4. Occupation: Coercion and Control

4.0 I n t r o d uction Indonesian personnel; but how this personnel Peter Post was recruited, why they joined these policing organizations, and how local society reacted Th e essays in this Section deal with some of towards them, is a fi eld of research that still the more controversial aspects of Japanese needs to be undertaken. military rule in Indonesia and focus on themes that have come to symbolize the brutality of 4.1 P o licing Society the Japanese regime. Particularly in the West, Peter Post some topics, like the civilian internment camps and POW camps, have been well studied and Introduction relevant publications have gained vast reading Like any occupation force, the Japanese mili- audiences. Th e defeat and humiliation, the suf- tary administration needed police to discipline ferings and starvation, and—ultimately—the and control its own people and to see to it that loss of an empire needed to be explained, and anti-Japanese movements by the local inhabit- accounted for the popularity of these works. In ants did not interfere with the military strategy Indonesia, however, despite a general consensus and wartime planning. Th ese tasks were allo- that the Japanese occupation was the ‘darkest cated to the regular civilian police (Keisatsu) period in Indonesian history’, there was little and the (). Th e alloca- attention to the fate and ordeals of the Indo- tion of the tasks to the civilian and the military nesian population itself, specifi cally as forced police forces was not clearly demarcated, allow- laborers (rōmusha) or as . It ing their duties to overlap, especially at shū was only in the early 1990s, and by a strange (residency) and lower administrative levels. Th e stroke of coincidence through activist Japanese local people feared the Kenpeitai more than the scholars, that Indonesian academics started to Keisatsu but they were oft en unable to diff eren- study these controversial and politicized issues. tiate the two and so they oft en called the regular Th ese diff erent reactions in the West and Indo- police the Kenpeitai. In addition to these two nesia towards issues of violence and victimiza- agencies, the Japanese military administration tion under Japan’s rule are still not properly created a range of social organizations, such as understood and need further research, but the the Keibōdan, Seinendan, Fujinkai, , result is that we currently know much more as well as more specialized policing agencies, about the ordeals of the Westerners than that such as the Keizai Keisatsu (economic police). of the Indonesians. Th e Keisatsu and the Kenpeitai could call upon In general, the essays show that Japanese all these organizations as sources of informa- policies of coercion and control led to violent tion and means for control. acts towards (perceived) resistance movements, women, laborers, civilian internees and POWs, Th e Keisatsu and sometimes unreasonable killings. But they Th e regular police fell under the jurisdiction also show that we still know very little about of the Keimubu (Police Department) and the Japanese motives, organizations involved, and judicial matters were dealt with by the Shihōbu ‘lines of responsibility’. Even less is known (Justice Department). In Sumatra, the civil about the roles and functioning of Indonesian administrative headquarters established both personnel in Japanese-led policing institutions. departments separately from the Department of To control and police Indonesian society the General Aff airs, whereas in Java, only the Justice Japanese army police and naval police built Department acquired separate status and police upon the existing colonial police networks and aff airs functioned partly under the General intelligence services, which consisted mostly of Aff airs Department and partly under the Civil occupation: coercion and control 149 Security Department. In the Navy areas, no sep- two sections: a criminal investigation section arate departments for police or for justice were which employed regular native police and han- set up within the civil administration. It would dled similar cases as under Dutch rule where appear that the general police and justice tasks the accused were tried by the government-ini- in the areas under Navy control fell under spe- tiated native courts; and a political intelligence cifi c sections of the General Aff airs Bureau but section, Tokkōka, charged with reporting to the it is also possible that most of the ‘policing’ shū chōkan the political feelings of the people. in the Navy-controlled regions was allocated Th is intelligence section employed very few directly to the Navy , the Tokkeitai, Japanese and towards the end of the war had which worked in close cooperation with the hundreds of native agents on its payroll. naval base garrison guards, the Keibitai. Th e Judicial Department at the shū level in Sumatra was closely allied to the Police Depart- ment but not necessarily under its control. Th e judicial department’s main function was con- trolling the examination of witnesses in any big cases as instructed by the shū chōkan and the prosecution, trial, and execution of the accused that came under the jurisdiction of the military courts. Th e Judicial Department was responsi- ble for the administration of all POW and civil- ian internment camps until March 1944 when the Japanese Army took control. In Java at the shū level, the native police fell formally under the native civil administrators, pangreh praja, who were directly supervised by the Japanese shū chōkan. Since the Japanese administration paid good wages, many Indo- nesians sought to join the native police force. Kenpeitai personnel stationed in Madura. From left - to-right: Sgt. E. Hashimoto, Seito, Sudo and Sgt. Suri- Moreover, for many young men, the police force matsu of the PID. was an important institution for social advance- © National Archives Th e Hague, NEFIS 3857 ment that, in general, required few skills. By the late 1930s, the Dutch colonial police forces In Sumatra, the Police Aff airs Department throughout the archipelago counted about at the General Headquarters was responsible 30,000 offi cers. In Java, at the end of the Japa- for maintaining order under Japanese law, nese occupation, there were 27,000. preventing anti-Japanese espionage, control- ling Allied nationals, and establishing Judicial Th e Kenpeitai: the origin Courts. It had no control over the policing Each member of the Kenpeitai was called ken- agencies at the shū level where separate Police pei, which literally means law(-enforcing) sol- Aff airs Departments were established and were dier. Th e original task of the Kenpeitai in Japan directly controlled by the shū chōkan. It was was indeed to enforce strict obedience to the divided into four sections: a police section, law by the military men. However, soon aft er a secret service section, a public peace sec- its establishment in 1881 under the authority tion, and a section for internment camps. Th e of the Army Minister, the Kenpeitai also took degree of control diff ered among residencies to deal with unrest among the urban and rural depending on local circumstances and judg- populations that became subjected to conscrip- ments of the shū chōkan. In general, its main tion. It thereby encroached upon the jurisdic- task was to administer the pre-war native police tion of the regular police and, in particular, organization. Investigations carried out by the that of the Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu (special Police Department were, as a rule, connected higher police or secret intelligent police), bet- to general crimes committed by Indonesians ter known for its acronym, Tokkō. From the and Chinese residents, such as theft and man- beginning, the Kenpeitai’s duties were twofold: slaughter. Th e Department was divided into to police the army and to police the people. In