Notes

Preface

1. For example, the special issue of Philosophical Explorations that is devoted to the discussion of the meaning of neurological findings for moral philoso- phy is set up within the dichotomy ‘sentimentalism’ versus ‘rationalism’ (cf. Gerrans and Kennett 2006).

Part I

1. This they have in common with the earlier sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Price. W.D. Hudson includes them in his definition of intuitionism: ‘Ethical intuitionism is here taken to be the view that nor- mal human beings have an immediate awareness of moral values,’ Hudson (1967, 1). I do not include the sentimentalists in my account since they do not fit into the core theory; that is, they are generally not taken to be nonreductive moral realists but subjectivists instead (with the exception of Shaftesbury, cf. Gill 2006). 2. There may be philosophers who are not characterized as intuitionists but who still fulfill the criteria. Strictly speaking, they could then be called intuitionists as well. The idea that intuitionism is more widely accepted than only by textbook-intuitionists is something Reid would be eager to acknowledge. He emphasizes throughout his work that he is saying nothing controversial but is defending a theory that is supposed to capture com- monsense and that has been defended by many philosophers, in particular .

1 Ethical intuitionism

1. David Brink (1989, 102) and (2005) have a similar char- acterization of intuitionism. Brink refers mainly to the same authors as I do. 2. Whether this is a correct interpretation is a matter of debate among Hume scholars, but I will adopt this interpretation since this is how Hume is com- monly understood in the recent meta-ethical literature. 3. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the different importance intuitionists assign to these propositions. 4. Cf. also Broadie (1998). For a criticism of Reid’s view on this point, see Chapter 5. 5. At least as they present themselves in recent analytical metaethics, such as Korsgaard and Rawls.

183 184 Notes

6. I will mainly use the contemporary terminology of ‘basic belief’, but when I quote Reid the reader should realize that this is what he means by ‘first ’; that is, for Reid a particular observation can also function as a ‘first principle’, namely, as a foundation for other beliefs. 7. Sidgwick takes these to be moral axioms. 8. This example can be found in different versions in the literature, for exam- ple, in AP 232, McNaughton (1988), and Little (1995). 9. In the case of animals, Reid calls this opinion and reserves the term judg- mentt for rational beings only. 10. It may not be a coincidence that in that quote Reid takes the Golden Rule as an example, as this can be seen as more or less (extensionally) equivalent to the . 11. An example of an externalist who does speak in terms of justification is Alvin Goldman: ‘I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something “possessed” by the believer which can be called a “jus- tification.” I do assume that a justified belief gets its status of being justi- fied from some processes or properties that make it justified’ (Goldman 1992, 106). 12. This still allows for the possibility that theorems that we can intuit can also be verified, that is, in the case of improperly basic beliefs. But in the end such a verification will rely on basic beliefs concerning axioms (cf. the point about overdetermination before). 13. Moore says something similar, cf. PE 145. 14. In the case of moral beliefs this last criterion might invite more disagree- ment than consensus. I will discuss this point further in Chapter 3. 15. I will discuss this notion in Chapter 2. 16. However, recently, for example, Cuneo (2007) and Shafer-Landau (2003) have defended in book-length studies. 17. Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988b), especially the diagram on p. 15. I will argue fur- ther on in this section why I believe that an antirealist version of cognitiv- ism is problematic. 18. There has been a huge debate about whether Moore’s open question argu- ment indeed proves what it is supposed to, or whether it proves too much,

for example, that water and H2O cannot be the same since we can always ask whether this is really true. I will not go into this debate here; instead, I try to capture the spirit of the open-question argument, which is that moral properties cannot be reduced to nonmoral properties as is an irre- ducible domain of reality (cf. Huemer 2005, 94, 95). 19. Dancy argues that ‘resultance’ and supervenience are strictly speaking not the same. Supervenience is more suited for a generalist account, whereas resultance is more suited for a particularist account. Cf. for example Dancy (1993) 73–8. I will come back to the issue of generalism and particularism in Chapter 4. 20. However, compare with what I said before and what I will say in Chapter 2, when I discuss that both Ross and Reid believe that we have to believe that what we do is right. But this does not mean that our beliefs can change the facts; it just means that we have to act from a motive and with the right intentions. Notes 185

21. In his discussion of different ways to understand naturalist Jaegwon Kim defends that Moore is a (nonreductive) ethical naturalist, cf. Kim (1993, 233, 234). See also Kim’s quote of Moore on p. 233. 22. According to Reid, this same figurative way of assigning properties to objects that actually are properties of the of the object’s creator occurs with regards to works of art, science, and God’s creation and so on, cf. IP 773–5. 23. However, elsewhere Reid distinguishes between the inherent of an action in abstraction of the intentions of an agent and the value of an action given the agent’s intentions (APP 394, 395; cf. my Chapter 2).

2 Different forms of intuitionism

1. By active principles of man, Reid means instincts, desires, and rationality; cf. Essay III of the AP. 2. Rawls (1971, 45) claims that his attempt to provide for a serial ordering of moral principles is a novelty, but Reid already did so 200 years before Rawls, and Sidgwick can be understood to attempt something similar, as will become clear below. 3. Cf. AP 431: ‘The simple rule, of not doing to his neighbour what he [a man] would think wrong to be done to himself, would lead him to the knowledge of every branch of .’ 4. Sidgwick calls these ‘Principles’ with a capital P, while principles with a small p refer to principles in the sense of ‘first principles’. 5. Hedonism here means the prevention of pain and the maximization of . 6. Actually, Sidgwick claims that universal hedonism and egoistic hedon- ism are equally self-evident but lead to contrary results; this is what he calls the ‘paradox of practical reason’, an issue I will not discuss any further. 7. Concer ning the end of happiness understood in an egoistic way, Sidgwick believes that the most reliable method is ‘empirical hedonism’. 8. J.B. Schneewind (1977, 291) emphasizes that Sidgwick reformulates these axioms several times throughout ME; these are the shortest versions, but probably not the most complete. 9. Cf. the discussion of nonreductionism in Chapter 1. 10. Hence Rawls misrepresents Sidgwick completely when he says that ‘[c]lassical tries, of course, to avoid the appeal to altogether’ (Rawls 1971, 40, 41), where he refers to Sidgwick explicitly. This might be due to Rawls’s own disputable definition of intuition as particular basic moral belief, but this is a definition which is (at least con- cerning the intuitionists) historically incorrect and causes a misrepresen- tation of the intuitionists’ views. I will come back to this at the end of this chapter. 11. The theory of the ‘organic whole’ can in Moore’s words be summarized as this: ‘The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts’ (PE 28). 186 Notes

12. Prima facie is meant as ‘as far as it goes’. I will explain this idea in more detail in Section 3. 13. This is a different formulation of the principle of justice than the one I quoted in Section 2. Note that the other formulation is in positive terms, but still Sidgwick would find that principle insufficient. 14. Note that in contemporary literature the notion ‘pro tanto reason’ (meaning ‘as far as it goes’, see Dancy 1993, 180) is sometimes used instead of prima facie duty, to avoid the misleading expression ‘prima facie’, which might sug- gest that it is immediately obvious what our duty is; indeed Ross was not happy with that expression (RG 20). 15. In this context, Ross only refers to Kant, but I think his point is valid against all kinds of monist theories, cf. McNaughton (1988) 198. Cf. also De Haan (2000), who argues that monist theories cannot acknowledge the possibility of moral dilemmas; according to him a Rossian-style pluralist intuitionism can give the most plausible account of what a moral dilemma is and why we experience it as such. 16. I try to avoid the term deontologyy, as it might be understood as referring to unconditional duties (as Sidgwick presents it). As I will argue in this section, Reid and Ross are well aware of the importance of considering consequences of actions, but not in the sense of maximizing outcomes. 17. Cf. Chapter 1, Section 5. 18. This is how Ross calls Moore’s consequentialist position. 19. Cf. FE 71, 72. Ross only talks about two individuals here, but the way I con- strued the example might be even more revealing. 20. Which was probably not justified, cf. Donagan (1977). 21. Zimmerman (1999) argues that it is wrong to say that pleasure as such has intrinsic value, as there can also be inappropriate or undeserved pleasure, that is, the pleasure in something morally bad (cf. especially p. 659). 22. Cf. Reid, who also says that we cannot define the notion of moral obliga- tion: ‘Moral obligation is a relation of its own kind, which every man under- stands, but it is perhaps too simple to admit of logical definition’ (AP 229). 23. Several philosophers say this in their criticism of Sidgwick, for example, Broad (1951), cf. especially p. 221, and Raphael (1974). 24. Some have taken Moore to (implicitly) defend conservatism: We should rely on what is generally taken to be morally right instead of judging for ourselves; cf. Regan (1986). Regan himself does not agree with this inter- pretation of Moore. According to Regan, Moore was mainly defending a progressive theory, which should be evident from the fact that he was so influential on the far-from-conservative Bloomsbury’s group. This was because of Moore’s emphasis on aestheticism. Maybe we can say that Moore underestimated the possible implications of his skepticism and connected defense of traditional rules. 25. Reid (1997, 19). 26. On this point, Alston (1993) also offers an extensive argument; cf. my dis- cussion in Chapter 1, Section 4. 27. For example Reid’s introduction to the Inquiry into the Human Mindd (1997) [1764] is a humorous polemic against the skeptical philosopher in defense of the convictions of the common person. Notes 187

28. This is one of Reid’s first principles of morals, and although it refers mainly to our knowledge about our own duties, we can also extend it to our moral judgments in general.

3 Typical objections against intuitionism

1. For more about this point, see Chapter 4. 2. Cf. DePaul (1993) who writes about the importance of formative experi- ences. 3. Cf. Chapter 1, in which I discuss Reid’s view that needs to be developed. 4. Note that recently, the biologist Marc Hauser (2006) has also developed an account of a ‘Moral Sense’ that is close to Reid’s. 5. For a general criticism of the causal requirement for knowledge such as most famously formulated by Benacerraf (1973), cf. Plantinga (1993b), 113–21.

4 Particular intuitions and emotions

1. In my discussion of Dancy’s ideas I will not always insert exact references since I extract Dancy’s position from his many publications on this matter and from conversation with him. 2. An analogous account holds for wrong-makers: If an action is overall wrong, it is made wrong by the ‘wrong-making base’, which is the resul- tance base that only includes those properties that count directly against the action. 3. Cf. my schemas 1 and 2 further on that are meant to illustrate the same point. 4. In a particularist sense: They are necessary in this case but need not be so in another case. The same holds for all other morally relevant features; they can be necessary and/or sufficient in this specific case without needing to be so everywhere or anywhere else. 5. For a list of what Ross takes to be prima facie duties, see Chapter 2. 6. In contemporary literature the notion ‘pro tanto reasons’ is sometimes used instead of prima facie duties, cf. Chapter 2, n. 14. 7. Dancy says something analogous about value (Dancy 2000b, 139). 8. Dancy points to this phenomenon as well, cf. Dancy (2000b). 9. It is not clear whether with basic moral facts Dancy refers to contributing features or to overall normative reasons. In what follows I will assume that he means contributing features. 10. In this view, it is still reasonable to speak of a moral sense instead of a normative sense, since it is implausible that we can understand other normative reasons, such as epistemic norms or logical norms, through sympathy. 11. At the Bled Conference on Particularism (June 13–18, 2005) during the discus- sion of a paper which I have presented there, and on which this section is based. 188 Notes

12. There are also emotional cognitivists who claim that emotions can be solely defined as cognitive states. This is a controversial form of emotional cogni- tivism and not the one that I defend.

5 Affectual intuitionism

1. Ewing says in two passages that we need affective states in order to have moral knowledge (cf. Ewing 1929; 194, 215), but he does not defend this thesis in much detail. 2. Reid wonders whether this is an animal or rational principle. He concludes that it is a lower principle not because animals have it (although he admits that they might) but because it is also developed in people who are not vir- tuous or reasonable (AP 153). 3. Indeed, de Waal (1996) gives empirical evidence for the existence of social emotions in primates and other animals. 4. This is the meaning of the term feeling in the strict, technical sense. 5. Note that Reid sometimes also calls these ‘feelings’ (e.g., AP 469). 6. In the broad sense, comprising feelings in the technical sense and also affections, esteem, and so on. 7. However, Susan James (1997) argues that, for example, many 17th-century’s philosophers thought that passions and emotions were of vital importance to human existence. 8. This is also pointed out by Ben Ze’ev (2000b, 39). 9. Cf. Damasio (1994) and his famous ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis for a similar account. 10. I here use value judgment as a generic term, including evaluative judgments about good and bad, normative judgments about right and wrong, and judgments about and vices. 11. According to Linda Zagzebski (2003) emotions are unitary states that have a cognitive and an affective aspect. Similarly, Robert C. Roberts (2003) analyzes emotions as ‘concern-based construals’. ‘Concern’ refers to the affective aspect of emotions, construal to the belief-like or cognition-like aspect of emotions, that is, the way we conceive of something. 12. Here is a clear link to . Indeed, just as traditional intuition- ists work in the Aristotelian tradition, so do many emotional cognitivists. However, traditional intuitionism and affectual intuitionism go beyond Aristotelian by also emphasizing the importance of deonto- logical and consequentialist considerations in ethics, next to virtue ethical considerations. 13. DePaul (1993) writes about the importance of formative experiences, but he does not emphasize the role affective states play in these kinds of experiences. 14. Indeed, Slovic and his colleagues conducted further studies which show that compassion starts to diminish if the number of victims is 2. 15. Trolley problems have become very popular in the philosophical and psy- chological literature on moral judgments. They were initially conceived of Notes 189

by (1967) and further developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976, 1985). 16. There are many other cases that cover the terrain between these two pos- sibilities a. and b. These alternative cases might help to give us a better understanding of what the crucial differences between our intuitions are (cf. Hauser 2006, 110–20; Kamm 2007). 17. Haidt (2003) acknowledges this but says that this is the exception rather than the rule – an empirical claim that should be further investigated. 18. ‘[T]hat each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as mush as his own’ (Sidgwick 1901, 380). This principle is roughly similar to the principle of equality that I mentioned before. 19. Timmons (2007) raises the same point against Greene, explicitly referring to Ross and Prichard. 20. For thorough discussions and overviews of the variety of possible positions in these debates, see among others Parfit (1997) and Dancy (2000a). 21. The problem has initially been stated by McNaughton (1988, 23). 22. Cf. Scherer (1984, 294). Note that Scherer uses the notion of component, whereas other emotional cognitivists prefer the notion of aspect, since com- ponent might wrongly suggest that emotions are contingent amalgams of other states. I will come back to this issue further on. 23. Nevertheless, Zagzebski acknowledges the possibility that people have moti- vational responses to thin moral concepts without necessarily being emo- tional about them, cf. Zagzebski (2003, 122). 24. Cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000a), who writes about the fact that emotions are typically focused on what is close by. 25. This is an option McDowell does not acknowledge; cf. Zagzebski (2003, 106, 107). 26. Cf. Smith (1994, 120), who quotes Stocker about this. 27. de Sousa (1987, 165) offers several arguments why emotions cannot be reduced to either belief or desire, nor to a simple combination of both. 28. Cf. Frijda (1986, 110–14), for empirical evidence concerning the variabil- ity of the motivational force of emotions. Frijda (1986, 113–14) argues that so far there is no convincing empirical evidence that there is a consistent pattern between arousal and performance (or, in the terminology of this chapter, feeling intensity and motivation), despite the popularity of the so- called inverted U-curve or Yerkes–Dodson law, which claims that there is an optimal point up to which increasing arousal leads to increased perform- ance and after which it is supposed to drop. 29. Features 2 and 3 are meant to capture Zagzebski’s idea of ‘thinning’. 30. Cf. Zagzebski (2003, 123): ‘In short, moral motivation is confusing because we cannot account for the connection between our motivating emotions and our judgments by one single mechanism. Nonetheless, our psychology is economical. There is an important class of cases in which the judgment itself is motivating because these judgments are expressions of emotion. Those moral judgments that are not expres- sions of emotion are the descendants to those that are, and while they require the development of a backup mechanism of moral motivation, 190 Notes

they are not wholly devoid of the motivating force of those judgments from which they derive.’ Roberts (2003) also gives various lists of paradigmatic features of emotions instead of necessary and sufficient conditions. 31. I here choose the formulation of weak internalism: ‘can be’ instead of ‘are’ in order to allow for akrasia.

Epilogue: new perspectives in moral philosophy

1. Affectual intuitionism is, for example, also compatible with Ross’s general- ist ontology. Works Cited

Alston, William P. (1989a), Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. Alston, William P. (1989b), ‘Level Confusions in Epistemology’, in Alston (1989a), 153–71. Alston William P. (1989c), ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’, in Alston (1989a), 185–226. Alston, William P. (1989d), ‘Concepts of Epistemic Justification’, in Alston (1989a), 81–114. Alston, William P. (1993), The Reliability of Sense Perception, Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. Audi, Robert (1997), Moral Knowledge and Ethical Characterr, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Audi, Robert (2003), The Good in the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ayer, A.J. (1952) [1936], Language, Truth and Logicc, New York: Dover Publications Inc. Benacerraf, Paul (1973), ‘Mathematical Truth’, Journal of Philosophyy, 8, 667–8. Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron (2000a), The Subtlety of Emotions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron (2000b), ‘Reid on the Emotions’, Reid Studies, 3, 29–41. Blackburn, Simon (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Blackburn, Simon (1998), Ruling Passions, Oxford University Press. Blum, Lawrence A. (1994), Moral Perception and Particularityy, New York: Cambridge University Press. Bonjour, Laurence (1992), ‘Externalism/Internalism’, in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemologyy, Oxford: Blackwell, 132–6. Bowden, Peta (1997), Caring: Gender-Sensitive Ethics, London: Routledge. Boyd, Richard (1988), ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’, in Sayre-McCord (1988a), 181–228. Brandom, Robert (1994), Making It Explicitt, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brandt, Richard (1959), Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Brink, David (1989), Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Broad, C.D. (1951) [1930], Five Types of Ethical Theoryy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Broad, C.D. (1971), ‘Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics’, in David R. Cheney (ed.), Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophyy, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Broadie, Alexander (2010), ‘Reid Making Sense of Moral Sense’, in Roeser (2010), 91–102. Butler, Joseph (1896) [1736], ‘Dissertation II: Of the Nature of Virtue’, in W.E. Gladstone (ed.), The Works of Joseph Butler. Volume I, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

191 192 Works Cited

Chisholm, Roderick (1989), Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edn, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Crisp, Roger (2000), ‘Particularizing Particularism’, in Hooker, Little 2000, 23–47. Cuneo, Terence (2003), ‘Reidian Moral Perception’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, 229–58. Cuneo, Terence (2007), The Normative Web, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Damasio, Antonio (1994), Descartes’ Error, New York: Putnam. Dancy, Jonathan (1981), ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, XC, 367–85. Dancy, Jonathan (1983), ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties’, Mind, XCII, 530–47. Dancy, Jonathan (1993), Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. Dancy, Jonathan (1994), ‘Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societyy, 95, 1–18. Dancy, Jonathan (2000a), Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dancy, Jonathan (2000b), ‘The Particularist’s Progress’, in Hooker and Little (2000), 130–56. Dancy, Jonathan (2000c), ‘Recognition and Reaction’, in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin, 39–52. Dancy, Jonathan (2004a), Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dancy, Jonathan (2004 b), ‘On the Importance of Making Things Right’, Ratio, 17, 229–37. DePaul, Michael (1993), Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry, London: Routledge. Donagan, Alan (1977), ‘Sidgwick and Whewellian Intuitionism: Some Enigmas’, Canadian Journal of Philosophyy, 7, 447– 65. Ewing, A.C. (1929), The Morality of Punishmentt, London: Kegan Paul. Ewing, A.C. (1947), The Definition of Good, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Fine, Cordelia (2006), ‘Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? Reason in Moral Judgment,’ Philosophical Explorations, Special Issue: Empirical Research and the Nature of Moral Judgment, 9, 83–98. Foot, Philippa (1967), ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’, Oxford Review, 5, 5–15. Frijda, Nico (1987), The Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gauthier, David (1988), Morals by Agreementt, Oxford: Clarendon. Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette (2006), ‘Introduction: Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?,’ Philosophical Explorations, Special Issue: Empirical Research and the Nature of Moral Judgment, 9, no. 1, 3–12. Gettier, Edmund (1963), ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis, 23, 21–3. Gibbard, Allan (1990), Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gill, Michael B. (2006), ‘Lord Shaftesbury [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury]’, in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shaftesbury/ Gilovich, Thomas, Dale W. Griffin, & Daniel Kahnemann. (eds.) (2002), Intuitive Judgment: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Works Cited 193

Goldie, Peter (2000), The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldman, Alvin (1992), ‘What Is Justified Belief?,’ in Alvin Goldman, Liaisons. Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Greene, Joshua D. (2003), ‘From Neural “Is” to Moral “Ought”: What Are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific ?’, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 847–50. Greene, Joshua D. (2007), ‘The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul’, in W. Sinnott- Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Developmentt, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2–79. Greene, Joshua D. and Jonathan Haidt (2002), ‘How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?,’ in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 517–23. Greenspan, Patricia (1995), Practical Guilt. Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haidt, Jonathan (2001), ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail. A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psychological Review, 108, 814–34. Haidt, Jonathan (2003), ‘The Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom, 2003’, Psychological Review, 110, 197–8. Hare, R.M. (1952), The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Harman, Gilbert (1988), ‘Ethics and Observation’, in Sayre-McCord (1988a), 119–24. Hauser, Marc D. (2006), Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrongg, New York: Harper Perennial. Herman, Barbara (1993), The Practice of Moral Judgmentt, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hooker, Brad (2000), ‘: Wrong and Bad’, in Hooker and Little (2000), 1–22. Hooker, Brad and Margaret Little (eds.) (2000), Moral Particularism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Howard-Snyder, F. (2007), ‘Doing vs. Allowing Harm’, in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/doing-allowing/ Hudson, W.D. (1967), Ethical Intuitionism, London: Macmillan. Hudson, W.D. (1980), A Century of Moral Philosophyy, Guildford, CT, and London: Lutterworth Press. Hume, David (1975) [1748, 1752], Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Huemer, Michael (2005), Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. James, Susan (1997), Passion and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kamm, Frances M. (2007), Intricate Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel (1984) [1785], Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Stuttgart: Reclam. Kim, Jaegwon (1993), ‘What Is “Naturalized Epistemology”?,’ in Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind. Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 216–36. Korsgaard, Christine (1996a), Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 194 Works Cited

Korsgaard, Christine (1996b), The Sources of Normativityy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Korsgaard, Christine (1999), ‘Self-constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant’, The Journal of Ethics, 3, 1–29. Lacewing, Michael (2005), ‘Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation’, Ratio, 18, 65–81. Ledwig, Marion (2010), ‘Reid and Modern Theories of Emotions’, in Roeser (2010), 106–26. Lehrer, Keith (1989), Thomas Reid, London, New York: Routledge. Little, Margaret Olivia (1995), ‘Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology’, Hypatia, 10, 117–37. Little, Margaret Olivia (2000), ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, in Hooker and Little (2000), 276–304. Luper-Foy, Steven (1997), ‘Knowledge and Belief’, in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemologyy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 234–7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1966), A Short , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1997), After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theoryy, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Mackie, J.L. (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrongg, Hammondsworth: Penguin. McDowell, John (1988), ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in Sayre-McCord (1988a), 166–80. McIntyre, A. (2004), ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’, in Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ double-effect/ McNaughton, David (1988), Moral Vision, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. McNaughton, David and Piers Rawling (2000), ‘Unprincipled Ethics,’ in Hooker and Little (2000), 256–75. Mikhail, John (2007), ‘Moral Cognition and Computational Theory: Comment on Greene’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Developmentt, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 81–91. Moore, G.E. (1988) [1903], , Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Moore, G.E. (1912), Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moser, Paul K. and Thomas L. Carson (eds.) (2001), : A Readerr, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nagel, Thomas (1970), The Possibility of , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Narveson, Jan (1988), The Libertarian Idea, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Nichols, Shaun (2004). Sentimental Rules. On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha (1992), Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha (2001), Upheavals of Thoughtt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parfit, Derek (1997), ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Societyy, suppl. vol. 71, 99–130. Works Cited 195

Pizarro, D.A. and P. Bloom (2003), ‘The Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001),’ Psychological Revieww, 110, 193–6. Plantinga, Alvin (1993a), Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press. Plantinga, Alvin (1993b), Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press. Pollock, John (1986), Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Prichard, H.A. (1912), ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’, Mind, 21, 21–37. Pritchard, Michael S. (1978), ‘Reason and Passion: Reid’s Reply to Hume’, The Monist, 61, 283–98. Pugmire, David (1998), Rediscovering Emotion, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Rachels, James (1999), ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism’, in James Rachels (ed.), The Elements of Moral Philosophyy, 3rd edn, New York: Random House. Raphael, D.D. (1974), ‘Sidgwick on Intuitionism’, The Monistt, 58, 405–19. Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Regan, Tom (1986), Bloomsbury’s Prophet. G.E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophyy, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Reid, Thomas (1967) [1748], ‘Essay on Quantity’, in Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works with Notes and Supplementary Dissertations (ed. Sir William Hamilton), Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 715–19. Reid, Thomas (1969a) [1785], Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reid, Thomas (1969b) [1788], Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Reid, Thomas (1997) [1764], Inquiry into the Human Mindd (ed. by Derek R. Brookes), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Roberts, Robert C. (2003), Emotions. An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychologyy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roeser, Sabine (2005), ‘Intuitionism, Moral Truth, and Tolerance’, The Journal of Value Inquiryy, 39, 75–87. Roeser, Sabine (2009), ‘The Relation between Cognition and Affect in Moral Judgments about Risk’, in Lotte Asveld and Sabine Roeser (eds.), The Ethics of Technological Risks, London: Earthscan, 182–201. Roeser, Sabine (ed.) (2010), Reid on Ethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ross, W.D. (1927), ‘The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics’, International Journal of Ethics, 37, 113–27. Ross, W.D. (1967) [1930], , Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ross, W.D. (1968) [1939], Foundations of Ethics. The Gifford Lectures, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ruddick, Sara (1984), Maternal Thinkingg, New York: Ballantine Books. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (ed.) (1988a), Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (1988b), ‘Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms’, in Sayre-McCord (1988a), 1–23. 196 Works Cited

Scherer, Klaus R. (1984), ‘On the Nature and Function of Emotion: A Component Process Approach’, in Klaus R. Scherer and Paul Ekman (eds.), Approaches to Emotion, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 293–317. Schneewind, J.B. (1977), Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophyy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003), Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sidgwick, Henry (1901) [1874], , London/New York: Macmillan. Singer, Peter (2005), Ethics and Intuitions, The Journal of Ethics, 9, 331–52. Sinnot-Armstrong, Walter (2006), ‘Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology’, in Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Slovic, Paul (2007), ‘Numbed by Numbers’, Foreign Policyy, March 2007. Smith, Jonathan (2010), ‘On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case against Moral Intuitionism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 13, 75–88. Smith, Michael (1991), ‘Realism’, in (ed.), Companion to Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 399–410. Smith, Michael (1994), The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. Solomon, Robert (1993), The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, Indianapolis: Hackett. Stevenson, Charles L. (1944), Ethics and Language, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Stevenson, Charles L. (1963), Facts and Values, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Stocker, Michael, and Elizabeth Hegemann (1996), Valuing Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stratton-Lake, Philip (2002), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sturgeon, Nicholas (1988), ‘Moral Explanations’, in Sayre-McCord (1988a), 229–55. Thomson, J.J. (1976), Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, The Monistt, 59, 204–17. Thomson, J.J. (1985), The Trolley Problem, Yale Law Journal, 94, 1395–415. Timmons, Mark (1998), Morality without Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tronto, Joan (1993), Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, London: Routledge. Tversky, A. and D Kahneman (1974), ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science, 185, 1124–131. Walker, Margaret Urban (1997), Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics, London: Routledge. Warnock, G.J. (1967), Contemporary Moral Philosophyy, London: Macmillan. Wellman, Carl (1963), ‘The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity’, The Journal of Philosophy, 55, 169–84. Wiggins, David (1987), Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. Williams, Bernard (1981), ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in , Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101–13. Works Cited 197

Wollheim, Richard (1999), On the Emotions. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. Wolterstorff, Nicholas (2001), Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemologyy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Woudenberg, René (2000), ‘ and Agent Causation. A Discussion of Thomas Reid’s Views’, in Ton van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontologyy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 143–53. Yaffe, Gideon (2005), Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid’s Theory of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L. (2003): ‘Emotion and Moral Judgment’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, 104–24. Zimmerman, Michael J. (1999), ‘Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIX, 653–66. Index

actual duties (duties proper), 59, on unverifiability of intuitions, 118–19 101–3 act-utilitarianism, 66 aesthetic enjoyment, 68, 125 basic beliefs, xiv, 13 intrinsic value, 52–3 coherentists’s rejection, 13 affections, 142 contextualists’s contention, affective states, 133, 134, 138–9 13–14 Little on need for, 135 intuitionists’s diverse notions, 39, Reid on, xv–xvi, 138, 139–43 43, 46–54 Reid on role and importance, justification, 21–4 143–5 self-evident, 14–17, 20–1, 97, 98 Reid’s types, 142 verification, 26–7, 76 affectual intuitionism, xiii, xv, beliefs 109–10, 138–9, 179, 180–1 basic, see basic beliefs empirical psychology and, 181 coherentists’ views, 13 and Humeanism compared, 171 contextualists’ views, 13–14, 94–6 intuitions as emotions, 149–58 desire-belief dichotomy, 169, motivation and, 167–78 170–4 neuroethical challenges, 158–67 diversity of, intuitionism and, notion, xii 82–6 particularism and, 181 nonbasic, 13, 14–16, 18–20, 23–4, agent intention, 66–7, 69 26, 127, 128 agent relativity, 65 perceptual, 5, 6, 13 akrasia, 172–3 rational, 5, 6, 13, 16, 156–7 Alston, William P., 24 relationship between general and epistemization, 22–3 particular beliefs, xiv, 10–11, 77, animal principles of action, 140, 147 116–18 benevolence, 140 scientific, 105 a priori beliefs, 23 self-justifying, 97–8 Aristotelianism benevolence on acquisition of moral Reid on, 140 knowledge, 12 Reid on role of, 143–4 on moral supervenience, 41 Sidgwick on, 50–1, 56, 164 Aristotle, 41, 101, 110, 113, 183n. 2 Bentham, Jeremy, 58 atomism, 120–2 Benthemian hedonism, see Audi, Robert, xiii, 4, 77 utilitarianism on derived beliefs, 18–19 Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron, 170 on moral supervenience, 40, 41 besires, 171 on prima facie duties, 59 weakness of will and, 171–3 axiomatic beliefs, 5, 6, 13, 16 Blackburn, Simon, 4 Ayer, R.J., 4 on quasi-realism, 31, 35 noncognitive account of morality, Bloom, P., 162 7 Blum, Lawrence A., 135, 151

199 200 Index

Bonjour, Laurence problems with nonrealist forms, on external vs. internal epistemic 30–6 justification, 22 subjectivist and emotivist account, bottom-up generalism, 77, 6–7 113–14 subjectivist and emotivist account, Dancy’s criticism, 118–24 criticism on, 8–9 pluralism and, 114–16 , 13 Bowden, Peta, 4 combat model, Korsgaard’s, 145–6 Boyd, Richard, 4 commonsense, 18–20, 72, 96 Brandom, Robert, 36 Reid’s views, 72, 73–6 Brandt, Richard, 36 Ross’s views, 72–3, 114 Brink, David, 4, 13 Sidgwick’s criticism, 56–7, 61, 70 on circularity of intuitionism, compatibilist thesis, 154–5 97–8 conduct definition of moral realism, 28, 29 moral perception and, 87–8 Broad, C.D., 66 conscience on plurality of methods, 114, affective and judgmental role, 146 115–16 development, 25 Broadie, Alexander , 70 on Reid’s moral sense, 146 –7 Moore’s views, 63–4 bureaucratic model, Little’s, 147 Sidgwick’s views, 61–2, 68 Butler, Joseph constitutional model, Korsgaard’s, notion of moral faculty, 12 147 constructivism, Rawls’s, 31–2 Carson, Thomas L., 30 contextualism, 13–14, 94–6 categorical imperative, 18–19, contributing features, Dancy’s, 184n. 10 117–18, 187n. 9 causal truths, 71 Crisp, Roger, 123 Chisholm, Roderick, 13 cultural relativism internalist-deontological account diverse moral beliefs and, 82, of justification, 24 83–4, 85 circularity of intuitionism particularism vs., 95 Brink’s criticism, 97–8 Cuneo, Terence Clarke, Samuel, 50 account of Reid’s moral cognitive emotions, see moral perception, 106 approbation and disapprobation cognitive moral emotions, 148, 149 Damasio, Antonio, xvii, 136, 156, Reid’s notion, 142–3 175 cognitive theories of emotions, 109, on emotions and moral beliefs, 133–5, 137 106 see also affectual intuitionism Dancy, Jonathan, xiii, xv, 4, 41, 77 , xiv, 1, 28, 43 on basic beliefs, 128 acquisition of moral knowledge constraints on particularism, and, 11–12 125–7 direct, 1 intuitionism criteria, 1–2 moral judgments and, 10–11 on particularlism, 116–24, moral realism and, 169, 178 180–1 in nonreductive moral realist rejection of , sense, 6, 7–8 127–8 Index 201 deontology notion of intuition, 129–31 account of justification, 23–4 on plurality of methods, 114, 116 nonconsequentialism and, 69–70 utilitarianism vs., 159, 163–7 fallibilism, 20–1, 44, 71 depression, 175–6 feelings, 142, 148 derived beliefs, 13, 18–20, 23–4, 127 gut feelings, 158–64 verification, 26 felt value judgments, 149, 150–1, 152 Descartes, René Fine, Cordelia on foundationalism, 20, 21 on gut feelings and rational desires, 131, 170 judgments, 162, 163 belief-desire dichotomy, 169, Foot, Philippa, 189n. 15 170–4 foundationalism, xiv, 1, 6, 12–13, 43 role in moral judgments, 133 Brink’s criticism, 97–8 De Sousa, Ronald, 157 central feature, 15–17 direct cognition, 1 coherentism, 13 dispositional emotions, 150–1, 167 contextualism, 13–14 diversity of moral beliefs Dancy’s rejection, 127–8 intuitionism and, 82–6 fallibilism/infallibilism, 20–1, 44 dogmatic intuitionism, 79–81 intuitionism as a form of, 14–15 Sidgwick on, 56–7 notion, 13 Donagan, Alan, 67 friendship, 68 Dretske, Fred, 36 intrinsic value, 52–3 duties Frijda, Nico, xvii, 170, 189n. 28 duty proper, 59, 118–19 prima facie, 54, 59–60, 114–15, generalism, xiv, 10–11, 77 118–24 bottom-up approach, 113–14 residual, 119 bottom-up approach, Dancy’s criticism, 118–24 egalitarian distribution top-down approach, 111–12, 136 utilitarianism and, 66 Gibbard, Allan egoistic hedonism, 50, 51, 185n. 6 of, 31, 34–5 , 7 Gilovich, Thomas, 100 criticism, 8–9 Golden Rule, Reid’s, 48, 49, 85 empirical beliefs, 23 Goldman, Alvin, 184n. 11 enabling conditions, Dancy’s, 117–18 Greene, Joshua D. Epicurean hedonism, see egoistic empirical research in , hedonism xvi, 158–62 Epicurus, 145 on superiority of utilitarian ethical intuitionism, see intuitionism considerations, 163–7 ethical truths, 71 Greenspan, Patricia, 110, 157, 174 evaluative account of justification, gut feelings, 158 23–4 moral judgments and, 158–64 , 38 see also neuroethics Haidt, Jonathan externalism, 21–4 on neuroethics, xvi, 158, 159, 162 motivational, 168 happiness/pleasure, 186n. 21 normative, 168 Sidgwick’s account, 49–50, 51–2, notion, 22 61–2 Ewing, A.C., 21, 34, 82, 128 Hare, R.M., 4 202 Index

Harman, Gilbert criticism of presupposing obscure criticism on intuitionism, 104–6 moral faculty, 100–6 Hauser, Marc D., 164 criticism of unreliability, on moral sense, 165 98–100 hedonism, 185n. 5 as emotions, 151–4 egoistic, 50, 51, 185n. 6 Ewing’s notion, 129–31 problems with, 62–4 as a form of foundationalism, universal, see utilitarianism: 14–15 Sidgwick’s account Greene and Singer’s rejection, Herman, Barbara, 4 163–4 holism of reasons, 120–3, 126–7 monism vs. pluralism, 55–61 Hooker, Brad, 124 notion and definition, 4–6 Howard-Snyder, F., 163 particularism and, 127–31 Hudson, W.D., 132, 183n. 1 Sidgwick’s notion, 50–1, 55–9, 61 Huemer, Michael, xiii, 4 skepticism vs. commonsense, Humeanism, 4, 5, 168 70–7 and affectual intuitionism types, xiv, 45–6, 78 compared, 171 utilitarianism and, 58–9, 68 alternative approaches to realism intuitive capacity, 18, 24 and relativism, 31, 33–5 intuitive induction, 113 belief-desire dichotomy, 169, 170, invariant reasons, 123 171 isolation method/case, 52–3 Hume, David, 39 on moral perception, 9 just acts, 48–9 subjectivist account of morality, justice 6–7 Sidgwick’s views, 50–1, 56, 58 subjectivist account of morality, justification, 14, 184n. 11 Sidgwick’s criticism, 8 circular justification, 97–8 emotions and, 157–8 utilitarianism, Moore’s, 62–4, evaluative vs. deontological, 23–4 65 external vs. internal, 21–4 criticism, 68 infallibilism, 20–1, 44 Kahneman, Daniel, 100 intended action, 66–7, 69 Kamm, Francis, 163 internalism, 21–4, 98, 155 Kantianism motivational, 168, 169, 177–8 on acquisition of moral normative, 168 knowledge, 12 intramoral properties, 124 Kant, Immanuel, 4, 50, 166 intuitionism, xii, xiii–xiv, 45–6, categorical imperative of, 18–19, 183n. 2 184n. 10 affectual, see affectual on lying, 121 intuitionism Korsgaard, Christine, 4, 28 consequentialism vs. combat model of, 145–6 nonconsequentialism, 61–70 constitutional model of, 147 ‘core theory’, xiv, 1–3, 6, 43 on normative question, 88–93 criticism, xiv, xv, 3, 43–4, 45, 79, 106–7, 180 Ledwig, Marion, 141 criticism of being dogmatic, 79–8 Lehrer, Keith criticism of naivety, 81–100 on Reid’s moral philosophy, 19 Index 203

Little, Margaret Olivia, 110 need, 25–6 bureaucratic model of, 147 moral emotions defence of particularism, 123–4 assessment, 155–6 on importance of feelings and degrees of motivation and, emotions, 151 170–7, 188n. 11, 189n. 23, 189n. on need for affective states, 135 30 , 102 as felt value judgments, 149, 150–1, 152 McDowell, John, 4, 35, 152, 172 Gibbard’s , 34–5 on cognitive and affective aspects intuitions as, 151–4 of emotions, 174 particularism and, 131–6 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 4 rationality’s impact on, 156–7, 172 on prejudices and intuitionism, Reid’s theory, xv–xvi, 138–45 94–7 as source of moral knowledge, xvi, McIntyre, Alison, 163 139, 156–8, 166–7 Mackie, J.L., 4, 8 moral epistemology argument from queerness, 100–1 commonsense approach, 4–6 argument from relativity, 82, 83–4 emotion-reason dichotomy, xii–xiii, criticism on intuitionism, 81–2, 152 110 McNaughton, David, 4, 123 Humean approach, 4, 5 on tolerance and realism, 81 moral faculty mechanical principles of action, 139 development, 25–6 Mikhail, John Mackie’s criticism, 100–1 on moral sense, 165 notion, 11–12 Mill, John Stuart, 37, 58–9 moral judgments on utilitarianism, 51 difficulty in making, 81–2 monism, 55–9, 112, 186n. 15 ground-level, 172 Ross’s criticism, 60–1 motivation and, 169–77 Moore, G.E., xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 43, 45 neuroethics, xvi, 139, 158–67 on commonsense epistemology, 73 nonmoral judgments and, 87 on ideal utilitarianism, 62–4, 65, 68 notion, 10–11 on intrinsic value of objects/state of objectivism, 103–4 affairs, 52–3, 64, 69–70 Reid’s views, 8–9, 19–20 on moral supervenience, 41 Ross’s views, 128–9 on , 36–9, 62 Sidgwick’s views, 8, 56–9, 61–2 notion of moral judgment, 10 Zagzebski’s views, 171–7 open question argument, 38, 94, moral obligations, 93, 186n. 22 184n. 18 moral ontology, 39–40 open question argument, Dancy’s particularist ontology, Korsgaard’s criticism, 91–2 116–18 rejection of subjectivism, 8 Reid’s views, 46–7 on self-evident beliefs, 15–16, 20 moral perception, 10, 132 skeptic position, 71–2, 186n. 24 Harman’s views, 105 moral approbation and Hume’s views, 9 disapprobation (cognitive Reid’s views, 146–7, 148 emotions), 140–3 Reid’s views, readings on, 106 role and importance, 145 moral problem, Smith’s, xvi, 139, moral constructivism, 28 169–70 moral education, 105 solution, 177–8 204 Index moral properties, 12, 44, 101 noncognitivism, 7 as analogous with secondary nonconsequentialism, 67–8 qualities, 35–6 deontology and, 69–70 intuitionist notion, 41–3 Reid’s views, 66–7 nonmoral properties and, 87 Ross’s views, 64–6 nonreductive moral realist nonreductive moral realism, xiv, 1, account, 36–40 36–9, 43, 101 supervenience, 40–1, 87 on beliefs, 171 moral realism, 28, 80–1 cognitivism in, 6, 7–8 alternative approaches to, 30–6 nonrelativistic theories, 31–6 cognivitism and, 169, 178 , 35, 36 definition, 28, 29 Greene’s views, 163–4 diversity of moral beliefs and, 85 Reid’s views, 47 as a form of antirelativism, 31 normative externalism, 168 nonreductive, see nonreductive normative internalism, 168 moral realism normative reasons, 168 vs. other positions, 28–9 normative relationships, 116–18 moral sense, 137, 187n. 10 normative sense, 131–2, 187n. 10 Dancy’s arguments against, 131–3 normativity, 32, 36–7, 88–93 moral supervenience, 40–1, 87, 184n. norm expressivism, 31, 34–5 19 Nussbaum, Martha, xii, xvii, 110, Moser, Paul K., 30 149 motivating reasons, 168 on emotions, 135–6, 151, 156, motivation 157–8, 171 affective states and, 146 on sympathy, 163 based on affectual intuitionism, 175–7 objectivism, 110 moral cognition and, 88 Nichol’s argument against, 103–4, moral emotions and, 170–7 154–5 normative vs. motivating reasons, Smith’s views, 169 168 occurrent emotions, 151 motivational externalism, 168 open question argument, Moore’s, motivational internalism, 168, 169, 38, 91–2, 94, 184n. 18 177–8 paradigmatic moral emotions, 109, Nagel, Thomas 136–7, 139, 150, 158, 177, 179 on externalism, 168 particularism, xiv, 10–11, 77, 109, narrative rationality, 125–7, 137 136–7 affecutal intuitionism and, 181 cognitivism vs., 7–8 cultural relativism vs., 95 naturalistic fallacy, Moore’s, 36–9, 62 Dancy’s, 116–24, 180–1 neuroethics, xvi Dancy’s constraints, 125–7 affectual intuitionism and, 158–67 emotions and, 131–6 Nichols, Shaun, 31, 175 importance, 111–16 sentimental rules-account, 31, intuitionism and, 127–31 33–4, 103–4, 154–5 Little’s defence, 123–4 nonbasic beliefs, 13, 18–20, 23–4, Sidgwick’s criticism, 56, 111–12 26, 127 passions, 144, 146 intuiting, 18–20, 128 impact on reason, 145 Index 205 perception Rachels, James, 30 Reid’s analysis, 146–7 rationalism-sentimentalism perceptual beliefs, 5, 6, 13 dichotomy, xii, xvi–xvii, 110 perceptual intuitionism rational principles of action, 140, 146 (ultraintuitionism), 56, 70–1 moral approbation and perfection disapprobation, 141 Sidgwick’s views, 50 Rawling, Piers, 123 philosophical intuitionism, 57 Rawls, John, 4, 13, 165, 185n. 2 Pizarro, D.A., 162 on constructivism, 31–2 Plantinga, Alvin, 13 identification of intuitionism with externalist epistemology, 22, 23, 24 Rossian bottom-up view, 77 Platonism notion of intuition, 185n. 10 account of moral properties, 41 reason pluralism of duties, 43–4, 59–61 atomistic conception, 120–2 bottom-up generalism and, 114–16 basic beliefs and, 15–17 Pollock, John, 20 capacities, 17–18 prejudices invariant reasons, 123 intuitionism and, 94–7 moral knowledge and, 19–20 preliminaries, 90, 129 motivating vs. normative reasons, Prichard, H.A., xiii, 22, 41, 82, 114, 168 128 narrative rationality, 125–7, 137 argument for bottom-up passion’s impact on, 145 generalism, 113 pro tanto reason, 186n. 14, 187n. 6 MacIntyre’s criticism, 94 reasoning capacity, 18, 24 notion of intuitionism, 152 reductionism position on normative question, Moore’s account against, 36–9 Korsgaard’s criticism on, 89–91 Regan, Tom, 186n. 24 on preliminaries, 90, 129 Reid, Thomas, 1, 39, 41, 95, 128, 133, on reduction of ‘right’, 68–9 165, 168, 182, 185n. 1–2 on self-evident beliefs, 17 on basic beliefs, 14, 15, 16–17, 19, prima facie duties, 54, 59–60, 114–15, 184n. 6 118–19 basic beliefs classification, 46–9 Dancy’s criticism, 119–24 basic beliefs verification, 26, 76 definition, 120 beliefs classification, 23 primary qualities, 42 on capacities of reason, 17–18 principles of action, Reid’s, 139–40, on commonsense epistemology, 72, 185n. 1 73–6 Pritchard, Michael, 146 criticism on Cartesian pro tanto reasons, 186n. 14, 187n. 6 foundationalism, 21 see also prima facie duties externalist position, 22, 23, 24 prudence on intellectual faculties, 84 Sidgwick’s views, 50–1 internalist-deontological position, psychology 24 affecutal intuitionism and, 181 moral emotions theory, xv–xvi, need for philosophical engagement 138–45 with, 181–2 moral emotions theory, criticism Pugmire, David, 149 on, 145–9 on moral faculty, 11, 25–6 quasi-realism, 35 on moral judgments, 8–9, 10 206 Index

Reid, Thomas – continued moral beliefs vs., 105 on moral obligations, 186n. 22 secondary qualities on moral perception, 146–7, 148 moral properties analogous with, on moral perception, readings on, 31, 35–6 106 realist account, 41–3 on moral qualities, 42–3 self-evident beliefs, 14–17, 20–1, 97, nonconsequentialist view, 66–7 98 notion of axioms/principles, 16 self-justifying beliefs, 97–8 on problematic features of sense perception, 9, 100, 104, 131, intuitions, 99 132–3 on relationship between moral moral perception vs., 10 knowledge and reasoning, 19–20 as source of basic beliefs, on truth and lack of 17–18 understanding, 82–3 sensibility, 105 relativism, 9, 31 sensitive abilities, 131–3 alternative approaches to, 30–6 sentiment(s), 142 unacceptability, 29–30 sentimentalism-rationalism residual duties, 119 dichotomy, xii, xvi–xvii, 110 resultance base, 118, 184n. 19 sentimentalist deontology, 166 Roberts, Robert C., xii, xvii, 135, 165, sentimental rules-account, 31, 33–4, 188n. 11 103–4, 154–5 Roeser, Sabine, 47, 81, 149 Sidgwick, Henry, xii, xiii, xiv, 1–2, Ross, W.D., xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 8, 39, 43, 27, 39, 43, 45, 67, 73 49, 68, 77, 82 on basic beliefs, 14 on basic beliefs relation to basic consequentialist view, 61–2, 68, 70 moral truths, 15 criticism on particularism, 56, on basic beliefs verification, 26–7, 111–12 76 on means to achieve ultimate on bottom-up generalism, 113–14 ends, 49–52 on bottom-up generalism, Dancy’s monist stance, 55–9, 61, 112 criticism on, 119–24 on moral supervenience, 40, 41 on commonsense epistemology, paradox of practical reason, 72–3 185n. 6 criticism on ideal utilitarianism, rejection of Hume’s subjectivism, 8 65 skeptical position, 70–1 on moral judgments, 128–9 on top-down generalism, 111–12 on moral supervenience, 41 on utilitarianism, 50, 51–2, 58–9, nonconsequentialist view, 64–6 61–2, 68, 115–16, 164 on objective morality, 83 SIM, see social-intuitionist model pluralist stance, 43, 59–61 Singer, Peter on prima facie duties, 54, 59–60, on superiority of utilitarian 118–19 considerations, 163–4, 165 Ruddick, Sara, 4 Sinnot-Armstrong, Walter rule-utilitarianism, 66 on unreliability of intuitionism, 98–100 Scherer, Klaus R., xvii skepticism, 70–2, 76–7 on emotions, 134, 170, 189n. 22 Reid’s rejection, 74–6 Schneewind, J.B., 185n. 8 Slovic, Paul, 157, 172, 188n. 14 scientific beliefs Smith, Jonathan, 99–100 Index 207

Smith, Michael deontology vs., 159, 163–7 on besire-like state, 171–4 dispositional emotions’ role in, 167 on Humean belief-desire Mill’s views, 51 dichotomy, 173 Moore’s criticism, 62–4, 68 on moral problem, xvi, 139, 169–70, Ross’s criticism, 60 177–8 rule-utilitarianism, 66 social-intuitionist model (SIM), Sidgwick’s views, 50, 51–2, 58–9, Haidt’s, 162 61–2 Solomon, Robert, xii, xvii, 135, 149 Sidgwick’s views, criticism on, Spencer, Herbert 115–16 on evolutionary ethics, 38 unconscious utilitarianism, 58, 73 Stevenson, Charles L., 4, 7 Stocker, Michael, xvii verification, 26–7, 76 Stratton-Lake, Philip, xiii, 4 Ayer’s criticism, 101–3 Sturgeon, Nicholas, 4 virtues, 48–9 subjectivism, 6–7 criticism, 8–9 Walker, Margaret Urban, 4 substantive realism Warnock, G.J. Korsgaard’s criticism, 92–3 criticism that intuitionism is supererogatory acts, 48–9 uninformative, 86–8 sympathy, 131–3, 137, 152–3, Wellman, Carl, 30 157, 163 Whewell, William, 67 passion’s role in, 144 Wiggins, David, 4 relevance of utilitarian principle Wilberforce, William, 83 and, 167 Williams, Bernard, 4 on normative reason, 168 theorems, 19, 184n. 12 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 123 Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 189n. 15 Wollheim, Richard, 150–1 Timmons, Mark, 13 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 106 sentimentalist deontology, 166 Van Woudenberg, René, 47 top-down generalism, 77, 136 Sidgwick’s account, 111–12 Yaffe, Gideon, 47 trolley problems, 159, 189n. 15 Tronto, Joan, 4 Zagzebski, Linda, 110, 134, 135, 152, Tversky, A., 100 165 on variability of motivational force ultraintuitionism, see perceptual of emotions, 171–3, 188n. 11, intuitionism 189n. 23, 189n. 30 unconscious utilitarianism, 58, 73 on variability of motivational force Unger, Peter, 166 of emotions, criticism on, 173–4, universal hedonism, see 175–6 utilitarianism: Sidgwick’s account Zajonc, Robert, 134 utilitarianism Zimmerman, Michael J., 121, act-utilitarianism, 66 186n. 21