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Preface Part I Intuitions 1 Ethical Intuitionism Notes Preface 1. For example, the special issue of Philosophical Explorations that is devoted to the discussion of the meaning of neurological findings for moral philoso- phy is set up within the dichotomy ‘sentimentalism’ versus ‘rationalism’ (cf. Gerrans and Kennett 2006). Part I Intuitions 1. This they have in common with the earlier sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Price. W.D. Hudson includes them in his definition of intuitionism: ‘Ethical intuitionism is here taken to be the view that nor- mal human beings have an immediate awareness of moral values,’ Hudson (1967, 1). I do not include the sentimentalists in my account since they do not fit into the core theory; that is, they are generally not taken to be nonreductive moral realists but subjectivists instead (with the exception of Shaftesbury, cf. Gill 2006). 2. There may be philosophers who are not characterized as intuitionists but who still fulfill the criteria. Strictly speaking, they could then be called intuitionists as well. The idea that intuitionism is more widely accepted than only by textbook-intuitionists is something Reid would be eager to acknowledge. He emphasizes throughout his work that he is saying nothing controversial but is defending a theory that is supposed to capture com- monsense and that has been defended by many philosophers, in particular Aristotle. 1 Ethical intuitionism 1. David Brink (1989, 102) and Michael Huemer (2005) have a similar char- acterization of intuitionism. Brink refers mainly to the same authors as I do. 2. Whether this is a correct interpretation is a matter of debate among Hume scholars, but I will adopt this interpretation since this is how Hume is com- monly understood in the recent meta-ethical literature. 3. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the different importance intuitionists assign to these propositions. 4. Cf. also Broadie (1998). For a criticism of Reid’s view on this point, see Chapter 5. 5. At least as they present themselves in recent analytical metaethics, such as Korsgaard and Rawls. 183 184 Notes 6. I will mainly use the contemporary terminology of ‘basic belief’, but when I quote Reid the reader should realize that this is what he means by ‘first principle’; that is, for Reid a particular observation can also function as a ‘first principle’, namely, as a foundation for other beliefs. 7. Sidgwick takes these principles to be moral axioms. 8. This example can be found in different versions in the literature, for exam- ple, in AP 232, McNaughton (1988), and Little (1995). 9. In the case of animals, Reid calls this opinion and reserves the term judg- mentt for rational beings only. 10. It may not be a coincidence that in that quote Reid takes the Golden Rule as an example, as this can be seen as more or less (extensionally) equivalent to the categorical imperative. 11. An example of an externalist who does speak in terms of justification is Alvin Goldman: ‘I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something “possessed” by the believer which can be called a “jus- tification.” I do assume that a justified belief gets its status of being justi- fied from some processes or properties that make it justified’ (Goldman 1992, 106). 12. This still allows for the possibility that theorems that we can intuit can also be verified, that is, in the case of improperly basic beliefs. But in the end such a verification will rely on basic beliefs concerning axioms (cf. the point about overdetermination before). 13. Moore says something similar, cf. PE 145. 14. In the case of moral beliefs this last criterion might invite more disagree- ment than consensus. I will discuss this point further in Chapter 3. 15. I will discuss this notion in Chapter 2. 16. However, recently, for example, Cuneo (2007) and Shafer-Landau (2003) have defended moral realism in book-length studies. 17. Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988b), especially the diagram on p. 15. I will argue fur- ther on in this section why I believe that an antirealist version of cognitiv- ism is problematic. 18. There has been a huge debate about whether Moore’s open question argu- ment indeed proves what it is supposed to, or whether it proves too much, for example, that water and H2O cannot be the same since we can always ask whether this is really true. I will not go into this debate here; instead, I try to capture the spirit of the open-question argument, which is that moral properties cannot be reduced to nonmoral properties as morality is an irre- ducible domain of reality (cf. Huemer 2005, 94, 95). 19. Dancy argues that ‘resultance’ and supervenience are strictly speaking not the same. Supervenience is more suited for a generalist account, whereas resultance is more suited for a particularist account. Cf. for example Dancy (1993) 73–8. I will come back to the issue of generalism and particularism in Chapter 4. 20. However, compare with what I said before and what I will say in Chapter 2, when I discuss that both Ross and Reid believe that we have to believe that what we do is right. But this does not mean that our beliefs can change the facts; it just means that we have to act from a good motive and with the right intentions. Notes 185 21. In his discussion of different ways to understand naturalist epistemology Jaegwon Kim defends that Moore is a (nonreductive) ethical naturalist, cf. Kim (1993, 233, 234). See also Kim’s quote of Moore on p. 233. 22. According to Reid, this same figurative way of assigning properties to objects that actually are properties of the mind of the object’s creator occurs with regards to works of art, science, and God’s creation and so on, cf. IP 773–5. 23. However, elsewhere Reid distinguishes between the inherent value of an action in abstraction of the intentions of an agent and the value of an action given the agent’s intentions (APP 394, 395; cf. my Chapter 2). 2 Different forms of intuitionism 1. By active principles of man, Reid means instincts, desires, and rationality; cf. Essay III of the AP. 2. Rawls (1971, 45) claims that his attempt to provide for a serial ordering of moral principles is a novelty, but Reid already did so 200 years before Rawls, and Sidgwick can be understood to attempt something similar, as will become clear below. 3. Cf. AP 431: ‘The simple rule, of not doing to his neighbour what he [a man] would think wrong to be done to himself, would lead him to the knowledge of every branch of justice.’ 4. Sidgwick calls these ‘Principles’ with a capital P, while principles with a small p refer to principles in the sense of ‘first principles’. 5. Hedonism here means the prevention of pain and the maximization of happiness. 6. Actually, Sidgwick claims that universal hedonism and egoistic hedon- ism are equally self-evident but lead to contrary results; this is what he calls the ‘paradox of practical reason’, an issue I will not discuss any further. 7. Concer ning the end of happiness understood in an egoistic way, Sidgwick believes that the most reliable method is ‘empirical hedonism’. 8. J.B. Schneewind (1977, 291) emphasizes that Sidgwick reformulates these axioms several times throughout ME; these are the shortest versions, but probably not the most complete. 9. Cf. the discussion of nonreductionism in Chapter 1. 10. Hence Rawls misrepresents Sidgwick completely when he says that ‘[c]lassical utilitarianism tries, of course, to avoid the appeal to intuition altogether’ (Rawls 1971, 40, 41), where he refers to Sidgwick explicitly. This might be due to Rawls’s own disputable definition of intuition as particular basic moral belief, but this is a definition which is (at least con- cerning the intuitionists) historically incorrect and causes a misrepresen- tation of the intuitionists’ views. I will come back to this at the end of this chapter. 11. The theory of the ‘organic whole’ can in Moore’s words be summarized as this: ‘The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts’ (PE 28). 186 Notes 12. Prima facie is meant as ‘as far as it goes’. I will explain this idea in more detail in Section 3. 13. This is a different formulation of the principle of justice than the one I quoted in Section 2. Note that the other formulation is in positive terms, but still Sidgwick would find that principle insufficient. 14. Note that in contemporary literature the notion ‘pro tanto reason’ (meaning ‘as far as it goes’, see Dancy 1993, 180) is sometimes used instead of prima facie duty, to avoid the misleading expression ‘prima facie’, which might sug- gest that it is immediately obvious what our duty is; indeed Ross was not happy with that expression (RG 20). 15. In this context, Ross only refers to Kant, but I think his point is valid against all kinds of monist theories, cf. McNaughton (1988) 198. Cf. also De Haan (2000), who argues that monist theories cannot acknowledge the possibility of moral dilemmas; according to him a Rossian-style pluralist intuitionism can give the most plausible account of what a moral dilemma is and why we experience it as such. 16. I try to avoid the term deontologyy, as it might be understood as referring to unconditional duties (as Sidgwick presents it). As I will argue in this section, Reid and Ross are well aware of the importance of considering consequences of actions, but not in the sense of maximizing outcomes.
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