Social Norms. GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack No. 31
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The Strength of Social Norms Across Human Groups
PPSXXX10.1177/1745691617708631Gelfand et al.Strength of Social Norms 708631research-article2017 Perspectives on Psychological Science 2017, Vol. 12(5) 800 –809 The Strength of Social Norms Across © The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: Human Groups sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708631 10.1177/1745691617708631 www.psychologicalscience.org/PPS Michele J. Gelfand1, Jesse R. Harrington1, and Joshua Conrad Jackson2 1University of Maryland and 2University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Abstract Social norms are a defining feature of human psychology, yet our understanding of them is still underdeveloped. In this article, we present our own cross-cultural research program on tightness-looseness (TL)—which draws on field, experimental, computational, and neuroscience methods—to illustrate how going beyond Western borders is critical for understanding social norms’ functions and their multilevel consequences. Cross-cultural research enables us to account for the universal features of norm psychology but also explains the great cultural diversity we see in social norms around the globe. Keywords culture, diversity, neuroscience, individual differences, environment Imagine a world where everyone drives on both sides around town, to having conversations, to running an of the road. There are stoplights but no one pays atten- organization turn into an uncoordinated mess. tion to them. Trains, buses, and airplanes don’t operate Perhaps because of their important role in human with any fixed schedule. In conversations, people don’t behavior, social norms have been a central topic of greet each other, interrupt each other frequently, and study in psychology. The earliest studies of normative invade each other’s space. -
Philosophy 320: Knowledge and Assertion
Course Syllabus: Philosophy 320: Knowledge and Assertion Matthew A. Benton [email protected] Description This 300-level upper-division undergraduate course, intended primarily for philosophy majors, will cover the literature on a fascinating question that has recently surfaced at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of language: whether knowledge is the norm of assertion. The idea behind such a view is that in our standard conversational contexts, one who flat-out asserts that something is the case somehow represents herself as knowing that thing, and thus, there is a norm to the effect that one ought not to flat-out assert something unless one knows it. Proponents of the knowledge-norm have appealed to several strands of data from ordinary conversation practice and problematic sentences to sup- port their view; but other philosophers have leveled counterarguments. This course will evaluate the debate, including the most recent installments from the cutting edge of the philosophical literature. The course will meet a demand amongst undergraduates to study this re- cently (and hotly) debated issue: the literature relating knowledge and assertion is new enough that it is not typically covered by other undergraduate courses in epistemology or philosophy of language. It will hold special appeal for un- dergraduates with cross-disciplinary interests in language, epistemology, and communal/social normativity, and will provide a rich background for those who want to do further advanced study in philosophy or linguistics. Course Requirements Weekly readings and mandatory class attendance; students missing more than 5 class sessions will have their final grade lowered a half grade for each additional absence. -
Social Norms and Social Influence Mcdonald and Crandall 149
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Social norms and social influence Rachel I McDonald and Christian S Crandall Psychology has a long history of demonstrating the power and and their imitation is not enough to implicate social reach of social norms; they can hardly be overestimated. To norms. Imitation is common enough in many forms of demonstrate their enduring influence on a broad range of social life — what creates the foundation for culture and society phenomena, we describe two fields where research continues is not the imitation, but the expectation of others for when to highlight the power of social norms: prejudice and energy imitation is appropriate, and when it is not. use. The prejudices that people report map almost perfectly onto what is socially appropriate, likewise, people adjust their A social norm is an expectation about appropriate behav- energy use to be more in line with their neighbors. We review ior that occurs in a group context. Sherif and Sherif [8] say new approaches examining the effects of norms stemming that social norms are ‘formed in group situations and from multiple groups, and utilizing normative referents to shift subsequently serve as standards for the individual’s per- behaviors in social networks. Though the focus of less research ception and judgment when he [sic] is not in the group in recent years, our review highlights the fundamental influence situation. The individual’s major social attitudes are of social norms on social behavior. formed in relation to group norms (pp. 202–203).’ Social norms, or group norms, are ‘regularities in attitudes and Address behavior that characterize a social group and differentiate Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045, it from other social groups’ [9 ] (p. -
1 Epistemic Norms of Political Deliberation Fabienne Peter
Epistemic norms of political deliberation Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick ([email protected]) December 2020 Forthcoming in Michael Hannon and Jeroen de Ridder (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology (https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Political- Epistemology/Hannon-Ridder/p/book/9780367345907). Please cite the published version. Abstract Legitimate political decision-making is underpinned by well-ordered political deliberation, including by the decision-makers themselves, their advisory bodies, and the public at large. But what constitutes well-ordered political deliberation? The short answer to this question is that it’s political deliberation that is governed by relevant norms. In this chapter, I first discuss different types of norms that might govern well-ordered political deliberation. I then focus on one particular type of norms: epistemic norms. My aim in this chapter is to shed light on how the validity of contributions to political deliberation depends, inter alia, on the epistemic status of the claims made. 1. Introduction Political deliberation is the broad, multi-stranded process in which political proposals get considered and critically scrutinised.1 There are many forums in which political deliberation takes place. Some of them are formal institutions of government such as the cabinet and parliament. Other forums of political deliberation include advisory bodies, government agencies, political parties and interest groups, the press and other broadcasters, and, increasingly, social media platforms. The latter are not directly associated with political 1 I have received helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter from Jeroen de Ridder, Michael Hannon, and an external referee. I also benefitted from conversations with Nathalie Ashton, Rowan Cruft, and Jonathan Heawood in the context of our ARHC project on Norms for the New Public Sphere and from discussions at a NYU Political Economy and Political Theory workshop, especially with Dimitri Landa, Ryan Pevnick, and Melissa Schwartzberg. -
Reflections on Social Norms and Human Rights
The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights Deborah A. Prentice Princeton University Chapter to appear in R. Goodman, D. Jinks, & A. K. Woods (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights. New York: Oxford University Press. This chapter was written while I was Visiting Faculty in the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ. I would like to thank Jeremy Adelman, JoAnne Gowa, Bob Keohane, Eric Maskin, Dale Miller, Catherine Ross, Teemu Ruskola, Rick Shweder, and Eric Weitz for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of the chapter. Please direct correspondence to: Deborah Prentice Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall Princeton, NJ 08540 [email protected] 1 Promoting human rights means changing behavior: Changing the behavior of governments that mistreat suspected criminals, opponents of their policies, supporters of their political rivals, and members of particular gender, ethnic, or religious groups; changing the behavior of corporations that mistreat their workers, damage the environment, and produce unsafe products; and changing the behavior of citizens who mistreat their spouses, children, and neighbors. In this chapter, I consider what an understanding of how social norms function psychologically has to contribute to this very worthy project. Social norms have proven to be an effective mechanism for changing health-related and environmental behaviors, so there is good reason to think that they might be helpful in the human-rights domain as well. In the social sciences, social norms are defined as socially shared and enforced attitudes specifying what to do and what not to do in a given situation (see Elster, 1990; Sunstein, 1997). -
Life with Augustine
Life with Augustine ...a course in his spirit and guidance for daily living By Edmond A. Maher ii Life with Augustine © 2002 Augustinian Press Australia Sydney, Australia. Acknowledgements: The author wishes to acknowledge and thank the following people: ► the Augustinian Province of Our Mother of Good Counsel, Australia, for support- ing this project, with special mention of Pat Fahey osa, Kevin Burman osa, Pat Codd osa and Peter Jones osa ► Laurence Mooney osa for assistance in editing ► Michael Morahan osa for formatting this 2nd Edition ► John Coles, Peter Gagan, Dr. Frank McGrath fms (Brisbane CEO), Benet Fonck ofm, Peter Keogh sfo for sharing their vast experience in adult education ► John Rotelle osa, for granting us permission to use his English translation of Tarcisius van Bavel’s work Augustine (full bibliography within) and for his scholarly advice Megan Atkins for her formatting suggestions in the 1st Edition, that have carried over into this the 2nd ► those generous people who have completed the 1st Edition and suggested valuable improvements, especially Kath Neehouse and friends at Villanova College, Brisbane Foreword 1 Dear Participant Saint Augustine of Hippo is a figure in our history who has appealed to the curiosity and imagination of many generations. He is well known for being both sinner and saint, for being a bishop yet also a fellow pilgrim on the journey to God. One of the most popular and attractive persons across many centuries, his influence on the church has continued to our current day. He is also renowned for his influ- ence in philosophy and psychology and even (in an indirect way) art, music and architecture. -
Norm (Philosophy) from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
Norm (philosophy) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Norms are concepts (sentences) of practical import, oriented to effecting an action, rather than conceptual abstractions that describe, explain, and express. Normative sentences imply "ought-to" types of statements and assertions, in distinction to sentences that provide "is" types of statements and assertions. Common normative sentences include commands, permissions, and prohibitions; common normative abstract concepts include sincerity, justification, and honesty. A popular account of norms describes them as reasons to take action, to believe, and to feel. Types of norms Orders and permissions express norms. Such norm sentences do not describe how the world is, they rather prescribe how the world should be. Imperative sentences are the most obvious way to express norms, but declarative sentences also may be norms, as is the case with laws or 'principles'. Generally, whether an expression is a norm depends on what the sentence intends to assert. For instance, a sentence of the form "All Ravens are Black" could on one account be taken as descriptive, in which case an instance of a white raven would contradict it, or alternatively "All Ravens are Black" could be interpreted as a norm, in which case it stands as a principle and definition, so 'a white raven' would then not be a raven. Those norms purporting to create obligations (or duties) and permissions are called deontic norms (see also deontic logic). The concept of deontic norm is already an extension of a previous concept of norm, which would only include imperatives, that is, norms purporting to create duties. The understanding that permissions are norms in the same way was an important step in ethics and philosophy of law. -
Changing Roles in Is: a Role Theory Perspective R
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) International Conference on Information Systems ICIS 1988 Proceedings (ICIS) 1988 CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVE R. L. Heckman Jr. University of Pittsburgh Dennis F. Galletta University of Pittsburgh Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1988 Recommended Citation Heckman, R. L. Jr. and Galletta, Dennis F., "CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVE" (1988). ICIS 1988 Proceedings. 34. http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1988/34 This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICIS 1988 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVEl It. L. Heckman, Jr. Dennis F. Galletta Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business University of Pittsburgh ABSTRACT The recent dramatic and interesting advances in computer technology have significantly altered the roles of both users and developers. Role theory might be applied to more fully understand and more effectively investigate organizational, behavioral, and social issues related to these changes. A frame- work for categorizing information systems roles is built from a matrix of information system and organizational activities. The information system activity dimension is composed of indirect user, direct user, autonomous developer, traditional developer, and facilitator categories. The organizational activity dimension contains clerical, professional, and managerial categories. -
Deviance from Social Norms: Who Are the Deviants?
Running Head: DEVIANCE FROM SOCIAL NORMS: WHO ARE THE DEVIANTS? This article was published in the Journal of Social and Political Psychology doi: https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v8i1.1134 The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Norm Deviants: A Field Study in a Small Cohesive University Campus Robin Gomila and Elizabeth Levy Paluck Princeton University Word count: 10,342 DEVIANCE FROM SOCIAL NORMS: WHO ARE THE DEVIANTS? Abstract People who deviate from the established norms of their social group can clarify group boundaries, strengthen group cohesion, and catalyze group and broader social change. Yet social psychologists have recently neglected the study of deviants. We conducted in-depth interviews of Princeton University upperclassmen who deviated from a historical and widely known Princeton norm: joining an “eating club,” a social group that undergraduates join at the end of their sophomore year. We explored the themes of these interviews with two rounds of surveys during the semester when students decide whether to join an eating club (pilot survey, N=408; and a random subsample of the pilot survey with 90% takeup, N=212). The surveys asked: what are the social and psychological antecedents of deviance from norms? The data suggest that deviance is a pattern: compared to those who conform, students who deviate by not joining clubs report a history of deviance and of feeling different from the typical member of their social group. They also feel less social belonging and identification with Princeton and its social environment. Students who deviate are lower in social monitoring, but otherwise are comparable to students who conform in terms of personality traits measured by the Big Five, and of their perception of the self as socially awkward, independent, or rebellious. -
Plato the ALLEGORY of the CAVE Republic, VII 514 A, 2 to 517 A, 7
Plato THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE Republic, VII 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7 Translation by Thomas Sheehan THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE SOCRATES: Next, said I [= Socrates], compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE: THE CAVE AND THE FIRE The cave SOCRATES: Imagine this: People live under the earth in a cavelike dwelling. Stretching a long way up toward the daylight is its entrance, toward which the entire cave is gathered. The people have been in this dwelling since childhood, shackled by the legs and neck..Thus they stay in the same place so that there is only one thing for them to look that: whatever they encounter in front of their faces. But because they are shackled, they are unable to turn their heads around. A fire is behind them, and there is a wall between the fire and the prisoners SOCRATES: Some light, of course, is allowed them, namely from a fire that casts its glow toward them from behind them, being above and at some distance. Between the fire and those who are shackled [i.e., behind their backs] there runs a walkway at a certain height. Imagine that a low wall has been built the length of the walkway, like the low curtain that puppeteers put up, over which they show their puppets. The images carried before the fire SOCRATES: So now imagine that all along this low wall people are carrying all sorts of things that reach up higher than the wall: statues and other carvings made of stone or wood and many other artifacts that people have made. -
The Role of the Institution of Property in the Economic Transformation and Development Process in Central and Eastern Europe1
R. Frunză 33 ISSN 1648 - 4460 Transformational Challenges for Finance Market in CEEC ---------TRANSFORMATIONS IN -------- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS © Vilnius University, 2002-2011 © Brno University of Technology, 2002-2011 © University of Latvia, 2002-2011 THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE1 Ramona Frunză Centre for European Studies “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi Bvd. Carol I, no. 19, 700507 Iasi, Romania Tel.: +40 745455305 Fax: +40 232201318 E-mail: [email protected] Ramona Frunză, is post-doctoral researcher in the field of Economics at “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi (Romania), Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. She is involved in many national and international research projects and she published over 40 studies on the analysis of institutional economics and regional development. She is also lecturing on Political Economy and European Economy at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaşi. 1 Acknowledgements: This work was supported by Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development, through the project “Developing the Innovation Capacity and Improving the Impact of Research through Post-doctoral Programmes” (grant POSDRU/89/1.5/S/49944). TRANSFORMATIONS IN BUSINESS & ECONOMICS, Vol. 10, No 2 (23), Supplement B, 2011 R. Frunză 34 ISSN 1648 - 4460 Transformational Challenges for Finance Market in CEEC ABSTRACT. In the present paper, the emphasis is laid upon the evolution of the institutional change process that occurred in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, after the fall of the communist regime in the area, the main purpose being that of grasping its significance for the economic development. -
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION and POLITICAL Behavrori an EMPHASIS \T,PON STRUCTURAL 11YNAMICS
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL BEHAVrORI AN EMPHASIS \T,PON STRUCTURAL 11YNAMICS by Christopher Bates Doob A.B., Oberlin College, 1962 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Oberlin College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Sociology 1964 ~-,-\t ii I," - ~ <" . , Preface There are a number of people whose assistance has made this project possible. Without their aid I literally would have been unable to complete this thesis and obtain my degree. xy" profoundest acknowledgment goes to Dr. Kiyoshi Ikeda, whose knowledge of theory and methodology literally shaped this project. The influence of Professors Richard R. xy"ers, George E. Simpson, .J. Milton Yinger, and Donald P. Warwick is also evident at various points through- out this work. Mr. Thomas Bauer, Dr. Leonard Doob, Miss Nancy Durham, and Miss .June Wright have given valuable assistance at different stages of the process. Christopher B. Doob Oberlin College June 1964 09\,~O\A4 'i::l "\ ~ S iii Table of Contents Page Preface 11 r. Introduction The Problem 1 An Historical Approach to the Dynamics of Social Stratification 2 Broad Sociological Propositions Concerning Social Mobility 3 Empirical Studies 4 Status Crystallization 6 Static Structural Variables in This Study 7 Some Observations on Voting Behavior 11 The Hypotheses 12 II. Methodology The Sample 17 The Major Independent Variables 18 Intermediate Variables 25 The Dependent Variables 26 A Concluding Note 28 III. Description of the Findings The Relationship of Mobility, Class, and Intermediate Variables to Liberalism-Conservatism 30 The Intermediate Variables 31 Status Crystallization, Class, and Liberalism Conservatism • iv III.