THE PUBLICATION OF THE UK’S AIRPROX BOARD 2015
ELECTRONIC EYE SPIES THE RISKS IN CLASS G SILENT FLIGHT AND UAVs
INSIDE Ins and outs of traffic warnings How much of a threat is there? Much more to watch out for
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE WELCOME... to the annual Airprox Report Magazine 2015
A VERY WARM WELCOME to this third they do not engage in our day-to-day business evident during the circuit joining process edition of the annual Airprox magazine. – please be assured that identities are so, unless you have good reason to do Building on the success of the last two protected. This is a really important point something different, stick to the standard years, feedback from readers has because it means that we can identify lessons procedures and keep your ears and eyes suggested that many would be interested without fear or favour, and that we can also be open. Secondly, there are many incidents in seeing more in-depth features on critical of regulation or suggest improvements featuring inaction on receiving Traffic Airprox-related topics in addition to a to procedures if appropriate. Information or when otherwise identifying sprinkling of précis reports. Therefore, So, with all that in mind, I’ve chosen seven a potential conflict. These often involve we’ve tried to include articles in this themes for this year’s magazine: Glider those who rely on ‘right of way’ in these edition that will hopefully be thought- Operations; Hang glider and Paraglider situations. It’s very dangerous to assume provoking and, as ever, we’re trying to Operations; Military Low-Flying Operations; that the other pilot has seen you, even engage with a broad range of experiences. Electronic Conspicuity; Class G Risk Study; if they are supposed to give way. Self- Airprox Risk Classification; and Remotely preservation dictates that you do something For seasoned aviators, some topics will Piloted Air Systems. Each of these features about it first so, if ATC give you Traffic serve more as reminders. For the less has three Airprox précis reports from 2014 Information about a threat on a constant experienced, I hope there is an element of to help illustrate the key points and I could bearing, change something before it hits education as well. As you will see, I have have easily chosen many more for each, but you! In doing so, your changing aspect gratefully accepted contributions from the space constraints limited me. If I’ve whetted might well also provide the visual cue that BGA and ARPAS-UK, both of whom are your appetite for more, then please go to the other pilot needs in order to see you. keen to highlight their own operating airproxboard.org.uk and search through our While on the topic of lookout and scan, environments and platform idiosyncrasies reports to find any of interest. my third top tip is to get your head moving to the GA community. I’ve also press-ganged We’re slowly getting ourselves into the and concentrate on lookout as your top my inspectors to come out from behind digital age, and my admin staff have done priority in the ‘aviate-navigate-communicate’ the scenes and make their own contributions sterling work to get all the assessed reports cycle. Be aware of cockpit obscuration (and on electronic conspicuity and Class G risk since 2010 individually posted on the website actively move your head to overcome them), studies, so I very much hope that you also – you’ll also find the annual analysis for each don’t get absorbed by the electronic gizmos find these illuminating and informative. year. I’m currently working on the 2014 in the cockpit and have a lookout/scan ICAO’s Airprox definition is broad, but it’s analysis as I write this, but it seems that strategy that covers all the areas (and important to recognise that these events are Airprox reporting trends continue to increase involves looking properly!). The human eye near-accidents and, as the UK’s focal point and I view this as a good thing. It’s not that is notoriously poor at seeing things that for investigating and reporting the people are necessarily having more Airprox, are static in the field of view until they get circumstances, causes and risk of collision but more that they are recognising the value very close and start ‘blooming’ in their own for all Airprox occurrences in UK airspace, of getting the lessons out to the wider right, and it’s also prone to focusing itself I really want to stress that the UK Airprox community. Please do continue to report: about 80cm ahead when not actively looking Board’s (UKAB) focus is purely on enhancing keeping the lesson to yourself may indeed at something (called empty-field myopia). air safety by the prevention of mid-air leave you a wiser person, but better that You really do have to work at lookout to collision. We do not engage in ‘witch-hunts’ others also learn from your experience than make it effective. or ‘finger-pointing’, and I’m indebted to those be doomed to repeat it themselves – and It just remains for me to once again offer who freely report events and incidents for perhaps less successfully at that. my thanks to all of you who have taken the the benefit of all. I’d ask that anyone reading So, what messages for this magazine? brave step of sharing your experiences this magazine also does so in the spirit of There are some clear themes that spring through Airprox reporting. Without your ‘there but for the grace of God go I…’. If you to mind. Firstly, situational awareness, and altruistic approach to safety, we would be do recognise anyone (or yourself) within the especially in the visual circuit. In what much the poorer in understanding how we reports then please respect confidentiality – should be the most predictable of airspace can avoid events recurring or changes we we strive for a just culture within air safety, environments, I see too many incidents can make to the benefit of all. not a blame culture. where people have lost the plot in the visual I’d also like to emphasise that we conduct circuit and, instead of seeking help from Safe flying to you all! our business as a distinct entity of our own ATC or getting out of the way until they away from direct oversight by the CAA and can identify all the other aircraft, they Steve Forward MAA. Although they fund us (both equally), press on regardless. This is particularly Director, UK Airprox Board
Managed overall by the Director, the UKAB comprises three elements: 14 experienced aviator and controller voting members of the Airprox assessment panel (Chaired by Dir UKAB) who decide the causes and risks of Airprox; a collective of airspace and flight operations subject-matter expert advisors who UKAB provide the in-depth policy and operations experience (but have no vote in deciding cause and risk); and the Secretariat (currently comprising three Airprox inspectors and three administrative staff) who prepare the casework. In investigating the circumstances of Airprox, we draw on the resources of the CAA Safety and Airspace Regulation Group – principally their flight operations staff and the Air Traffic Standards Inspectorate; the military Radar Analysis Cell at NATS Swanwick; and relevant military HQs and their associated air safety organisations.
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NOTE: ALL AIRCRAFT PHOTOS BY KEITH WILSON/SFB PHOTOGRAPHIC AND THE INSIDE THE 2015 AIRPROX EDITION: RAF (CROWN COPYRIGHT). DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATIONS BY PETER LIDDIARD
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Cover photo artpartner-images.com/Alamy
Publication content Unless expressly stated as CAA policy, the views expressed in Airprox do not necessarily reflect the policy of the Civil Aviation Authority or Military Aviation Authority. Articles are intended to stimulate discussion.
Advertising The advertising appearing in Airprox does not imply 15 endorsement by the UK Civil Aviation Authority or Military Aviation Authority.
Free distribution 06 THE NUMBERS 29 HANGING IN THERE Airprox is distributed free and at selected GA THEY’RE ON THE RISE FOOT-LAUNCHED FLYING events across the UK during 2015/16. With 224 Airprox reported last year − up 30% and Hang gliders and paragliders are far back to historic figures − the question is: why? more than a glorified ‘sledge ride’ Copyright Reproduction in whole or in part of any item in Airprox, other than material shown to be from other sources or named authors, is freely permitted, providing it is intended solely for the 08 ELECTRONIC AIDS 36 LOW-LEVEL LOWDOWN purpose of promoting safe aviation, and providing WHAT’S OUT THERE TO HELP YOU MIXING WITH THE MILITARY acknowledgment is given to Airprox. Do you know your TCAS from your TAS? Fast jets down to 250ft and helicopters to And how does it all work, anyway? ground level? Here’s where you’ll find them
43 RISE OF THE ‘DRONES’ 15 THREATS IN CLASS G ARCHANT DIALOGUE IS PART OF NUMBER CRUNCHING WHERE AND HOW THEY CAN BE USED ARCHANT COMMUNITY MEDIA 1,813 incidents have been re-investigated to Big or small, UAVs are one of the fastest-growing discover the main problems facing pilots aviation sectors. That means new challenges Publisher Archant Dialogue, Prospect House, Rouen Road, Norwich NR1 1RE Tel: 01603 664242 Fax: 01603 627823 22 SILENT SOARING 50 SO WHAT’S THE RISK? Email: [email protected] Web: archantdialogue.co.uk GLIDER SPOTTING IT’S ALL IN THE DETAILS They can be found anywhere nowadays, so Finding out what went wrong (and what went Consultant Editor Nick Wall how do you work out where gliders might be? right) that made an Airprox rather than accident Production Editor Mike Waters Art Editor Craig Pearce Designer Matt Copland Account Director Katherine Berryman Account Manager Laura Stringer Editorial Director Jonathan Arnold Advertising Sales Director Sam Overton Finance Director Jamie Kent Publishing Director Zoë Francis-Cox 36 Managing Director Gavin Miller Advertising team Estelle Scott Sales 01603 772608 [email protected]
UK Airprox Board RAF Northolt West End Road Ruislip Middlesex 29 HA4 6NG
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 5 STATS AIRPROX BY NUMBERS They’re up, and up by a great deal – but why?
THERE WERE 224 Airprox reported in total in 2014, CATEGORY ICAO Doc 4444PANS-ATM classification UKAB collision risk descriptor/word picture which is an increase of approximately 30% over the 2013 figure of 171. Over the last 20 years, this shows a return to historic numbers after a dip in reported A incidents since 2006, as shown in Graphic A. Please note Providence. Situations where separation was reduced to the bare that Category E was only introduced in 2011, so these minimum and which only stopped short Risk of collision: …aircraft proximity in of an actual collision because chance incidents would likely have been recorded as Category which serious risk of collision played a major part in events: the C in previous years. Whether this increase in 2014 is has existed. pilots were either unaware of the other associated with increased GA flying after a reduction aircraft or did not make any inputs that during the UK recession years is hard to tell for sure materially improved matters. because there are no reliable records kept of the overall GA and sports aviation hours flown on an annual basis. B Safety much reduced. Risk-bearing Airprox are considered to be those that are Situations where aircraft proximity Safety not assured: …aircraft proximity resulted in safety margins being much categorised as Category A or Category B. In percentage in which the safety of the aircraft may reduced below the normal either due terms, the graphic below shows that risk-bearing Airprox have been compromised. to serendipity, inaction, or emergency avoiding action taken at the last minute have hovered around 30% in recent years, but in 2013 and to avert a collision. 2014 they increased to approximately 40% (43% in 2014). Therefore, not only were there more Airprox in 2014, but C more of them were, percentage wise, risk-bearing. Safety degraded. In terms of 2014 Airprox involvement, Graphic B shows Situations where safety was reduced that 75% of Airprox (168 Airprox) had GA involvement from normal but either fortuitous circumstances or early enough sighting/ No risk of collision: …aircraft proximity and, of these, 57% were with other GA aircraft. In 2013, action allowed one or both of the pilots in which no risk of collision has existed. the respective figures were 65% (111 Airprox) and 35% to either monitor the situation or take with other GA aircraft. Therefore, 2014 saw more GA controlled avoiding action to avert the aircraft from coming into Airprox; by percentage, more risk-bearing GA Airprox; and close proximity. more of these Airprox were with other GA aircraft. For the purposes of the following charts and graphs: ‘CAT’ refers to D the totality of commercial flying (including training schools Risk not determined: aircraft proximity Non-assessable. in which insufficient information was and air taxis etc), ‘Mil’ refers to all military types, ‘GA’ refers Situations where insufficient information available to determine the risk involved, to all private and sports aviation and ‘Other’ sweeps up was available to determine the risk or inconclusive or conflicting evidence involved, or inconclusive/conflicting everything else including air ambulances, police helicopters precluded such determination. and any unknowns that were reported. evidence precluded such determination. The sharp-eyed among you will no doubt have already added up the numbers in the central pie chart and come E to more than 224! That’s because some Airprox involve two Non-proximate. Met the criteria for reporting but normal No risk classification categories and so are represented twice in the graphic. For safety standards and/or standard interest, the sub-pie charts show the percentage of Airprox separation parameters pertained. interactions within each of the involved category types.
AIRPROX TRENDS BY RISK PERCENTAGE
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cat A Cat B Cat C Cat D Cat E
6 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE STATS
2014 AIRPROX BY AIRCRAFT MIX AND RISK D 2014 AIRPROX BY INVOLVEMENT B
CAT BREAKDOWN MILITARY BREAKDOWN RISK E 19% 22% 10 100 53% 1 RISK D 26% 80 9% RISK C 31 60 7 2 50% RISK B 40 23 5 7% 14% 1 35 17 RISK A 20 13 6 3 4 7 5 5 18 0 4 2 3 2 4 CAT MILITARY MIL/CAT MIL/MIL MIL/GA CAT/CAT CAT/GA GA/GA 32 99 14% 44%
AIRPROX TRENDS IN THE LAST 20 YEARS A OTHER GA 22 168 10% 75% 250
200 OTHER BREAKDOWN GA BREAKDOWN 150 23% 31% 100 9%
50 3% 14% 0 57% 63% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cat A Cat B Cat C Cat D Cat E GA MIL CAT OTHER
You can therefore see for yourselves which ‘Inadequate Avoiding Action/Flew Too Close’ Finally, the last graphic (D) shows the other categories are the main threats to was the second most prevalent cause. breakdown of 2014 Airprox by risk and your flights. These incidents include those in which pilots mix of categories. It’s clear that GA/GA The next graphic (C) shows the breakdown took inadequate action on receiving Traffic and Military/GA are the highest risk of the 2014 Airprox by top 10 causes. ‘Failure Information, flew too close during overtaking combinations, but the clearest risk to GA To See Other Aircraft’ and ‘Late Sighting’ manoeuvres or did not take positive action is from other GA aircraft − a whopping both feature highly, as might be expected in when sighting another aircraft due to their 56% of GA/GA incidents were risk bearing. what is, after all, predominantly a ‘see-and- assumption that the other pilot had seen The table on P6 gives the Airprox risk avoid’ environment. However, disappointingly, them and their having ‘right of way’. categorisation definitions.
2014 TOP 10 AIRPROX CAUSES C
NOT OBEYING ORDERS/FOLLOWING ADVICE/FROM ATC 13
FAILURE TO ADHERE TO PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES 14
FAILURE TO SEPARATE/POOR JUDGEMENT 15
FALSE/MISTAKEN IMPRESSION OF LOSS OF SEPARATION 16
OTHER CAUSE 19
FAILURE TO PASS OR LATE PASSING OF TRAFFIC INFO 20
FIR CONFLICT 29
FAILURE TO SEE CONFLICTING TRAFFIC 58
INADEQUATE AVOIDING ACTION/FLEW TOO CLOSE 59
LATE SIGHTING OF CONFLICTING TRAFFIC 91
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 7 ELECTRONIC CONSPICUITY
KEEPING ALERT TO TRAFFIC
If you don’t know your TCAS from your TAS or what to do when they give you a warning, you’re not alone
AS IF THE acronyms aren’t enough on IT’S AS EASY AS ABC… their own, the details about traffic warning Let’s get some acronyms out of the way first. systems can be baffling unless you plough TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance through the manuals. So with that in mind, System) is an implementation of the ICAO here’s a brief non-technical overview of Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) how various systems operate, together with standard. In fact, it’s currently the only an appreciation of practical considerations implementation of the ACAS so TCAS and from insights gained at the Airprox Board. ACAS are often used interchangeably. Who knows, it might even tempt you to TCAS gives traffic information about other buy one... ‘co-operating’ (i.e. TCAS compliant) aircraft
8 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE ELECTRONIC CONSPICUITY
which are displayed as various symbols in various or descent. Among many other factors in that colours (depending on system parameters) and it tragedy, one crew of two converging airliners will tell you how to get out of the way as long as followed their TCAS ‘Descend’ RA and the the other aircraft is ‘co-operating’. other followed ATC instructions to descend, For traffic assessed to be converging in plan “ contrary to their TCAS ‘Climb’ RA. and altitude, TCAS will first provide a traffic Some TAS displays are So how does TCAS work? Rather than take alert (TA), highlighting the traffic, followed by up the rest of this magazine with the subject, a resolution advisory (RA), which is the ‘getting quite ‘TCASy’, but it’s let’s just cover the basics. The first important out the way’ bit. The outer ring of the display, fact is that TCAS operates independently of mostly in red in our example (P8, bottom left), important to remember any ground equipment; it’s a co-operative indicates that an RA ‘Climb’ is required. In this system that uses SSR transponders to gather example, the pilot has to pitch up to put the that the only ‘getting and derive information such as bearing, vertical speed needle on the green bit of the location, altitude, slant-range and closure rate. arc or at least get it off the red bit. out the way’ algorithm It then applies anti-collision logic to calculate Following events such as the Überlingen with these systems alerts based on time-to-go to the predicted mid-air collision in July 2002 (you can read Closest Point of Approach (CPA) between the the report online in English at bfu-web.de by is in your brain aircraft (known as tau). putting Überlingen in the search box), it’s now Traffic alerts and resolution advisories are mandatory for commercial air transport pilots triggered at defined tau values which, in effect, to follow a TCAS RA demanded rate of climb provide protected volumes around the aircraft.
// SUMMARY disappear. A few seconds later, the // ASSESSMENT THE AIRPROX INVOLVED a Fokker 70 formation made a left turn towards him, THE BOARD CONSIDERED the various (F70) and a formation of Hawks, the latter triggering a TCAS RA to ‘adjust vertical aspects of this incident and reached the undertaking an air combat manoeuvring speed’. He responded but, before he had following conclusions: sortie in Class G airspace. The F70 was fully reached the pitch required, the operating on an IFR flight in receipt of a TCAS RA ceased. Deconfliction Service from Durham Tees The Durham controller was advised Cause: The Durham controller did Valley (DTV). Its pilot did not receive any by Leeming of two Hawks which would not achieve the desired Deconfliction avoiding action but did receive traffic be manoeuvring in the area. He pre-noted Service deconfliction minima. information (TI) and a TCAS RA. The Swanwick (Mil) that he would route the Hawks were receiving a Traffic Service F70 to the east coast. TI was given on Contributory Factors: from Swanwick (Mil) and also received the Hawks and the F70 pilot replied 1. Hawk pilot awareness of flight traffic information. that he had them on TCAS. Because vector with regard to TCAS equipped The F70 pilot was given TI about the F70 had been pre-noted to Swanwick aircraft. 2. Insufficient coordination two aircraft approaching from the right. (Mil), the Durham controller had expected between the Durham controller and Shortly afterwards, he received a TCAS the Hawks to keep a reasonable distance. Swanwick (Mil). TA and became visual with the other However, they closed to 3nm at the aircraft. They were doing an evasive same altitude. At this point, the F70 Degree of Risk: C right turn, causing the TCAS TA to reported a TCAS RA.
CPA REPORT DETAILS F124 0921:03 F70 F121 F125 200ft V/2.7nm H AIRPROX REPORT: 2014058 21:03 Date and time: Apr 28 2014 0920Z
20:55 Position: 15nm E Durham Tees 0920:47 F122 NMC F129 Airspace: Vale of York (Class: G) 4nm F122 F126 F125 Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: Fokker 70 Hawk
Alt/FL: FL120 NK 2nm Conditions: VMC VMC
Visibility: 2x Hawk NK 10K 0 Reported Separation: 0ft V/3nm H
Diagram based on radar data Recorded Separation: and pilot reports 200ft V/2.7nm H
¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 9 ELECTRONIC CONSPICUITY
COLLISION WARNING AREA CAUTION AREA AREA
RA 15-35 seconds
TA 20-48 seconds
RA
TA
However, it is important to know that they mandatory or deemed essential to operations. may be inhibited by the system logic – for For the vast majority of GA, any equipment example, at low height when on the final installed will probably be a TAS. Because your stages of an approach, or for a more input is required to resolve conflictions shown ‘important’ alert such as a ground proximity on TAS, Airprox Board experience indicates warning. As a result, you need to get into that it’s worth having a good think about how the TCAS manuals to understand when to interpret and assimilate the information, these warnings will be inhibited so that formulate a plan of action and carry out an you are not relying on something that may appropriate avoidance manoeuvre if required. not be generated. Remember, you’re still required to operate in compliance with the Rules of the Air/SERA, IT’S LESS COMPLEX FOR GA so you have to think about how you’d respond So that’s TCAS, but what’s TAS (Traffic to TAS indications with that in mind too. Advisory/Alerting System) all about? TAS is A common misconception is that TCAS/ a broad definition that covers all the systems TAS will show track geometry, whereas which tell you where some of the traffic is, what it actually displays is the bearing of but won’t tell you how to get out the way. the other aircraft. Some examples are FLARM/PowerFLARM Let’s consider, for example, an aircraft (FLight alARM), Avidyne TAS600, Garmin approaching from the right-hand side, GTS800 and f.u.n.k.e. TM250. perpendicular to our track, at the same TAS uses a variety of data to generate airspeed and altitude and on a collision course. traffic information and warnings or alerts. The What would that look like on a TAS screen? obvious data source is SSR information, but Let’s examine this hypothetical situation systems also typically use GPS in conjunction. and an associated TAS display (left) with the PowerFLARM, for example, uses GPS-derived same time-based positions shown. data, SSR Mode C and S information and ADS-B We’re in the aircraft travelling from bottom ‘out’ data to give a hybrid picture. How this to top, with equivalent positions of both information is displayed varies from model to aircraft marked by the same number (i.e, at model and some displays are quite ‘TCASy’, time ‘3’, both aircraft will be at their respective but it’s important to remember that the only position ‘3’). At time ‘1’, the other aircraft will ‘getting out the way’ algorithm with these be 45° right of the nose. At time ‘2’, the other systems is in your brain. aircraft will still be 45° right of the nose but The cost of installing TCAS means that it’s now at a reduced range. Similarly, at times not common in anything other than airliners or ‘3’, ‘4’ and ‘5’, the other aircraft will remain major commercial fleets, where its fitment is 45° right of the nose with the range
10 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE ELECTRONIC CONSPICUITY
// SUMMARY IN THIS INCIDENT, all pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and the Jetstream Jetstream pilot was in receipt of a Basic 2400ft alt Service from Cranfield Approach. The Diagram based on radar data Cranfield controller was providing a service without the aid of surveillance equipment. Radar recording showed intense glider activity to the north of Cranfield. The Jetstream was fitted with 1417:10 PowerFLARM, the ‘pilot flying’ was in the right seat and an examiner was in the Several groups of PSR 17:22 left seat. On the final approach track, the Tracking east to west 17:46 PowerFLARM gave an indication of contacts 17:34 ahead. Three gliders were seen and, in 4nm 4nm the next few seconds, two more gliders (which were thermalling) were seen too. CPA The examiner took avoiding action. As 1418 they got closer to the thermal, more gliders were discernible until a total of seven were identified. The PowerFLARM warning resulted in no risk of collision Cranfield RW12 ILS Final Approach Fix 2nm 2nm REPORT DETAILS
AIRPROX REPORT: 2014126
Date and time: Jul 30 2014 1418Z 0 0 Position: 3.5nm NW Bedford
Airspace: against the FLARM-equipped gliders. for having the foresight to fit PowerFLARM London FIR (Class: G) He assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’. to their aircraft. FLARM supports ‘see-and-avoid’ by The Board was disappointed that Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: helping to identify potential threats and none of the glider pilots could be Jetstream 31 Untraced gliders thereby directing lookout. FLARM equipage traced and could but hope that the continues to rise among civilian and military situational awareness of the pilots Alt/FL: Class G users. in the FLARM-equipped gliders 2,500ft, QNH (1,015hPa) had been increased by knowledge Conditions: of the approaching Jetstream. VMC // ASSESSMENT THE POWERFLARM equipment fitted to Cause: A conflict in Class G resolved Visibility: the Jetstream had provided considerable by the Jetstream pilot. 10km mitigation against mid-air collision by warning the crew of the presence of Degree of Risk: C Reported Separation: other FLARM-equipped aircraft, cueing 0ft V/0.5nm H their lookout to enable early visual Recommendation: The CAA considers Recorded Separation: acquisition. The Board commended the producing a chart of UK airfield IFR NK Jetstream crew for their pro-active holding pattern positions. behaviour and their operating authority
continually decreasing. Plotting all that on other traffic. You’ll be pleased to hear there’s a TAS screen in one go produces the picture a simple rule: if the other contact is on a shown, with time positions also annotated. constant bearing at the same altitude, you’re However, the effect in reality would be of the on a collision course – so change something. contact moving diagonally down the screen “ A small change in altitude is probably the towards us. It’s worth having quickest effective action, although there So, in looking at the TAS display, you are other options. If time permits, perhaps have to interpret the moving dot over time. a good think about request a Traffic or Deconfliction Service? Is that an aircraft crossing right to left or is Or, if that isn’t possible, simply request Traffic it an aircraft heading straight for you? How how to interpret Information? How about putting in a 45° will your perception of its track affect your turn for 30 seconds and then reversing back decision to turn? Will you turn right or left? and assimilate to track? It won’t significantly delay arrival Does your decision conform to the Rules of the information at your destination, but it will break the the Air/SERA? collision geometry. Airprox 2014126 is If, like me, you lose 50% of your ability to a great example of where Power-FLARM think properly as soon as you step into an saved the day for a Jetstream and some aircraft, these issues are best considered gliders through intelligent interpretation in the bath rather than while closing with of the displayed information. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 11 ELECTRONIC CONSPICUITY
Another important consideration is the effect will your TAS display be located? Buried at the selecting the SSR ‘on’, with all available Modes. a new bit of kit will have on lookout. Perhaps base of the instrument panel on the other side Squawk 7000 plus Mode C in Class G airspace, counter-intuitively, putting a shiny new TAS of the cockpit would not be useful. Mounted in even when you’re not getting a service, might into your aircraft can seriously hamper lookout. your eye-line on top of the coaming might also just save you if the other aircraft has a TCAS One of the Airprox quotes that stand out in get in the way of your visual scan. There’s no or TAS fitted even if you don’t. my mind is “the traffic indicated inside a mile, easy answer, but it’s a question that needs Give TCAS and TAS a chance! But, equally, so I turned the scale up”. Or, in other words, thinking about carefully. be aware that your flight vector may well cause the traffic was so close, I looked inside the problems for other aircraft that are TCAS cockpit, found the scale control knob, turned THE BEST EQUIPMENT IS equipped. Remember that commercial aircraft it in the correct direction to change the scale BETWEEN YOUR EARS pilots are mandated to follow any TCAS RA and looked at the display to try and resolve the That’s a very brief look at TCAS and TAS, and commands so, if you are operating near them, other aircraft’s position. Really? Getting your here’s the ‘take-home’ message: clearly, if SSR have consideration about pointing at them or eyes outside the cockpit would be my priority isn’t selected on, TCAS can’t react to it at all flying close to them lest you cause a TCAS in this circumstance, but it’s amazing how and, if Mode C or S isn’t selected either, an RA RA (and a subsequent likely Airprox report!). seductive a new display in the cockpit can be. can’t be generated because the TCAS doesn’t See Airprox 2014058 and 2014207 for more. Many TAS have the option of an audio output, know the altitude of the other aircraft. That which seems an excellent investment – the less is the reason for the Airprox Board’s almost Rob Curry is a Senior Airprox Inspector you need to look inside, the better. Also, where monthly reiteration of the importance of at the UK Airprox Board
REPORT DETAILS followed but, within a second or two, holding as agreed, the aircraft would have they were ‘clear of conflict’. The risk of been further apart and the TCAS alert would collision was assessed as ‘Medium’. probably not have been activated. It was AIRPROX REPORT: As the Do328 was taxiing out, the G115 noted that there have been a number of 2014207 pilot agreed to the controller’s request Airprox where pilots had manoeuvred Date and time: that he hold over the south bank of the sufficiently close to other TCAS-equipped Oct 24 2014 1533Z River Tay not above 3,000ft. He was unable aircraft to generate RAs and so a to do so due to cloud, so was further north recommendation was made regarding Position: than the controller expected. The G115 GA pilots’ education. 6nm W Dundee Airport pilot was visual with the Dornier throughout and was never concerned, assessing the Cause: A TCAS sighting report. Airspace: risk as ‘None’. Scottish FIR (Class: G) Degree of Risk: E Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: // ASSESSMENT Recommendation: That GASCo Do328 G115 THE G115 PILOT had not informed ATC consider means to educate GA pilots that it had not been possible for him to Alt/FL: on TCAS envelopes and the implication route to the south bank of the River Tay 2,600ft 2,600ft of flight vectors. QNH (1005hPa) NK as agreed. Had the G115 pilot had been
Conditions: VMC CLBC VMC CLBC
Visibility: 10km 10km Diagram based on radar data Reported Separation: 200ft V/2nm H 0ft V/1nm H CPA Do328 Recorded Separation: 1532:49 F021F026F029 0ft V/0.9nm H 0ft V/0.9nm H F031 // SUMMARY SHORTLY AFTER DEPARTURE from 32:41 Dundee Airport, the pilot of a Dornier 328 PSR (Do328) received a TCAS RA against a F031 32:33 Grob G115 (G115). Both flights were receiving a service from Dundee Tower/ F029 1532:25 Approach. Both pilots were issued with traffic information about the other flight F030 prior to the departure of the Do328, the crew of which noted a contact on their TCAS screen approximately 5-6nm southwest indicating +2,700ft. Before commencing the take-off roll, 02nm 4nm the contact disappeared from the screen but, once airborne, it reappeared as a TA. G115 On passing approximately 2,600ft, the contact became an RA descent which was
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12 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE
CLASS G WHAT ARE THE RISKS IN CLASS G?
Not quite the devil, but the
risk factors are exposed in 9% 6% the detail and, unsurprisingly, top of the list is ‘scan’ EQUIPMENT FACTORS 16% INDIVIDUAL/HUMAN FACTORS
SO WHY DO Airprox happen and how OPERATING ENVIRONMENT can we understand what lies behind the causes? There are, of course, many ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS underlying factors and we’ve been 69% struggling for years to identify key themes, hard facts and trends to back up our thoughts.
Last year, as part of its work to look at Class G Risks in the 21st Century, the CAA AIRPROX HIGH-LEVEL RISK DOMAINS, WITH PERCENTAGE INVOLVED commissioned a study to try to shed light on our Airprox data, answer some of these questions and document the contributory depicted key mitigations to collisions in of leading indicators that we might in future risk factors that increase the likelihood Class G; be able to use to monitor key areas of risk. of mid-air collisions (MAC). A copy of the report can be found on the UKAB website, • A full textual analysis of all Airprox reports To cut a long story short, all 1,813 Airprox but this is a précis of the findings. from 2000-2013 to provide a ‘bottom-up’ reports from 2000-2013 where at least one view to complement the ‘top-down’ analysis of the aircraft involved was in Class G THE THREE PHASES TO THE PROJECT enabled by the barrier model; and airspace were reviewed. In doing so, they • A review of existing studies to help found that there were frequently numerous provide a common understanding and • An analysis on which to base a list of key causal or environmental factors which development of a barrier model that factors that would hopefully lead to a set contributed to Airprox that were not ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 15 CLASS G
captured in the (often singular) cause identified by the UKAB. That said, in defence HAZARD PREVENTION HAZARD RECOVERY of the historic reports, they recognised that they were never intended to be used Strategic for this sort of analysis and so it was not conflict Pre-tactical management events surprising that there were inadequacies. Pilot tactical control To make sense of it all, a group of experts ATC tactical re-examined the Airprox texts and developed intervention ATC recovery Pilot a new, more contemporary taxonomy to recovery Pilot (ACAS) recovery catalogue the additional factors. This (see and avoid) contained four high-level domains (as shown) and, within these, they identified 137 different contributory factors. Given that Class G flying is a very human endeavour rooted in the ‘see-and-avoid’ principle, it’s not surprising that the majority of Airprox fell into the ‘Human Factors’ high-level domain. There were, though, some very interesting aspects
// SUMMARY outbound from Sywell in IMC, climbing his Service. There was discussion whether he THE AS365 PILOT was operating IFR in aircraft through cloud. Not being a local would have been better served by conducting receipt of a Basic Service from Oxford, pilot, he had not been aware that Oxford his flight further above the cloud layer, but requested just prior to the Airprox, while had recently acquired radar and could it as accepted that there were ‘on the day’ the DA40 pilot was operating IFR in receipt therefore offer more than a Basic Service. constraints. However, the Board noted that of a reduced Traffic Service from Coventry. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘high’. the DA40 pilot had been issued TI by The Coventry Radar controller provided Coventry but he had not taken action to traffic information (TI) twice to the DA40 // ASSESSMENT avoid the reported traffic. pilot regarding the AS365, subsequently THE AS365 PILOT’S lack of awareness of updating the TI as the two aircraft came Oxford’s radar was perhaps indicative of into proximity. The AS365 pilot reported limited pre-flight planning. Furthermore, Cause: A late sighting by both pilots. seeing the DA40 closing from the left and bearing in mind that the helicopter was so took immediate action. Both pilots were climbing IMC through cloud, the Board was Contributory Factors: responsible for their own collision avoidance surprised that the pilot had not requested 1. The AS365 pilot chose to fly in IMC and neither aircraft was fitted with a a Traffic Service from the relevant LARS. without a Radar Service. collision warning system. The AS365 pilot Members were pleased to note that the 2. The DA40 pilot did not act on the reports that he was operating an IFR flight DA40 pilot had been in receipt of a Traffic Traffic Information.
Degree of Risk: B Diagram based on radar data REPORT DETAILS
AS365 AIRPROX REPORT: 1100:07 2014224 2500ft alt Date and time: 01:19 Dec 5 2014 1102Z Position: 01:31 9.1nm SW Sywell
Airspace: 01:43 London FIR (Class: G) Type: AS365 DA40
Alt/FL: 2,000ft 2,800ft DA40 QNH QNH (1,019hPa)
Conditions: 2700ft alt IMC VMC Visibility: CPA Nil >10km Reported Separation: 1101:55 100ft V/30m H 300ft V/0.25nm H 200ft V/<<0.1nm H Recorded Separation: 200ft V/<0.1nm H
16 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE CLASS G
Diagram based on radar data and pilot reports “ 3nm Pilot scan was the EC135 top contributory GT450 pilot reported position 1410:34 factor (52.5%) 10:46 and track A05 and double the next A06 2nm 10:58 most frequent 1411:22 A07 A09 11:10 A08 CPA ≈1411 1nm EC135 slight turn left that emerged from the other three which GT450 could offer useful mitigations in future – more of which are covered later. 0 Taking a ‘top-down’ view of Airprox, existing work has already identified safety barriers that help stop collisions. For more information, see the article on risk in this magazine on p50. There are two types of such safety Beccles ATZ barriers: those which prevent the hazard before it happens and those which aid recovery after the hazard is identified. Each of the 1,813 Airprox was assessed to find out which of these barriers had failed sighting of a flex-wing microlight less than and which had been successful. At the same REPORT DETAILS 100m away in the right one o’clock position time, contributory factors were assigned and slightly above. He took avoiding action to each of the pilot’s actions and, where by turning left and descending. He appropriate, to ATC. AIRPROX REPORT: assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’. 2014165 Analysis of the associated 137 contributory The GT450 pilot was operating under factors provided the foundation of the report’s Date/Time: VFR in VMC and was not in receipt of an conclusions. Remember, most incidents Sep 7 2014 1411Z Air Traffic Service. He listened first to had more than one contributory factor and, Wattisham RTF, then changed to Seething although more than one factor may have Position: as he approached Bungay and then to the been present, this did not automatically 4.6nm NNW Beccles Beccles frequency. He was about to make mean that there was a direct correlation initial contact with Norwich RTF when he between the two. Airspace: saw a helicopter in his right one o’clock London FIR (Class: G) The ten most common factors (and the position at a range of 300yd, approximately number of reports within which they featured) 200ft below and heading directly towards Type: are shown on p20 in the charts for both pilots EC135 Quik GT450 him. Assessing the situation, he applied and controllers overall. Additionally, the five full power and climbed to the left in order most prevalent contributory factors for each Alt/FL: to avoid any potential rotor turbulence. of the main user groups are also as shown. 1,000ft 1,300ft The pilot noted that he was surprised he QNH (1,016hPa) NK (1,016hPa) had not heard any calls from the helicopter SO WHAT ARE THE TOP THREE pilot on any of the frequencies he had CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS? Conditions: monitored en route. He assessed the risk VMC VMC 1 – Pilot Scan. Perhaps unsurprisingly of collision as ‘Medium to High’. in see-and-avoid Class G airspace, Visibility: pilot scan was the top contributory >10km 15nm // ASSESSMENT factor (52.5%) and double the next THE GT450 PILOT had undertaken his most frequent. Reported Separation: flight with considerable attention to local In analysing this, the study confirmed 75ft V/<100m H 200ft V/200ft H factors. Members noted the degree to that pilots were far more likely to see which the GT450 pilot listened out and another aircraft if they were given additional Recorded Separation: communicated with local agencies and NK situational awareness such as ATC or commended him for doing so. It was just ACAS-derived information. Other factors unfortunate that the two pilots were relevant to pilot scan were poor airmanship, not on the Seething frequency at the the conflict’s geometry, visual conspicuity same time. The Board agreed that, and field-of-view. // SUMMARY although avoiding action had been taken, The bottom line is: get your head out of THE EC135 PILOT reported that he was safety margins had been much reduced the cockpit, actively scan, learn effective returning to base after completing a below normal. lookout, be aware of cockpit obscuration low-level task. He was operating under and use all available aids such as seeking VFR in VMC and not in receipt of an Air Cause: A late sighting by both pilots. a Traffic Service and having your SSR on Traffic Service but was listening out on with Mode C selected. Airprox 2014165 Seething Radio. Heading 225° at 110kt in Degree of Risk: B was an example where pilot scan in both a straight and level cruise, he had a late cockpits was not effective. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 17
CLASS G
// SUMMARY // ASSESSMENT A CTSW MICROLIGHT and a Partenavia THE P68 WAS on a converging course in REPORT DETAILS P68 flew into proximity in the vicinity of a slow descent and, as such, would have Damyns Hall Airfield. Both pilots were presented an almost constant sightline operating under VFR in VMC. The P68 pilot in the CTSW pilot’s right three o’clock. AIRPROX REPORT: was returning to Thurrock Airfield 4.6nm This would have made visual acquisition 2014030 east of Damyns Hall while in receipt of a extremely difficult. Date/Time: Basic Service from Farnborough LARS(N). The P68 pilot had been given Traffic Mar 28 2014 1704Z The CTSW pilot was arriving at Damyns Hall Information on the CTSW, for which the Airfield listening out on ‘Hornchurch Radio’. Board commended the controller. Members Position: Neither aircraft was fitted with a collision felt that the P68 pilot should, when he Damyns Hall Aerodrome warning system. could not see the traffic, have asked On arriving in the Damyns Hall overhead, for further Traffic Information. They Airspace: the CTSW pilot spotted another aircraft at could not understand why the P68 Lon FIR (Class: G) the same level in the three o’clock position pilot had chosen to track so near to the Type: approximately 200m away on a collision overhead of Damyns Hall on his way CTSW P68 course. He immediately climbed because to Thurrock at an altitude close to the there was no room to turn. The other aircraft circuit altitude. Alt/FL: continued to fly through the Damyns Hall 1,400ft 2,200ft overhead. He assessed the risk of collision Cause: A late sighting by the CTSW pilot QNH (1,014hPa) QNH (NK hPa) as ‘High’. and a non-sighting by the P68 pilot. The P68 pilot stated that he was Conditions: B positioning to land on the easterly runway Degree of Risk: VMC VMC at Thurrock and did not see a microlight. Visibility: 8km 10km
Reported Separation: 0ft V/100m H Not Seen
Diagram based on radar data Recorded Separation: P68 300ft V/<0.1nm H CTSW 1400ft alt on sighting a conflicting aircraft because they had ‘right of way’ meant that many incidents 1703:10 were not quickly resolved by early changes of track or height because the pilots relied on the other party to do the avoiding. 03:22 The assumption that the other pilot has even seen you is a dangerous one to make, let A17 alone relying on them to react appropriately 03:34 if the Rules of the Air place you ‘in the right’. The Director of UKAB likens this to stepping A16 out in front of a No. 10 bus on a pedestrian 03:46 crossing – cold comfort to know that you A15 were ‘in the right’ as you lie in your hospital bed… or worse. Airprox 2014030 is an example where airmanship could have A15 been better in avoiding Damyns Hall.
3 – Situational Awareness. The next most A13 A16 common causal factor at 21.5% was lack of situational awareness. In this respect, poor planning (including lack of route planning CPA and appreciation of other airspace users 1703:58 01nm 2nm such as glider sites, airfields and approach and departure lanes) was prevalent. For 300ft V/<0.1nm H example, better planning might have alerted the helicopter pilot in Airprox 2014224 to the fact that Oxford now had radar – which could have helped him. For military users, there was a lack of awareness of other non-military aviators in the Low Flying System. The MoD is working 2 – Airmanship. Frequent themes here While it’s clearly not mandatory to be in to overcome this with the introduction of were pilots flying too close to one another, radio contact in Class G, a quick call to several initiatives such as allowing users of ineffective integration in the visual circuit ATC – even just stating your location and the Pipeline Inspection Notification System and inaction. intentions – can often resolve confusion (PINS) to input directly into CADS (Centralised A third of pilots involved in an Airprox or uncertainty with others who might not Aviation Data Service, a military system chose not to make radio contact with ATC be aware of your presence, or whom you primarily designed to allow visibility and or use an available common frequency. may equally not be aware of. deconfliction between all planned military This directly impacted the situational The most concerning element was a missions within the UK low-flying system) awareness of other pilots who were tendency for pilots to assume that others and, very recently, the trial of a new VHF unaware of the potential conflict. would get out of their way. Their inaction low-level frequency in Scotland. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 19 CLASS G
For more information on the latter, see the article on MoD operations on p36. FIGURE X
SO WHAT? SUCCESSFUL AND TOP 10 PILOT CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS UNSUCCESSFUL BARRIERS Planning (pre-tactical) (Pilot) 154 At UKAB, it can often feel we live in a gloomy and stygian world where we only see what Field of view (Pilot) 155 went wrong, so it’s important to recognise Action/inaction (non-intentional) (General) (Pilot) 173 that most flights in the UK are conducted Conspicuity of aircraft 200 safely and successfully. In this vein, the most effective barrier on Conflict assessment (Pilot) 213 the model’s recovery side was pilot ‘see-and- Action/inaction (non-intentional) (Navigation) (Pilot) 227 avoid’ – good lookout really does work. Where Conflict geometry 278 recorded, 52% of successes in avoiding collisions resulted from lookout even if it was Situational awareness (Pilot) 389 often only at a late stage. For their part, ATC Action/inaction (non-intentional) (Airmanship) (Pilot) 450 tactical control accounted for almost 24% of Scan (environment) (Pilot) 951 successes in avoiding them by providing radar surveillance, Traffic Information and the intelligent application of UK FIS. TOP 10 ATC CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS Finally, it’s worth a mention that the use of TCAS/TAS accounted for 12% of Traffic information (ATC-ATC) 48 successes in avoiding conflicts and Action/inaction (non-intentional) (Communication) 64 electronic conspicuity is a real boon to Scan (ATC equipment) 70 effective lookout. Have we mentioned anywhere the importance of selecting Workload (ATC) 88 SSR on and squawking Mode C in order Coordination (ATC) 89 to give TCAS/TAS a chance? As for the unsuccessful barriers, it is Conflict assessment (ATC) 92 perhaps unsurprising that these were often Procedures 119 the ineffective application of the successful barriers, and 49% of Airprox were down to Situational awareness (ATC) 135 ineffective pilot tactical control (i.e, the Action/inaction (non-intentional) (General) (ATC) 226 actions of the pilot at the time of the Airprox). Traffic information (ATC-Pilot) 231 This was mostly down to not seeing in time, poor situational awareness, ineffective airmanship skills and poor navigation. With regard to ATC, we all know it is FIGURE Y not universally available as a barrier anyway due to radar and radio coverage TOP 5 CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS FOR EACH MAIN USER-GROUP but it is worth reflecting that almost a GA MILITARY COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT third of Airprox occurred when pilots were not in contact with ATC when perhaps they could have been, thus negating this Scan 20.4% Scan 20% Scan 16.1% barrier altogether. On the other hand, as we also all know, ATC is not a universal panacea. In 18% of Airmanship 7.7% Low flying 7.4% Situational Awareness (Pilot) 9.6% Airprox where an ATS was provided, the controller did not detect a conflict or could Conflict Geometry 6.9% Situation Awareness (Pilot) 6.4% Conflict Assessment (Pilot) 9.1% not implement an effective solution. That is not to malign the controllers; if you simply ask for a Basic Service, they have Situational Awareness (Pilot) 6.8% Conflict Geometry 6.3% Visibility 5.7% no duty to provide constant monitoring of your flight or advise you of conflictions unless they happen to be looking at that Navigation 3% Airmanship 4.6% Conflict Geometry 5.2% part of the screen at the time.
NEXT STEPS Assessing 13 years of Airprox data pinpointed 137 contributory factors, with the top three pilot factors being scan, airmanship and situational awareness. Well, we had guessed all of that anyway from our empirical approach, but what the study did do was to give quantifiable data on which to base further work. As such, it has moved us forward in our understanding and the next step is to start delving further into the data to try to identify mitigations and leading indicators.
Suzanne Sinclair is a UKAB Inspector
TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK
20 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE
GLIDING
Gliders can be found just about anywhere, so how do you work out where they might be? SOARING
UNPOWERED FLIGHT HAS a long and proud history in the UK, from Cayley’s AROUND (somewhat reluctant) coachman to a recent World Championship victory by the Jones brothers in Finland. It’s a sport, so we are all doing it for fun, the beauty of soaring silently through a mountain landscape, the challenge of competition SILENTLY or aerobatics or simply for the shared pleasure of succeeding at something demanding with a group of like-minded friends. Gliding is a very social sport and it is almost always done in a club environment because getting airborne usually needs a team working together.
While there are those who believe gliding is all old gliders made of fabric and wood (which still happens in the very active Vintage Gliding movement), most modern gliding is much more like this main picture – remarkable aerodynamic aircraft that can have best glide ratios of more than 50:1 and, even at 100kt, can still make 40:1. Skilled pilots using thermals on a good day can achieve average speeds of 65-70kt over distances of 500km or more. Gliding occurs pretty much all over the UK and in all sorts of weather. Thermals are used to make progress across country in summer, while spring and autumn see peaks in wave flying where, in favoured spots, gliders may climb up to FL245 and above (agreements with NATS permit this in defined areas). All-year-round gliders will ridge soar over hills in suitable wind directions. So, on a decent summer afternoon when everyone is flying, what will gliders be up to? They’ll be training novices and conducting local soaring close to their base sites so, if you route close to one, you’re likely to get close to a glider. They’ll also be doing cross-country tasks – up to 750km or more on a really good day – at all altitudes but “ The whole launch takes a couple of minutes, so if you’re doing 120kt the ground crew checking it’s clear probably won’t see you 4nm away when they start the launch
22 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE GLIDING
// SUMMARY REPORT DETAILS ON A DAY of difficult gliding conditions, a Puma flew into proximity with up to AIRPROX REPORT: four gliders, all of which were in the 2014143 Benson MATZ and one of which was penetrating the Benson ATZ. The pilot Date and time: of the glider that penetrated the ATZ Aug 18 2014 1321Z had established communications with Position: Benson Tower. Timing and position data 2nm W Benson confirm that this was not the glider involved in the Airprox. The Puma was Airspace: receiving a Basic Service from Benson Benson ATZ (Class: G) who were ‘SSR only’ and therefore could not see the gliders on radar. Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: Assessing the risk as ‘Medium’, the Puma Nimbus Puma pilot departing Benson saw a Alt/FL: glider in the nine o’clock position at 1,000ft the same level at a range of 0.5nm. The pilot of the glider most likely to be Conditions: the one seen by the Puma pilot reported VMC VMC that he was flying a FLARM-equipped self-sustaining glider. He did not see Visibility: any other aircraft. 30km The Benson control team were Reported Separation: pro-active and busy gathering 0ft V/0.5nm H NK information on glider activity from different sources, sharing it with crews. Recorded Separation: NK // ASSESSMENT THE GLIDERS WERE entitled to be glider pilots had a duty to fly responsibly: inside the MATZ, but good airmanship tracking right along the boundaries of suggested a radio call to Benson ATC ATZs did not represent good airmanship would then be advisable. That a number given the likely disruption to the of the pilots had called Benson ATC operations of the airfield concerned was commendable. irrespective of whether or not a radio Ways to improve the timely call had been made. promulgation of such events, including dissemination which would aid military Cause: A sighting report. aviators, are being examined and what was required from both sides was Degree of Risk: E co-operation and understanding. The
Diagram based on radar data and pilot reports
Reported CPA specifically making use of thermals. Finally, Glider 1321z they’ll be final gliding in long, straight glides from the top of their last climb back to base. 1500-2300ft alt Flying above active gliding sites is Puma particularly hazardous because of the likelihood of encountering winch-launching 1000ft alt gliders (or their cables). Sites that use cable winching are marked on the VFR chart with the symbol ‘G’ and ‘/’ followed by a max height AMSL – so ‘/3.2’ means winching up to altitude 3,200ft. You’re not only very unlikely to see the cable if you overfly one of these sites but, because the Primary only contacts glider is climbing very steeply, its pilot might well not see you either. The whole on radar winch-launch process takes approximately 01nm 2nm 3nm a couple of minutes so, if you’re doing 120kt or so, you’ll be far enough away that the ground crew who are checking that it’s clear before the launch probably won’t see you 4nm away when they start the launch. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 23 GLIDING
the winch. A tug/glider combination is connected by a rope approximately 200ft long, so it has limited manoeuvrability. For the purposes of the Rules of the Air and avoiding tugs and gliders, they are considered as a single unit that should be avoided by a large margin. Routing close to, or overhead, an active site on a good gliding day greatly increases your chances of coming across such a combination, as Airprox 2014177 illustrates.
HOW WE STAY UP Gliders obviously use rising air instead of engines to stay up. Summertime is thermal- time and, generally speaking, the best thermals are below cumulus clouds. Glider pilots like to stay closer to the clouds than the ground, so they might well be thermalling right up to cloudbase.
In the picture of a single-seat glider winch-launching (right), note the steep angle of climb which severely limits the pilot’s view ahead. That’s why they rely on the ground crew to check that the area is clear before launching. The cable might be visible against a light sky, but would you see this against the ground? Almost certainly not. These kinds of Airprox seem to have increased in frequency recently and a common theme is that the overflying pilot assumes that, because the weather isn’t wonderful, gliders won’t be flying. This isn’t the case: gliders will launch in winds that would shut down many GA airfields and in any cloudbase that lets them complete the winch launch without penetrating cloud. Gliding sites may also operate non-radio or on one of the dedicated gliding radio channels. Unless a gliding site publishes a specific frequency for passing aircraft to use, don’t assume that lack of response to a radio call also means there’s no activity. Airprox 2014211, where the helicopter pilot was caught out by encountering a launching glider in poor weather conditions, was an example of this. Unless you have positive confirmation that a gliding site isn’t operating, it’s wisest to assume it’s active. The majority of gliding sites also offer aerotowing. This has the benefit to the glider pilot of delivering them to where the lift actually is rather than simply to overhead
24 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE GLIDING
REPORT DETAILS Diagram based on radar data AIRPROX REPORT: 2014211
Date and time: 02nm 4nm 6nm Nov 8 2014 1135Z
Position: Dunstable Downs Gliding Site
Elevation: 500ft
Airspace: Luton CTR (Class: D) 1134:59 Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: ASK21 A109 34:47 Alt/FL: CPA ≈1135
1,100ft¨ 1,900ft 34:23 QFE QNH 34:35
Conditions: VMC VMC 34:11
Visibility: 25km NK
Reported Separation: 0ft V/35m H 150ft V/150m H
Recorded Separation: A109 NK 1900ft alt // SUMMARY THE ASK21 PILOT was instructing on a winch launch, near the top of which the in a right turn below his altitude. He of avoiding gliding sites, members instructor caught sight of a helicopter assessed the risk of collision as ‘Low’. agreed that doing so on this occasion at the same level and on a converging Intensive gliding activities can take would have contributed significantly course. It had previously been obscured place in surprisingly poor weather, much to collision mitigation. The glider pilot from view due to the glider’s high of it training to operate safely in those was commended for his prompt actions nose-up attitude. The instructor took conditions. It would be good practice at a difficult stage of flight. immediate avoiding action, assessing to assume that a gliding site is active the risk as ‘High’. unless positively notified otherwise. Cause: The A109 pilot flew close to Due to the poor weather and wind a promulgated and active gliding site conditions, the A109 pilot had expected and into conflict with the ASK21. that gliding would not be taking place // ASSESSMENT THE A109 PILOT at Dunstable and consequently had assumed that there would be no gliding activity at Contributory Factor: The A109 requested to route overhead. Luton pilot assumed that the weather ATC informed him that Dunstable was Dunstable Downs due to the inclement weather and high wind speed, agreeing conditions would preclude glider notified as active so he scanned the operations. glider site, noting a cable-tow and two he had not avoided the site “…if at all possible” as requested in the UK AIP gliders on the ground. He scanned Degree of Risk: A further and saw a glider in his left entry for Luton. Commending him 9.30 position at approximately 200m for normally adopting a ‘procedure’
However, the most efficient way to travel ranges (left middle picture, P24) and these In competitions, Class D airspace is off limits across country in a glider is to minimise the can take gliders very high (the current UK even with a clearance. This is to maintain a time spent thermalling, so pilots try to link up record is in excess of 35,000ft) and a long level playing field – it would hardly be fair if areas of lift. They slow down to climb in the way (there have been flights of more than one competitor got a clearance and the next ‘good’ air and speed up (maybe to 100kt or 1,000km in Scotland using wave systems). one didn’t. But all of this means that ‘choke more) in the sinking air. If the wind organises points’ can give rise to particularly high traffic the thermals into long ‘cloud streets’, gliders AIRSPACE densities as depicted in the diagram (lower will tend to follow these to maximise the Gliders normally operate in Class G, although left, P24), where red indicates the especially energy gained, even if it means a significant they are permitted to fly in Classes C, D and high-density airspace areas – watch out! deviation from their planned track. E with appropriate clearances and equipment. But glider pilots also have responsibilities But wind also gives us rising air in two However, staying airborne and making too, and Airprox 2014143 was an example forms. Wind blowing across a ridgeline will progress across country without an engine of a glider skirting around an ATZ; all legal allow low-level soaring along the ridge, takes concentration and, of course, it’s not but, as a glider pilot, if you can’t avoid doing sometimes for quite long distances – for possible to follow a defined track or level. it then airmanship dictates that you talk example, the South Downs in a northerly Therefore, gliders don’t usually ask for with ATC so that they are at least aware wind. Similarly, in the right conditions, lee clearances to fly in controlled airspace, and able to inform or route other aircraft waves can form downwind of mountain preferring to ‘route around’. to avoid you. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 25 GLIDING
COMPETITIONS Gliding can also be a competitive sport and, throughout the summer, organised competitions allow pilots to develop their Diagram based on radar data skills and test themselves against each and pilot reports other. A competition involves anything from 20 to 60 (or more) gliders being based at an airfield and set a specific task Bonanza 1431:13 around a defined course. DR400 The task will be decided on the day + ASK21 depending on the weather and can change at short notice if the forecast and reality don’t match up. Once the group of gliders Stratton has been launched (usually within an hour Audley of each other), each pilot makes their own decisions about when to start the task and what route to take around the defined turnpoints. All of the gliders carry loggers, which record their position and altitude every few seconds to prove where they’ve been and how fast they went. 1433:21 Individual competitions are NOTAMed DR400 Pilot’s for point of departure, but the task route reported track and timing is so variable that each task is not usually subject to a specific NOTAM. DR400 Pilot’s However, all competition organisations estimated Airprox are required to have a dedicated Airspace 01nm 2nm 3nm Co-ordinator, who will ensure that airfields position close to the planned route will be notified on a daily basis. There is also a website which will list // SUMMARY the competition tasks set on any given AFTER TAKEOFF FROM Bicester, Cause: The Bonanza pilot flew into day at bgaladder.co.uk/SHOWTASK.ASP. the DR400 pilot routed to the north conflict with the DR400 tug and Tasks are usually finalised at approximately of Stratton Audley before turning onto glider while in close proximity to a 10am in the morning, just prior to the a heading of 200°. Passing approximately promulgated and active gliding site. mass briefing. 2,000ft in the climb, he noticed a Bonanza at the same height approximately 50 Degree of Risk: B HOW NOT TO BUMP INTO A GLIDER metres away which was turning ‘hard to the right’ and climbing. The DR400 • Avoid routing over or close to gliding sites, pilot did not have time to take any especially below the winch-launching height. action, assessing the risk of collision as ‘Medium’. REPORT DETAILS • If it looks like a good thermal soaring day, The Bonanza pilot reports that he watch out for gliders under cumulus clouds. frequently flies this route but, because AIRPROX REPORT: of cloud in the Birmingham area, he had 2014177 • Be aware of areas of intensive ridge soaring elected to transit at 2,100ft QNH. As he and the wind directions that make them busy. approached Bicester, he could see activity Date and time: at the glider site. Continuing to scan, he Sep 6 2014 1433Z • At higher levels, be aware of the gliding saw a tug towing a glider ‘low and slow’ in wave areas (primarily in Scotland, his 10 or 11 o’clock. He assessed there was Position: 1nm NE of Bicester Glider Site Yorkshire, the Pennines and Wales) and ‘no risk of dangerous proximity’ even with the conditions that give rise to wave. no change of course. However, he elected Airspace: to turn right and climb until the other London FIR (Class: G) WHAT ABOUT TECHNOLOGY? aircraft were clear. He assessed the risk Well, transponders remain a problem for of collision as ‘None’. Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: aircraft that have to carry all their own DR400 Beech A36 power in batteries and may be airborne for // ASSESSMENT + Glider Bonanza many hours. Both battery and transponder THE BONANZA PILOT, while he had not technology has advanced in recent years flown directly over the glider site, was Alt/FL: and it’s true that most new gliders are fitted 2,300ft 2,100ft flying close-by and below the published AGL (1,014hPa) QNH with a Mode S unit, but there are significant maximum launch height. It would have technological (and regulatory) barriers to been wiser to have given such a busy site Conditions: retrofitting these to existing gliders. However, a wider berth. The Bonanza pilot had seen VMC VMC glider pilots have been quick to adopt FLARM the other aircraft and, although assessing – a relatively low-cost and low-power device that there was no risk of collision, took Visibility: that can easily be fitted to most gliders. See action anyway. The Board noted that 20nm 10km the article about electronic conspicuity on p8- gliders being towed usually have little 12 for more, and particularly the associated Reported Separation: ability to manoeuvre. Also, the glider might 0ft V/50-100ft H 200ft V/200m H Airprox 2014126 to see an example of its be released at any point, after which a tug benefits beyond the gliding community. is then likely to make swift manoeuvres to Recorded Separation: return to the glider site. NK Chris Fox is a UKAB Glider Member
TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK
26 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE t +44 (0) 24 7776 7000 w airwaysaviation.com HANG GLIDING
are exceptional and flights of approximately two to three hours with height gains of up to 5,000ft (if the cloudbase permits) are more the norm for many experienced cross-country pilots. Given that hang gliders and paragliders don’t generally carry radios or transponders, a good lookout near known launch sites is critical as the primary method of collision avoidance. However, see-and-avoid alone is insufficient to minimise the chances of an Airprox – it’s essential to also understand hang gliding and paragliding practices and techniques, together with an appreciation of the weather conditions in which they fly. Most hang glider and paraglider flying is HAVE WINGS, initiated through foot-launching from ¨ WILL TRAVEL “ See-and-avoid alone is Hang gliding and paragliding Nowadays, the aim is to gain as much height as possible above the take-off point insufficient to minimise have come a long way – and using ridge lift and thermals, then head off across country seeking new thermals and the chances of an so have their pilots… staying airborne for as long as possible. Airprox – it’s essential Experienced pilots who circle in thermals IF YOU THOUGHT foot-launched gliding up to cloudbase routinely achieve height to also understand is purely a glorified sledge ride involving gains of several thousand feet and can nothing more than leaping off the top travel hundreds of kilometres across country. hang gliding and of a hill and gliding down to the bottom, The UK record height gain for a hang glider paragliding practices you’d be wrong. It’s a common is 12,000ft above take-off in wave conditions misconception that belies the skills of and the duration record stands at just over the pilots and the abilities of their craft. eight hours. However, these achievements
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 29 HANG GLIDING
// SUMMARY Sea King from some distance. Visual REPORT DETAILS acquisition of the yellow helicopter A SEA KING pilot reported carrying and then either landing or manoeuvring out a Search and Rescue Operation AIRPROX REPORT: to increase separation and/or to aid (SAROP) in the vicinity of Carrock Fell 2014047 visual acquisition by the Sea King (Lake District). In a right-hand turn to pilot would have been wise. Although transition away following deployment Date and time: both airspace users were equally of a winchman to the ground, the Mar 26 2014 1315Z entitled to operate in Class G airspace, right-hand-seat (RHS) pilot saw a Board members expressed their Position: paraglider canopy very close on the strong opinion that all airspace users Carrock Fell left. The RHS pilot took control, had a duty to make way for the self- manoeuvring to increase separation. evident priority of a SAROP. Airspace: The Sea King pilot saw several Lon FIR (Class: G) The Board noted the RAF Safety paraglider pilots on the ridgeline above Centre advice that helicopter crews him, his impression being that they Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: should avoid hang gliders, paragliders were waiting for his aircraft to depart Sea King Paraglider and other ultralight aircraft by before launching. He stated that the 2,000m laterally. Alt/FL: crew were aware of multiple aircraft in
NK NK the area and had been flying defensively, Cause: A conflict of flight paths transmitting safety calls on ‘low-level resolved by the Sea King pilot. Conditions: common’ to mitigate the risk. He VMC VMC assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’. Degree of Risk: B Visibility: Despite extensive tracing action, the paraglider pilot could not be located. For 10km NK Recommendation: a variety of reasons, virtually no paraglider The BHPA consider producing Reported Separation: pilots fly with an air-band radio. 50ft V/100m H NK a catalogue of paraglider launch // ASSESSMENT sites, including usage under given Recorded Separation: THE PARAGLIDER PILOT would wind conditions. NK most likely have heard the approaching
30 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE HANG GLIDING
“ Paragliders favour lighter surface winds of up to 10kt, but hang gliders can launch quite comfortably in surface winds of up to 25kt. Thus, in surface winds of 25kt or below, activity on the ‘into wind’ sites should be expected
Diagram based on pilot report Diagram based on pilot repor
Paraglider
CPA 1315
Sea King
¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 31
HANG GLIDING
REPORT DETAILS
AIRPROX REPORT: Diagram based on pilot reports 2014062
Date and time: Diagram based on pilot reports May 15 2014 1133Z
Position: Approx. 6nm SW Huddersfield
Airspace: Tutor Lon FIR (Class: G) Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: 750ft agl Tutor Untraced paraglider Alt/FL: 750ft NK
Approx CPA 1133 Conditions: VMC NK
Visibility: >10K NK
Reported Separation: 100m V/<0.1nm H NK
Recorded Separation: NK
were entitled to operate in the area with an equal and shared collision Unknown Paraglider avoidance responsibility. After considering whether or not this should be a Risk B assessment, the risk was ultimately determined to be ‘C’, it being felt that effective and // SUMMARY incident was assessed as ‘Medium’. timely action had been taken by the THE PILOT OF a Tutor on a nav-ex The incident cannot be seen on radar Tutor pilot in achieving the reported was flying in VMC towards the and it has not been possible to trace the 100m separation. Ladybower Reservoir in the Derwent paraglider/motor. As noted by both HQ Air Command Valley. He reported seeing a paraglider and the British Hang Gliding and pass beneath the aircraft from front to //ASSESSMENT Paragliding Association, this Airprox back underneath the right wing, THE BOARD DISCUSSED whether particularly highlights the need approximately 100m below. Both the the paraglider/motor pilot had seen for good lookout by all in the student and the instructor were looking the Tutor, deciding that the apparent see-and-avoid environment of out, with the instructor in the LHS lack of avoiding action would seem to Class G airspace. seeing nothing. Both pilots looked indicate that (s)he had not. In the event, behind, but neither could identify it was probably the Tutor pilot’s look-out Cause: A late sighting by the Tutor the paraglider. and avoiding action that prevented this pilot and an assumed late sighting It should be noted that post-incident from being a more serious incident, by the paraglider/motor pilot. analysis of the wind conditions makes there being no ATC service that the it much more likely that the aircraft Tutor pilot could have received to Degree of Risk: C was a paramotor. The severity of the assist them. Both airspace users
For example, rain will retard the airflow over a hang glider wing, which will result in a much higher stall speed and thus a greatly reduced stall margin. Therefore, launches will not take place in such adverse conditions.
However, it should also be remembered that gliders can frequently get caught in precipitation during flight and particularly so in ‘light shower’ or ‘intermittent rain’ conditions. Therefore, as a rule, precipitation will only prevent gliding activity when it is frequent, constant or heavy in nature. In the case of in-flight visibility, the limitations specified for maintaining VFR are equally as applicable to foot-launch gliders as they are to all other forms of aviation. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 33 HANG GLIDING
• Seasonal activity/Site limitations REPORT DETAILS to monitor the ‘view’ from the drone. Comparatively little hang gliding or Each time the paraglider pilot changed paragliding takes place in the UK during AIRPROX REPORT: direction, the quadcopter tracked the winter months, largely due to short 2014198 the change, following him with daylight hours, adverse and unpredictable approximately 25ft vertical separation weather conditions and greatly reduced Date and time: and between zero and 25ft horizontal thermal activity. Any flying that does take Oct 2 2014 1445Z separation. Assessing the risk of collision place is likely to be confined to ridge-soaring as ‘High’, the hazard of a collision with a few hundred feet above the windward side Position: his thin canopy-to-harness lines caused Rushup Edge of a hill or top to bottom training flights. serious concern. Additionally, many sites are closed during Airspace: The quadcopter operator could not these periods due to seasonal activities such London FIR (Class: G) be traced. as pheasant/grouse shooting, lambing and crop sowing. Site operating periods and Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: // ASSESSMENT limitations (such as no fly areas) will be Paraglider Untraced quadcopter THIS INCIDENT WAS one of an clearly specified in the relevant Club Site increasing number of Airprox involving Guides, accessible through the BHPA Alt/FL: small unmanned aircraft (SUA). It 150ft AGL website (see ‘Wind Direction’ above). appeared from the paraglider pilot’s Conditions: report that the quadcopter had been In summary, in order to minimise VMC flown around him and his canopy at the risk of Airprox incidents with extremely close range as a deliberate foot-launched gliders: Visibility: act. The Board agreed that the paraglider 5km pilot had been placed in great peril • Visit the BHPA website at bhpa.co.uk/clubs/ by the reckless actions of the SUA and check which clubs operate in the area(s) Reported Separation: operator. If the ranges reported to be overflown. 20ft V/0m H were accurate, the quadcopter’s Recorded Separation: flight was in contravention of the Air • Access the relevant Club(s)’ Site Guide(s) Not Recorded Navigation Order and therefore and check which sites may be active in the a criminal offence. prevailing surface wind conditions. Members considered that chance // SUMMARY had played a major part in events and • Where unable to avoid the site(s), plan safety had been very much below to fly upwind of the windward side of the THE PARAGLIDER PILOT reports acceptable levels. Short of the paraglider hill/ridge, maintaining as much horizontal ridge-soaring at approximately 150ft pilot landing immediately, he could not and vertical separation as possible. in VMC. He saw a ‘DJI Phantom FC40 have done more to improve matters type’ quadcopter drone descend to given that the quadcopter was seemingly Lastly, keep a good lookout from the surface approximately 20ft above his canopy, being operated to deliberately follow all the way up to cloudbase. Gliders are noting that it was quite hard to see him in flight. constantly seeking lift (rising air) to stay against the grey sky even with a row airborne. To the casual observer, they may of LEDs on its underside. Reporting Cause: The quadcopter was appear to fly together in ‘gaggles’ whereas that he could not see anyone on the flown into conflict with they are in fact merely using the same ridge nor in the fields below ‘with a the paraglider. thermal. The company of other gliders is radio unit’, he assumed that the not their goal. Rather, it is staying airborne quadcopter was being flown out of Degree of Risk: A by gaining as much altitude as possible line of vision using a remote screen from whatever lift is available. Where one glider is observed circling in thermal lift, there are likely to be several others working the same lift at varying altitudes above and below. Also, there may well be foot-launch gliders flying cross-country by ‘hopping’ from one thermal to the next, particularly downwind Rushup Edge of active sites. Hang glider and paraglider pilots have their part to play in collision avoidance too. Airprox 2014047, for example, was an incident that should have been avoidable. If you see a hovering helicopter or one that has emergency markings, give it a wide berth because it’s very likely to be conducting an emergency task. Finally, if you’re a drone operator, please CPA 1445 do not try to take video or fly close to paragliders or hang gliders. As Airprox 2014198 demonstrates, what might seem good sport to you is life-threatening to them – especially if your drone gets caught in the rigging or, even worse, severs some lines. In any case, it is illegal to fly your drone in such a way as to endanger others and/or closer than 50 metres to any person, vessel, TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT vehicle or structure. MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK Major J P Gilbert REME
34 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE
MILITARY MIXING IT WITH THE MILITARY
have been low-flying for decades, driven Flying below 2,000ft? by a need to effectively support troops or Think about fast-jets! deliver tactical munitions accurately below the coverage of enemy radar by using FIXED-WING AND ROTARY aircraft terrain-masking techniques to evade are considered to be low-flying when detection and gain tactical advantage. below 2,000ft and 500ft respectively, Today, the requirement to low-fly remains. which brings them into potential conflict As seen in recent operations, it’s not just the with a range of other Class G airspace ability to drop weapons with precision in users: light civilian aircraft, gliders, high-threat environments that’s needed, paragliders, helicopters and, of course, but also the capability to conduct other tasks other military aircraft. such as: ‘shows of force’ (high-speed low-level passes, requiring skilful piloting, to disperse So why do the military still need to low-fly? enemy troops without the need for the use How is it managed, what training do they of weapons), the delivery of supplies to undertake to stay safe and, finally, what troops via air-drops, emergency medical could you as a pilot do to enhance your own recovery operations, or even delivery of safety when operating in the same areas? humanitarian aid when the environment As many pilots will know, military aircraft may not be guaranteed as friendly.
36 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE MILITARY
DANGER CLOSE Low-level flying is demanding and there is PINS 14W Main areas avoided by military aircraft little margin for error. Because of this, it is a ie Regulated airspace constant theme during all stages of military Tactical training areas, down to 100ft AGL flying training. Pilots are first introduced to R6610C some of the skills and techniques during Areas used mainly by helicopters R6110B 1-Salisbury Plain Ops/Odiham/Benson, Middle Wallop, elementary training in the Grob Tutor, which R610D0D 3-Culdrose, 9-Shawbury, 10-Wattisham Area 14T is conducted at the relatively slow speed of HRA Highlands Restricted Area 120kt and no lower than 500ft. R610A Area 14C The next step is in the Shorts Tucano, Low flying boundaries currently based in Yorkshire. Here the PINS 14E PINS boundaries that lie within low-flying becomes more challenging, with Area 14 low flying area boundaries speed doubled and pilots being trained to fly safely at heights of 250ft. Some students then Hotspots move on to RAF Valley to conduct advanced flying training in the Hawk. A considerable part of this course is also flown at low-level, Area 16 and speed is again increased to 420kt. The final part of the lengthy training process sees pilots join an Operational Area 12 Area 20T Area Conversion Unit where they learn to fly 13 Area 19 high-performance frontline aircraft. Here the ability to fly and operate at low-level is very demanding and requires constant attention. Area 17 Untested, the required skills can fade rapidly. PINSS 11N The number of military aircraft involved in Area 11 low-flying has dropped considerably over the last 20 years, reflecting the reducing numbers of front-line aircraft and their more PINS 11S11 varied roles. Nevertheless, there were still Newark-on approximately 20,000 fixed-wing low-level PININSI 7N Area 8 -Trent daytime movements alone in the past year. Area 7 Area 9 To manage this significant amount of Area 5 military low-flying, a system called the Area 6 Centralised Aviation Data Service (CADS) AArea 7T Glasbury Area 4 ensures that information on other airspace Kineton Area 10 PINS 7S Tewkesbury users is commonly available and, where 5nm North Ebbw Vale possible, known flight-path conflictions Thames Valley are resolved – more on that later. Avoidancece Area Area 1 HOW LOW CAN YOU GO? Yeovilton Area 18 The military’s UK Low Flying System (UKLFS) Area 2 extends vertically from the surface up to Area 18 2,000ft over land and sea out to the UK FIR Area 3 Boundary and is managed by the Low Flying Operations Squadron currently based at RAF Wittering. Apart from aircraft which fly below 140kt, any military pilot who wishes to fly an aircraft in the UKLFS must make a prior booking to gain traffic information and locations where fixed-wing flying is routinely For example, military aircraft will climb to any late warnings which may affect their authorised this low. These are only available 1,000ft when crossing coastlines to avoid sortie. Bookings are made on the day of the during the day and, when active, the airspace birds. Airprox 2014052 (shown on p40) flight, or the day prior if after 20:00L. is allocated to a single aircraft or formation. was an incident where this was pertinent. Because of the different see-and-avoid The three TTAs are LFA 7T (located in Wales), Inadvertently flying into the ground is, considerations by day and night, there is a LFA 14T (located in Scotland) and LFA 20T of course, an ever-present risk in military UK Day Low-Flying System (UKDLFS) and (which overlays parts of the Scottish Borders). low-flying. However, another significant a UK Night Low-Flying System (UKNLFS). Their usage times are published on the gov.uk risk is that of mid-air collision. With no The day system comprises 20 Low Flying website to ensure people are made aware of Air Traffic Services generally available Areas (LFAs) as shown in the graphic above, when this very low-flying will take place. at low-level due to terrain screening, six of which are Dedicated User Areas which Finally, as can also be seen on the graphic, pre-flight planning and ‘see-and-avoid’ are not available to all users. The five shown there is also the Highland Restricted Area − become increasingly important. in green on the graphic are mostly for another segregation with the same boundaries For both day and night low flying, CADS helicopter operations, while LFA19 covers as LFA 14T, but which is also used for low-level is used to enhance situational awareness Northern Ireland and is only for aircraft Terrain Following Radar training in IMC. of other aircraft. The system provides a based at Aldergrove. visual representation of the planned route The night system has different area HOW LOW IS LOW? an aircraft will take and gives an indication designations which, for obvious see-and-avoid The minimum height that fixed-wing aircraft of any other entered routes that might reasons, are much more controlled in terms can normally be booked down to in the UKLFS conflict. All military pilots are required of access so that only individual military is 250ft, with the exception of the TTAs where to enter their planned routes onto CADS, users are generally able to operate in any the minimum height is 100ft for fast jets and and many civilian commercial, Police and particular area at one time. 150ft for C130s. Rotary aircraft are able to Air Ambulance pilots also have access so Additionally, there are three Tactical book down to ground level throughout. that those conducting helicopter pipeline Training Areas (TTAs) for Operational However, this is the minimum height and inspections (PINS) or similar can also add Low Flying at 100ft; they are the only aircraft can still be operating above this. their routes to the system. ¨
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 37 MILITARY
REPORT DETAILS
Diagram based on pilot reports AIRPROX REPORT: 2014167
Date and time: Sep 9 2014 1544Z
Position: Reported CPA 1544 Typhoons 4nm E Dolgellau Airspace: 250ft agl London FIR (Class: G) Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: Typhoon Gyrocopter Gyrocopter Alt/FL: 250ft 700ft RPS (1,016hPa) AGL 700ft agl Conditions: VMC VMC
Visibility: 10KM 20KM
Reported Separation: 350ft V/0ft H 200ft V/0ft H
Recorded Separation: NK
members said that GA pilots should // SUMMARY a climb, so they passed beneath it expect to encounter military low-flying with an estimated 350ft separation. THE TYPHOONS WERE in a military below 2,000ft in any mountainous They assessed the risk of collision low-flying area and listening out on terrain and that flow arrows were as ‘Medium’. the low-level frequency. Known as the irrelevant, while others noted that flow The gyrocopter pilot was following ‘Machynlleth Loop’, the valley concerned arrows were indicative of choke points the valley and had instructed the is regularly used by military fast jets which reflected more than usual student to climb to approx 700ft AGL for terrain flying training. On military low-flying activity. Members felt that to maintain a safe height. Just as they charts, it is marked with flow arrows. the significance of this particular levelled, he heard and then saw two The gyrocopter pilot was on a cross- valley was great enough to warrant Typhoon fighters pass below, too late country exercise and its pilot was on some form of warning. to take any avoiding action. He assessed Welshpool’s frequency. None of the the risk of collision as ‘Low’. aircraft were fitted with a collision Cause: A conflict in Class G warning system. airspace. After approximately five minutes of // ASSESSMENT flying low-level, both Typhoon pilots NOTING THAT THE airspace was Degree of Risk: C saw a gyrocopter less than 1nm ahead. Class G where all the pilots were entitled The formation could not manoeuvre to fly, members wondered whether Recommendation(s): HQ Air laterally to increase separation due the GA community were aware of the Command reviews GA education to the valley sides and the position of the significance of this particular valley with regard to flow arrows. gyrocopter above them precluded regarding military low-flying. Some
RISE ABOVE THE REST CADS is all very well for those who have access, but what about GA pilots who don’t? It simply isn’t viable to roll out the system to individual users and GA pilots probably don’t want to spend time inserting their planned routes anyway. Nevertheless, there are a couple of things you can do to help yourself and the military. First, a bit of pre-flight preparation can pay dividends in understanding where the likely military low-level choke points are so that you can try to avoid them. In this respect, there are a number of ‘Flow Arrows’ in the low-flying system where military pilots are required to fly down valleys or choke points in a specified direction. These are depicted on the UK AIP ENR 6-5-1-2, along with other information about Areas of Intense Aerial Activity.
38 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE MILITARY
Airprox 2014167 was an example where, a trial is currently being carried out in Scotland had the pilot appreciated that he was flying using 135.475MHz as a low-level common in a valley covered by a Flow Arrow (also VHF frequency to broadcast positions and shown in the graphic from the military intentions, exchange information and provide low-level chart on p36), he might have “ a means for pilots to communicate with chosen another route. The CADS each other when they see another aircraft. Another thing that will help is to have Not just intended for military encounters, SSR on and with Mode C selected. Increasing provides a visual it is hoped that use of this frequency will numbers of military aircraft are being fitted be expanded across the UK if the trial is with collision warning systems and these representation of the successful. As shown, Airprox 2014152 are usually SSR-based. The military are would have been an ideal opportunity to also installing P-FLARM in some of their planned route use this to clear up who was doing what. aircraft, so this can also be a useful tool an aircraft will take for gaining situational awareness. Letting WORK TOGETHER Air Traffic Control agencies know where you and gives an In summary, low-flying remains an essential are operating can also be useful. Military requirement for military aviators’ training and aircraft will often be receiving a service indication of other continued practical experience remains before descending into the low-level system, a constant part of any military aviator’s so they might hear your call or might be entered routes that flying career. There is a comprehensive informed of your presence by controllers. management system in place, with all Clearly, this might not work or be might conflict involved working hard to minimise the appropriate everywhere. Because of this, chances of aircraft coming into conflict. ¨
// SUMMARY paths were divergent so he perceived of the incident more highly than the THE SEA KING, its external lights that no avoiding action was necessary, glider pilot had. illuminated, was mountain training and assessing the risk of collision as ‘None’. The fact that both pilots were on the glider was looking to gain lift in the different frequencies was discussed at mountains. The helicopter crew were // ASSESSMENT length. It was noted that there are a monitoring the UHF low-level common NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE glider number of different gliding frequencies. frequency. Rolling out from a right-hand pilot saw the Sea King from some Use of a common safety frequency turn just under the cloud base, a glider distance, he still flew close enough accessible to all users might have was seen ahead. A further turn was to cause its pilot concern. Glider allowed for greater deconfliction promptly initiated. The risk of collision members of the Board explained that, in this instance. A VHF safety was assessed as ‘Medium’. when ridge soaring in the mountains, frequency (135.475), accessible The glider pilot reported seeing the pilots have limited options: once to all aviators operating below helicopter from several miles away. committed to one ridge, turning back 2,000ft AGL, is now being trialled He was unable to contact its crew by is often not feasible. in Scotland. radio as they both used different The Board thought it likely that the frequencies. Using an updraught to Sea King crew were initially surprised Cause: A conflict in Class G. gain height, he continued the flight by the sudden proximity of the glider along the Brecon Beacons with the and, having seen it relatively late, Degree of Risk: C Sea King in sight throughout. The flight correspondingly judged the severity
REPORT DETAILS
AIRPROX REPORT: 2014152 Sea King Date and time: Aug 22 2014 1208Z
Position: 3000ft alt N Pen-y-Fan
Airspace: Lon FIR (Class: G)
Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: Sea King LS6c Glider Alt/FL: LS6C 3,000ft NK
Conditions: VMC VMC
Visibility: >10km >10km
Reported Separation: 150ft V/200yds H 0ft V/300m H DiagramDiagram based based on on pilot pilot reports reports Recorded Separation: NK
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 39 MILITARY
commenced a climb // SUMMARY to 1,000ft. Local 0 2nm 4nm THE TORNADO WAS ‘number two’ in bird populations can a low-level formation sortie while the increase significantly AS355 was conducting a railway survey near the coast so, task. Both aircraft had external lights to reduce the risk of CPA Tornado #2 selected on and respective transponders birdstrike, coastlines 1224:23 with Modes A, C and S. The AS355 had are normally planned 200ft V/0.3nm H a Traffic Advisory System (TAS) which to be crossed at alerted its pilot to the approaching 90° and the aircraft A80 Tornado. The Tornado pilot was in climbs from low- A60 A80 communication with the formation level to a height of leader and was also listening out on approximately 1,000ft. 24:15 the UHF low-level common frequency. 24:07 The AS355 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Warton. As the // ASSESSMENT 1223:59 AS355 Tornado approached the coast, its pilot THE AS355 PILOT Tornado Ld was necessarily 1000ft alt constrained in altitude, REPORT DETAILS speed and flight path Diagram based on radar data by his task. Members AIRPROX REPORT: suggested that the 2014052 Tornado pilot, as number two of a Cause: A late sighting by the AS355 Date and time: pair, would have been concentrating pilot and effectively a non-sighting Apr 29 2014 1224Z his lookout to his right in order to by the Tornado crew. regain formation integrity after the Position: formation turn. Degree of Risk: B Morecambe Bay Other than noting that fitment of a Recommendations: Airspace: TAS or similar to the Tornado would Lon FIR (Class: G) probably have provided a warning of 1. HQ Air Command considers the helicopter, the Board observed liaising with the CAA to publicise Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: that the Tornado pilot had noted that military fast jet behaviours Tornado GR4 AS355 ‘PINS was active’ for the entirety of near coastlines. his route. However, railway survey 2. The CAA considers the inclusion Alt/FL: tasks are not currently included in of Railway Survey Flights in its 820ft 1,000ft PINS review. QNH (1,008hPa) Rad Alt PINS notification, which it was agreed was highly undesirable. Conditions: VMC VMC RAUWG CONTACT DETAILS Visibility: 8km 10km Area Hosting Unit Point of Contact Telephone
Reported Separation: 01980 662994 0ft V/750ft H 150ft V/60m H Central Southern England MOD Boscombe Down DSATCO
Recorded Separation: 01760 337261 Ext 3425 200ft V/0.3nm H East Anglia RAF Marham SATCO
01334 857280 East of Scotland RAF Leuchars SATCO
Military low-flying generally only 01400 267283 takes place during the week and Lincolnshire RAFC Cranwell SATCO comprehensive briefings for sorties 0208 833 8364 are a key part in reducing any London (location varies) RAF Northolt SATCO mid-air collision risk. Lastly, military aviators are always 01677 457229 North of England RAF Leeming/ SATCO RAF Leeming keen to share views and information with (location alternatives) RAF Linton-on-Ouse other airspace users through the many Regional Airspace User Working Groups. 01343 817414 These are hosted by relevant RAF stations North of Scotland RAF Lossiemouth SATCO and provide a really good forum for 01491 827008 discussing local issues. Oxfordshire Oxford Airport SATCO RAF Benson Most local airfields or flying clubs will have contact details for these – all are 01939 250351 Ext 7231 welcome, and you usually get a free lunch RAF Shawbury SATCO too. For those who would like to find out a Wales and West Midlands bit more about military low-flying, the RAF (location alternatives) 01407 762241 Ext 7204 Low Flying Ops Squadron can be contacted RAF Valley SATCO on 0800 515544.
TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK
40 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE
UAVs WHAT’S THE DEAL WITH DRONES?
They are becoming a bigger part of the flying world, but that’s producing a set of new challenges CHRIS DAVIES
IT SEEMS THAT hardly a week passes • Consumers, who purchase small ready-to- without an article in the media regarding fly quad-rotors and operate them with little spectacular footage of ‘drones’, their or no knowledge of rules and regulations, illegal flight operation or the potential both with or without cameras. for their nefarious usage. In fact, the reality is that any ‘useful’ technology • Hobbyists, who are fully aware of the will be widely adopted and adapted rules, have many years of radio-controlled – and not always for the purpose the modelling experience, are insured for manufacturer intended. third party risk and generally confine their activities to dedicated sites. Sub-20kg ‘drones’, variously referred to officially as Remotely Piloted Aircraft • Commercial, many from a non-aviation Systems (RPAS), Unmanned Aircraft Systems background, who have either started a (UAS), Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA) or business (predominantly to capitalise on Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), are the fastest the opportunities these systems bring to growing aviation sector in the UK. Although the table) or have integrated RPAS into nobody has thus far been seriously injured an existing business. or killed by the operation of one in the UK, a number of near-miss incidents have been All operators must abide by the rules and reported. So, just what are the rules and guidance outlined in CAA publication CAP regulations for the operation of ‘drones’ in UK 722 – the ‘Bible’ for UAS operations in UK airspace, and do General Aviation and Military airspace. Commercial users are expected to Aviation have anything to fear from them? be fully conversant with this and hobbyists The Association of Remotely Piloted Aircraft will likely be acquainted, but it is unlikely Systems UK (ARPAS-UK) is a non-profit that consumers will be much aware of its association formed in 2013 to represent our existence or perhaps even that there are small RPAS industry and help promote best rules at all! practice among its members. ARPAS-UK As a result, the CAA has distilled the considers that legitimate users can be divided key parts into a more readable form within
into three main groups: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY MICHAEL KHENG/KURNIA CAP 1202. There is also a very useful website ➝
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 43 UAVs
a course run by one of the National Qualified Entities. This involves ground school of ALWAYS REMEMBER approximately two to four days (where the process of writing the operations manual You are legally responsible for It is illegal to fly your unmanned will be discussed in depth, followed by an the safe conduct of each flight. aircraft over a congested area exam); a flight test; and an assessment of (streets, towns and cities). Take time to understand the rules your operations manual. If they are happy, - failure to comply could lead to a Also, stay well clear of airports they will recommend you for a permit. YOU are reponsible criminal prosecuton. and airfields. for each flight Keep your distance The courses do not necessarily teach people how to fly, so there is a need to clarify Before each flight check that Don’t fly your unmanned aircraft your unmanned aircraft is within 50m of a person, vehicle, this before signing up. For operators from an not damaged, and that all building or structure, or overhead aviation background, the process could be components are working in 50m groups of people at any height. accordance with the simplified because to attend ground school BEFORE each flight Supplier’s User Manual. KEEP YOUR DISTANCE check drone for damage 50 metres might not be required. However, a flight test and operations manual will still be called for. You must keep the unmanned Think about what you do with any aircraft within your sight at all images you obtain as you may The permit allows operators to fly within times. breach privacy laws. Details are the confines of the Air Navigation Order but, available from the Information Commissioner’s Office. in most cases, to operate successfully Drone is in sight Consider rights at all times of privacy commercially means operating in congested areas. The CAA places far greater emphasis You are responsible for avoiding If you intend to use an collisions with other people or unmanned aircraft for any kind on safety to do this and requires operators objects - including aircraft. of commercial activity. you must to have a UAS Operating Safety Case get a ‘Permission’ from the Civil Do not fly your unmanned aircraft Aviation Authority, or you could (UAS-OSC). This looks at not just improved in any way that could endanger face prosecution. For more operational procedures and safety YOU are reponsible people or property. Permission to use details, visit www.caa.co.uk/uas for avoiding collisions drones for paid work management systems, but also at pilot competency and the safety of the aircraft. At the time of writing, only one UAS-OSC at caa.co.uk/uas which provides plenty of has been approved by the CAA, which useful information and guidance, and an allows the company in question to fly animated video explains the rules for drone within 10 metres of people or property flying in an easily digestible form. not under their control at up to 600ft AGL. As for commercial operators, there are At the moment, the greatest demand now more than 950 commercial operators comes from the most restrictive operating in the UK using both multi-rotor and fixed- “ environment — that of urban areas like wing systems in connection with industries London. The introduction of the CAA’s such as TV and film production, agriculture, Although nobody has Urban Areas Operating Safety Case surveying and inspection. Commercial (UAOSC) congested areas ‘licence’ will operators must have a CAA ‘Permission thus far been seriously also create a new tier of RPAS operators for Aerial Work’ permit in order to fly an injured or killed by who are able to tackle the most demanding SUA, for which the CAA requires sight of jobs in urban areas. a completed operations manual and the operation of one Commercial users in the UK are, on the evidence of pilot competency. The latter whole, professional, enthusiastic and dedicated. is broken into three critical elements: in the UK, a number A typical RPAS mission is conspicuous, with adequate theoretical knowledge/general operators setting out a well-marked take-off airmanship; successful completion of a of near-miss incidents and landing area and employing the use practical flight assessment on the class of have been reported of airspace and groundspace observers SUA that is being applied for; and a minimum (usually in high-visibility jackets). There is amount of recent flying experience. no requirement for 7kg or less operators For those coming from a non-aviation to inform ATC of their operations, (but it is background, this is achieved by attending considered best practice to do so) whereas CHRIS DAVIES
44 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE UAVs
7-20kg operators must have permission from any relevant ATC in the area (and it is worth noting that many operators have a very successful working relationship with their local ATC units). Similarly, operators will (as part of their pre-planning checks) inform relevant agencies (such as military low-flying cells, HeliMed, Police helicopters, the Police and local flying clubs) of their location and operations. RPAS operations are generally short in duration so, unless specifically requested, Notams are kept to a minimum. Generally, you will find commercial RPAS flights operate no further than 500 meters from the pilot in control (PiC) and no higher than 400ft AGL because this is the basic permission issued by the CAA. Many operators have additional permissions such as EVLOS (extended visual line of sight) and night flight permissions. At night, the RPAS will be fitted with at least a single white strobe but many operators also fit coloured orientation/early warning LEDs. RPAS operation is one of the most dynamic areas of aviation right now and this looks set to continue for many years. ¨
REPORT DETAILS Diagram based on radar data AIRPROX REPORT: 2014117
Date and time: A320 Jul 22 2014 1416Z
700ft alt RW09L Position: London Heathrow
Airspace: London CTR (Class: A)
Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: Heathrow A320 Unidentified model helicopter
Alt/FL: CPA 1416 700ft QNH (NK hPa)
Conditions: VMC
to trace the operator of the model Visibility: // SUMMARY NK AN AIRBUS A320 was operating aircraft in question. under IFR in VMC and in receipt of Reported Separation: an Aerodrome Control Service from // ASSESSMENT 20ft V/0m H Heathrow Tower when it came into THE A320 CREW had seen a model proximity with a suspected radio helicopter and the Board was of the Recorded Separation: controlled model helicopter. unanimous opinion that the operator NK The A320 pilot stated that, as they of the model had chosen to fly it in passed 700ft in the descent, a small an entirely inappropriate location. black object was seen to the left of the That the dangers associated with The Board concluded that the risk aircraft which passed approximately flying such a model in close proximity amounted to a situation that had 20ft over the wing. It appeared to be to a commercial aircraft in the final stopped just short of an actual collision a small radio-controlled helicopter. stages of landing were not self-evident where separation had been reduced The object did not strike the aircraft, was a cause for considerable concern. to the minimum. but was a distraction during a critical The Board were heartened to hear of phase of flight. ATC was informed of work being undertaken by the CAA Cause: the object’s presence and following to bring the issue of remotely piloted A suspected model aircraft were notified. aircraft operations to wider public aircraft was flown into conflict Despite extensive tracing action and attention, an example being the recent with the A320. the proactive assistance of local model issue of CAP1202 which gives advice for Degree of Risk: flying club members, it was not possible the conduct of such operations. A
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 45 We Offer EASA Floatplane Ratings for €2950.00 in Ireland
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REPORT DETAILS A109 AIRPROX REPORT: Track from 2014187 intermittent RW02 Date and time: radar data Sep 16 2014 1512Z
Position: 1nm SW of Rochester
Airspace: London FIR (Class: G)
Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: MTO Sport Gyroplane Untraced model/UAV
Alt/FL: 1,000ft NK Reported CPA QFE (1,000hPa) NK
Conditions: VMC NK
Visibility: 7nm NK
Reported Separation: 0ft V/10ft H NK V/NK H
Recorded Separation: Approximate visual circuit NK V/NK H track from radar data Diagram based on radar of other circuit traffic data and pilot reports was agreed that the incident was Risk Category B. that the operator of the model aircraft // SUMMARY Cause: The model aircraft AN AIRPROX WAS reported between could possibly be unaware of the presence of the airport and the aircraft was flown into conflict with an MTO Sport gyroplane flying in the the gyroplane. visual circuit on final approach to RW02 operating in the vicinity. Regarding the degree of risk, the gyroplane pilot at Rochester and an untraced model Degree of Risk: B aircraft/UAV. had just had time to take evasive The gyroplane was conducting action. Therefore, after discussion it a training exercise in the left-hand circuit for RW02 at Rochester Airport. A Robinson R22 helicopter was also operating. The gyroplane pilot heard the R22 pilot report that he had seen a model aircraft on the ground. Approaching final, the instructor and student both looked and saw the white delta- or boomerang-shaped model aircraft still in the field. They noted that it was still there on their next circuit but that it had gone on their next circuit. Carrying out a further circuit, they positioned for final approach to RW02 at 70kt. The model appeared at their height (1,000ft) and “came straight for” them. The instructor immediately took control, banked the aircraft sharply right, and estimated that the model came within 10ft of them. The student was quite shaken, so the instructor elected to land and reported the Airprox to ATC. He assessed that the model had a wingspan of 5-6ft. He assessed the risk of collision as ‘High’. // ASSESSMENT THE AIRPROX HAD occurred after several visual circuits had been flown to RW02 by more than one aircraft.
Members were, therefore, incredulous CHRIS DAVIES ➝
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 47
UAVs
ARPAS-UK foresees that the current was almost perfectly on the ILS media and commercial filming work will REPORT DETAILS glideslope, level with their aircraft, increase over time, and will be joined by in the 10 o’clock position and 50m work from the industrial sector such as oil AIRPROX REPORT: away. The incident happened very rig flare inspection, wind farm maintenance 2014194 quickly but, from the brief glimpse or tasks that are repetitive or dangerous in they had of the UAV, it was a type of nature and ultimately cost-saving to the Date and time: quadcopter. They immediately broke Sep 30 2014 1140Z end user. There is a real hunger to drive the off the ILS and continued with a visual approach. He assessed the risk of industry forwards, with seemingly boundless Position: opportunities facilitated by an enabling Norwich collision as ‘Medium’. and supportive regulator. There are challenging times ahead and Airspace: // ASSESSMENT it is certain that many early adopters could Norwich CTR (Class: D) THE AW139 PILOT considered it to well fall by the wayside, but there is a real be a sufficiently close threat that he positive shift in the public opinion of these Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: elected to break off his approach. AW139 Unknown UAV systems and it is being reflected by a The quadcopter operator was not change of mood in the media. Moving traced and so the Board was unable Alt/FL: forward into 2016 and beyond, ARPAS-UK 1,000ft NK to determine whether the operator is keen to ensure that a balanced point NK (1,023hPa) was aware of the danger that they had of view is put forward. Commercial posed. Members wondered whether operators generally accept that they are Conditions: non-aviation-trained people operating VMC NK quadcopters were aware either of the potential consequences of their actions Visibility: or that they were breaking CAA rules by 10km flying in proximity to other aircraft and Reported Separation: by operating close to airfields. “ 0ft V/50m H The Board noted the AW139 pilot’s estimate of proximity and that he had The problem is Recorded Separation: to manoeuvre to avoid the quadcopter. NK Members therefore assessed the risk that illegal or as Category B because safety margins unthinking drone use is had been much reduced below normal. // SUMMARY undoing all of the AN AIRPROX WAS reported when an Cause: The quadcopter was flown AW139 came into close proximity with into conflict with the AW139. hard work put in an untraced UAV on the Norwich ILS glideslope. The incident did not show Contributory Factor: The by hobbyists and on radar. quadcopter was flown in the commercial operators The AW139 pilot reported that, Norwich approach path. although it was difficult to judge distance due to not knowing the actual size of the Degree of Risk: B UAV, the crew estimated that it ambassadors for the industry and they have a responsibility to conduct their operation safely and professionally. However, the problem is that illegal or Diagram based on pilot reports unthinking drone use is undoing all of the hard work put in by hobbyists and commercial AW139 operators. The Airprox illustrated here (Airprox 2014117, 2014187 and 2014194) 1000ft alt show examples of this and please also see p34 for one notable case (Airprox 2014198) in the paraglider feature which was particularly reckless. The CAA has (so far) successfully prosecuted on two occasions which were not Airprox incidents, and the first involved a man from Cumbria who was successfully prosecuted for the dangerous and illegal CPA 1140 flying of an unmanned aircraft. For its part, UAV ARPAS-UK looks to educate and engage with key stakeholders to promote safe operation Sighted at and is currently engaging with the National Rackheath Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) drone-lead to this end. Industrial Estate They are also engaging with manufacturers in looking at how to ultimately try to overcome the problem of consumer-level equipment 02nm 4nm straying into manned aviation airspace, potentially through software geo-fencing and height restrictions.
TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 49 RISK CLASSIFICATION SO WHAT’S THE RISK?
with no accident means there needs to be Number crunching and another way to differentiate between those ‘bowties’ can only produce requiring the most attention and the less critical cases. The term used for this is some of the answers Event Risk Classification (ERC). “ However, classifying risks consistently is a challenge. By their nature, reporting of It’s hard to put AT THE END of Airprox reports, there Airprox is subjective because the outcome is always a risk category rating from was that the aircraft ended up undamaged a definitive ‘risk’ A to E and, until recently, an ‘ERC’ score. and everyone went home uninjured – albeit figure on what is, But have you ever wondered what these slightly wiser in some cases. In short, it’s hard really mean, how they are worked out to put a definitive ‘risk’ figure on what is, in in the end, a qualitative and what use they are? the end, a qualitative assessment of a pilot’s or controller’s concern about an incident. assessment of a pilot’s As you’ve probably worked out, what we’re We could simply try to classify events by how fundamentally trying to establish is the bad the potential accident might have been or controller’s concern amount of ‘badness’ in each Airprox and and how many lives might have been lost, but about an incident how this compares with other aviation risks. then we would simply skew things to focus on While it’s often easy to quantify what went large-aircraft events and would miss valuable wrong in an accident, that Airprox all end lessons from small-aircraft incidents.
UKAB GUIDANCE EVENT RISK CATEGORY ICAO DEFINITION Alternatively, we could try to assess how close the aircraft were physically, but different Stops just short of actual collision. Luck played a major sectors of aviation have very different comfort A Risk of Collision part. Often very late or non- levels of proximity. After all, glider pilots sighting. wouldn’t think twice about thermalling within not many feet of their compatriots. The point Safety margins much reduced. is that, while both methods are valid, they Late avoiding action has a B Safety not assured focus on the outcome when we’d really like position effect. to know is what went wrong and – very importantly – what went right to make an Airprox rather than an accident. Effective and timely actions For those acolytes of psychologist and taken. Separation may be less C No risk of collision than ideal, but situation fully safety author Prof Erik Hollnagel, this is his controlled by pilot or controller action.
Too little information to make a D Risk not determined meaningful assessment. REPORT DETAILS
Meets criteria for Airprox AIRPROX REPORT: reporting, but analysis shows 2014131 E Normal safety standards pertained that normal safety standards pertained. Date and time: Jul 11 2014 1515Z
Position: Leicester Aerodrome AIRPROX TRENDS IN THE LAST 10 YEARS Airspace: 250 Leicester ATZ (Class: G) Cat A Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: R22 PA-34 200 Cat B Alt/FL: NK 0ft 150 Cat C Conditions: VMC VMC Cat D 100 Visibility: >8KM NK Cat E 50 Reported Separation: Not Seen 50ft V/100m H
Recorded Separation: 0 NK 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
50 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE RISK CLASSIFICATION
A BOW-TIE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR AIRPROX IN CLASS G
Two or more aircraft in vicinity of each other while airborne in UK Class G Airspace (excluding visual pattern)
Two or more ATS issue and aircraft in vicinity Flight Crew/Pilot In-flight Two or more Flight Crew/Pilot ATS monitor, Flight Crew/ ACAS RA Flight Crew/Pilot of each other Appropriate detect and resolve contingencies aircraft are in plan and conduct detect conflict Flight Crew/Pilot Pilot respond generated see conflict and while airborne overall airspace conflict (e.g. using handled such proximity Mid-air flight appropriately and provide follow appropriate appropriately and Flight Crew/ fly a safe, visually in UK Class G design and see and avoid/or effectively by that their safety (including appropriate ATS advice/ to emergency Pilot respond guided evasive collision Airspace Rules of the Air TCAS Traffic both Flight Crew/ is or may be obtaining ATS advice/ information advice/ correctly manoeuvre (excluding Display/TA, Pilot and ATS compromised where necessary) information information visual pattern) FLARM, etc.)
Safety-I vs Safety-II debate. In short, Safety-I The graph below shows reporting and system devised by a cross-industry group is learning from what went wrong, while risk assessments over the last ten years, of risk experts, was our first attempt Safety-II is about learning from what went but it’s hard to work out what progress is to improve our classification methods. right. The Eurocontrol website has a good being made over time. For example, there Essentially, it gave a scoring system based introductory article on both of these – just were more Airprox reports in 2005 than on the status of the remaining safety barriers. put Safety-I in the site’s search box. there were in 2011, but fewer were assessed If you find this a little difficult to understand, as Category A. Which was the worst or best imagine driving along a motorway alongside SAFETY FIRST year in terms of Airprox? What do we make two cars in the next lanes. All have brakes We’ve been classifying Airprox based on the of the steep increase in the number of reports fitted but the second and third cars have ICAO classification system (as shown) for in the last couple of years? Are there more anti-lock brakes and, in addition, the third many years and this has served well, but Airprox happening because there is more has airbags. Suddenly, an animal runs it also has some important shortcomings. flying going on or is it simply that more are across the road and you all brake hard and First, there are really only three categories being reported? stop without hitting the animal. You have into which almost all serious occurences fit – We might like to think it’s the latter and, all seen-and-avoided effectively and would Categories A, B and C. A and B are referred to if we’re right, we should probably be seeing have scored a ‘Category B’ in ICAO terms. as ‘risk-bearing’ and C as ‘non-risk-bearing’. an increase in the ‘less risky’ reporting given However, the first car (without anti-lock Category D is self-explanatory, and I’ll come that people would probably have reported brakes) only just stops before a collision, to Category E later. the ‘cor blimeys’ anyway. However, the the second (with anti-lock brakes) stops Pigeon-holing incidents in this way is useful statistics show that a growing proportion well short of the collision point and the to give a broad feel for their severity, but it have been risk-bearing in the last few years. third not only stops early but also has an doesn’t give much scope to differentiate them So where does that leave us? The current additional safety barrier remaining in the or work out what went wrong. It also makes classification provides little help in answering form of the airbags. Even though the airbags it difficult to measure progress in preventing any of these questions. were not deployed, they were still there recurrence over time, which is what we’re The ERC system, developed from the in reserve. Looking at events like Airprox really after. Airlines Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) 2014131, using ERC allows us to capture ¨
// SUMMARY // ASSESSMENT THE AIRPROX OCCURRED within THE R22 PILOT should have been the Leicester ATZ. Both pilots aware of the presence of an aircraft Diagram based on pilot reports reported that they had made in the circuit to RW10. Although he a appropriate RT calls on the Air/ checked that the RW04 approach Not to sc le Ground (A/G) frequency. Because was clear, he did not check the the runway in use (RW04) was too RW10 final approach area. short for his type of aircraft, the The majority of members PA-34 pilot was conducting circuits believed that the PA-34 pilot’s plan Diagram based on pilot reports on RW10. The R22 pilot departed of initially making a full-stop landing Not to scale from RW04, not realising that the and then continuing the touch-and-go PA-34 was on final approach to if the R22 had passed clear of the CPA 1515 RW10. The pilot of the PA-34 reported runway was appropriate. Actual PA34 that he was visual with the departing distances between the two aircraft R22 and took appropriate action to could not be confirmed because resolve the situation by changing his there was no radar recording. initial intention of carrying out a Because the PA-34 had the R22 in RW10 touch-and-go into making a full-stop sight at all times and had a plan landing. He only reverted to his original to avoid any risk of a collision, the R22 Airprox was categorised as Risk C. intention after the R22 had cleared a RW10 to the north. Heli Are The Leicester Aerodrome A/G Operator recalls that she did not Cause: The R22 pilot flew across view the incident. However, she did an active runway and in front of RW04 hear most of the radio calls and did the PA-34. hear the pilot of the PA-34 making two final approach calls at the time Degree of Risk: C for RW10.
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 51 PlaneWeighs Weight & Balance
throughout Europe CAA approval A1/8538/79
01792 310566 [email protected] www.planeweighs.com RISK CLASSIFICATION
the road perhaps), and the recovery barriers (the brakes and airbags) which stop the THE BARRIER MODEL Airprox becoming a mid-air collision sit on the right (see the graphic on P51). The relevance of each safety barrier Separation by design is different in each class of airspace. For Separation by procedures example, see-and-avoid is very important
Air Traffic Management/Planning in Class G but less so in Class A where procedural separation is more important. ATC Conflict detection and resolution Therefore, we needed a way to give each Pilot planning/Compliance with ATC barrier a weighting to reflect its importance and we did this by asking a number of pilots Pilot Conflict detection (SA) and resolution and air traffic controllers to go through a ACAS RA scoring exercise to create a weighted model.
See and avoid This isn’t a mathematically perfect solution 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% (and if you have one, please send answers on a postcard…), but it gave a reasonable level of assurance to the model. this concept of how many safety barriers we could group our analysis into three CLASS G BARRIER MODEL were remaining and what their fundamental areas: Class G airspace; controlled airspace; The diagram (above left) shows our current effectiveness was. and visual circuits and patterns. We then Class G barrier model, with the barrier names used bowtie analysis to develop our barrier on the right and their relative importance BOWTIES AND BARRIERS models. If you’re not familiar with bowtie shown in the graphic. The lower coloured bar But it was clear that ERC still didn’t take models, then take a look at caa.co.uk/bowtie shows the relevant weightings for an average enough account of the context within which for an introduction. Class G situation. The upper coloured bar the Airprox occurred or describe the barriers Bowties provide a visual picture to help shows the score for a ficticious Airprox which well enough, so it quickly became obvious understand the relevant barriers for different is similar to Airprox 2014232. The dimmed- that it needed further development. situations. The basic principle is that the out colours show the amount of each barrier The first thing was to better understand preventative barriers which stop the whole that failed while the bright colours show their the barriers that were in place to prevent Airprox happening sit on the left of the remaining effectiveness. mid-air collisions in different airspace. Once problem’s knot (e.g. for our earlier car example, In this fictitious case, we can see that some initial work had been done, we realised building animal-proof fences on the side of ‘See-and-Avoid’ completely failed (neither ¨
on a transit flight in // SUMMARY Diagram based on pilot reports contact with Leuchars BOTH PILOTS WERE operating under Not to scale VFR in VMC in Class G airspace. The and then Dundee, from Heron was in the RW27 visual left-hand whom he requested circuit with four other aircraft and its a Basic Service, stating pilot was receiving a service from that he was “just going Dundee Tower. The EC120 pilot was to go through the gap” RW27 between the Dundee ATZ and Leuchars MATZ. CPA ≈0941 The incident occurred Heron REPORT DETAILS below radar coverage. Dundee ATC, AIRPROX REPORT: experiencing ‘medium’ 2014144 workload, was providing a combined Aerodrome Date and time: and Approach Control Aug 19 2014 0941Z service without the aid of surveillance equipment. Position: The Airprox occurred Dundee when the Heron, at 1,000ft EC120 Airspace: in the late downwind Dundee ATZ/ position, and the EC120, Scottish FIR (Class: G) at 7-800ft, came into The Heron pilot was operating in the proximity, most likely near the RW27 visual circuit. Members noted that Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: boundary of the Dundee ATZ. a GA circuit would normally be expected Grob Heron EC120 There was insufficient time for to be flown within the ATZ but that ab the controller to assimilate the initio circuit instruction can result in Alt/FL: position and routing of the EC120 1,000ft 700ft patterns which extend further. QNH (1,010hPa) QNH (1,013hPa) prior to the Airprox. Members’ opinion was that the EC120 pilot’s assessment that the Conditions: // ASSESSMENT aircraft would remain clear amounted VMC VMC THE EC120 PILOT chose to transit to effective and timely action to prevent through the (just less than 500m) gap the aircraft colliding. Visibility: between the Leuchars MATZ and the NK >40km Dundee ATZ at a level close to the Cause: A non-sighting by the Dundee circuit height. The chosen Heron pilot and a late sighting Reported Separation: routing increased the potential for 200ft V/0m H 300ft V/500m H by the EC120 pilot. conflict with Dundee traffic that may Recorded Separation: have been flying at or just beyond the Degree of Risk: C NK boundaries of the ATZ.
THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE | 53 RISK CLASSIFICATION
pilot saw the other aircraft in time to take able to indicate not only the key barriers we what we might refer to as ‘an interesting E’. any action), but ‘ATC Conflict detection need to improve, but also highlight defences Specifically, this means an Airprox where and resolution’ was fully successful (the that worked well or comment on relative the outcome could be described as business controller issued effective avoiding action) risks (such as in Airprox 2014144) regarding as usual because the aircraft did not get and ‘ACAS RA’ was partially successful MAC risk vs airspace, all of which could help particularly close, but where there are plenty (perhaps indicating that one aircraft had in informing procedures, training, investment of lessons to be highlighted. a collision avoidance system installed and further research. The downside of all of this is that assessing which gave a warning, but the other did not). For example, we know that see-and-avoid occurrences using this process could be Of course, these graphical representations is an important barrier in Class G airspace, very time consuming. To give the speed and are also supported by tables of figures, which but how reliable is it and how much can it consistency needed, we turned our bowties can be difficult to assimilate but which will be enhanced if you invest in a simple traffic and scores into a simple computer-based tool be extremely valuable in studying Airprox alerting system versus a fully-featured using a Risk Classification Wizard that does trends over time. collision avoidance system? the maths for us. However, we don’t want to We can also focus the time of our Airprox end up in a position where “The computer REALITY GETS THE DECIDING VOTE Inspectors more efficiently by looking at the says nah…”, and so we will be using internal Currently, we can only tell you if the number occurrences which offer the most to learn peer review to check our scores and the of Airprox reports and Risk Categories A, B, from, which are not always the ones that Airprox Board members will still bring their C, D and E have gone up or down, and then frighten people the most. extensive knowledge and experience to offer some limited analysis or expert opinion Using our old system, we have been aware bear by reviewing and endorsing all risk on the causal trends. In future, we hope to be for a long time that there are many cases of and cause classifications.
Members discussed the amount 2nm Diagram based on radar data of flying activity at Stapleford. Agreeing that it was of such a level that an Air Ground Communication Service (AGCS) may not be appropriate, a Recommendation A09 was made. A10 A08 C152 Cause: The PA-28 pilot flew into conflict with the C152. A06 1nm 07:55 A05 Degree of Risk: A 07:43 A06 A08 Recommendation: Stapleford and 07:31 1107:19 the CAA review the suitability of the A07 Stapleford A/G Service. CPA A09 1108:07 100ft V/<0.1nm H A010 REPORT DETAILS
0 AIRPROX REPORT: 2014232
Date and time: Stapleford PA28 Dec 14 2014 1108Z Position: Stapleford
// SUMMARY He commented that this non-sighting Airspace: BOTH PILOTS WERE operating in the may have been due in part to a ‘high- Stapleford ATZ (Class: G) visual circuit in receipt of an Air/Ground wing/low-wing’ issue and to a very busy radio frequency. Reporting aircraft: Reported aircraft: (A/G) Service from Stapleford Radio. C152 PA-28 Runway 22 ‘left’ was in use, with only // ASSESSMENT hard surfaces being used due to the Alt/FL: grass surfaces being waterlogged. IT WAS AGREED that it fell to the 400ft NK The C152 was on short final to land on PA-28 pilot to avoid the C152 but, in QNH (NK hPa) QNH (1,013hPa) RW22 when the aircraft was overtaken the absence of visual contact and on the left and from above. Assessing situational awareness of the C152’s Conditions: the risk of collision as ‘High’, the C152 position, this was not accomplished. VMC VMC pilot instructed his student to go-around. The PA-28 pilot had turned onto base from a shorter downwind leg, with the Visibility: The PA-28 pilot reports recovering 50km 10km to Stapleford, verifying the runway in resultant ground track and slightly higher airspeed causing the PA-28 to use and calling ‘descending dead-side Reported Separation: for 22 left’. He neither heard overtake the C152 on final. The two 50ft V/15m H Not seen transmissions from nor saw any other aircraft missed each other by the aircraft ahead so made the assumption narrowest of margins and a collision Recorded Separation: that he was ‘number one’ to land. was only averted by pure fortune. 100ft V/<0.1nm H
TO READ MORE REPORTS OR TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION, VISIT: AIRPROXBOARD.ORG.UK
54 | THE UK’S AIRPROX SAFETY MAGAZINE Broaden your horizons with the experienced professionals
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