Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric
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Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric Daniel Tovar Are the goals that we aspire to achieve the result of our rational considerations and choice? Or, are we more closely akin to animals, pursuing only those goals determined by our non-rational desires? In his ethics, Aristotle is notoriously unclear about where he stands. At times he seems to conceive of humans as highly rational while at other times he seems to portray them as largely animalistic. By approaching these questions through the lens of the Rhetoric, a text little studied in philosophy, I propose a view that harmonizes Aristotle’s seemingly conflicting positions. I maintain that desire is responsible for determining which ends we pursue, but that reason can prod and nudge those desires to pursue different ends. This account shows that the apparent unclarity in Aristotle is merely the consequence of a long standing prejudice that he must side with either a more rationalist or more animalistic conception of human beings. I show that these seeming contradictions in Aristotle can be understood as part of a single coherent account. Broadly speaking, interpretations of Aristotle’s account of motivation can be divided into two opposing groups: rationalist and Humean. Scholars have overwhelmingly favored rationalist views, which maintain that reason can choose which ends we desire to pursue.1 They take it that reasoning or being convinced by an argument that some end is good is sufficient to compel one to desire that end.2 Unfortunately, 1 Richard Loening ([1903] 2010), Allen (1977), Ross (1923), Hudson (1981), Sorabji (1980), Irwin (1975), Wiggins (1975-6), Cooper (1975), Taylor (2008), Broadie (1991), Kraut (2012). 2 This is a simplification. There are many other factors that come into play, in particular other competing desires that might overwhelm the desire that emerges from thinking that an end is good to pursue. In such cases, there is arguably a desire evoked by reason that still exists, but this desire will not ultimately be strong enough to compel one to action. Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric despite their popularity, these views face serious difficulties. In both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, desire, not reason, is stated as being responsible for establishing the ends we pursue.3,4 Moreover, Aristotle maintains that these desires are not molded through reason but through a process of habituation (Burnyeat 1980). This has led some scholars, most notably Jessica Moss (2012), to adopt Humean views on which desire alone establishes our ends.5 For such scholars, these desires are altered through habituation, not reasoning or argument. In what follows, I argue for a hybrid view by offering the first broad account to detail how rationality influences non-rational desire. Looking at the Rhetoric, I shall argue that there is good textual evidence that rationality, through argument, can alter our ends. However, I will also argue that it is only in virtue of a Humean interpretation of motivation that we are able to make sense of how reason alters our ends. For, on a Humean account, we desire to pursue those ends that we perceive as pleasant. But, reason can change our perceptions and, in doing so, alter which ends we pursue. To be clear, because I rely on the Rhetoric, my account will explicitly be limited to showing how reasoned arguments from another person are able to manipulate our ends. I will leave to the side cases in which one is reasoning by oneself. However, the account I present here lays a foundation for explaining such cases. 3 To be accurate, Aristotle states that “virtue makes our ends right, deliberation what leads to them.” The statement that “virtue makes our ends right” is often taken in the way I have taken it above, as stating that the desires that we gain through habituation determine which ends we pursue. There are, of course, alternative ways of interpreting this passage that make it less overtly Humean. However, one of the upshots of my argument is that we can embrace a Humean reading of this passage while still attributing a rationalist account to Aristotle. All NE translations by Rowe (2012) unless otherwise noted. 4 NE VI.12, 1144a7-10: “Again the ‘product’ is brought to completion by virtue of a person’s having wisdom and excellence of character; for excellence makes the coal correct, while wisdom makes what leads to it correct.” This is supported by a number of passages from the Eudemian Ethics:(EE II.11, 1227b19-25, EE II.11, 1227b33-36, EE II.11, 1227b37-1228a2 5 Also see Walter (1874) and Eduard Zeller (1886) (both mentioned in Allen (1977)), C. D. C. Reeve (2006). Tovar, Writing Sample — Page 2 of 23 Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric The argument that follows will be developed in two parts. First, I will consider new evidence from the Rhetoric, never before considered in this light, which demonstrates that Aristotle believes that ends can be rationally altered through argument. In the second part, I will offer a novel psychological account of how reason relates to desire. This account shows that reason can alter our ends while at the same time accommodating the Humean-esque contention that ends are set by non-rational desire. Part 1: Arguments About Ends There are a number of passages in Aristotle’s ethical works that rationalist accounts cite for support. For instance, Aristotle says that desire can “listen” to reason, and in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is arguably attempting to persuade his audience to take up a new end. In addition to these and other passages found in the Ethics, I believe that the Rhetoric adds further, never before considered evidence in support of a rationalist account. I will present this evidence below. The Rhetoric is a text devoted to discussing the means of persuasion available to an orator. Among these means of persuasion is a category that Aristotle terms “deliberative rhetoric” (1.3.3/1358b8) which investigates how to exhort and dissuade an audience to act (1.3.3/1358b8, 1.4.1/1359a30ff.).6 Generally speaking, Aristotle outlines two kinds of arguments available to the orator as tools of persuasion: arguments about means and arguments about ends (1.6-1.7). Arguments about means consist of arguments aimed at convincing an audience that a certain course of action (that is, a means) is to its advantage because it will allow the audience to achieve an end it already holds. The second type of argument —arguments about ends—aims to convince an audience that it 6 Translations of Rhetoric from Kennedy (1991), unless otherwise noted. Tovar, Writing Sample — Page 3 of 23 Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric ought to take up an action because that action is in itself worth pursuing; that is to say, because it is desirable as an end. Aristotle introduces arguments about ends as a way of compensating for a shortcoming inherent in arguments about means. Aristotle explains that an audience will often agree that a certain course of action is to its advantage because it will see that that course of action leads to one of its ends. However, if they see another end as better, the audience will not be persuaded to actually embark on this course of action. Consequently, Aristotle states that he must discuss arguments aimed at showing that one end is better than another. Aristotle writes, "Since both sides in a debate often agree (ὁµολογοῦντες) about what is advantageous [to achieving a particular end] but disagree about which is more advantageous, something should next be said about greater good [end] and the more advantageous" (I.7.1/1363b5-8).7 In short, something is advantageous when it forwards one to an end that one sees as good. But, if the orator is going to convince his audience that a course of action is advantageous, he must often first convince the audience that the end it leads to is a good end, and one that they should pursue above any competing ends. To achieve this, Aristotle provides a number of examples of what I have been calling arguments about ends. Each example is a consideration about how the orator can show that some particular end is superior to another end that the audience currently holds. First, let us look at the most straightforward example. In it, Aristotle notes that the orator can convince an audience to take up a new end if he can show it that the end it currently holds is not an end at all, but rather a means to an end. He writes: 7 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁµολογοῦντες ἄµφω συµφέρειν περὶ τοῦ µᾶλλον ἀµφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ µείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ µᾶλλον συµφέροντος. Tovar, Writing Sample — Page 4 of 23 Desire and Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1) And if one thing is an “end” and another is not, [the “end” is a greater good]; one is sought for its own sake, the other for something else, for example, exercise for the sake of bodily fitness (I.7.9/1364a2-5).8 This consideration indicates that if the orator can show that what the audience takes to be good is not an end, but rather a means to an end, the orator can argue that the audience ought to abandon its original goal. Instead, it ought to adopt another goal, one that actually functions as an end. Let us take an example from a comment about wealth in NE I.3.1095a17-25 and I.5.1096a5-8. These passages indicate that many take wealth to be an end.