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Fact Finding Mission Report Somalia

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Fact Finding Mission Report Somalia FACT FINDING MISSION REPORT SOMALIA Sicherheitslage in Somalia Bericht zur österreichisch-schweizerischen FFM August 2017 Herausgeber Staatendokumentation | Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Modecenterstraße 22 | 1030 Wien | Österreich www.staatendokumentation.at Redaktion Thomas Schrott | Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Layout & Design Martin Angel | Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Druck Bundesministerium für Inneres Disclaimer Dieser Bericht wurde von der Staatendokumentation des BFA unter Berücksichtigung der Common EU Guidelines for the Processing of Information on Countries of Origin (April 2008, https://www.ecoi.net/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/coi_common_guidelines-2008-04- en.pdf) und der Methodologie der Staatendokumentation (Mai 2016, www.staatendokumentation.at) erstellt. Die Fact Finding Mission erfolgte unter Berücksichtigung der EU Common Guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions (November 2010, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1292230919_20101118-ecs-ffm-guidelines-final- version.pdf) und der BAA FFM Guidelines (Juni 2010, www.staatendokumentation.at). Alle in diesem Bericht enthaltenen Informationen wurden mit äußerster Sorgfalt recherchiert, evaluiert und verarbeitet. Das Produkt erhebt keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit, und es ergeben sich hieraus keine Schlussfolgerungen für die rechtliche Beurteilung eines konkreten Asylverfahrens. Das vorliegende Dokument kann insbesondere auch nicht als politische Stellungnahme seitens des Bundesamtes für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (BFA) und des Staatssekretariates für Migration (SEM) gewertet werden. Copyright Das Produkt der Staatendokumentation und die darin enthaltenen Daten sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Die Werknutzungsrechte sind dem Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl (BFA) vorbehalten. Ohne vorherige schriftliche Zustimmung des BFA sind die Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung der Daten sowie deren kommerzielle Nutzung nicht gestattet. Des Weiteren ist es untersagt, die Daten ohne vorherige schriftliche Zustimmung des BFA ins Internet zu stellen, und zwar auch bei unentgeltlicher Verbreitung. Eine zulässige Weiterverwendung ist jedenfalls nur mit korrekter Quellenangabe gestattet. ISBN: 978-3-903109-05-6 © 2017 Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl .BFA Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Seite 1 von 113 Abkürzungen ............................................................................................................................. 5 Danksagung .............................................................................................................................. 5 Zusammenfassung .................................................................................................................... 6 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 7 1. Zustandekommen, Durchführung und Methodologie ....................................................... 8 1.1. Entscheidung über die Durchführung, Terms of Reference............................................. 8 1.2. Gesprächspartner und Protokolle ................................................................................... 8 1.3. Berichterstellung ............................................................................................................. 9 2. Einleitung ...................................................................................................................... 10 3. Sicherheitskräfte in Süd-/Zentralsomalia ....................................................................... 10 3.1. Polizei ........................................................................................................................... 12 3.2. Somali National Army (SNA) ......................................................................................... 13 3.3. National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) ........................................................ 15 3.4. AMISOM ....................................................................................................................... 16 3.5. Bilateral eingesetzte Truppen (v.a. ENDF, KDF) ........................................................... 17 3.6. Die Liyu Police des äthiopischen Somali Regional State .............................................. 18 4. Frontgebiete und Areas of Influence ............................................................................. 21 4.1. Lagekarte – Areas of Influence ..................................................................................... 22 4.1.1. Erklärung zur Legende .............................................................................................. 24 4.1.2. Kommentare zum Inhalt ............................................................................................ 25 5. Al Shabaab ................................................................................................................... 27 5.1. Reichweite .................................................................................................................... 30 5.2. Steuern, Zakat und Erpressung .................................................................................... 32 5.3. Zivile Zielpersonen und Deserteure .............................................................................. 34 5.3.1. Mitarbeiter von NGOs, internationalen Organisationen, Regierung ........................... 37 5.3.2. Mutmaßliche Kollaborateure und Spione ................................................................... 40 5.3.3. Deserteure ................................................................................................................ 43 5.3.4. Deserteure in und nach der Rehabilitation................................................................. 45 5.3.5. Sippenhaft ................................................................................................................. 47 5.4. (Zwangs-)Rekrutierung ................................................................................................. 48 .BFA Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Seite 2 von 113 5.4.1. Zwangsrekrutierung .................................................................................................. 48 5.4.2. Wo wird rekrutiert? .................................................................................................... 51 5.4.3. Rekrutierung über Clan, Eltern oder Freunde ............................................................ 52 5.4.4. Rekrutierung über Indoktrination, Propaganda und Glauben ..................................... 53 5.4.5. Rekrutierung über ökonomische Anreize ................................................................... 53 5.4.6. Freikaufen von der Rekrutierung ............................................................................... 54 6. Lage in den einzelnen Landesteilen .............................................................................. 55 6.1. Die Föderalisierung Somalias ....................................................................................... 55 6.2. Jubaland ....................................................................................................................... 57 6.2.1. Kismayo und Umland ................................................................................................ 58 6.2.2. Restliches Lower Juba .............................................................................................. 61 6.2.3. Middle Jubba ............................................................................................................. 62 6.2.4. Gedo ......................................................................................................................... 63 6.2.5. IS in Jubaland ........................................................................................................... 65 6.2.6. Der Verbleib von Barre Hiraale .................................................................................. 65 6.3. South West State .......................................................................................................... 66 6.3.1. Lower Shabelle ......................................................................................................... 67 6.3.2. Bay ........................................................................................................................... 71 6.3.3. Bakool ....................................................................................................................... 72 6.4. Benadir/Mogadischu ..................................................................................................... 73 6.4.1. Sicherheitskräfte in Mogadischu ................................................................................ 76 6.4.2. Gerichte der al Shabaab für Mogadischu .................................................................. 77 6.5. HirShabelle State .......................................................................................................... 78 6.5.1. Hiiraan ...................................................................................................................... 78 6.5.2. Middle Shabelle ........................................................................................................ 80 6.6. Galmudug (Galmudug Interim Administration/GIA) ....................................................... 82 6.6.1. Galkacyo ................................................................................................................... 83 6.6.2. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ)
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