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04 Ezedike FM.Fm 51 Happiness as an end: a critique of Aristotle’s rational eudaemonism Edward Uzoma Ezedike1 Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. uzomaezedike@gmail.com Abstract This paper examines Aristotle’s concept of happiness as encapsulated in his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that happiness is the supreme practical good because it is perfect, final, self-sufficing and complete in itself. For him, happiness is simply defined as rational eudaemonism (an activity of the soul according to rea- son in contrast with mere sensual pleasure). In view of the foregoing, this paper raises the question of whether happiness is actually an end as Aristotle posits. What is happiness and how can we find it? Our objective is to critically evaluate Aristotle’s position on the questions raised here and to see whether we can develop a new moral thesis that can truly reflect our existential realities. Although Aristotle’s position gives us a moral leap and is quite commendable in its ethico- epistemological profundity, this paper, however, maintains that happiness is an elusive concept. It argues that if at all anything termed happiness exists in this world, it might only be transient, ephemeral and illusory and cannot be seen as an end in the physical absolute terms when viewed from the standpoint of Plato’s metaphysical dualism. The paper also argues that Aristotle did not say enough about what we are supposed to do to attain happiness. He gives detailed descriptions of many of the virtues, moral and intellectual, but with a persistent 'air of indeterminacy'. The paper concludes that moral virtues are a necessary component, but not a sufficient condition for happiness. Keywords: Happiness, rationality, virtue, means, end Introduction Apart from his profound reflection on other branches of philosophy, one core area which drew the attention of Aristotle is the larger and vaguer problems of conduct and character. Interesting- ly, above all the questions that border on the physical world looms the fundamental ethical ques- tion of what is the good life? What is the highest good? Why be good? What is virtue and what does it take to live a virtuous life? What is happiness and how can we find it? Aristotle’s answers to these questions constitute what is known as his ethics. The word “ethics” is a derivative of the Greek word ethos which means character or custom. The derivative phrase ta ethika was em- ployed by Plato and Aristotle in describing their personal studies of Greek values and ideals (So- lomon 1984: 3). Aristotle was primarily concerned with the details of everyday normative ethics of conduct and character, unlike Plato who was more interested in the most meta-ethical questions such as the definition of the Good and the Just (Justice). Probably, there has never been a more compre- hensive work on the subject of ethics than that of Aristotle. He wrote two major treatises on eth- ics, namely the Nicomachean Ethics, said to have been edited by and named after his son Nichomachus, and the Eudemian Ethics which differs in some significant respects from the former (Solomon 1984:66). The Nicomachean Ethics is by far the better known of the two treatis- 1. Edward Uzoma Ezedike Ph.D is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2018, 10(1) 52 es. Any discussion on the areas of divergence between them is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of clarity, this paper will refer to the Nicomachean Ethics as the “Ethics”. Aristotle’s treatise on ethics is characterised by a sort of down to earth, common sense ap- proach that captures the “moral intuitions that we bring to philosophy” (Lawhead 2002:80). From his standpoint, ethics is distinctively teleological and constitutes a body of objective knowledge, though not as exact or precise a science as mathematics owing to the peculiarities inherent in human nature. Human beings, for him, just as every other thing in the natural world, have a dis- tinctive moral end to actualise. In the opening page of the Ethics, Aristotle posits that “Every practical science has an end. The ultimate end, which is the supreme good” (Ethics BK1,1). From this perspective, it is clear that he sees ethics as a practical science of human conduct the function of which is to guide people towards the goal of achieving human excellence. The stated purpose of Aristotle’s ethical treatise is to describe “the good for man”. It is less involved than many modern ethical treatises in the justification of the values and institutions described. It seemed sufficient, Aristotle thought, to simply describe such values, for their virtues seems to speak for themselves (Solomon 1984:66). Moreover, ethics and politics are for Aristotle two mutually inclusive but interdependent phases of one line of inquiry. Ethics is an inquiry into how men may best live, and since men can- not live well in solitude (without organised social relations), ethics finds it completion in politics (Lamprecht 1955:61). However, his justification of the institution of slavery as being essential to the just society and the exclusion of women from political life seems to be a blind acceptance of the prejudices of the age and culture he lived. Happiness as an intrinsic end (the highest good) Aristotle begins his “Ethics” by frankly refuting Plato’s idea of good as basis for ethics because it is disproved by the doctrine of categories. Plato’s idea of good, he argues, is “not relevant to ethics, since a transcendent good is unattainable, and useless even as a guide to the attainment of practical goods” (Ethics BKI, I2). He contends that happiness is the supreme practical good because it is perfect, final, self-sufficient and complete in itself. Put in a syllogistic form: i. Every practical science has an end ii. Ethics is a practical science iii. Therefore, ethics must have an end. Aristotle frankly recognises that the aim of life is not goodness for its own sake, but happiness. He makes the general point that the Good must be the good for man, which in turn means that toward which all human activities ultimately aim. This highest or ultimate good (the summum bonum) is identified by Aristotles as “happiness”. He used the Greek word eudeimomia for the moral end men ought to pursue. Ordinarily, this word is translated into English as “happiness” or "human flourishing" but its meaning is much the same as what Plato meant by the Greek word we translate as “Justice”. The word “happiness” has to do with the complete well-being of the mature and excellently developed man (Lamprech 1955:61). The emphasis, here, is on activity and accomplishment rather than a mere feeling of contentment or satisfaction (Solomon 66). The nature of happiness according to Aristotle is not necessarily that of “the life of enjoyment” “amusement” or “the life of money-making”. This means that happiness in the Aristotelian sense is not equivalent to pleasure (which is sensual), though the two words are sometimes used interchangeably in modern English. Pleasures can be sub-divided into good pleasures and bad pleasures respectively. They may be “parts of human happiness or of its antithesis” (Lamprech 1955:61). Some kind of pleasure may lead to pain while some kind of pain may lead to pleasure on the long run. Pleasure, therefore, is not the ultimate end as happiness. Given the primacy 2. It's a reference to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We simply refer to it as Ethics. Since it was written in separate Books, we abbreviate each as Bk, for example (Ethics, Bk1: 258). Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2018, 10(1) 53 Aristotle attached to happiness (an activity according to reason) as the ultimate, moral end men ought to pursue, we may term his ethical position as rational eudaimonism or ethical teleologism respectively. Two types of goods: extrinsic good or instrumental good / intrinsic good or ultimate good Aristotle identifies two types of ends human activities are directed. On one hand, therefore some kinds of activities that merely serves as necessary means for the achievement of other and extrinsic in nature. On the other hand are acts that are desirable not for the sake of something else, but are rather desirable in themselves because of their intrinsic worth. These types of ends are called intrinsic or ultimate ends. They are activities which do not aim at any result beyond the mere exercise of the activity. This is felt to be the nature of actions in conformity with virtue; for to do noble and virtuous deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake. Since happiness lacks nothing and is self-sufficient and something desirable in itself, it is therefore an intrinsic end. The only problem with the foregoing is that there is no consensus among people as to what kind of life is most happy. Aristotle examines some conceptions of good life namely pleasure (amusement, life of enjoyment), life of money-making, success and honour and rejected them. He, however, concedes that it is not possible to lead the good life completely without them for they are necessary conditions for actualizing the ultimate good (Uduigwowen 2001:131). Happiness as an end Happiness, Aristotle maintains, is activity chosen for its own sake, but it must be activity manifesting virtue or excellence, not merely pursued for amusement (Ethics BK 10, 258). The peculiar excellence of man that makes him biologically unique among other earthly beings is life of reason. It is by this that he surpasses and rules all other forms of life; and as the growth of this faculty has given him supremacy over other however beings, Aristotle presumed that its development will give him fulfilment and happiness.
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