Legislative Infidelity" - a Norm of Int'l Economic Jurisprudence - in the N8.1Tn ($60Bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market Collins U.C
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Golden Gate University School of Law GGU Law Digital Commons Theses and Dissertations Student Scholarship Spring 2011 Mismanagement of Emerging Stock Markets: Analysis of the Role Played by "Legislative Infidelity" - a Norm of Int'l Economic Jurisprudence - in the N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market Collins U.C. Ikebudu Golden Gate University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/theses Part of the International Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons Recommended Citation Ikebudu, Collins U.C., "Mismanagement of Emerging Stock Markets: Analysis of the Role Played by "Legislative Infidelity" - a Norm of Int'l Economic Jurisprudence - in the N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market" (2011). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 27. This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW MISMANAGEMENT OF EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: Analysis of the Role played by 'Legislative Infidelity' - A Norm of Int'l Economic Jurisprudence - In the N8.ltn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market. SUBMITTED TO THE GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONFEREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF SCIENTIAE JURIDICAE DOCTOR (SJD). MEMBERS OF THE DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PROFESSOR DR. CHRISTIAN N. OKEKE, LL.M (KIEV) DOCTOR IN DE RECHTS GELEERDHEID (AMSTERDAM); PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW; DIRECTOR, THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW. PROFESSOR DR. SOPHIE CLAVIER, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL: MA, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL: DIPLOME D'ETUDES SUPEREURES (JD PLUS LL.M EQUIVALENT); DIPLOME D'ETUDES APPROFONDIES (LL.M); DOCTEUR EN DROIT (SJD), UNIVERSITY OF PARIS, PANTHEON SORBONNE. PROFESSOR TIMOTHY A. SIMON, BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO; JURIS DOCTOR, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS, GOLDEN GATE SCHOOL OF LAW, SAN FRANCISCO; ADVISOR ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES IN GOLDEN GATE'S US. LEGAL STUDIES PROGRAM. BY Collins Uc. Ikebudu, Esq., LL.B (HONORS), LL.M SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 1 APRIL 29 \ 2011. MISMANAGEMENT OF EMERGING STOCK MARKETS: Analysis of the Role Played by 'Legislative Infidelity' - A Norm of Int'l Economic Jurisprudence - In the N8.ltn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market. Summary of Contents Summary of Contents Table of Contents 11 Table of Cases V11 Table of Statutes viii Abbreviations x Acknowledgement Xlll Abstract xiv Chapter 1: Issue, Purpose and Scope Chapter 2: TRIPS as an Exemplification of 'Legislative Infidelity' in International Law; A Brief Analysis 50 Chapter 3: Legislative Infidelity and N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market; Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. -Part 1- 95 Chapter 4: Legislative Infidelity and the N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market: Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. -Part 2- Complicity of Nigeria's Investments and Securities Tribunal in the Securities Fraud that Crashed Nigeria Stock Market. 144 Chapter 5: Legislative Infidelity and the N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market: Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. -Part 3-More Evidence of Contrived Dysfunction: Other Plots that Abet Fraud in Nigeria Capital Market. 193 Table of Contents CHAPTER 1: Issue, Purpose, and Scope 1.1 Introduction 1.1.1 The Apocalyptic Crash 2 1.1.2 The Cover-Up 5 1.1.3 Cover-Up by Market Operators, Regulators, and Government 5 1.1.4 Cover-Up by the Central Bank of Nigeria 7 1.1.5 Other Markets Debunked Global Crisis Excuse 10 1.1.6 Plots of the Crash Hidden in Framework of Nigeria Market 12 1.2 Why This Topic Is Important 13 1.2.1 The Crash Beckons for Inquiry 14 1.2.2 My Dissertation is a Fortuitous Opportunity 14 1.3 Benefits of My Research 15 1.3.1 Research Offers Opportunity for Redress 15 1.3.2 Research Proves that Global Poverty is Mostly Induced 15 1.3.3 Dissertation Spotlights 'Legislative Infidelity' 16 1.4 Central Thesis of My Dissertation 17 1.5 Legislative Infidelity; Definition, Encounter, and Examples 19 1.5.1 Definition of Legislative Infidelity 19 1.5.2 Encounter with Legislative Infidelity 20 1.5.3 Examples of Legislative Infidelity in Int'l 'Legislation' 22 1.5.3.a Sources of International Law 22 1.5.3.b Insurgent Sources of International Law 23 1.6 IMF and World Bank; Exemplars of Legislative Infidelity in the Jurisprudence of Int'l Economic Order 24 1.6.l Origin and Brief History of the IMF, and its Metamorphosis to Infidelity 24 1.6.2 Original Mandate of IMF 26 1.6.3 Termination ofIMF Job 27 1.6.4 IMF's Metamorphosis 28 1.6.5 IMF Articles of Agreement; Legislative Infidelity Epitomized 31 l.6.5.a IMF's Immunity with Impunity 32 1.6.6 Criticisms of IMF and Its Operations in Developing Countries 33 ii 1.6.6.a IMF's Reports Described as 'Garbage' 35 1.7 Four Deadly Steps IMF (and World Bank) use to Kill Developing Nations Economies 36 1.7.1 Step One is privatization 36 1.7.2 Step Two is capital market liberalization 37 1.7.3 Step Three: Market-based pricing - a fancy term for raising prices on food, water and cooking gas. "Step-Three-and-a-HalJ: 'the IMF riot'" 38 1.7.4 Step Four is free trade -likened to the Opium Wars 39 1.7.5 Doctrinaire Ideology of 'free-market Fundamentalism' still Shapes Policy 40 1.8 World Bank; A Model of Legislative Infidelity 41 1.8.1 History of the World Bank 41 1.8.2 World Bank's Transformation 42 1.8.3 Opening Remark on World Bank's Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 43 1.8.4 Legislative Infidelity and World Bank 'Guidelines for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investments'; A Brief Analysis. 44 CHAPTER 2: TRIPS as an Exemplification of 'Legis/ative Infidelity' in International Law; A Brief Analysis. 50 2.1 Introduction 50 2.2 Trip into TRIPS; A Summary of TRIPS' Major Controversies 51 2.3 TRIPS and Legislative Infidelity; Analytical Overview 53 2.4 TRIPS Cross-Referencing Technique; A Geme of Legislative Infidelity 62 2.5 Post-Adoption Controversies That Trail TRIPS; Stirring the Hornet's Nest 68 2.6 Scholarly Angle to TRIPS Controversies 72 2.7TRIPS Neglect of the Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities; Another Face of Legislative Infidelity 79 2.7.1 The Bellagio Declaration 80 2.7.2 Scholarly Writings on the Neglect of Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities 83 iii 2.8 UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; An Effort that was Aborted. 89 2.9 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 611295; Real Solution that Fell Short. 92 2.10 Conclusion 93 CHAPTER 3: Legislative Infidelity and N8.1tn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market; Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. -Part 1- 95 3.1 Introduction 95 3.2 What Caused Nigeria's N8.1tn ($60bn) Stock Market Crash; Fortuitous Tragedy or an Organized 'Hot Money Cycle' Scam Scheme? 100 3.3 Events Associated with the Crash 102 3.4 SEC Board's Trips to U.S. 106 3.5 'Legislative Infidelity' Designed into Nigerian Securities Acts and Subsidiary Legislations 107 3.6 Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission; Capital Market Regulator Officially Sabotaged in the Securities Act 109 3.6.1 Part-Time, None-Executive SEC Chairman 112 3.6.2 Sabotage of SEC on Appointment 114 3.6.3 Tenure and Devotion 116 3.6.4 Sabotage of SEC on Salary 118 3.7 India Stands as a Reproach to Nigeria 122 3.7.1 Nigeria Arrangement is unlike no Other 125 3.7.2 Nigeria Arrangement is not Like the British System 125 3.8 Nature of Securities and the Implication to Securities Regulation 129 3.8.1 Distinguishing Feature of Securities 130 3.8.l.a). Securities are Created, not Produced 132 3.8.l.b). Securities are not used or Consumed 133 3.8.1.b.i) Efficient Market Hypothesis 134 3.8.l.c) Intangible and Complex Nature of Securities 137 iv 3.8.l.d) Higher Regulatory Standard 138 3.9 Nigerian Investments and Securities Tribunal (1ST); a Strategic Impediment to Nigeria's SEC 139 3.10 Conclusion 143 CHAPTER 4: Legislative Infidelity and the N8.ltn ($60bn) Crash of Nigeria Stock Market: Analysis of a Premeditated Securities Fraud. ,...,Part 2,..., Complicity of Nigeria's Investments and Securities Tribunal (1ST) in the Securities Fraud that Crashed Nigeria Stock Market. 4.1 Introduction 144 4.2 Power of Nigeria's SEC (through APC) to Investigate and Punish Securities Malpractices, Under ISA 2007 146 4.3 Nigerian 1ST through the Cases: 1ST's Judicial Hostility towards SEC; Happenstance or Evidence of Complicity in Securities Fraud? 148 4.3.1 Examples of the Tribunal's Judgments that Freed Securities Fraudsters 150 4.3.1.i) Union Bank ofNigeria (UBN) PLC v. SEC 150 4.3.1.ii) Molten Trust Ltd & Another v. SEC 152 4.3.l.iii).Nova Finance & Securities Ltd and Mr. Eugene Anenih v. SEC 156 4.3.l.iv) Dlisaemeka v. SEC 169 4.3.l.v) Akintola Williams Deloitte v. SEC and 20 others 170 4.4 Award of Costs to SEC; Nigerian Tribunal's Rivalry with APC and SEC 181 4.4.1).