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THE Nicomactteanethics of ARISTOTLE THE NICOMACttEANETHICS OF ARISTOTLE THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF AI_ISTOTLE TRANSLATED BY F. H. PETERS, M.A. FELLOW OF EN|VF2_SIT0Y0LLRGR,OXFORD FIFT_r EDITION LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., L_,. 1893 PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. M_Y more or less important alterations have been made in this translation, which was first published in 1881, as new editions have from time to time been called for. The present edition in par_cular has been revised throughout, and brought into accordance with Bywater's text (Oxford, 1890), ° which is coming to be recognized, not in Oxford only, as the received text of the Nicomachean Ethics. I wish gratefully to acknowledge the debt which, in common with all lovers of Aristotle, I owe to Mr, Bywater, both for his edition and for his "Contributions to the Textual Criticism of the Nicomachean Ethics" (Oxford, 1892). To Mr. Stewart also I wish to express my grati- tude, not only for much assistance derived from his admirable "Notes on the :Nicomachean Ethics" (Oxford, 1892), but also for much kindly and helpful criticism in that work and in a review of my first edition (Mind, July, 1881). My old friends Mr. * In the few passages where this text is _ot followed, the readiDg adopted is indicated in a note. vl PREFACE. A. C. Bradley and Mr. J. Cook Wilson (Professors now at Glasgow and Oxford respectively) will allow me to repeat my thanks for the valuable help they gave me when the first edition was passing through the press. To Mr. F. tI. Hall of Oriel, and Mr. L. A. Selby Bigge of my own College, I am indebted for some corrections in a subsequent edition. To other translators and commentators I am also under many obligations, which I can only acknowledge in general terms. When I have inserted in the text explanatory words of my own, I have enclosed them in square brackets thus [ ]. A short Index of leading terms and proper names has been added to this edition (in preparing which I have found Mr. Bywater's Index of the greatest service). This Index makes no pre- tension to completeness or anything approaching to compleimness (except in regard to proper names). Its aim is merely, in conjunction with the Table of Contents, to help the reader to find the more im- portant passages bearing on the questions in which he may be specially interested. F. H. PETERS. O_ORD, May, 1893. CONSPECTUS. BOOr Of the good or the end ............ I. Of moral virtue in general ......... II. Of the will ............... IlI. 1-5. Of the several moral virtues and vices ... III. 6-end of V. Of the intellectual virtues ......... VI. Of forms of moral character other than virtue or vice ............... VII. 1-10. First account of pleasure ......... VII. ll-end. Of friendship or love ............ VIII. and IX. Second account of pleasure ......... X. 1-5. Conclusion .............. X. 6--end. TABLE OF CONTENTS. BOOK I. THE EN'D. C_',t P, ]PAGlll 1. In all he does man seeks some good as end or means ... 1 2. The end is _he good; our subject is this and its science, Polities ... 2 -% Exactness not permitted by subject, nor to be expected by student, who needs experience and training ...... 3 4. Men agree that the good is happiness, but differ as to what this is. We must reason from facts accepted without question by the man of trained character ...... 5 5. Tile good cannot be pleasure, as some hold, nor honour, nor virtue **, . ........ • ..... ... 6 6. Various arguments to show against the Platoni,ts that there cannot be one universal good: even ff there were it would not help us here ............... 8 7. The good is the final end, and happiness is thia To find it we ask, What is man's function ? Resulting definition of happiness ..................... 12 8. This view harmonizes various current views ... ... 18 9. ls happiness acquired, or the gift of Gods or chance ? ... 22 10. Can no man be called happy during life ? ...... 2_ 11. Cannot the fortunes of survivors affect the d_t ? ...... 27 12. Happinem as absolute end is above praise ......... 28 18. Division of the faculties and resuJting division of the virtues 30 X TABLE OF CONTENTS. BOOK IL iIORAL VIRTUE. CHAI I, PAGW 1. Moral virtue is acquired by the repetitlou of the corre- sponding acts .................. 3_ _. These acts must be such as reason prescribes ; they cannot be defined exactly, but must be neither too much nor too little ... .................. 36 3. Virtue is in various ways concerned with pleasure and pain ........................ 38 4. The conditions of virtuous action as distinct from artistic production ..................... 4l _. Virtue not an emotion, nor a faculty, but a trained faculty or habit ..................... 42 6. Viz. the habit o_ choosing the mean ............ 43 7. This must be applied to the several virtues ......... 48 8. The two vicious extremes are opposed to one anothe_ and to the intermediate virtue ...... ...... ... 52 8. The mean is hard to hi_, aud is a matter of perception net o£resining ..................... 55 BOOK llI. C1tirrEas 1-5. THE WILL, 1. An act is involuntary when done (a) under compulsion, or (b) through ignorance : (a)means not originated by doer, (b) means tkrough ignorance of the circumstance_: voluntary, then, means originated with knowledge of circumstances .................. 58 2. Purpose, a mode of rill, means choice after deliberation ... 66 3. We deliberate oa what we can do--not on ends, but means 68 4. We wish for the end, the real or apparent good ...... 72 5. Virtue and vice are alike voluntary : our acts are oar own ; for we are puntshod for them : ignorance is no excuse when due to negligence : if this be our character, we have made it by repeated acts : even bodily vices are blam- able when thus formed. We cannot plead that our TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xi L_APo PAGB notion of good depends on our nature: for (1) vice would still be as voluntary as virtue, (2) we help to make our- selves what we are .................. 74 CHaPTeRS 6--12. THE SEVERAL MORAL VIRTUES AND VICES. 6. Of courage and the opposite vices ............ 80 7. Of courage--c_ntinued ................ 82 8. Of courage improperly so call_" ... ......... 85 9. How courage involves both pain and pleasure ...... 89 10. Of temperance ..................... 91 11. Of temperance--continued ... ... .... .. ... 93 12. How profligacy is more voluntary thau cowardice ... 96 BOOK IV. THE SAME--Conti_ued. 1. ()f liberality ..................... 99 2. Of magnificence ..................... 108 3. Of high-mindedness .................. 113 4. Of a similax virtue in smaller matters ......... 120 5. Of gentleness ..................... 122 6. Of agreeableness ........ ......... 125 7. Of truthfulness ..................... 127 S. Of wittiness .o. .oo ............... 131 9. Of the feeling of shame ............... 133 BOOK V. THE SA_--C.oncl_ed. JUSTICE. 1. Preliminary, Two senses of justice distinguished. Of justico (1) = obedience to law, = complete virtue ... 136 2. 0f justice (2) -_ fairuess_ how related to justice (1). What is just in distribution distingoished from what is just in correction .................. 140 Xil TABLE OF CONTENTS. L'HAP, PAGE 8. Of what is just in distribution, and its rule of geometrical proportion ..................... 144 4. 0£what is just in correction, and its rule of arithmetical proportion ..................... 147 5. Simple requital is not identical with what is just, but pro- portionate requital is what is just in exchange ; and this is effected by means of money. We can now give a general definition of justice (2) ............ 152 6. (It is possible to act unjustly without being unjust.) That which is just in the strict sense is between citizens only, for it implies law ............... 160 7. It is in part natural, in part _onventional ......... 163 8. The internal conditions of a just or unjust action, and of a just or unjust agent ............... 165 9. Sundry questions about doing and suffering injustice ,.. 189 10. Of equity ..................... 174 11. Can a man wrong himself? ............... 176 BOOK VI. THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. |. Must _e studied because (a) reason prescribes the mean, (b) they are a part of human excellence. The intel- J lcot is (1) scientific, (2) caleulative : we want the virtue of each ..................... 180 2. The function of the intellect, beth in practice and specula- tion, is to attain truth _.._ ......... 182 3. Of the five modes of attaining'truth:'(1) of demonstrative science of things unalterable ._ ...... 184 4. Of knowledge of things alterable, viz.(2) of'art in what we make ..................... 185 6. And (3) of prudence in what we do, the virtue of the caleula- tire intellect .................. 186 8. (4) Of intuitive reason as the basis of demonstrative soience 189 7. (5) Of wisdom as the union of science and intuitive retaken. Comparison of the t;wo intellectual virtues, wisdom and prudenoo ..................... 190 8. Prudence compared with statesmanship and other forms of knowledge .................... 192 ..° TABLE OF CONTENTS. Xlll CHAP. F&Gm 9. Of deliberation ..................... 195 10. Of intelligence ..................... 198 11. Of judgment. Of reason or intuitive perception as the basis of the practical intellect ............ 199 12. 0£ the uses of wisdom and prudence. How prudence is related to cleverness ... ... ......... 202 15. How prudence is related to moral virtue ......... 295 BOOK ¥1L CnAPTm_ 1-10. CHARACTERS OTHER THAN VIRTUE AND VICE. 1. Of continence and incontinence, heroic virtue and brutality. Of method. Statement of opinions about contiueuco 208 2. Statement of difl]cul ties u to how one can know right and do wrong ..................... 210 3. Solution : to know has many senses ; in what muse such a nmn knows ..................... 214 4. Of incontinence in the strict and in the metaphorical sense 220 5. Of incontinence in respect of brutal or morbid appetites ... 224 6. Incontinence in anger less blamed than in appetite ..
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