Understanding the Presidential Elections in Zambia And

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Understanding the Presidential Elections in Zambia And Presentation and Q&A: Understanding the Presidential elections in Zambia and its potential impact on health (10 mins) The conference chair, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for giving me this opportunity to share about the forth coming presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia. The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, neighbouring 8 countries the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Angola. The capital city is Lusaka. Zambia has about 13 million people. On 24 October 1964, the country declared independence from the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda became the first head of state. Zambia was governed by Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) from 1964 until 1991. From 1972 to 1991 Zambia was a one-party state with UNIP the sole legal political party. From 1991 to 2002, Zambia was governed by President Frederick Chiluba of Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. During which the country saw a rise in social- economic growth and increased decentralisation of government. Levy Mwanawasa was the third President of Zambia. He presided over the country from January 2002 until his death in August 2008. He is credited with having initiated a campaign to rid the country of corruption, and increasing standards of living from the levels left by Frederick T.J. Chiluba. Due to the death of former President Levy MWANAWASA, early elections were held to identify a replacement to serve out the remainder of his term. Elections which saw the current president Banda come into office. Election results: Rupiah BANDA 40.1%, Michael SATA 38.1%, Hakainde HICHILEMA 19.7%, Zambia has an independent Electoral Commission that has regulatory powers to determine how Elections are run. Electoral Commission Act 24 of 1996 provides for the composition of Electoral Commission and its operations. Elections: The President is elected by popular vote for a five- year term (eligible for a second term); TOWARDS 2011 ELECTIONS – A REFLECTION Last minute preparations for the 2011 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections expected in within the next 90 – 120 days are concluding. Candidates are now known. It’s a repeat of the 2008 elections which saw President Rupiah Banda put up a spirited fight against Michael Sata and Hakainde Hichilema. But this time, the stakes are higher. Both Banda and Sata are in this race for the last time as both are in their 70s. Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF) have yet another opportunity to wrestle power from the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). With failed attempts in 2006 and 2008, the PF are now counting on new friends, new partnerships and perhaps disgruntled MMD members. Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) on the other hand is staging a ‘’ Real Change’’ campaign exploiting his potential, his age (48 yrs), his economic programme and if no one from the MMD or the PF wishes to work with him, he is likely to spoil it for both of them. He is the dark-horse of the race, the ‘prodigal son.’ THE MOVEMENT FOR MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY (MMD) The MMD has taken many shades and stripes over the last 20 years. Former President Frederick Chiluba fashioned the party to a liberal agenda. He was known to be close to the grassroots membership and leadership that helped him cultivate a loyal following and use these structures as outreach foothold for his campaigns. And then came Levy Mwanawasa, a lame duck President who entered office with a dismal 29% vote. This was strange for the MMD that in the past enjoyed a popularity buoyancy of over 70%. Mwanawasa chose a populist approach to shore up his support. He picked an anti-corruption agenda that endeared him to the civil society groupings and formed a partnership with the most popular daily newspaper, The Post. He lifted the Constitutional immunity of his predecessor, former president Frederick Chiluba and him with corruption and arrested him. THE BY-ELECTIONS SINCE 2008, WHAT DO THEY TELL US? Since President Rupiah Banda came into office in 2008, the country has held eleven (11) parliamentary by-elections. The MMD has reduced its parliamentary seats from 78 in 2008 to 72 in 2011 (a serious loss of 6 parliamentary seats in such a short space of time). NOW - PRESIDENT RUPIAH BANDA President Banda is riding on a crest of development programmes that are coming to realization. Over a decade ago, in 2000, the World committed itself to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, through the UN. All resources and planning were directed to achieving these goals to eliminate extreme poverty and rural underdevelopment. The 15 year program of building basic and now high schools, hospitals and health centres, roads and other infrastructure are coming to completion as we race towards the completion point of 2015. However, besides these projects related to the MDGs, President Banda has sourced funding for Roads related to his own programs. The Chinese government has come handy and borrowings from commercial entities have helped begin to achieve this. This infrastructure development is only comparable to the massive construction undertaking in the 60s and 70s under first President Dr. Kaunda. Recently, government announced a K707 Billion construction and rehabilitations of urban roads. The project starting in May 2011, will upgrade major township roads in Lusaka and Copperbelt. The road construction and rehabilitation, will concentrate on Bus Routes, Markets, Commercial Centres and Township roads. This is to deal with the eye sores standing in place of roads especially in Lusaka and Copperbelt townships. ................................. NOW – OPPOSITION - THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (PF) The PF is the biggest opposition party in Zambia, second to the MMD. The PF and UPND had entered into electoral alliance which has died. With the death of the electoral alliance between the UPND/PF, pundits expected a plain sailing victory for the MMD and President Banda. But this is not to be. Forces are gathering around PF leader Sata to make him a suitable and acceptable candidate of the Opposition and a determined figure to defeat Banda. The forces are led by senior elements in the Catholic Church that are supporting Sata as their proxy candidate. The Catholic Church proved to the greatest and strong obstacle to the recently failed constitution making process. They led a boycott against the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) and also led another less successful boycott against the National Constitutional Conference (NCC). Fred Mmembe, editor of The Post is also at the centre of such forces. The Post has given a tilted coverage boosting Sata’s standing. Mmembe is counting on the new young registered (1.2m) voters and his perceived win of votes for PF from Western Province to bridge the 35,000 vote difference. Remember, this was the difference between Banda and Sata during the 2008 Elections. He planted the debate on the Barotse Agreement and achieved the goal of alienating the MMD government from the Lozi people. Another figure helping the PF is Bob Sichinga. One of the founder members of the MMD and known competent drafter of the first MMD Manifesto and UPND Manifesto, he is leading a team that is trying to ‘’ institutionalise’’ the PF. He is at the centre of intellectual activities in the PF. He has helped put up a new and credible Manifesto for the PF. Michael Sata is now made to read a prepared speech at functions. Sichinga is also coordinating activities among cooperating partners and seeking donor support for the forthcoming election. This is to ensure that a Sata Presidency is possible and accepted. Sichinga has organised speaking engagements for Sata to undertake before the elections at world renowned Universities. His first stop is Oxford University where Sata is expected to discuss Chinese Investments in Africa. Sichinga has helped Sata hold provincial conferences to shed off the perception of a dictator running a one-man-show. Soon the party is expected to hold a National Conference. It has also a launched an interactive and good website to appeal to younger voters. ...................... UNITED PARTY FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (UPND) Hakainde Hichilema is now an experienced politician. When he inherited the party in 2006 from the late Anderson Kambela Mazoka, he was accused of shrinking the party from 47 MPs and the largest opposition party in Zambia to 21 MPs only. He also lost key senior members who helped give the party a national and multi-tribal character. The senior members who left accused Hichilema of practising tribalism to ascend to the top post. The man with two difficult names has now become a household name. He is a much sought after partner for any credible electoral alliance or pact. Although the UPND feel confident that Hakainde has regained the party’s tradition support in Southern, Western, North-Western and Central provinces. The UPND has also shown consistency growth since the 2008 elections and have won more ward and Parliamentary By-elections seats than the MMD and the PF. The UPND has recently grabbed parliamentary seats from the MMD in Chilanga, Solwezi and Mufumbwe (though now under court contest). So the UPND cannot be relegated to the underdogs or categorised simply as a third force or third runner. It has party structures country-wide, a credible leadership and a team. It also has a viable and written economic and revival plan. This makes it a party that attracts intellectuals, middle class, workers and peasants. It is for this reason that the electoral alliance entered into with the PF formed a serious threat to the MMD. The Pact collapsed for various reasons. Chiefly among them were undermining activities by The Post, by the MMD and by party’s own senior members.
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