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A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS Indoctrination and Recruitment
California State University, Monterey Bay Digital Commons @ CSUMB Capstone Projects and Master's Theses Capstone Projects and Master's Theses 12-2016 A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS Indoctrination and Recruitment Trevor Hawkins California State University, Monterey Bay Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes_all Part of the Other Political Science Commons, Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Other Sociology Commons, Political Theory Commons, Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, Social Psychology Commons, and the Theory and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Hawkins, Trevor, "A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS Indoctrination and Recruitment" (2016). Capstone Projects and Master's Theses. 7. https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/caps_thes_all/7 This Capstone Project (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Capstone Projects and Master's Theses at Digital Commons @ CSUMB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capstone Projects and Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ CSUMB. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Running Head: ISIS RECRUITMENT A Theoretical Analysis of ISIS Indoctrination and Recruitment Tactics Trevor W. Hawkins California State University of Monterey Bay SBS: 402 Capstone II Professor Juan Jose Gutiérrez, Ph.d. Professor Gerald Shenk, Ph.d. Professor Jennifer Lucido, M.A. December 2016 ISIS RECRUITMENT 2 Table of Contents Abstract 3 Introduction 4 Theoretical Framework 6 Influence Psychology 6 Cult Indoctrination 7 Soviet Montage Theory 7 Methodology 8 Execution of Cult Indoctrination Paradigm 9 Execution of Soviet Montage Paradigm 9 Use of Analysis Technology 10 Literature Review 10 I. The Production of Reality Objective Reality 10 Moral Reality 12 Reality of the Self 13 Moral Reality in Context 14 Objective Reality in Context 15 As Context Becomes Reality 16 II. -
The Strength of Social Norms Across Human Groups
PPSXXX10.1177/1745691617708631Gelfand et al.Strength of Social Norms 708631research-article2017 Perspectives on Psychological Science 2017, Vol. 12(5) 800 –809 The Strength of Social Norms Across © The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: Human Groups sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617708631 10.1177/1745691617708631 www.psychologicalscience.org/PPS Michele J. Gelfand1, Jesse R. Harrington1, and Joshua Conrad Jackson2 1University of Maryland and 2University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Abstract Social norms are a defining feature of human psychology, yet our understanding of them is still underdeveloped. In this article, we present our own cross-cultural research program on tightness-looseness (TL)—which draws on field, experimental, computational, and neuroscience methods—to illustrate how going beyond Western borders is critical for understanding social norms’ functions and their multilevel consequences. Cross-cultural research enables us to account for the universal features of norm psychology but also explains the great cultural diversity we see in social norms around the globe. Keywords culture, diversity, neuroscience, individual differences, environment Imagine a world where everyone drives on both sides around town, to having conversations, to running an of the road. There are stoplights but no one pays atten- organization turn into an uncoordinated mess. tion to them. Trains, buses, and airplanes don’t operate Perhaps because of their important role in human with any fixed schedule. In conversations, people don’t behavior, social norms have been a central topic of greet each other, interrupt each other frequently, and study in psychology. The earliest studies of normative invade each other’s space. -
Chapter 20: Attitudes and Social Influence
Psychology Journal Write a definition of prejudice in your journal, and list four examples of prejudiced thinking. ■ PSYCHOLOGY Chapter Overview Visit the Understanding Psychology Web site at glencoe.com and click on Chapter 20—Chapter Overviews to preview the chapter. 576 Attitude Formation Reader’s Guide ■ Main Idea Exploring Psychology Our attitudes are the result of condition- ing, observational learning, and cogni- An Attitude of Disbelief tive evaluation. Our attitudes help us On July 20, 1969, Astronaut Neil define ourselves and our place in soci- Armstrong emerged from a space capsule ety, evaluate people and events, and some 250,000 miles from Earth and, while guide our behavior. millions of television viewers watched, ■ Vocabulary became the first man to set foot upon the • attitude moon. Since that time other astronauts • self-concept have experienced that same monumental unique experience in space, yet there are ■ Objectives in existence today numerous relatively • Trace the origin of attitudes. intelligent, otherwise normal humans who • Describe the functions of attitudes. insist it never happened—that the masses have been completely deluded by some weird government hoax—a conspiracy of monumental proportions! There is even a well-publicized organization in England named “The Flat Earth Society,” which seriously challenges with interesting logic all such claims of space travel and evi- dence that the earth is round. —from Story of Attitudes and Emotions by Edgar Cayce, 1972 hat do you accept as fact? What do you call products of fan- tasy? Your attitudes can lead you to believe that something is Wfact when it is really imaginary or that something is not real when it really is fact. -
What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical Eory
What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical eory* Alex Silk University of Birmingham [email protected] Forthcoming in M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. Abstract is paper investigates how inquiry into normative language can improve substantive normative theorizing. First I examine two dimensions along which normative language differs: “strength” and “subjectivity.” Next I show how greater sensitivity to these features of the meaning and use of normative lan- guage can illuminate debates about three issues in ethics: the coherence of moral dilemmas, the possibility of supererogatory acts, and the connection between making a normative judgment and being motivated to act accord- ingly. e paper concludes with several brief reections on the theoretical utility of the distinction — at least so-called — between “normative” and “non- normative” language and judgment. e discussions of these specic linguistic and normative issues can be seen as case studies illustrating the fruitfulness of utilizing resources from philosophy of language for normative theory. Get- ting clearer on the language we use in normative conversation and theorizing can help us diagnose problems with bad arguments and formulate better mo- tivated questions. is can lead to clearer answers and bring into relief new theoretical possibilities and avenues to explore. *anks to Eric Swanson and the audience at the Fih Annual Arizona Normative Ethics Work- shop for discussion, and to two anonymous referees for comments. Contents Introduction Weak and strong necessity Endorsing and non-endorsing uses Dilemmas Supererogation Judgment internalism and “the normative” Conclusion Introduction e strategy of clarifying philosophical questions by investigating the language we use to express them is familiar. -
Reflections on Social Norms and Human Rights
The Psychology of Social Norms and the Promotion of Human Rights Deborah A. Prentice Princeton University Chapter to appear in R. Goodman, D. Jinks, & A. K. Woods (Eds.), Understanding social action, promoting human rights. New York: Oxford University Press. This chapter was written while I was Visiting Faculty in the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ. I would like to thank Jeremy Adelman, JoAnne Gowa, Bob Keohane, Eric Maskin, Dale Miller, Catherine Ross, Teemu Ruskola, Rick Shweder, and Eric Weitz for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of the chapter. Please direct correspondence to: Deborah Prentice Department of Psychology Princeton University Green Hall Princeton, NJ 08540 [email protected] 1 Promoting human rights means changing behavior: Changing the behavior of governments that mistreat suspected criminals, opponents of their policies, supporters of their political rivals, and members of particular gender, ethnic, or religious groups; changing the behavior of corporations that mistreat their workers, damage the environment, and produce unsafe products; and changing the behavior of citizens who mistreat their spouses, children, and neighbors. In this chapter, I consider what an understanding of how social norms function psychologically has to contribute to this very worthy project. Social norms have proven to be an effective mechanism for changing health-related and environmental behaviors, so there is good reason to think that they might be helpful in the human-rights domain as well. In the social sciences, social norms are defined as socially shared and enforced attitudes specifying what to do and what not to do in a given situation (see Elster, 1990; Sunstein, 1997). -
The Psychology of Cultural Contact
1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CULTURAL CONTACT Deborah A. Prentice and Dale T. Miller thnic diversity currently preoccupies a sizable segment of U.S. society, from employers and school administrators, who must E manage diversity within institutional settings, to politicians and social scientists, who must formulate policies for addressing the com- peting claims of different ethnic groups. The issue of diversity is fraught with anxiety. Ethnic conflicts in many countries around the world attest to the potential for relations across cultural boundaries to go seriously and destructively awry. Moreover, Americans' own struggles with race have left many pessimistic about the prospects for achieving positive, stable relations between ethnic groups. With new waves of immigrants coming from Asia and Latin America and higher birth rates among mi- nority than majority groups, the U.S. population is becoming, and will continue to become, ethnically and culturally more diverse. Thus, how to promote positive relations across group boundaries is a question of paramount importance. Thirty or forty years ago, psychologists thought they had an answer to this question. The contact hypothesis posited that if members of dif- ferent ethnic groups interact with each other on an equal-status basis in pursuit of common goals, positive intergroup relations will result (Allport 1954). This hypothesis was so appealing that it spawned hun- dreds of studies designed to test and refine its claims. The results have been less than encouraging. Yes, equal-status contact can have positive results, but only if many conditions obtain: the contact should be mean- ingful and have the potential to extend beyond the immediate situation; the individuals should be as similar as possible on all dimensions be- sides group membership; the contact should be voluntary, extended in duration, and varied across contexts; and so on (for a more complete list, see Stephan 1985). -
Changing Roles in Is: a Role Theory Perspective R
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) International Conference on Information Systems ICIS 1988 Proceedings (ICIS) 1988 CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVE R. L. Heckman Jr. University of Pittsburgh Dennis F. Galletta University of Pittsburgh Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1988 Recommended Citation Heckman, R. L. Jr. and Galletta, Dennis F., "CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVE" (1988). ICIS 1988 Proceedings. 34. http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1988/34 This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICIS 1988 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHANGING ROLES IN IS: A ROLE THEORY PERSPECTIVEl It. L. Heckman, Jr. Dennis F. Galletta Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business University of Pittsburgh ABSTRACT The recent dramatic and interesting advances in computer technology have significantly altered the roles of both users and developers. Role theory might be applied to more fully understand and more effectively investigate organizational, behavioral, and social issues related to these changes. A frame- work for categorizing information systems roles is built from a matrix of information system and organizational activities. The information system activity dimension is composed of indirect user, direct user, autonomous developer, traditional developer, and facilitator categories. The organizational activity dimension contains clerical, professional, and managerial categories. -
PERSONAL and SOCIAL IDENTITY: SELF and SOCIAL CONTEXT John C. Turner, Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam and Craig Mcgarty D
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIAL CONTEXT John C. Turner, Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam and Craig McGarty Department of Psychology Australian National University Paper presented to the Conference on "The Self and the Collective" Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 7-10 May 1992 A revised version of this paper will appear in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin Special Issue on The Self and the Collective Professor J. C. Turner Department of Psychology GPO Box 4, ANU Canberra, ACT 2601 Australia Tel: 06 249 3094 Fax: 06 249 0499 Email: [email protected] 30 April 1992 2 Abstract Social identity and self-categorization theories provide a distinctive perspective on the relationship between the self and the collective. They assume that individuals can and do act as both individual persons and social groups and that, since both individuals and social groups exist objectively, both personal and social categorical self-categorizations provide valid representations of self in differing social contexts. As social psychological theories of collective behaviour, they take for granted that they cannot provide a complete explanation of the concrete social realities of collective life. They define their task as providing an analysis of the psychological processes that interact with and make possible the distinctive "group facts" of social life. From the early 1970s, beginning with Tajfel's research on social categorization and intergroup discrimination, social identity theory has explored the links between the self- evaluative aspects of social'identity and intergroup conflict. Self-categorization theory, emerging from social identity research in the late 1970s, made a basic distinction between personal and social identity as differing levels of inclusiveness in self-categorization and sought to show how the emergent, higher-order properties of group processes could be explained in terms of a functional shift in self-perception from personal to social identity. -
Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism Author(S): Cleo H
Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism Author(s): Cleo H. Cherryholmes Source: Educational Researcher, Vol. 21, No. 6, (Aug. - Sep., 1992), pp. 13-17 Published by: American Educational Research Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1176502 Accessed: 02/05/2008 14:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aera. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. http://www.jstor.org Notes on Pragmatismand Scientific Realism CLEOH. CHERRYHOLMES Ernest R. House's article "Realism in plicit declarationof pragmatism. Here is his 1905 statement ProfessorResearch" (1991) is informative for the overview it of it: of scientificrealism. -
Syllabus Theories Intergroup Relations
Theories of Intergroup Relations 1 Psychology 9234 Fall, 2015 Theories of Intergroup Relations Fatih Uenal, Room A-12 Time: Tue 16:00-18:00 Room: 271 Dragos Kampüsü Office hours: by appointment Email: [email protected] Substance: This course includes an introduction to and comparison of most extant theories of intergroup relations: those theories that explain how human groups form and relate to one another. It may be of relevance to students in psychology, sociology, political science, communications, history, anthropology, economics, or to anyone interested in group conflict, diplomacy, oppression, discrimination, society, or culture. One of the major questions we will consider is whether different kinds of theories are required to explain intergroup relations based on different kinds of group definitions, including nationality (the nation-state), gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class. We will also consider the type of phenomena and level of analysis each theory addresses, that is, whether theories concern mainly the psychological state of an individual, the social-cultural context, the social-structural context, the economics of social arrangements, collective behavior, institutionalized patterns, and so forth. Because of the theoretical abstractness of some of the works, I have also provided a “concrete” reading dealing with each topic for each subject (e.g., works of autobiography, fiction, commentary, history, etc.). Such readings are indented on the reading list below. Original readings and important writers are emphasized in the readings selected, but research concerning elaborating on each theory will also be read. Objectives: Students will learn to recognize the level of analysis theories use, the kind of process or mechanisms they prescribe, the family of theories to which the theory belongs, as well as the basic tenets and assumptions of each theory. -
'The Magic That Can Set You Free': the Ideology of Folk and the Myth of the Rock Community
The magic that can set you free': the ideology of folk and the myth of the rock community by SIMON FRITH Rock, the saying goes, is 'the folk music of our time'. Not from a sociological point of view. If 'folk' describes pre-capitalist modes of music production, rock is, without a doubt, a mass-produced, mass- consumed, commodity. The rock-folk argument, indeed, is not about how music is made, but about how it works: rock is taken to express (or reflect) a way of life; rock is used by its listeners as a folk music - it articulates communal values, comments on shared social problems. The argument, in other words, is about subcultures rather than music- making; the question of how music comes to represent its listeners is begged. (I develop these arguments further in Frith 1978, pp. 191-202, and, with particular reference to punk rock, in Frith 1980.) In this article I am not going to answer this question either. My concern is not whether rock is or is not a folk music, but is with the effects of a particular account of popular culture - the ideology of folk - on rock's interpretation of itself. For the rock ideologues of the 1960s - musicians, critics and fans alike - rock 'n' roll's status as a folk music was what differentiated it from routine pop; it was as a folk music that rock could claim a distinctive political and artistic edge. The argument was made, for example, by Jon Landau in his influential role as reviews editor and house theorist of Rolling Stone. -
Epistemic Justification, Normative Guidance, and Knowledge
13 Epistemic Justication, Normative Guidance, and Knowledge ∗ ARTURS LOGINS Abstract. Recently, Pascal Engel has defended a version of a compatibilist view in epistemology that combines both an element of externalism and an element of internalism (Engel 2007, 2012). According to this position exter- nalism has to be adopted about knowledge, whereas internalism has to be endorsed concerning epistemic justification. In this paper I argue that consi- derations that, allegedly, motivates Engel’s internalism about epistemic justi- fication, can be explained equally well, or, indeed, even better by a knowledge based externalist account of epistemic justification. ∗This paper is dedicated to Pascal Engel. I would like to express my gratefulness to Pascal for his teaching and support. His work has made an important impact on me. In particular his Engel 2000, and his Engel 2007 contributed largely to my initiation to analytic philosophy and contem- porary epistemology, respectively. The research work that lead to this article was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) grant number 100015_131794 (project Knowledge, Evidence, and Practice). 169 170 ARTURS LOGINS 1. Introduction Recently, Pascal Engel has defended a version of a compatibilist view in epis- temology that combines both an element of externalism and an element of internalism (Engel 2007, 2012). In short, according to this view, knowledge has to be characterized in externalist terms, whereas epistemic justification and ra- tionality has to be characterized in internalist terms. The externalist view about knowledge that Engel favours integrates a ver- sion of safety account of knowledge that requires that knowledge is safe belief and does not require that a subject has a reflective access top in order for the subject to know thatp (see Engel 2012 : 8).