Fire today ManagementVolume 70 • No. 1 • 2010
Managing Wildland Fire
United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service Share Your Story…
This issue of Fire Management Today explores the new Interagency Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. Striving to achieve sound natural resource management, apply the best available science, and collaborate among agencies, wildland fire management agencies changed their strategy in 2009 to allow fires to be managed concurrently for multiple objectives and to allow boundaries of fire management objectives to shift as fires move across the landscape. Along with this new implementation guidance come stories of success— acres burned, fires contained, and resource goals attained—and stories of frustration—communication errors, funding complications, and challeng- ing management scenarios.
Share your stories from the 2009 and 2010 fire seasons and your lessons learned about managing wildfire for resource benefits with the FMT com- munity. Send photos, excerpts, and articles to Monique LaPerriere, man- aging editor, at [email protected].
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Tom Vilsack, Secretary Melissa Frey U.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager
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Tom Harbour, Director Editors Fire and Aviation Management EMC Publishing Arts
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March 2010
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Fire Management Today 2 Fire Management today Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010
On the Cover: Contents Anchor Point: Managing Wildfire for Resource Benefits ...... 4 Tom Harbour
Implementing Federal Wildland Fire Policy—Responding to Change . . .6 Richard Lasko Organizational Learning Contributes to Guidance for Managing Wildland Fires for Multiple Objectives ...... 9 Thomas Zimmerman and Tim Sexton Wildland Fire Behavior Case Studies and the 1938 Honey Fire Controversy ...... 15 On The Cover: Martin E. Alexander and Stephen W. Taylor The Effects of Climatic Change and Wildland Fires on Air Quality A lightning storm over the Beaverjack Fire, a wildland fire in National Parks and Wilderness Areas ...... 27 use fire (now termed a wildfire) in Don McKenzie the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, The 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations: viewed from Hells Half Acre Lookout We Don’t Bend Them, We Don’t Break Them . . . in the Bitterroot National Forest, ID. Photograph by Mark S. Moak, We Don’t Know Them ...... 30 professor at Rocky Mountain College Bryan Scholz in Billings, MT, and lookout at Hells From Another Perspective—The 10s, 18s, and Fire Doctrine ...... 33 Half Acre, 2005. Larry Sutton The USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation The Potential for Restoring Fire-Adapted Ecosystems: Management Staff has adopted a logo reflecting three central principles of wildland Exploring Opportunities To Expand the Use of Wildfire fire management: as a Natural Change Agent ...... 36 Gregory H. Aplet and Bo Wilmer • Innovation: We will respect and value thinking minds, voices, and thoughts of Working Toward a Fire-Permeable Landscape— those that challenge the status quo while focusing on the greater good. Managing Wildfire for Resource Benefits in Remote, Rural, and Urban Areas of Alaska ...... 41
• Execution: We will do what we say we Mary Kwart and Morgan Warthin will do. Achieving program objectives, improving diversity, and accomplishing Fire Effects Information System: New Engine, Remodeled Interior, targets are essential to our credibility. Added Options ...... 46 • Discipline: What we do, we will do well. Jane Kapler Smith Fiscal, managerial, and operational discipline are at the core of our ability to fulfill our mission. Short Features Web Sites on Fire ...... 8 Introducing the Virtual Incident Procurement (VIPR) System . . . . .26
Firefighter and public safety is our first priority.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 3 by Tom Harbour Anchor Director, Fire and Aviation Management Point Forest Service, Washington, DC
Managing Wildfire for resourCe Benefits �
hange has come to wildland Naturally caused wildfires can Region, wildfires have been man- fire use (and its precursor, enhance many natural resource aged for resource benefits since Cprescribed natural fire). The values when we allow fire to play 1972. Managers and the public Federal Interagency Wildland Fire its natural role while we protect are beginning to see the advantages Community now has only two private property and social values. of allowing fire to play a natural kinds of fire: wildfire (unplanned For centuries, these lightning- role in some defined areas, the fire) and prescribed fire (planned caused fires have resulted not only same role it played more than 100 fire). According to the 2009 in the enhancement of land condi- years ago. “Guidance for Implementation of tions, but in better places for wild- Federal Wildland Fire Management life to live and roam. Simply stated, Climate change continues to chal- Policy,” the Forest Service and U.S. in some cases, fire on the landscape lenge the Nation and our national Department of the Interior agencies is beneficial, and resource manag- forests. Fire season comes earlier can now manage wildland fires for ers need to become more active and stays longer each year. Fires multiple objectives concurrently, in allowing it to be part of the burn with more intensity. They are and the objectives can change as natural landscape. more damaging and dangerous to the fire moves across the land- our firefighters, the public, and scape. This means that where fire people’s properties. When appro- is a major component of the eco- All fires have risks, priate, management of wildfires system, naturally ignited fires can but we have developed for resource benefits is one com- be managed to achieve resource sophisticated tools that ponent of fire management that benefits where the impacts to will assist us in predict- can help us improve the condition landscape are tolerable. What � of the land where, ultimately, we does that mean to us? Currently, ing what a fire will do. will be better able to control those in simple terms, wildland fire unwanted fires when they happen. management is comprised of two That’s not to say that managing types of fire. First, there are those wildfires for resource benefits We have individuals who specialize fires we plan and ignite; we refer comes without risks. All fires in managing naturally ignited wild- to them as prescribed fires. Then, have risks, but we have developed fires within the Forest Service, but there are unplanned fires, the ones sophisticated tools—and are devel- all of us need to be aware of and we call wildfires, which can be oping more—that will assist us support the new interagency strat- started either naturally (by light- in predicting what a fire will do— egy, in which fires can be managed ning strikes) or unnaturally (by where it will go and how it will act. for multiple objectives. We will humans). Although wildfires are, by continue to suppress human-caused definition, unplanned, we conduct Managing wildfires as an ecosys- fires at the lowest cost and with a planning and analysis process, tem process is a relatively new fire the fewest negative consequences closely linked to land management management strategy for most of possible. Naturally caused wildfires plans, in which we decide ahead us throughout the Forest Service. will not be used to benefit natural of time if we want to allow some However, there are some forests resources everywhere—not every naturally occurring fires to burn with long-standing histories of this location is appropriate. But, under in order to either reap a positive practice, referred to in the past as the right conditions, wildfires can resource benefit or to allow fire to wildland fire use, or prescribed nat- be a tremendous asset to effectively burn within tolerable limits set by ural fire. On national forests such move us toward our motto, “caring the agency administrator. as the Gila in the Southwest Region for the land and serving people.” and the Bitterroot in the Northern
Fire Management Today 4 iMpleMenting federal Wildland fire poliCy—responding to Change Richard Lasko
ederal wildland fire policy has significantly changed since the A revision to the 2003 Interagency Strategy F1935 introduction of the “10 removes the distinction between wildland � a.m. policy,” whereby all wildland fires were to be contained by 10 fire use and wildfire. This will enhance � a.m. on the day following ignition. a fire manager’s ability to implement � Although revisions to policy and Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy � implementation guidance have by allowing consideration of the full range of often been the result of tragic loss- of-life events or notably destructive positive and negative attributes of a fire. � fire seasons, other factors have provided an impetus to examine relationships between wildland fire cal distinction between wildland fire is a necessary disturbance for policy and Federal land managers’ fire use and wildfire. Field deploy- the overall health and diversity of mandate to protect life and proper- ment of this change began in 2009. many ecosystems. The fires of the ty while managing ecosystems. The 2000 fire season stimulated further exponential growth of the wildland- Implementing Federal debate and fostered acceptance for urban interface—a result of rapid Wildland Fire Policy— the idea that fire exclusion had development in and near wildland Changes Since 1988 increased fire hazards in vegetation areas—coupled with the dramatic types historically characterized by The Yellowstone National Park fires increase in wildland fire frequency frequent, low- to mixed-severity of 1988 reinvigorated the debate (fig. 1), intensity, and size (fig. 2), fire regimes. The 2000 fire season over management of wildland fire and an increasing need to use fire also nurtured the concept that fire and raised public awareness that to meet natural resource objectives exclusion is not operationally or provided the latest incentives to take a fresh look at the guidance for implementation of Federal wildland fire policy.
Continuing the quest to provide land managers with relevant Federal wildland fire policy, the interagency fire community field- tested potential modifications to the 2003 “Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy.” Based on information from the field test and discussions with the fire community, fire management agen- cies modified the Implementation Strategy and removed the categori-
Richard Lasko is the assistant director, Fire and Aviation Management, Fuels and Fire Figure 1—The number of fires greater than 100,000 acres (40,500 ha) in size has Ecology, Forest Service. increased dramatically over the years.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 5 actions implemented on a wildfire to minimize loss may be essentially the same as those implemented for a wildland fire use event to achieve resource management objectives.
The distinction imposed by the two categories presented difficulties in addressing the biophysical, tempo- ral, and spatial complexities of wild- land fire events. The fact is that the effectiveness and efficacy of a fire management strategy in protecting public values and achieving natural resource goals is highly situational. As fire moves across the landscape, scenery, structures, and valued Figure 2—Acres burned, in millions, 1960–2007. resources are threatened at the same time that land management ecologically desirable in infrequent, manage a fire to achieve resource benefits are realized. stand-replacing fire regimes. This benefits or (author’s emphasis) discussion led to the development manage a fire to reduce losses and Success of a fire management strat- of the “National Fire Plan,” part minimize suppression costs. While egy is dependent upon an intricate of a national program linking fire all person-caused fires were to be web of conditions. Fire managers research with land management managed as wildfires and treated as encounter changing levels of risk as practices to address the changing such, land and resource manage- fires occur throughout the season. forest conditions. ment plans or fire management Actions that may be successful and plans could identify the appropri- sensible under one set of conditions In 1995, the “Federal Wildland Fire ateness of using natural ignitions to may be unachievable or unrealistic Management Policy” addressed the achieve resource benefits through under more extreme conditions of role of fire as a natural disturbance wildland fire use. Regardless of weather and terrain or with regard and moved fire planning toward the chosen strategy, the 2003 to the national and regional pri- integration with resource man- Interagency Strategy required that orities that dictate availability of agement. Natural ignitions could Federal land managers respond fire management resources. Costs be managed to achieve natural to all wildland fire events with an of a management action may be resource benefits and maintain fire- appropriate management response, inordinately high in relation to the dependent ecosystems. The 1995 which allowed the use of any tactic resources protected or improved. policy also introduced the appropri- (or combination of tactics), from ate management response concept, monitoring to intensive manage- Engaging the Future which was further refined in the ment actions, to achieve a defined 2001 “Review of Federal Wildland strategic objective. The 2008 field test of modifications Fire Management Policy.” to the 2003 “Interagency Strategy Impetus for Change for the Implementation of Federal The 2003 “Interagency Strategy Wildland Fire Management Policy,” The 2003 “Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal and the subsequent dialogue and for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy” collaborative engagement with Wildland Fire Management Policy,” broadened the scope of fire man- many of our partners and the divides unplanned fire events agement to balance fire suppression public provided the opportunity into two categories: wildland fire with management for ecosystem to carefully reconsider the 2003 use and wildfire. The distinction sustainability. It defined the alter- Implementation Strategy. The 2009 between the two categories is often native strategies available to man- revision to the 2003 “Interagency obscured, especially when tactical age unplanned natural ignitions: Strategy for the Implementation of
Fire Management Today 6 Federal Wildland Fire Management Web Sites On Fire Policy” removes the categorical distinction between wildland fire use and wildfire. The revision pro- Ecosystem Restoration Through Fire vides fire managers with the flex- A diverse group of volunteers is promoting the use of controlled fire ibility to respond successfully to to restore and maintain ecosystem health on the Mendocino National changing conditions and address Forest and surrounding lands. This campaign, called “Restore the the complexities of the wildland Mendo,” has generated support from local governments, landowner fire environment encountered on associations, and individual citizens as well as State and national a fire event. This will enhance a environmental groups. fire manager’s ability to implement Federal Wildland Fire Management The Web site at
Watching the Red. Mandi Unick keeps an eye on burnout operations on the Cub Creek Complex, Lassen National Forest, CA. The lightning-caused fire burned more than 19,000 acres in northern California. Photo: Aaron Black-Schmidt, Squad Leader, Columbia River Division Initial Attack Crew, Wenatchee-Okanogan National Forest, June 2008.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 7 organizational learning ContriButes to guidanCe for Managing Wildland fires for Multiple oBjeCtives Thomas Zimmerman and Tim Sexton
ince the inception of organized fire suppression in the early As organizational learning has affected the entire wildland fire man- S1900s, wildland fire manage- agement program, its influence on the management of wildland fires ment has dramatically evolved in for resource benefits has accounted for significant advances, directly operational complexity; ecologi- contributing to the program’s evolution and growth, including: cal significance; social, economic, and political magnitude; areas and • � Expanded knowledge and understanding of fire ecology and the timing of application; and recog- natural role of fire; nition of potentially serious con- • � Continual adjustments to the Federal wildland fire management policy; • � Focused planning, procedures, and precision; Social pressures and • � Advanced risk assessment of management knowledge and capabilities; organizational biases • � Expanded and improved directions and magnitude have created barriers to of operational procedures; program development • � Increased management of fires as an ecological process, with for wildland fire implementation scales expanded beyond wilderness areas and into all fire regimes and vegetation types; management. • � Improved capability to manage fires for multiple objectives, and to redefine those objectives throughout the life of a fire; sequences. Throughout the past • � Improved capability to manage fires across a wider fire behavior 100 years, fire management has range; and matured from a single-dimensional • � Implemented after-action reviews to observe, evaluate, and program focused solely on control document accomplishments, successes, and failures. and immediate extinguishment to a multidimensional program. Throughout this period, fire man- agers have adapted their responses tives described in the applicable responses supported by the new to changing conditions, emerging land and resource management “Guidance for Implementation of knowledge, and increasing experi- plans and fire management plans. Federal Wildland Fire Management ence. Now, they can utilize the full Policy” (USDA and USDI 2009). spectrum of responses to wildland The expanded knowledge of fire’s fire to achieve both protection and natural role has markedly facili- What we know today about man- ecological benefits based on objec- tated the increased use of wild- agement of wildland fires to meet land fire to accomplish beneficial resource objectives evolved from Tom Zimmerman is the program man- ecological effects. Management of decisions made nearly 40 years ago ager for the Wildland Fire Management naturally caused wildland fire to about the use of fire in wilderness Research, Development, and Application Program, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain protect, maintain, and enhance areas, national parks, and other Research Station, Boise, ID. Tim Sexton is resources and, as nearly as possible, lands. This progressive think- the national fuels specialist for the Forest to function in its natural ecological ing and the associated adaptive Service, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID. role, is one of many management responses have extended fire man-
Fire Management Today 8 Table 1—Critical tasks important to organizational learning.
Task Specific Activity Outcome
Acquire new • Collect information; • Information and existing information information. • Consolidate program history and from personal sources documented; —current status; and • Information accuracy validated; • Develop shared vision. • Current policies, procedures, and processes reviewed; and • Program goals and purposes better defined.
Analyze the best • Analyze program development; • Programmatic needs identified; procedures. • Examine past performance; • Past practices, both good and bad, • Establish standards and baselines; both limiting and facilitating, evalu- and ated; • Analyze interdependency of all • Past experiences that need to be rep- program elements. licated or eliminated identified; and • Best practices that lead to superior performance and accomplishment identified.
Apply knowledge, • Experiment with new knowledge • Continual flow of new ideas, knowl- processes, technol- applications; edge, and technology into application ogy, and proven • Experiment with new technological established; practices. applications; • Distinction between factual informa- • Incorporate best knowledge and tion, perceptions, and personal technology into business; viewpoints recognized; • Address problem solving; and • Knowledge, principles, guidelines, • Transfer knowledge. procedures, practices, etc., trans- ferred through all available methods to practitioners; and • Application through the use of a dynamic learning environment improved.
Archive overall • Document program development, • Information transfer processes processes and practices, and organizational growth; improved; results. and • New practices, experiences, and • Ensure the retention of critical knowledge, both positive and nega- information. tive, documented; and • All information for future reference and application retained. agers’ knowledge and experience. Organizational Learning land fires and has increased the We now think of management of ability of personnel to manage fires Organizational learning has con- naturally caused ignitions as for multiple objectives by: tributed to continuous and pro- an essential tool for achieving • Recognizing the importance of grammatic development of the beneficial ecological effects. consolidating program guidance for management of wild- examination;
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 � 9 • � Acquiring new information; The conviction that all has been placed on identifying best • � Analyzing the best procedures; practices for wildland fire manage- • � Applying knowledge, processes, wildland fires can and ment, efficiency and accomplish- technology, and proven prac- should be suppressed ment have improved; yet despite tices; and is long standing, but this development, resistance still • � Archiving the overall processes mixed success in affects resource agencies to some and results and using the degree today. information to improve achieving this provides program effectiveness. widespread support for Changing Perspectives
defining multiple fire Today, organizational learning Fire managers recognize the management objectives. promotes a broader understanding importance of examining the and awareness that is beginning results of management responses to change outdated thinking and to wildland fire and applying the all wildland fires can and should reduce barriers. Organizational information to improve program be suppressed is long standing, but learning is spurring policy revi- effectiveness. However, organiza- mixed success in achieving this sions, directing funding, and tions are sometimes controlled by provides widespread support for relaxing fiscal constraints for man- social influences that hinder inno- defining multiple fire management aging wildland fires for multiple vation and administrative mandates objectives. This belief has limited objectives. The 2009 “Guidance that limit response. fire managers from full utilization for Implementation of Federal of “emerging knowledge” of fire’s Wildland Fire Management Policy” Barriers to Managing natural role, fire effects, and the allows wildland fires to be managed Wildland Fire as an ramifications of fire exclusion in concurrently for many objectives Ecological Process the development of management and allows personnel to redefine Social pressures and organizational responses. those objectives as conditions biases have created barriers to pro- change. Additionally, public percep- gram development for the manage- Administrative barriers have existed tions and support have improved, ment of wildland fires as a natural throughout the history of wildland workforce limitations have been process. Such internal and external fire management. Use of wildland reduced, and safety concerns have forces have led to divisiveness and a fires to support ecological processes been addressed. lack of clear and concise messages, has been viewed as an action that direction, and goals. This situation is distinctly separate from wildland Finally, fire’s role in a healthy has stifled overall organizational fire management and with different ecosystem is receiving positive growth, restricted productivity, and operating standards. Internal poli- recognition. Management of wild- has most certainly fueled negative cymaker resistance to changes that land fire for ecological benefits public attention. advocate expanded use of wildland has grown from a wilderness-only fire have surfaced in every review application to one that spans all Public and governmental responses and revision of wildland fire man- land-use situations with marked to specific fire situations have agement policy. increases of land types considered promoted agency reluctance to suitable for application and expand- advance wildland fire manage- Managing wildland fire to achieve ed operational capabilities. ment and resulted in procedural land and resource management statements, operational guidance, goals continues to be riddled with References and other circumstances intended misperceptions and misinforma- USDA and USDI. 2009. Guidance for to limit the magnitude and slow tion, which have limited both Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire programmatic growth and overall Management Policy. Washington, DC: implementation of change in fire U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. management. The conviction that effectiveness. As more credibility Department of the Interior: 20 p.
Fire Management Today 10 Table 2—Specific examples of organizational learning benefits that support the management of wildland fire for resource benefits.
Changes and Learned Outcome Fire Management Advancements
Expanded • Better understanding of wildland fire • Significant knowledge base of litera- knowledge of as a natural process and of its role in ture and reference materials estab- fire and its restoring and maintaining healthy eco- lished; The Fire Effects Information natural role systems; and System Web site
Continual • Understanding that wildland fire • Accountability for long-term adjustments policy must provide flexible and unplanned fire events managed for of policy responsive direction for wildland fire resource benefits that consider pre- management—without unnecessary paredness levels and fire management constraints, and readily adapting to plan completion; emerging knowledge, technology, • Prescribed natural fire eliminated as and science. a strategy; • Wildland fire use eliminated as a defined and separate entity from other wildfires; • Approval of naturally caused ignitions to be managed as an ecological process, and to be managed for multiple objectives. • Fiscal procedures established that are conducive to greater use of wildland fire for resource benefits; • Standardized qualification of all fire management activities; and • Specific policy elements in the areas of science, planning, fire management, and ecosystem sustainability.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 11 Changes and Learned Outcome Fire Management Advancements
Improved • Successful application of fire to ecosys- • Guidance to incorporate fire effects planning tems depends upon detailed planning and the natural role of fire information processes at all levels from the land management into land management plans; plan to the fire management plan • Land management processes that and into specific fire implementation guide fire management planning and action planning. implementation; • Fire management plans that translate and support land management plans and on-the-ground action; • The Wildland Fire Decision Support System, providing the most detailed and comprehensive fire management planning and implementation informa- tion for fire use decision and tactical action to accomplish the strategic objectives of an unplanned igntion managed for resource benefits; and • A process developed with a focus on efficient long-term risk assessment, strategic planning, and tactical imple- mentation instead of short-term, tacti- cal operational implementation.
Risk assessment • Acceptance of the importance of • Significant advances in predicting and decision assessing risks associated with wild- fire behavior spread and intensity, support tools land fire management in terms of val- analyzing climatological and meteoro- ues, hazards, and probability in order logical data, and assessing rare to more adequately determine if the weather occurrences; level of risk can be accepted and suc- • Advances in predicting fire effects, cessfully mitigated or eliminated; and smoke production, and smoke disper- • Recognition of the importance of sal; estimating fire-spread areas; iden- obtaining better information, reducing tifying values at risk; and evaluating uncertainty, assessing potential fire probabilities of the fire spatial extent; outcomes, evaluating consequences of • Enhanced experience and knowledge failure, determining probabilities of in utilizing this kind of information in success, evaluating potential costs, and support of fire management decision- identifying values to be protected to making, planning, and implementa- better support decisionmaking. tion; and • Improved decisionmaking processes.
Fire Management Today 12 Changes and Learned Outcome Fire Management Advancements
Increased • Balanced fire management program • Improved understanding of wildfire management with multiple management objectives; and its primary and secondary benefits; of wildland fires • Recognition of the value and impor- and for ecological tance of managing wildland fire for • Expanded fire management accom- benefits resource benefits; and plishments, strengthened ecosys- • Recognition of the role wildfire can tem maintenance and restoration, play in long-term restoration pro- increased vegetation mosaics, grams. decreased long-term wildfire potential, increased community protection, and advanced land management practices.
Development • Better understanding that operational • Increased capability to respond to of operational mitigation actions must include the wildland fire under a wider range of procedures full range of firefighting responses and jurisdictional situations and individual tactics as appropriate to the specific management areas; situation; and • Ability to acquire and utilize all • Understanding that successful wildland firefighting resources as needed to fire management requires detailed respond to wildland fires, regardless of planning that defines threats, opera- objectives; and tional mitigation actions, constraints, • Established dedicated resources for number, and types of resources need- use in managing wildland fire for ed, and contingency actions. resource benefits.
Expansion • Acceptance of the use of wildland fire • Increased vegetation mosaics, beyond to protect, maintain, and enhance decreased long-term wildfire potential, wilderness resources and, as nearly as possible, to and increased community protection function in its natural ecological role capabilities resulting from the expan- as an effective management practice in sion of the use of wildland fire as an wilderness and nonwilderness; and ecological process outside wilderness; • Realization that successful manage- and ment across all landscapes is depen- • Expanded fire management accom- dent upon continued and proactive plishments, strengthened ecosystem collaboration among Federal and State maintenance and restoration, com- agencies, private organizations, and munity protection strategies, and private landowners. advanced land management practices achieved by managing naturally caused ignitions to accomplish resource ben- efits beyond wilderness to across all land-use situations, where applicable.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 13 Changes and Learned Outcome Fire Management Advancements
Management • Understanding of the need to include • Growing experience with managing across wider fire wildland fire management across all fire in all fire regime classes and all behavior ranges fire regime classes and diverse situa- fire behavior scenarios; and tions, depending on land management • Successful examples of management direction and constraints; and of high-intensity stand replacement • Understanding that the success of wildland fires. managing wildland fire for resource benefits is measured by fire effects and not solely by fire type and behavior.
Use of After • Immediate illumination of both suc- • Immediate feedback to program Action Reviews cesses and failures; efficiency; • Awareness of the importance of timely • Facilitated progression toward a and frank assessments of actions and high-reliability organization; and presentation of outcomes regardless of • Established dynamic feedback success or failure; and mechanism supporting improved • Understanding the importance of and advanced processes, procedures, documenting both successes and fail- and policy. ures in fire management planning and implementation.
Documentation • Understanding the importance of • Markedly improved and advanced archiving both successes and failures training; and in fire management planning and • A substantial record of accomplish- implementation; and ments, examples, case studies, etc., • Understanding the value of saving accessible to fire management examples and practical knowledge. practitioners.
Fire Management Today 14 Wildland fire Behavior Case studies and the 1938 honey fire Controversy Martin E. Alexander and Stephen W. Taylor
ver the past 90 years, fire Later, a member of the research research has contributed to The story of the Honey crew published a case study that Oour understanding of wildland Fire and the ensuing not only analyzed the fire’s behav- fire behavior through laboratory ior but also critiqued the actions of and field experiments, physical and controversy is as much the suppression forces. That article, empirical modeling, numerical about human behavior in turn, provoked a harsh outcry. simulations, analyses of individual as it is about fire fire reports, and wildfire case stud- behavior. Synopsis of the Honey ies. Although basic research on Fire Case Study combustion is essential to a full understanding of fire behavior, 1938, originally published in Fire Chronology and Behavior such research would not be very Control Notes by Olsen (1941)— The major run of the Honey Fire useful without actual field experi- one of the first comprehensive case took place on January 25, 1938, ence gained and case study docu- studies of a wildland fire under- on the Catahoula Ranger District mentation (Brown 1959). taken by fire behavior researchers. of the Kisatchie National Forest This account was reprinted in the in north-central Louisiana (fig. 1). In general terms, what is a case Fall 2003 issue of Fire Management A total of 494 fires were to burn study? Contributors on Wikipedia Today, the first of three special more than 12,800 acres (5,180 ha) (
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 15 Suggested Strategy and Tactics Timeline and Tactics Olsen made many positive comments on prepared- Initial Fire Behavior and Attack ness, dispatch time, equipment, and crew morale The fire started at 9:50 a.m. on the east side of the under trying conditions. However, he felt that, given Louisiana & Arkansas (L & A) Railroad (point A). the extreme fire behavior during the fire’s initial Crew 1 (a pumper truck and 2 men) and Crew 2 (a run, indirect attack by backfiring was the only fea- fire boss and 12 men) were dispatched to the fire’s sible control measure and valuable time had been presumed point of origin. When they arrived, the lost in direct attack at the point of origin. He sug- fire had a perimeter of 2,640 feet (805 m) and was gested that if the pumper truck and crews 2, 3, and spreading at about 360 feet per minute (110 meters 4 had begun aggressive backfiring earlier along the per minute). Crew 2 began to work the north flank of west firebreak, the fire might have been held there. the fire. The pumper truck could not be used because He also suggested that the fire boss and crew leaders of wet ground and was redeployed to join Crews 3 should not have worked directly on the line along- and 4 (a total of 31 men), who had started backfiring side their crews, but should have been more engaged along the west side of Tower Road. The fire boss then in directing and managing the firefighting operation. split Crew 2, taking five men (Crew 2A) overland to the west firebreak, and leaving seven men (Crew 2B) at the north flank. By 10:30 a.m., the fire reached the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp and Tower Road, where it was stopped at the line created by the backfires and the pumper truck. Crews 3 and 4 then joined Crew 2A on the west firebreak and began backfiring and attacking the north flank of the fire near the head. At 10:44 a.m., the wind shifted to the southwest, creating a new head (point B), which by 10:53 a.m. had spread to the west firebreak, where it was held by the backfiring operation; however, all of the constructed line on the north flank was lost. Later Fire Behavior and Tactics After the wind shift, the north flank, from the tail to the west firebreak (now effectively the head), was left to burn freely, which resulted in fire spread to and spotting across the west firebreak with new heads developing between the west firebreak and Tower Road (points C, D, and F). Crews continued patrolling and backfiring along the east and west firebreaks, Tower Road, and Highway 19. The south flank of the fire was stopped by patrols (22 men), a cultivated field, backfiring against Highway 19, and a wind shift to the southwest. Final Attack During the final attack on the fire, crews reinforced the backfires on the Tower Road and east firebreak (although spot fires at points G and H occurred across the Tower Road and east firebreak) and worked the north flank from the rear or tail of the fire to the head, mopping up as they went, aided by the pumper truck and additional crews. The fire was contained at 2:43 p.m. by a force of 19 supervisors Maps of fire progress and summary of fire suppression activities and 129 men. The fire was mopped-up and declared and general fire behavior associated with the major run of the out some 4 hours later. 1938 Honey Fire (adapted from Olsen 1941).
Fire Management Today 16 Station of the Forest Service, fireline intensities, determined more than 3 years’ accumulation. and three others (A.H. Antonie, after the fact and based on these Available fuel loads would have R. Brooks, and C.A. Bickford) observed spread rates and estimated been in the order of 3.4 tons per were members of a research crew fuel consumption, ranged from acre (7.6 tonnes per hectare), based assigned to study the behavior 6,660 to 9,295 British thermal on the sampling carried out by of free-burning wildfires in the units per second per foot (23,050 Bruce (1951). region (Harper 1937, Olsen 1938). to 32,170 kw/m) with correspond- Normally, the crew was dispatched ing flame lengths averaging 26 to Although air temperatures were with initial attack forces. However, 30 feet (8 to 9 m) (Byram 1959). considered “crisp” at 45 to 50 in the case of the Honey Fire, the However, flames at the head of the degrees Fahrenheit (7.2 to 10 crew happened to arrive on scene fire “frequently reached out in long degrees Celsius), moderately low (at 9:53 a.m.) within 3 minutes of tongues extending 100 feet [30 relative humidities prevailed (26 to the fire’s origin; they had been trav- meters] or more” (Olsen 1941), no 33 percent). The moisture content eling about a mile (1.6 km) behind doubt in response to momentary of the fine, dead, fire-carrying fuels the train south along U.S. Highway gusts of wind (table 1). was determined to be about 12 per- 167, which ran parallel to and west cent. Winds were moderately strong of the railroad tracks (see descrip- and gusty (table 1), and shifted tion on previous page). When should the about 90 degrees, from northwest observer drop � to southwest, during the initial Within 2 minutes of happening major run. upon the initiating fire, the four- the camera and person crew began mapping the notebook and pick up � Fire Suppression fire perimeter (fig. 1) in order to a shovel or pulaski? � The Civilian Conservation Corps determine rates of fire spread and and Work Projects Administration fire size, collecting fuel and soil provided 129 firefighters and 19 samples for analysis of moisture Environmental Conditions supervisory personnel for suppres- content, recording fire weather The fire started in an area that sion duty on the Honey Fire. They data, and making notes on various was “typical of open cut-over used a single 350-gallon (1,325-L) fire behavior characteristics (e.g., longleaf pine land in the Upper pumper truck along with the stan- flame size and spotting distances). Coastal Plain” (Olsen 1941), the dard fire tools of the day—swatters Unfortunately, to our knowledge, predominant fuel being a heavy or flaps (Sykes 1940), backpack the crew took no photographs stand of cured broomsedge grass pumps, fire rakes, fusees, and during or immediately after the (Andropogon sp.) resulting from axes. Some photographs illustrat- fire. The technology of the time would not likely have permitted the Table 1—Onsite wind speeds measured during the major run of the 1938 Honey Fire research crew to have radio com- (adapted from Olsen 1941) munication with the local fire sup- pression organization (Gray 1982). Duration and exposure mph km/h Average at 3.5 feet (1.1 m) above ground 9.7 15.6 At one point, the Honey Fire advanced almost 2 miles (3.2 km) Average at 20-foot (6.1-m) open standard 15 24 during a 30-minute interval follow- Average at 33-foot (10-m) open standard 17 27 ing ignition, and the fire eventually Maximum 1-minute average at 3.5 feet 16.6 26.7 burned a total area of 1,092 acres (1.1 m) above ground (442 ha) before containment at 2:43 p.m. on the day of origin. The Maximum 1-minute at 20-foot (6.1-m) 25 40 Honey Fire’s documented rate of open standard advance ranged from 330 to 463 Maximum 1-minute at 33-foot (10-m) open standard 29 47 feet per minute (101 to 141 meters per minute). Spot fires over 200 Note: The 20-foot (6.1-m) and 33-foot (10-m) open wind speeds used for fire danger rating and fire behavior prediction in the United States and Canada, respectively, were estimated feet (61 m) in advance of the main from the observation at 3.5 feet (1.1 m), as per Lawson and Armitage (2008). head were observed. Computed
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 17 A Suggestion To Help Improve Fire ing firefighting scenes of the era and general geographical location Suppression Tactics* associated with the Honey Fire are presented here. he morale and determination of all men were excellent, and in many cases remarkable. Virtually all of them used their flaps and back- Communication on the fireline Tpack pumps effectively, showing that the training they had received would have been difficult under was very much worthwhile. During the hot flank attacks, however, the the circumstances. There would flapmen [i.e., firefighters using swatters that are commonly used in have been no radio communication containment of grass fires] relied heavily upon the pumpermen spray- capability between the local district ing water to knock down the flames. The men should be trained to office and the fire boss or among rely less upon water in fighting the flanks by having the crew leaders the fire suppression crews temporarily stop suppression and rest the crews when the wind shifts (Gray 1982). on a flank, resulting in a very hot fire to fight. More line on the flanks will be extinguished and held by resting a crew while the fire is burning In addition to observing and intensely and then efficiently directing them when the heat and flames recording the fire’s development have diminished. and chronology, Olsen’s crew docu- mented the fire suppression activi- Two firefighters attack a spot ties and the fire’s resistance to con- fire in 4-year-old rough using trol (e.g., arrival time, suppression swatters or flaps, South Carolina. Photo: George K. Stephenson, tactics, amount of constructed and Forest Service, 1944. held line, and general difficulties experienced by the firefighters). No firefighters were killed or injured during the Honey Fire, but Olsen (1941) acknowledged that, after the wind shifted, “the danger of a crew getting trapped by the high, oncoming flames was great” along the left flank of the fire. Firefighters use backpack pumps and a swatter or flap on a small grass fire, The Controversy Georgia. Photo: Clint Davis, Forest Service, 1942. � That Followed Roy Headley, who served as head of fire control for the Forest Service from 1919 to 1942, was interested in analyzing the accounts of large fires for the lessons that they might provide. For the year 1938, the Honey Fire was the third largest of the 13 Class E fires (fires greater than 300 acres [121 ha] in size) in the Southern Region of the Forest Civilian Conservation Corps Service and 1 of 5 large fires on crew undertaking suppression the Kisatchie National Forest. A action on a wildfire with little more than a third of the area backpack pumps and handtools, Ozark National Forest, burned by the Honey Fire had been Arkansas. Photo: Bluford W. planted with slash pine seedlings Muir, Forest Service, 1938. about a year earlier. Wildfires had been and continued to be a chronic problem for the reforestation pro- *Excerpt from Olsen (1941).
Fire Management Today 18 Lessons Learned in Large Danger Meter for the Southern and Southeastern United States Fire Management* (Jemison and others 1949).
uch an infinite variety of problems are involved Olsen and his fellow crew members in the management of large fire jobs that were criticized for not immediately Sthoughtful men seldom fail to learn from each attempting to suppress the fire. one something which should be guarded against However, the forest supervisor had in the future, something which should be done previously agreed that this research differently, some cherished belief which must be crew was free of any obligation modified or abandoned. For 35 years I have been to undertake any fire suppression working on or observing suppression jobs, but I action so that the best possible fire still learn something from every fire I reach. Roy Headley, circa behavior data could be obtained. It’s 1942. In “Re-thinking unlikely that they could have done Sometimes, alas, we “learn the same lesson over Forest Fire Control,” much anyway: “With two fences and over”—or do we? For example, I have learned Headley (1943) and a railroad between them and throughout many years that there is some flaw summarized the lessons he had the fire, there is no doubt that their in our management of larger fires which keeps us learned from a long truck was unusable on this fire” from getting a reasonable output of held line from and distinguished (Olsen 1941). Furthermore, when a crew of a given size. Plenty of other people have career in fire control administration with the research crew arrived on the learned the same thing. But, untrained as we are the Forest Service. scene, the fire had already advanced in the science and art of management, we have not Photo: courtesy of more than 100 feet (30 meters) found ways to act satisfactorily on what we have Stephen J. Pyne, from its point of origin and “was learned. Our learning has too often failed to lead to Arizona State University. very definitely too big for them productive action. to hold with hand tools alone” (Olsen 1941). The first essential in such matters is to grasp the need for change, the nature and importance of a problem, the chance to introduce Olsen’s (1941) account of the something better. With that fact in mind, the outline for 1938 reports Honey Fire included considerable on larger fires requested a record of lessons learned by the man or commentary on the actions taken men who had most to do with each fire. Some of the most suggestive by fire suppression personnel in answers received are quoted in this article. … All fire-control men may addition to his description of fire benefit by the lessons learned on these fires. Perhaps these notes will behavior and the associated fire help reduce the number of times lessons have to be “relearned” by dif- environment. This commentary ferent men—or by the same men. was presumably in part the result,
*Excerpt from Headley (1939a), which was published when Roy Headley headed the Division of Fire Control, according to the editor of Fire Forest Service, Washington, DC. Control Notes at the time, of a board review held by the regional forester that provided additional gram that began in 1930 when the 1969; Riebold 1956). Yet as Cheney information to the Southern Kisatchie National Forest was first and Sullivan (2008) have rightly Forest Experiment Station for established (Burns 1982, 1994). pointed out, there are inherent use in its study of the Honey Fire dangers with backfiring that limit (Olsen 1941). In his analysis of the Honey Fire, the chances of success. At the time, Headley (1939b) felt that the fire the fire boss was required to rely Olsen (1941) indicated that one of boss had failed to recognize the solely on his general knowledge and his objectives in publishing his case severity of the burning conditions experience; no guide to judging fire study was “to offer constructive that prevailed at the time and thus potential relevant to the fuel type criticism and suggestions as a guide failed to select an appropriate strat- was available at the time. Less than in planning suppression action for egy and tactics for containing the 2 years later, Bickford and Bruce future fires burning under similar fire, namely backfiring from exist- (1939a) produced what evolved conditions.” He also offered many ing roads and firebreaks (Cooper into the Coastal Plain Forest Fire positive observations.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 19 Despite his good intentions, Reflections and others 2007), highlighting Olsen was criticized in an article firefighter safety incidents (e.g., Wildfire case studies are invalu- published in 1942 in Fire Control Pearce 2007), and fostering institu- able in providing fire behavior data Notes. Barry (1942) chastised the tional memory of local, historically for developing and evaluating fire fire behavior research crew for not significant fires (e.g., Ward 2005) behavior models (e.g., Pearce 2002, attempting to control the fire; he represent other valuable contribu- Townsend and Anderson 2006) and also deemed it inappropriate for fire tions. Case studies of prescribed as a source of training material research personnel to analyze or fires (e.g., Alexander 2006) are just (Alexander 2002). The recent report critique the efforts of the fire sup- as valuable as their wildfire coun- on the 2006 Billo Road Fire in New pression personnel involved after terparts. A combination of case South Wales, Australia, by Cruz and the fact. Further, Barry asserted study knowledge, experienced judg- Plucinski (2007) is a good example that such actions could have seri- ment, and simulation modeling of of this traditional role of wildfire ous repercussions on the image and fire behavior is seen as the most case studies. Documentation of the morale of the organization and that effective approach to appraising effects of fuel treatments on fire only those fires that had escaped fire potential and predicting wild- behavior in relation to fire sup- initial attack should be the subject land fire behavior (Alexander 2007, pression effectiveness (e.g., Murphy of fire behavior studies. Alexander and Thomas 2004). Lessons-Learned Analyses The Louisiana State law requires that the railroad free of the Honey Fire* their right-of-way from combustible material. The forest [Forest Service] has never been able to force n this case the fault lies with the fire boss in his fail- the L. & A. to do this. The railroad officials have been ure to recognize extreme fire conditions that existed warned, both in person and by letter, many times. Ion January 25, and to modify his attack to fit these Also, they have paid suppression cost and damages for extreme conditions. If he had recognized the dan- other fires caused by their railroad. Railroad business ger, or had means other than his general knowledge is rather poor, and the officials took the attitude that and experience to guide him in selecting the correct they could not afford to keep rights-of-way clear as method of attack, the fire would have been controlled required by law. Reimbursement of damages and much easier, and with a somewhat smaller acreage. suppression costs amounting to $2,160.62 has been Instead of attempting a direct attack, had he backfired asked for. all existing roads and firebreaks facing the oncoming fire, the fire would have been controlled at about 700 Since this fire occurred, however, the railroad officials acres [280 ha] and the slash-pine plantation inside of have decided it is cheaper to clear the right-of-way the fence would have been saved. The amount of held than to pay damage and suppression costs. Both the line per man-hour would have been at least tripled. L. & A. Railroad and Missouri-Pacific Railroad Cos. One answer is a well-constructed, fire-danger meter have cleared their rights-of-way of combustible mate- which will leave as little as possible to the judgment rial within the forest boundary. For the first time in of the fire boss on the fire line. the history of the Kisatchie Forest, we will enter the 1938-39 fire season without the constant hazard of The only method of controlling this fire at a smaller railroad fires. acreage after it had started would have been an imme- diate attack by the indirect method by backfiring. Fusees used for backfiring in some of the tool boxes Under such conditions, tank trucks and specialized had absorbed enough moisture from the air to be equipment are of very little value. A strip of burned worthless. The wet or damp fusees could not be ground at least 400 feet [120 m] wide is necessary to detected by casual examination. Some delay in back- stop the heads of such a fire. firing was caused by these dud fusees. Fusees cost only about 9 cents a piece, and this failure could have The fire was started by the L. & A. Railroad train been eliminated by simply replacing old fusees with which was temporarily stalled at the point of origin. new ones every 30 days.
*Excerpt from Headley (1939b), which was published when Roy Headley headed the Division of Fire Control, Forest Service, Washington, DC.
Fire Management Today 20 Criticism of the Actions of the Wildfire Behavior Documentation Crew on the Honey Fire* reading of the article by C.F. refrain from an attempt to check decrease spirit and morale in a Olsen, entitled “An Analysis or retard the spread of this fire marked degree. Moreover, the fire- A of the Honey Fire,” in the when it was approximately 100 behavior crew has been permitted October 1941 issue of Fire Control feet long is hard to understand. to make capital of their question- Notes, brings to attention a situa- We would expect more from four able action by printing the results tion hard to imagine. Of course, it untrained men off the street as of their study. is practically impossible for us at a quality of citizenship. Forest this remote location to visualize Service guard-training instruc- There is no quarrel with the policy all the factors; nevertheless, after tions have emphasized for years of conducting fire-behavior stud- making generous allowances, I still that there is always something ies, and the men assigned to that experience an unpleasant jolt when that even a single guard can do duty should not be expected to I think of what happened. to retard the spread of a fire, take part in the suppression work although it may be obvious that a on fires that have escaped first There were two branches of the frontal attack is impossible. The control efforts. However, there same department involved in the failure to make some attempt in should be no tolerance of a policy suppression of a fire, one inter- that direction on the part of this permitting an organized crew of ested in determining how the fire fire-behavior crew indicates that men to travel about the country would behave on a bad burning they did not believe in such a the- looking for fires to study unless day, the other charged specifically ory. Won’t the morale and fighting they are willing to lend a hand in with the responsibility for stopping spirit of our temporary guards be an effort to check the spread of its spread. lessened by such an example? The small fires pending the arrival of public, too, may find such action, regular suppression crews. The branch interested in behavior or lack thereof, confusing. arrived at the Honey Fire first, 3 It is hoped that in the future this minutes after its origin according If the fire-behavior crew admitted fact will be made clear to all, to the article. A four-man fire- that they were unskilled in fire so that even though a fire cannot behavior crew had been traveling fighting and limited their report be entirely stopped, it may on a paralleling highway about a to factors of weather and rate of be retarded, thereby permitting mile [1.6 km] behind a train that spread, their disregard for attempt- arriving suppression crews to han- stopped to service a hot box. The ing control action could be over- dle it more easily. That kind train crew carelessly threw some looked to some extent. of action will make far better read- burning waste into dry grass and ing than the one referred to above, the behavior crew happened along The fact that suppression foremen, and the results after the fire is 3 minutes later. They found it “def- who apparently did their best to out will go far toward strengthen- initely too big for them to hold.” stop this fire, were subjected to ing the spirit and morale of the The decision of the fire-behavior criticism by such men indicates whole organization. crew—equipped with a car hav- an oversight in personnel man- ing various fire-fighting tools—to agement that cannot help but
*Excerpt from Barry (1942), which was published when E.F. Barry was a staff assistant on the Flathead National Forest, Northern Region (Region 1), Forest Service.
The value of the fire behavior docu- through wildfire monitoring and computer simulation. At the time, mentation of the Honey Fire that documentation. This is especially Olsen’s article was the most com- Olsen (1941) provided is unques- true during periods of extreme prehensive published wildfire case tionable. As Van Wagner (1971) has burning conditions, which are study of its kind. Over time, many pointed out, “some valuable refer- often impractical or impossible to others have used his data and infor- ence data can be collected by being simulate with outdoor experimen- mation in their own fire research at the right place at the right time” tal fires, in the laboratory, or by studies and for other purposes,
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 21 On Wildfire analyze how a fire should have Implications been suppressed? The general value of wildland fire Case Studies • � Is it incumbent upon research- behavior case studies has been ers to raise questions and and Firefighter discussed at length (Alexander point out deviations from and Thomas 2003a, 2003b, 2006). Safety standard operating procedures However, case studies are com- and discuss potential reasons I confess that I like case studies. monly seen as the “poor cousins” of for doing so? They are the kind of thing his- fire science, occasionally tolerated torians are used to dealing with. but seldom encouraged in the sci- A clear understanding of what hap- We don’t expect to find general entific and technical peer-reviewed pened during a fire is often “hard laws: we accept the particular- literature, although exceptions to acquire because it is obstructed ity of experience. Moreover, the do exist (e.g., McRae 1986, Noble by the natural human desire to save case study is a story. That’s why 1991). This situation contrasts with face, fear of disciplinary action, I think it’s especially useful for that of other professions, such as fear of being made a goat, and lack safety. Nobody remembers guide- engineering, medicine, business, of confidence in the competence lines the way they remember and law, where case studies are and impartiality of men who may a story, which is the next best well accepted (Henderson and oth- judge the record,” as pointed out thing to actually experiencing ers 1983). For example, the New by Headley (1943). However, a case the events. England Journal of Medicine has study is not intended for “taking published an ongoing series of people to task for errors in judg- Dr. Stephen J. Pyne (2008) case studies since 1923 (Falagas ment, but solely to ensure that the Global Wildland Fire Historian and others 2005) and the Harvard lessons that have been learned con- Business School is renowned for tribute to the success of future fire the use of the case study method in including the present article. For suppression operations” (Luke and the classroom (McNair 1954). example, the Honey Fire was one of McArthur 1978). five wildfires that Anderson (1983) used to evaluate his two elliptical fire shape models. On Criticism and Wildland Olsen’s (1941) documentation of Fire Suppression the fire suppression decisions and actions on the Honey Fire are also The one contemporary issue that interests me most in this article is valuable, though controversial. His sensitivity to the concept of criticism—constructive or otherwise. case study analysis of the Honey Fire provides lessons for fire man- We still have not, I’m afraid, learned to use criticism to its full benefit. agers and researchers alike and Many fire managers and leaders in today’s firefighting ranks are espe- raises issues that are still pertinent cially fearful of criticism from official sources—especially as it relates to today, including some of the follow- firefighter safety. After-action reviews, risk refusal, lessons learned, acci- ing ethical questions: dent prevention analysis and other tools are being successfully used to • � Should case studies document counteract resistance to constructive criticism, but much more work is fire control activities as well as needed. It will always be so as long as firefighters remain a proud, self- fire behavior and compare model assured bunch, and they want to control fires in risky environments. predictions and accepted knowl- edge against observations? The source and purpose of criticism is key here. The threat of “witch- • � When should the observer drop hunts,” real or imagined, will keep criticism a sensitive subject. Direct the camera and notebook and criticism from research is no exception, even with good intentions. pick up a shovel or pulaski? • � When is it appropriate for Ed Bratcher (2008) a researcher to critique the Team Leader for Fire, Lands and Minerals decisions and actions of fire- Forest Service, Kisatchie National Forest fighters and fire managers or Pineville, LA
Fire Management Today 22 We can only speculate whether the gain � in part by involving practitioners was worth the adversity that Olsen and � in the analysis. his crew faced afterward. � Parting Thoughts As fire behavior research profes- Case studies can bring to light lowed by several other pioneering sionals, we admire the determina- unusual or perplexing problems case studies in North America in tion that Olsen and others showed that might otherwise be neglected the early 1930s (e.g. Jemison 1932, in their approach to systematically and, by telling a story, can ground Dauge 1934, Shaw 1936). documenting the Honey Fire. It what would otherwise be dry must have been extremely difficult theory into a meaningful context Documenting or analyzing fire for Olsen to complete his case study (Hallenbeck 2005). However, case suppression strategies and tactics article in the face of the criticism studies can be among the worst of has not been undertaken as part that followed the control of the the literature, offering few conclu- of rapid response research to date, Honey Fire. sions. Additionally, extrapolating despite the fact that fire behavior conclusions from a single case is may be influenced by fire sup- We can only speculate whether the usually unwise, and attempting to pression and that fire suppression gain was worth the adversity that solve a difficult case after the fact actions are arguably an important Olsen and his crew faced afterward. can become an exercise in self- part of the record. Although fur- Despite their express freedom to aggrandizement (Hallenbeck 2005). ther analysis of human factors and study fire behavior, the question of activities on a fire opens the door whether or not to engage in initial The role of the fire researcher as an to controversy, it may nonethe- attack must have constituted a independent observer established less provide valuable information major moral dilemma. Obviously, by Olsen (1941) and others more and learning tools for fire manag- the crew sincerely believed in the than 70 years ago continues to be ers. Taking a page from the New value of their research, and such used today. For example, current England Journal of Medicine and dedication to the task is commend- work by rapid-response researchers developing a mechanism to analyze able. Would you have done the focuses on gathering data related and publish a regular series of peer- same? to fire behavior and fire effects reviewed case studies of fire behav- (Lentile and others 2007a, 2007b). ior and fire suppression activities Acknowledgments would be a valuable addition to Thanks to Dale Wade, Steve Similar activities have been under- both the fire management and fire Pyne, Jen Beverly, Dave Finn, and taken in the past, especially in research professions. This would Jennifer Ziegler for insightful documenting free-burning fire serve to complement the sugges- reviews of this article and to behavior (e.g., Hardy 1983, USDA tion of creating operational wild- Karen Mora, Peggy Robinson, and Forest Service 1993, Wilson and land fire behavior research units Monique LaPerriere for an artful Davis 1988). In fact, Forest Service (Alexander 2002). job of editing the final product. pioneer fire researcher Harry T. Gisborne is believed to have pub- Perhaps the idea of fire researchers References lished the very first attempt at a critiquing human decisionmaking Alexander, M.E. 2002. The staff ride comprehensive wildfire case study and actions would be viewed by approach to wildland fire behavior and in his description of the Quartz fire managers as taboo, although firefighter safety awareness training: A Creek Fire (Gisborne 1927), which there doesn’t seem to have been commentary. Fire Management Today. occurred on the Kaniksu National any past reluctance to publish posi- 62(4): 25–30. Alexander, M.E. 2006. Prescribed burn Forest adjacent to the Priest River tive assessments (e.g., Countryman documentation and fire danger rat- Experimental Forest in northern 1969, Kurth 1968, Scowcroft and ings: A case study. In: Viegas, D.X., Idaho during the summer of 1926; others 1967). Nevertheless, we ed. Proceedings of 5th International Conference on Forest Fire Research, Kay (1927) published a less detailed suspect a certain sensitivity still November 27–30, 2006, Figueira da Foz, documentation of several fires that exists in having fire researchers Portugal. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: occurred the following summer second-guess fire operations per- Elsevier BV. CD-ROM. Alexander, M.E. 2007. Simple question; in Western Canada. This was fol- sonnel. This might be overcome Difficult answer: How much fuel is
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 23 acceptable? Fire Management Today. edition. Collingwood, Victoria, Australia: Kay, J. 1927. Forest fire research. Forestry 67(3): 6–11, 30. CSIRO Publishing. 150 p. Chronicle. 4(4): 30–37. Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2003a. Cooper, R.W. 1969. Preliminary guidelines Kurth, T. 1968. Combination helitanker-air Wildland fire behavior case studies and for using suppression fires to control tanker attack on the Pine Creek Fire. analyses: Value, approaches, and practical wildfires in the Southeast. Res. Note Fire Control Notes. 29(4): 3–5. uses. Fire Management Today. 63(3): 4–8. SE-102. Asheville, NC: U.S. Department Lawson, B.D.; Armitage, O.B. 2008. Weather Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2003b. of Agriculture, Forest Service, in the Canadian Forest Fire Danger Wildland fire behavior case studies and Southeastern Forest Experiment Station. Rating System. Edmonton, AB: Natural analyses: Other examples, methods, 2 p. Resources Canada, Canadian Forest reporting standards, and some practical Countryman, C.M. 1969. Use of air tank- Service, Northern Forestry Centre. advice. Fire Management Today. 63(4): ers pays off—a case study. Res. Note Lentile, L.; Morgan, P.; Hardy, C.; Hudak, 4–12. PSW–188. Berkeley, CA: U.S. Department A.; Means, R.; Ottmar, R.; Robichaud, P.; Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2004. of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Sutherland, E.; Way, F.; Fites-Kaufman, Forecasting wildland fire behavior: Aids, Southwest Forest and Range Experiment J.; Lewis, S. 2007a. Lessons learned from guides, and knowledge-based protocols. Station. rapid response research on wildland fires. Fire Management Today. 64(1): 4–11. Cruz, M.G.; Plucinski, M.P. 2007. Billo Fire Management Today. 67(1): 24–31. Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2006. Road Fire—a report on fire behaviour Lentile, L.; Morgan, P.; Hardy, C.; Hudak, Prescribed fire case studies, decision aids, phenomena and suppression activities. A.; Means, R.; Ottmar, R.; Robichaud, P.; and planning guides. Fire Management Rep. A.07.02. East Melbourne, Victoria, Sutherland, E.K.; Szymoniak, J.; Way, F.; Today. 66(1): 5–20. Australia: Bushfire Cooperative Research Fites-Kaufman, J.; Lewis, S.; Mathews, Anderson, H.E. 1983. Predicting wind- Centre. E.; Shovic, H.; Ryan, K. 2007b. Value driven wild land fire size and shape. Dauge, C.I. 1934. The weather of the Great and challenges of conducting rapid Res. Pap. INT-305. Ogden, UT: U.S. Tillamook, Oregon, Fire of August 1933. research on wildland fires. Gen. Tech. Department of Agriculture, Forest Monthly Weather Review. 62: 227–231. Rep. RMRS–GTR–193. Fort Collins, CO: Service, Intermountain Forest and Range Falagas, M.E.; Fragoulis, K.N.; Kopterides, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Experiment Station. P. 2005. An analysis of the published Service, Rocky Mountain Research Barry, E.F. 1942. How about the esprit de Massachusetts General Hospital case Station. corps. Fire Control Notes. 6(3):124–125. records (1994–2004). The American Luke, R.H.; McArthur, A.G. 1978. Bushfires Bickford, C.A.; Bruce, D. 1939a. A tentative Journal of Medicine. 118: 1452–1453. in Australia. Canberra, Australian Capital fire-danger meter for the longleaf-slash Gisborne, H.T. 1927. Meteorological factors Territory: Australian Government pine type. Occas. Pap. 87. New Orleans, in the Quartz Creek forest fire. Monthly Publishing Service. LA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Weather Review. 55: 56–60. McNair, M.P., ed. 1954. The case method at Forest Service, Southern Forest Gray, G.C. 1982. Radio for the fireline: the Harvard Business School: Papers by Experiment Station. A history of electronic communica- present and past members of faculty and Bickford, C.A.; Bruce, D. 1939b. Fire- tion in the Forest Service, 1905–1975. staff. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book discovery time in the longleaf-slash pine Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Company. type. Occas. Pap. 88. New Orleans, LA: Agriculture, Forest Service. McRae, D.J. 1986. Prescribed burning for U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Hallenbeck, J. 2005. The role of case discus- stand conversion in budworm-killed bal- Service, Southern Forest Experiment sions in palliative medicine. Journal of sam fir: An Ontario case study. Forestry Station. Palliative Medicine. 8: 665. Chronicle. 62: 96–100. Bratcher, E. 2008. Personal written com- Hardy, C.E. 1983. The Gisborne era of for- Murphy, K.; Rich, T.; Sexton, T. 2007. An munication. Team Leader for Fire, est fire research: Legacy of a pioneer. assessment of fuel treatment effects on Lands and Minerals, U.S. Department of FS-367. Washington, DC: USDA Forest fire behavior, suppression effectiveness, Agriculture, Forest Service, Kisatchie Service. and structure ignition on the Angora National Forest, Pineville, LA. Harper, V.L. 1937. Fire research in the Fire. Tech. Publ. R5–TP–025. Vallejo, CA: Brown, A.A. 1959. Reliable statistics and Lower South. Fire Control Notes. 1(5): U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest fire research. Fire Control Notes. 20(4): 229–237. Service, Pacific Southwestern Region. 101–104. Headley, R. 1939a. Larger fires on the Noble, J.C. 1991. Behaviour of a very fast Bruce, D. 1951. Fuel weights on the National Forests. Fire Control Notes. grassland wildfire on the Riverine Plain Osceola National Forest. Fire Control 3(3): 6–17. of southeastern Australia. International Notes. 12(3): 20–23. Headley, R. 1939b. Lessons from large fires Journal of Wildland Fire. 1: 189–196. Burns, A.C. 1982. The Kisatchie story: of 1938. Fire Control Notes. 3(4):30–45. Olsen, C.F. 1938. Studies in fire behavior at A history of Louisiana’s only National Headley, R. 1943. Re-thinking forest fire the Southern Forest Experiment Station. Forest. Ph.D. Dissertation. Lafayette, LA: control. Unpubl. book manuscript. Mississippi National Forests Fire News. University of Southwestern Louisiana. Henderson, J.M.; Bellman, L.E.; Furman, 2(17): 2–3. Burns, A.C. 1994. A history of the Kisatchie B.J. 1983. A case for teaching engineer- Olsen, C.F. 1941. An analysis of the Honey National Forest. Pineville, LA: U.S. ing with cases. Engineering Education. Fire. Fire Control Notes. 5(4):161–178. Department of Agriculture, Forest 73: 288–292. [reprint: Fire Management Today. 63(3): Service, Southern Region, Kisatchie Jemison, G.M. 1932. Meteorological condi- 29–41]. National Forest. tions affecting the Freeman Lake (Idaho) Pearce, G. 2002. Wildfire documentation: Byram, G.M. 1959. Combustion of for- Fire. Monthly Weather Review. 60: 1–2 The need for case studies illustrated est fuels. In: Davis, K.P., ed. Forest fire: Jemison, G.M.; Lindenmuth, A.W.; Keetch, using the example of “The Atawhai Fire Control and use. New York, NY: McGraw- J.J. 1949. Forest fire-danger measure- of 7 May 2002: A case study by S.A.J. Hill Book Company: 61–89. ment in the Eastern United States. Anderson”. Fire Tech. Trans. Note 26. Cheney, P.; Sullivan, A. 2008. Grass fires: Agric. Handb. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Christchurch, NZ: New Zealand Forest Fuel, weather and fire behaviour. Second Department of Agriculture. Research, Forest and Rural Fire Research Programme.
Fire Management Today 24 Pearce, H.G. 2007. Bucklands Crossing firefighter burnover – a case study of fire behaviour and firefighter safety implica- tions. In: Butler, B.W.; Cook, W., comps. The Fire Environment – Innovation, Management, and Policy Conference Proceedings. 2007 March 26-30; Dustin, FL. Proc. RMRS–P–46CD. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station: 229–239. Pyne, S.J. 2008. Personal written com- munication. Professor, Arizona State University, School of Life Sciences, Tempe, AZ. Riebold, R.J. 1956. Variations in backfiring in the South. Fire Control Notes 17(3): Vehicle and equipment used in fire behavior studies by fire research staff of the Southern 30–33. Forest Experiment Station during the mid to late 1930s on the Harrison Experimental Scowcroft, P.G.; Murphy, J.L.; Biddison, Forest, De Soto National Forest, MI. From left to right, the instruments are Foxboro L.R. 1967. Importance of coordinated pyrometer, thermocouple wire, thermocouple switch dial, storage battery, compass and air-ground attacks: A comparison of two Jacob staff, 8-pen thermograph recorder, portable recording hygro-thermograph, hand fires. Fire Control Notes. 28(2): 6–7. aspirated psychrometer, anemometer, and wood carrying case. In the truck compartments Shaw, E.B. 1936. The Newfoundland forest there are glass jars for fuel samples, cans for soil samples, a chain, and cloth of varying fire of August 1935. Monthly Weather colors for plot markings. Photo: T.T. Kohara, Forest Service, 1937. Review. 64: 171–175. Sykes, G. 1940. Mechanical weakness of the fire swatter. Fire Control Notes. 4(4): 191–192. Remembering (or Discovering) the Thomas, D.A.; Alexander, M.E. 2006. Fire Management Today offers its services to 1988 Yellowstone Fires wildland fire safety. In: Proceedings of 9th Wildland Fire Safety Summit, 2006 ny member of the wildland fire community younger than 21 years April 25–27, Pasadena, CA. Hot Springs, SD: International Association of Wildland old was not even born when the Yellowstone fires of 1988 took Fire. CD–ROM. Web site:
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 25 the effeCts of CliMatiC Change and Wildland fires on air Quality in national parks and Wilderness areas Don McKenzie
ow will climatic change and emissions sources (Malm 1999). In emissions from fires but also how wildfire management policies the Western United States, regional conditions may change over time in Haffect public land management haze from fires and other sources response to future climatic chang- decisions concerning air quality reduces visibility in most of the es, land use, and management through the 21st century? As global protected areas at some time dur- strategies. Fire regimes will likely temperatures and populations ing a typical year. The worst days, in evolve in response to temperature increase and demands on natural terms of visibility, are usually asso- increases and associated vegeta- resources intensify, managers must ciated with smoke from wildfires. tion changes (McKenzie and others evaluate the trade-offs between air 2004). The annual area burned by quality and ongoing ecosystem res- To maintain air quality, we need to wildland fire is expected to increase toration. In protected areas, where understand not only present-day across the Western United States wilderness values are paramount, public land agencies have adopted the policy of using wildfires to ben- In the Western United States, regional haze � efit natural resources, allowing nat- urally ignited fires to burn unless from fires and other sources reduces visibility � they present additional threats, in most of the protected areas at some � such as fire risk to structures or time during a typical year. � degraded air quality.
Effects on Air Quality Fire effects on air quality can be both local and regional. Smoke exposure at fires and immedi- ately downwind from fires can cause respiratory problems even in healthy people, but exposure is especially problematic for those with asthma or other chronic respiratory problems. Particularly hazardous are the particulate emis- sions smaller than 2.5 microns (2.5 x 10-6 m) in diameter (PM2.5), which can be breathed more deeply and cross protective membranes in the lungs. These same particulates and other elements of the smoke plume can impair visibility hun- dreds of miles downwind from
Don McKenzie is a research ecologist for Yosemite (left) and Glacier (right) National Parks experiencing near-pristine (top) and the Pacific Wildland Fire Sciences Lab, severely degraded (bottom) visibility. Photos courtesy of the IMPROVE Web site. [Web site Forest Service, Seattle, WA.
Fire Management Today 26 and Canada (Flannigan and others Fire Scenario Builder: 1998, McKenzie and others 2004, Gedalof and others 2005). A Tool for Predicting Regional Haze From Wildland Fire Fires in many ecosystems are already becoming larger and aze-producing emissions are sensitive to weather patterns and more severe than under historical the nature of fire occurrence, which can be offset by management conditions because of increasingly Hefforts. The fire-scenario builder uses real-time regional meteorol- severe fire weather, unnatural fuel ogy to simulate regional haze under current conditions and allows for buildup from fire suppression, or the projection of wildfire events. A fuel-mapping module links vegeta- both (Agee 1997, Allen and others tion data to a fuel classification system. A framework of emission, con- 2002). Increases in area burned sumption, dispersion, and trajectory models reads the fire event data and fire severity increase biomass and the fuel mapping and calculates smoke emissions, plume rise, and consumption, smoke emissions, regional-scale dispersion. Associated research is reported in McKenzie and atmospheric dispersion of par- and others (2006). ticulates and aerosols that produce regional haze. Climate Prescribed fire and Air Quality Trade-Offs management There are many obstacles to return- (Fire) weather ing the Nation’s wildlands to their natural fire regimes, as noted by Wildfire starts other authors in this issue. In many regions, such as the Pacific Fire severity Consumption Northwest, air quality restrictions are one of the major impediments even to well controlled prescribed Fire regimes Emissions fires. These restrictions are based on the hazard of smoke exposure Fuels (live/dead) to local communities. Local effects, Dispersion and the prospect of generating Vegetation unacceptable visibility impairment Fire scenario builder Visibility/Haze in protected areas many miles away, make the management of wildfires for resource benefits less available as a fire management tool. Thinking Locally, benefits. In some cases, wildfires In one study, colleagues and I simu- Reacting Globally may be the sole source of smoke, lated smoke dispersion and regional whereas in others it may be a minor Fire managers in national parks contributor alongside agricultural haze from the wildland fires of and wilderness areas are faced with 2003 in the Pacific Northwest with and industrial pollution and haze background levels of reduced air from distant wildland fires. an integrated model of fire starts, quality, which exacerbate the con- combustion, emissions, and dis- flict between air quality and other Climate Change and persion. We found that wildland wilderness management goals. The fires in Oregon and Washington contribution of wildfires to haze, in the Use of Wildfires as produced significant regional haze particular those wildfires allowed an Ecological Process downwind at Glacier National Park to burn as a natural ecological How will wildland fire affect vis- in Montana and the Bob Marshall process, may be overestimated in ibility in the future? With a warm- and Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness some areas, leading to management ing climate, statistical models and Areas in Montana and Idaho (fig. 1). choices hostile to the expansion simulation models suggest that of the use of wildfires for resource wildland fire areas will increase in
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 27 prescribed fire scenarios or other means of fuel reduction allows us to estimate the potential value of fuel treatments on multiple-use lands for enabling ongoing appli- cation or expansion of managing wildfires for resource benefits in protected areas. Understanding trade-offs between air quality and ongoing ecosystem restoration, and precise quantitative estimates of the effects of fuel treatments, will help land managers across the West make informed choices.
References Agee, J.K. 1997. The severe weather wildfire: Too hot to handle? Northwest Science. 71: 153–157. Air Resource Specialists, Inc. 2004. WinHaze Visual Air Quality Modeler, ver- sion 2.9.6. Fort Collins, CO. Allen, C.D.; Savage, M.; Falk, D.A.; Figure 1—Class I wilderness areas in the Pacific Northwest. Arrows indicate approximate Suckling, K.F.; Swetnam, T.W.; Schulke, flow patterns of smoke emissions from wildland fires in Washington and Oregon. From P.; Stacey, P.B.; Morgan, P.; Hoffman, M.; McKenzie and others 2006. Klingel, J.T. 2002. Ecological restoration of southwestern ponderosa pine ecosys- tems: A broad perspective. Ecological Applications. 12: 1418–1433. Flannigan, M.D.; Bergeron, Y.; Engelmark, O.; Wotton, B.M. 1998. Future wildfire in circumboreal forests in relation to global warming. Journal of Vegetation Science. 9: 469–476. Gedalof, Z.; Peterson, D.L.; Mantua, N. 2005. Atmospheric, climatic, and eco- logical controls on extreme wildfire years in the northwestern United States. Ecological Applications. 15: 154–174. IMPROVE (Interagency Modeling of Figure 2—Total emissions of PM2.5 (tons) from wildland fires simulated over a Protected Visual Environments). 2004. future decade (2045–2054) compared to estimates from fire records (1990–1999). [Web site
Fire Management Today 28 the 10 standard firefighting orders and 18 WatCh out situations: We don’t Bend theM, We don’t Break theM...We don’t knoW theM Bryan Scholz
ost of us don’t know the 10 fundamental instructions and standard firefighting orders Knowing the “10 & 18” to react even in emergencies in Mand 18 watch out situations, is the best tool we have accordance with those instruc- the “10 & 18,” by heart. Judging by tions. One device by which such our fatality reports and close calls, to protect ourselves discipline is achieved is that it shows. from bad decisions. It of ‘general orders,’ which all is the best tool we can men of the unit are required to In 1956, Forest Service Chief give to our rookies to memorize. On some of the fires Richard McArdle convened a task we reviewed, men who knew force to study 16 fires that occurred protect them from our better just did not pay adequate from 1937 to 1956. These fires had bad decisions. � attention to good firefighting 79 fatalities due to burnover. The practices that seem like small resulting 1957 report to the Chief details, but could become the (Moore and others 1957) identified adequate margin for safety; critical item in an emergency. 10 factors that were common to detailed line location incorrect. The use of a form of standard many of these fires: 7. � Scouting—not done, not thor- orders starting immediately ough, too dependent on air would be a long step in the 1. � Unexpected fire behavior— scouting. direction of assuring attention basic elements not understood; 8. � Escape plan—not formulated, to the fundamentals” (Moore indicators of change in usual not explained, not executed. and others 1957). fire behavior not recognized; 9. � Lookout posting—routine local fire weather forecasts not practice not followed. Shortly after the standard firefight- obtained, inaccurate, or not 10. Organization—humans and ing orders were incorporated into understood. machines committed to action firefighter training, the 18 watch 2. � Instructions—not followed, not without adequate supervision, out situations were developed to clear, or not given. or without adequate tie to the complement them (USDA Forest 3. � Foremanship—lost control of rest of the organization. Service 2008a). personnel at critical time. 4. � Line supervision—overhead To address these critical factors, Fifty years later, fire has found no busy on minor jobs, not avail- the report presented a list of 10 new way to hurt us. We continue able when major decisions had “standard firefighting orders” and to make the same mistakes. From to be made. recommended: Mann Gulch to South Canyon to 5. � Communication—not available, Cramer, we put ourselves into not used, or broken down. “These orders are to be com- places where there is unburned fuel 6. � Firefighting strategy and mitted to memory by all between us and the fire, or where tactics—control effort made personnel with fire control we can’t see the main fire and we’re in wrong location or without responsibilities. not in contact with someone who can. We make decisions that are Bryan Scholz is an assistant fire man- “Military organizations have not based on current and expected agement officer for Central Oregon Fire had long experience in train- fire behavior. Management on the Ochoco National ing men to remember certain Forest.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 29 In “A Trend Analysis of Fireline assignment when the deploy- “There were numerous instanc- ‘Watch Out’ Situations in ment occurred. They were es where personnel indicated Seven Fire Suppression Fatality enroute to a camp location to their perceptions that wildland Accidents” (Morse 2004), 84 sepa- debrief with a crew they were fire use and wildfire suppres- rate hazardous conditions or events replacing and would not sion were two separate events, were identified in the fatality have been given a fireline even on a single wildland fire reports. Morse states, “In each of assignment until the next such as the Little Venus Fire.” seven fatality events, a single over- operational period.” looked ‘watch out’ appeared to be The reasons for not recognizing the the major contributing factor.” “The 10 standard firefighting 18 watch out situations and not fol- orders must be firm rules of lowing the 10 standard firefighting In a September 2004 report to engagement. They cannot be orders are complex, and have much the Chief, the Office of Inspector simple guides, nor can they to do with human factors. But General (OIG) analyzed the fatality be ‘bargained.’ They are the whatever the reasons, judging by reports for the Cramer, Thirtymile, result of hard-learned lessons. our fatality reports and close calls, and South Canyon Fires. The OIG Compromise among one or we continue to act like we don’t found that “fire suppression per- more of them is always the com- know the “10 & 18,” and the reason sonnel violated all of the [standard mon denominator of tragedy. is, a lot of us don’t. This doesn’t firefighting] orders and failed to On Dude, South Canyon, and make sense. We should be required mitigate most of the watch out Thirtymile, these orders were to prove, every year, that we know situations. Each fire had rapid ignored, overlooked, or somehow the “10 & 18” by heart in order to growth unexpected by manage- compromised. The orders mean get an incident qualifications card ment; fire suppression personnel little once we are in trouble, and (“red card”). Knowing the “10 & employed questionable or improper because of that we must routine- 18” is the best tool we have to pro- tactics and did not adjust their tac- ly observe them and rely on them tect ourselves from bad decisions. It tics as necessary” (USDA Office of before trouble confronts us.” is the best tool we can give to our Inspector General 2004). rookies to protect them from our —Jerry Williams, former director, Fire and bad decisions. This is not just a problem during Aviation Management (2002) wildfire suppression. In 2006, 10 Some people think that the new people assigned to the Little Venus “Many individuals did not have foundational doctrine for fire sup- Fire on the Shoshone National a thorough understanding of pression (USDA Forest Service Forest in Wyoming as part of a the purpose and objectives 2005) replaces the “10 & 18.” While fire use module were entrapped by of their fireline assignments; this is not its intent, there is lan- the fire and deployed fire shelters. many did not have a good guage in the doctrine that confuses Members of this fire use module awareness of the weather, its the issue. The doctrine describes did a great service to their profes- influence on fire behavior, the “10 & 18” as “universal prin- sion by contributing openly and and resource disposition; an ciples of suppression operations… honestly to the after-action review, understanding of planned con- principles [that] guide our funda- especially by reminding us that a tingencies; working knowledge mental fire suppression practices, fire managed in part for ecosystem of personnel assigned to the behaviors and customs, and are benefits (those previously called fire and the chain of command; understood at every level of com- wildland fire use events) is still a and assumptions were made mand.” However, the doctrine then wildfire, and the same rules apply. that led to failure to realize states that they “…are not absolute From the review: deficiencies in the organiza- rules. They provide guidance in the tion and implementation. As a form of concepts and values.” This “This incident...differs from result, this lack of situational is an unfortunate contradiction. past deployments in that the awareness created instances of Either the “10 & 18” are universal involved personnel were not confusion, incomplete informa- and fundamental, or they are not. actively engaged in the perfor- tion sharing, and contributed Either we base all of our actions on mance of an operational fireline to complacency.” current and expected fire behavior
Fire Management Today 30 or we don’t. And if we’re not going “Safety first” is a simple, October 2008). to base all our actions on current Morse, G.A. 2004. A trend analysis of fire- clear expression of the line “watch out” situations in seven and expected fire behavior, then fire suppression fatality accidents. Fire what are we going to base them on? fundamental value of Management Today. 64(1): 66-69. our profession. � Russo, J.E. and P.J.H. Schoemaker. 1990. Decision traps: Ten barriers to brilliant Some people think that “lookouts, decision-making and how to over- communications, escape routes, come them. New York, NY: Simon and and safety zones” (LCES) replace There is concern that the orders Schuster. 275 p. USDA Forest Service. 2005. Fire the “10 & 18.” I had the privilege are not measurable and quantifi- Suppression: Foundational Doctrine. of hearing one of the first lectures able. So what? They are clear and Washington, DC: U.S. Department of that Paul Gleason gave about his concise: “keep calm,” “give clear Agriculture, Forest Service, Fire and concept of LCES, and it was not Aviation Management. Available at instructions,” and “know what your
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 31 froM another perspeCtive— the 10s, 18s, and fire doCtrine Larry Sutton
he following comments are ing that a firefighter’s mind will was going to do. An investigation offered as response to the retrieve the appropriate piece of report that says that specific fire Tarticle, “The 10 Standard memorized information for any behavior could have been or should Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch situation, even under stress, and have been predicted is itself an Out Situations: We Don’t Bend make it available just when needed. interpretation: investigators have Them, We Don’t Break Them...We Unfortunately, human minds under the advantage of hindsight. What Don’t Know Them;” they are meant duress just don’t work that way. actually happened was that the fire to continue the Even if they did, a firefighter would moved faster, or went in a differ- discussion on this important topic. still have to consider multiple pos- ent direction, or burned with more My impression of some of the sible courses of action, decide, and intensity than firefighters thought points the article makes might be then act under conditions involving it would. Is this a shortcoming on summarized as follows: time pressure, fatigue, and incom- the part of the firefighters? Not plete information. These “human necessarily. Unpredictability is not 1. � If all firefighters memorized the factors” are extremely important predictable: even the most sophisti- “10 & 18,” we would have fewer to any complex human endeavor cated fire behavior prediction tools fireline fatalities; like wildland firefighting, which is currently available cannot always 2. � Historic investigation reports why the approach of simple memo- replicate observed fire behavior. have reached the correct rization of rules will ultimately be conclusion that firefighter ineffective. It is easy to memorize Unfortunately, accident investiga- mistakes cause firefighter words without understanding tion reports have historically done fatalities, and the same reports their implications. accurately point out what those mistakes were; 3. � The standard orders need not The problem with relying too much on be measurable and quantifiable; memorization of rules to keep us safe is that and we are presupposing that a firefighter’s mind 4. � Foundational doctrine for fire suppression somehow contra- will retrieve the appropriate piece of memorized dicts or confuses the intent or information for any situation, even under stress, purpose of the “10 & 18.” and make it available just when needed. �
We all want firefighters to come home safely after every shift, on Furthermore, we have to look at a poor job of reconstructing the every fire. Yet we recognize that what is being memorized. Standard “whys” of an accident. Why did the the environment in which we oper- order #3 is frequently mentioned: firefighters’ decisions make sense ate contains many hazards, some “Base all actions on current and to them at the time? Simplistic of which can be difficult to detect expected behavior of the fire.” The causal factors have been cited, such or predict until it’s too late. The problem with this order is that you as the “violation” of a standard problem with relying too much can follow it and still be killed! All order requiring firefighters to have on memorization of rules to keep that is required is for the fire to an escape route. Often, firefighters us safe is that we are presuppos- do something unexpected. In fact, did have one or more escape routes, that is the true common denomi- but they were inadequate when Larry Sutton is the fire operations risk nator of fire behavior on tragedy needed. We need to know why fire- management officer at the National fires: what the fire actually did fighters thought an escape route Interagency Fire Center in Boise, ID. wasn’t what firefighters thought it would be adequate when in fact
Fire Management Today 32 it proved not to be. Most reports ciples or best practices, they are, in must recognize them as best prac- haven’t told us that, even when fact, subjective and circumstance- tices for safe firefighting and teach firefighters survived a burnover. dependent enough that they cannot them that way. function as true standards by which The standard firefighting orders firefighters should be judged in a The foundational doctrine for fire- and watch out situations focus on post-accident investigation. In the fighting is based on the premise preventing burnovers, but they are past, occupational safety and health that the best tools we have are fire- no guarantee of safety from fire investigators have agreed to have fighters’ brains using all our best behavior-related hazards, and they standard order “violations” removed practices for safe firefighting, not a do not address the other four-fifths from the record. There is also now set of hard-and-fast rules to cover of accidents that kill firefighters. case law (Backfire 2000 vs. United all situations. Simply put, the stan- Accident data show that burnovers States of America, 2006, available dard orders and watch outs alone account for approximately 21 per- at
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 33 hotshot, developed a variation on a more thorough discussion, see trade. Well-educated firefighters LCES that he calls “F LCES ∆.” The http://www.firerescuemagazine. and capable leaders who are able to “F” stands for fire behavior, which com/pdfs/WUI_04.pdf.) maintain situation awareness and urges you to consider the poten- continuously make sense of their tial “worst case scenario.” LCES is These topics will be discussed and environment are safe firefighters. looked at to determine if it’s ade- debated by firefighters forever. It’s But we’re kidding ourselves if we quate for that worst case. And the important for firefighters to learn think that any single rule set will “∆” (delta) represents change—it and understand—not just mem- serve to keep everyone safe on every is there to remind you to consider orize—the standard firefighting fire. There is no such thing as a “what’s changing now” as well as orders and watch out situations, “safety guarantee” in the dynamic “what might change later.” (For LCES, and all the other tools of our wildland fire environment.
Introducing the Virtual Incident Procurement (VIPR) System
Beginning with the 2009 fire season, the Forest Service is using the Virtual Incident Procurement (VIPR) system to acquire certain types of contracted equipment for incident management. The VIPR system is a Web-based Forest Service application that awards and administers preseason Incident Blanket Purchase Agreements or I–BPAs (formerly called Emergency Equipment Rental Agreements or EERAs; EERAs are used for at-incident sign ups and are not part of VIPR). �
Solicitations for wildland fire equipment are posted on the FedBizOpps Web site:
For more information about VIPR, including how to set up an � eAuthentication account and what equipment categories are being solicited, visit
Fire Management Today 34 the potential for restoring fire- adapted eCosysteMs: exploring opportunities to expand the use of Wildfire as a natural Change agent Gregory H. Aplet and Bo Wilmer
ire has shaped America’s for- est ecosystems for millennia. Just as vegetation ecology and fire are � FFrom ponderosa pine wood- intimately connected, land management and � lands that burn every few years to subalpine forests that erupt into fire management are inextricably linked. � flame every few centuries, most forests have evolved with fire and gating the escalating costs of fire used as a tool to reduce fuels depend on periodic blazes for suppression (USDA Forest Service and restore ecosystems under health and regeneration. Fire is and others 2001). But despite its tightly prescribed conditions; such an important force that veg- broad acceptance, in practice, and etation ecology and fire cannot be wildfires are rarely used to benefit 3. � Where fire is distant enough described independently. natural resources. Many people from communities that it consider allowing wildfires to burn poses little risk to people and Just as vegetation ecology and for resource benefit to be appro- resources and natural fires can fire are intimately connected, priate only in national parks and be used to help achieve land land management and fire man- wilderness; even some fire manag- management objectives. agement are inextricably linked. ers view this management option Policymakers and forestry experts as too risky (Parsons 2000, Black These three situations are compat- recognize that, after a century of and others 2008). If the benefits of ible with a three-zone, landscape fire suppression, there is a crisis wildfire are to be realized, use of approach to wildland fire manage- in forest health: fire-dependent wildfires as a natural change agent ment (DellaSala and others 2004, ecosystems starved of regular fire must be applied over large areas The Wilderness Society 2006). cycles now have unhealthy fuel wherever safe. The fire manage- Under this approach, a community loads and experience unnatu- ment approach we suggest would fire planning zone (zone 1) consists rally large wildfires (Laverty and greatly expand the use of wildfires of the area immediately adjacent Williams 2000, Aplet and Wilmer for resource benefit across signifi- to communities and is managed 2005). cantly larger areas of the Western for community protection. A wild- landscape. fire resilience zone (zone 2) exists In response, forest managers seek beyond zone 1 for a few miles and to restore fire to fire-dependent is managed not only to minimize ecosystems using both manage- A Three-Zone Approach unplanned fire through direct ment-ignited and natural fires. The Three situations exist on any land- attack or containment but also to management of natural fires as a scape with regard to communities restore conditions that are ecologi- natural change agent in designated, and fire: cally resilient to fire. Beyond zone remote sections of the landscape is 1. � Where fire has the potential to 2, the full range of management widely accepted by scientists, man- cause great damage to people responses to fire (from direct attack agers, and policymakers. It is a tool and homes, and fire should to monitoring) is possible, but for restoring forest health and miti- always be excluded; emphasis is placed on the use of 2. � Where people are uncomfort- fire for resource benefit. In this Greg Aplet is a senior forest scientist with able with the close proximity fire use emphasis zone (zone 3), The Wilderness Society in Denver, CO. Bo of natural fire but fire could be Wilmer is a landscape scientist with The management of fire as a natural Wilderness Society in Boise, ID.
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 35 A process is a priority when conditions allow. Public land managers may use these three planning zones to focus resources where they are most needed and to restore natural processes to the landscape where practical.
Because the highest priority is the protection of people and their homes, the first step in designing a plan to promote the management of fire as an ecological pro- cess is identifying the community fire planning zone (Wilmer and Aplet 2005). Although sometimes called the wildland-urban interface, the term community fire planning zone better conveys the overriding objective of community protection for the area. Areas designated as zone 1 should be examined for opportunities to improve public safety through public education, infra- B structure improvement, and fuels treatment (Cohen 2000, Nowicki 2002). Delineation of community areas at risk from wildland fire can help focus community protection efforts.
The wildfire resilience zone would extend from the community fire planning zone to a distance considered safe for possible fire use. Within zone 2, suppression would be the response to unplanned ignitions, but fire could be introduced intentionally to achieve manage- ment objectives. The primary management objectives in zone 2 would be (1) protection of critical resource values such as recreation sites, experimental forests, and research natural areas, and (2) maintenance of ecological resiliency through modification of forest C composition and structure. Generally, this means fuels would be modified to protect specific resources and restore ecosystems (Landres and others 1999, Brown and Aplet 2000).
Opportunities for expanded management of wildland fires for resource benefit exist in the fire use empha- sis zone. The full suite of management responses (including suppression and containment) is available under any given condition, but the preference would be to maximize opportunities for managing wildfire for resource benefit wherever possible. Delineation of zone 3 would require rigorous analysis to determine if an area is far enough away from communities such Figure 1—Comparison of current opportunities for using that fire would not be expected to threaten structures wildfires for resource benefits with an expanded fire use or other highly valued resources. Zone 3 delineation emphasis zone (FUEZ) in California (A), Idaho (B), and should increase managers’ confidence to select this Montana (C). Current opportunities to use wildfire as a natural change agent based on existing national parks and wilderness management option in the event of a natural ignition. are represented by yellow cross-hatching. Fire use emphasis zones (zone 3) are represented in dark green (Federal lands) and light green (non-Federal lands). The wildfire resilience zones (zone 2) are shown in pink. Community fire planning zones (zone 1) are shown in red.
Fire Management Today 36 Mapping the Zones Managing the landscape under a three-zone, To represent the three-zone landscape-scale fire management strategy could approach and identify opportuni- dramatically increase the area on which natural ties for expanded use of wildland fire as a natural change agent, we fire could be managed for resource benefit, mapped areas meeting the defini- without fear of property loss. tion of a wildland-urban interface community.* Using housing data from Census 2000 and ownership of restoration work in the dry for- and 6,095,789 acres (2,466,878 data for California, Idaho, and ests of the Western United States. ha) of private land, most of it in Montana (three States representa- In some cases, restoration would be the mountains to the west of the tive of conditions in the Western desirable beyond this distance, but Central Valley. Together, lands in United States), we identified loca- most opportunities to reduce fuels this zone would amount to 27.5 tions meeting the housing density in dry forests at low elevations for percent, about one-quarter, of the threshold for definition as a com- restoration purposes exist within a area of California. munity. We removed public land few miles of communities. By limit- (where houses generally do not ing zone 2 to a 5-mile wide buffer, In Idaho, national parks and wil- occur) from census blocks and restoration planning can be focused derness cover less than 4 million calculated where housing density on the “frontcountry,” where the acres (1.6 million ha) (fig. 1B). within a census block exceeded need is clear and there is less con- Our estimated fire use emphasis one house per 40 acres (16 ha) on troversy over the use of thinning. zone would increase the amount private land. We assigned those of Federal land available for using communities a ½-mile buffer to We classified the remainder of the wildfires as part of land manage- complete delineation of zone 1. landscape beyond zone 2 as the fire ment by 319 percent to 16,598,211 A ½-mile buffer is codified in law use emphasis zone. We assessed acres (6,717,057 ha), and identify (Healthy Forests Restoration Act of opportunities for expanded manage- 3,488,543 acres (1,411,763 ha) of 2003) and provides a practical zone ment of wildfire by comparing the non-Federal land, mostly in south- in which to look for opportunities extent of zone 3 with an approxi- east Idaho, where natural fire could to reduce home ignitability through mation of the current opportunities be considered as a management fuels reduction, emphasis on use for managing wildfires for resource option. Zone 3 in Idaho would rep- of fire-resistant building materials, benefit, defined by the boundaries resent 37.6 percent, over one-third, and education efforts (Wilmer and of existing national parks and wil- of the State’s area. Aplet 2005). derness areas in California, Idaho, and Montana. In Montana, the situation is even A buffer extending 5 miles around more dramatic. Montana currently zone 1 represents the wildfire resil- Fire Use has 4,583,378 acres (1,854,827 ha) ience zone (zone 2). In practice, Emphasis Zone of national parks and wilderness the extent of zone 2 would have to (fig. 1C). The delineated zone 3 Currently, 15,404,733 acres be negotiated through participa- would almost triple the amount of (6,234,074 ha) of national parks tory public planning; a 5-mile buf- Federal land suitable for using wild- and wilderness areas in California fer was chosen as a starting point fires as part of land management are available for using wildfires as for this analysis because it seems to 13,631,600 acres (5,516,512 ha), part of land management (fig. 1A). a reasonable approximation of the but an even larger change would be Under the three-zone approach discomfort zone within which it the inclusion of almost 29 million suggested above, the estimated fire is unrealistic to expect people to acres (11.7 million ha) of private use emphasis zone would encom- accept natural fire. From ½ to 5 land in the eastern two-thirds of pass 21,584,654 acres (8,935,000 miles outside of communities also the State. All told, zone 3 would ha) of Federal land (a 40-percent provides a reasonable area for fuels represent 45.6 percent, almost one- increase over the current situation) treatments that should be the focus half of the area of Montana.
*”Urban wildland interface communities within the vicinity of Federal lands that are at high risk from wildfire” (Federal Register 66(3): 751–777, January 4, 2001).
Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 37 Land Management fire. The use of wildfires is appro- In the roadless landscape, includ- and the Management priate only where the results of fire ing wilderness, managers must of Wildland Fire For would benefit resources. For exam- prove that proposed actions will ple, benefits are unlikely where not degrade roadless or wilderness Resource Benefit invasive weeds now carry frequent, character prior to manipulation, Our calculation shows that manag- intense fire into plant communi- including the use of prescribed ing the landscape under a three- ties in which fire was historically fire. The Wilderness Act requires a zone, landscape-scale fire manage- rare. Generally, ensuring resource “minimum requirements analysis,” ment strategy could dramatically benefits requires a determination a deliberate review to determine the increase the area on which natural that fire behavior will be natural or least disruptive method necessary fire could be managed for resource historically typical for the location. to accomplish the objective. The benefit without fear of property To provide a sufficient basis for fire special values of roadless areas also loss. The fire use emphasis zone management, a land management demand that special care be taken. would start at a distance of 5½ plan would not need to include The Wilderness Act does not specif- miles from delineated communi- ically prevent suppression action or ties. In practice, this distance could fuel management in wilderness, but be modified by individual commu- Wilderness, roadless actions proposed for any part of the nity and scientific input, but these roadless landscape must be care- numbers do suggest ample oppor- areas, and remote fully planned using best available tunity for expanded use of wildfire roaded land provide science and an inclusive public pro- in the West. excellent opportunities cess. Because remote areas tend to to plan for management be in higher elevation montane and In order to implement the use of subalpine forests, open deserts, and wildfire as a management strategy, of wildfire as a natural arid shrublands, little of zone 3 is Federal policy requires the exis- ecological process. likely to be in the low-severity fire tence of a management plan that forest types that may require thin- recognizes a beneficial role for fire; ning or prescribed fire before natu- currently, all human-caused igni- these detailed analyses but must ral fire will yield resource benefits. tions must be suppressed. Even provide sufficient latitude to allow The majority of zone 3 areas would with an approved fire management fire planners to identify the appro- include forests typified by less fre- plan that authorizes the use of nat- priate conditions for management quent fire regimes that would likely urally caused wildfire for resource of wildfires for natural resources in benefit from natural fire as long as benefit in a given area, weather the subsequent fire management fire regimes have not been altered conditions, personnel availability, plan. Such latitude could be provid- by invasive species, human igni- and other variables would have to ed by delineating zone 3 as widely tions, or other causes. be considered before a manager as possible. could make a definitive decision to Fire management in zone 3 should use wildland fire to improve eco- Management prescriptions appro- seek to maintain the natural system condition. Once the initial priate for zone 3 range from character of the area, even in any decision was made, fire managers addressing wilderness concerns and roaded portion, and minimize would have to constantly monitor protection of roadless character in impacts to aquatic, terrestrial, or and re-assess conditions and order a roadless landscape to active resto- watershed resources. Accordingly, suppression where appropriate. ration and protection of recreation minimum-impact suppression sites in roaded areas. Prescribed fire tactics should be used throughout Identifying the specific condi- could be used throughout zone 3 zone 3 when suppression is the tions under which management of to achieve a composition and struc- appropriate response. wildfire as a natural change agent ture that can accommodate natural might be appropriate requires fire. This is especially true for road- Management of wildfires for detailed scientific and spatial analy- ed areas, where existing roads could resource benefit has historically ses. Even in remote areas, forest be used (possibly after thinning of been confined largely to wilderness conditions, weather, and wind fac- adjacent fuels) to systematically areas and national parks, but there tors may preclude the safe use of reintroduce fire to the landscape. is no reason why fire cannot be
Fire Management Today 38 ness.org/Library/Documents/upload/ O’Loughlin, J., comps. Wilderness sci- used outside wilderness, wherever Restoring-Forests-Reducing-Fire-Danger. ence in a time of change conference— safe. Thus, the fire use emphasis pdf> (accessed January 2010). Volume 5: Wilderness ecosystems, zone may be mapped as everywhere Cohen, J.D. 2000. Preventing disaster: threats, and management; May 23–27, home ignitability in the wildland-urban 1999; Missoula, MT. Proceedings RMRSP- beyond zone 2. Zone 3 in our exam- interface. Journal of Forestry. 98(3): 15-VOL-5. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department ples includes any location further 15–21. Available at Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 39 Working toWard a fire-perMeaBle landsCape—Managing Wildfire for resourCe Benefits in reMote, rural, and urBan areas of alaska Mary Kwart and Morgan Warthin ildland fire is a recurring, A Tool for Alaska’s risk—have second priority. Fires on significant, natural process Fire Managers limited management option lands Win the boreal forest and are generally managed for resource tundra ecosystems of Alaska. These The Alaska Interagency Wildland benefits unless they threaten values ecosystems surround Alaskan cit- Fire Management Plan sets priori- on adjacent lands. ies, towns, native villages, remote ties for the assignment of firefight- homes, and historic properties, ing resources statewide and pro- The modified management option is rendering them susceptible to vides a range of initial responses to more flexible and provides a level of wildland fire. In 2004 and 2005, wildland fire through the use of fire management between the full and two of Alaska’s three most severe protection categories called “man- limited options. A predetermined wildland fire seasons on record, agement options” (Alaska Wildland conversion date is used as part of the modified management option to determine whether initial attack Fire managers must think of values at risk in on wildland fire is appropriate. terms of their permeability to wildland fire and Fires that start before the conver- sion date normally receive initial begin to promote a fire-permeable landscape attack. On the conversion date, the in which fire and values at risk coexist. Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group assesses the current fire danger indices and fire activity to fires burned more than 11 million Fire Coordinating Group 1998). determine whether it is appropri- acres (4,444,000 ha), an area great- The four management options— ate to convert to a noninitial attack er than that of Massachusetts and critical, full, limited, and modi- response strategy. Fires starting Connecticut combined. Now, fire fied—are tied to the proximity of after the conversion date might not managers must think of values at the fire to values at risk; they deter- be selected to receive initial attack risk in terms of their permeability mine priorities for fire suppression and can be managed to accomplish to wildland fire and begin to pro- needs and indicate where using resource management goals and mote a fire-permeable landscape: naturally caused wildfires to benefit reduce long-term suppression costs. one in which fire and values at natural resources is appropriate. risk coexist. Managing wildfires Most of Alaska’s park units and as an ecological process and Lands managed under the criti- wildlife refuges managed by the natural change agent is the first cal management option—where U.S. Department of the Interior, of many steps toward achieving human lives, inhabited prop- National Park Service (NPS) and that landscape. erty, housing developments, or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service National Historic Landmarks are at (FWS) have fire management plans risk—are the first priority for the that approve management of some Mary Kwart is retired from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in Anchorage, AK, assignment of suppression forces. wildfires for resource benefits on where she was a fire use manager and an Lands under the full manage- lands in the limited management Alaska regional fuels specialist. Morgan ment option—where uninhabited option and on lands in the modi- Warthin is a regional wildland fire com- fied management option following munication and education specialist for the property or cultural, historical, or National Park Service in Anchorage, AK. high-value natural resources are at the conversion date. If suppression Fire Management Today 40 actions have not been initiated were within sight of a major rec- The Fox Creek Fire, discovered and the criteria for an alternative reational road system and several the evening of July 11 by detec- response have been met, the agen- Kenai Peninsula communities. tion aircraft, was 392 acres (159 cies can also use naturally caused ha) at size-up and actively burning wildfires on lands in the modified The Irish Channel Fire, ignited by parallel to 73,000-acre Tustumena management option before the lightning on July 6, burned on the Lake. The weather on the Kenai conversion date, and those on lands south shore of 25,000-acre (10,100- Peninsula had been hot and dry, in the full management option, for ha) Skilak Lake within plain view of and the fire was burning by passive resource benefits. touring motorists. The fire burned crowning in stands of black spruce and beetle-killed white spruce. Although the fire was within des- Managing wildfires as an ecological process and ignated wilderness, the smoke col- umn was in plain view of the town natural change agent is the first of many steps of Soldotna, which has a year-round toward achieving a fire-permeable landscape. � population of about 4,000 and twice that during busy summer week- ends, when recreationists arrive Fires used to protect, enhance, or in deep duff under white spruce and from Anchorage. maintain resources are managed hemlock. Smoke was visible from with the expectation that they will the Sterling Highway, a main route be of long duration. Fire managers into the Kenai Peninsula. The use long-term assessment methods Irish Channel Fire was managed and tools to help determine where under a stage 1 wildland fire the fire might burn, to identify implementation plan (WFIP) long-term management actions, analysis level for 12 days. When and to identify trigger points that continuing dry weather indicated will initiate actions for preventing that active fire behavior and perim- the fire from burning into areas of eter growth would continue, the higher protection priority or for WFIP analysis level progressed to a protecting specific features. Fire stage 2. Although not directly on a The Fox Creek Fire smoke column was consistently visible from central Soldotna. managers face unique challenges: road network, the fire was directly Photo: Jim Hall, FWS, 2005. the incidence of wildland fire may west of a floatplane- and boat- be increasing on the landscape and accessible lodge on the shores of Smoke from the Fox Creek Fire Alaskan values at risk are varied, Skilak Lake. Final fire size was 925 was also visible within the com- widely dispersed, and often difficult acres (374 ha). munities of Kasilof, Clam Gulch, to access. Highlights of these chal- and Ninilchik. Suppression action lenges and their solutions follow. was taken only to protect specific values at risk, such as the Caribou Using Wildfire as Hills Recreation Area directly west an Ecological of the fire, which contained over Process in Rural 200 structures with no road access. and Urban Alaska* Because of the fire’s potential to During the 2005 fire season, the grow and threaten structures in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge in Caribou Hills, the Kenai National south-central Alaska managed two Wildlife Refuge and Kenai-Kodiak wilderness fires: the Irish Channel The Irish Channel Fire burned within view Area Forestry decided to order a Fire and the Fox Creek Fire. Both of a heavily used recreation road system. Photo: Paul Slenkamp, FWS, 2005. “short” Alaska type 2 incident *The wildland fires described in this article were managed under the 2003 “Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy.” The 2009 “Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy” replaces that strategy and no longer uses the terms “wildland fire use,” “fire use incident,” or “fire use manager” to describe naturally ignited fires managed for resource benefits. Terminology from 2003 policy was retained in this article to provide an accurate description of how these specific fires were managed. Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 41 Lessons Learned From The Fox management team to help manage the wildfire. A fire use manager was Creek and Irish Channel Fires: already on site. The Fox Creek Fire spread extremely quickly through 1. � The fire use manager for the two fires worked as a liaison between one of the largest contiguous fuel the suppression service provider (Alaska Department of Natural beds on the Kenai Peninsula— Resources–Division of Forestry, Kenai-Kodiak area) and the land about 125,000 acres (50,600 ha) of manager (Kenai National Wildlife Refuge) to revalidate the WFIP beetle-killed white spruce and live, daily. This allowed both the suppression service provider and the highly flammable black spruce. refuge manager to be involved in the WFIP process, alleviating understandable anxiety about an unfamiliar process. While the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge and Kenai-Kodiak Area 2. � The incident commander for the Fox Creek Fire, the suppression Forestry were transitioning with fire management officer, and the refuge manager gathered around the type 2 team, the fire progressed a fire area map showing vegetation, land management boundar- quickly to a stage 3 WFIP analysis ies, and the latest fire perimeter. They collaboratively drew a level. Within a few days, the fire maximum manageable area, which proved to be a good choice and grew to 25,189 acres (10,194 ha) remained intact for the duration of the fire. with about 150 people performing suppression, support, and monitor- 3. � The type 2 team provided successful management of the fire ing. The final fire size was 26,300 under a wildland fire use strategy, and, when they transitioned to acres (10,640 ha), the largest a type 3 organization, the team ensured that the refuge manager wildfire on the Kenai Peninsula and the type 3 incident commander agreed on a plan of action since 1969. and organization. Using Wildfire To 4. � Managing the impact of smoke on nearby communities was a Manage Resources constant challenge. Besides being visible to local Kenai Peninsula in Remote Alaska communities, a wind shift blew smoke into Anchorage (popula- tion of about 270,000). Managers and incident commanders on Although many NPS fire manage- the Fox Creek and Irish Channel fires documented their work ment units in Alaska comprise and followed the guidelines in the “Smoke Effects Mitigation extensive and remote tracts of and Public Health Protection Proposal” (see Alaska Wildland fire-dependent ecosystems, val- Fire Coordinating Group 2007), which the Alaska Wildland Fire ues at risk dot the landscape. For Coordinating Group prepared in response to public concerns instance, there are about 325 about smoke impacts from the record-breaking 2004 fire season. known cultural resources in Denali National Park and Preserve, but 5. � It was important to have wildland fire use messages prepared and cultural resource inventories are ready for use by incident information officers and staff who were incomplete, and this number rep- not familiar with management of fires for resource benefits. A resents only a small fraction of the temporary staff answered a bank of phones so that information total sites. In 2005, Denali National could be clearly and consistently communicated to the public. Park and Preserve sustained five naturally ignited wildfires that were 6. � Aerial resources were critical to success. The two Canadair CL-215 used to benefit natural resources, air tankers proved invaluable during the successful burnout oper- totaling 118,034 acres (47,767 ha). ations. With the fire in such close proximity to a large lake, these To varying degrees, each of those “scooper” planes could make quick turnarounds, providing wet- wildfires threatened a value at risk. line and spot fire support as the burnout progressed. Maintaining scarce aerial resources while multiple suppression fires were Thunderstorms ignited three active throughout the State was a constant challenge. wildfire sites on June 16 in the remote northwestern portion of Denali National Park and Preserve. Fire Management Today 42 The NPS Western Area Fire fire was declared out on July 12 and plants and animals that are adapted Management officer (a fire use never advanced towards Roosevelt. to fire-caused change. Without fire, manager type 2) managed the fires organic matter accumulates, the with support from a staff of six. Western Area Fire Management not permafrost table rises, and eco- only managed wildfires for natural system productivity declines; veg- resources in Denali National Park etation communities become less and Preserve but also in Noatak diverse, and their value as wildlife National Preserve. Four wildland habitat decreases. Fire rejuvenates fire use fires, totaling 17,945 acres these subarctic and arctic systems: (7,262 ha), occurred in the national it removes some of the insulating preserve. The largest, the Goiter matter and elicits a warming of the Fire, totaled about 8,000 acres soil; vegetative regrowth quickly (3,200 ha). Because of the remote occurs, and the cycle begins again. nature of the fire and the fact that Wildland fire is a key environmen- Denali National Park and Preserve � no values were threatened, the fire tal factor on the Noatak National wildland fire use and Denali Mountain. remained at a stage 1 WFIP analysis Preserve, an appropriate area Photo: NPS Western Area Fire Management level and was monitored through for using wildfires as a natural Staff, 2005. aerial surveillance by the Bureau ecological process. Over several days, the McKinley of Land Management Alaska Fire River wildland fire use fire grew to Service every few days. Conclusion 112 acres (45 ha). While complet- Managing naturally ignited ing “Wildland Fire Relative Risk wildfires specifically for natural Assessment, Step 1: Determining resource benefits allows land man- Values” from the McKinley River agers to maintain the important wildland fire use WFIP, the fire role of fire across the Alaskan land- management officer determined scape even as they protect values that the McKinley River to the west at risk—whether homes at the and the Kantishna River to the wildland-urban interface adjacent north were sufficient natural barri- to wilderness areas, a remote resi- ers to prevent the fire from enter- dence, or a historically significant ing the full management option cultural site within a national park area (native allotments) around Aerial view of Roosevelt following defensible space treatment. Photo: NPS and preserve. Using wildfires as an Lake Chilchukabena. However, the Western Area Fire Management staff, 2005. ecological process will promote fire historic town site of Roosevelt, permeability and will help main- a cultural resource with several The Noatak National Preserve, tain the character of the landscape structures that needed protec- located north of the Brooks Range, while accommodating values and tion, was located roughly 10 miles is characterized by immense sweeps resource use. northeast of the fire. The park had of tundra strewn with ponds and proposed restorative stabilization marshes. The northernmost reaches References plans for the structures and did not of spruce forest that exist in the far Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group. want to lose them. west region of the preserve consti- 1998. Alaska interagency wildland fire tute less than 1 percent of the total management plan. Fort Wainwright, To lessen the wildland fire threat to vegetative cover of the preserve. AK: Alaska Interagency Coordination the historic site, Western Area Fire Major portions of Noatak National Center. Available at Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 43 fire effeCts inforMation systeM: � neW engine, reModeled interior, � added options Jane Kapler Smith ome of today’s firefight- inferences about responses to fire. ers weren’t even born when FEIS reviews also offer For example, the review of rush Sthe Fire Effects Information extensive information skeletonweed, an invasive forb, System (FEIS) (Web site Jane Kapler Smith is an ecologist at the Figure 1—Opening page of species review in Fire Effects Information System showing Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research table of contents (top) and citation (bottom). This review (Meyer 2006) contains nearly 20 Station, Fire Sciences Laboratory, pages of information and 76 citations. Missoula, MT. She manages the Fire Effects Information System, has been a technical editor for three volumes of the “Rainbow Series” on fire effects (RMRS-GTR-42), and * The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience of the reader. Such use does not constitute an official endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Department is a co-author of the “FireWorks” educa- of Agriculture. Individual authors are responsible for the technical accuracy of the material presented in Fire tional program. Management Today. Fire Management Today 44 FEIS Tips � biology and ecology, including Fires that are used to regeneration and succession, they can be used for land use planning, protect, enhance, or If you locate a species review maintain resources through the FEIS search win- restoration and rehabilitation dow, your first screen shows planning, wildlife and range proj- are managed with the mainly the citation and taxo- ects, and related environmental expectation that they nomic information. You’ll want assessments. A person who is will be of long duration. � the complete review, so click unfamiliar with a particular geo- on any link in the table of graphic region can use FEIS to get contents before downloading. a quick orientation to the ecology of dominant species. Don’t limit your use of FEIS ual agencies in the U.S. Department to the Fire Ecology and While the fundamental purpose of of the Interior, including the Fire Effects sections of a FEIS is unchanged, the content and Bureau of Land Management, the review. Many facts reported technology have advanced since its National Park Service, and the U.S. in Botanical and Ecological establishment. FEIS moved from Fish and Wildlife Service. Characteristics pertain the now-retired Data General* directly to management issues. computer to the Internet in 1996. FEIS now contains reviews of more Examples include vegetative Additions, corrections, and revi- than 1,100 plant and animal species regeneration, response to non- sions have been continuous, guided and subspecies, native and nonna- fire disturbance, seedbed and by input from a 20-member adviso- tive. The system is nationwide in establishment requirements, ry committee and supported by the scope, covering hundreds of species and successional patterns. Forest Service Office of Fire and in every region of the United States. Aviation Management, the Joint Nearly one-half of all fire-related Go online to get the best that Fire Science Program, the National environmental impact statements FEIS has to offer. Recycle those Wildfire Coordinating Group, and prepared by Federal wildland man- ancient printouts in your file the U.S. Department of the Interior. agers now cite FEIS. Recent chang- cabinet. Since 2000, more than Other contributors include the es that can help managers and fire 100 new reviews have been National Forest System and individ- specialists are discussed below. added to the system, more than 150 old ones have been rewritten, and small changes have been made in at least 250 reviews. This means nearly 50 percent of the database has been improved in the past 7 years—and more improve- ments are coming. If you use FEIS for environ- mental planning documents, cite individual species reviews rather than the entire database. Each review has its own date and author; so, when you cite reviews individually, you tell readers exactly what informa- tion you used and how current Figure 2—Homepage of Fire Effects Information System shows (A) link to information on it is. invasive species; (B) list of fire studies in FEIS, including research project summaries, fire case studies (located within species reviews), and downloadable research papers; and (C) link to list of fire regimes for the United States. Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 45 Excerpt from Research Project Summary (Gucker 2005) describing effects of prescribed fire on graminoids in a rough fescue prairie.* (The RPS includes a separate table describing fire effects on 19 forb and 3 shrub species.) Percent cover of graminoids species at the end of the second growing season after prescribed fire (Archibold and others 2003) Common Name Unburned Spring Summer Fall Grasses thickspike wheatgrass 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 slender wheatgrass 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 rough fescue 11.3 13.2 7 8.8 spikeoat 0 0 0 0.1 porcupine grass 5.6 4.9 3 2.2 prairie Junegrass 0 0.2 0 0.1 green needlegrass 0.5 0.2 0.7 1.5 western wheatgrass 0 0 0.1 0.2 Kentucky bluegrass 6.8 0.2 1.3 5.4 Sedges needleleaf sedge 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 sun sedge 1.4 2.6 3.2 3.7 obtuse sedge 1 1 0 0 *Yellow identifies species that are cross-linked with FEIS reviews. Blue identifies species not reviewed in FEIS; a search on these species in FEIS retrieves the research project summary. New Engine update 100 FEIS species reviews FEIS reviews describe the fire and add reviews covering 100 addi- regimes thought to have influenced FEIS users sometimes stalled out tional species. Updates include: the species in past centuries. When in the database’s file structure • � Rewritten reviews on the spotted FEIS was established, reviews before finding needed information owl, Table Mountain and pitch addressed fire regimes only for on ecology and fire. Now, the sys- pines, several western oaks, dominant species. At the request of tem is rebuilt so that every review and Jeffrey pine, all originally managers, FEIS began in 2000 to starts with a table of contents and written in the late 1980s and report historic fire intervals for the links to all sections in order (fig. 1). early 1990s; habitat of each species reviewed. This organization allows readers to • � New reviews on bear huckleber- These reports were initially orga- quickly access topics of interest. ry, bog birch, and several cacti, nized by plant community but not lichens, and mosses; linked to a comprehensive national Remodeled Interior • � New reviews on the great gray classification. Reviews completed Reviews covering 60 nonnative owl, Indiana bat, eastern box since mid-2007 include new, more invasive plant species and subspe- turtle, red-headed woodpecker, complete fire regime descrip- cies were revised or added to FEIS fisher, and black-tailed prairie tions for a comprehensive list of between 2001 and 2006. A list dog; and vegetation types (fig. 2C). These of all invasives covered in FEIS • � A review of the first insect descriptions were developed from (more than 100 species) is available species in FEIS, the Karner data collected for the LANDFIRE through the homepage (fig. 2A). blue butterfly (fig. 1) and its Rapid Assessment (2007) and will obligatory forage species, the be updated when the National The FEIS team recently completed wild lupine. LANDFIRE Mapping Project a project that began in 2004 to is complete. Fire Management Today 46 Added Options all relevant RPSs. The search in a Saskatchewan rough fescue prairie. engine also locates RPSs for In: Fire Effects Information System, In 2006, FEIS began to provide a [Online]. U.S. Department of Agriculture, species not reviewed in FEIS. new kind of review, the research Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research For instance, Virginia straw- Station, Fire Sciences Laboratory project summary (RPS). An RPS berry is not reviewed in FEIS, (Producer). Available at Volume 70 • No. 1 • 2010 47 To fax your orders: 202-512-2104 To phone your orders: 202-512-1800 or 1-866-512-1800 For subscription cost and to Order on Line: http://bookstore.gpo.gov Mail To: U.S. Government Printing Office - New Orders P.O. Box 979050 St. Louis, MO 63197-9000