difference story of his persecution by the church of comes from comparing the approach of the day is notorious. Newton (1642–1727) with that of the Galileo’s work provided a firm con- ‘French Newton’, Pierre Simon de Laplace ceptual basis for the view of Copernicus (1749–1827). (1473–1543) that the universe is not Newton was not strictly ‘orthodox’ in geocentric; according to him the earth terms of a Trinitarian Christian theology, circled round the sun, and stars were but was firmly and devoutly theist. Yet in perceived as other suns. To defensive terms of scientific method he was rigor- church authorities of the time, this seemed ously empiricist. It was his rule ‘to admit to remove humankind from the centre of no more causes of natural things than are the universe as God’s crowning creation true and sufficient to explain them’. He above God’s other creatures. They cited used only scientific method, but held to a the sequence of creation in Genesis and the theist world-view, in which God had role of humankind in Psalm 8 and else- created the world and sustained the where. stability of its rational ‘order’ by divine In 1613 Galileo wrote to Castelli, ‘In providence. discussion of physical problems we ought Laplace believed that Newton was the to begin not from . . . scriptural passages greatest genius to live, and assimilated . . . which may have some other meaning Newton’s theories and methods as his beneath their words.’ Today virtually all model for science. He developed Newton’s biblical specialists would agree with Gali- mechanics of planetary motion. Yet in leo’s verdict. The Bible does speak of the some circles he is remembered more unique dignity of humankind (especially especially for his dialogue with Napoleon. Ps. 8:6–8; also quoted and endorsed in Napoleon is said to have queried why Heb. 2:6–8). But this has no explicit Laplace did not mention the Creator in his connection with any astronomical loca- large book on the universe. The famous tion. Religion and theology had tried to (or infamous) reply was: ‘I had no need of imperialize an area of knowledge that was that hypothesis.’ not at issue in a responsible interpretation This, in itself, might have been a of scripture and tradition. legitimate reply if it were innocently on behalf of science. However, Laplace was why do conflicts exist? from articulating a broader world-view, namely the side of ‘science’ that of the autonomy of science and a On the other side, conflict arises when view of the world as a self-sufficient, scientists extend the scope of scientific independent, impersonal mechanism. A methods to areas and issues beyond mechanistic method had become an expli- natural science. Even granted that, as most citly mechanistic and materialist world- informed scientists and philosophers of view. Ian Barbour describes this as a science would agree today, it is more ‘reductionist’ epistemology (Issues in accurate to speak of scientific methods Science and Religion, 59). It led almost (plural) than of a single scientific method, inevitably to Diderot and to La Mettrie’s these methods operate within the sphere of Man the Machine (see Enlightenment). the natural phenomena under observation ‘facts’, interpretation and or exploration. They become overex- levels of explanation tended if their theoretical dependence upon empirical data is transposed into a The notion that natural sciences work metaphysical or ontological world-view. simply from observation of empirical facts Empiricist method then becomes positivist tested by experiment and prediction tends ontology. to hold only for the simpler segment of 281 science and religion

‘schoolroom’ science. As John Polkin- ‘If you have something like an electron, ghorne comments, it is ‘not just what they then if you know where it is, you can’t [scientists] see but the way that they see it know what it’s doing; if you know what that counts’ (Quarks, Chaos and Chris- it’s doing, you can’t know where it is. tianity, 5). He cites the example of the That’s Heisenberg’s celebrated Uncertainty discovery of the planet Neptune as an Principle in a nutshell’ (Polkinghorne, The unobserved inference from the behaviour Way the World Is, 16–17). The ‘unpictur- of Uranus: there is ‘a chosen point of able’ world of electrons gives us ‘some view’; a desire not only to observe, but surprises’, just as religious experience of also to understand and to interpret. God reflects both ‘ordered’ faithfulness In a series of detailed studies, Karl Heim and unpredicted surprise (ibid.). An over- shows that the outworn myth of the simple account of value-neutral observa- neutral scientific observer looking out onto tion and predication is too narrow to fit a world of value-neutral ‘objective’ facts the advances in physics and other sciences has been displaced by a widespread recog- since the 1920s and more recently. nition of the relativity of the observer to ‘the clockwork universe is dead’ what is observed. This is no longer a simple subject–object epistemological process. Whitehead makes similar points to those Moreover, ‘levels’ of interpretation and of Karl Heim. Supposedly stable founda- explanation are involved. At one level, an tions in physics, he comments, have been acoustic scientist observes varying sound- broken up. ‘Time, space, matter, electricity wave patterns on an oscilloscope. At . . . all require interpretation.’ another level these may be ‘observed’ as The biochemist A.R. Peacocke devel- variations of acoustic pitch and timbre. At ops this principle with reference to biolo- what level, and by what kind of observer, gical sciences. Biology, he reflects, used to do these become a Beethoven symphony or assume that ‘law-like behaviour at the a Schubert quartet? Does empirical method macro-level rests on statistical analysis at suggest that they are only vibrations of the micro-level’ (Creation and the World varying wavelengths and wave-shapes? of Science, Oxford: OUP, 1979). But now Does empirical enquiry provide a compre- nature, supposedly simple in structure, is hensive account of the world? Is a painting seen as ‘multi-dimensional’, including the no more than blobs of variable light-waves sub-atomic; once it was regarded as within the colour spectrum? The impor- mechanistic; now as interplay between tance of ‘levels of explanation’ is explored chance and causal uniformity; once, with by Polkinghorne in The Way the World Is little novelty; now with ‘dynamic newness’ (London: Triangle, 1983, 16–19). (ibid., 62). Although the example may have Peacocke examines Jacques Monod’s become overworked, there are few more Chance and Necessity, and the implications striking illustrations of the problematic of Einstein’s theory of general relativity, status of ‘fact’ divorced from interpreta- and places these within a theistic frame- tion than that of quantum field theory work (also further Peacocke, God and the established at Cambridge in the late 1920s New Biology, London: Dent, 1986). In his by Paul Dirac. Questions about light Science and Providence (London: SPCK, formulated on the basis of assumptions 1989) Polkinghorne defends the notion of about particles elicit ‘answers’ in terms of divine action in the world in the context of particles; questions couched in terms of modern physics. In course of argument he waves produce answers about atomic or observes, ‘The clockwork universe is dead’ sub-atomic waves. An electron will behave (ibid., 33). Natural science and theology sometimes like a wave; sometimes like a have both travelled a long way since particle. Laplace and La Mettrie. science and religion 282

We have left aside the challenge of the However, computer technology relates organic and developmental theories asso- to the philosophy of mind, and more ciated with Darwin (1809–82) and Spen- especially genetic engineering and embry- cer (1820–1903) since these are discussed ology relate to questions about human under teleological argument, evolu- selfhood. In this area, technologies that tion and related entries. alter a genetic cell affect only a life-span; However, a fundamental issue lies at but changes to a germ-line are irreversible the heart of theistic responses to Darwi- because they reorder DNA sequences for nian theories. We noted the responses of subsequent generations. Tennant and of W. R. Matthews that the Thedebateabouttherapeuticand very possibility of processes that could reproductive cloning seems to cause permit constructive adaptation supports, problems about human identity, but only rather than undermines, the notion of a at a popular, not at an informed, scientific divine Designer, or of purpose in the level. For a clone shares only genetic world. ‘Lucky accidents . . . bewilderingly identity, of the same order as already accumulate until the idea of purposiveness pertains to an identical twin. Yet no . . . [becomes more] reasonable . . . [than] responsible person ascribes the same groundless contingency’ (Tennant, Philo- ‘identity’ to both twins. In this respect, sophical Theology, 2 vols., Cambridge: the debate clarifies a theistic view that CUP, 1930, vol. 2, 92–93). ‘persons’ are more than their genetic Swinburne also incisively argues for inheritance, even if allowance is made for the importance of this phenomenon of environmental influences also. Moreover, ‘orderedness’ as a principle of the universe the long-term degenerative effects of a with reference to multiple phenomena decreasing gene-pool would underline the including electrons and positrons. Einstein importance of differentiation as a char- confessed himself puzzled by the very fact acteristic of humankind and the animal that the world is ‘understandable’. Polk- kingdom. inghorne builds up a case for the ‘very It is sometimes asked whether crea- special universe’ that is needed to meet the tion entails the possible role of co- emergence and sustaining of our carbon- creation for humankind in facilitating based life. Its margin of brute possibility is new departures in genetic developments. around ‘one in a trillion’. ‘If the universe Here, however, the philosophical issue expands too quickly . . . it will rapidly becomes an ethical one. Even if it is become too dilute for anything interesting acceptable to conceive of humankind to happen in it . . . If it expands too slowly, continuing creation by ‘co-creation’, is it will re-collapse before anything inter- the risk of inadvertent mutation caused esting happens . . . To make carbon in a by genetic manipulation of a germ-line one star, three helium nuclei have to be made that can be taken responsibly? to stick together. This is tricky . . . Also This area of biogenetics and medicine carbon is not enough; for life one needs a challenges those who define human per- lot more elements’ (Quarks, Chaos, and sons merely as naturalistic mechanisms. Christianity, 27, 29). The argument For can we avoid the inference that these mounts up. are moral decisions, not to be left to scientific and clinical interests alone? If we religion, science and accept this moral dimension, however, we technology have already accepted the principle of Many of the numerous epoch-making ‘levels of explanation’ discussed above. applications of science to practical ends The discussion of paradigms and incom- raise issues for ethics, rather than more mensurability by Kuhn and Feyerabend, broadly for the philosophy of religion. even if we allow for possible overstate- 283 self, selfhood ment in their earlier work, at very least Yet, anticipating more recent discussions serves to relate ‘science’ to human by thinkers such as Ricoeur, Locke communities of scientists. (See also rightly perceives that the most significant empiricism; Freud’s critique of trans-subjective criterion of identity religion; materialism; metaphysics; arises from responsibility and account- positivism; theism.) ability on the part of this person (ibid., 18, 19). A modern analogy would be that of self, selfhood contributing to a pension or superannua- From earliest times philosophers have tion fund. I may be almost unrecognizable noted a particular dialectic or duality at the age of eighty, from my snapshot at between continuity and change in the self. twenty-one. Yet if it is ‘I’ who contribute Plato (428–348 bce) addressed the pro- the pension payments, no matter how blem by an over-neat dualism between much accident, illness or misfortune may the body (soˆ ma), which belongs to the ravage my demeanour, it is ‘I’ who claim realm of change and decay, and ‘the soul’ entitlement to receive superannuation (he¯ psyche¯), which belongs to the unchan- payments after retirement. The experience ging realm of eternal Forms or Ideas. of continuity through change is a legal and These dualist perspectives persist, even social reality. though many recognize that they generate no continuity of self-identity serious problems. through change? hume on the dual criteria for personal self identity? locke on the self Does this stand philosophical scrutiny at a Locke (1632–1704) did not subscribe to deeper level? Further, are we obligated to Plato’s dualism as a world-view. Never- depend on Locke’s distinction between theless, he recognized that identifying a ‘body’ and ‘consciousness’, let alone on person through their biological organiza- any dualism of body and soul? tion (today we might speak of fingerprints Hume (1711–76) was sceptical about and even of DNA fingerprints) addresses the notion of a stable self. He enters into a only one aspect of human identity. At the critical discussion in his Treatise of level of humankind’s participation in the Human Nature (1739: I: 4, esp. ‘Of biological animal kingdom, identity is Personal Identity’, sect. 6). Experience perceived in an individual’s ‘organized reveals, or seems to reveal, that as ‘selves’ body’ (Essay Concerning Human Under- we are simply a succession of perceptions: standing, II: 27: 6). Locke declares, how- impressions, ideas, emotions, memories, ever, that if we are speaking of the identity hopes. We perceive only perceptions. We of human persons qua persons (not just as perceive no underlying structure that ties men, or women) ‘consciousness makes them together. We can never catch our- personal identity’ (ibid., 10). selves without a perception; but these are Locke expounds the hypothetical ana- merely fleeting and successive. logy of the body of a cobbler which Persons are ‘nothing but a bundle or becomes inhabited by the ‘soul’ of a collection of different perceptions’; for prince. To the outside world, the identity perceptions are exhaustively all that we of the new hybrid appears to be that of can perceive by introspection (ibid.). the cobbler; but in his heart of hearts, the There is no ‘invariable and uninterrupted’ prince knows by introspection that he is core of selfhood that we can observe. To really the prince (ibid., 15). The ‘inner’ ascribe ‘identity’ to what is constantly identity, however, defies, or seems to changing is both groundless and logically defy, the application of public criteria. self-contradictory, or paradoxical. self, selfhood 284 three responses to hume’s of moral struggle and moral change critique presupposes ‘the self-same being through- out its different experience’ (ibid., 74 and Various strands of argument have been 181–209). offered by those who dissent from Hume. A broader, highly sophisticated inter- First, identity and sameness are not disciplinary approach that takes account synonyms for an ‘unaltered’ condition in of agency, responsibility and inter-subjec- all or in most contexts. If someone steals tivity is offered by Ricoeur, in Oneself as one of my books and damages it, and it is Another (Chicago: Chicago University recovered by a search, I may logically Press, 1992). identify it as ‘the same’ book, even if it has dualism resolved by lost its cover or had ink splashed over the naturalistic behaviourism? pages. Wittgenstein and linguisticians have explored the multi-level meanings of The traditional soul–body dualism asso- ‘the same’. ciated with Plato, largely with Aquinas, Second, in the psychology of moral and with Descartes is vulnerable to action we distinguish between act, desire, criticism. Ryle has attacked it as the myth wish, will, habit and character. It makes of the ‘ghost in the machine’. Such sense for someone to say ‘I acted out of criticisms, however, tend to relate more character,’ or more sharply, ‘I was not directly to the notion of dualist ‘compo- myself when I did that.’ Character pre- nents’ of the self than to a recognition that supposes a continuity of habituated acts the self lives through two, or indeed that is describable in terms of character- multiple, dimensions as body, as a spiri- istics identifiable over time. Otherwise we tual being, as a morally responsible agent could not write references endorsing and so on. someone’s ‘reliability’ or ‘loyalty’. J. B. Watson’s Behaviour (1914) and Third, C.A. Campbell appeals to a Behaviourism (1924) in theory present a judgement theory of cognition. Percep- method in psychology which excludes tion alone might suggest that when Big introspection. However, in B.F. Skinner Ben strikes nine o’clock we ‘perceive’ it and others ‘radical behaviourism’ becomes strike one o’clock nine times. In practice, a naturalistic and materialistic account of however, we review our series of percep- the self. The self is a neurological machine tions to make cognitive judgements: ‘the without a higher level of explanation. This clock has struck nine’ (On Selfhood and generates what has been called ‘the para- Godhood, London: Allen & Unwin, 1957, dox of materialism’. If thought is merely a 76). This presupposes a continuity which given level of complexity reached by binds together the series of perceptions random neurological processes, on what through the agency of a stable selfhood. basis might materialism count as a ‘Activity implies a subject that is active’ ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ view of the (ibid., 70). self? (See behaviourism; materialism; Given that the self is ‘distinguishable reasonableness.) from its experiences’, Campbell declares, Often the word ‘person’ is used in ‘we have no right to assume that the self preference to ‘self’ to denote those dis- manifests all that it is in the human tinctive characteristics of being human experiences’ (ibid., 108, Campbell’s which many in philosophy and religion italics).Perceptsleadontojudgements have striven to designate by using the and to interpretations, which utilize word ‘soul’, but which are perhaps better frameworks of understanding built up expressed through less reifying, substantial over time (ibid., 36–94) The experience terminology. 285 self, selfhood the grammar of persons in the logic of persons in british european continental philosophy philosophy In the logical tradition of British philoso- Two complementary approaches invite phy Strawson (b. 1919) discusses the attention, one from the Continental tradi- status of language about persons in his tion of existentialism or phenomenology; work Individuals (London: Methuen, the other, from the British tradition of the 1959). After discussing ‘structural features analysis of logical grammar (see logic). of the conceptual scheme’ concerning Among existentialist thinkers Marcel identification and individuation in the case (1889–1973) stresses that human beings of ‘Bodies’ which have proper names are not ‘cases’ or ‘numbers’, but persons (ibid., 15–58), and their ‘Sounds’ (ibid., worthy of respect as persons. Humanity, 59–86), Strawson considers ‘Persons’ love and openness or ‘availability’ (dis- (ibid., 87–134). The focus here is ‘personal ponibilite´) to the ‘other’ enhances not only experience’ dependent on a ‘certain body’ the humanness of the ‘other’, but also my (ibid., 97). own claim to be human. In Being and Strawson concludes that the concept of Having (1935) Marcel contrasts ‘having’ person is ‘primitive’ in that ‘both predi- impersonal objects with ‘being with’ cates ascribing states of consciousness and another person as a ‘Thou’, without any predicates ascribing corporal characteris- desire to ‘possess’ or to dominate. tics, a physical situation . . . are equally Marcel reflects the thought of the applicable to a single individual of that Jewish philosopher Buber (1878–1965), single type’ (ibid., 102). Hume, Strawson and paves the way for Levinas (1906–95). observes, was mistaken in assuming that Buber distinguishes between the ‘attitude’ ‘I’ refers to a ‘pure’ subject: ‘The concept conveyed by regarding ‘the Other’ as of a person is logically prior to that of an ‘Thou’ and the attitude of ‘I’ towards an individual consciousness. The concept of a ‘it’: ‘the combination I–Thou . . . the person is not to be analyzed as that of an combination I–it’ (I and Thou, New York: animated body or of an embodied anima’ Scribner, 1958, 3). Like Locke’s ‘man’, (ibid., 103). persons may be regarded as ‘objects to be Corporeal characteristics (M-predi- observed’ for scientific purposes. Yet cates) and predicates that apply to persons persons are more than things. A person is (P-predicates) complement each other in one who addresses me as a ‘Thou’. Until describing persons. Hence ‘is smiling’, and I discover this interpersonal dimension, I ‘is thinking’, ‘believes in God’, all draw on myself am not fully human. a reservoir of personal language. Both Levinas also explores the face-to-face axes are necessary for an understanding of relation of human persons. While violence the conceptual grammar in question. Even and force is dehumanizing, it is ‘the Other’ those who contemplate the possible logic who makes me human by placing my own of a ‘post-mortal soul’ can do so only on interests in question. Self-identity and self- the basis of its continuity with the self ‘as a sacrifice are to be held together in a former person’ (ibid., 116). dialectic of mutuality and responsibility, does identity matter in post- so that neither is ‘gobbled up’ by the other, mortal survival? which each nevertheless gives of the self to the other. Such qualities of life as home, Most philosophical and theological dis- hospitality, the face, patience, mark out cussion in the West has focused on the ‘personhood’ in the human. Further intelligibility of, and criteria from, the themes of this kind are also developed by continuity and extension of personal Ricoeur (b. 1913). identity. Two approaches, among others, self-involvement, the logic of 286 question the value of this focus. One arises involves them in some other way. Such from the work of Derek Parfit; the other language is more than ‘flat’ description. from Eastern thought. Donald D. Evans (The Logic of Self- In modern Western philosophy Derek Involvement, London: SCM, 1963) Parfit argues that ‘identity is not what explores the significance of performative matters in survival’ (Reasons and Persons, utterances in Austin for language in Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). Parfit sees no religion, including Austin’s categories of ‘rational’ explanation for why we should constatives, commissives, exercitives, be exclusively concerned about ‘our’ behabitives and verdictives (ibid., 27–40). survival and well-being rather than survi- He applies these to biblical language about vors who replaces us. creation (ibid., 145–252). In Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the The term ‘self-involvement’ has a dis- reason for a concern about identity lies in tinct advantage over the more widely used trust that it is the will of God or Allah to parallel ‘existential’. In the tradition of continue the care and love that the self has Anglo-American linguistic philosophy it is already enjoyed. It is bound up, in other clear that for self-involving language to be words, not with egoism, but with a effective, certain states of affairs are either particular understanding of the God of presupposed or are true. Existential lan- theism. guage in Kierkegaard, Bultmann and In Hindu philosophy thecaseis European Continental philosophy all too different. In the tradition of Advaita often overlooks the necessary interaction Vedanta, as mediated through S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ between self-involvement, or subjectiv- (788–820), the very notion of differentia- ity, and questions about the truth of tion as an individual self is a ‘lower’ those states of affairs on which the understanding based on ‘illusion’ (ma¯ya¯). currency of this self-evolving dimension Final release (moksha) from an unwel- is often based. (See also existentialism; come cycle of existence, rebirth and speech acts; Wolterstorff.) reincarnation takes the form of an awaited assimilation into undifferentiated con- self-transcendence sciousness. Then the inner self (a¯tman) See transcendence. becomes now explicitly and clearly one with an uncharacterizable Ultimate Rea- lity (bra¯hman). semantics This stands in contrast to the traditions Most specialists in this area accept the of the major Western religions. At worst, definition of semantics as ‘the study of these suffer from undue individualism. At meaning’ (John Lyons, Semantics,2 best, they look forward to a transformed vols., Cambridge: CUP, 1977, 1). Charles mode of existence in the resurrection, Morris proposed a threefold division which allows for both continuity of between ‘semantics’ as the meaning of identity and the destiny of a community signs, ‘syntactics’ as a study of combina- of persons. (See also post-mortal exis- tions of signs and ‘pragmatics’ as the tence; resurrection.) ‘uses and effects’ of signs within human behaviour. The distinction between semantics and self-involvement, the logic of syntactics is blurred and difficult to This phrase denotes existential involve- sustain, since signs in language draw their ment on the part of the self in language meaning-currency from their syntagmatic that commits the speaker or the addressee and paradigmatic relations with other to certain attitudes or actions, or appoints signs, i.e. in conjunction with which they them to a certain status or task, or function (syntagmatic relations); and in 287 solipsism place of which are they selected (paradig- dialogue-partners. Plato’s Crito, Euthy- matic relations). phro, Ion, Protagoras, and the Apology The role of semiotics also overlaps with of Socrates are likely to have embodied semantics. Both may include non-linguis- Socratic teaching. His Phaedo recounts the tic signs and sign-systems (flags, traffic trial and death of Socrates. Xenophon lights, road signs), and both depend on a provides a further source. distinction between the sign-system or Self-knowledge and the questioning of language-system (Saussure’s la langue) accepted opinion were two key emphases and the particular selection and use of a of Socrates. ‘Know yourself’ and ‘virtue is sign from this repertoire to perform a knowledge’ provide aphorisms that reflect communicative event (Saussure’s la par- the first. ‘The unexamined life is not worth ole). living’ articulates the second. Alongside In practice, semantics often concerns the midwife metaphor, which encouraged relations of contrast, antithesis or seman- people to think for themselves, Socrates tic opposition, as well as the perceived used a second image: he perceived himself scope of a semantic domain. The principle as a gadfly to rouse the lazy ‘horse’ of of contrast or ‘difference’ is often illu- Athens into critical self-examination and strated from kinship terms or colour- reflection. words, since the semantic scope may vary Although he was accused of ‘atheism’, from language to language. If a language Socrates rejected only the institutional and has no word for ‘orange’ as a colour, the anthropomorphic gods and goddesses semantic scope respectively of ‘red’ and of Athens. According to Plato’s Euthyphro ‘yellow’ will be extended. and also Xenophon, he claimed to have Most works on semantics include, at experienced guidance from a divine voice. least, discussions of classes (types and His view of ethics and virtue was high, tokens); reference; denotation; semantic although he believed that at bottom every fields; opposition and contrast; synchronic human being seeks virtue, and that this is and diachronic meaning; synonymy; hindered only through ignorance. He grammatical ambiguity; and lexicography. dissented from Gorgias and many of the (See also concepts; definition; lan- Sophists in their view that ethical value guage in religion; logic; Wittgen- and virtue is merely subjective. stein.) Socrates’s self-portrait in his dialogues as a perplexed enquirer is largely but not skepticism wholly an ironic device to provoke the dialogue-partner into active reflection and See scepticism. response. However, Socrates always remained suspicious of over-easy certainty. bce Socrates (470–399 ) His methods of philosophizing remain a Socrates, philosopher of Athens, perceived constructive legacy for all branches of his mission as that of a midwife who philosophy, including philosophy of reli- facilitates the birth of truth. His major gion. Socrates, Jesus of Nazareth and method was to question unexamined Kierkegaard are all masters of ‘indirect assumptions, or common assumptions communication’. that had been insufficiently explored. The midwife metaphor may readily have been solipsism suggested by the occupation of his mother, Phaenarete. Solipsism denotes the belief that nothing Socrates wrote no treatise, but the early exists outside one’s own mind. It derives dialogues of Plato (428–348 bce) portray from the Latin solus, alone, and ipse, encounters between Socrates and his oneself. Only oneself exists. A ‘softer’ Sophists 288 version of solipsism takes the form of the This insight in recent research (e.g. in S. belief that there are no grounds for M. Pogaloff, Logos and Sophia, Atlanta: concluding that anything else exists out- Scholars Press, 1992; more recently also side one’s own mind, even if the possibility works by Bruce Winter) explains much of cannot be excluded. Paul’s simultaneous use of classical In his earlier writings Wittgenstein rhetorical forms and criticism of a (1889–1951) acknowledged that what the pragmatic rhetoric of self-promotion (cf. solipsist ‘means’ is understandable, even 1 Cor. 2:1–5, and elsewhere). (See also correct, primarily as a comment on the epistemology; Plato; postmodernity; boundaries and limits of ‘my’ world. pragmatism; Rorty.) In his later work Wittgenstein pointed out in his attack of ‘private’ language that soul the very concepts and understanding that areneededtoformulatesuchaview Concepts of the soul vary from one presuppose a shared logical grammar of religious tradition to another, and from language through interaction with ‘other one philosophical system to another. In minds’. Wittgenstein’s critique of ‘private’ some systems the term is almost synon- language is forceful and constructive, but ymous with ‘spirit’; in others, the term assumes a special, technical use of ‘pri- virtually overlaps with ‘mind’. Some thin- vate’ which is often misunderstood. kers, including Thomas Aquinas (1225– Strawson helpfully paraphrases ‘private’ 74), envisage the soul as existing indepen- as ‘unteachable’ (i.e. the grammar has dently of the body; other atheistic or been ‘learned’). (See also logic; Plan- empiricist thinkers reject both the cred- tinga; scepticism; self.) ibility and intelligibility of the notion (for example, Antony Flew). Plato (428–348 bce) held a dualist Sophists view of soul and body. The soul is the The fifth-century Sophists included Prota- immaterial part of the human person. goras (c. 490–420 bce) and Gorgias (c. More than this, it is the essential part, 483–380 bce), who were categorized by the essence of the self, which constitutes their opponents as seeking fees for their the mental life of the self and survives the philosophy and rhetoric, and as teaching dissolution of the body. epistemological relativism. Protagoras Plato offers several arguments for the declared, ‘Man is the measure of all post-mortal existence of the soul. In things’, especially in contrast to some Phaedo (78b) he postulates that the soul is supposed external standards imposed by ‘simple’, i.e. without parts. Entities that the gods. consist of parts suffer dissolution when the Although we must allow for coloured parts disintegrate into fragments, but in portrayal through the eyes of opponents, the soul of these are no ‘parts’ that can be Aristophanes’ contention that Sophists separated. Hence the soul remains eternal. urged invalid argument through persua- Plato also ascribes to the soul or mind sive rhetoric finds corroboration in recent memories which appear to be innate ideas, research in the ‘Second Sophistic’ move- but are better explained as surviving from ment of the first century. Clearly in the a previous existence. If, however, there time of the Apostle Paul there were was a previous embodiment, it is reason- Sophist rhetoricians who gained status, able to infer that there will also be a applause and professional fees for aiming subsequent embodiment (Phaedo,73a– at pragmatic rhetorical success in the face 78a; cf. Meno, 81b–86b). (This is close of an implausible case, placing more value to the notion of reincarnation in Eastern on ‘winning’ than ‘truth’. religions, discussed below.) 289 speech acts

Aristotle (384–322 bce)holdsa affected the conceptual expression of different view, which finds its way in a future hope. The emphasis falls more radically modified and changed form, to upon an ultimate future destiny than upon elements in Aquinas. The soul, for Aris- immediate individual survival. totle, is the ‘form’ of a being that defines In Eastern religions the dominant or expresses the being’s modes of beha- themes take either of two forms. Some viour in the public world. It is not look to the law of Karma and reincarna- dualistic, but verges on what in modern tion of the soul into a level of existence philosophy might be called a dispositional (often in this world) that reflects ethical understanding of mind or character. Its conduct in this life. Others envisage the nature is instantiated in bodily actions, goal of full liberation from existence as a and it cannot be separated from the body. differentiated individual into assimilation Thomas Aquinas was closer to Aris- with the All. totle than to Plato’s dualism, but insisted In Hindu philosophy the Advaita that (against Aristotle) the soul could Vedanta school, especially S´an˙ ka¯ra¯, stres- survive separation from the body. How- ses the Oneness of a¯tman–brahman. The ever, since Aquinas also looked forward to apparent separation of the self is at the final resurrection of the dead, this bottom illusory, and the goal is to over- separation would be temporary rather come this illusion, and to experience than ultimate; at least until it received explicit assimilation into the One Ultimate some ‘body’ or ‘somatic’ form. reality. The biblical writings of the Judaeo- In both Hindu and Buddhist philo- Christian tradition, however, give almost sophy, particular sub-traditions vary in minimal emphasis to ‘the soul’. In emphasis. However, a major emphasis in Hebrew, the word nephesh, probably the Buddhism is to find liberation from the nearest to ‘soul’, has a wide range of cycle of death and rebirth, and to be meanings, even meaning ‘dead body’ in released to nirvana. In most Buddhist one passage, and simply ‘life’ in many traditions nirvana denotes ‘nothingness’, texts. The alternative, ruach, usually but in some it may come to signify a state translated ‘spirit’, does not denote what of bliss. These two variations may have Plato, Aristotle or Aquinas tend to mean different implications concerning notions by ‘soul’. The nearest notion in the of a ‘soul’, but mostly a broader idea of Hebrew Bible (Christian Old Testament) the self provides adequate language for is a quasi-conscious ‘thinned down’ exis- expression of what is at issue. tence of She’ol, among the shades: a In practice, perhaps only those tradi- bloodless, ‘reduced’ existence. tions that hold to some notion of an In the New Testament, Jesus speaks of intermediate state, such as purgatory, may the need to fear God who can destroy the be seriously troubled about the precise soul as well as the body, but the term nature of the soul as a metaphysical entity. psyche¯ (‘life’ or ‘soul’) and pneuˆ ma (spirit) For many religious traditions the term is are used only rarely to denote a surviving used almost as an adverbial term to denote entity. The major weight is placed upon a the continuity of the self who enters a transforming and creative act of God in mode of life after death. (See also athe- which the whole person will be raised by ism; empiricism; eternity; Ryle.) divine power in resurrection. The Greek soˆ ma is used to denote an entity capable of speech acts full identity and communication, a public, inter-subjective, heavenly mode of being. Speech-act theory focuses on the kinds of The patristic and medieval traditions acts or actions that are performed in the became mixed, as Graeco-Roman thought uttering of language. The fundamental speech acts 290 principles are expounded and instantiated match the world’ (Searle, Expression and in the entries on performative utter- Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech ances and Austin. Acts, Cambridge: CUP, 1979, 3; his Austin (1911–60) laid the groundwork italics). for speech-act theory, but Wittgenstein ‘Promising’ in ‘I promise to . . .’ con- (1889–1951) had already noted the dis- strains the speaker to act in certain ways, tinctive logic or function of certain first- following the act of promising (given the person utterances such as ‘We mourn . . .’ conditions of sincerity, power to imple- or ‘I believe . . .’ (Wittgenstein, Philoso- ment the words, and so forth). In reli- phical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, gion, a divine word of promise is 1967, II: ix, 189; x, 190). transformative and creative, and may also ‘We mourn’ constitutes an act of be a free choice of God to constrain God’s mourning, not a description of the inner own ‘raw’ omnipotence. mental states of the speakers. In religious Searle distinguishes between illocution- worship or prayer, ‘I repent’ is not an ary force and propositional content in attempt to inform God about an inner logical notation. The basic form is ‘F(p)’. state that God presumably knows, but ‘I promise not to come’ takes the form performs an act of repentance. In a solemn ‘F(~p)’. Speech-act theory explores the context of worship, ‘I believe’ (as in a nuances of ‘F’, the force of the action, in creed) is as much an action as nailing one’s contrast to the concerns of more formal colours to the mast in a naval battle. logic with ‘p’. Austin classified a variety of speech acts further developments after under five headings. ‘I find you guilty’ is an searle: wolterstorff and act of pronouncing a verdict, or a verdic- others tive. In sports a verdictive may be expressed in shorthand form: ‘Out!’; Searle produced a series of volumes on this ‘Off-side’; ‘No ball’. Exercitives perform subject, and goes well beyond the core acts that set new states of affairs in points outlined here. All the same, others motion: ‘I appoint you . . .’; ‘I open this focus on particular aspects. F. Recanati feˆte’; ‘I name this ship . . .’. Austin added (Meaning and Force, Cambridge: CUP, commissives (‘I promise to . . .’) and 1987) explores issues of performative behabitives (‘I apologize’; ‘I thank’); and force. A large group of writers might be a ‘weaker’ form of constatives (‘I make the mentioned, including Vincent Bru¨ mmer point . . .’). (Theology and Philosophical Inquiry, London: Macmillan, 1981). However, the developments after Wolterstorff wittgenstein and austin: john work of has important searle relevance for issues in the philosophy of religion, which is his special area of John Searle (b. 1932) offers a more expertise. systematic and thorough theory of speech Wolterstorff’s earlier works, Art in acts than does Austin. He reclassifies Action (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980) Austin’s categories, replacing ‘verdictives’, and Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: for example, with ‘declaratives’, partly to OUP, 1980), primarily address a theist or facilitate a far-reaching and fruitful dis- Christian approach to aesthetics and the tinction between ‘differences in the direc- philosophy of art. However, they also tion of fit between words and the world’. introduce his concept of ‘count-genera- Speech acts that are performative or tion’, which is fundamental for his philo- illocutionary are ‘to get the world to sophy of speech acts. ‘By performing one match to the words’. Descriptive proposi- or another action with or on his work of tions, by contrast, ‘get the words . . . to art, the artist generates a variety of other 291 Spinoza, Baruch

. . . actions’ (Art in Action, 14). A sophis- from the simple to the ever more complex, ticated and convincing theory of count- culminating in consciousness and the generation emerges in Works and Worlds adjustment of the self to its social of Art. environment. Adaptation to society yields In his later Divine Discourse (Cam- the ethical goal of pleasure or happiness. bridge: CUP, 1995) Wolterstorff offers a Pain is a sign of maladjustment. rationally coherent argument for the intel- Spencer pressed a liberal political ethic ligibility of the notion that ‘God speaks’. to support free-market competitive capit- For certain speech acts may be performed alism, which was not unrelated to his by human deputies which are believed to aphorism ‘the survival of the fittest’. He ‘count as’ acts of promising, commanding, was greatly admired as a prophet of acquitting, or appointing, on the part of capitalism in late-nineteenth century God. ‘Speech-action theory opens up the America. Nevertheless, he was criticized possibility of a whole new way of thinking in Britain for an over-simple view of about God speaking’ (ibid., 13). evolution, and for over-pressing the claims Like Austin and Searle, Wolterstorff of free-market economy against measured gives due allowance to institutional or legislation for its control. (See also personal stance as the background which science and religion.) operative speech acts presuppose (ibid., 35). In short, ‘one locutionary act’ may Spinoza, Baruch (Latin, Benedict, ‘count as’ more than one illocutionary act 1632–77) (ibid., 55). The latest in a long line of studies (at Spinoza is most widely known as an the time of writing) is a constructive exponent of monism or pantheism.He treatment by Richard S. Briggs (Words in follows the rationalist and mathematical Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical method of Descartes (1596–1650), and Interpretation, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, was also influenced by Hobbes (1588– 2001). Briggs shows that Austin and 1679). Searle may have paid too much attention Although many refer to him as a to criteria derived from vocabulary, ‘Jewish’ philosopher, Spinoza was Jewish although he broadly endorses their only by birth and rabbinic or Talmudic approaches. He explores the institutional education. He also read modern philoso- and contextual presuppositions of speech phy and other ‘secular’ subjects, and soon acts, and endorses Wolterstorff’s notion of abandoned Jewish faith and practice. In ‘doing x to bring about y’ (ibid., 9). Yet he 1656 he was excommunicated from the establishes further clarifications and Jewish synagogue on a charge of atheism. refinements. (See also language in He changed his name from the Hebrew religion; theism.) Baruch to the Latin equivalent, Benedict. Spinoza’s major exposition of his pantheistic philosophical system occurs Spencer, Herbert in his major work Ethics Demonstrated (1820–1903) in a Geometrical Manner (completed in Spencer was born in Derby, in England, 1675). He also wrote on biblical criticism and had little formal education in philo- as part of a plea for free thought and sophy. He extended Darwin’s (1809–82) tolerance in his Tractatus Theologica- theory of evolution into an explanatory politicus (published anonymously in hypothesis for issues of philosophy, 1670). He lived most of his life partly in ethics and human life. the area of Amsterdam, where his rejec- Evolution, he argued, provided an tion of traditional theism caused huge explanatory theory based on development hostility, and partly in The Hague. Stoicism, Stoics 292 substance, ‘god’, and nature Friedrich Jacobi viewed it as a determinist, rationalist monism without God (1785); At first sight it might appear contradictory Johann W. Goethe and J.G. Herder that Spinoza received the two seemingly praised the system as thoroughly theistic opposite designations of ‘atheist’ and ‘the (theissimum). God-intoxicated man’. But the reasons for epistemology and biblical these dual labels are not difficult to criticism explain. Spinoza drew from Descartes the If the knowledge of the order of nature notion of ‘substance’ as an underlying (natura) is thereby knowledge of God as ontological principle. However, if sub- the One Being, the human mind does not stance denotes that which has independent depend upon special revelation for this existence of itself, substance is coextensive knowledge. Understanding, as Hobbes with the whole of reality. Yet, since ‘God’ had suggested, comes when we see what is infinite, God is also ‘the whole of we seek to know as a logical effect of its reality’. Hence, Spinoza concludes, we cause. Epistemology is therefore linked may speak equally either of God, or of with Spinoza’s determinism as well as his nature (‘Deus, sive Natura’) to denote the rationalism. same single reality, the single Whole. In addition to his ontology, Spinoza’s Many theists viewed this as ‘natural- passionate concern for tolerance and ism’, and hence as atheism. Spinoza saw it political liberalism led him to publish as remaining true to his Hebrew roots, in anonymously (for reasons of safety) on a which, above all, God is ‘One’: a divine historical and critical approach to the unity and a divine infinity. ‘God is One’ Bible, especially to the Pentateuch. He (‘Deus esse unicum’), and ‘God necessarily argued that the early documents reflect the exists’ (‘Deus necessario existit’). intellectual limitations of the era, and that Spinoza’s insistence on these formulae the Bible does not promote the intolerance arose not least from his simultaneous that was often ‘read’ from it. His view of respect for Descartes and utter rejection the state was broadly similar to that of of Cartesian dualism. In particular, God Hobbes, but he did not live to complete is not a ‘mind’ to be excluded from the his work on political philosophy. realm of substance or matter. In spite of his clear awareness of the Through this monist metaphysics and problem, Spinoza does not explain with pantheist ontology, Spinoza was able to full adequacy his simultaneous emphasis formulate the ethics promised by the title upon determinism and his campaign for of his work. The ethical goal is to freedom. Freedom seems at times in transcend the limits of the partial. This Spinoza to denote little more than a lack explains, in turn, his passionate concern of awareness about what causes certain for freedom and tolerance. Lack of toler- actions. ance (which he experienced in person from others) was due to elevating partial knowl- Stoicism, Stoics edge into the status of a pretension to have grasped the Whole. The earliest traditions of Stoicism go back Yet the price for pantheist monism of to Zeno of Citium (c. 333–262 bce). The this kind is that God remains uncharacter- central theme is the rationality of the izable. God is neither personal nor trans- world, governed by the ‘world-soul’, its cendent. Thus after his death the orderedness, and its unified wholeness. ‘pantheism controversy’ (Pantheismus- The order of the world is reasonable and streit) erupted concerning whether Spino- immutable. This provides a foundation for za’s ontology was indeed ‘atheistic’. an ethics of self-control in the light of 293 Strawson, Peter Frederick reason. Well-being (Greek, eudaimonia) for many years, becoming Waynflete Pro- stems from rational action. fessor of Metaphysical Philosophy in The creative power of the world is succession to Ryle (1900–76). reasonable logos, but this divine principle Strawson’s writings have had consider- is immanent rather than transcendent. It is able influence, especially in the areas of probable that Paul the Apostle had this logic, ‘descriptive’ metaphysics and a contrast in mind in 1 Corinthians 2:12: distinctive exposition of the philosophy of ‘We have received not the spirit of the Kant. He also contributed decisively to a world (Greek, to pneuˆ ma touˆ kosmou) but change of philosophical climate at the Spirit who proceeds forth from God Oxford, moving from the ‘linguistic phi- (to pneuma to ek touˆ Theouˆ )’, where ek losophy’ of Austin to a more metaphysi- conveys ‘from’ or ‘out of’ rather than ‘of’. cal, less ‘formal’ approach. In the context Happiness or well-being lies in indepen- of philosophy of religion his work on dence from all external distractions, includ- individuation, persons and the self holds ing those of the passions (pathe). In contrast particular importance. to theism, Stoicism promotes self-suffi- logic and language ciency, autonomy and the achievement of one’s own goals, set by the self.‘Value’is An early influential paper ‘On Referring’ what accords with these self-determined (1950) attacked Russell’s reformulation goals. However, among the early Stoics, of definite descriptions in a logical form Cleanthes (c. 330–231 bce)formulatedthe that entailed the use of existential quan- ethical goal, ‘live harmoniously with nat- tifiers. Russell had translated ordinary ure’ (Greek, homologoumenos te¯ physei language into formal logical propositions ze¯n: Stoic, 3:12), which offered a less that would bracket out, by the use of subjective or self-focused ethic. the quantifier, whether or not the referent The early school of Zeno (333–262 of the definite description was held to bce), Cleanthes and Chrysippus (c. 280– exist. 206 bce) declined, but Stoicism under- Thus ‘The present King of France is . . .’ went revival in the period of the ‘Middle’ was translated as ‘(For at least one present Stoa (c. 185–98 bce). A fuller revival came King of France) (The present King of with the Stoics of the imperial Roman France is . . .)’ i.e. ‘(Ex)(Fx)’. Russell period, and included Seneca (c.4bce – 65 claimed that by this device, he had ce; almost the exact contemporary of Paul disengaged the definite description from the Apostle); Musonius Rufus (c. 30–100); acting as a referring expression. Strawson and Epictetus (c. 50–120). argued that Russell leaves insufficiently Debates about affinities or differences clear the contrast of function between in relation to the New Testament con- sentences of natural language and what tinue. There may be resonances about propositions or formal logical statements ‘freedom from distraction’ (1 Corinthians are made by uttering the sentence. In the 7:29–31), but the early Christian emphasis natural language sentence, he concludes, upon the transcendence of God, and a the referring dimension is presupposed, more positive view of the body and human even if it is not entailed formally. emotions mark fundamental differences. The broader upshot of the debate was (See also immanence; pantheism.) toraisetheissuealreadyintheairwith the later work of Wittgenstein about the relation between ‘logical form’ (or Strawson, Peter Frederick formalized propositions) and sentences in (b. 1919) ordinary language. This theme is devel- Strawson was born in London, and oped further in the latter part of Straw- educated at Oxford. He taught at Oxford son’s next book, Introduction to Logical subject, subjectivity, subjectivism 294

Theory (London: Methuen, 1952). In the subject, subjectivity, first part he expounds the issues in formal subjectivism logic, but then raises the fundamental It is of fundamental importance to distin- question about how far strictly formal guish between these three terms. ‘Subject’ logic can take us in considering the usually denotes the active human agent as complexities and nuances of natural subject in a process of knowledge or inter- languages as they are spoken and written. personal relation. ‘Subjectivity’ usually He is particularly concerned about the denotes the participatory stance of active rigidity of logical constants, and the engagement by a human agent or subject tendency to underplay the role of non- in which the ‘I’ becomes sharpened in a explicit presuppositions. venture that may entail the staking of persons: individuation and one’s very life on the outcome. ‘Subjecti- kantian philosophy vism’ denotes the unverified standpoint of a human agent or subject who makes a Strawson’s Individuals (London: purely subjective judgement without ser- Methuen, 1959) is perhaps his most ious grounding in public argument or in influential work. The ability to re-identify the public domain. particulars or persons over time presup- poses that they are more than subjective subjectivism constructs of the mind, and are also This third use accords with popular, non- locatable in space. Partly drawing on a philosophical, usage, although the pejora- background from Kant, Strawson argues tive use of ‘subjective’ in philosophy of for the irreducibly ‘primitive’ concept of religion is well established and accepted. person as an entity of which bodily or The term often denotes that for which a material predicates (‘M’ predicates) and person claims truth or value merely on the personal, consciousness-related or supra- basis of desire, hope or uncorroborated material predicates (‘P’ predicates) are opinion. predicated simultaneously and interac- Subjectivism may seek to dress up tively. personal opinions as tested beliefs when Strawson’s third chapter, ‘Persons’, they may reflect no more than preferences attacks both a Cartesian dualism of or personal attitudes of approval or mental entities alongside bodies and a disapproval. This may apply, for example, behaviourist or positivist reductionism. to ethics, systems of belief, claims to The grammar is not that of ‘mind plus truth or epistemology. body’, or ‘body plus mind’, but irreducibly of ‘person’. subjectivity In The Bounds of Sense (1966) Straw- son offers a constructive and sympathetic ‘Subjectivity’ denotes a dimension of exposition of the thought of Kant human personhood that reaches the heart, (1724–1804), in particular of Kant’s or depths, of what is it to be a responsible Critique of Pure Reason. He focuses human agent. In this context Kierke- especially on the transcendental issues gaard (1813–55) declared, ‘Subjectivity raised by Kant, which Strawson himself is truth.’ It is how we engage with truth, formulates in a different and distinctive including wrestling, struggle and first- way. These transcendental questions are hand decision and commitment, that closely relevant to epistemology in the brings us face-to-face with ‘truth’; not philosophy of religion. (See also beha- merely assenting to the ‘right’ answer as if viourism; positivism; transcendental the whole were a value-neutral objectivist philosophy.) abstraction of the intellect alone. 295 Swinburne, Richard subject of knowledge and more thinkers see religious discourse as subject as person about God as well as from God. Whatever our evaluation of subject, ‘Subject’ falls into two distinct sub-cate- subjectivity and subjectivism, these three gories within the notion of an active terms denote very different characteristics, human subject seeking knowledge or and need to be identified within their relationship. Traditionally Descartes appropriate contexts of discourse. They (1596–1650) isolates the human ‘subject’ are not concerned, as one writer expresses in terms of individual human conscious- it, with ‘grubbing about in the depths of ness looking out from within to scrutinize one’s psyche’; and it is questionable simply a world of objects. This is the subject– ‘to identify truth with objectivity and error object relation in rationalist and empiricist with subjectivity’ (James Brown, Subject epistemology, or theories of knowledge. and Object in Modern Theology, London: The thinker is the subject: what is thought SCM, 1955, 13). Often there is a dialectic about is the object. in which ‘control’ on the side of subject or In Buber (1878–1965), Marcel object depends on the issue. Many writers (1889–1973) and Levinas (1906–95), a seek to move beyond a subject–object split, concern is also expressed that the human but not always with success. (See also subject does not become a mere object in empiricism; self; God, concepts and the eyes of other human subjects. Because ‘attributes’ of; rationalism.) other subjects have the personal status of a ‘Thou’, their humanity and personhood can suffer reduction if they are objectified Swinburne, Richard (b. 1934) into a mere ‘it’. This does not overlook the Swinburne, Nolloth Professor of the Phi- need for scientific or empirical observation losophy of Religion at Oxford, is one of of persons as ‘objects’ of inquiry on the two or three most influential theistic occasion. However, ‘I–Thou’ constitutes philosophers of religion currently writing. the fundamental dimensions of the sub- Like Plantinga (b. 1932) and Wolter- ject-to-subject relation. storff (b. 1932) in America, he combines This gives rise to the constructive a robust and explicit commitment to notion of inter-subjectivity. The human theistic belief with incisive philosophical subject is not a mere individual mind, but argument. He taught at the University of contributes to a community of active, Hull (1963–72) and the University of personal agents who share inter-subjectiv- Keele (1972–84) prior to his Oxford chair ity. (to 2002). god as ‘subject’ most influential writings Barth (1886–1968) (with Buber) insists Among students of philosophy of religion that ‘God is always the Subject’who Swinburne’s three most influential books addresses humankind. God is not an are probably The Coherence of Theism, ‘object’ to be demonstrated or ‘proved’. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977, rev. edn, Hence Buber observes that next to the 1993); The Concept of Miracle (London: foolishness of denying God is the folly of Macmillan, 1971); and The Existence of trying to ‘prove’ God. If God is active God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979, rev. edn, Subject, humanity, in the first place, it is 1991). However, his Faith and Reason argued, needs to place itself in the role of (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981) and Revela- listener before that of explorer or scruti- tion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) are also nizer. Such an approach is related closely widely read and used. to concepts of divine transcendence and The titles indicate particular areas of revelation. On the other hand, many substantial contributions to the philosophy Swinburne, Richard 296 of religion. In The Concept of Miracle Swinburne develops the argument to Swinburne rejects the suggestion that mira- take account of the mass and movement of cles disrupt the ‘orderedness’ of the natural electrons and positrons, and issues of world. He agrees (with Alastair McKinnon) predictability in post-Einsteinian science. that they are not suspensions of ‘natural However, he also considers the cumulative law’, but only changes to a normally force of such phenomena as consciousness, expected course of events (ibid., 20). Some patterns of history and the nature of ‘laws’ denote observations of customary religious experience. events: these may be bypassed. But miracles would not suspend ‘laws’ in the sense of a some further distinctive law ‘which holds without exception’ (ibid., contributions and themes 28). Swinburne believes that there is good evidence for the miracle of the bodily Swinburne has devoted himself to promot- resurrection of Jesus Christ. ing arguments for theism at all levels, not The title The Coherence of Theism least for student audiences in universities sums up much of Swinburne’s main and for student readers. However, it philosophical agenda. He argues clearly would be a mistake to perceive Swinburne and rigorously that even the problem of as writing only or primarily at this level. evil does not render theism incoherent. First, an important and distinctive area Many of the traditional arguments receive is Swinburne’s conception of ‘the philoso- a new vitality under his treatment, and he phy of Christian doctrine’. This embraces consistently addresses counter-arguments philosophical theology as well as philoso- such as those of Mackie against the free- phy of religion. His book The Christian will defence argument. God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) In The Existence of God Swinburne represents constructive work this area, argues for the cumulative probability of together with his Responsibility and Ato- the valid force of the three main argu- nement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). ments for the existence of God. On the Second, Swinburne holds a deep teleological argument, he expounds a respect for, and belief in, the ‘orderedness’ concept of ‘order’ or ‘orderedness’, which of the world, as we have noted above. This embraces both a ‘spatial’ and a ‘temporal’ points to God as Creator and perceives the order (ibid., 136). The former exhibits world as a rational expression to God’s ‘regularities of co-presence’: the latter, own ‘rational’ nature. Swinburne pays ‘regularities of succession’. Spatial order close attention to the phenomena in the might include the very possibility of (for light of modern science. This emerges in example) alphabetical lists, or right-angled his Space and Time (London: Macmillan, corners; temporal order includes regula- 1968; 2nd edn, 1981), in his edited work rities in the behaviour of objects or events, Space, Time, and Causality (Dordrecht: such as those that give rise to descriptive Reidel, 1989) and in his edited volume ‘laws’ in natural science. Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 1989). This mode of formulating teleology Swinburne’s work not least addresses anticipates some of the difficulties put in conditions for the coming into being of an the way of the notion of purpose or design ordered universe. With John Polkinghorne by Darwin’s theory of evolution. For it and others, he notes the narrow margins applies to the very presence of order and of ‘viability’ (within astronomy and to conditions for the emergence of ordered physics) that allow for the very possibility phenomena without stipulating ‘how’ the of the creation and sustaining of our order is to emerge. This work stands in the ordered world. As we have noted, this tradition of W.R. Matthews and Tennant softens some of the claims put forward on (1866–1957). behalf of evolutionary theory as a less 297 syllogism relevant critique of purpose and design Since the middle term (M) may be either suggested by our world. subject or predicate in each premise, this One reason for the wide influence of may yield four different ‘figures’ of the Swinburne’s works may be their particular syllogism. Given that the three proposi- combination of philosophical rigour with tions may be of four different kinds (‘A’, clarity and a respect for common-sense ‘E’, ‘I’, ‘O’), each figure contains 64 (43) rationality. In his chair at Oxford, he types of syllogism. If the figures are four, succeeded Basil Mitchell, whose writings the four figures together may formalize were marked by similar qualities. (See also 256 combinations, or ‘moods’. eternity; God, arguments for the The four designated ‘A’, ‘E’, ‘I’ and ‘O’ existence of; God, concepts and represent respectively propositions of uni- ‘attributes’ of; omniscience; science versal affirmation (‘all are . . .’); of uni- and religion.) versal negation (‘none are . . .’; ‘no . . .’); particular affirmation (‘some are . . .’); and particular negation (‘some are not . . .’ or syllogism ‘it is not the case that some . . .’). These In Western logic the syllogism is based four classes have been portrayed by Euler upon three terms, of which the ‘middle (1707–83) and John Venn (1834–1923) in term’ serves as a bridge occurring in two of diagrammatic forms. Inclusive circles, the three propositions of the syllogism. exclusive circles and overlapping circles Often it occurs in the major premise and are familiar features of these diagrams. the minor premise of the syllogism. A conclusion necessarily follows, as an developments in the use of inference of deductive reasoning. syllogism Aristotle bce (384–322 ) first formu- Although the logic of syllogisms remains a logic lated the syllogism as form of ‘in subsidiary area within modern formal which, a certain thing being stated, some- logic, after developments in the late nine- thing other than what is stated follows of teenth century the Aristotelian syllogism necessity from being so’ (Prior Analytics, has tended to fade from prominence in 24B, 18). The terms must not change their modern logic. meaning through implicit redefinition In less formal philosophical discourse, (ibid., 25B, 32–7). however, syllogisms retain some place. necessary’ The inference is ‘ because if Sometimes a formal syllogism may expose both the major premise is true and the or sharpen a logical fallacy. Thus it is a minor premise is also true, the conclusion weakness of the cosmological argu- cannot of necessity be false. ment for the existence of God that on a The following standard example formal logical level its use of cause is at demonstrates the use of the ‘middle’ term best ambivalent, and at worst violates the (M), ‘man’; the ‘major’ term (P), the rule about redefinition, as follows: predicate of the conclusion, ‘is (are) mortal’; and the ‘minor’ term (S), the Major Every state of (M is P); subject of the conclusion, ‘Socrates’: premise: affairs has a cause Minor The world is a state (S is M); Major ‘All men are (M is P); premise: of affairs premise: mortal’ Conclusion Therefore the world (S is P /P ). Minor ‘Socrates is a (S is M); 1 2 (Questionable): has a cause (cause premise: man’ 1 or cause2?) Conclusion: ‘Therefore Socrates (; S is P). is mortal’ Arguably, ‘M’ is thereby equally ambiva- lent; ‘caused state of affairs’ (by caused symbol, symbolism 298 causes) may not be identical with ‘causal can’t define’ (Man and his Symbols, New state of affairs’ (by an uncaused cause). York: Doubleday, 1971, 21). Jung himself The syllogism also occurs in Hindu believed that symbols are generated from philosophy. Here the syllogism has five archetypal patterns mediated through the terms. Usually a positive and negative collective unconscious of humankind. instantiation serve to give concrete Jung, Jaspers and Tillich all perceived a substance to the abstract argument, even positive role in the use of symbols as if the logical bridge is now broader than vehicles of integration and wholeness. that of formal deduction and inference. Whereas cognitive concepts may seem Even if the ‘categorical syllogism’ (dis- to depend on differentiation between sub- cussed above) is supplemented by ject and object in epistemology, symbols hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism operate with an immediacy that integrates (i.e. where the premises are hypothetical conscious and unconscious levels of the or the major premise yields a disjunction), human mind, and resists the danger of this still fails to cover the numerous elevating the fragmentary or partial to the categories required by modern logic, let status of a supposed wholeness. alone ‘informal’ logic. Hence the syllo- By pointing beyond themselves, sym- gisms has less importance today than in bols invite supplementation by other earlier times. complementary symbols. Jung and Ricoeur stress the ‘double meanings’ of symbols. Like metaphors, they operate at symbol, symbolism more than one level, often interactively. In the context of religion, symbols are Thus while ‘stone’ or ‘rock’ is a perma- linguistic or non-linguistic signs that are nent, lasting object at one level, at another recognized as pointing beyond themselves level it may open up understanding of God to God, the Ultimate, or a transcendent as steadfast and ever present. reality. This meaning of ‘symbol’ differs T. Todorov explores metaphorical and from the use of the same term in formal symbolic readings of biblical texts as logic. In logic it generally denotes a fixed ‘allegorical’ or double-meaning effects in piece of logical notation which serves in Symbolism and Interpretation (1982) and place of variables in sentences, in order to Theories of Symbol (1984). distinguish between logical forms in pro- symbols as vehicles of creative positions and variables in sentences of power natural languages. Symbols in religion feature promi- Tillich also viewed symbol as metaphori- nently in the work of Jung (1875–1961), cal or ‘figurative’, and as rendering the Jaspers (1883–1969), Tillich (1886– ‘invisible’ and transcendent ‘perceptible’ 1965) and Ricoeur (b. 1913). In all of especially by the human imagination. He these writers they denote the pre-concep- adds: ‘The third characteristic of the tual or pre-cognitive, usually as a vehicle symbol is its innate power . . . a power to express or to communicate that which inherent within it that distinguishes it lies beyond the realm of conceptual, from a mere sign’ (‘The Religious Symbol’, subject–object thinking. in S. Hook, ed., Religious Experience and symbols as pre-conceptual and Truth, Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1961, integrative 3–11; also in F.W. Dillistone, ed., Myth and Symbol, London: SPCK, 1966, 15–34, Jung wrote, ‘Because there are innumer- quotation on 16). able things beyond the range of human ‘Every symbol is two-edged. It opens understanding, we constantly use sym- up reality, and it opens the soul . . . It bolic terms to represent concepts that we opens up hidden depths of our own being’ 299 symbol, symbolism

(Theology of Culture, New York: OUP Without linguistic controls, a person Galaxy edn, 1964, 57). Here Tillich who suffers from mental disorders may compares the revelatory power of a work perceive almost any object as symbolic of of art – for example, a Rubens landscape some threat or self-affirmation, without painting. This power is enhanced by warrant or due grounds. Hence the pre- engaging the unconscious. conceptual immediacy of symbols must, in Ricoeur saw the necessity of herme- turn, be placed critically within a frame of neutics to do away with ‘idols’ and to reference that will test the validity of their retrieve the power ‘to listen with openness interpretation. to symbols’. Symbols have not only To be fair to Tillich, he argues that revelatory power, but also creative and symbols cannot be contrived at will, but initiating power. ‘The symbol gives rise to grow and die in accordance with their thought’ (Freud and Philosophy,New perceived resonance. Nevertheless, this Haven: Yale, 1970, 543). does not address the issue of their becom- critique of symbols ing distorted while they still have power, or of their gaining power in destructive Ricoeur seems to have been more alert contexts. than Tillich to the problem that the Armies have crushed victims under the enormous power of symbol may at times spell of symbols, just as martyrs have become distorted and destructive. Even faced death under their inspiration. Sym- our idols, Ricoeur insists, can be served by bols operate with power, but they do not symbols. Hence ‘the critique of idols bypass questions of truth.(See also remains the condition of the conquest of concept; language in religion; mod- idols’ (ibid.). els and qualifiers; transcendence.) T

teleological argument for the an ‘inevitable’ inference, ‘that the watch existence of God must have had a maker . . . an artificer’ the nature of the argument (Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity . . . Together with the cosmological argu- 1802, ch. 1, sect. 2). Such phenomena as ment and the ontological argument the complexity of the human eye similarly for the existence of God, this constitutes point to a divine creator and designer. one of the three main traditional argu- Clearly this argument is closely bound ments, although some include the moral up with the approach of the cosmological argument as a fourth. The term ‘tele- argument. It derives from Aristotle’s ological’ is derived from Greek, telos, distinctions between efficient, material, denoting ‘end’ or ‘goal’. Hence it operates formal and final (purposive) cause.It as an argument from the observation of features in the five ways of Thomas design, purpose, or order in the world. Aquinas. ‘The fifth way is based on the This is an a posteriori argument from guidedness of nature (Latin, ex guberna- the nature of the world to the existence of tione rerum). An orderedness of actions to an Intelligence, or intelligent Designer, an end (propter finem) is observed.’ They who is usually identified as God. (On the tend towards ‘a goal’ (finem), just as an broad differences between a posteriori and arrow is directed to a target by an archer. aprioriarguments, see God, argu- The One who orders and directs nature we ments for the existence of; and the call ‘God’ (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 2, entries on a posteriori and a priori.) art. 3). The simplest illustration of the argu- ’s formulation ment, and the most widely known, was suggested by Paley (1743–1805). ‘In Paley wrote several works of apolo- crossing a heath . . . I found a watch upon getics. He opens his Natural Theology the ground . . . When we came to inspect (1802) with a comparison between finding the watch, we perceive . . . that its several and examining a stone, and finding and parts are framed and put together for a examining a watch. A stone is simply purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and ‘there’ and suggests no particular inference adjusted as to produce motion, and the about its nature and origin, at least for motion so regulated as to point out the theology. The watch, however, contains a hour of the day.’ Such examination yields coiled elastic spring, and a flexible chain 301 teleological argument for the existence of God which conveys the motion initiated by the Minor the world is a designed state of spring to wheels, cogs, a balance, and premise: affairs; pointers. The sizes and shapes of compo- Conclusion: therefore the world requires an nents cause ‘an equable and measured intelligent cause. progression’, and the whole yields an ‘inference, . . . [which] is inevitable, that However, the logic would remain valid the watch must have had a maker’ (ibid., only if the terms within the syllogism are ch. 1, sect. 2). defined consistently without any change of It would not weaken the force of this meaning (see the entries on Aristotle and inference if we had never seen a watch syllogism). Otherwise the conclusion does made; it would make no difference if we not necessarily follow. Hence, it may be had never met a watchmaker. Even if the argued, the teleological argument is no watch went wrong on occasion, this more successful than the cosmological in would not invalidate this inference. The this respect. design need not even be perfect for us to Hume (1711–76) in his posthumously infer the work of the designer. published The Dialogues Concerning Nat- Such logic applies to mechanisms that ural Religion (1779) attacked a version of abound in nature, or in creation. Paley the teleological argument which virtually alluded to the complexities of animal and anticipated Paley’s. The three characters of human life also on the analogy of mechan- the ‘Dialogue’ include an anticipated isms. The mechanism of the eye, he ‘Paley’ (‘Cleanthes’), an orthodox believer believed, was duly designed for the pur- (‘Demea’) and a sceptic, probably close to pose of sight. Hume’s own views (‘Philo’). ‘Cleanthes’ (the ‘natural theology’ dependence of the validity on believer) portrays the world as a machine the cosmological argument? the existence of which points a posteriori to God as its Designer. The orthodox Thomas Aquinas had attempted to trace theist ‘Demea’ has reservations about an both continuities and contrasts between argument to God in terms of ‘probability’. these two arguments in his Five Ways. The This does not go far enough. ‘Philo’ points first three ways turn on potentiality, out that if ‘Cleanthes’ follows the logic of efficient cause and contingency, while his analogies, a designed effect (e.g. a the fifth concerns order, purpose and house) might simply suggest a plurality of design. In as far as ‘mind’ presupposes designers. It does not require a single direction and conscious will, some have uncaused cause, who is other than finite. traced the teleological argument back to Hume also anticipated later debates in Anaxagoras (c. 499–422 bce) and more questioning whether the analogy of the convincingly to Plato (428–348 bce) and world as a ‘mechanism’ was any more Aristotle (384–322 bce). than a subjective analogy. Moreover, he Some, however, have called attention claimed that causality cannot be observed to the logical fallacy in versions of the empirically. What is observed is only cosmological argument that overlook the constant conjunction of events (see the logical difference between caused causes entry on cause). and an uncaused cause. If this is applied to Kant (1724–1804) goes further. First, the teleological argument, the following he views cause as a regulative category attempt to formulate it as a syllogism brought by the human mind to make sense exposes the problem: of the world, rather than as a ‘given’ that independently constitutes the order of the Major a designed state of affairs world. The aesthetic judgement that per- premise: requires an intelligent cause; ceives order and purpose in the world is teleological argument for the existence of God 302 not based on reason (German, Vernunft). Far from the eye being designed to give Teleological interpretation emerges when sight, it now seemed to be the case that we ‘objectify’, or treat as ‘objective’, the because the eye developed in processes of order which we project as a regulative evolution and adaptation, it was ani- principle of understanding (Critique of mals that could see that survived. In a Judgement, 1790). competitive evolutionary world the Psal- The teleological argument, for Kant, mist’s expression of gratitude that God ‘rests upon the cosmological proof, and filled all things living with plenteousness the cosmological upon the ontological’ became transposed into a minor key: what (Critique of Pure Reason [1788], Eng., failed to be filled with plenteousness was London: Macmillan, 1933, ch. 3, sect. 6). no longer one of ‘all things living’. As Nevertheless Kant does not utterly individuals, or more especially as a spe- reject the teleological argument. It ‘always cies, they became extinct. deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is Radically naturalistic theories of evolu- the oldest, clearest, and the most accor- tion propose that the illusion of design dant with the common reason of mankind’ emerges only because blind mechanisms of (ibid.). Teleology is indeed a constructive natural selection, or (in more recent terms) aspect of human judgement. It may not genetic mutation, ensure the adaptation and escape the rigours imposed by strictly survival of those whose functional capacities logical argument. ‘God’ is not ‘within’ appear to be ‘designed’ (i.e. in fact ‘fit’) for the world order. Nevertheless, it stimulates the demands of a given environment. The insight. development of the human brain and the emergence of tools, weapons and language the darwinian legacy and for co-operative enterprise mark a decisive scientific explanation stage in this process. Darwin (1809–82) published The Origins It should not be assumed, however, that of Species in 1859. While it is an over- ‘evolution’ constitutes a single generalized statement to suggest that Darwin single- theory. Darwinism specifically presents the handedly exploded Paley’s argument, the view that species evolve biologically wider evolutionary movement of which through chance variations and natural Darwin’s work became most widely selection. This leads to Spencer’s ‘the known provided the most serious attack survival of the fittest’. Darwin, however, suffered by the teleological argument. used greater caution than Spencer, prefer- The developmental approach instan- ring to speak of ‘modification’. He con- tiated earlier in the philosophy of Hegel ceded that variations can occur either in (1770–1831) and his attention to time, constructive or in degenerative directions. and the later coining of the slogan ‘the If it develops the ‘right’ characteristics, a survival of the fittest’ by Spencer species flourishes and proliferates. Envir- (1920–1903) in biology and even ethics, onments also change, for better or worse. made a huge impact that emerged as the Darwin’s theory did not become pop- spirit of the times, namely nineteenth- ular in his own day. Fellow biologists century evolutionary progressivism. criticized his detailed postulates about Darwin’s work was one contributory ‘inheritance’, and many rejected his mate- factor among many. rialist account of the world. Nevertheless, Developmental metaphors associated the principle of evolution as such took with Romanticism began to replace the hold of many thinkers in the last quarter mechanical metaphors of the eighteenth of the nineteenth century. More sophisti- century with more organic ones. No cated versions of the theory have emerged longer could a merely static model of the with the more recent development of world as ‘designed machinery’ hold sway. genetics. 303 teleological argument for the existence of God

The cosmological argument addresses processes in the world that eighteenth- ‘explanation’ and design at different century teleologists (Paley) had ascribed to levels. In terms of a ‘First Cause’ or ‘Prime God. Mover’ what is required is a universe that ‘The survival of the fittest presupposes embodies the potentiality for design, the arrival of the fit’, and Darwin shed no however this goal of design is achieved. light on the originating source of varia- In terms of ‘caused causes’ the possibility tions (ibid., 85). Tennant moves the focus that God as Designer may have deter- to the provision of necessary conditions mined to utilize genetic processes in order for the possibility of processes which may to produce ‘human being’ or other crea- well include progressive adaptations in tures ‘as God wills’ (1 Cor. 15:38) remains organisms. What is at issue is ‘the con- open and conceivable. spiration of innumerable causes to pro- Evolutionary theory thus does not duce, by their united and reciprocal attempt to explain the origin of life, or action, and to maintain, a general order even how the earliest forms of life came to of Nature’ (ibid., 79). exist. It is a descriptive science, when To suggest a parallel: if, for example, it properly understood. It concerns the dia- can be shown that a secondary agent lectic between phenotypes (the observa- arranged letters in alphabetical order, the ble characteristics of an organism resulting more important question concerns the from how its ‘geneotype’ interacts variably emergence of twenty-six letters which with the environment) and stenotopic or had the potentiality to provide an intelli- ‘constraining’ ranges of observable toler- gible, purposive sign-system in English. ance in the face of environmental change. The secondary question of how they are Genetic mutation gives rise to necessary sorted does not explain the primary variation, not least since if a gene-pool ground of their designed origin. becomes too small and inbred, degenera- ‘The outcome of lies tion occurs. not in particular cases of adaptedness in None of this excludes the possibility of the world . . . Lucky accidents and coin- an intelligent Designer of the universe, cidences bewilderingly accumulate until unless it is assimilated within an already the idea of purposiveness . . . is applied to presupposed materialist world-view. Evo- effect the substitution of reasonable, if lutionary theories do not exclude the alogical, probability for groundless con- possibility of purpose either within or tingency’ (ibid., 79, 92, 93). Purposive- beyond the universe. ness, Tennant urges, already lies to hand as the most reasonable account of human further counter argument: f.r. conduct. tennant Tennant further counter-arguments: (1886–1957) believed that even richard swinburne if each of the main arguments contains logical flaws, their cumulative effect is to Swinburne (b. 1934) also believes that establish the probability and rationality of the force of the three main arguments is theistic belief. He addresses the impact of cumulative, and also appeals to the notion Darwinism on Paley’s work and on the of an ‘ordered’ universe. He distinguishes force of the teleological argument in his between ‘spatial’ and a ‘temporal order’ Philosophical Theology (2 vols., Cam- (The Existence of God, Oxford: OUP, bridge: CUP, 1930). ‘Gradualness of con- 1979, 136). He describes the former in struction is in itself no proof of the terms of ‘regularities of co-presence’ and absence of external design’ (ibid., vol. 2, the latter in terms of ‘regularities of 84). The practical ‘sting’ of Darwinism lay succession’. Spatial order would include in replacing ‘mechanical’ explanations for such phenomena as an alphabetical order teleological argument for the existence of God 304 of names, or roads all at right angles to world. The struggle for existence can be each other. Temporal order would include cruel and severe. Animal predators devour regularities of behaviour of objects or weaker species. persons, such as the laws of gravity and On the basis of many evolutionary motion identified by Newton. The uni- theories, a species that may take more verse manifests both kinds of order. than a million years to evolve finally Paley’s watch clearly illustrates spatial becomes extinct. There are too many order, but so does the kind of regularity ‘rejects’. How are they part of a ‘purpose’? presupposed by evolutionary competition Hume pointed to the superabundance for survival. The very possibility of adap- of stars and astronomical phenomena as tation to a changing environment reflects challenging a providential account of the ‘great spatial order’ and regularity. How- existence of humankind. However, such ever, the teleological argument from tem- an anthropocentric account of divine poral order is ‘a much stronger one’. purposes reflects neither biblical perspec- Regularities of succession are ‘all-perva- tives nor those of modern Christian sive’. The universe might well have been theology nor Islamic theologies of God. chaotic, but it is not. Many supposed examples of dysteleol- Against Kant, Swinburne argues that ogy, on closer examination, serve some since this temporal order stretches back ecological balance. It is well known that into the past and continues (however the elimination of certain bacteria or human agents ‘interfere’) into the future, ‘pests’ will thereby open the door to more such order and regularity ‘exists indepen- substantial threats which these had held in dently of’ human actions and mental check. Indeed, ecology underlines the construals. importance of the more general potenti- This is not invalidated as a matter of ality for ‘order’, emphasized by Tennant ‘order’ even if specific case studies (e.g. of and Swinburne. protons, electrons, positrons and quarks) Exploration of the immensity of the may raise some less clear-cut issues about cosmos reveals an ‘order’ which points far fundamentals or predictability in given beyond the small horizons of humankind instances. Thus, for example, ‘all electrons and beyond a teleology centred mistakenly have a mass of ½MeV/c2, a change of –1, a on the welfare of our planet alone rather spin of ½, etc.’. Positrons share these than God’s delight in a larger creation. constants, except that they have a charge The explosion of a hydrogen bomb is of +1. infinitesimally small compared with that Even if the teleological argument is not of supernovae. Yet this unimaginable demonstrable by strict deductive a poster- vastness and energy provides no counter- iori logic, this approach reflects ‘a reaction argument to teleology. It makes the to the world deeply embedded in the modifications to the pre-modern formula- human consciousness’. Thomas Aquinas tions of Aquinas and Paley undertaken by and Newton both express this positive Tennant and Swinburne, and others all the human insight. more to the point. The alternative hypothesis of contin- dysteleology and cosmology gent accident becomes (or seems to The prefix dys- derives from the Greek for become) increasingly less probable when ‘hard’ or ‘bad’, and ‘dysteleology’ is the the extraordinarily narrow margins for the identification of actual or alleged counter- development of life in terms of the examples to teleology. The most promi- expansion/contraction of the universe nent are discussed in greater detail under and its cosmic forces of cold and heat evil, and include examples of apparent are considered. The one lucky throw of the waste and destructiveness and the natural dice is more than lucky: it is almost too 305 theism good to be true. (See also materialism; deism. By the beginning of the eighteenth objectification; subjectification; century it likewise came to stand in science and religion; theism.) contrast to pantheism, to denote belief in the God who transcends the world as its Tennant, Frederick R. Ground ‘Beyond’ the world. The God of (1886–1957) theism is not identical with the world or with some impersonal, amoral Absolute. Tennant made a number of contributions The term derives from the Greek word to philosophy of religion and to Christian theos, God. theology. Probably his most influential Fundamentally, the God of theism is book was his two-volume Philosophical both transcendent and immanent. God is Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1930). One ‘Other’ than the world and the whole of purpose of this work was to argue that the the created order. Hence many theists (but principle of ‘order’ in the universe is such far from all) expect that the cosmologi- that Darwin’s evolutionary theory does cal argument for the existence of God not invalidate teleology, or the notion of will fail, since if God were part of the divine purpose in the world. causal chain in the contingent world, Tennant writes, ‘Gradualness of con- this Being would not be the ‘God’ of struction is in itself no proof of the theism.Equally,theGodoftheism absence of external design’ (ibid., vol. 2, indwells the world and God’s creation as 84). ‘The survival of the fittest presup- immanent, animating and sustaining it. In poses the arrival of the fit’ (ibid., 85). contrast to deism, theism affirms belief in Tennant anticipates the work of such more divine action, providence and divine recent thinkers as John Polkinghorne and omnipresence. Richard Swinburne. He asserts, ‘Lucky Theism also excludes polytheism, since accidents and coincidences bewilderingly it holds to the Being of One God, who is accumulate until the idea of purposive- sovereign, eternal and almighty. The so- ness’ hardly seems less reasonable (ibid., called attributes of omnipresence, omni- 79, 92). Tennant’s emphasis upon prob- potence and omniscience are usually ability, induction and ‘orderedness’ in the ascribed to God, except that the precise light of modern science paves the way for logical grammar of these terms is complex more rigorous developments of this parti- and not to be taken for granted. cular approach by Swinburne (b. 1934). Some Christian theologians distance Tennant also wrote further on the themselves from ‘theism’ for specific rea- philosophy of religion: Miracle and its sons. Thus Moltmann (b. 1926) per- Philosophical Presuppositions (1925); The ceives the term as denoting too static and Philosophy of the Sciences (1932); and too ‘invulnerable’ a God to do justice to The Nature of Belief (1943). His earlier the God of the Bible. In the opposite work, however, was more especially in direction, Tillich (1886–1965) distanced Christian theology: The Origins and Pro- himself from a God who is said to ‘exist’ pagation of Sin (1902), and The Concept and to be described by analogy with of Sin (1912). (See also evolution; science and religion; teleological human qualities through superlatives. For him, God is ‘Being-itself’, the Ground of argument.) Being, or the God beyond ‘God’. Nevertheless the main traditions of theism Judaism, Christianity and Islam are The term ‘theism’ emerged in the seven- broadly theist, even if we allow for these teenth century to denote belief in God, in disclaimers. Although Barth (1886– contrast to atheism, and also belief in the 1968) called God ‘Wholly Different’ or God who acts in the world, in contrast to ‘Wholly Other’, and had reservations theodicy 306 about the application of ‘person’ rather the free-will defence debate, should than ‘mode of Being’ to God as Father, Son have become a dominant method of and Holy Spirit, in general Christian responding to the existential anguish of tradition from Augustine and Thomas evil. Aquinas conceives of God as a thinking, A classic expression of this unease is willing Being, who is ‘person’ in an Terrence Tilley’s work The Evils of Theo- analogical sense (Aquinas, Summa Theo- dicy (Washington: Georgetown, 1991). logiae, Ia, Qu. 13, arts. 1–12). ‘The One Tilley seeks to recast the dialogue in terms who is’ (Qui est) is the most appropriate of speech acts rather than of arguments name for God (maxime proprium nomen or propositions. Vincent Bru¨ mmer also Dei: ibid., art. 2, ‘Reply’). pleads for timeliness in using traditional Whether some Hindu and other East- theodicy. It may be argued that polypho- ern traditions are ‘theist’ depends on how nic dialogue, as seen in the book of Job broadly or narrowly we define the term and in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Kar- (see Buddhist philosophy). It is more amazov offers a complementary approach important to define the major character- to the problem of evil. istics of theism than to debate what may Both more existential approaches and be included at its edges. Judaism, Chris- the more traditional logical approaches tianity and Islam are strongly theistic. have their place. Yet, as Tilley argues, care Hinduism contains some quasi-theistic is required when some simply transplant strands, although more generally some of the arguments of Augustine and Aqui- its traditions tend towards pantheism. (See nas into the guise of a post-Enlightenment also God, concepts and ‘attributes’ ‘theodicy’. (See also existentialism and a of; immanence; logic; panentheism; detailed discussion under evil.) transcendence.) Tillich, Paul (1886–1965) theodicy Tillich exercised considerable influence as Derived from the conjunction of the two a theologian, especially in the third quar- Greek words for ‘God’ and ‘justice’, ter of the twentieth century in America. theodicy denotes the task of deploying He lived and taught in Germany up to arguments that seek to defend the coher- 1933, when he resigned his professorship ence of theism in the face of the problem at Frankfurt with Hitler’s rise to power. of evil. If God is good, omnipotent and He emigrated to the United States where wise, and if evil is evil, how can divine he taught in New York, at Harvard action, or lack of action, be explained in Divinity School and at the University of the face of evil? Chicago. Prior to the Enlightenment the Tillich saw himself as consciously stand- emphasis tended to fall upon the coher- ing On the Boundary (one of his book ence of belief in the sovereignty and titles) between religion and culture, goodness of God among theists. Increas- between theology and philosophy, between ingly in the modern period the emphasis German and American traditions, between changed to that of defending theistic belief thought and art, and between sacred and in the face of the reality of evil. ‘Theodicy’ the secular. He sought ‘to mediate’ between applies especially to this second aspect. different beliefs and cultures. The currency of the term today, however, method and attitude to has acquired pejorative as well as neutral philosophy overtones. Many writers express unease that the philosophical and logical debates Tillich drew on the German traditions of about the grammar of omnipotence,and philosophy to argue that ‘every philosopher 307 Tillich, Paul is a hidden theologian’ (Systematic Theol- theological content, rather than in formal ogy, 3 vols., London: Nisbet, 1951, 1957, terms as ‘Ultimate Concern’. God is that 1964, vol. 1, 29). He wrote ‘from the which concerns us as Ultimate. What he point of view of a passionately loved and terms ‘the Protestant principle’ forbids any studied philosophy’ (The Protestant Era assimilation of God as Ultimate, into such [1948], Chicago: Chicago University penultimate forms of religion as those of Press, 1957, vii). He broadened the defini- the scriptures, creeds, doctrines or other tion of ‘religion’ into whatever is of conceptual formulations. ‘ultimate concern’. This leads to an incisive and profound Tillich perceived his work as that of an question. Does the religious believer gen- apologist, which he defined as providing uinely encounter ‘God’ when he or she an ‘answering’ theology, in contrast to a identifies ‘God’ with a limited concept of declarative theology. His major work, the God, drawn, for example, from child- three-volume Systematic Theology,is hood, church, or Israel’s early history? structured around a ‘principle of correla- Conversely, has an unbeliever genuinely tion’ between philosophical questions and encountered and then rejected ‘God’ when theological ‘answers’. he or she has merely examined the Questions about reason suggest credibility of a concept of ‘God’ drawn answers concerning revelation;and from opinion, church or from a theologi- questions about being (ontology) point cal textbook? to answers about God (vol. 1). Questions On one side this underlines the parti- about concrete ‘existence’ invite answers cipatory or existential dimension of the- relating to Christ (vol. 2). The ambiguities ism. It should not be forgotten that of life and questions about the meaning of Tillich’s philosophical roots and training history point respectively to ‘answers’ came from Germany, where Heidegger’s concerning the Spirit and the Kingdom of thought remained very influential from God (vol. 3). 1920s to the 1960s. On the other side, the On one side critics have challenged the notion of being willing to die for what is degree of openness of the questions. Do ultimate defines ultimacy only for this or they implicitly already contain the that person. Possible confusions between expected answers? On the opposite side, the psychological and ontological reflect a some theologians claim that the answers partially parallel problem in Schleierma- are too heavily pre-shaped by the ques- cher’s appeal to the psycho-ontological tions to be fully Christian, or even ‘theist’. Gefu¨ hl (more than ‘feeling’ alone). tillich’s distinctive notion of tillich’s view of symbol god beyond ‘god’ Second in importance only to his view of Tillich argues that to seek to describe God God is Tillich’s account of symbol as the by use of concepts is irretrievably reduc- basis for thought and language about God tionist, in the sense that it fails to do as Ultimate. It is fundamental for Tillich justice to the transcendence of God. that symbols reach beyond the sphere of God is not ‘a being’ who ‘exists’: God is concepts. ‘Religious symbols’ represent Being-itself, or the Ground of Being. To ‘that which is unconditionally beyond the ascribe ‘existence’ to God compromises conceptual sphere’. Symbols represent the divine ultimacy, and implies a contin- transcendent. ‘They do not make God a gent, finite status that is not God’s. part of the empirical world.’ However, there is a price for this. Tillich drew heavily on the psychology Although he concedes that we may speak of Jung (1875–1961) for his view of of God through symbols, in the end Tillich symbol. Psychic forces both conscious is reluctant to identify ‘God’ in terms of a and unconscious find integration and time 308 focus through symbols, which grow and time die rather than being contrived by con- A fundamental difference marks cyclical ceptual systems. Thus Tillich writes: views of time, found most characteristi- ‘Every symbol is two-edged. It opens up cally in Eastern philosophies and espe- reality, and it opens the soul’, i.e. ‘hidden cially in Hindu philosophy, and ‘linear’ depths of our own being’ (Dynamics of views characteristic of Western theism Faith, New York: Harper & Row, 1957, that embody direction, dynamic purpo- 43; also in Theology of Culture, 1959). siveness and teleological goal. However, in The emphasis on integration is con- the West secular pragmatism has also structive. Tillich reserves the term ‘demo- nurtured an optimistic social progressi- nic’ for whatever causes fragmentation, vism, in which human autonomy is to and then treats the part as if it were carve out its own goals. the whole; the penultimate as if it were Traditions associated in the West with ultimate. He finds biblical resonance Plato (428–348 bce)tendtoviewthe with this in the principle: ‘The Lord is changes and differences wrought by time as One; and you shall love the Lord your a contingent ‘moving image’ of ‘timeless’ God with all your heart and with all your eternity (formulated in Plato’s Timaeus). soul . . .’ Traditions of Eastern philosophy find a Tillich successfully distinguishes parallel expression in the Advaita Vedanta between representational ‘signs’ and ‘sym- of S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ (788–820), although rather bols’ which, he argues, participate in that than viewing temporal or spatial differ- to which they point. Thus symbols of the ences as a mere ‘image’ or shadow of the sacred carry a penultimate sacred status. real, S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ attributes perception of However, while he successfully expounds differences to illusion (ma¯ya¯). their power, does Tillich provide criteria for their truth? Is his account of lan- clock time, created time and guage in religion dependent on too ‘human’ time specific a tradition of thought? main significance for Augustine (354–430) points out that temporal processes in the world give rise philosophy of religion to distinguishing between memory, sight Tillich presents some distinctive, even if and expectation (or hope). Wittgenstein controversial, themes. He broadens a (1889–1951) explains Augustine’s puzzle- possible definition of religion, and seeks ment in attempting to answer the question to promote dialogue between religion and ‘What is time?’ by showing that questions twentieth-century culture. In particular his about time need to be contextualized in theme of ‘God’ beyond God promotes a practical ways. Metaphors of flowing powerful challenge to more conventional rivers of time give rise to fruitless and and sometimes shallow notions of God. nonsensical questions (Philosophical His distinction between genuine ultimacy Investigations, sect. 89–90). Augustine’s and the merely penultimate phenomena of more important point was that God religions clarifies distinctions between created the universe with time (cum God and religions, although his critics tempore) not in time (in tempore). Time argue that his way of achieving this pays was not a pre-existing medium into which too heavy a price which compromises God placed the world. theism and Christianity. His work on Einstein’s theory of relativity assists our symbol contributes both insights and understanding of the interrelationship problems to discussions of language in between space and time as co-jointly religion. (See also concept; existential- categories of a space–time continuum. ism.) Literary theory and sociology, as well as 309 tradition theology, shed light on how we construe A constructive interdisciplinary dialo- sequence, periodicy, tempo, duration and gue between philosophy, literary theory opportune time, in accordance with cer- and issues of the self is required, and for tain subjective controls that differentiate example may be found in Ricoeur’s, Time them from astronomical or ‘clock-time’ and Narrative (3 vols., Chicago: University intervals. of Chicago, 1984–8). (See also Bradley; A person in power has control over the hermeneutics; science and religion.) diary of an employee in working hours. The shaping of ‘human time’ by commerce tradition and industry is a concern of sociologists. ‘Narrative time’ is also different from This word has assumed increasing impor- merely succession in clock time. A narra- tance with the steady weakening of the tor will use flashbacks or changes of privilege accorded to the model of think- narrative tempo to make a point that ing represented by Enlightenment enhances the movement or tension of the rationalism, and often by versions of plot. Heidegger (1889–1976) sees ‘tem- the so-called scientific world-view. A porality’ (Zeitlichkeit) as the transcenden- number of cultural factors have contrib- tal condition for the possibility of time and uted to this shift, including the impact of such construals. since the 1960s of philosophical herme- All of this makes more plausible the neutics. need to distinguish between time as it Many definitions of ‘tradition’ are generates succession, duration and peri- heavily value-laden, on both sides of the odicy in the world and the possibility of debate. Negatively, when it is defined as different modes of expressing sequence, ‘customary sets of belief of obscure progression and novelty within a realm origins but based upon convention’, it usually designated as eternal. appears that tradition belongs to the time as given? opportune times Socratic realm of mere ‘opinion’. It is implied that we must employ the metho- and the gift of time dological doubt associated with Des- In theism, God may be said to give the gift cartes (1596–1650) to regain a more of time as opportunity; as an interval for solid foundation for knowledge. promise, hope and faithfulness; as a On the other side, more positively some resource for which humankind is accoun- writers, notably the hermeneutical theorist table; or as sheer gift for enjoyment. This Gadamer (1900–2002), define tradition is as much part of the order of creation differently, with different implications. as spatial distance or spatial resource. In Gadamer claims that the subjective con- more philosophical terms, Heidegger sciousness of the individual alone is ‘a rightly urges that time constitutes a distorting mirror’. To listen to what has horizon for hermeneutical understanding. been handed down and filtered through a In modern Western philosophy J.E. succession of community experiences and Taggart (1866–1925) attempted a distinc- community judgements is ‘based not on tive way of demonstrating the ‘unreality’ the subjection and abdication of reason, of time, as well as of matter and space. but on an act of acknowledgement . . . and Nevertheless, it is arguable that his logical knowledge that the other is superior to arguments bypass the multiform distinc- oneself in judgement’ (Truth and Method, tions outlined above between different London: Sheed & Ward, 2nd Eng. edn, modes, levels and experiences of human 1989, 276). time, and the ‘givens’ of sequence and In Gadamer’s view, to value tradition duration, whatever the arbitrariness of for its cumulative wisdom is ‘an act of periodicy and tempo. reason itself’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, he may transcendence 310 be too optimistic in emphasizing the and others to explore the basis on which positive, tested content of tradition. Some human thought is possible at all, together people value tradition less for epistemolo- with the limits of thought. In scholastic gical reasons than for its role in defining philosophy the two terms become close, and locating their identity. since here ‘transcendental’ denotes what- Postmodernity, like the Enlighten- ever lies beyond thought and definition by ment, tends to undervalue tradition, and categories or classes. to substitute discontinuities, or a ‘local’ This feature leads to an understanding pragmatism. Traditions yield a positive of the transcendence of God both in terms resource, but are capable of perpetuating of God’s ‘Otherness’ from the finite world distortions and falsehoods, which persist and in terms of God’s unique Being, as not because they survive testing, but well as God’s unique relation with the because they serve the interests of those world. In religion and theology this is who maintain them. often expressed in terms of divine holiness. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ‘life’ and One classic study produced by Otto community reminds us that ‘every human under the title Das Heilige (1917, Eng. being has parents’, and that doubt comes The Idea of the Holy) expounds this in ‘after’ certainty. To discard tradition terms of the numinous which embodies simply because it is tradition is to impov- the mysterium tremendum et fascinoscum. erish our epistemological resources, and in This is fathomless, holy mystery, which a limited sense potential criteria of coher- evokes creaturely awe. ence. Nevertheless, an uncritical accep- In contrast to a more optimistic lib- tance of tradition would not be ‘an act eral theology in which God was of reason’. Traditions are fallible and perceived as primarily ‘within’ humanity corrigible, but often they are to be treated and the world, existentialist approaches more seriously than as if they were never from Kierkegaard to the mid-twentieth more than mere ‘habit’ or ‘convention’. century call attention to human finitude, (See also authority; corrigibility; and thereby to God’s transcendence. In epistemology; science and religion; theology, Barth (1886–1968) stands as a subjectivity.) key figure who sought to re-establish the Otherness or Godhood of God, in contrast to earlier turn-of-the-century liberalism. transcendence Barth expounds divine transcendence The term denotes that which surpasses or in many contexts, but especially in terms goes beyond (Latin, transcendere) human of the need for divine revelation or thought and human finitude. When disclosure. God is free to choose whether applied to God, it denotes divine ‘Other- to become ‘knowable’ or ‘thinkable’, as ness’ or ‘Beyondness’, in contrast to divine Eberhard Ju¨ ngel elaborates further. Barth immanence, which denotes God’s indwel- writes: ‘God is known through God, and ling presence within the world. The latter through God alone’ (Church Dogmatics, reaches its most exaggerated form in II: 1, sect. 27; Eng., Edinburgh, T & T pantheism. An exclusively transcendent Clark, 1957, 179). God would be, in effect, the ‘God’ of Barth’s comment occurs in his section deism. on ‘The Hiddenness of God’. God is ‘Transcendence’ and its adjective, known not by logical proof but ‘in utter ‘transcendent’, should be distinguished dependence, in pure discipleship . . . in from ‘transcendental’. However, both faith itself . . .’ (ibid., 183). This marks ‘the terms carry the connotation of ‘beyond limitation of our perception and . . . human thought’, since transcendental thinking’ (ibid., 184). God is ‘incompre- philosophy denotes the quest of Kant hensible and inexpressible . . . not defined’ 311 transcendental philosophy

(ibid., 186, 187). Only divine grace mainline Jewish and Christian theology permits divine disclosure in times of divine and religion. choice. In recent Christian theology Pannen- Barth’s emphasis in Continental Europe berg holds together a strong emphasis on found a broad parallel in Reinhold Nie- divine transcendence with a recognition of buhr (1892–1971) in the United States. divine immanence. Jesus, he argues, wit- Niebuhr saw the creatureliness and fini- nesses to this transcendence: ‘He lets God tude of humankind (in contrast to God) be God over against himself’ (Systematic expressed also morally in illusory human Theology, 3 vols., Edinburgh: T & T aspirations towards pride. He sought to Clark, 1994, vol. 2, 22). ‘The contingency recover the emphasis on divine transcen- of the world . . . has its basis in the dence found in the Hebrew scriptures omnipotent freedom of the divine creat- (Christian Old Testament). ing’ (ibid., 20). In Pannenberg’s theology Both Niebuhr and Tillich emphasized of the Trinity, such is God’s transcendence not only that God is ‘beyond’ the horizons that ‘only the persons of the Son and the of human thought and concepts, but also Spirit act directly in creation. The Father the notion of self-transcendence. Human acts in the world only through the Son and freedom and creativity point to the possi- the Spirit’ (ibid., vol. 1, 328). bility of lifting the self above and beyond This draws upon the tradition of the merely routine, instrumental and material. Hebrew scriptures that God, as transcen- Self-transcendence denotes the capacity of dent, acts upon and within the world the self to reach ‘beyond’ to higher ideals primarily through such intermediaries as and values. God’s Word, God’s Wisdom, and God’s Tillich speaks of the ‘God beyond Spirit, viewed as mediating ‘extensions’ of “God”’. ‘The being of God cannot be God’s action. (See also existentialism; understood as the existence of a being God, concepts and ‘attributes’ of.) alongside others or above others . . . When applied to God, superlatives become transcendental philosophy diminutives. They place him on the level of other beings while elevating him above Transcendental philosophy asks such all of them’ (Systematic Theology, 3 vols., questions as: ‘What conditions are neces- London: Nisbet, 1953, vol. 1, 261). sary for the possibility of thought, reason, God is not ‘a being’, Tillich insists, but or knowledge?’, rather than the more ‘Being-itself’ (ibid., 265). Every other traditional questions: ‘What do we know?’ statement about God has to make use or ‘How do we know?’ That which is not of concepts (which are inadequate) transcendental goes beyond ‘experience’ to but of symbols, which point to what lies what thought and experience presuppose ‘beyond’ conceptual thought. This is the as a necessary a priori. It is not derived context in which we should understand empirically. Tillich’s comment that ‘it is as atheistic to Kant (1724–1804) in effect may be affirm the existence of God as to deny it’ regarded as the founder of transcendental (ibid., 263). If God is the Ground of Being, philosophy. ‘Transcendental’ denotes that or ‘Being-itself’, this is ‘more’ than ‘exis- which is presupposed by experience, but tence’, which is an attribute of contin- not derived from experience. This lies gent objects in the world. beyond the categories that regulate Islamic philosophy also stresses the thought. transcendence of God, especially in its Such a distinction is already implied in prohibition of representations of God. Aristotle and in medieval philosophy, This feature is shared (alongside a doctrine for the transcendental is what lies beyond of immanence) with most strands of and above such classes or categories as truth 312 characterize objects in the world. How- a referential theory of meaning. Russell ever, Kant (followed by Fichte and (1872–1970) consistently promoted a the- Hegel) postulates problems about the ory of reference, but also held to an very possibility of knowledge and human empiricist view of the world, and deployed reason. It was Schleiermacher’s assim- sophisticated devices of logic to address ilation of this problem into theology that those cases where this theory of truth and marks the beginning of ‘modern’ theology reference appeared to break down. at the dawn of the nineteenth century. The early Wittgenstein expounded Transcendental arguments are often this view in the Tractatus (1921). An deployed to combat scepticism by show- ‘elementary proposition’ is true if it ing that what the sceptic doubts may corresponds with a state of affairs: (der constitute a precondition or presupposi- Sachverhalt). In the case of more complex tion for the intelligibility of the sceptic’s propositions, ‘a proposition is an expres- formulation of the problem. In other sion of agreement and disagreement with words, the scepticism is parasitic upon truth-possibilities of elementary proposi- what it presupposes as a transcendental. tions’ (Tractatus, 4.4). (See also empiricism.) The correspondence theory of truth places virtually all of its weight on the status of propositions rather than on the truth testimonies of persons. The initial problem The two oldest, traditional theories of is how we reach back to the states of truth hinge respectively on the correspon- affairs that the propositions depict, other dence between what is claimed to be true than through the propositions (or the (usually in a proposition) and states of perceptions, observations or judgements affairs in the world; and on the coherence that they formulate) that describe the between propositional claims to truth, and states of affairs. In other words, can we between such claims and other proposi- escape a circularity which vitiates their tions which are accepted as true. application as criteria, even if it permits their function as replicated descriptions of the correspondence theory of the same state of affairs? truth A second problem arises from asking Plato (428–348 bce), Aristotle (384– whether all human language communi- 322 bce) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) cates or conveys truth in this way. In his held to a correspondence view of truth. In later thought Wittgenstein came to see the Sophist Plato states that the proposi- that he had given undue privilege to the tion ‘Theaetetus is sitting down’ is true descriptive propositions of natural science, because ‘Theaetetus is in fact sitting alongside those logical propositions that down’. The proposition ‘Theaetetus is aretruebyvirtueoftheirstatusas flying’ is false because this is not the case analytical statements. (Sophist, 263 A, B). Third, the correspondence theory Aristotle holds the same view. ‘To say leaves aside issues of warrant on the part of what is that it is not . . . is false, while to of human witnesses, and this becomes say of what is that it is . . . is true’. Thomas transparent in its neglect of community Aquinas asserts, ‘Truth is the correspon- and history. Where is there room for a dence (or more strictly, adequacy) between process of discovery and confirmation, not mind and the thing itself’ (Latin, veritas least as a corporate journey? est adequatio rei et intellectus: Summa the coherence theory of truth Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 16, art. 1). In modern philosophy it has been noted The coherence theory has the advantage that this theory of truth tends to presuppose of broadening a range of criteria of truth. 313 truth

Coherence is required not only between The notion of incomplete systems, of the various propositions or truth-claims competing systems and of incommensur- which together constitute a system of ability suggests a third possible approach belief, but also between what is claimed to truth. in these beliefs and what is generally pragmatic theories of truth accepted as true by others in other areas of thought. Thus the status of the person If truth is in the process of evolving, and if who makes the claim to truth is consid- the corporate body of human knowledge ered in the light of whether other people of truth is growing as history advances, hold beliefs, or state truths, that are can we say more than that a given set of consistent with that of the person in propositions, or growing system of beliefs, question. can be tested for their effectiveness against Leibniz (1646–1716), Spinoza competing claims relative to a given stage (1632–77), Hegel (1770–1831) and of history? Bradley (1846–1924) promote versions If the first model has affinities with of a coherence theory of truth. Since all of empiricism, and the second with ration- these stand in a broadly rationalist or alism, the third recognizes that truth is idealist tradition, there is a tendency for conditioned by the contingent advances all of them to seek to build systems of of history, the radical historical finitude of coherent ideas. Moreover just as empiri- human persons and the communal context cist attitudes engender questions about of knowledge of truth and its usefulness observing what ‘corresponds’ to ‘facts’, so for solving problems. rationalist assumptions tend to work with The maxim ‘By their fruits you shall mathematical models of coherent systems. know them’ (Mt. 7:16) seems initially to A mathematical proposition is ‘true’ if encourage such a practical approach. It it coheres with axioms or other mathe- recognizes the corrigible nature of knowl- matical propositions within the system. It edge and fallibilist aspects of the agenda. In is scarcely surprising that Spinoza, Hegel the entry on pragmatism, the approaches and Bradley worked with notions of ‘the of C.S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey Whole’. The partial is necessarily provi- and Rorty (b. 1931) are noted. sional and fragmentary, because, as Kier- Yet even a false belief can help someone kegaard insisted, an incomplete system is to succeed or to come to terms with life, or not adequate as a system. to help them forward. Under pragmatism, How do we know whether a test of the distinction emerged between a prag- coherence has reached widely enough? matic theory of action and a pragmatic What resort is there when an apparently theory of truth. Peirce expressed reserva- coherent and self-consistent set of truths is tions about the latter, even if Rorty promoted, but runs up against a compet- replaced epistemological questions by ing system of truths that is also self- strategies of ‘coping’. It is difficult for consistent? religions, especially theism, to accept It is at this point that debate emerges the notion of purely ‘local’ or temporally over the so-called phenomenon of incom- and culturally relative criteria of truth, if it mensurability. Might it be that there is is believed that language about God (for no ground from which the competing example as Creator) makes universal claims of the two systems can be assessed truth-claims. and arbitrated? In the entry on incom- performative, semantic and mensurability it appears unlikely that no existential views of truth potential overlap can be identified, but this would still not be enough to satisfy the Alfred Tarski urged that ‘It is true that . . .’ criteria of ‘strong’ coherentists. adds nothing to the truth-content of a truth 314 proposition, except at the level of meta- the unity of truth? contextual statement. Truth then becomes the subject issues matter of a statement about a sentence. It Pannenberg calls for the need to regain a offers a semantic description of the role sense of the unity and comprehensiveness that the original proposition is to play. of truth in theology (‘What is Truth?’ in Strawson More to the point, (b. 1919) Basic Questions in Theology, London: argues that to say ‘It is true’ is to perform SCM, 1971, vol. 2, 1–27). Yet even he speech act a of endorsement. The concedes that truth contingently ‘proves speaker ‘stands behind’ the proposition, itself anew’ in life and history (ibid., 8). in a commissive, self-involving stance. He Each theory of truth offers criteria or she adds their authority to it. They relevant to different contexts in life, admit to a stake in it. This provides a thought, history and experience. None is bridge from truth-claims to belief, for it is to be rejected on the ground that it fails to the logic of creeds, confessions and testi- offer a comprehensive criterion of truth. mony. Theories of language and meaning operate This comes close to what Kierkegaard in a parallel way. A correspondence theory (1813–55) called truth when he declared, of truth has useful, but limited, currency, subjectivity ‘ is truth’. This is not the like the referential theory of meaning. ‘what’ of a propositional truth-content, Nevertheless, religion and theology do but staking one’s life on the currency of not operate with ‘double’ systems of truth. that which is at issue in terms of ‘how’. Rationality is conditioned by context, but Hence Kierkegaard declares, ‘Truth not created by context. Hence an attention becomes untruth in this or that person’s to context needs to be held together with mouth’ (Concluding Unscientific Post- the recognition that truth-claims are far script, Princeton: Princeton University more than of ‘local’ or ‘semantic’ status. Press, 1941, 181). (See also corrigibility; epistemology; fallibilism; idealism; performative utterances; reason.) U

they genuinely ‘real’ entities, on the basis universals of which the particulars are what they are? The term ‘Universals’ denotes a class that The respective answers to these ques- embraces common shared features of the tions are denoted by the terms nominal- individuals or particulars that make up the ism (universals are construct of language), class in question. The term, therefore, realism (the universals are realities) and stands in contrast to ‘particulars’. The conceptualism (universals have a kind of main philosophical issue raised by ‘uni- reality in the mind, but not in the external versals’ is their status. Are they linguistic world or elsewhere). (See also Abelard; constructions the reality of which depends Duns Scotus; Plato; William of ock- solely on language or semantics? Or are ham.) V

via negationis, via negativa in some ancient and modern Buddhist traditions. Na¯ ga¯ rjuna (c. 150–200) The Latin phrases ‘the way of negation’ argued that nothing has a determinate and ‘the negative way’ allude to the use of nature. In modern Buddhist philoso- negation in language in religion to phy, Nishida (1870–1945) urges the role speak of God. The term emerged in of negation prior to a subject–object Jewish, Christian and Islamic philoso- split, while Nishitani (1900–90) dis- phy in the medieval period, for example in cusses nihilist perspectives in dialogue Maimonides (1135–1204) and in Tho- with Western thought. mas Aquinas (1225–74). It would be difficult to conceive of all Aquinas considers the objection that no language in religion as functioning nega- name (Latin, nomen) ‘is applicable properly tively. For if we have no idea at all of the to God’, since all are borrowed from prior Being of whom we are negating certain use to denote ‘creatures’ (Summa Theolo- attributes, the process of negation has no giae,Ia,Qu.13,art.3).Aquinasallows stable reference. Of whom is it being said Analogy to function as an ‘imperfect’ that given qualities cannot be predicated? match, but only language that asserts what Thus Aquinas gives a necessary role to the God is not has genuinely accurate currency. via negationis, but not a comprehensive Thus ‘negative language’ may attribute one. (See also epistemology; models to God infinity and immortality: God is and qualifiers; ontology.) neither finite nor mortal. A second meaning emerges, however, Vienna circle of ‘the way of negation’, in broader contexts. In Mysticism writers often The Vienna circle published its manifesto speak of self-emptying. John of the Cross in 1929, under the title ‘The Scientific (1542–91) speaks of ‘the night of the soul’ Conception of the World: The Vienna as part of this process. In Hindu philo- Circle’ (‘Wissenschaftliche Weltan- sophy any difference between self schauung: Der Wiener Kreis’). Empirical (a¯tman) and Ultimate Reality (bra¯hman) method in natural science was extended is negated in the non-dualist Advaita into a ‘world-view’ or ontology of the Vedanta of S´an˙ ka¯ ra¯ . world. The main editorial name associated A third strand of ontological and with this 1929 manifesto was Rudolf epistemological negation finds expression Carnap (1891–1970). He regarded the 317 Vienna circle language of empirical science as the high- this early period) was a member, and those est in a possible hierarchy of language. who visited from abroad included Ayer, The group of thinkers who became ‘the and Alfred Vienna circle’ had already been organized Tarski. less formally as what came to be called The institutional structure was linked ‘the Schlick circle’ when it met under with the chair of the Philosophy of the Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) in 1924. Inductive Sciences in the University of Schlick, rather than Carnap, therefore, is Vienna, which was founded in the usually thought of as the founder of the tradition of the work of Ernst Mach Vienna circle. (1836–1916), who was both a physicist Schlick was a physicist who anticipated and a philosopher. (See also empiricism; Ayer in formulating the criterion of falsification; logical positivism; verifiability. Friedrich Waismann (during positivism; science and religion.) W

Weil, Simone (1909–1943) Waiting on God, London: Routledge, 1951, 63–78). ‘God is not satisfied with Weil was born and educated in Paris, and finding his creation good; he wants it to qualified as a lecturer in philosophy in find itself good.’ ‘We can be thankful for 1931. She lived a life of selfless devotion to . . . fragility’, which removes complacency, others, which finds expression in her and for that ‘intimate weakness’ which philosophical, mystical and autobiogra- under certain conditions makes it possible phical writings, published for the most to be ‘nailed to the very centre of the part after her death. Cross’ (Gateway to God, London: Collins, For periods of time Weil abandoned 1952 and 1974, 88). her teaching to discover the experience of Weil exudes a solemn mystical opti- ‘oppression’ in heavy industry. Oppres- mism. We may celebrate the beauty of the sion, she concluded, is more than physical waves of the sea, even if the sea is no less constraint: ‘it crushes the spirit’. During beautiful because the gravity of the waves the Spanish Civil War she undertook also wrecks ships. (See also mysticism.) hospital service, sharing the painful hor- rors of war. In this situation she also Whitehead, Alfred North encountered what she perceived as a deep (1861–1947) experience of God, which redirected her thought. Whitehead was a leading thinker and In 1941 Simone Weil laboured in the probably in effect also founder of process fields of southern France, also studying philosophy. This approach explores the Greek and Hindu philosophy. She sought importance of change, and especially of to work with the French Resistance, but ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’ as an was rejected on health grounds. In England ontology. A British philosopher and she refused to eat more than the minimum mathematician, Whitehead was educated allocation for her compatriots in Occupied at Cambridge, and wrote his first book France, and died in 1943, with near- under the title A Treatise on Universal starvation contributing to her death. Algebra (1898). This background provides first-hand It is helpful, as well as conventional, to credibility to Weil’s writings on ‘the love distinguish between three periods in of God and affliction’ (French, malheur) Whitehead’s academic life, each of which and the problem of evil (for example, in represents new interests and new contexts. 319 William of Ockham

In the decade from 1900–10, White- Whitehead calls his space–time events head worked collaboratively with his ‘occasions’. former student Russell (1872–1970). Adventures of Ideas paints more They jointly published the innovative broadly on a wider canvas. Beliefs serve Principia Mathematica (3 vols., 1910– to articulate aspirations, and thereby to 13), which provided a theoretical founda- promote change. It brings to a more tion of mathematics in logic. This decisi- popular readership a perspective moti- vely contributed to the shaping of modern vated by issues of change, ‘connexions’, logic. creativity, process and temporality. In the second period (about 1910–24) Whitehead thought of ‘God’ as the Whitehead’s concerns moved on, away Ground of occasions or events, but not as from Russell’s. He became professor at Creator in the sense of a theistic doctrine. Imperial College in the University of As ‘first event’, God constitutes a principle London, where he combined an interest of limitation on otherwise boundless in education for the less privileged with possibilities. God is ‘the Poet of the world work in natural science. He published The . . . leading it by the vision of truth, Concept of Nature (1922) and completed beauty, and goodness’. Arguably, White- The Principle of Relativity (1924). head’s ontology borders on monism, but a In 1924 Whitehead was invited to distinctively ‘eventful’, not static, monism. become Professor of Philosophy at Har- (See also Bergson; Hartshorne; the- vard University, a post which he held until ism; time.) retirement in 1937. This period saw the publication of Process and Reality (1929), William of Ockham Adventures of Ideas (1933) and Nature (c. 1287–1349) and Life (1934). His Essays in Science and Philosophy appeared in 1947. Born in Ockham in Surrey, William taught Process and Reality challenges the at Oxford, London, Avignon and Munich phase of philosophy that stretched from as a member of the Franciscan order. He Descartes to Hume. This period tried, was a leading and very influential late and failed, to base epistemology upon a scholastic thinker, who also defended static metaphysics of substance. By con- nominalism. trast, Whitehead saw objectsnotas William taught both Aristotelian logic ‘things’ in their own right, but as having and Christian theology, and was more action and effect. ‘Objects’ as static willing than many other scholastic thin- abstractions divide ‘the seamless coat of kers to maintain a clear distinction the universe’. Objects have significance between the two disciplines and the only in their ‘ingressive’ relation to events. independence of theology. He is widely This ‘ingression’ is complex, and prohibits known today for the principle of our conceiving of substance or objects as ‘Ockham’s razor’, which resisted the defined in terms of a location, thereby undue multiplication of explanatory ‘bifurcating the universe’. Whitehead pos- hypotheses beyond what was strictly tulated a four-dimensional space–time necessary. The gratuitous proliferation of continuum (‘the extensive continuum’). hypotheses merely clouded the issue: Since Leibniz rejected the notion of ‘Multiplicity is not to be assumed without ‘monads’ (atomic ‘units of one’) as spatial necessity.’ entities and re-formulated their identity in Ockham carefully qualified his accep- time of force, there are resonances tance of nominalism. Only individual between the common dissatisfaction with particulars exist, since general designa- Descartes that Leibniz and Whitehead tions are largely generated by language shared. Yet there are differences, and and semantics. Nevertheless, a general Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann 320 concept signifies all the entities within a edn, 1967) and On Certainty (1950–1), class. He admits that regularities may alongside many other works. Some emerge typify real individual entities, to provide from an arguably ‘middle’ period a foundation for the semantic use of (1930–2). universals. From the standpont of philosophy of William was critical of the traditional religion, the later writings explore the arguments for the existence of God.He logical grammar of concepts in construc- based theology upon revelation. How- tive ways, and some have appealed to ever, an order of nature coexists alongside them (almost certainly mistakenly) to an order of grace. William became support either a fideist view of language involved in a theological confrontation and truth in religion, or some modified between the head of his Franciscan order version of incommensurability. For the and Pope John XXII concerning the sake of accuracy in understanding Witt- poverty of the church. Ahead of his time genstein, however, we need to begin with he stressed the right of people to choose the difficult early writings, even though their rulers, and stressed the freedom of all some may prefer to move directly to the people to follow ‘right reason’. later works. The early works have also William’s most sophisticated contribu- been misconstrued as implying a positivist tions were to logic, semantics and the view of the world, which is also to be philosophy of language. He wrote exten- questioned. sively on signification, connotation and the early period and its other aspects of semantics. His work was widespread misinterpretation discussed across the universities of Europe until the from the early fourteenth century. 1960s Wittgenstein was born in Vienna into a home where music and culture were Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef valued. In his earliest years he specialized Johann (1889–1951) in mathematics and the sciences, and in Wittgenstein remains one of the most 1908 undertook aeronautical research at creative philosophers of the twentieth the , in England. century. His impact on the philosophy of By 1912 his interests had moved from religion concerns especially uses of lan- applied to pure mathematics, and he guage in religion, particularly the logi- entered Trinity College, Cambridge, to cal currency of language about believing, study philosophical and mathematical thinking, understanding and experiences logic under Russell. With the outbreak of pain, love and joy. Such language, he of war he joined the Austrian army, observed, is rooted in the concrete situa- writing his Notebooks on logic, which tions in life shared by more than one he carried with him during his war service. person, or within a community. This prepared the way for his widely It is fundamental to note key differences famed Tractatus. His journey from engi- of approach between Wittgenstein’s earlier neering to mathematics, from philosophy and later writings. The Notebooks 1914– to logic, from logic to the philosophy of 1916 and especially the Tractatus Logico- logic reflects his drive to reach fundamen- Philosophicus (Germ. and Eng., London: tals behind phenomena in this period. Routledge, 1961) form the main earlier The Tractatus is written in the form of writings up to 1929; the later writings seven succinct logical propositions, the include The Blue and Brown Books first six of which are subdivided into a (dictated 1933–35), especially The Philo- series of assertions identified as subhead- sophical Investigations (mainly 1936–49; ings by the use of decimal points. Just as Germ. and Eng., Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd Kant sought in his transcendental 321 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann philosophy to define the scope and limits truth-possibility. They are true whatever of thought, Wittgenstein offered a critique states of affairs pertain in the world. of language in which ‘the limits of my Hence they lack ‘sense’ (sind sinnlos), language mean the limits of my world’ even though they are not ‘nonsense’ (Tractatus, 5.6). (unsinnig). Thus leads on the famous The first three main propositions concluding proposition of the Tractatus. expound the function of language as ‘The correct method in philolosophy portraying (or ‘picturing’) states of affairs. would really be that of the following: to Thus say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science’ (ibid., (1) ‘The world is all that is the case.’ 6.53). ‘What we cannot speak about we (2) ‘What is the case – a fact – is the must pass over in silence’ (ibid., 7). existence of states of affairs (Ger., These sentences might be understood in Sachverhalten).’ a positivist, materialist or behaviourist (3) ‘A logical picture of facts is a thought.’ sense, as in logical positivism or in the positivist philosophy of the Vienna Wittgenstein’s biographers convincingly circle. Russell understood them in this trace his exposition of ‘the picture theory way, viewing Wittgenstein’s linguistic of language’ to his early reading of a ‘atoms’ or simple elements of language as report in 1914 of a traffic accident in representations of units of the empirical which ‘the facts’ were portrayed to a court world. However, Wittgenstein almost cer- by means of models (cars, dolls, roads, tainly viewed these as logical entities, houses) in which the relations between the which did not necessarily prescribe a models represented the relations between positivist (or any) world-view. the objects that were configured to repre- After unsuccessful attempts to have the sent a state of affairs. Tractatus published, Wittgenstein appears The fourth main proposition of the to have handed the manuscript to Russell Tractatus (‘A thought is a proposition ‘to do as he liked with it’. Russell with a sense’, der sinvolle Satz) expounds successfully secured its publication, but the principle of projection or representa- only with a preface of his own, which tion whereby the states of affairs and implies a line of interpretation reflecting corresponding constituents of proposition Russell’s own understanding of the work. stand in a determinate relation to each More recent research and the publica- other. He explores ‘what was essential to tion of letters from this period have led to depiction’ (Abbildung, ibid., 4.016). reappraisals. Was the Wittgenstein who Yet Wittgenstein as mathematical logi- admired music and the writings of Tolstoy, cian knew that language also functions to Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, in whose formulate logical relations, and not only childhood home Brahms, Ravel and other to describe states of affairs in the world. composers were welcome visitors, likely to Descriptive, representational language have held a reductive and materialist portrays contingent states of affairs; world-view? ‘What cannot be “said”’ (it formal or analytic statements formu- became increasingly evident) includes some late necessary, a priori, logical relations of the deepest values of life. (See G.H. von independently of the world. The second Wright and N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgen- kind of language does not ‘say’ (sagen) stein: A Memoir, Oxford: OUP, 1966, 3, 21 anything. Rather, it ‘shows’ something (von Wright); 27, 40, 42, 52 (Malcolm); P. (zeigen). These must not be confused. Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgen- ‘What can be shown (gezeigt) cannot be stein, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967; and esp. A. said (gesagt)’ (ibid., 4.1212). Janik and S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Analytic statements have only one Vienna, London: Nicholson, 1973.) Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann 322

This coheres with the Kantian legacy in the later period: multiple the Tractatus which presupposes a con- functions of language trast between ‘facts’ or states of affairs, observed in practice which are located within human thought and language, and the ‘beyond’ of the Initially in the notes that were published world, which transcends conceptual under the title TheBlueandBrownBooks, thought but remains a source of value, and then more rigorously and in fuller detail ethics or even the presuppositions behind and scope in the Philosophical Investiga- religion. These are not to be dismissed; but tions, Wittgenstein exchanged an apriori they lie beyond the limits of language, at theory of logic and language for a series of least as Wittgenstein saw it in his earlier exploratory questions and observations period. arising from actually looking at how people fresh questions and fresh use language in life. ‘Don’t say: “There must exploration: a ‘middle’ period? be . . .” – but look and see whether there is . . .’ (ibid., sect. 66, his italics). For some years Wittgenstein seems to have This has profound consequences for considered that the Tractatus had solved issues about language in religion, although the most burning problems of language this is not Wittgenstein’s agenda at this and philosophical thought. During the point. Of any issue of intelligibility in period 1919 to 1929 he became, in turn, language Wittgenstein sees its context in an elementary schoolmaster in Austria and life (or form of life) which it serves as a a gardener to a monastery, and designed a crucial frame of reference. ‘One learns the house. In 1929, however, he returned to game by watching others play’ (ibid., sect. Cambridge as a Fellow of Trinity College. 54). To imagine a language is to imagine a ‘He put his whole soul into everything he form of life (Lebensform, sect. 19). did . . . his life was a constant journey’ The characteristic term ‘language- (von Wright, op. cit., 20). ‘He drove game’ is used especially to denote a himself fiercely with absolute, relentless, whole, namely ‘language and the actions honesty [and] ruthless integrity’ (Mal- into which it is woven’ (ibid., sect. 7). colm, ibid., 27). Language performs a variety of actions Works from 1929 to 1933 reveal a new, like ‘tools in a tool box . . . a hammer, restless exploration of conceptual or logi- pliers, a saw, a screwdriver . . . The cal problems and uses of language which functions of words are as diverse as the did not easily fit into the dualist categories functions of these objects’ (ibid., sect. 11). of the Tractatus. These include Philoso- Wittgenstein implicitly criticizes his phische Bemerkungen ([1929–30], own earlier work. In the Blue Book he Oxford: Blackwell, 1964) and Philosophi- attacks ‘our craving for generality’ and cal Grammar [1929, 34], Oxford: Black- promotes ‘the particular case’ (The Blue well, 1974). and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell, There is a well-known story of an 2nd edn, 1969, 18). encounter with an Italian from Naples Wittgenstein also attacks ‘a logic for a who made a vigorously derisive gesture vacuum’, as if our concern was almost ‘an with the comment, ‘And what is the ideal language’, rather than language in logical form of that?’ What emerged at action (Philosophical Investigations, sect. the end of this period (around 1933) was a 81). In daily life we learn to use language fuller recognition of the infinitely com- in given ways often ‘by receiving a plex, multi-layered texture of language in training’ (ibid., sect. 86). A logic of everyday life. Such language served to abstraction may confuse us, because it is perform a variety of functions in a variety like an engine idling and disengaged from of ways. a specific task (ibid., sect. 88). 323 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann

Thus the meaning of such a word as status of e.g. ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, ‘exact’, for example, cannot be determined ‘expecting’, ‘intending’ and ‘believing’. in the abstract; but only when we know They also concern the role of communities whether we are talking of ‘exact’ distances within which language uses are shared, in in astronomy, or of ‘exact’ measurements contrast to the technical phenomenon of in carpentry or joinery, or of ‘exact’ ‘private language’. Wittgenstein uses this quantities in micro-sciences. term in a technical sense which seems to Wittgenstein therefore rejects the value have been misunderstood by Ayer, among of talking about ‘essences’: the essence of others. Strawson more convincingly calls language, the essence of meaning, the it ‘unteachable’ language, for it is of a kind essence of thought. ‘The language-game that never presupposed an inter-subjective in which they are to be applied is missing’ or genuinely communicative use. (ibid., sect. 98). He speaks of ‘turning our Some meanings derive simply from our whole examination round’, to destroy the shared status as human beings. Wittgen- seduction of ‘the preconceived idea of stein sometimes uses ‘language game’ to crystalline purity’ in logic and language explore hypothetical language-situations (ibid., sect. 108). involving, for example, dogs or aliens. In this context Wittgenstein utters one An alien might be puzzled to hear humans of his most widely known aphorisms: uttering bleating noises and shaking up ‘Philosophy is a battle against the bewitch- and down. Given an appropriate context, ment of our intelligence by means of human beings would understand that as language’ (ibid., sect. 109). We should laughter. Conceptual grammar is not be deceived by the surface grammar of grounded in communal life. One could language. This is like trying to explain say, ‘I am in pain – Oh, it has gone away chess by describing the physical properties now’; but one could hardly say, ‘I am in of its pieces, rather than how they move love – Oh, it has gone away now’ (see on the board. ‘A picture held us captive’ Wittgenstein, Zettel, Oxford: Blackwell, (ibid., sect. 115). 1967, sects. 53–68 and 504). Pain-lan- In this later work we run our heads up guage and love-language are grounded in against ‘the limits of language’ not on the specific human behaviour for their cur- basis of an a priori Kantian-type theory, rency. but by a confusion which derives from applications to uses of failing to observe the multiform contexts language in religion in human life which give currency to diverse uses of language. It is in this sense Work on the conceptual grammar of that ‘philosophy may in no way interfere belief remains of constructive importance with the actual use of language . . . It for philosophy of religion. ‘If there were a leaves everything as it is’ (ibid., sect. 124). verb meaning “to believe falsely” it could It is not even the case that all meaning is not have any significant first person pre- ‘use’; only in a ‘large class of cases’ (ibid., sent indicative’ (Philosophical Investiga- sect. 43). tions II: x: 190, 192). Hence when I say, ‘I explorations of specific uses of believe’ I am making not simply a state- language in philosophy ment about a state of affairs, but also an act of endorsement, involvement, pledge The remaining two-thirds of the Philoso- or commitment. Thus it makes sense to phical Investigations apply this approach say, ‘He believes it but it is false’, but to mainly to particular uses of language that say, ‘I believe it but it is false’ is mean- have generated confusions and lack of ingless. Similarly, ‘I repent’ or ‘We mourn’ clarity in philosophy. Such examples con- is a speech act: it does not seek to cern the conceptual ‘grammar’ or logical ‘inform’ God or others about some inner Wolterstorff, Nicholas 324 state of mind (see further performative of similarities overlapping and criss-cross- utterances; Austin). ing’, sometimes reflecting ‘family resem- A central achievement is to show by blances’ (Philosophical Investigations, example that the logical currency of much sects. 66, 67). Wittgenstein’s observations language in religion is distinctive not ring true to the language of primary because of some special vocabulary, but religious texts. For example: Jesus of because of special uses to which ordinary Nazareth discusses with Nicodemus the vocabulary is put. Thus ‘hearing’ God has different logical grammar of being ‘born’ a different currency from ‘hearing’ sounds: (Jn3:3–7),andwithawomanfrom ‘You can’t hear God speak to someone Samaria the different grammars of ‘draw- else’ (Zettel, sect. 717). Hence it would be ing living [running] water’ (Jn 4:31–4). logical or conceptual nonsense to advise (See also analogy; behaviourism; someone who lamented, ‘I never hear God empiricism; fideism; materialism; speak to me’, by commenting ‘Then buy a models and qualifiers; positivism; hearing-aid.’ Impaired ‘hearing’ operates Ramsey.) with a different logic in these two ‘sur- roundings’. Wolterstorff, Nicholas (b. 1932) This has given rise, however, to at least one possible misunderstanding. A few Wolterstorff has made outstanding con- writers speak as if Wittgenstein saw all tributions to the philosophy of religion in religion as playing ‘the religious language- the areas of metaphysics, epistemology game’ in contrast to a supposed ‘language- and speech-act theory. He has also game of science’, or whatever. However, written on aesthetics and the philosophy the very term ‘language-game’ is as com- of art and on ethical and political issues. plex, flexible and varied as the particula- He is probably one of two or three most rities of all human life. That is why incisive contemporary philosophers of Wittgenstein’s work contributes to her- religion who writes from an explicitly meneutics, but does not justify a ‘fideis- theistic perspective. tic’ or ghetto-like approach to language in Wolterstorff was educated in the Chris- religion. Religion is also part of human tian Reformed tradition of Dutch America life, with varied traditions and currencies. at Calvin College, Grand Rapids, but then The varied bridges between language in also studied at Harvard University. He has religion and the language uses of the taught at Yale, at Calvin College, at the everyday world emerge in several ways. Free University of Amsterdam and from Most distinctively, the embedding of 1989 again at Yale, as Professor of language in human life means the lan- Philosophical Theology. guage-games in religion become intelligi- metaphysics and aesthetics ble by ‘watching’ how language is ‘backed’ by life in religions. Does the During the period up to 1980, Wolter- utterance ‘I have freely received’ gain storff’s publications included On Univer- currency in part through observing a sals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, generous lifestyle that matches the words? 1970), Reason Within the Bounds of Wittgenstein’s work by implication chal- Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, lenges the credibility of religious people by 1976, 2nd edn, 1984), Works and Worlds this approach. It is like a paper currency of Art (Oxford: OUP, 1980) and Art in that has to be ‘backed’ by genuine wealth Action (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980, (explored further in the entry on belief). 2nd edn, 1994). Further, Wittgenstein sees varied lan- Are universals ‘real’, and instantiated guage uses not as self-contained sub- in particulars; or are they merely verbal or systems, but as ‘a complicated network semantic constructs that engage with 325 Wolterstorff, Nicholas reality only at the level of the particular ‘Count-generation’ assumes a major from whose shared properties they linguis- role in the later work Divine Discourse tically derive? (1995). However, in 1980 the main con- In a very broad sense Wolterstorff cern is to offer a Christian understanding defends ‘realism’, in contrast to the view of aesthetics and a model of the dynamics that the activity of the mind so decisively of creative art. The emphasis falls upon constructs ‘the world’ that, in effect, creativity, not mere replication; but a nothing is ‘given’. Wolterstorff does not creativity that is more than mere self- present a naı¨ve objectivism, as if the expression. It carries those who contem- conceptual activity of the human subject plate it beyond the self of the artist to the were irrelevant; but he rejects the anti- divine creation. The world is ‘created’ in realism that extends Kant’s transcen- accord with God’s own ideas . . . full- dental philosophy into a forerunner of bodied realities in their own right’ (Art in social constructionism. Action, 31). This coheres with Wolterstorff’s obser- speech-act theory vations about art and epistemology. He expounds a philosophy of art which The two works that are fundamental and entails engaging ‘in critique, in unmasking seminal for the philosophy of religion are . . . the institution of high art . . .’, so that both mainly from the Yale period: Divine works of art do not ‘become surrogate Discourse (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), gods’ (Art in Action, 11 and 30). Works of mainly on language in religion and art are often ‘an expression of the Wel- speech acts; and John Locke and the tanschauungen of their makers’ (ibid., Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) 221). Art, however, can be representa- mainly on the epistemological issue of tional; it can project depictions of the ‘entitlement’ to belief, or ‘reasonable’ world. belief. This develops further, in the light This touches upon the theme that of a new appreciation of Locke,the emerges centrally in Wolterstoff’s work epistemology begun in the volume jointly on speech acts: ‘By performing one and edited with Plantinga, Faith and Ration- another action with or on his work of art, ality (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univer- the artist generates a variety of other, sity Press, 1984). distinct, actions. Some of those . . . are In Divine Discourse, Wolterstorff count-generated, some are causally gener- observes, ‘Contemporary speech-action ated’ (ibid., 14), One action may ‘count theory opens up the possibility of a whole as’ performing another: ‘instruments in new way of thinking about God speaking: the performance of generated actions’ perhaps the attribution of speech to God (ibid.). by Jews, Christians and Muslims, should Theverycapacitytodistinguish be understood as the attribution to God of between ‘projecting a world’ in art (or in illocutionary actions, leaving it open how literary narrative) and using ‘descriptive’ God performs these actions’ (ibid., 13). representational language, or between Convincingly, Wolterstorff insists that authorial or artistic commitments to por- promising, commanding and taking up a tray states of affairs and authorial or certain kind of narrative stance are no less artistic explorations of fictional ‘possible’ fundamental (probably more so) than worlds, presupposes the possibility of ‘communicating or expressing knowledge’ reaching out beyond the mind to the (ibid., 35). This may be perceived as ‘from ‘given’ world (Works and Worlds of Art, God’ through ‘Double Agency Discourse’, 222–39). The factual worlds may also be in which human persons utter discourse as ‘fictive’ worlds, but these differ from deputized appointees, like a secretary writ- ‘possible’ worlds. ing on behalf of the director or president. Wolterstorff, Nicholas 326

The key point is that ‘by way of a single ‘reasonable belief’. Locke represents a locutionary act one may say different foundationalism, but a version with ‘that things to different addressees’ (ibid., 55). depth for which I was looking’ (John This is where Wolterstorff reintroduces his Locke,xi). notion of count-generation: one or more The centre of gravity of Locke’s Essay speech acts may count as the action of on Human Understanding is not book II, divine promise, divine appointment, but the often neglected book IV (although divine forgiveness or a wide range of less neglected among recent commenta- multi-level speech actions. tors). Wolterstorff agrees with Locke’s epistemology point that mere intensity of religious conviction offers no warrant for the truth Wolterstorff’s work on Locke gives a of religious belief. Further, he retains the distinctive turn to his earlier discussions core of ‘Reformed Epistemology’, namely of foundationalism and ‘Reformed the belief that natural theology,or epistemology’ in Reason within the reason without the aid of grace or Bounds of Religion,inFaith and Ration- revelatory discourse, is an inadequate ality (with Plantinga) and a number of foundation for religious belief. Yet Locke’s research articles. In the first of these, careful, reasonable, balanced middle path Wolterstorff had attributed an unqualified on broad criteria of reasonableness avoids foundationalism to ‘Aquinas, Descartes, both evidentialism and ‘hard’ rational- Leibniz, Berkeley, logical positivists – all ism, and this offers a sane way forward. of them and many more have been Since 1996, Wolterstorff has continued foundationalists’ (Reason within the his concern for public Bounds, 26). Such an approach he had in the Public Square (with R. Audi; Row- attacked. man & Littlefield, 1997) and for episte- In the light of a fresh appraisal of mology in Thomas Reid and the Story of Locke, Wolterstorff came to distinguish Epistemology (Cambridge: CUP, 2001). between the ‘far more restricted’ foun- (See also Austin; instantiation; logi- dationalism of Descartes and the alto- cal positivism; performative utter- gether more promising work of Locke on ances; semantics; theism.) Z

Zen philosophy Zoroastrianism The term generally denotes a sub-tradition Zoroastrianism was the major religion of within Maha¯ya¯na Buddhist thought in the ancient Iran (Persia) founded by Zoroaster form in which this developed in China and or, in Iranian, Zarathustra. His date is Japan after about the sixth century ce. contested: from 1400 bce to as late as 500 Self-awakening and liberation remain pro- bce. Zoroastrianism suffered severe minent themes, together with perception decline after the Muslim invasion of the unclouded by desire or undue distraction. seventh century, with virtually enforced Since subject–object conceptual conversion to Islam. thought and over-neat ‘definition’ is It is estimated that today a following of regarded as obtrusive rather than illuminat- the order of 100,000 remain, of whom ing, it is difficult to characterize Zen by a three-quarters are Parsis (‘people from list of defining abstractions, rather than by Persia’) who had migrated from persecu- more helpful instantiations. In modern tion to Western India. thought Nishida (1870–1945) and Nishi- The sacred scriptures of Zoroastrian- tani (1900–90) offer bridges between Zen ism is the Avesta, of which the Ga¯tha¯s are themes and Western concepts, while several seen as containing the essential teaching of Western philosophers have sought to inter- Zarathustra as the prophet. In summary, act with Zen. These include the later Zoroastrianism embodies a metaphysical Heidegger and Cupitt,amongothers. dualism, in which Ahura Mazda¯ (‘the One attempt to move beyond subject– Wise Lord’), or Ormadz, represents the object thinking is the use of the koan to force of righteousness; and the evil power provoke a different level of thought and is Ahriman, or Angra Mainyu. The right- perception. The koan intended to stimu- eous power is light, life, order, law and late meditative or ‘non-objective’ reflec- truth; the evil power is darkness, death, tion, namely the image of ‘one hand evil and falsehood. clapping’, is frequently cited by Western Zoroaster, as the prophet, seeks the writers. (See also buddhist philosophy; protection of Ahura Mazda¯ in the Ga¯tha¯s, monism; mysticism; via negativa; more prays for victory, and gathers together a broadly, dualism; Hindu philosophy; group of ‘immortal holy ones’, or dis- Na¯ga¯ rjuna.) ciples, to help forward the cause. The Zoroastrianism 328 world is the theatre and cosmic arena of concedes that other currents also influence this cosmic struggle. After a current period the religion. of balance Ahura Mazda¯ will prevail, Zoroastrianism today is not a ‘centra- bringing in the judgement of the power lized’ religion, and has developed in of evil and the new kingdom. The words different directions. The conservative tra- and deeds of the righteous are recorded in dition has been sustained by Rustom the Book of Life. Sanjana of Bombay, who emphasizes After earlier years in which some ‘One God’, and respect for the Prophet. polytheistic assimilation seems to have J.J. Modi allows for some ‘demytholo- taken place, Zoroastrians today affirm a gizing’ of the texts (as Hinnells describes form of monotheism, in spite of a dualist it), but retains many elements in a dimension, on the ground that they moderate way. Yet others have stressed worship only Ahura Mazda¯. Among spe- the rational and philosophical, sitting cialists on this subject, John Hinnells loose to the earlier core, and explaining stresses the increasing role of ‘sweet away many texts and much ritual. Zor- reason’ and liberal influence among mod- oastrianism is an identifiable but barely ern adherents, not least through the unified religion today, except for the influence of the philosophy of M.M. common reference-point of the Ga¯tha¯s, Dhalla (1875–1956), although he also at least in principle. Chronology

c. 1500–800 BCE Era of the Vedas. c. 800–500 BCE Era of classical Vedanta and Upanis¸ads c. 600 BCE (?) Zoroaster, (Zarathustra) founder of Persian religion, Zoroastrianism (?) Date contested from 1400–500 BCE c. 624–546 BCE Thales of Miletus, Greek philosopher c. 551–479 BCE , Chinese philosopher; in effect founder of Chinese philosophy c. 550–470 BCE ‘The Buddha’: Siddhartha Gautama, ‘Enlightened’ founder-teacher of Buddhism c. 550–470 BCE (?) Maha¯vira, ‘Enlightened’ founder-teacher of Jaina philosophy c. 540–425 BCE Heraclitus of Ephesus, Greek philosopher

fl. 515–492 BCE Parmenides of Elea, Greek philosopher c. 470–399 BCE Socrates, Athenian philosopher c. 428–348 BCE Plato, Athenian philosopher c. 384–22 BCE Aristotle, Greek philosopher of Stagira and Athens c. 341–270 BCE Epicurus of Samos, Greek philosopher c. 334–262 BCE Zeno of Citium, Greek philosopher c. 20 BCE –50CE Philo of Alexandria, Jewish philosopher and biblical commentator c. 30 CE Approximate date of crucifixion of Jesus Christ A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 330 c. 150–200 Na¯ga¯rjuna, Buddhist philosopher, founder of the Madhyamaka school of Maha¯ya¯na Buddhism c. 185–254 Origen, Christian biblical and philosophical theologian

205–70 Plotinus, Neoplatonist thinker

354–430 Augustine, Christian theologian and philosopher

411 Augustine: City of God c. 480–525 Boethius, Roman philosopher

622–32 The Prophet (Muhammad) and the texts of the Qur’an; capture of Mecca, 628 c. 788–820 S´an˙ ka¯ra¯, influential Hindu philosopher of non-dualist (Advaita) Vedanta tradition c. 813–71 al-Kindi, Islamic philosopher and mathematician

875–950 al-Farabi, Islamic philosopher

882–942 Saadiah Gaon, Jewish philosopher

980–1037 Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Islamic philosopher c. 1017–1137 Ra¯ma¯nuja, Hindu philosopher of ‘modified’ Advaita Vedanta

1033–1109 Anselm of Canterbury, philosopher, theologian and archbishop

1058–1111 al-Ghazali, Islamic philosophical theologian

1079–1142 Peter Abelard, French theologian and philosopher

1126–98 Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Islamic scholar and philosopher

1135–1204 Moses Maimonides, Jewish religious philosopher

1200–80 Albertus Magnus, scholastic philosopher c. 1238–1317 (?) Ma¯dhva, Hindu philosopher and theologian of Dvaita (dualist) Vedanta school

1260–1327 Meister Eckhart, German mystic c. 1266–1308 Duns Scotus, Scottish theologian and philosopher

1287–1349 William of Ockham, English philosopher 331 Chronology

1288–1344 Gersonides, Jewish philosopher and astronomer

1401–64 Nicholas of Cusa, German philosopher and church theologian

1465–1536 Erasmus of Rotterdam, European humanist

1483–1546 Martin Luther, German Reformation leader; Ninety-five Theses, 1517

1509–64 John Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1536

1542–91 John of the Cross (Juan de Yepez y Alvarez), Spanish mystic

1588–1679 , English philosopher

1596–1650 Rene´ Descartes, French rationalist philosopher and mathematician

1619 Jakob Boehme: On the Principles of Christianity

1624 Lord Herbert of Cherbury, deist: On Truth

1632–77 , Dutch monist philosopher

1632–1704 John Locke, English empiricist philosopher

1641 Rene´ Descartes: Me`ditations

1651 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan

1663 Leibniz: De principiis individui

1670 Spinoza: Tractatus theologico-politicus

1685–1753 George Berkeley, Irish idealist and empiricist philosopher

1690 John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

1695 John Locke: The Reasonableness of Christianity

1710 Leibniz: The´odice´e

1711–76 , Scottish empiricist philosopher and historian

1714 Leibniz: Monadology

1724–1804 Immanuel Kant, German transcendental philosopher

1728 William Law: A Serious Call to Devout and Holy Life A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 332

1729–86 , German Jewish philosopher

1730 Matthew Tindal, deist: Christianity as Old as the Creation

1738 Voltaire introduces ideas of Isaac Newton to France

1739 David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature

1748–53 David Hume: Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding

1751–72 French ‘Encyclope´die’ published

1762–1814 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, German idealist philosopher

1768–1834 , German theologian, philosopher and founder of modern hermeneutics

1770–1831 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, German idealist philosopher

1775–1854 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, German philosopher

1779 David Hume: Dialogues of Natural Religion (posthumously)

1781 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

1788 Kant: Critique of Practical Reason

1788–1860 , German philosopher

1792 Fichte: Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung

1793 Kant: Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason

1798–1858 Auguste Comte, French positivist philosopher

1799 Schleiermacher: On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers

1800 Schelling: System of Transcendental Idealism

1804–72 , German philosopher

1806–73 , English philosopher

1807 Hegel: Pha¨nomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit) 333 Chronology

1809–82 Charles Darwin, English naturalist and exponent of evolutionary theory.

1813–55 Søren Kierkegaard, Danish philosopher of existentialist outlook

1818–83 Karl Marx, German political philosopher and social theorist

1819 Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as Will and Idea)

1820–1903 Herbert Spencer, English philosopher and evolutionary theorist

1821 Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith

1836–86 Ramakrishna, Hindu guru and teacher

1838 Auguste Comte: gives the basic social science of sociology its name

1839–1914 Charles S. Peirce, American philosopher and logician

1841 Ludwig Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)

1842–1910 William James, American philosopher and psychologist

1844–1900 Friedrich Nietzsche, German iconoclastic philosopher

1846–1924 F. H. Bradley, English Hegelian philosopher

1859 Charles Darwin: On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection

1859–1938 Edmund Husserl, Austrian philosopher

1859–1952 John Dewey, American philosopher of progressivist pragmatism

1861–1947 Alfred North Whitehead, English mathematician and philosopher

1870–1937 Alfred Adler, Austrian psychiatrist

1870–1945 Nishida Kitaro¯ , Japanese philosopher and innovative thinker; founder of Kyoto school A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 334

1875–1961 C.G. Jung, Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher of symbol

1878–1965 Martin Buber, Austrian Jewish philosopher of personhood

1886–1929 Franz Rosenzweig, Jewish philosopher

1886–1957 Frederick R. Tennant, English philosophical theologian

1886–1965 , German-American philosophical theologian and apologist

1889–1951 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Austrian and Cambridge philosopher

1889–1973 , French Roman Catholic existentialist philosopher

1889–1976 , German philosopher of human existence

1893 F.H. Bradley: Appearance and Reality

1900 Sigmund Freud: The Interpretation of Dreams

1900–76 Gilbert Ryle, English philosopher of conceptual analysis.

1900–90 Nishitani Keiji, Japanese philosopher of Kyoto school, influenced by Zen and Western thought

1900–2002 Hans-Georg Gadamer, German philosopher and major hermeneutical thinker

1904–90 B.F. Skinner, American psychologist and behaviourist

1906–95 Emmanuel Levinas, Lithuanian-born Jewish philosopher of personhood

1907 William James: Pragmatism

1907–72 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Polish-American Jewish philosopher

1913– Paul Ricoeur, French hermeneutical thinker and philosopher

1915–80 Roland Barthes, French philosopher and semiotic theorist

1919 Karl Barth: Der Ro¨ merbrief (The Epistle to the Romans, 2nd edition, 1921) 335 Chronology

1923 Martin Buber: I and Thou

1927 Sigmund Freud: The Future of an Illusion

1927 Martin Heidegger: Being and Time

1929 The ‘Vienna circle’: Carnap, Schlick, et al.

1930– Jacques Derrida, French philosopher and postmodern theorist of signs

1932– , American theistic philosopher and logician

1932– , American theistic philosopher

1934– Richard Swinburne, English theistic philosopher of religion

1936 A.J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic

1941 : ‘New Testament and Mythology’

1950 Gilbert Ryle: The Concept of Mind

1953 Nishitani: What is Religion?

1953 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations (posthumously)

1953–64 Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology (3 volumes)

1959 P.F. Strawson: Individuals

1962 J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words

1962–5 Second Vatican Council in Rome

1966 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (2nd edition, 1977)

1966 Ian Ramsey, Oxford philosophical theologian, becomes Bishop of Durham

1967 Jacques Derrida: Of Grammatology, and Writing and Difference

1967 Alvin Plantinga: God and Other Minds

1969 John Searle: Speech Acts

1974 Emmanuel Levinas: Otherwise than Being A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 336

1977 Richard Swinburne: The Coherence of Theism (revised edition, 1991)

1979 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

1979 Richard Swinburne: The Existence of God

1984 Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff:

1984–88 Paul Ricoeur: Time and Narrative (3 volumes)

1989 Revised English translation of Gadamer, Truth and Method

1994 Richard Swinburne: The Christian God

1995 Nicholas Wolterstorff: Divine Discourse

1998 Richard Rorty: Truth and Progress

1999 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief

2002 Death of Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) Index of names

Abelard, Peter 2–3, 49–50, 252, 278 Arouet, Franc¸ois-Marie, see Voltaire Adler, Alfred 112, 153 Athanasius 25 Adorno, Theodor W. 189 Atiyeh, G. M. 160 Albert the Great 3, 5, 13, 71, 149, 246 Audi, R. 326 Alexander the Great 15 Augustine of Hippo 10, 11, 16, 17, 21–5, Alston, William P. 77, 193 36, 41–2, 56, 77, 79, 84, 85, 86, 87, Ambrose of Milan 21 89, 93, 105, 108, 122, 123, 131, Anaxagoras 301 132–3, 141, 145, 186, 198, 211, 213, Anaximander 279 232, 243, 259, 261, 266, 306, 308 Andronicus of Rhodes 185 Aule´n, Gustav 214 Anscombe, G. E. M. 54, 83 Austin, John L. 8, 25–6, 36, 63, 220, Anselm of Canterbury 2, 10–11, 18, 32, 225–6, 286, 289–90, 291, 293 33, 39, 51, 52, 78, 104, 118, 124–5, Averroes, see Ibn Rushd 148, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217 Avicenna, see Ibn Sina Aquinas, Thomas 3, 4, 5, 6–7, 8, 11, Ayer, Sir Alfred Jules 8, 9, 29–31, 33, 35, 13–14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 32, 34, 39, 72, 73, 83, 97, 162, 166, 174–5, 191, 41–2, 49, 51, 52–3, 54, 55, 56, 64, 70, 233, 241, 317, 323 71, 72, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 102–5, 108, 117, 119, 121–2, 123, 131, 133, Badham, Paul 236 136, 141, 142, 145, 148, 149, 152, Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 67 163, 164, 186, 196, 206, 207, 208, Barbour, Ian G. 280 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 232, 233, Barfield, Owen 184 243, 246, 255, 258–9, 264, 278, 284, Barth, Karl 7–8, 10, 32–4, 55, 85, 100, 288–9, 300, 301, 304, 306, 312, 316, 102, 103, 118, 120, 122, 145, 158, 326 159, 163, 164, 196–7, 205, 206, 209, Aristophanes 288 214–15, 217, 262, 264, 265, 295, Aristotle 2, 4, 5, 13, 14–17, 21, 29, 38, 305–6, 310–11 41–2, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51–3, 54–5, 56, Barthes, Roland 144, 184–5, 200, 234, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 235 80, 83, 87, 94, 98, 103, 104, 105, 117, Bartsch, H-W. 42, 62 121, 136, 141, 142, 148, 149, 152, Bauer, Bruno 99, 179 159–60, 173, 176, 184, 185, 196, 198, Bautain, Louis 102 216, 231, 232, 233, 239, 252, 253, Beethoven, Ludwig van 267 266, 275, 278, 279, 288–9, 297, 300, Bentham, Jeremy 81–2, 185, 190–1 301, 311–12 Berdiaev, Nikolai 67 A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 338

Bergson, Henri Louis 37, 103, 201, 245 Camus, Albert 67, 88, 93, 158 Berkeley, George 37–8, 73, 74, 76, 138, Cantor, Georg 173 143, 144, 171, 250, 326 Carlyle, Thomas 61 Bernard of Clairvaux 2, 192, 193, 258 Carnap, Rudolf 35, 174, 255, 316–17 Bernstein, Richard 233 Carneades 276 Betti, Emilio 130–1 Carroll, Lewis 269 Bhartrhari 136, 137 Castelli 280 Black,˙ Max 165, 184, 188 Chadwick, Henry 39, 79 Blake, William 267 Chandoux 64 Bloch, Ernst 189 Chang Tsai 182 Boehme, Jacob 192 Chisholm, Roderick 77, 229 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 2, Chrysippus 293 38–9, 77, 79, 89, 121, 145, 198, 208, Church, Alonzo 173 211–12, 213, 214 Cicero 22, 23, 139 Bonaventure (John of Fadanza) 39, 278 Clarke, Samuel 53, 104 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 21, 27, 100, 112, Cleanthes 84, 293 113, 169, 200–1, 262 Clement of Alexandria 196, 231, 258 Boole, George 173 Clifford, W. K. 36, 37, 76–7, 229 Bradley, Francis H. 3, 9, 39, 82, 85, 127, Cohen, Hermann 48, 153 137, 143, 144, 189, 224, 225, 253, Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 261–2, 268 260, 269–70, 313 Collingwood, R. G. 67 Brahms, Johannes 321 Comte, Auguste 232–3 Braithwaite, R. B. 161, 166 Constable, John 267 Breuer, J. 109, 112 Copernicus, Nicolaus 146, 279 Briggs, Richard S. 291 Corrington, Robert 239 Brightman, Edgar S. 85, 242, 243 Craig, W. I. 54 Broad, C. D. 56–7 Cudworth, Ralph 231 Brown, James 295 Cullmann, Oscar 37, 264–5 Brown, Stuart C. 166 Cupitt, Don 20, 57–8, 120, 170, 202, 327 Bruckner, Anton 267 Bru¨ mmer, Vincent 87–8, 109, 242, 244, Dannhauer, J. C. 129 290, 306 Dante, Alighieri 246 Brunner, Emil 33, 196, 197, 214 Darwin, Charles Robert 19, 37, 59, 82, Buber, Martin Mordechai 20, 39–40, 84, 90, 105, 111, 117, 127, 221, 282, 291, 95, 96, 101, 116, 120, 151, 153, 169, 296, 302, 303, 305 178, 193, 204, 241, 257, 262, 266, Davidson, Donald 147, 240 285, 295 Dawkins, Richard 91 Bulgakov, Sergei 67 Deissman, Adolf 193 Bultmann, Rudolf 36, 42–3, 48, 62–3, 93, Delacroix, Eugene 267 96, 127, 128, 129, 144, 158, 159, Democritus 72, 137, 182 164–5, 194, 201, 204, 205, 259, 265, Dennett, Daniel 183 286 Denzin, Norman 233 Butler, Joseph 81 Derrida, Jacques 63–4, 144, 175, 184–5, Butteworth, E. J. 215 200, 234–5 Byron, (Lord) George 267 Descartes, Rene´ 9, 22, 29, 42, 44, 47, 64–5, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 92, 97, 105, Cajetan, Thomas 7 106–7, 114, 117, 147, 150, 167–8, Calvin, John 2, 163, 228, 265 169, 170, 171, 183, 206, 207, 215–16, Campbell, C. A. 47–8, 238, 284 222, 224, 229, 234, 250–1, 254, 271, Campbell, N. R. 188 284, 291–2, 294, 309, 319, 326 339 Index of names

Dewey, John 77, 239, 240, 241, 245, 268, Frazer, J. G. 111, 256–7 313 Freeman, Anthony 202 Dhalla, M. M. 328 Frege, Gottlob 173 d’Holbach, see Holbach Freud, Sigmund 19, 20–1, 57, 63, 99, Diderot, Denis 74, 182–3, 280 100, 106, 109–13, 120, 153, 154, 178, Dillistone, F. W. 298 234, 256, 257, 261, 262, 266, 279 Dilthey, Wilhelm 40, 114, 130, 210–11, Fuchs, Ernst 26 251, 277 Funk, Robert 26 Dirac, Paul 281 Dostoevsky, Fe´dor Mikhailovich 39, 67–8, Gadamer, Hans-Georg 27–8, 65, 67, 75, 88, 89, 93–4, 95, 178, 201, 306, 321 114–15, 130, 250–2, 253, 254, 255, Duns Scotus, John 6, 7, 70, 148, 152, 309–10 208, 218, 278 Gaius (Roman emperor) 151 Galen 142 Eagleton, T. 144 Galileo (Galilei) 146, 277 Eckhart, Meister Johannes 6, 7, 71, 88, Galloway, George 257 192, 193, 201 Ga¯tha¯s68 Edwards, David 250 Gaunilo 11, 215 Edwards, Paul 177 Geach, Peter 85, 122, 206, 207 Einstein, Albert 146, 147, 183, 186, 282, Gersonides (Levi ben Gerson) 153 308 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid 51–2, 56, Eliade, M. 193 115–16, 141, 142, 148, 149, 259, 263 Empedocles 15 Gibson, A. Boyce 187, 243 Engelmann, P. 321 Gill, Jerry H. 250 Engels, Friedrich 100, 178, 179–80 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 101, 119, 224, Epictetus 293 267, 276, 292 Epicurus 18, 72, 84, 139, 182 Gollwitzer, Helmut 181 Erasmus, Desiderius 51, 276 Goodenough, E. 226 Euler, Leonhard 173, 247, 297 Goodman, L. C. 142 Euripides 199 Goodman, Nelson 202 Evans, Donald D. 26, 286 Gorgias 80 Evans, J. L. 30–1 Gregory XVI, Pope 102 Griffin, David 86, 133 al-Farabi, Abu Nasr 5, 16, 56, 98, 115, Gunton, Colin 109 141, 142, 148, 177, 198, 259, 264 Farmer, H. H. 131 Habermas, Ju¨ rgen 115, 144, 175, 240 Feuerbach, Ludwig 19–20, 32, 57, 67, Hadrian 12 98–101, 113, 119–20, 125, 127, 143, Halevi, Judah 193 178, 179, 180, 257, 261, 262 Hampshire, Stuart 70 Feyerabend, Paul 147, 281 Hare, R. M. 80, 83 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 38, 66, 67, 75, Harnack, Adolf 32, 169, 170 101, 125, 126, 143, 144, 180, 252, Harre´, Ron 188 276, 277, 312 Hart, David 202 Findlay, J. N. 3, 127, 216–17 Hartshorne, Charles 11, 123, 124–5, 146, Flacius, Matthias 226 173, 174, 187, 198, 214, 215, 217, Flew, Antony 87, 90, 97, 162, 213, 229, 221–2, 245 235, 236, 288 Harvey, David 235 Foucault, Michel 29, 105–6, 175, 200, Haydn 267 234, 235 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 3, 12, Francke, August 228 19, 29, 38, 39, 44, 48, 49, 55, 66, 75, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 340

85, 93, 98, 99, 100, 101, 114, 119, Iamblichus 198 125–7, 128, 130, 137, 143–4, 148, Ibn Daud, Abraham 152 153, 157, 158, 159, 179, 180, 194, Ibn Gabirol, Solomon 152 208, 210, 218, 222, 224, 237, 244, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) 52, 121, 141, 148, 251, 253–4, 258, 274, 276, 277, 278, 149, 153, 196, 198, 209, 259 302, 312, 313 Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 51, 52, 70, 103, 117, Heidegger, Martin 4, 29, 42, 63, 79, 92, 141, 142, 148–9, 152, 198, 209, 259, 94, 95, 96, 114, 127–9, 150, 169, 201, 263 204, 214, 218, 231, 234, 240, 259, Irenaeus 87, 131, 132, 197 265, 275, 307, 309, 327 Heim, Karl 281 Jacobi, Friedrich H. 81, 224, 292 Helm, Paul 78, 212, 213, 214 James, William 73, 77, 201, 239–40, 253, Hengel, Martin 151 268, 313 Henry, Carl 265 Janik, A. 321 Hepburn, R. W. 62 Jaspers, Karl Theodor 94–5, 150–1, 164, Heraclitus 244 165, 265, 275, 296 Herbert, Edward (Lord Herbert of Joad, C. E. M. 156 Cherbury) 61 John of the Cross 192, 193, 316 Herder, J. G. 119, 224, 266–7, 292 John of Damascus 245 Herrmann, W. 42 John XXII, Pope 320 Hertz, Heinrich 188 Johnson, Samuel 38 Heschel, Abraham Joshua 153 Jonas, Hans 62 Hesse, Mary 184, 188 Julian of Norwich 192 Hick, John Harwood 85–6, 87, 92, 98, Jung, Carl Gustav 112, 153–4, 164, 165, 109, 131–3, 213, 215 298, 307 High, D. M. 36 Ju¨ ngel, Eberhard 118, 310 Hildegarde of Bingen 192 Justin 12, 55 Hillel, Rabbi 1 Hinnells, John 328 Kant, Immanuel 3, 8, 18, 19, 25, 27, 28, Hitler, Adolf 32, 33, 40, 127, 150, 196, 29, 39, 44–5, 48, 49, 51, 53, 56, 57, 306 65, 67, 71, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83–4, Hobbes, Thomas 5, 18–19, 80–1, 83, 99, 101, 103, 105, 117, 118, 125, 126, 137–8, 182, 190, 202, 231, 242, 291, 130, 131, 137, 143, 144, 147, 155–9, 292 163–4, 189–90, 191, 205, 215, 216, Ho¨ lderlin, Friedrich 276 217, 218, 219, 222, 228, 234, 239, Holbach, Paul-Henri (Baron d’Holbach) 241–2, 243, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 19, 75, 182–3 277, 279, 294, 301–2, 304, 310, 311, Homer 129–30, 226 312, 320–21, 325 Hook, S. 298 Kaplan, Mordecai 153 Hospers, John 10 Kaufman, W. 275, 276 Hoyle, Frederick 54 Keats, John 132 Hugh of St Victor 278 Kenny, Anthony 79, 103, 104, 105 Hume, David 19, 31, 44, 45, 53, 54, 71, Kepler, Johannes 186 72, 73, 74, 76, 81–2, 84, 103, 105, Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye 22, 27, 33, 36, 117, 130, 138–40, 155, 157, 186, 187, 40, 57, 67, 92, 93, 95, 96, 102, 116, 189, 190, 221, 222, 238, 250, 251, 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 157–9, 177, 253, 270, 276, 283, 285, 301, 304, 319 258, 259, 274, 278, 286, 287, 294, Husserl, Edmund 63, 127–8, 234, 265, 310, 313, 314, 321 275 al-Kindi, Abu Yusuf Ya’qub Ibn Ishaq 51–2, Huxley, T. H. 59, 91 56, 98, 142, 148, 159–60, 259, 264 341 Index of names

Knox, John 194 Malcolm, Norman 124, 177, 187, 215, Kretzmann, N. 78 217, 240, 321, 322 Kripke, Saul 233 Malebranche, Nicolas 206 Kuhn, Thomas S. 146, 147, 235, 240, 281 Marcel, Gabriel 4, 84, 95, 96, 169, Ku¨ ng, Hans 21, 100–1, 113, 119, 181 177–8, 265, 285, 295 Marcion 68 La Mettrie, Julien Offroy de 75, 182–3, Marcus Aurelius 12 280, 281 Marsh, R. C. 269 Laplace, Pierre Simon de 280, 281 Marx, Karl 19, 20, 29, 66, 99, 100, 106, Lash, Nicholas 180 119–20, 125, 127, 143, 178–81, 234 Law, William 262 Matthews, W. R. 90–1, 282, 296 Leaman, Oliver 149 Mauthner, F. 269 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 19, 29, 45, Mendelssohn, Moses 75, 153, 183–4 50, 53, 75, 76, 88, 143, 153, 155, Mill, John Stuart 53, 67, 82, 85, 104, 167–9, 173, 177, 183, 189, 197–8, 185, 190–1 199, 201, 212, 215, 218, 232, 233, Milton, John 246 250, 251, 254, 313, 319, 326 Mitchell, Basil 296 Lenin, Vladimir 180–1 Modi, J. J. 328 Leo XIII, Pope 13 Molina, Luis de 213 Lessing, G. E. 50, 74, 75 Moltmann, Ju¨ rgen 12, 21, 88, 100, 101, Levinas, Emmanuel 40, 84, 151, 169, 103, 112, 113, 122, 124, 145–6, 169, 178, 204, 285, 295 181, 188–9, 200–1, 208, 209, 210, Lewis, Clarence I. 173, 187–8 214, 237, 262, 305 Lewis, C. S. 89 Monica (mother of Augustine of Hippo) Lindbeck, George 48 23 Lindtner, Christian 195 Monod, Jacques 281 Ling, Trevor 136 Montaigne, Michel de 74, 276 Locke, John 28, 29, 35, 36, 37–8, 42, 46, 47, Moore, George E. 8, 9, 39, 46, 47, 57, 80, 48–9, 53, 71–3, 74, 76, 94, 106–7, 130, 253, 270 138, 143, 170–2, 193, 199, 205, 229, Moore, G. F. 226, 260 237, 250, 251, 254, 255, 283, 325, 326 Morgan, Lloyd 245 Lombard, Peter 5, 70, 246, 278 Morris, Charles 286 Lovejoy, Arthur O. 35, 183 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus 267 Lucretius 182 Muhammad (the Prophet) 148 Luther, Martin 51, 71, 243, 276 Musonius Rufus 293 Lyons, John 286 Lyotard, Jean-Franc¸ois 175, 233 Na¯ga¯rjuna 192, 195, 225, 238, 316 Napoleon Bonaparte 280 Mach, Ernst 317 Natorp, Paul 48, 153 MacIntyre, Alasdair 83, 84, 236, 253 Netton, I. R. 98 Mackie, J. L. 54, 66, 87, 90, 108–9, 207, Neufeld, V. N. 36 211, 213, 296 Newman, John Henry 12, 61, 227, 258 McKinnon, Alastair 186, 295 Newton, Sir Isaac 19, 53, 74, 75, 103, Mackintosh, H. R. 277 138, 146–7, 198–9, 280, 304 Macquarrie, J. 277 Nicholas of Cusa 3, 71 Madhva 135, 176, 238, 249 Niebuhr, Reinhold 311 Mahler, Gustav 267 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm 5, 19, 20, Maimonides, Moses (Rabbi Moses ben 27, 29, 57, 63, 88, 92–3, 95, 96, 99, Maimon) 7, 14, 51, 52, 53, 56, 149, 100, 101, 106, 111–12, 120, 129, 144, 151, 152, 153, 176–7, 260, 264, 316 150, 162, 169, 180–1, 184–5, 189, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 342

191, 199–201, 231, 234, 240, 242–3, 153, 172, 191, 195–6, 198, 201, 208, 256, 261, 262, 267, 279 213, 218, 230–2, 237, 252, 263, 275, Nishida Kita¯ro¯ 201, 202, 316, 327 279, 283, 284, 287, 288–9, 301, 308, Nishitani Keiji 201, 316, 327 312 Norris, Christopher 241 Plew, Antony 10 Nowell-Smith, P. H. 80 Plotinus 7, 25, 54, 55, 71, 141, 142, 148, 159, 198, 231, 232 O’Connor, D. J. 170 Pogoloff, S. M. 288 Oetinger, Friedrich 228 Polkinghorne, John 91, 186–7, 280–1, Origen 231, 258 296, 305 Otto, Rudolf 203, 219, 257, 261, 262, Popkin, Richard H. 276 310 Popper, Karl 97, 162 Owen, H. P. 119, 191 Porphyry 148, 198, 232 Price, H. H. 36–7, 131, 237 Paley, William 90, 91, 117, 196, 221, Protagoras 80, 83, 288 300–301, 302, 304 Pseudo-Dionysius 6, 7, 192–3, 245–6 Pannenberg, Wolfhart 55, 120–1, 122, Putnam, Hilary 239, 240 127, 145, 187, 194, 208, 209–11, 222, Pyrrho of Elis 275, 276 237, 243, 259, 265, 311, 314 Parfit, Derek 285 Quine, Willard van Orman 202, 214, Parmenides of Elea 78, 137, 189, 218, 240, 268, 317 223, 224, 260 Paton, H. J. 32, 33, 166, 197 Rainer, A. G. A. 217 Paul (Apostle) 7, 12, 33, 47, 53, 60, 110, Ra¯ma¯nuja 54, 55, 133, 134, 135, 176, 129, 170, 193, 208, 212, 222, 223, 192, 225, 248–9, 273 227, 236–7, 238, 243, 244, 245, 251, Ramsey, Ian Thomas 12, 34, 165–6, 188, 254, 261, 263, 288, 292–3 249–50 Paul VI, Pope 13 Rashdall, Hastings 191 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich 35 Ravel, Maurice 321 Peacocke, Arthur R. 243, 281 Rawls, John 83 Peano, G. 173, 270 Recanati, F. 26, 290 Peirce, Charles S. 44, 97, 124, 173, 239, Reimarus, Samuel 75 313 Ricoeur, Paul 21, 24, 37, 40, 109, 113, Pelagius 108, 123 114, 130, 154, 165, 184, 237, 250, Phaenarete (mother of Socrates) 287 265–6, 277, 283, 296, 298, 299, 309 Philip of Macedon 15, 139 Robertson Smith, W. 111 Phillips, D. Z. 241, 244 Robespierre 75 Philo of Alexandria 151–2, 153, 176–7, Rorty, Richard McKay 73, 76, 77, 83, 193, 198, 226–7, 260 147, 172, 175, 191, 235, 239, 240–1, Pike, Nelson 78, 212–13 268, 313 Pitcher, G. 219, 272 Roscellinus 2 Pius XII, Pope 13 Rosenzweig, Franz 40, 153, 169 Plantinga, Alvin 11, 87, 89, 90, 106, 107, Ross, James 164 123, 124, 173, 174, 177, 187, 198, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 75, 251, 267–8 207, 211, 212–13, 215, 217, 228–30, Royce, Josiah 3, 127, 143–4, 224 233, 295, 325 Russell, Bertrand (Third Earl Russell) Plato 5, 12, 14, 15, 21, 28, 29, 46, 49, 8, 9, 31, 44, 57, 60–1, 74, 92, 147, 51, 52, 55, 57, 66–7, 68–9, 77, 78, 80, 173, 174, 215, 216, 217, 229, 247, 92, 94, 98, 104, 114, 117, 128, 129, 253, 255, 268–70, 293, 312, 319, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145, 148, 151, 320, 321 343 Index of names

Ryle, Gilbert 8, 9–10, 23, 31, 35, 37, 44, Strauss, David F. 99, 126, 127, 143, 179, 65, 69–70, 116, 122, 174, 206, 194 219–20, 240, 255, 270–2, 284, 293 Strauss, Richard 267 Stravinsky, Igor 267 Saadiah Gaon, al-Fayyumi 152 Strawson, Peter Frederick 10, 174, 220, Sabatier, Auguste 102 270, 285, 288, 293–4, 314, 323 Saint-Simon, Claude Henri 232 Stump, Eleonore 78, 212 Saladin 176 Swinburne, Richard 78, 79, 85, 87, 90, Sanjana, (Dastuv) Rustam 328 91, 122–3, 145, 186, 207, 210, 211, S´an˙ ka¯ra¯ 55, 56, 133, 134–5, 176, 192, 212, 214, 221, 228, 260–1, 265, 282, 202, 205, 225, 236, 238, 248, 249, 295–6, 303–5 273–4, 286, 289, 308, 316 Sankey, H. 147 Taggart, J. E. 309 Sartre, Jean-Paul 4, 92, 95–6, 158, 274–5 Tarski, Alfred 313–14, 317 Saussure, Ferdinand de 63, 136, 287 Taylor, Richard 104 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 37 von 3, 38, 101, 125, 126, 143, 144, Tennant, Frederick R. 90–1, 221, 282, 205, 233, 237, 268, 276–7 296, 303, 304, 305 Schiller, Johann 81, 267, 276 Teresa of Avila 192 Schlegel, Friedrich von 267, 276 Tertullian 102, 258 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Thales of Miletus 137, 279 Ernst 22, 28–9, 50, 87, 99, 100, 101, Thielicke, Helmut 74 114, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132, 157, Tilley, Terrence W. 84, 88–9, 226, 306 159, 228, 237, 257–8, 261, 262, 268, Tillich, Paul 3, 12, 18, 27, 29, 92, 96, 276, 277–8, 307, 312 116, 154, 164–5, 166, 205, 209, 219, Schlick, Moritz 174, 317 261, 262, 276, 296, 298, 299, 305, Schopenhauer, Arthur 199, 278–9 306–8, 311 Searle, John 26, 60, 136, 226, 290 Tindal, Matthew 62, 251 Segal, Robert A. 10, 12 Todorov, T. 298 Sellars, Wilfrid 240, 268 Toland, John 62, 251 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus 293 Tolstoy, Leo 321 Sextus Empiricus 276 Torrance, Alan J. 7, 164 Shelley, R. B. 19 Toulmin, Stephen 10, 321 Siddha¯rtha Gautama (the Buddha) 40, 41, 42 Tylor, Edward B. 10, 12, 111, 257 Sidgwick, Henry 83 Skinner, B. F. 35, 91, 284 Urmson, J. O. 10 Smart, J. J. C. 183 Smart, Ninian 134 Vallabha¯ca¯rya 135 Socrates 2, 7, 18, 46, 47, 66–7, 80, 137, van den Brink, Gijsbert 85, 122, 206, 207–8 191, 230, 237, 287 van Gogh, Vincent 129 Soskice, Janet Martin 184 Vanderveken, Daniel 26 Southern, R. W. 11 Venn, John 173, 297 Spencer, Herbert 19, 37, 59, 82, 91, 111, Vico, Giambattista 251 127, 232–3, 281, 291, 302 Voltaire (Franc¸ois-Marie Arouet) 19, 62, Spener, Philipp Jakob 227–8 74–5, 251 Spinoza, Baruch 18, 66, 76, 85, 119, 137, von Helmholtz, Hermann 48 153, 169, 189, 209, 222, 223–4, 231, 232, 250, 251, 291–2, 313 Wagner, Richard 200, 267, 279 Stalin, Josef 180 Waismann, Friedrich 47, 60, 317 Stevenson, Charles 83 Ward, Keith 212, 243 A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 344

Warnock, G. J. 10, 30 240, 255, 256–7, 268, 269, 270, 276, Watson, J. B. 34–5, 91, 284 284, 287–8, 289–90, 293, 308, 310, Weber, Carl 267 312, 320–24 Weil, Simone 85, 88, 318 Wolff, Christian 75, 153, 183, 189, 218, Wesley, Charles 228 226 Wesley, John 228 Wolfson, H. A. 260 West, Cornel 241 Wolterstorff, Nicholas 26, 27, 35, 76, Wheelwright, Philip 184 106–7, 166–7, 170, 171, 172, 226, Whitehead, A. N. 9, 37, 103, 124, 214, 228, 229, 230, 254, 261, 291, 295, 222, 245, 269, 270, 281, 318–19 324–6 Wiesel, Elie 88 Wood, O. P. 70, 219, 272 William of Champeaux 2 Wordsworth, William 267 William of Ockham 45, 49, 70, 72, 148, Wright, G. H. von 321, 322 202, 218, 278, 319–20 Winter, Bruce 288 Xenophon 287 Wisdom, John 97, 98, 162 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann 8–9, Zeno of Citium 292–3 22, 23, 24, 26, 31, 35, 37, 46–7, 48, Zeno of Elea 9–10, 66, 223, 224, 271 49, 57, 60, 70, 78, 102, 104, 131, Zinzendorf, (Count) Nicholas Ludwig 147–8, 161, 162–3, 165, 166–7, 173, von 228 174, 177, 188, 197, 218–19, 226, 229, Zizoulas, John 164