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Thorn of Sharon Aryeh Naor

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Thorn of Sharon Aryeh Naor It won't happen tomorrow, perhaps not On the same day, Rama and THORN OF even the day after. But if you listen Yehoshua Zamir, the parents of Yaron carefully to the talk within certain cir• Zamir, who had been killed in action cles in Israel and keep in mind the in the first week of the war, wrote their SHARON lessons of history, you cannot rule out own letter to Sharon-a letter he the possibility that one day Ariel would never answer. "Yaron has not Sharon may become Israel's Prime been taken from us. He was killed in What if Ariel Minister. an initiated, unneeded, and unjustified He wants it; he has already declared war on foreign soil. It was not for the Sharon were to his intention to seek the job when the sake of his country that he gave his conditions seem right, and not only life. You have changed the country become Prime does he remain active in political life, into an altar upon which our sons sac• he is also gaining in power and influ• rifice their lives. When will you Minister of Israel? ence. Is it so farfetched to imagine a admit our failure to establish order in time of distress in which the very Lebanon with our spears and on the Here the former qualities that so offend some people bodies of our sons?" government become for many others evidence that That evening, Sharon went to a Ariel Sharon is history's child, the luxury hotel in Tel Aviv to speak to a secretary to the right strong man to save the nation? group of followers. He first had an So it is not merely curiosity that opportunity to listen to the chair• Begin cabinet impels us to examine his motives, person's opening remarks, describing his dispositions, his policies, and his him as a great warrior "who had saved examines that intentions. Ariel Sharon is not merely the country" and declaring in refer• an uncommonly controversial ex- ence to the commission's report that "it possibility. Based general, ex-Minister of Defense, in• seems that justice is not always just." cumbent Minister of Trade and In• The friendly crowd responded with on the record, he dustry; he is, quite possibly, a future cries of "bravo." And then it was says it would be Prime Minister of Israel. Sharon's turn to take the rostrum, and with it, the offensive. a disaster. February 8, 1983, was a fateful day in "I won't discuss the commission," Ariel Sharon's political career. On he said. "It's being considered that day, the Commission of Inquiry elsewhere-in Washington, in Cairo, investigating the events at the refu• and by Arafat." But he would discuss gee camps in Beirut published its final the context of the commission's re• ARYEH NAOR report. The commission, chaired by port, as he saw it-nothing less than a the president of Israel's Supreme U.S.-directed, worldwide campaign Court, the late Justice Yitzhak to oust him in order to impose on Is• Kahan, found that in the wake of the rael a PLO state: "It's immaterial assassination of Lebanese President• whether the commission decided this elect Bashir Gemayel in September of or that way. I hear that in Washington 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon the Administration's hopes have was indirectly but personally responsi• soared at the prospect of Sharon's re• ble for the massacre of hundreds of moval so as to advance the Reagan Palestinians by the Christian Phalange plan. I have been and will continue to in Sabra and Shatila. "In our opin• stand, along with others, against ion," the members of the commission whoever tries to impose a second Pal• wrote, "it is fitting that the Minister estinian state alongside Israel, which of Defense draw the appropriate per• would mean suicide for us." sonal conclusions arising out of the The fact that nothing of that kind defects revealed with regard to the had either been mentioned in or in• manner in which he discharged the tended by the Reagan plan was, of duties of his office." course, irrelevant. Sharon's aim was to impress upon his followers the idea that by his removal, a mortal dan• ger to Israel would arise; hence the commission's recommendation should Aryeh Naor was Government Secre• not be approved by the cabinet. tary to the Israeli cabinet under Prime And, lest his depiction of a world• Minister Menachem Begin (May wide anti-Sharon conspiracy be dis• 1977-July 1984). missed as fantastical, Sharon moved 18/April 1987 Ariel Sharon on to a more familiar theme, one that forehead," he announced to the offi• ness foreigners have intervening in had worked for him before-the theme cers of the general staff. And to the the composition of our elected govern• of "the enemy within." Sharon cabinet he said that the mark had al• ment in an attempt to dictate its blamed Israel's Labor party opposition ready been placed on the national policy. But then I reached the conclu• for "inciting the media here and brow: "With the commission's idea of sion that they were right. Throughout across the globe against the govern• indirect guilt, Israel's enemies might this period, I really stood up, and I will ment's record in the war for no more accuse the country of genocide." continue to be an obstacle to anyone than petty political gains." Again, the fact that no one had attempting to force upon Israel the es• Now his "analysis" was almost drawn such a conclusion from the tablishment of a second Palestinian complete. The opposition in the commission's report-on the contrary, state." Knesset had joined hands with Is• the report was widely hailed in Eu• rael's enemies-including the United rope and America as evidence of Is• No, Sharon never said explicitly that States and, of course, the interna• rael's democracy and commitment to the Kahan Commission's report was a tional media-in order to gain politi• human values-was irrelevant. Nor part of a conspiracy between the cally from innocent Sharon's was it relevant when Sharon ap• American government and the Israeli removal, ignoring the danger to the peared before members of the Tel Aviv opposition to oust him from the De• very existence of the state his re• bar association: "As a nation, as a fense Ministry in order to impose on moval would bring about. state, and as Jews," he said, "we will Israel a policy that would inevitably All that remained for Sharon to ac• not be released from that indirect re• lead to its destruction. (In Israel, at• complish was to introduce a compel• sponsibility. This will be like a mark of tributing such a motivation to a judi• ling historical symbol to capture the Cain for generations. ."And, cial commission of inquiry could be full significance of the commission's once again, he turned to attack Presi• interpreted as a criminal violation of injustice. This he did the next day. "I dent Reagan for seeking his removal: law.) He simply repeated his several shall not put the mark of Cain on my "For a moment I wondered what busi• themes, over and over again: The Moment/19 Americans wanted him removed for But the cabinet did not share rence to which the government was their own reasons (to move forward Sharon's view that he was the last bar• yielding. "The IDF," he said, "may be with the Reagan plan); the Israeli op• rier before the enemies' onslaught. too weak to tackle a combined Arab position wanted him out for theirs By a vote of six against one, it ac• force, unless Israel launches preemp• ("petty political reasons"); the Kahan cepted Prime Minister Menachem tive strikes. But foreign pressures on Commission was recommending his Begin's proposal that all the commis• Israel, bitter arguments inside the resignation notwithstanding the "mark sion's recommendations be accepted country, and the Kahan report may de• of Cain" that would thereby be and implemented. And three days ter the government from ordering placed on the State of Israel and the later, it decided to take the defense such attacks." As an example of this Jewish people. portfolio from Sharon, albeit per• danger, he offered the consensual How to save not only face, but the mitting him to remain in the govern• policy towards Iraq: "One concept State as well? Not to worry: Reject ment as a minister without portfolio. that had guided Israel's security the commission's report. Let Sharon A year later, Sharon returned to his policymakers was that Iraqi forces stay on as the head of Israel's defense grand theme. By then, Begin was no should not be allowed to cross the establishment, and all those severe, longer in power. Sharon asked for border with Jordan, since their entry grievous dangers to the future, even cabinet approval to transfer to his would change the balance of power." to the very existence of Israel, would American lawyers some secret offi• That policy could be adhered to only be removed. cial documents that were needed in his as long as the government was ready In the formal opinion of the attorney libel suit against Time magazine. His in principle to decide on preemptive general, "personal recommenda• only support in the cabinet room came strikes. "The IDF," continued tions" of such a body as the Kahan from the leader of Te'hia, a small Sharon, "is strong enough to stop the Commission were equivalent to the right-wing party.
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