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Aquinas, Averroes, and the Human Will Traci Ann Phillipson Marquette University

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Aquinas, Averroes, and the Human Will Traci Ann Phillipson Marquette University Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Aquinas, Averroes, and the Human Will Traci Ann Phillipson Marquette University Recommended Citation Phillipson, Traci Ann, "Aquinas, Averroes, and the Human Will" (2017). Dissertations (2009 -). 733. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/733 AQUINAS, AVERROES, AND THE HUMAN WILL by Traci Phillipson A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2017 ABSTRACT AQUINAS, AVERROES, AND THE HUMAN WILL Traci Phillipson Marquette University, 2017 Scholars have largely read Aquinas’ critique of Averroes on the issue of will and moral responsibility in a positive light. They tend to accept Aquinas’ account of Averroes’ theory and its shortcomings, failing to read Averroes’ theory in its own right or take a critical eye to Aquinas’ understanding of Averroes. This dissertation will provide that critical eye by addressing four key issues associated with the location and function of the will: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate and “in the soul,” (B) the notion that the Intellects are “form for us,” (C) the relationship between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. In addressing these four issues several questions will be raised and answered. First, it will be necessary to examine whether Aristotle, on whom both medieval thinkers rely for their disparate understandings of will and intellect, has a faculty of will in his system and what role the intellect plays in moral decision making. Next, we must determine what Averroes and Aquinas positions are on these issues and how they relate to that of Aristotle. Finally, the two philosophers must be brought into dialogue with one another as we determine the strength and cogency of Aquinas’ critiques of Averroes’ view of the will and the intellects. Is it coherent? Through the course of this examination it will be demonstrated that Aristotle did not have a faculty of will in his philosophy and that the understanding of will attributed to him by Averroes and Aquinas actually has its roots in Stoic, Neoplatonist, and Peripatetic philosophy. It will also be demonstrated that, despite the view of many contemporary scholars of Aquinas, Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes regarding the will are not tenable. Despite this, we will see that the nature of the intellects and, more importantly, the intelligibles in act is central to moral agency for Averroes; here, Aquinas’ criticisms are more convincing. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Traci Phillipson First I want to thank my family for their support and encouragement during the long process of writing this dissertation. I want to thank Dr. Richard Taylor for his invaluable advice, help, and encouragement. I do not think I would have completed this project without his aid and counsel. I want thank him for the many hours of discussion, proofreading, and practical advice. I also want to thank Dr. Owen Goldin for his valuable suggestions throughout. I also thank Dr. Andrea Robiglio for being such a kind host during my time at KULeuven and for his willingness work on this project from afar. ii ABBREVIATIONS CNE Sententia Libri Ethicorum and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics conf. Confessiones deUnitate De Unitate Intellectus and On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists SCG Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Errores Infidelium seu <<Summa Contra Gentiles>> LCDA Averroes Cordobensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros and Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle lib. arb. De libero arbitrio MCDA Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima QDAnima Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima and Questions on the Soul Sent Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum magistri petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis ST Summa Theologiae trin. De trinitate TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………..i ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………………….ii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………1 1.1 General introduction…………………………………………………………..1 1.2 The Issues……………………………………………………………………...3 1.2.1 Does Aristotle have a faculty of will in his system? What is his view of the intellects?…………………………………………………………...4 1.2.2 Are either Averroes or Aquinas following Aristotle regarding the will or the intellects?…………………………………………………………...6 1.2.3 What is Averroes’ position and what motivates this position? Is it coherent?….…………………………………………………………………….…7 1.2.4. Does Averroes’ view hold up against the critiques of Aquinas?……9 1.3 Methodology……………………………………………………..…………..12 1.3.1 Aristotle and other influences……………………………………...12 1.3.2 Reading Averroes and Aquinas on their own terms………………..14 1.3.3 Assessing Aquinas’ critique…………………………………….….16 1.4 Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………..18 CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF WILL BEFORE AVERROES AND AQUINAS…………………………………………………………...19 2.1 Introduction………………………………………..………………………....19 2.2 Aristotle and his interpreters…………………………………………………21 2.2.1 The Texts of Aristotle……………………………………….……...21 2.2.2 Interpretations of Aristotle………………………………………....29 2.3 The Greek tradition after Aristotle…………………………………………...32 2.3.1 The Stoics……………………………………………………….….33 2.3.2 The Platonists and Peripatetics…………………………………….43 2.4 Augustine on the will and its freedom…………………….………………....48 2.4.1 The Texts…………………………………………………………...49 2.4.2 Interpretations of Augustine’s view………………………………..58 2.5 The Arabic Tradition…………………………………………………………62 2.5.1 Translating Aristotle into Arabic…………………………………...63 2.5.2 Al-Farabi…………………………………………………………...64 2.5.3 Avicenna………………………………………………………....…69 2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...79 CHAPTER 3: AVERROES………………………………………………………………83 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………….……………….83 3.2 The Texts…………………………………………………….……………….84 3.2.1 Commentary on Plato’s Republic: The Theoretical/Practical divide and the the cogitative faculty…………………………………………….85 3.2.2 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: The will and the deliberative process………………………………………………………92 3.2.3 Commentaries on the De Anima: The cogitative power, and the Intellects.…………………………………………………………………97 3.2.3.1 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima…………...97 3.2.3.2 Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle……….104 3.3 Analysis and interpretation: The resulting view of moral action and responsibility ………………………….…………..……………………………114 3.3.1 Knowledge and the Intellects……………………………………..114 3.3.2 Willing and the deliberative process……………………………...122 3.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….124 CHAPTER 4: AQUINAS………………………………………………………………128 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………128 4.2. Aquinas’ view………………………………………………………………129 4.2.1. The soul and its relation to the body………………………….….129 4.2.2. The intellective principle(s) of the human soul………………….142 4.2.3 Internal sense powers and their relation to the intellects: the importance of cogitation.……………………………………………….149 4.2.4 The view of knowledge attainment which this picture entails— relation to both universal and practical knowledge…………………….153 4.3 Will and its relation to the intellect and the human being in general….…....155 4.3.1 The relationship between the will and the intellect and their objects…………………………………………………………….…….155 4.3.2 The function of the will……………………………………….…..162 4.3.3 The process of willing from intellectual consideration to action…171 4.4 The emerging view of moral agency and responsibility……………………176 4.5 Conclusion …………………………………………………………..……..178 CHAPTER 5: AN ANALYSIS OF AVERROES VIEW OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LIGHT OF THE CRITIQUE OF AQUINAS……………………………………….180 5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….………….180 5.2 Issues A (placement of the separate Intellects/ “in the soul”) and B (separate Intellects as “form for us”)………….……….…………………………….……..181 5.2.1 Averroes’ Coherent Account of the Separate Intellects as “in the soul” and “form for us”..………………………………………………………….181 5.2.2 Aquinas’ view on the intellects as “in the soul” and “form for us”.….188 5.2.2.1 Aquinas’ position…………………………………………….188 5.2.2.2 Aquinas’ particular critiques of Averroes ……………………194 5.2.3 My critical analysis and assessment………………………………….211 5.3 Issue C (the relationship between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act)…….…………………………………………………....220 5.3.1 Averroes’ understanding of intelligibles in act……………..……..220 5.3.2 Aquinas’ position and critique of Averroes regarding the nature of the intelligibles and their relation to the human individual…………...…....225 5.3.2.1 Aquinas’ position……………………………………….225 5.3.2.2 Aquinas’ critique……………………….……………….227 5.3.3 A critical analysis and assessment of the teaching of Averroes…..231 5.4 Summary of these issues regarding the nature of the Intellects and intelligibles and their relation to the human being…………………………………………..235 5.5 Issue D (the location and function of the will)………………………….….236 5.5.1 Averroes’ view…………………………………………………….236 5.5.2 Aquinas’ position and his critique of Averroes……………….…..239 5.5.2.1 Aquinas’ position…………………………….……..…..239 5.5.2.2 Aquinas’ critique……………………….……………….243 5.5.3. Critical Analysis of Aquinas’ critique of Averroes’s supposed view of the will…………………………………………….…………………246 5.6 The impact of these critiques on the issue of moral responsibility in Averroes…………..…………………………………………….……..………..252 5.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….……256 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION…………………………………………………..……..259
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