Course Syllabus: Philosophy 320: Knowledge and Assertion

Matthew A. Benton [email protected]

Description

This 300-level upper-division undergraduate course, intended primarily for philosophy majors, will cover the literature on a fascinating question that has recently surfaced at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of language: whether knowledge is the norm of assertion. The idea behind such a view is that in our standard conversational contexts, one who flat-out asserts that something is the case somehow represents herself as knowing that thing, and thus, there is a norm to the effect that one ought not to flat-out assert something unless one knows it. Proponents of the knowledge-norm have appealed to several strands of data from ordinary conversation practice and problematic sentences to sup- port their view; but other philosophers have leveled counterarguments. This course will evaluate the debate, including the most recent installments from the cutting edge of the philosophical literature.

The course will meet a demand amongst undergraduates to study this re- cently (and hotly) debated issue: the literature relating knowledge and assertion is new enough that it is not typically covered by other undergraduate courses in epistemology or philosophy of language. It will hold special appeal for un- dergraduates with cross-disciplinary interests in language, epistemology, and communal/social normativity, and will provide a rich background for those who want to do further advanced study in philosophy or linguistics.

Course Requirements

Weekly readings and mandatory class attendance; students missing more than 5 class sessions will have their final grade lowered a half grade for each additional absence. Ttypical sessions will involve some brief lecturing, but will largely involve in-class discussion about the readings. Three essays will be due during the term, on topics assigned from the readings: the first paper will be 5–6 pages, the second will be 8 pages, and the final paper, which may involve

1 some research beyond the required readings, is to be 10–12 pages. Final grades will be based primarily on this written work, though in-class participation can count toward the final grade as well. There will be no mid-term or final exams.

Prerequisites and Learning Outcome Goals

Phil 103 or 104: Intro to Philosophy. Recommended: Phil 220 Theory of Knowledge and/or Phil 210 Intro to Philosophy of Language. This course satisfies Area 5 requirements for the Philosophy Major. Upon completion, stu- dents in this course will have (i) analyzed theoretical issues concerning the role of knowledge in everyday English language use, and (ii) applied them to prac- tical scenarios both real and hypothetical, gaining a better understanding of how variable epistemic conditions affect assertability conditions. Realizing such goals promotes a fuller appreciation of the value of knowledge to social interac- tion and as an aid to human action.

Schedule of Readings (subject to change)

Friday, Sept. 3: Introduction Background Sept. 7, 10: Paul Grice (1989 [1976]) “Logic and Conversation” in his Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. Excerpt: G.E. Moore (1912) Ethics. The Knowledge Account Sept. 7, 10: Max Black (1951) “Saying and Believing.” Repr. in his Problems of Analysis. Cornell University Press.

Sept. 14, 17: Chapter 7 of Peter Unger (1975) Ignorance: A Case for Scepti- cism, Oxford University Press; and Michael Slote (1979 [2010]) “Assertion and Belief.” Repr. in Michael Slote, Selected Essays, Oxford University Press.

Sept. 21, 24: Chapter 11 of Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.

Sept. 28, Oct. 1: Keith DeRose (1996) “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotter- ies.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 568–580; and excerpts from DeRose (1991) “Epistemic Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 100: 581–605.

Oct. 5, 8: Selections from (2009) Williamson on Knowledge. Ed. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford University Press.

2 FIRST PAPER DUE

Objections and Rivals

Oct. 12, 15: Matthew Weiner (2005) “Must We Know What We Say?” Philo- sophical Review 114: 227–251.

Oct. 19, 21: Jennifer Lackey (2007) “Norms of Assertion.” Noˆus 41: 594–626.

Oct. 12, 15: Igor Douven (2006) “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credi- bility.” Philosophical Review 115: 449–485.

Oct. 19: Jason Stanley (2008) “Knowledge and Certainty.” Philosophical Is- sues 18: 33–55.

No Class Oct. 22

Oct. 26, 29: David Sosa (2009) “Dubious Assertions.” Philosophical Studies 146: 269–272. Jonathan Kvanvig, “Norms of Assertion,” forthcoming.

SECOND PAPER DUE

Advances and Extensions

Nov. 2, 5: Jonathan Schaffer (2008) “Knowledge in the Image of Assertion.” Philosophical Issues 18: 1–19.

Nov. 9, 12: DeRose (2002) “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” Philosoph- ical Review 111: 167–203.

Nov. 16, 19: John Turri (2010) “Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Con- textualism.” Philosophical Review 119: 77–95.

Nov. 23: John Turri (forthcoming a) “The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. And John Turri (forthcoming b) “Prompting Challenges.” Analysis

Nov. 30, Dec. 3: Matthew Benton (draft) “Ignorance and Epistemic Modals.”

FINAL PAPER DUE by Dec. 5

3