It won't happen tomorrow, perhaps not On the same day, Rama and THORN OF even the day after. But if you listen Yehoshua Zamir, the parents of Yaron carefully to the talk within certain cir• Zamir, who had been killed in action cles in and keep in mind the in the first week of the war, wrote their SHARON lessons of history, you cannot rule out own letter to Sharon-a letter he the possibility that one day Ariel would never answer. "Yaron has not Sharon may become Israel's Prime been taken from us. He was killed in What if Ariel Minister. an initiated, unneeded, and unjustified He wants it; he has already declared war on foreign soil. It was not for the Sharon were to his intention to seek the job when the sake of his country that he gave his conditions seem right, and not only life. You have changed the country become Prime does he remain active in political life, into an altar upon which our sons sac• he is also gaining in power and influ• rifice their lives. . . . When will you Minister of Israel? ence. Is it so farfetched to imagine a admit our failure to establish order in time of distress in which the very Lebanon with our spears and on the Here the former qualities that so offend some people bodies of our sons?" government become for many others evidence that That evening, Sharon went to a is history's child, the luxury hotel in to speak to a secretary to the right strong man to save the nation? group of followers. He first had an So it is not merely curiosity that opportunity to listen to the chair• Begin cabinet impels us to examine his motives, person's opening remarks, describing his dispositions, his policies, and his him as a great warrior "who had saved examines that intentions. Ariel Sharon is not merely the country" and declaring in refer• an uncommonly controversial ex- ence to the commission's report that "it possibility. Based general, ex-Minister of Defense, in• seems that justice is not always just." cumbent Minister of Trade and In• The friendly crowd responded with on the record, he dustry; he is, quite possibly, a future cries of "bravo." And then it was says it would be Prime Minister of Israel. Sharon's turn to take the rostrum, and with it, the offensive. a disaster. February 8, 1983, was a fateful day in "I won't discuss the commission," Ariel Sharon's political career. On he said. "It's being considered that day, the Commission of Inquiry elsewhere-in Washington, in Cairo, investigating the events at the refu• and by Arafat." But he would discuss gee camps in Beirut published its final the context of the commission's re• ARYEH NAOR report. The commission, chaired by port, as he saw it-nothing less than a the president of Israel's Supreme U.S.-directed, worldwide campaign Court, the late Justice Yitzhak to oust him in order to impose on Is• Kahan, found that in the wake of the rael a PLO state: "It's immaterial assassination of Lebanese President• whether the commission decided this elect Bashir Gemayel in September of or that way. I hear that in Washington 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon the Administration's hopes have was indirectly but personally responsi• soared at the prospect of Sharon's re• ble for the massacre of hundreds of moval so as to advance the Reagan Palestinians by the Christian Phalange plan. I have been and will continue to in Sabra and Shatila. "In our opin• stand, along with others, against ion," the members of the commission whoever tries to impose a second Pal• wrote, "it is fitting that the Minister estinian state alongside Israel, which of Defense draw the appropriate per• would mean suicide for us." sonal conclusions arising out of the The fact that nothing of that kind defects revealed with regard to the had either been mentioned in or in• manner in which he discharged the tended by the Reagan plan was, of duties of his office." course, irrelevant. Sharon's aim was to impress upon his followers the idea that by his removal, a mortal dan• ger to Israel would arise; hence the commission's recommendation should Aryeh Naor was Government Secre• not be approved by the cabinet. tary to the Israeli cabinet under Prime And, lest his depiction of a world• Minister Menachem Begin (May wide anti-Sharon conspiracy be dis• 1977-July 1984). missed as fantastical, Sharon moved

18/April 1987 Ariel Sharon

on to a more familiar theme, one that forehead," he announced to the offi• ness foreigners have intervening in had worked for him before-the theme cers of the general staff. And to the the composition of our elected govern• of "the enemy within." Sharon cabinet he said that the mark had al• ment in an attempt to dictate its blamed Israel's Labor party opposition ready been placed on the national policy. But then I reached the conclu• for "inciting the media here and brow: "With the commission's idea of sion that they were right. Throughout across the globe against the govern• indirect guilt, Israel's enemies might this period, I really stood up, and I will ment's record in the war for no more accuse the country of genocide." continue to be an obstacle to anyone than petty political gains." Again, the fact that no one had attempting to force upon Israel the es• Now his "analysis" was almost drawn such a conclusion from the tablishment of a second Palestinian complete. The opposition in the commission's report-on the contrary, state." had joined hands with Is• the report was widely hailed in Eu• rael's enemies-including the United rope and America as evidence of Is• No, Sharon never said explicitly that States and, of course, the interna• rael's democracy and commitment to the Kahan Commission's report was a tional media-in order to gain politi• human values-was irrelevant. Nor part of a conspiracy between the cally from innocent Sharon's was it relevant when Sharon ap• American government and the Israeli removal, ignoring the danger to the peared before members of the Tel Aviv opposition to oust him from the De• very existence of the state his re• bar association: "As a nation, as a fense Ministry in order to impose on moval would bring about. state, and as Jews," he said, "we will Israel a policy that would inevitably All that remained for Sharon to ac• not be released from that indirect re• lead to its destruction. (In Israel, at• complish was to introduce a compel• sponsibility. This will be like a mark of tributing such a motivation to a judi• ling historical symbol to capture the Cain for generations. . . ."And, cial commission of inquiry could be full significance of the commission's once again, he turned to attack Presi• interpreted as a criminal violation of injustice. This he did the next day. "I dent Reagan for seeking his removal: law.) He simply repeated his several shall not put the mark of Cain on my "For a moment I wondered what busi• themes, over and over again: The

Moment/19 Americans wanted him removed for But the cabinet did not share rence to which the government was their own reasons (to move forward Sharon's view that he was the last bar• yielding. "The IDF," he said, "may be with the Reagan plan); the Israeli op• rier before the enemies' onslaught. too weak to tackle a combined Arab position wanted him out for theirs By a vote of six against one, it ac• force, unless Israel launches preemp• ("petty political reasons"); the Kahan cepted Prime Minister Menachem tive strikes. But foreign pressures on Commission was recommending his Begin's proposal that all the commis• Israel, bitter arguments inside the resignation notwithstanding the "mark sion's recommendations be accepted country, and the Kahan report may de• of Cain" that would thereby be and implemented. And three days ter the government from ordering placed on the State of Israel and the later, it decided to take the defense such attacks." As an example of this Jewish people. portfolio from Sharon, albeit per• danger, he offered the consensual How to save not only face, but the mitting him to remain in the govern• policy towards Iraq: "One concept State as well? Not to worry: Reject ment as a minister without portfolio. that had guided Israel's security the commission's report. Let Sharon A year later, Sharon returned to his policymakers was that Iraqi forces stay on as the head of Israel's defense grand theme. By then, Begin was no should not be allowed to cross the establishment, and all those severe, longer in power. Sharon asked for border with , since their entry grievous dangers to the future, even cabinet approval to transfer to his would change the balance of power." to the very existence of Israel, would American lawyers some secret offi• That policy could be adhered to only be removed. cial documents that were needed in his as long as the government was ready In the formal opinion of the attorney libel suit against Time magazine. His in principle to decide on preemptive general, "personal recommenda• only support in the cabinet room came strikes. "The IDF," continued tions" of such a body as the Kahan from the leader of Te'hia, a small Sharon, "is strong enough to stop the Commission were equivalent to the right-wing party. Sharon let loose: Iraqis from entering Jordan, but I am verdict of a court of law, and were to "You are all against me. By not let• no longer sure that the government be followed unconditionally. "No," ting me have the documents I need to• will order such an attack." Sensing said Sharon to his colleagues in a spe• day, you are resuming the campaign that, the Iraqis might take up positions cial cabinet meeting, "I shall not re• you waged against me in February in Jordan. And once in position, in sign. You may fire me if you wish, but 1983. You abandoned me to the mer• Sharon's view, there was reason to I am not going to put the mark of cies of the riffraff and the doubt that the Israeli army was pow• Cain on my own forehead and on the international media. You gave am• erful enough to tackle them. nation's." munition to my enemies, the enemies He used a similar argument with But if Sharon could persuade his of Israel, and the enemies of the Jew• regard to Egypt: If the Egyptians de• own camp, and then perhaps others ish people." cide to violate the peace treaty and as well, that for him to "draw the ap• Again, the "stab in the back" send troops into Sinai, there may be a propriate conclusions," as the com• theme, this time in connection with very bitter argument on how to re• mission had recommended, would Sharon's $50-million libel suit spond, and "present plans will be diffi• actually help Israel's enemies to against Time, Inc., the enemy incar• cult to implement." Without the achieve their aims, what then? (Lest nate of Israel and the Jews-in deterrent threat of a preemptive strike, there be any misunderstanding, the Sharon's words, a "center for anti- Israel would be forced to undertake a Hebrew for "drawing the appropriate Semitism." To refuse him the use of substantial increase in the size of the conclusions" means unambiguously, classified documents for his private le• IDF. "You may have to add tanks if in context, "to resign from office.") gal proceeding was, therefore, to col• | the government is deterred from Perhaps public opinion could serve laborate with the enemy. j launching preemptive strikes," he as a court of appeal; if he were to i told the generals. refuse to resign, would the cabinet What we have here is a profound i So again, a cabinet without Sharon actually dare to fire him? confusion, an apparent inability to dis• meant an Israel without will. Perhaps the cabinet could be per• tinguish between personal and na• suaded not to accept for implementa• tional interests. As Ezer Weizman, a Several months earlier, when (even tion the personal recommendations former Defense Minister and air before the Kahan Commission report) of the report. Failing that, perhaps it force commander who had known senior officers of the IDF had urged could be convinced to refrain from Sharon since the days of their active him to quit-an action unprecedented making any decision at all. In either military service, put it, "with regard to i in Israel-Sharon published a polemi• case, he would have the backing he : Arik, the boundaries between his cal article in the two major Israeli needed for his stated intention of hold• own good and that of the country are newspapers. "There is a limit to criti• ing on to his office. indistinct." cism by officers in active service," he When one minister proposed that he In his last meeting with senior Israel wrote, arguing that servicemen can• accept the responsibility ascribed to Defense Force (IDF) officers, shortly not tell the government that a policy him by the commission, Sharon's face before leaving the Defense Ministry, already decided upon by the civilian turned red. He raised his voice and Sharon asserted that his forced de• authority is wrong or dangerous. "This said: "Why should I chop off my head? parture would weaken Israel's power is a red line which should never be If you want to, you can chop it off." because of a process of self-deter• crossed," he wrote. And he told a

20/April 1987 group of senior officers, "If you want emies; those who do not follow him truth leads to a misperception of re• to fight me, you must do what I did 10 unconditionally belong to the second ality; and that leads to a mistaken years ago. Take off your uniforms category. And, since he knows what strategy and to inevitable failure. and go into politics." is best for Israel, they are not only his Sharon's actions in the 1982 Lebanon But this endorsement of a classic own enemies, but the nation's. Ac• War reveal the problems of his charac• democratic principle was apparently cordingly, he sees no inconsistency in ter more clearly than any previous far from Sharon's mind a decade ear• simultaneously demanding absolute episode in his very checkered past. lier. On January 21, 1974, the IDF discipline from his subordinates and On the face of it, Operation Peace spokesperson issued an unprec• denying it to his superiors. for Galilee was a paragon of orderly edented communique, explaining why For such a man, everything is in• cabinet functioning. The cabinet met Sharon's nomination as division strumental. "My way of conduct" he daily for a status report and to take de• commander had been revoked. "An or• once said, "is always to look towards cisions. But closer examination re• der of the day issued by General the end, and only after properly de• veals that the status reports were not Sharon and what had been published fining the end I look backwards to se• always accurate and the decisions in his name by Harper's magazine," lect the means." People are there to rested on false information and wish• it reads, "include slander of command• be used, as are values. As is the truth. ful thinking. Several major moves ers and units and insults of comrades (Perhaps that is why Sharon could so (such as the parachute landing north of in arms, and cause harm to the broth• easily change his political affiliations the 40-kilometer line on the first day erhood of warriors." For quite a long and ideologies. At various times, he of the war, the conquest of East Beirut, time, Sharon fought for a renewal of has been a member of Mapai [Labor], and the linkup with Bashir Gemayel's his nomination. But Golda Meir, fol• the Liberals, Herat [right-wing], and Christian militia) were carried out lowing her resignation from the Pre• Shlomzion, his own creation of 1977.) without cabinet authorization, while miership, told Haim Bar-Lev (a When the truth becomes an instru• other moves (such as the attack on the Labor party cabinet minister and for• ment like any other, to be used or Syrians' ground-to-air missiles and mer chief-of-staff): "If he returns in abused in the pursuit of one's goals, it the outflanking of the Syrian forces in uniform, I will personally picket the becomes legitimate to deceive your the mountains of the central sector Defense Ministry." superiors, your subordinates, and the from the second day of the war on) The months following the Yom general public alike. "If he could only were presented to the cabinet in a Kippur War were hard times for Is• rid himself of not speaking the truth, modified version that ignored any al• rael's defense establishment. Never• he would be a model military leader," ternative options. theless, Sharon's requests to rejoin wrote David Ben-Gurion in his per• Most important of all, the cabinet, the army were turned down again and sonal diary about the then-young, im• which dealt in great detail with tacti• again. In the view of his many crit• pressive Major Ariel Sharon, who cal and operative matters, was not the ics, he had always been a petulant, had successfully conducted the first body that decided on strategic goals. undisciplined, and insubordinate retaliation operations across Israel's Its authority as the supreme com• militarist, whose personal ambitions borders in the 1950s. mander of the army dribbled and had come before anything else. The drained into the Defense Minister's of• critique extended to his behavior dur• Ben-Gurion's assessment was dra• fice. "The cabinet does not have to be ing the 1973 war. The new chief of matically realized almost 30 years presented with all the dilemmas raised staff in 1974, Mordechai Gur, accused later, when as Menachem Begin's here," Defense Minister Sharon told Sharon of risking his troops, of readi• Defense Minister, Sharon misled the a group of commanders when the se• ness to sacrifice them in order to serve government about the aims of the war vere implications of a certain move his ambitions. "He always uses force in Lebanon and the strategy he imple• in Beirut became clear to him. for its own sake, and force is his favor• mented. It was a bit of historical In the cabinet session convened at ite solution," said Gur, who refused irony that Begin, once Ben-Gurion's Begin's home on Saturday night, June to mobilize him. bitterest political rival, could have 5, 1982, Operation Peace for Galilee But Sharon also had supporters, saved himself a personal tragedy had was approved on the basis of a plan who demanded his return to service. he only accepted the warning of the presented by the Defense Minister In their eyes, he was a military ge• first Prime Minister. Instead, he ap• and the Chief-of-Staff. This plan dif• nius, the warrior who had saved the pointed Sharon his Defense Minister, fered from a previous bne, worked out country from defeat in 1973. To keep and therein lay-to borrow from by the two generals and dubbed the him on the side would be suicidal Shakespeare-Begin's "most grievous "grand plan." According to the folly; Sharon himself was predicting fault, and grievously hath Begin an• "grand plan," Israel was supposed to a new war very soon. How could the swered it." reach Beirut. But it was the "little nation forgo his leadership? When it comes to the modus plan" that was presented to and ap• "They are all against me," was operandi of a Defense Minister, es• proved by the ministers, and it stipu• Sharon's explanation. "They have al• pecially in the absence of binding pro• lated as the operation's goal an ways been." cedures and a sophisticated system of advance to a point 40 kilometers Sharon's world is divided into his policy analysis and decision making north of the Israel-Lebanon border. loyal supporters and his wicked en• on the cabinet level, distortion of Further, the cabinet was told that

Moment/21 there was no intention of engaging in a and the duration of the war, and that it is doubtful whether it would have clash with the Syrians and that Is• the Prime Minister and the Defense adopted the decision it did; its decision rael's forces were under no circum• Minister operated simultaneously was based on the assumption that it stances to advance beyond 4 kilo• along parallel tracks to achieve contra• was possible to attack the PLO in meters (2.6 miles) from the Syrian dictory goals. It was in the nature of Lebanon without fighting with the lines. Sharon did add that he could things that the activity of the Defense Syrians. What this means is that rel• not guarantee that a clash with the Syr• Minister thwarted the political evant information, which was essen• ians could be avoided, only that it moves initiated by the Prime Minister. tial for making a rational decision, was his intention to avoid it. To that Not only was there no coordination was impaired. Second, the cabinet end, he told the cabinet, his plan was (not to mention integration) in politi• truly assumed that everything would to outflank the Syrians and to threaten cal-strategic activity, there was even be done to avert battle contact with them without opening fire; an inner contradiction between two the Syrians. and the likelihood was that they would basic goals: the determination of the Begin and his cabinet could not withdraw and take with them the Prime Minister and his cabinet not to have supposed that in contradiction to PLO's cannons from the Bekaa. What get involved in a confrontation with what had been told them in the cabi• Sharon did not tell the cabinet was the Syrians-Begin even sought U.S. net and in consultations at the Prime that in nearly all his initial discussions mediation for an attempt at indirect Minister's office, Sharon gave the with the top army command, he had contact with Assad and political agree• army instructions that objectively expressed doubt that such a flanking ment between Israel, , and were bound to lead to a provocation maneuver could be carried out with• Lebanon-and the goal of the Defense against the Syrians. out confronting the Syrians, and that Minister, who told an officer wonder• When the soldiers on the front re• he had on several occasions added ing about his order to approach the alized that they had been initiating that in his opinion there would eventu• Syrian missile area: "You don't imag• provocations against the Syrians, ally be no escaping a clash with ine that we will end this operation and that they had crossed the 40-kilometer them. these missiles will remain! Everyone line even without provocation from Almost unanimously, the cabinet knows exactly what we're going to the other side, and that there was approved the Sharon proposal. The do." hardly a connection between what "40 kilometer" figure was not included "Everyone knows"-except for the had been announced and what had in the decision, but the Defense Min• Israeli government. been done on the battlefield, unprec• ister himself said, in a news confer• Sharon must have assumed that had edented demonstrations began in ence convened in his office on June he told his colleagues in advance that which even some Likud voters par• 11, the day of the first cease-fire, that he planned to reach a confrontation ticipated. "I am not against fighting following the cabinet decision the with the Syrians and, at the same Yassir Arafat," said one soldier, "if IDF had been instructed to "sweep time, destroy their ground-to-air mis• Sharon had been honest. Soldiers who clean" a security strip of 40-45 kilo• siles, he would not have received the are going to die don't want to be lied meters. He explained the deviation necessary approval. Had he thought to." Another, a commander of a from this line by citing the need to otherwise, why did he not request the paratroop company in the reserves, outflank the Syrians in order to necessary authority for what "every• said he and his men were told there threaten them from the rear without one knew" was the true goal? was no intention of engaging the Syr• opening fire. In the ensuing days of Nor was the cabinet informed of the ians. "How did it happen that we the war, Begin was told that the devi• content of an opinion given by the moved precisely in the direction ation from the line was caused only by head of military intelligence to the fo• where a clash with the Syrians was in• local conditions and was in response rum of generals on May 13. Accord• evitable?" he bitterly asked. to guerrilla fire on the IDF forces. Ei• ing to the opinion, a military clash Sharon's reply was loud and clear. ther way, there is no doubt the cabinet with the Syrians was expected for "These men are opportunists and ca• members believed and understood that two reasons: 1) "One cannot go to war reer-oriented," he began. Then, later, the intention was to implement only and not attack the missiles," and 2) he added that his ministerial col• the "little plan" and penetrate 40 kilo• "Anyone who says a 40-kilometer strip leagues were to blame, together with meters into Lebanon, without any must be cleaned is going to wrestle the opposition, for creating a initiative against the Syrians, the goal with the Syrians, because one can discrepancy "between me and my for the war being "to remove the hardly see a situation in which we ad• soldiers." Galilee settlements from the range of vance 40 kilometers and deal only The discrepancy, of course, was be• the terrorists' fire." with the PLO while the Syrians stand tween what Sharon was telling the The events preceding the battles by. We're getting involved in fighting cabinet and the country, on the one with the Syrians and the manner in with the Syrians in Lebanon." hand, and the actions he was taking, which they in fact developed prove From an analysis of the things said on the other. And even his habitual that the cabinet's decision and its in• at the cabinet meeting, it transpires disregard for the truth was inad• tention were not translated by the De• that, first of all, if the cabinet had as- equate as explanation. For the real fense Minister into operational sumed that there was a high probabil• reason was known only to a very few instructions that would limit the scope ity of confrontation with the Syrians, I people: Sharon has a greater prize in

22/Apnl 1987 mind than even the "grand plan" have been the first to reject it, and all seemed to offer. His intention was the rest would have followed. For no Shawn's followers nothing less than to change the geo• matter how seductive the fantasy of want a strong man at political situation in the Middle East: compliant regimes to Israel's east and to get the Palestinian refugees in its north, others understood that no the top. They want Lebanon to emigrate to Jordan, and stable peace could be achieved there overthrow the king and estab• through Israel's imposition of gov• quick solutions and lish a Palestinian state that would, in ernments in its neighboring states. fact, be an Israeli protectorate. In or• immediate der to accomplish that, he needed Given his predispositions, what else Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the could be expected of Sharon once he satisfactions. Christian militia, to be elected the new realized that no one in the cabinet Lebanese President, for there was lit• would support his goals for the war? tle doubt what his election would "Believe me," he told Oriana Fallaci mean to the Palestinians. The Kahan in an interview, "democracy or no Commission mentions in its final re• democracy-I would have entered port that there was "widespread into Beirut had I been sure that we had knowledge" regarding the plans of the to enter." (A spokesperson for the Phalangists' leaders "for the future of Defense Ministry later denied that the Palestinians" once those leaders Sharon had said "democracy or no assumed power. democracy," but then Fallaci an• "Besides this general knowledge," nounced that she had kept records of says the commission, "Sharon also the interview, and no more was said by had special reports from his not incon• the spokesperson. siderable number of meetings with In his final address as Defense Min• the Phalangists' heads before Bashir's ister, Sharon sharply attacked the assassination." It was well-known Kahan Commission and the cabinet that Gemayel and his men wanted the for "blaming the Jews, the State, the Palestinians away from Lebanon. In government, and the IDF" for the light of the Phalangists' combat eth• slaughter in the refugee camps. Ac• ics, no crystal ball was needed to cording to that address, it was the anticipate that under Gemayel's cabinet (in which he continued to Presidency the Palestinians would be participate) that "put the mark of "encouraged" to emigrate. Cain" on our foreheads "for genera• How to ensure Gemayel's elec• tions." But he was not leaving his post tion? First, the men of the PLO must a beaten man: "A man's power," he be forced out of Beirut. So long as said, "is not measured by this or that they stayed in the city, there was dan• position he holds. It stems from hav• ger to the lives of a number of mem• ing clear directions and goals, and bers of the Lebanese parliament who readiness to fight for his ideas. And I were ready to vote for Gemayel. fully believe I am right and I have the Therefore, the evacuation of the PLO power and the readiness to fight to at• from Beirut became a major target of tain the goals." the war. This Nietzschean view of the But even if all the terrorists left the world-and of himself-made it inevi• city, there was no real chance for table that once he was subjected to a Gemayel as long as the Syrians were level of public criticism that would deployed in Lebanon in general and in have destroyed most others, he the capital in particular. For Sharon's would refute the criticism by resorting private grand plan to work, the Syr• to the "stab in the back" theory. And ians as well as the PLO had to be so, in a radio program marking the forced out. And the only way to force first anniversary of a war that was the Syrians out was to engage them in supposed to last for just 48 hours, battle. And that, in turn, meant mov• Sharon said he had no regrets about ing beyond the 40-kilometer line. the war; if he had it to do over again, That was the reason for Sharon's he would still recommend Operation cunning deception in the conduct of Peace for Galilee. He made only two the war. Had he brought his plan to the mistakes: "I had thought that on such cabinet for approval, he would have issues as the defense of the country, all been totally isolated. Begin would Israelis were united and none would

Moment/23 exploit the situation for political gain. fense Minister could mean only that they came to terms of agreement, he I also believed the government would Begin had an improper set of shook hands with Begin over a glass have the strength to stand firm and not priorities, that he placed party inter• of wine. But the morning after, he sent shirk its responsibility." ests ahead of the national interest. a letter to Sapir, announcing that he Sharon's view of himself, and of de• "They don't accept me as one of would never agree to run for the mocracy, makes him incapable of them," complained Sharon to a Knesset on Begin's ticket. The dealing thoughtfully with criticism of friendly correspondent; once again, reason (to which he did not refer in his behavior. His critics become "they are always against me." that letter): His promotion within the "swarming things," "wicked," and The Begin-Sharon relationship army had unexpectedly come through, "traitors." So, when the late Vice- was ambivalent. Begin admired so he would stay in service after all. Premier Simcha Erlich met in Tel Aviv Sharon's battle record, his determi• But four years later he came again to with American ambassador Samuel nation and bravery. The myth of Begin with a proposal to run jointly. Lewis, who complained that Sharon's Sharon as a national hero and his They did, but the Labor party won the behavior and comments were harm• abilities as a commander fascinated election. (The new Labor Prime Min• ing American-Israeli relations, Sharon Begin. On the other hand, he could ister, , offered Sharon a compared Erlich to a Judenrat mem• not stand Sharon's brutality and ego• job in his office, whereupon he left ber in the Holocaust. (The viciousness ism. "He is a genius of a general and a Begin and the rest of his allies.) Later of that comparison may have been vicious human being," said Begin to a on, in 1976, he wanted to rejoin the prompted by the fact that Erlich had friend in 1980. Liberal party, but Erlich, who at the long been critical of Sharon. In 1977, Nevertheless, he appointed him in time was the party chairman/re• he had put his criticism in a letter: "I 1981. Following the successful air fused. Sharon cursed Erlich, estab• see in him a danger to democracy and raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which lished his own Shlomzion party, and free society, because once he assumes was strongly supported by Sharon got 2 seats in 1977. Begin won with 43 government and power he will be ca• (then minister of agriculture) and Gen• seats. pable of building concentration camps eral Raphael Eitan, then chief-of- Late that night, when the results for political prisoners in Israel. This staff, a common language was were clear, Sharon called Begin. "I man has no principles, no human feel• developing between the two generals congratulate you, Menachem," he ings, and no moral norms, and there• and Begin. At that time, the Prime said. "I look forward to working to• fore he is dangerous to society.") Minister was preparing for the imple• gether with you." Begin wished his Erlich was not the only Likud lead• mentation of the peace treaty with parliamentary coalition to be as wide er who saw Sharon as a danger to de• Egypt, which included the comple• as possible and agreed immediately. mocracy. Menachem Begin used tion of the army withdrawal from the "But," he added, "first of all, you similar terms to explain why he had Sinai and the evacuation of the Israeli must apologize to Erlich." Sharon not appointed him as Defense Minis• settlers, some of whom threatened to wrote the letter, as he would write ter when Ezer Weizman resigned. resist. Begin did not wish the peace two more while serving as a member "Had I appointed him," said Begin, treaty with Egypt (for which he had al• of the national unity cabinet under "he could have surrounded the Prime ready been awarded the Nobel Peace the Premiership of . Minister's office with army tanks." prize) to cause clashes between the During his service under Begin, When Sharon complained, Begin re• IDF and the settlers. He believed that Sharon turned from flattery to threats plied that he'd only been joking. But Ariel Sharon, with his heroic reputa• and insults, depending on the results such jokes were entirely out of charac• tion and close ties with the settlers, he wished to achieve. One day he ter for Begin. could persuade them not to cause wrote a note saying "whatever the bloodshed on the occasion of making circumstances might be, I'll go along The Begin quip occurred in June peace. On these grounds, but not with• with you," and another day he would 1980. Following the resignation of out hesitation, Begin finally ap• blame Begin for risking the nation's Weizman, Sharon had unequivocally pointed Sharon Defense Minister in security for political gain. And when demanded the defense post for him• his new cabinet. "Should he fail to the cabinet adopted Begin's proposal self. When he realized that Begin was carry out the cabinet's decisions, I (August 12, 1982) that the Minister reluctant, and even preferred Yitzhak shall fire him," said Begin to a group of Defense would no longer be autho• Shamir, Sharon attacked him in a of worried politicians. rized to order the air force, the navy, noisy cabinet meeting. "You want to The continuation of the story is the artillery, and the armored forces to give the defense portfolio as a harlot's well known. act in a sector of Beirut without hav• fee!" he shouted at the Prime Minis• ing prior approval for their action from ter. Sharon simply could not under• As for Sharon, he basically despised either the cabinet or the Prime Minis• stand that Begin preferred someone Begin, though he was always ready to ter, he shouted, "Everything is done on else for the post he desired so much for use him. In 1969, when his military a personal basis, nothing is decided himself, unless, of course, there was career seemed to have come to an end, here on its merits!" something irregular in Begin's motiva• Sharon negotiated a political career, tion. The fact that Begin preferred with Begin and the late Joseph Sapir, The point is that Sharon's style Shamir or even Begin himself as De• the leader of the Liberal party. When works. For many Israelis, including a

24/April 1987 substantial number of Herat activists The more anxious and perplexed they that the end justifies the means. The and central committee members, are, the more Sharon is their comfort. propaganda machine would, of Sharon is perceived as Begin's natu• But it is not only a matter of propa• course, depict something quite ral successor. Even the public cam• ganda or of political psychology. More different-an idealistic leader, exer• paign of Begin's son, Dr. Ze'ev than 20 times in two years, he sug• cising a value-oriented policy on a Benjamin Begin, against Sharon has gested to the cabinet mat it demand the perfectly rational and legal basis. Yet not dissuaded them. removal of PLO headquarters from Sharon's record with regard to truth is Begin himself has not said a word. Jordan. The implication is clear: If unambiguous; for him, truth is just He remains at home; he has not ap• Hussein fails to expel the PLO, Israel another instrument to be used in the peared in public since his sudden res• should attack PLO headquarters in pursuit of his vision. ignation in September 1983. But Jordan; in any case, Israel should not Given how much is known of Sharon won 42 percent in Herat's cen• enter into a political process with Hus• Sharon's record, the real tragedy is tral committee when he challenged sein, neither directly nor indirectly, that if he does come to power, it will Prime Minister Shamir for the party's as long as Hussein continues to allow not be in spite of his extravagant leadership, and now he is the Minis• the PLO to remain in his kingdom. flaws, but because of them. * ter of Industry and Commerce, one of Whenever a terrorist incident occurred the most promising positions for in Israel or in the administrated terri• power-hunters in Israel. His followers tories, Sharon blamed Jordan-an ar• are strongly committed and spare no gument that is very similar to the effort to promote his chances to be• accusations he had raised against come Israel's next leader. They want Lebanon a year before the war. "Had a strong man at the top, and his image Sharon been in power, we probably fits their needs. Their frame of mind would have already conquered Jor• is fundamentalist, based on over• dan," said several highly placed, well- simplifications of Israel's compli• informed sources in . And cated security problems. They want no wonder. His final goal of the 1982 quick solutions and immediate satis• war still waits to be accomplished. faction. They consider coercive power much more appropriate for use in the In Sharon's office hangs a beautifully Arab-Israeli conflict than diplomacy. inscribed quotation from Isaiah: They await him, the strong man, to "And they shall beat their swords into teach the bad Arabs a lesson that they plowshares and their spears into will never forget. Israel's military pruning hooks." But on the grounds of power notwithstanding, they feel inse• his past acts and present expressions, cure and deeply disturbed by simple, it is more reasonable to anticipate a unsophisticated terrorist acts such as new war should Sharon come to the random stabbings that have re• power. And a Sharon Administration cently begun. Thus every act of terror would have vast domestic implica• increases Sharon's political power tions as well. For while Sharon would even more than does his sophisticated not, in fact, surround the Knesset use of his ministerial status. He en• with tanks, he would almost surely courages his supporters by appearing seek thorough control of Israel's at the funerals of victims of terrorist democratic institutions. Let those in• attacks, and impresses them even stitutions stay in place; why lose the more by the picture he paints of the basis of legitimacy and make so many, PLO as "a dreadful monster which al• at home and abroad, angry? Let the ways acts when it smells weakness." Knesset and the cabinet continue to And the conclusion is quite obvious: meet on a regular basis, discuss The best solution to a problem arising whatever is on the agenda, and even out of weakness is strength-rte qual• make decisions; but behind the ity he can offer. scenes, since you are the only one who In public declarations during the truly understands the national inter• last two years, he has time and again est, do what you believe is right. That, described the PLO as a danger to Is• at least, is what the Lebanon prece• rael's very existence. Beyond the po• dent teaches us. litical and psychological need to And so a Sharon Administration continue to justify the war in Leba• would reduce democracy to its formal, non, these declarations respond to the technical aspects. The operative existential fear of his supporters, value would not be democracy, but the thus strengthening their conviction. doctrine that might makes right, and

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