DOCSLIB.ORG

North Korea's Security Threats Reexamined

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Print ISSN 2433-4189 / Online ISSN 2433-4197 グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書 第２号 GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 2 NDA-FOI Joint Seminar North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined Coedited by Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström 防衛大学校先端学術推進機構 グローバルセキュリティセンター © National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense 1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239-8686 JAPAN Global Security Seminar Series No.2 NDA-FOI Joint Seminar North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined Coedited by Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström March 2019 Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy Yokosuka, Japan i CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 Hideya Kurata Kim Jong-un' s Nuclear Posture under Transformation: The Source of North Korea's Counterforce Compulsion 5 CHAPTER 2 Anders Lennartsson Estimating Ballistic Missile Performance Based on Incomplete Information: Application to North Korea's 2016–2017 Missile Tests 19 CHAPTER 3 Sangmin Lee Technical Assessment and Prospects on North Korean Nuclear Capability 32 CHAPTER 4 Jonathan Miller Evaluating the US Approach to North Korean Threat under Trump Administration 40 CHAPTER 5 Hiroyasu Akutsu North Korea's Evolving Strategy toward the United States: Kim Jong Un's New Buy-Time Tactic 51 CHAPTER 6 Kyengho Son ROK's Perception of and Posture toward the DPRK's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Development 63 CHAPTER 7 Sugio Takahashi North Korea's Threat and Japan's Response 73 CHAPTER 8 Takeshi Watanabe Japan-US-ROK Cooperation for Sustaining Deterrence 81 CHAPTER 9 Jerker Hellström European Perspectives on North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs 88 SEMINAR PROGRAM 101 CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTICIPANTS 103 ii GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security. The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This series consists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of the authors. Copyright ©2019 by National Defense Academy, Japan. Published by the Center for Global Security, Institute for Advanced Studies, National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, JAPAN. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy, and Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launched a joint research project, called NDA-FOI Joint Seminars based on the Memorandum of Understanding between Japan Ministry of Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense cooperation. This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA-FOI Joint Seminar on “North Korea’s Security Threats Reexamined” held on February 7, 2018. Most of the chapters are revised or up-dated to reflect the views expressed during the course of the seminar. On behalf of GS an FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not only to the contributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of this publication, but also to all those who attended the seminar and participated in the discussions. The views expressed in each of the chapters, however, strictly represent those of the respective authors, and so go the credits. We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of discussion among readers. Comments and suggestions on our joint research project are more than welcome. March 2019 Hideya Kurata and Jerker Hellström Coeditors iv Introduction (Kurata and Hellström) 1 INTRODUCTION Hideya Kurata Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy Jerker Hellström Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) At least since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea’s ambitions to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles have been regarded as one of the major threats to international security. In 2017, the Kim Jong-un regime tested more missiles in a single year than ever before and conducted its sixth nuclear test. Towards the end of the year, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) declared that North Korea had become a nuclear state. These developments prompted international concerns, no least in the United States, which held military exercises with South Korea and continued the launch of the terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile defense system south of Seoul. This, in turn prompted aggressive rhetoric and a “war of words” between Washington and Pyongyang. The latter also received political backing by China and Russia, which emphasized the concept of ‘double suspension’, by which the U.S. would reduce its military engagement in the region in exchange for a North Korean freeze of missile and nuclear tests. This was the backdrop to a seminar convened in early 2018 by the Center for Global Security at the National Defense Academy (NDA) in Japan and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) to address North Korea’s security threats. This publication is based on the papers presented at this joint seminar and the discussions they provoked. The chapters presented herein give various perspectives on the security challenges related to North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs as seen by 2 Introduction (Kurata and Hellström) Japanese, Swedish, South Korean and Canadian scholars. In Chapter One, Hideya Kurata of NDA assesses the development of North Korea’s nuclear posture. While North Korea has employed a nuclear no-first use and minimum deterrence doctrine, the regime has also issued statements that run counter to it. For example, it has not ruled out the possibility of conducting a ‘nuclear preemptive strike’. He also examines North Korea’s nuclear posture in comparison with evolving nuclear postures of both China and India. In Chapter Two, Anders Lennartsson of FOI reviews North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 2016 and 2017. The chapter provides insights into the physics that determine the range of a ballistic missiles and analyzes the range capacity of North Korean missiles tested during this time period. In Chapter Three, Sangmin Lee of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) makes a technical assessment of North Korea’s nuclear capability and discusses the prospects for its development. One conclusion is that North Korea is developing anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) as tactical nuclear weapons, and that the Scud- ER, Rodong, and Polaris-1 and -2 missiles can become candidates for ASBMs. Moreover, due to limited progress in denuclearization talks with the United States, North Korea may return to nuclear development in the future. In Chapter Four, Jonathan Berkshire Miller of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) evaluates the United States’ approach to North Korean threats during the Trump presidency. Berkshire Miller describes how the intensity of North Korea’s missile program is making for very difficult strategic choices for United States and its allies which are looking to deter and defend against Pyongyang’s bellicosity. He suggests that the United States should accelerate deterrence efforts and coordinate further with Japan and South Korea, also in regards to sanctions and diplomatic efforts. In Chapter Five, Hiroyasu Akutsu of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) examines North Korea’s approach to the United States. Akutsu argues that North Korea has adopted a two-phased approach, namely taking advantage of South Korea’s engagement policy, while also agreeing to a US offer for a summit meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. Pyongyang’s most immediate policy Introduction (Kurata and Hellström) 3 priority appears to force the US into accepting North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state. In Chapter Six, Kyengho Son of the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) discusses South Korean perceptions and responses in regard to North Korea’s development of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. Son suggests that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program may have two major purposes: as a tool for preserving the regime, and as a means to change the status quo on the Korean peninsula. In response to Pyongyang’s ambitions, he proposes a range of strategic considerations and makes recommendations for South Korean policymakers to ponder. In Chapter Seven, Sugio Takahashi of NIDS examines Japan’s response to North Korean threats. Takahashi states that Japan has made multiple efforts against North Korea’s nuclear escalation ladder. First and foremost, Japan has attempted to improve its credibility of extended deterrence by the United States. He asserts that Japan plays a critical role in coping with Korean Peninsula contingencies, whilst having virtually no direct military commitment. Moreover, Takahashi stresses that the effects of North Korea’s strategic weapons must be neutralized in order to maintain regional peace and stability. In Chapter Eight, Takeshi Watanabe of NIDS reviews the Japan-United States-South Korea trilateral cooperation for sustaining deterrence. Watanabe states that North Korea has significantly improved its power to coerce others and take advantage of the China-South Korea ‘three no’ policy, namely that Seoul is not to join the U.S. missile defense system, nor to develop the trilateral cooperation into a military alliance, or make an additional deployment of THAAD system. He asserts that the three powers must, in fact, improve their trilateral security cooperation for denuclearization negotiations and deterrence to be effective. Finally, in Chapter Nine, Jerker Hellström of FOI discusses European perspectives
Recommended publications
  • Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements Committee

    Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements Committee

    i [H.A.S.C. No. 115–11] MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION HEARING HELD MARCH 8, 2017 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 24–683 WASHINGTON : 2017 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California DUNCAN HUNTER, California MARC A. VEASEY, Texas MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri BETO O’ROURKE, Texas AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey MO BROOKS, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona PAUL COOK, California SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JACKY ROSEN, Nevada SAM GRAVES, Missouri A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland STEPHEN KNIGHT, California STEPHANIE N.
  • Unit-V Topic-2 Strategy of Deterrence

    Unit-V Topic-2 Strategy of Deterrence

    UNIT-V TOPIC-1 NUCLEAR ERA IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGY A strategic nuclear weapon refers to a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on targets often in settled territory far from the battlefield as part of a strategic plan, such as military bases,military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic, and energy infrastructure, and heavily populated areas such as cities and towns, which often contain such targets.It is in contrast to a tactical nuclear weapon, which is designed for use in battle as part of an attack with and often near friendly conventional forces, possibly on contested friendly territory. How have nuclear weapons changed world politics? The nuclear powers gained the ability to use “threat of n-weapons” for securing their national interests in international relations. ... During 1945-90 the nuclear weapons influenced the politics of cold war. These kept the securing of disarmament and arms control highly complex and problematic and un-successful exercise. In some ways, nuclear weapons merely made effective the earlier promise of air power—overwhelming violence delivered at an opponent’s cities, bypassing its military forces. Nuclear weapons were different, however, in their speed, their destructiveness, and the apparent absence of countervailing measures. Furthermore, the expense and high technology of nuclear weapons suddenly created two classes of powers in the world: those who wielded these new tools of war and those who did not. In the ensuing decades, nuclear facts and nuclear strategy had a peculiarly uneasy coexistence. Many of the realities of nuclear weapons—how many were in each arsenal, the precise means for their delivery, the reliability of the devices themselves and of the planes, missiles, and crews that had to deliver them—were obscure.
  • Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process

    Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process

    NW ear Weapons Tare ‘eting Proeess unitstatesed General Accounting Office GAO Wtihington, D.C. 20648 National Security and International Affairs Division B-244436 September 27,199l The Honorable John McCain United States Senate The Honorable John R. Kasich House of Representatives This is the unclassified version of the classified fact sheet we provided you in August 1991. This responds to your request for an unclassified description of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) process for formulating its strategic nuclear weapons targeting policy and translating that policy into a nuclear war plan -the Single Integrated Operational Plan (sop). Our description includes information on (1) the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and the determination of require- ments for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, (2) the level of civilian oversight, and (3) the categories and types of targets. These strategic nuclear weapons systems, commonly known as the triad, include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine- launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers armed with nuclear bombs and missiles. Results in Brief The strategic nuclear weapons targeting process consists of four steps: (1) Presidential direction for the employment of nuclear weapons is pro- vided to the Secretary of Defense through a National Security Decision Directive or Memorandum, which defines national security objectives and sets policy guidance concerning employment of U.S. nuclear weapons. (2) The Secretary of Defense issues the Policy Guidance for the Employ- l ment of Nuclear Weapons, which establishes the planning assumptions, attack options, and targeting objectives. (3) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops more detailed guidance for preparation of the SIOP based on guidance from the Presi- dent and Secretary of Defense.
  • United States Tactical Nuclear Doctrine: Developing a Capability

    United States Tactical Nuclear Doctrine: Developing a Capability

    W&M ScholarWorks Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1979 United States tactical nuclear doctrine: Developing a capability Christopher Michael Cooke College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Military and Veterans Studies Commons Recommended Citation Cooke, Christopher Michael, "United States tactical nuclear doctrine: Developing a capability" (1979). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625067. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-zset-zj41 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. United States Tactical Nuclear ii Doctrines Developing A Capability A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Government The College of William and Mary in Virginia In Partial Fulfillmait Of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts by Christopher Cooke 1979 APPROVAL SHEET This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Christopher Cooke Approved, August 1979 ar Magaret Hamilton ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Alan J. Ward, under whose guidance this study was conducted, for his very helpful advice and, especially, for his considerable editorial skill. The author is also indebted to Professors Margaret Hamilton and George Grayson for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript. LIST OF TABLES Figure Page A.
  • Report- Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons

    Report- Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons

    Federation of American Scientists Special Report No 3 May 2012 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons By HANS M. KRISTENSEN 1 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons By HANS M. KRISTENSEN Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org 2 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Acknowledgments e following people provided valuable input and edits: Katie Colten, Mary-Kate Cunningham, Robert Nurick, Stephen Pifer, Nathan Pollard, and other reviewers who wish to remain anonymous. is report was made possible by generous support from the Ploughshares Fund. Analysis of satellite imagery was done with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Image: personnel of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base in Italy load a B61 nuclear bomb trainer onto a F-16 fighter-bomber (Image: U.S. Air Force). 3 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 About FAS Founded in 1945 by many of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is devoted to the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labor are applied to the benefit of humankind. e founding mission was to prevent nuclear war. While nuclear security remains a major objective of FAS today, the organization has expanded its critical work to issues at the intersection of science and security. FAS publications are produced to increase the understanding of policymakers, the public, and the press about urgent issues in science and security policy.
  • The Human Cost of Nuclear Weapons

    The Human Cost of Nuclear Weapons

    The human cost Autumn 2015 97 Number 899 Volume of nuclear weapons Volume 97 Number 899 Autumn 2015 Volume 97 Number 899 Autumn 2015 Editorial: A price too high: Rethinking nuclear weapons in light of their human cost Vincent Bernard, Editor-in-Chief After the atomic bomb: Hibakusha tell their stories Masao Tomonaga, Sadao Yamamoto and Yoshiro Yamawaki The view from under the mushroom cloud: The Chugoku Shimbun newspaper and the Hiroshima Peace Media Center Tomomitsu Miyazaki Photo gallery: Ground zero Nagasaki Akitoshi Nakamura Discussion: Seventy years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Reflections on the consequences of nuclear detonation Tadateru Konoé and Peter Maurer Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie Pursuing “effective measures” relating to nuclear disarmament: Ways of making a legal obligation a reality Treasa Dunworth The human costs and legal consequences of nuclear weapons under international humanitarian law Louis Maresca and Eleanor Mitchell Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear events: The humanitarian response framework of the International Committee of the Red Cross Gregor Malich, Robin Coupland, Steve Donnelly and Johnny Nehme Humanitarian debate: Law, policy, action The use of nuclear weapons and human rights The human cost of nuclear weapons Stuart Casey-Maslen The development of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and its effect on the nuclear weapons debate Alexander Kmentt Changing the discourse on nuclear weapons: The humanitarian initiative Elizabeth Minor Protecting humanity from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: Reframing the debate towards the humanitarian impact Richard Slade, Robert Tickner and Phoebe Wynn-Pope An African contribution to the nuclear weapons debate Sarah J.
  • How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons

    How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons

    HOW SOUTH KOREA COULD ACQUIRE AND DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS Charles D. Ferguson INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDYING OPTIONS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FUTHER PROLIFERATION Political leaders and defense planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, are cognizant that worsening security in Northeast Asia could lead to additional states, including the ROK, to consider and even develop nuclear weapons. In particular, Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in May 2014 that another nuclear bomb test by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) would be “crossing a Rubicon” and would make it “difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring in this area.”1 She mentioned that there are some leaders in minority political parties in the ROK discussing options for South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. But the preference is still strongly for the ROK to rely on extended nuclear deterrence from the United States and for the ROK Armed Forces to improve their conventional military capabilities in cooperation with the United States. Nonetheless, if the Japanese government decides that it must acquire nuclear weapons, which would also be far from Japan’s preference, the ROK would feel pressure to follow Japan. Thus, while South Korea would not be first to acquire these weapons, it would not want to feel vulnerable to a nuclear-armed Japan. Often nonproliferation analysts avert their gaze and do not want to contemplate too deeply how trusted allies such as South Korea or Japan could plausibly develop 1 nuclear arms. However, to prevent an awful event, it is useful to study how the external geopolitical and internal domestic political circumstances could transpire to lead to this event and then to examine the consequences if such an action were to occur.
  • Nuclear Arsenals: Current Developments, Trends and Capabilities Hans M

    Nuclear Arsenals: Current Developments, Trends and Capabilities Hans M

    International Review of the Red Cross (2015), 97 (899), 563–599. The human cost of nuclear weapons doi:10.1017/S1816383116000308 Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie Hans M. Kristensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and co-author to the FAS Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the World Nuclear Forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook. Matthew G. McKinzie directs the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council. Abstract In this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment. Keywords: nuclear weapons, nuclear war, nuclear arms control and disarmament. © icrc 2016 563 H. M. Kristensen and M. G. McKinzie Introduction The Russian Federation and the United States have made enormous progress in reducing the sizes of their Cold War nuclear arsenals over the last decades.
  • Nuclear Stability with Russia and North Korea Workshop Write-Up

    Nuclear Stability with Russia and North Korea Workshop Write-Up

    U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons RMSI Research Reports & Studies 2018 Nuclear Stability with Russia and North Korea Workshop Write-Up Russia Maritime Studies Institute Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/rmsi_research Recommended Citation Studies Institute, Russia Maritime, "Nuclear Stability with Russia and North Korea Workshop Write-Up" (2018). RMSI Research. 1. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/rmsi_research/1 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports & Studies at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in RMSI Research by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. U.S. Naval War College Nuclear Stability with Russia and North Korea U.S. Naval War College Newport, RI Friday, January 12 [email protected] [email protected] The views presented here are those of the workshop participants and do not represent those of the Naval War College or the U.S. Navy. Dr. Walter Berbrick Dr. Jonathan Caverley Dr. Stephen Cimbala Dr. Bridget Coggins Ms. Anna Davis Dr. Peter Dombrowski Dr. Tom Fedyszyn Dr. Anya Loukianova Fink Ms. Suzanne Freeman Dr. Lyle Goldstein Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev Mr. John Hanus CDR Mark Kurtz CDR Michael O’Hara Dr. T. Negeen Pegahi Dr. Michael Petersen Dr. Daryl Press Dr. Terence Roehrig CDR Brian Ross Dr. Joshua Rovner Mr. Benjamin Schechter Dr. Jacquelyn Schneider Dr. David Stone Dr. Matthew Tattar Dr. Andrew Winner American University Dartmouth College Harvard University Penn State Brandywine University of California, Santa Barbara U.S.
  • 1. Nuclear Weapons

    1. Nuclear Weapons

    1. Nuclear weapons Prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Databook staff, Washington, DC' I. Introduction It is difficult to characterize 1989. It was a year during which the entire foundation of the cold war seemed to crumble and the most fundamental assumptions about East-West relations and military strategy required a complete reappraisal. Even a narrow assessment of the nuclear weapon developments of 1989 must take into account the extraordinary political changes in Eastern Europe, the overwhelming economic and political pressures to reduce military expenditure and forces, and the unprecedented level of co-operation between the USA and the USSR. It appears that these developments may permit a fundamental change in the nuclear postures and practices of the nuclear weapon states. Against this backdrop, future historians may see 1989 as the year in which the post-World War IT era ended and a new era began. Even without this new situation the defence budgets of the five nuclear weapon nations in general and the budgets for nuclear weapons in particular are becoming severely constrained. For the fifth year in a row the US military budget declined, as measured in constant dollars. The Soviet Government stated, and the US Government apparently agrees, that Soviet military spending was less in 1989 than it was in 1988. France is now feel- ing the effect of its economic constraints, especially visible in the nuclear weapon programme. Nevertheless, nuclear weapon modernization continued in all five of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states: the USA, the USSR, the UK, France and China. In the USA there was a decrease in the strategic arsenal because of bomb and submarine retirements.
  • Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA CHINESE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS by Gregory B. Owens June, 1996 Thesis Advisor: Peter Lavoy Thesis Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 09615 ni IHLEY KNOX LIBRARY ^POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL SoNTEREY CA 83943-5101 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fomi Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20S03. 1 . AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3 . REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 1996 Master's Thesis 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: CHINESE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Gregory B. Owens 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORTNG/MONTTORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILrrY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is urilimited.
  • 2 Los Alamos National Laboratory During the Cold War, in the 1950S and ’60S, the Fear of Nuclear War Drove Thousands of U.S

    2 Los Alamos National Laboratory During the Cold War, in the 1950S and ’60S, the Fear of Nuclear War Drove Thousands of U.S

    2 Los Alamos National Laboratory During the Cold War, in the 1950s and ’60s, the fear of nuclear war drove thousands of U.S. families to provide themselves with costly bomb shelters (also called fallout shelters), either converting their basements or installing prefabricated shelters several feet underground in their backyards. The shelters were stocked with essential supplies, and even some amenities, against the possibility of the families’ having to shelter for many days or weeks. (Photo: Open Source) RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE The Cold War began in 1945 with the use of nuclear weapons to end World War II and officially ended in December 1989 with a joint declaration in Malta by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. In retrospect, excepting the regional wars in places like Korea and Vietnam, this 44-year period was remarkably stable. While many factors contributed to this stability, the contribution of nuclear weapons is undeniable. Nowhere is this stability more obvious than in Europe. During the 3.5 centuries before 1945, a major war had erupted in Europe every 11.9 years, and each lasted an average of 6.6 years. As the weapons for conventional war improved, each new war was more vicious and cost more in human lives than the previous one. Yet for over 40 years following World War II, opposing U.S. and Soviet forces were poised for war in Europe but remained fixed in place. Why? Amassing adequate conventional forces in Western Europe to counter Soviet forces had been politically, economically, and geographically impossible. The peak size of the U.S.