Patrimonialism, Power and the Politics of Judicial Reform in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: an Institutional Analysis
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Tahyar, Benjamin H. (2012) Patrimonialism, power and the politics of judicial reform in post‐ Soeharto Indonesia: an institutional analysis. PhD Thesis. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/15945 Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. Patrimonialism, Power and The Politics of Judicial Reform in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: An Institutional Analysis Benjamin H. Tahyar Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Law 2012 Department of Law School of Oriental and African Studies University of London Abstract The increasingly voluminous literature on judicial reform in developing coun- tries typically takes little account of the resistance that local elites mount against the reforms as an explanation of why these reforms often fail. In the small number of in- stances where elite resistance is taken into account, it is treated as a black box, and very little effort is made to analyze the issue of why the elites have an interest in resist- ing the reforms. This thesis contributes to the literature by explicitly examining the interests of Indonesia’s elites in resisting the judicial reforms instituted since the downfall of the Soeharto dictatorship and the reintroduction of democracy. By using institutional theory, the thesis examines the patrimonial basis of elite power in Indone- sia and concludes that the ‘rule of law’ and constitutionalism required by the reforms is fundamentally antithetical to the ‘rule of discretion’ so necessary to patrimonialism. It is shown that the Reformasi movement that led to Soeharto’s downfall in 1998 did not result in the destruction of patrimonial rule and the displacement of the country’s core group of elites. The continuity of the patrimonial basis of power during the post- Soeharto period has therefore made reception of the rule of law and constitutionalism exceedingly problematic. The thesis first closely analyzes the informal institutional underpinnings of pat- rimonial power—corruption and the rule of discretion—under Soeharto’s dictatorship to expose the reasons why the regime intentionally rendered the country’s judicial sys- tem dysfunctional. Next, the thesis explores Reformasi and concludes that what actu- ally happened to bring down Soeharto’s dictatorship has many of the earmarks of a soft coup orchestrated by elements of the elite, especially the military, and bears little resemblance to the social revolutions normally associated with massive and fundamen- tal institutional changes. The thesis then examines the key reform initiative intended to restore the independence of the judiciary and concludes that this initiative has large- ly failed. The next two chapters show that some reform initiatives—the Constitutional Court and the Anti-Corruption Court—can be considered successful but conclude that in the case of the Constitutional Court such success must be qualified due to the Court’s limited jurisdictional reach that excludes large portions of laws from its pur- view, and that the Anti-Corruption Court, precisely because it has been successful, is now under attack by the elites. The thesis also concludes that the Commercial Court failed because it directly threatened the institutional basis of patrimonial rule. The 3 overall conclusion drawn by the thesis is that the rule of law and constitutionalism can only be established by Indonesia’s political-economic elites who must be prepared to spend substantial economic and political resources to capture the state and impose their goals upon the rest of society. To the extent that the political-economic elites remain tethered to the institutional underpinnings of patrimonial rule, the prospects for the rule of law and constitutionalism will remain largely unfulfilled. 4 Contents Page Declaration for PhD Thesis ............................................................................................. 2 Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 3 Abbreviations/Glossary................................................................................................... 6 Table of Interviews ......................................................................................................... 9 Table of Cases ............................................................................................................... 11 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 13 2. Dysfunctional by Design: The Indonesian Judiciary Under the New Order ....................................................................................................................... 25 3. Downfall of the New Order and Reformasi: Implications for the Negara Hukum ........................................................................................................ 67 4. Satu Atap and Judicial Independence: Distinguishing Between Form and Substance........................................................................................................ 100 5. Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the Mahkamah Konstitusi: Treating Human Rights Seriously? ....................................................................... 164 6. Corruption and Bankruptcy: A Tale of Two Courts ............................................ 207 7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 251 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 258 5 Abbreviations/Glossary ABRI ......................................Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (name used for the Indonesian Armed Forces before Reformasi). AICC ......................................American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, a non- profit organization, headquartered in New York City, es- tablished to promote better business ties between Ameri- can companies and the Indonesian government. Bappenas ................................Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency), a cabinet-level agency of the Indonesian government. BLBI ......................................Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia Li- quidity Assistance), liquidity assistance given by the In- donesian Central Bank to a number of distressed banks during the Asian financial crisis. DPD........................................Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representatives Council), DPR ........................................Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council), the Indonesian National Parliament. GBHN ....................................Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of State Policy), issued by the MPR on a five-yearly basis as a guide to national policy planning; no longer issued post-Reformasi. IBRA ......................................Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, an Indonesian government agency established in the wake of the Asian financial crisis to deal with the assets of distressed banks; abolished on ___________. ICW ........................................Indonesia Corruption Watch, an NGO established by LBH to keep track and publicize instances of corruption. IFIs .........................................International Financial Institutions, name used to denote a multilateral financial institution, such as the IMF. IMF ........................................International Monetary Fund. Kostrad ...................................Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve), an elite unit of the Indonesian army, consisting of between 35,000 and 40,000 men divided into several infantry and airborne brigades as well as field artillery regiments. KPK........................................Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission), an independent agency of the Indonesian 6 government established to investigate and prosecute cas- es of corruption. KRHN ....................................Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (Consortium for National Legal Reform), an NGO established by LBH to promote legal reform in Indonesia. LBH........................................Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute), an NGO established by Adnan Buyung Nasution to provide legal assistance to indigent defendants. LeIP ........................................Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan (Indonesian Institute for an Independent Judi- ciary), an NGO established to promote judicial inde- pendence in Indonesia. MaPPI-FHUI ..........................Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia—Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, a judicial watch NGO es- tablished by the Faculty of Laws of the University of In- donesia. MPR .......................................Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat