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The Fallacy of [The] Peace Process in Afghanistan: the People's Perspectives

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The Fallacy of [The] Peace Process in Afghanistan: the People's Perspectives Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies The Fallacy of Peace Processes in Afghanistan The People’s Perspectives Peace studies IV © 2018 Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) is an independent research institute, founded on October 2012 with a goal of providing scientific and academic ground for assessment of the strategic issues of Afghanistan in regional and international levels. Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies strives to help the society in improvement and development of democracy, security, peace, good governance and other matters through conducting independent researches, translating and publishing books and scientific papers, convention of national and international gatherings and conferences. Disclaimer The analysis provided in this study are solely those of the author and do not reflect viewpoint of AISS. The Fallacy of Peace Processes in Afghanistan: The People’s Perspectives Author: Dr Omar Sadr Data Analyst: Mohammad Shoaib Haidary Publishing No: AISS-P-020-2018 Circulation: 1000 Copies Date Printing: 2018 Kabul Address: Qala-e-9 Borja, Kart-e-Parwan, Kabul Afghanistan Contact Number: (+93)799840161-(+93) (20)2232806 I Contents Illustrations ........................................................................................................... II Acronyms ........................................................................................................... VIII Foreword .............................................................................................................. IX Introduction.......................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One: Afghanistan’s peace processes post 2001 ................................... 12 Chapter Two: Level of awareness on the peace process ................................... 36 Chapter Three: People’s perception of the taliban ............................................ 41 Character of the taliban ................................................................................. 41 Popularity of the taliban ................................................................................. 51 Chapter Four: Evaluation of the current peace process .................................... 55 Possibility of peace with the taliban ............................................................... 58 Proposed peace solution ................................................................................. 65 A peace model ................................................................................................ 67 Role of women ................................................................................................ 72 The hekmatyar model ..................................................................................... 74 On the reintegration of the taliban ................................................................ 76 On the international dimension of the peace ................................................. 79 Locations of talks ............................................................................................ 83 High peace council .......................................................................................... 86 Spoilers and facilitators of peace process ...................................................... 90 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 94 Annex 1: Tables ................................................................................................. 104 Annex 2: Figures ............................................................................................... 134 Annex 3: Questionnaire .................................................................................... 145 Reference .......................................................................................................... 162 II ILLUSTRATIONS TABLES Regional factions of the Taliban 45 Demographic Profile of the respondents 104 Respondents provinces 105 Respondents regions 106 Level of awareness regarding the peace process 106 Level of awareness regarding the peace process; by gender 106 Level of awareness regarding the peace process; by nationality 106 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace 106 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace; by gender 107 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban for peace; by nationality 107 Perception regarding the conditions laid down by the Taliban 107 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the government 107 Level of awareness regarding the conditions laid down by the government; by nationality 107 Perception regarding the conditions laid down by the government for peace 108 Level of awareness regarding the US’s South Asia strategy 108 Level of awareness regarding the US’s South Asia strategy; by nationality 108 Appropriate description for the Taliban; by nationality 108 Appropriate description for the Taliban; by the level of acceptability of their behaviour 109 Comparison of the Taliban with ISKP 109 Comparison of the Taliban and ISKP; by nationality 109 Acceptability of the Taliban’s policies and conduct 109 Acceptability of the Taliban’s policies and conduct; by region 110 Acceptability of the Taliban’s policies and conduct; by the character of the Taliban 110 Perception regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively 110 Perception regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively; by education 110 III Acceptability of the conditions laid down by the Taliban 111 Acceptability of the conditions laid down by the Taliban; by nationality 111 Acceptability of the Taliban; by the level of satisfaction from HPC 111 Perception regarding the current peace process; by gender 111 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process; by nationality 111 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process;by zone 112 Level of failure of the peace process; by effectiveness of HPC 112 Perception regarding the level of failure of the peace process; by the perception regarding the level of possibility of peace 112 Perception regarding the government of Afghanistan’s weakness in the peace process 112 Chances of the Taliban’s success in the war and the government’s weakness 113 Perception regarding whether the international community intends to make peace 113 The reasons for the lack of intention in the international community to make peace 113 The reasons for the lack of intention in the international community to make peace; by the result of the peace process 113 Perception regarding whether the government of Afghanistan has the intention to make peace 114 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace 114 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by gender 114 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by nationality 114 Perception regarding whether the Taliban has the intention to make peace; by education 114 Chances of the Taliban’s success in the war 115 Perception regarding the chances of the Taliban’s success in the war; by acceptability of their behaviour 115 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban 115 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban; by the appropriate description for the Taliban 115 Perception regarding the possibility of peace with the Taliban; by the level of change in security dynamics post the Hekmatyar deal 116 IV People’s intention to make peace with the Taliban 116 People's intention to make peace with the Taliban; by region 116 Level of satisfaction and happiness about peace with the Taliban 116 Level of satisfaction and happiness about peace with the Taliban; by region 117 Effective approaches to deal with the Taliban 117 Approaches to follow as the Taliban reject peace 117 Possible steps for ending the conflict in Afghanistan at the international level 117 How much do the international forces help the peace process 118 How much do the international forces help the peace process; by nationality 118 How much do the international forces help the peace process; by region 118 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces; by the chances of the Taliban’s success in the war 118 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces; by the level of education 119 Perception regarding the effectiveness of the presence of international forces; by the appropriate description for the Taliban 119 Level of agreement with the US’s South Asia strategy 119 Level of agreement with the US’s South Asia strategy; by the chances of the Taliban’s success in the war 119 Level of agreement with the US’s South Asia strategy; by the importance of the role of women in the peace process 120 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban 120 Concessions to the Taliban 120 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban; by gender 120 Level of agreement with regard to giving concessions to the Taliban; by nationality 120 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban 121 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban; by gender 121 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban; by the level of importance of the role of women in the peace process 121 Conditions laid down by the people for peace with the Taliban;
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