INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF IMAGINATION IN EARLY MODERN KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION: THE ARTISANAL PRACTICES OF ISAAC BEECKMAN MIRRORED TO RENÉ DESCARTES’ RHETORIC

Drawing of a mechanical system of gears by Beeckman in 1624 (Waard, 1942: p. 286)

Research Master Thesis by Ruben Duinmeijer (5686024) Arts & Culture: Art Studies Graduate School of Humanities University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Prof. dr. Jan Lazardzig Second Reader: Dr. Bram van Oostveldt 21-07-2017

Content

Introduction ...... 3

Theoretical Framework ...... 6 Methodology ...... 9 1. Developments in knowledge-acquisition of the early modern period: the function of imagination and the education of Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes ...... 11

1.1 Imagination and its instrumentalization in the seventeenth century ...... 11 1.2 Artisanal practice and scholarly theory in the youth and education of Beeckman ...... 15 1.3 Rhetorical Practices in education of René Descartes ...... 20 2. Perceptual Cognition and Imagination ...... 23

2.1 Beeckman’s mechanistic account of perceptual cognition ...... 23 2.2 Artisanal practices: repetition and proportionality ...... 26 2.3 Descartes mechanistic and symbolical account of imagination ...... 30 3. Instrumentalization of Imagination ...... 35

3.1 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: artisanal intuition...... 35 3.2 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: transition of wonder ...... 40 3.3 Descartes’ instrumentalization of imagination: rhetorical practices ...... 42 Conclusion ...... 47

Bibliography ...... 51

Appendices ...... 54

2 Introduction In the summer of 1626 there was a breeze of tense expectancy to be sensed in the city of Rotterdam. A greatly improved horse-driven mill was to be created, ordered by one of the larger beer-brewers in town. The new mill was expected to grind three to four times as much malt as an ordinary mill. The mechanism behind it was said to rest on the principle of perpetual motion. When Isaac Beeckman, assistant-rector of the Latin school in Rotterdam, heard of this, he instantly refuted the idea. He claimed that ‘only God makes living gears or perpetual motion’ and warned the investing parties involved.1 Still, the project continued and on the day the machine would be tested, a large crowd had gathered to witness the spectacle. As Beeckman predicted, the new mill did not work, and was allegedly demolished the day after.2 Although Isaac Beeckman had a modest position as assistant rector at that time, he was a respected natural philosopher of his time. While being scholarly educated at the University of Leiden and earning his doctorate in medicine in 1618, Beeckman was also a craftsman, immersed in the production of candles, water circuits and lenses.3 The abovementioned episode of Beeckman’s reveals both the acquaintance with the laws of mechanics, as well as experience with the practical application of these laws: against the inventor’s stark claims, Beeckman was able to predict the erroneousness in these claims.. The combination of his artisanal background and scholarly education allows Beeckman to rightfully imagine whether a machine will work or not. Because of this distinctive feature, he was sought after for advice by regents and burgomasters on many occasions.4 In the discourse of knowledge making, Beeckman was equally imaginative, for example in his account of motion. Whereas the still dominant Aristotelian notion pleaded that motion occurs because of intrinsic motivation, Beeckman simply asked why an object, if brought into motion, ever stops moving.5 Similarly imaginative, Beeckman advanced in mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, which he called physico mathematico. Scholars acquainted with the development of natural philosophy or imagination in the early seventeenth century, will immediately recognize the novelties that Beeckman displays here.6 The imaginative qualities present in Beeckman and his double identity as both craftsman and natural

1 De Waard (II), 1942: pp. 358-359. 2 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 36. 3 Though secondary literature is insightful, in order to get a grasp of what practices Isaac Beeckman was involved in, his own diary is an obligatory point of departure: Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1939-1953). 4 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 136 An example of such an occasions Beeckman is his involvement in devising a mechanism for dredging the harbor of Middelburg. 5 Van Berkel, 1983: p. 188. Dijksterhuis, 1950: p. 24. 6 The refusal of the Aristotelian idea of motion is a clear, but also the combination of physics and mathematics is a novelty: it goes against Aristotle’s classification of knowledge, which separates the realms of physics and mathematics and consequently did not allow for intermingling of its principles.

3 philosopher, evoke questions about how imagination is affected by the entanglement of artisanal and scholarly practices with regard to the production of knowledge. These questions become more pressing when one knows that Beeckman closely collaborated with Rene Descartes, the philosopher that is said to have gone beyond anyone else in his understanding and cultivation of imagination.7 This collaboration, which happened in 1618, and the consequential relationship between Isaac Beeckman and Rene Descartes have been discussed plenty.8 One of the more explicit similarities of their methodologies is the demand for a vividness of explanations given to natural phenomena. Indeed, Descartes is known for his ‘clear and vivid ideas’ and Beeckman allowed nothing in philosophy that could not be represented to the imagination.9 In fact, this was one of Beeckman’s two main principles –the other being the combination of mathematics and physics in explaining natural phenomena – and it gives imagination a very significant position in his thinking. With imagination at the core of his scholarly work, Beeckman –and Descartes as well! - fits into the image of the early modern knowledge making. Indeed, it has been claimed that the most distinctive feature of early modern science is the absence of Aristotle from the philosophical scene.10 This has in turn sparked many interpretations of how this epistemological vacuum was filled. Besides the general accounts on perception and imagination, and their the scientific endeavors in the early seventeenth century, various scholars have attempted to create an image of this period by discussing the relation of concepts as instruments, artisanal practices, methodology, to name but a few.11 Whereas Descartes is merely present in all of these interpretations, Beeckman is only now and then discussed briefly. In fact, until the early 20th century Beeckman was by and large known through the biographies on Descartes. The reason for this is Beeckman’s lack of publications: only

7 Sepper, 1996: p.289 8 See: Arthur, R. ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 1-28. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion. Mechanical philosophy in the making. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013. Cole, J. The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of Rene Descartes. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1992. Gaukroger, S. Descartes. An Intellectual Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Hatfield, G., "René Descartes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Zalta E.N. ed. Sepper, D. Descartes’ Imagination: proportion, images and the activity of thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. 9 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 81 10 Kenny, 2007: p. 501. 11 See, for example: Brann, E.T. The World of the Imagination. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991. Bundy, M.W. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1928. Cocking, J.M. Imagination. A Study in the History of Ideas. London: Routledge, 1991. Funkenstein, A. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Hankins, T.L, Silverman, R.J. Instruments and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Lipking, L. What Galileo Saw. Imagining the Scientific Revolution. New York: Cornel Press University, 2014. Ronzeaud, P. ed. L’imagination au XVIIe siècle. Paris: Honoré Chamption, 2002. Schramm, H., Schwarte, L. and Lazardzig, J., eds. Instruments in Art and Science. On the Architectonics of Cultural Boundaries in the 17th Century. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. Sennett, R. The Craftsman. New Haven: Yale University Press,2008. Smith, P. The Body of the Artisan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

4 posthumously a short excerpt of his diary was published by Beeckman’s brother.12 The larger bulk of Beeckman’s notes vanished into oblivion and was long thought to be lost, until it was rediscovered in 1905 by historian Cornelis de Waard.13 His transcription of Beeckman’s voluminous diary or Journal resulted in four books, which were published between 1939 and 1953. Since the first of these books was published, Beeckman’s role within the early modern discourse of knowledge has been analyzes, interpreted and debated with increasing frequency.14 The scholar that has examined Beeckman in greatest detail is historian Klaas van Berkel. His Dutch dissertation Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (1983) and its recent English translation Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion (2013), are required readings for any scholar that examines the life of this Dutch natural philosopher.15 The central these of Van Berkel is that Beeckman, conducting research in a time where there was no common ground for those who sought alternatives to Aristotelian or scholastic notions, contributed to a rise of mechanical philosophy that would dominate the seventeenth century scientia.16 Though his dissertation is thorough, van Berkel does not deal with Beeckman’s conceptualization and use of imagination extensively. With Beeckman’s principle – in philosophy I allow nothing that cannot represented to the imagination – and his imaginative force in explaining natural phenomena in mind, this appears to be a lacuna in van Berkel’s account. Given the fact that in Beeckman both the philosophical and artisanal practices reside and taking into account that some of his ideas are very imaginative, it is worthwhile to analyze what Beeckman’s notion of imagination is and how his speculations become imagined in his mind. The aim of this thesis is therefore to clarify how Beeckman relates his ideas of the natural world to the nature of perception and imagination, and how in turn imagination functions his the process of knowledge acquisition. There are a number of questions that need to be answered, which enable an analysis of Beeckman’s description and use of imagination. These questions are as follows. First, how is imagination conceptualized by Beeckman and what function does it hold in his ideas of natural world and human perception? Second, how does Beeckman instrumentalize his imagination for the purposes of knowledge production? Third, how do the notions and uses

12 D. Isaaci Beeckmanni Medici et Rectoris apud Dordracenos Mathematico-physicarum Meditationum, Questionum, Solutionum Centuria (1644). 13 See: Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1955. De Waard has published four annotated volumes, in which Beeckman’s noted thoughts between 1604 and 1634 are described (Volumes I, II and III). Complementary to this, De Waard has transcribed many of the letters that were exchanged by Beeckman with, Marin Mersenn, Pierre Gassendi and Rene Descartes, among others. (vol. IV) 14 See for example: Koyré, A. Galileo Studies. Transl. Mepham, J. Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978. Dijksterhuis, E.J. De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld. Nijmegen: G.J. Thieme, 1950. Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983. Arthur, R. ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 1-28. A special mention is: Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion. Mechanical philosophy in the making. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013. In this book, a literary survey is to be found, which is helpful to any scholar interested in Beeckman. 15 Literal translation of Isaac Beeckman en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld is Isaac Beeckman and the mechanizing of the worldview. 16 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 185.

5 of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes differ? Given the clear division between conceptualization of imagination and the instrumentalization of imagination, these topics will be discussed separately in chapter 2 and 3. These chapters will be preceded by a chapter that mainly focusses on contextualizing imagination, as well as both of their education.

Theoretical Framework When writing about a topic within early modern Europe, which I will date from roughly 1500 to 1800, there are a few pitfalls to be avoided. There are plenty of metaphors that all suit the early modern period in Europe well, but once applied, these metaphors have a tendency to stick and limit further inquiry. The ‘scientific revolution’, the ‘mathematization of nature’, the ‘disenchantment of the world’ and the ‘mechanization of the worldview’ are such metaphors. Their formulation creates clear imaginations which instantly come to mind, but which are equally persistent in their coloring of the early modern period.17 Indeed, when analyzing the function and use of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes, these metaphors can easily and unconsciously steer one’s mind to a specific direction. An eye-opener in this sense, is a sentence I came across in a book by Lorraine Daston and Kathryn Park called Wonder and the order of Nature: 1150-1750 (1998). In their introduction, they state: “The history of science looks different when organized around ontology and affects rather than around disciplines and institutions.”18 What I read here is: if you take a clear concept and use it as a central focus which you are consciously reading and writing towards, you create a different perspective. In doing so, the standard metaphors and events are only to be used if necessary, and do not stick and limit or steer your findings. Daston and Park have done this with the concept of wonder in a very large context, I will do the same with imagination, but restricted to its features that are present in Beeckman and Descartes. Though the center of this analysis is Beeckman’s and Descartes’ conceptualization and use of imagination, Beeckman’s familiarity with artisanal practices demands a theoretical framework that gives a general understanding how artisanal practices and knowledge production in the seventeenth century are related. In addition, this framework also has to aid in answering the question to what extent an affinity with craftsmanship structures one’s use of imagination. The theory I will use for this framework consists of two notions: instrumentalization and tacit knowledge. The rest of this section seeks to explain these two notions in more detail. In Descartes, the artisanal practices are not present, which enables me distinguish more starkly the differences between Beeckman and Descartes.

17 For general accounts of the early modern period and its metaphors see: Clarke (2011), Daston (1998), Dear (2001), Lipking (2014) and Ronzeaud (2002). 18 Daston, 1998: p. 18.

6 In his article ‘The Anatomy of the Brain as Instrumentalization of Reason’, part of the book Instruments in Art and Science (2008), the philosopher Ludger Schwarte demonstrates how early modern visualizations of the brain and its activities are important for the understanding of cognition. The anatomical representation of the brain in the body is used as an instrument to understand cognition: the body model provides a material equivalent of one’s understanding of the brain’s activity. It organizes visually a range of operations, by relating cognitive abilities to cognitive organs.19 Here, the visualization of the brain is instrumentalized, it functions in determining the qualitative unity of a quantity of material. Schwarte then defines instrumentalization as follows:

“Instrumentalization assumes the ability to recognize possible applications. […] We must understand the manipulative behavior directed towards objects, and the symbolization that makes something (an aspect, a goal) visible in relation to an object as preparation for controlled making. Instrumentalization is the organization of operative possibilities, which can be mobilized for an anticipated goal.”20

It becomes clear that the instrumentalization is foremost a manipulative force, which structures thoughts on a subject or process in terms of productiveness. The product of imagination is the image. Therefore, instrumentalization of imagination shows how these images, or rather imaginings, are constituted and developed; it is the organization of operative possibilities in the imagination. With regard to the episode that opened this thesis, it is clear that Beeckman relies on his experience in artisanal practices and his scholarly knowledge of mechanics. The idea of perpetual motion is not compatible with the imaginings that present in Beeckman and thus he correctly refutes to proper working of the new mill. Throughout this thesis, this instrumentalization will remain an important element. In the first chapter, I will make this notion clearer within early modern discourse of knowledge and in the third and final chapter this notion will be used to analyze Beeckman and Descartes’ use of their imagination. Though instrumentalization, I believe, will help me in analyzing imagination, there is in this thesis a strong focus on the craftsmanship in Beeckman. Let me therefore introduce how artisanal practices can and do affect knowledge production in the seventeenth century. In her book, Body of the Artisan (2004), historian Pamela Smith dwells upon the rise of synthesis between practice and theory as sources for knowledge. Based on her claim that “knowledge is active and knowing is doing” Smith portrays the change in the relation of theoretical knowledge of scholars and the practical knowledge of artisans, which is an opposition of intellectual and bodily knowing.21 In the early modern period, the hierarchy is initially clear: head over hand.

19 Schwarte, 2008: p. 179. 20 Schwarte, 2008: p. 177. 21 Smith, 2004: p. 149.

7 However, according to Smith, this is gradually changing. Smith develops an argument for the sake of the artes as autonomously towards the linguistic, scholastic way of knowledge. In a story of the mathematician Petrus Ramus (1515-1572) visiting Nurnberg, the painter Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528), when criticized upon his work, had said that his art did not need the words of critics. This example inspired Ramus to see the artes as something equally valuable for the purpose of knowledge acquisition, and subsequently also the knowledge of craftsmen.22 In the first chapter, the idea of scholarly knowledge and artisanal practices will be related to Beeckman and Descartes. Another book that is of major importance for the relation between knowledge production and artisanal practices, is Richard Sennett’s The Craftsman (2008). His central claim is that there is in craftsmanship an element of material awareness. This is created by the metamorphosis that is central to artisanal practices. In turn this awareness enables intuitive leaps, as Sennett calls them: inventions that come intuitively in the production process.23 Sennett furthermore emphasizes two elements which are key to this consciousness: the internal evolution of a prototype and the judgement about mixture and synthesis.24 Especially in chapter 3, this notion will be of use, for it is here that the instrumentalization of imagination and its relation to craftsmanship is discussed. In their appreciation for artisanal practices in relation to knowledge acquisition, both Smith and Sennett base themselves on Michael Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension (1966). The motto of this book is: we know more than we can tell.25 There are in humans, thoughts or actions that cannot be expressed in words, for the understanding of it would lessen. There is, according to Polanyi, a tacit dimension where we have an intuitive grasp of things, which is more profound than the explicated version of it. When one says the word ‘table’ many times, it loses all connotations to our concept of table; the meaning of the uttered sound fades away. And yet, within us, the concept of table is still present. The knowledge that is not explicated – that is tacit – is an intuitive understanding of nature, that precedes an explicatory structure, whether this structure is visual, linguistic, mathematical, or otherwise. A nuance to the term tacit knowledge is postulated by scientist Harry Collins in his book Tacit and Explicit Knowledge (2010). He distinguishes between three types of tacit knowledge:

22 Smith, 2004: p. 67. 23 Sennett, 2008: p. 213. 24 Sennett, 2008: p. 129. 25 Polanyi, 1966: p. 4. The chemists and philosopher Michael Polanyi wrote this short book as a reaction to the aim of what he calls the modern sciences – the sciences of the 1960’s - which is detached, objective knowledge. Against this scientific goal, Polanyi formulates the following: “But suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge, then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge”. Though the book is dated, its ideas are applicable still specifically when relating ‘science’ and artisanal practices.

8 somatic, relational and collective tacit knowledge.26 For this thesis, I will focus primarily on the first form, which is essentially the knowledge embodied in the human body and brain. With regard to this somatic tacit knowledge, Collins claims that this knowledge is not so tacit after all; we are in fact able to explicate it. Because if humans perform acts in knowledge acquisition for example, they are ‘just a complicated set of mechanisms’.27 Knowledge that follows from this act is not tacit and neither mysterious, rather human experience that is involved in the acquisition is. Here, Collins touches upon a weak spot in the usage of terms as tacit knowledge, namely the hint of mysteriousness that is involved in knowledge that cannot be expressed. However, I still prefer to side with Polanyi when he claims that knowledge arises from the personal (and not from a set of complicate mechanisms) and that excluding human experience of the process of knowledge acquisition would destruct all knowledge.28 For my these, Collins’ structuring and explication will be of use predominantly by his separation of somatic tacit knowledge, as opposed to the other kinds of tacit knowledge. In sum, my theoretical framework consists of two notions, namely instrumentalization and somatic tacit knowledge. The former is a manipulative force, which structures the comprehension of things, thoughts or processes in terms of productiveness. Therefore, the instrumentalization of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes is a way of structuring the process of their knowledge acquisition, from their forging of and image or imagining to the explication and communication of this image. In doing so, the notion of somatic tacit knowledge is the theoretical component that will allow me to distinguish the differences in this process in Beeckman and Descartes. Whereas Schwarte, Polanyi and Collins have provided the theoretical notions, Sennett and Smith will be of great use when transferring these notions to the domain of artisanal practices in the early modern period.

Methodology The elaborative nature of Beeckman’s Journal allows for a thorough examination of its content: the four volumes that De Waard has published comprise such a variety of texts that it enables scholars to tell different stories about the scientific work of Beeckman, depending on their perspective. In addition, the fact that Beeckman was not only a scholar but also a craftsman – he made candles, constructed fountains and grinded lenses – gives him a fundamentally different outlook on what can be pictured in the imagination, than a scholar who is mostly interested in and familiar with theoretical matters would have Taking up this assumption as a central these throughout this thesis, I will make use of Descartes as Beeckman’s theoretical and

26 Collins, 2010: p. 2. In addition: relational tacit knowledge has to do with knowledge that tacitly exists in social life, and collective tacit knowledge is knowledge that is embodied in society. 27 Collins, 2010: p. 105. 28 Polanyi, 1966: p. 5.

9 methodological mirror. Though their work in physico mathematico gives insight in their methodological sameness, Descartes’ theories on the mental capacities of humans will show where he and Beeckman differ. Before engaging in the process mentioned above, there is one more thing that needs to be addressed here: the inequality between Beeckman and Descartes with regard to media. Beeckman’s Journal is a voluminous gathering of short scribbles and oddly juxtaposed theories. Thoughts on a specific topic are not neatly organized into an elegant textual argument, as is the case with Descartes. Rather they are scattered throughout the Journal, which troubles the quest for a coherent explanation of imagination. My methodology will therefore consist of a thorough reading of the Journal, after which I will make a selection of sections that are important to either the function of imagination within Beeckman’s worldview, or when a section reveals an instrumentalization of Beeckman’s imagination. This selection is found in the appendix of this thesis. As I have mentioned, for Descartes this is rather different: to determine his concept and use of imagination I will use secondary literature. I will do this without keeping a specific chronology or order. Within this thesis, I organize the comparative analysis around the concept of imagination, not around the development of either Beeckman or Descartes.

10 1. Developments in knowledge-acquisition of the early modern period: the function of imagination and the education of Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes

This chapter deals with the general features of imagination in early modern period and the education of both Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes. As such it is divided into two parts. The first part will describe the position of imagination within developments that center around artisanal and scholarly ways of knowledge production. Positioning imagination as such, a uniform definition of imagination cannot be given: its uses and conceptualizations are numerous in the early modern period. Still, the general tendencies will be explained. Thus, the first part creates a general context of imagination, in which the imagination in education and youth of Beeckman and Descartes can be embedded. This will consume the second part, which is separated into paragraphs on Beeckman’s education and on Descartes education. In turn, they provide the necessary context for understanding the ideas of both philosophers and the presence and instrumentalization of imagination in them. Though this chapter is predominantly aimed at giving a general context, its focus is clearly on the relation between artisanal practices and the function of imagination.

1.1 Imagination and its instrumentalization in the seventeenth century Before describing the conceptualization of imagination in the seventeenth century, let me introduce a well-known image of the early modern discourse of knowledge. The frontispiece of Francis Bacon’s publication Novum Organum (1620) portrays the Atlantic Ocean, seen through the mythical pillars of Hercules. Two ships are returning from open sea, entering Europe through the street of Gibraltar. In the time of seafaring towards new lands across ill mapped oceans, the ships returned safely by their use of instruments such as the compass. With regard to science, the metaphor is clear: the limitless sea of the known and unknown things and phenomena can only successfully be sailed if we use instruments to guide us in quests for knowledge. Only then, we can return safely to the realm of the known, bringing back previously unseen, unknown or even unimagined things. There are in this metaphor two levels of analysis possible with regard to the making of knowledge. The first is to interpret the instrument as a physical entity. A reinforcement of interpreting the use of instruments in this way is given by Bacon himself, when he claims that real knowledge was not to be found in the hands of the philosopher, but in those of craftsman.29 Bacon thus fits right into Pamela Smith’s image of the early modern discourse of knowledge

29 Hankins, 1995: p. 3.

11 making, which is characterized by an increasing mixture of artisanal and scholarly practices.30 As a consequence of this mixture, artisanal instruments become increasingly used by scholars in the process of unraveling nature. The repositioning of the scalpel from the butcher’s hands into the hand of the doctor for a dissection, is but one example of this phenomenon.31 In general, from the sixteenth century onwards, the tools of the artisan, initially used to create objects, become instrumentalized for the creation of knowledge. One such an example is the development in seventeenth century visual theory. In 1604, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) created a new anatomical perspective of the eye. By making observations of a moon eclipse through a camera obscura and by eye, Kepler discovered that the process taking place in the eye is similar to the mechanical workings of the camera obscura.32 Much like this observational instrument, which was devised as a tool for painters, the lens of the eye functions as a projector that imprints the retina with images, or picturae, as Kepler called them.33 By equating the eye with the camera obscura, Kepler not only altered its anatomical workings and rejected the medieval chain of visual theory, he also allowed for the process of visual abstraction to be understood in purely geometrical and quantitative principles. Kepler’s discovery exemplifies how artisanal instruments could be used not only for making, but also for knowing. However, Kepler’s example also problematizes human perception and in its footsteps, human cognition. If the human eye is similar in construction as the camera obscura, it is just as liable to error as instruments are. Indeed, the early seventeenth century is marked as a period where it becomes clear that ‘what the eye sees, is as much deception as it is truth.’34 As a consequence, human perception needed to be structured, in order to distinguish between reality and distortion. The set of rules for the inquiry of knowledge that Bacon proposed in The Advancement of Learning (1605) – and here is the second level of the interpretation of his metaphor – is an instrumentalization of human experience.35 In other words: the instrument can be a scientific method. Bacon’s metaphor thus provides a clear understanding of instrumentalization in the early modern period: by instrumentalizing artisanal tools knowledge was gained. In turn, this knowledge sometimes contrasted human experience in such a way, that questions upon the nature of perception were raised. Within this development, questions arise around the human imagination as well. As the mental faculty that makes images of the world, its functioning is

30 Smith, 2004: p. 149. 31 Sennett, 2008: p. 198. In the middle of the sixteenth century Vesalius, a doctor in Brussels, started operate himself. Prior, it was always the butcher that provided the cutting. 32 Smith, 1990: p. 740. 33 Alpers, 1989: p. 57. 34 Vogl, 2008: p. 18. In his essay, Vogl denotes that Galileo, in discovering that the moon was not of quintessence material but showed similar ruptures and shadows as the earth did, the revolution of the instrument is twofold: first, by seeing further new images came to scientists, whereas it also became clear that the human vision is not, essentially, giving the truth. 35 Hankins, 1995: p. 3.

12 extensively discussed.36 Whereas some heralded imagination as a creative force, others opposed it to reason because of its distorting effect on perception.37 Thus, when speaking of imagination in the seventeenth century, one has to accept the fact that a unified definition cannot be given. Still, when accepting the multifaceted character of imagination, some general remarks can be made. First, imagination can mean perception, it is a mental representation of input from sense data.38 In other words: there is a natural world which we perceive by our senses, whose information is processed by our imagination. Although Plato was the first to devise a theory of imagination that is still known, Aristotle provides us with an idea that is hard to argue against: there is no thought without a phantasm.39 The question of how we become in possession of this phantasm and whether it is material or immaterial is, still in the seventeenth century, an ongoing debate. The early atomist thinker Democritus formulated the most concrete and materialistic answer, by claiming that “images” or “idols” flew off from physical objects and thus caused impressions in the human mind.40 Second, the word imagination can also be also linked with intellect when it represents an idea or the reformulation of an image or idea stored in memory.41 Plato regards the imagination as an intermediary between the world of material objects and the world of ideas, which is infused with divinity.42 This explanation of imagination and its closeness to both memory and intellect is further exemplified by the ars memoriae; the art of memorizing, for example, a speech by linking the structure of the speech to spacious elements such as the rooms of a known building. In this context, imagination is used by Beeckman as the recollection of ideas and sentences.43 Imagination and intellect also coincide when it comes to seventeenth century scientia: Pascal, for instance, humbled by the large cosmos, stated that testing the world also requires testing the limits of what he can imagine.44 This idea of Pascal stretching to the outer limits of his imagination also relates to the third conception of imagination, which has to do with creation: the combination, metamorphosis, distortion or invention of images.45 For Kepler, for example, imagination and calculation joined in mighty acts of creation.46 Related to this conception, imagination is also

36 See: note 12. 37 Kepler and Pascal. Lipking, 2014: p. 8 and p. 16. 38 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 39 Sepper, 1996: p. 8. 40 Bundy, 1928: p. 14. 41 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 42 Bundy, 1928: p. 271. 43 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 35. 44 Lipking, 2014: p. 15. 45 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 46 Lipking, 2014: p. 16.

13 viewed as intertwined with ideas that are not real per se.47 Illusory, unreal, monstrous imaginations and fantasies are all devoid of reality-based experience. Phantasm was supplied by Plato with a decent amount of negativity: imagination could be peculiarly subjective and therefore illusory.48 The main reason for a wariness towards imagination is exemplified in the so-called placebo-effect: to some extent the mind is helpless to resist whatever ideas are planted in it.49 Because of this feature of imagination, the medieval usage of imagination was, on the whole, unfavorable to any recognition of the creative capacity of imagination. Fantasy implied freedom, but at the same time liability to error.50 Though the first two notions of imagination – as mediator and as assisting reason- are more closely related to the discourse of knowledge, the latter is linked to the magical beliefs that were still present in the early seventeenth century. A fierce example of this is the maternal imagination. The maternal imagination is to be understood as the power attributed to the mind of a pregnant woman; it was believed that by thinking specific thoughts or seeing specific things, deformities in the baby’s mental or physical health could be caused.51 A critical stance towards this example as insightful for the conceptualization of imagination in the seventeenth century is easily taken. It concerns a layman’s beliefs instead of ‘scientific’ knowledge, the primary sources are largely subjective and the maternal imagination concerns thoughts of women instead of man; the seventeenth century stamp of hysteria could easily be given. Still, the maternal imagination was more than just a superstition believed in out of fear of mysterious events such as pregnancy and delivery. Indeed, it formed part of a general pattern of cultural concepts; the body as open to all kinds of impressions.52 For Beeckman, the maternal imagination was very real: his cousin was also born with deformities and he mentions this as an example of physical changes influenced by thought.53 Imagination here is regarded as incontrollable, as the portal of the mother’s body that mysteriously transported images to the baby, who’s growth in turn would be influenced by this. What is key here, is the uncontrollability and yet powerfulness of the imagination. Seventeenth century solutions for fearful pregnant women were not sought in imagination itself, but rather by restructuring and augmenting the

47 Ronzeaud, 2002: p. 12. 48 Bundy, 1928: p. 257. 49 Lipking, 2014: p. 7. 50 Bundy, 1928: p. 266. 51 See Roodenburg (1988). 52 Roodenburg, 1988: p. 711. 53 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 121: “Men is verwondert, dat een vroue die swaer gaet, deur haer gedachten soo een groote veranderinge in het kint brengen kan, als by exempel, dat het wel somtyts gebeurt, dat het kint daerdeur syn handeken verliest, of lyncken daerin krijgt, gelyck ick selve geseien hebbe in myn nichten kind.” Unclear is what the words of lyncken daerin krijgt mean and if this is what happened to Beeckman’s cousin. Clear is, however, that the deformity, for Beeckman, is caused by specific thoughts (gedachten) of the mother.

14 physical surrounding that entered a woman’s sight.54 Thus, whereas imagination could be hailed by scholars for its creative capacities, many variations of its conception existed simultaneously. In sum, Bacon’s metaphor thus reveals the period of Beeckman and Descartes to be one where the fundaments of epistemological thought where shaken to its core. Not only did artisanal practices provide new ways of knowledge, they also revealed truths about human experience which kindled questions on the perception of reality. To extend Bacon’s metaphor of the limitless sea: its waters now also entered the cognitive capabilities of humans. Therefore, it is by no means wondrous that the faculty of imagination, central in translating images of the external world into internal representations, held a pivotal position in early modern knowledge acquisition.55 In addition, the fact that artisanal practices increasingly informs scholarly knowledge, means a revaluation of both imaginations creating- and deforming capacities This general introduction to imagination in the seventeenth century started with Bacon and it ends with him as well, when he claims that ‘both instruments and the imagination were essential for creativity in natural science, but both could distort as well as create.’56 It is worthwhile to let this constant intellectual calibration of imagination be a reminder of the more general developments in the early seventeenth century. Also, turning towards Beeckman and Descartes, it has to be kept in mind that besides the encounters with imagination in a scholarly context, also the wondrous and mysterious powers such as the maternal imagination also play a role in seventeenth century society.

1.2 Artisanal practice and scholarly theory in the youth and education of Beeckman As stated in the introduction Isaac Beeckman is not known through his publications, but rather by his voluminous diary that was rediscovered in 1905. There is however one exception. A short excerpt of the Journal was posthumously published by Beeckman’s brother Abraham, who also added a short characterization of his brother: ‘he was always busy speculating.’57 Any scholar that reads through the Journal will immediately recognize the adequateness of this characterization. Beeckman’s diary consists of numerous scribbles, observations and theories – in sum: speculations- shifting from Latin to Dutch back and forth. In his dissertation, Klaas van Berkel has added that the speculations of Beeckman can be viewed as guided by two principles. First, a combination of mathematics and physics is the best way to analyze nature, and second,

54 Roodenburg, 1988: p. 712. 55 Brann, 1991: p. 3 56 Hankins, 1995 p. 6. 57 The small publication is known under the name D. Isaaci Beeckmanni Medici et Rectoris apud Dordracenos Mathematico- physicarum Meditationum, Questionum, Solutionum Centuria (1644) and it did not receive a lot of attention.

15 only explanations which can be represented in the imagination clearly and visually, should be allowed in natural philosophy.58 In rounding out the definition of Beeckman given by others, John Schuster has come up with the most elaborate and, for this thesis, most fruitful version of Beeckman. In his publication, Descartes and the Scientific Revolution (1977) he characterizes Beeckman as follows:

“No mechanic would appeal to teleological processes, occult virtues or immaterial causes to account for the functioning of a simple mechanical device. Explanations in the mechanical arts rested on the appeal to a clear picture of the structure and interaction of the constitutive parts of the apparatus. As simple mechanical and hydro-dynamical devices showed, only motion or pressure can produce the re- arrangement of parts and hence produce work, and, for theoretical purposes, the causes of motions and pressures are other motions and pressures. What Beeckman demanded in natural philosophy was the application of criteria of meaningful communication between mechanical artisans – the appeal to a picturable or imaginable structure of parts whose motions are controlled within a theory of mechanics. His central contention was that there is no point in talking about effects if you cannot imagine how they are produced, and the exemplar of imaginatively controlled efficacy is the mechanical arts where men do command nature at the macroscopic level.”59

Schuster’s emphasis on the mechanical, the practical and the picturable as the explanatory forces behind Beeckman’s production of knowledge are confirmed by Beeckman’s worldview, which can be explained in similar terms. In short, at the base of Beeckman´s universe there is God. As Beeckman conceives the natural world to function as a mechanical structure, God is its primal mover. According to Beeckman, he is not necessarily the creator of men, animal and natural phenomenon, but rather he has shaped the fundamentals or primordia that constitute all creatures, animate or inanimate.60 Beeckman’s atomist perspective is revealed. Taken from Democritus and predominantly Lucretius, Beeckman believes the world to consist of tiny particles, that are mechanistically linked.61 Similarly taken from Lucretius, Beeckman believes these primordia to be a limited in number. However, by the recombination of various fundamentals an infinite number of possibilities arise, and as such, Beeckman is able to account for the many forms that are present in the world. Before explaining the function and position of imagination in this world in chapter 2, the youth and education of Beeckman provides us with fundamental insights in the development of this worldview.

58 Van Berkel, 1983: p. 77. 59 Schuster, 1977: pp. 59-60 60 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 90. 61 Van Berkel: p. 132.

16 Growing up as the child of a craftsman, Beeckman learnt accustomed himself with artisanal practices quite early in his life. Beeckman’s father was a candle maker in Middelburg in the province of Zeeland. Besides this craft, he also constructed and repaired water pipes of either private houses or breweries.62 Here, the basis for Isaac Beeckman’s involvement in artes mechanicae can be seen. Indeed, Beeckman opened up his own candle shop in Zierikzee in 1611 and assisted his father with the negotia mechanica., the mechanical operations focused on water pipes.63 In addition, Isaac Beeckman not only constructed water pipes for breweries or houses, he also started to work water circuits for fountains. These systems needed some form of pumping, which inspired Beeckman to devise in the Journal– his diary, which he had started by then – various theoretical explanations of how the pumps of solidly functioning fountains work.64 Not only was Beeckman involved in artisanal practices from an early age onwards, he also learnt to align theory and practice coherently. The importance of this artisanal upbringing and familiarization and reworking of material is important in two ways. As we shall see, Beeckman has the habit of using analogies when precise explications of certain problems are absent. Artisanal knowledge appears for Beeckman to be a rich source for drawing out these analogies. For example, in explaining a problem of Galen concerning the simultaneous supply of nutrients and discharge of waste in the human body, Beeckman points out that a lighter liquid can rise up while heavier ones will fall to the bottom of an ordinary water pipe.65 The thorough understanding of practical workings of fountains, thus provides Beeckman with images to explain more abstract phenomena such as the bloodstreams in the human body. Another importance of Beeckman’s artisanal upbringing lies in the tacit knowledge that is embedded in craftsmanship. The familiarity that comes from repeated interaction with matter, seems to have given young Beeckman a decent amount of confidence in foretelling the way this matter would behave upon manual manipulations. Beeckman did not allow anything in philosophy unless it could be clearly presented visually to the imagination; it was one of his main principle. This can be complemented by the fact that in the more practical sciences, such as physics, Beeckman did not allow anything that was in contradiction with his intuitive understanding of nature. Hence, Van Berkel characterizes the artisanal influences to be most clearly present when resentment is shown by Beeckman, resentment aimed at the abstract, ungraspable and impenetrable explanations for natural phenomena.66 The exact relation between the tacit knowledge or intuitive understanding derived from craftsmanship and the function of imagination in Beeckman’s thinking will be further spun in chapter 3. Sufficient for

62 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 10. 63 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 16. 64 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 17. 65 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 137. 66 Ibidem.

17 now is the fact that Beeckman, during his studies, was drawn towards scholars such as Simon Stevin and Petrus Ramus indicates a practically oriented preference, rooted in his artisanal upbringing. Klaas van Berkel has pointed out that Beeckman, immersed in the world of craftsmen, also understood the limitations of artisanal knowledge in the sense that he believed that crafts could only be raised to a higher level by theoretical education.67 Besides the artisanal, the other pillar of Beeckman’s education are his formal studies at the University of Leiden. Though Beeckman had shown strong interest in mathematics prior, he enrolled the university as a student in theology, which was besides law and medicine the third of the three main faculties. As preparation for the higher faculties, Beeckman spent his first two years partaking in courses on the seven free arts (grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy), philosophy or mathematics.68 This structure was a very common one; Leiden university did not stand out in this respect. In terms of content however, the university sought to offer various interpretations: classical thought and contemporary ideas were juxtaposed. Aristotle and Ramus were compared, and so were Galen and Fernel. In theology, protestant Calvinistic teaching dominated, and yet the ideas of Francisco Suarez, one of the leading catholic Jesuit scholars, were taught as well.69 In this respect the university was a standout: it allowed different schools of thought, often polemically opposed content wise, to -most of the time- peacefully co-exist between the walls of the university.70 Besides following the official curriculum at Leiden University, Beeckman also familiarized himself with mathematics. Having showed prior interest in this rather new discipline, Beeckman did not wait long after his arrival in Leiden to visit rector and professor Rudolph Snellius (1546-1613) to become acquainted with the literature on mathematics.71 The list of books that Beeckman received from Rudolph Snellius was comprised of works by Euclid, Ptolemy and some early modern commentaries by Flemish mathematician, physicist and military engineer Simon Stevin (1548-1620) and Copernicus, amongst others.72 The list also included works by the French educational reformer and mathematician Petrus Ramus (1515- 1572) who was a protestant educational reformer, who advocated art and craftsmanship as models for knowledge production. Of these authors, Stevin and Ramus appear to have inspired Beeckman the most. A closer examination of these two scholars is needed. Upon visiting workshops in Nuremberg, Ramus found an ideal mixture between practice

67 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 139. 68 Van Berkel, 2014: p. 14. 69 Otterspeer, 2008: p. 59. 70 For Jesuit colleges, contentious texts were often kept from students to avoid quarrels. Large parts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics were not taught, for example. 71 Van Berkel, 2014: p. 15. 72 De Waard (IV), 1953: pp. 17-19.

18 and theory; practical mathematical and artistic activity as instruments for representing the natural world.73 From this idea, Ramus developed the thought that the transferal of knowledge should gain a more prominent place, at the cost of the actual knowledge itself; form over content. Ramus pleaded that the abstract needed to be made visual – his principle of picturability – and that theory could only be explained by the possibilities of applying the theory: practicality.74 The ideas of Ramus must have interested any student with a background in crafts, and for the young Beeckman this was no different.75 The application of the Ramist perspective by Beeckman can foremost be detected in his mechanistic approach in physics: the calculation and theorizing of movement –of air, water and bodies- is directly related to Beeckman’s construction of water-circuits (fountains) and air-flows (fireplaces). In the Journal, most of the time, these theories based on practical knowledge, are accompanied by drawings of the posed problem; practicality and picturability.76 Another important source for Beeckman’s scientific thinking is to be found in a slightly older contemporary of Beeckman: the engineer Simon Stevin. Though the topics of his publications vary widely, the primary feature of his works is dominant throughout his oeuvre: the close connection between theory and practice. According to Stevin, theory existed solely because it mirrored the natural world; he conceived the act of purely theorizing without a practical application as a meaningless endeavor.77 After Stevin’s’ death in 1620, Isaac Beeckman was allowed to take along Stevin’s works so he could examine them intensely. If we compare the mottos of both natural scientists, a striking comparison can be seen. Where Stevin used the phrase Wonder en is gheen wonder (wonder is no wonder), Beeckman slightly altered Stevin’s motto: Van wonder tot gheen wonder (from wonder to no wonder). Even though the catchphrases are almost similar, the subtle difference is a deliberate decision which is informative with regard to Beeckman’s instrumentalization of with imagination. In chapter 3 this alteration will be discussed more extensively. What remains of Beeckman’s early life and education with regard to imagination, however, is predominantly his artisanal infused upbringing, the broad curriculum at the University of Leiden and Beeckman self-study, in whom he focused on the more practically informed scholars. The dissertation that Beeckman wrote and successfully defended in 1618,

73 Smith, 2004: p. 66. Dürer had his workshops in Nuremberg; linked to Ramus. 74 Van Berkel, 1983: p. 261. Van Berkel cites a dated, but extensive study on Ramus by J. Verdonk: Petrus Ramus en de Wiskunde (Petrus Ramus and mathematics). 75 Van Berkel, 2014: pp. 156-162. These pages give a clear overview of Ramist perspectives in Beeckman’s thinking. Also, the 1637 auction catalog of Beeckman’s books include various titles by, and commentaries on Ramus. 76 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 70 Here, Beeckman has drawn a large pump and devised an explanation of is functioning. 77 Van Berkel, 1985: p. 19. A side note on this image: Stevin was not completely opposed against pure theoretical knowledge. He believed that theory without practical application could be fruitful: some theoretical ideas could actually be useful if they were picked up by a craftsman or technician. Pure theory, as it were, could open up possibilities the theoretician would or could not have foreseen; then, through a collaborative effort with practice, pure theory could be useful, according to Stevin.

19 can be seen as the close of this period. The dissertation was of medical nature, since medicine was, at that time, the only way to gain a doctoral degree. However, Beeckman was not at all aiming for the position of doctor. His interest in the human body was infused by the will to understand its mechanical workings rather than to cure people. His dissertation consisted of twenty theses on Tertian fever, but was furthermore comprised of propositions on vacuums, light, motion and, some of which were considered rather bold at that time.78 How imagination came to function in Beeckman’s ideas is largely based on the intersection of artisanal knowledge and scholarship that resided in Beeckman: the intuitive understanding of nature was complemented by the knowledge gained from books. The tacit images of nature present in Beeckman from an early age onwards, have continued to guide him throughout his scientific career.

1.3 Rhetorical Practices in education of René Descartes When Isaac Beeckman met René Descartes in the fall of 1618, he recognized in the young Frenchman a mathematical genius lacking the scientific maturity that Beeckman, being eight years older, had already established. Reversely, Descartes found in Beeckman a mentor who provided him ears and eyes that could witness Descartes ingenuity with regard to the mathematical, musical and physical problems they encountered together. This image of their relationship arises very clearly from the letters between the two natural philosophers that followed their cooperation in 1619.79 In them, Descartes repeatedly professes his feelings of connection towards Beeckman, both scientific and personal. In turn, through his letters to Descartes, Beeckman portrays a less warm version of their relationship, neatly fulfilling the role of a mentor that praises the cleverness of his student, while distancing himself from personal affection. Although this difference in attitude was plausibly the cause of a soon-to-be, long- lasting quarrel, their joined imaginative force in 1618 was exceptionally for the early seventeenth century discourse of knowledge.80 The mathematical ingenuity of Descartes complemented the physical imagination of Isaac Beeckman and his phyisico-mathematico understanding of nature. Beeckman showed Descartes how to tame his wild, uncontrolled ideas; he showed Descartes how to make to instrumentalize his imagination. Descartes in turn, would show the possibilities that lie in endless imagination.

78 Van Berkel, 2014: p. 21. Van Berkel refers to a rough notion of inertia, which Beeckman held more likely to be true than the widely-accepted impetus theory of Aristotle. 79 Cole, 1992: p. 118. 80 See: note 6.

20 Descartes’ education is located at one place: the Jesuit College at La Fleche, France, which he attended from the age of ten.81 The Jesuit college was an institute that was built upon the principles of the Society of Jesus, founded in 1534 and originating in Spain. This catholic order advocated the educational aspects of Christs’ life. Hence, one of their key activities consisted of the founding of schools or colleges, in which students where taught in theology and classical languages. The Jesuits furthermore believed in conversion of the individuals’ heart as the center of the reforms that were needed within the Catholic Church.82 Through personal and spiritual meditations under guidance by spiritual directors, the individual was guided to the undiluted messages of God. Having spent more than eight years, between the ages of ten and eighteen, the college will have marked René Descartes’ conception and use of imagination in a significant way. The curriculum of La Fleche at the time Descartes was a student there, was comprised of five or six years of predominantly Latin and Greek grammar, learnt through classical poets and Cicero. The three years of philosophy included logic, morals, physics, metaphysics and followed Aristotle and the scholastic commentaries on Aristotle. The last three years also included mathematics.83 However, not only the commonplaces of medieval scholasticism were to be found amongst Jesuit education. The Jesuits have been called ‘supreme cultural gatherers’ of their day: in their ambition to spread evangelization, they built up a large collection of both artifacts and information, rounding out the existing order of knowledge. The idea that Descartes encountered amidst this broad educational network has come across several notions of imagination at La Fleche can be regarded as a near certainty.84 Since the Jesuit college was founded on military fundaments, order was a main pillar of the education. Hence, in the philosophical curriculum a restriction in the range of authors taught was kept, for in this realm some texts were contentious of nature. This is the reason why a large part Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the discussion of the nature and divinity, was not taught at all.85 Another text of Aristotle however was: de Anima. Though brought to Jesuit scholars by wat has been called the Coimbra Commentaries, the discussions in it are insightful with regard to the conceptualization of imagination.86 The result of these discussion is plain: for all practical and theoretical purposes, there can be no thinking and knowing without the internal senses and their phantasms, except when the human being passes beyond the natural into the supernatural realm.87

81 Descartes also studied one year of law and possibly medicine in 1615/1616, but Gaukroger calls this ‘a little more than a formality’, and does not ascribe any importance to it. Therefore: the Jesuit college can be regarded as his only education. 82 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 39. 83 See: Hatfield (2016). 84 Sepper, 1996: p. 27. 85 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 52. 86 Sepper, 1996: p. 27. 87 Sepper, 1996: p. 28.

21 It has been pointed out that a curiously theatrical element is to be found in Jesuit education.88 Burials for example, were conducted with a great feel for ceremony and grandeur. Also in the menstruae disputationes the ceremony of exchanging arguments among teachers and students was informed with military guidelines, referencing constantly to the sport of jousting.89 Also the rhetorical tradition at La Fleche was infused with a sense of theatricality, in balancing between short sentences in simple vocabulary combined with emotionally charged forms of communication, resembling Cicero.90 Another trait of rhetoric at La Fleche was to be found in the use emblems and symbols. Though clearly rooted in the military tradition, it has been claimed that Descartes took from these preoccupations with physical imagery, the theory of clear and distinct ideas.91 If Beeckman education is characterized in terms of artisanal practices, it’s counterpart is a rhetorical theatricality that can be view in Descartes education. One has to have at least a little amount of theatrical imagination to aim at reforming the base of all knowledge.92 However, there is an important element in Descartes thinking to discern here. At some point in a discussion with Balzac, Descartes argues for the sake of eloquence in writing or speaking, which gives the words of the speaker or writer a sense of truth.93 Descartes was from an early age onwards very fond of poetry, and thus it is not strange that he saw in the virtuous expressions a form of truthfulness:

“It can seem amazing, why pregnant meanings [are] in the writings of poets more than of philosophers. The reason is that poets write through enthusiasm and the force of imagination: there are particles [or seeds] of science in us, as in flint stone, that are educed by philosophers through reason, [but] that through imagination are shaken loose by poets and shine out more.”94

This phrase reveals the importance of communicating an idea over the content of this idea. This has implications for how Descartes makes use of his imagination. In the third chapter, the effect of rhetorical practices in Descartes’ education on his instrumentalization of imagination will further be discussed, after we have seen how he locates imagination in the perceptual cognition of humans in the second chapter. Indeed, to see how Descartes’ emphasis on the theatrical rhetoric coincides with the practically informed ideas of Beeckman, we now turn to the conceptualization of imagination of both scholars.

88 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 43. 89 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 44. 90 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 50. 91 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 51. 92 See: Jones et al (1979). Here, the three consecutive dreams that Descartes allegedly had in 1618 and which he himself explained, are under examination. This is one moment in Descartes life where he seeks – indeed, is instructed! – to reform the existing orders of nature. 93 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 182. 94 Sepper, 1996: p. 4 and p. 47.

22 2. Perceptual Cognition and Imagination

Having established the general features of imagination and the characterization of Beeckman and Descartes’ education and principles, this chapter seeks to clarify how both philosophers describe and apprehend imagination. It’s location in the process of perceptual cognition is of essential importance here. With the early modern realization ‘that human perception is as much deception as it is truth’ in mind, a clear understanding of imagination seems to be a necessity to anyone that is involved in knowledge production. The artisanal practices that are present in Beeckman and the more rhetorically informed education of Descartes, have create a fundamental difference in their apprehension of imagination. Because of their close collaboration in 1618, this is not distinguishable right away. It takes an elaborative analysis of how imagination is located in perceptual cognition, which relates the principles of the natural world to the inner workings of the human mind, to distill Beeckman’s and Descartes’ differences their conceptualizations of the imagination.

2.1 Beeckman’s mechanistic account of perceptual cognition Isaac Beeckman’s most important contribution to the history of science is his definition of motion. With a relatively simple question he defied the teleological explanation of motion, a persistent idea postulated by Aristotle. This explanation holds that every object and phenomenon has a natural resting place in the hierarchy of nature, in the order of the world. Motion occurs because of the intrinsic need of an object to be at its natural place; everything that is not in place will move.95 Though the plausibility of this these had been criticized often, around 1600 a satisfactory alternative had not been found. Beeckman however imagined a different universe, one where motion is not a change, but a continuity instead. He did not seek to explain the occurrence of motion but rather asked: ‘why does an object, if brought into motion, ever stop?’96 With this question, Beeckman altered the essence of motion to a state of being, instead of change. Beeckman formulated this question already in 1614 and it essentially remains the basic principle of his physics.97 More generally speaking, the idea of motion as a continuity also buttresses the mechanistic perspective that Beeckman advanced: change in motion only occurs because of external sources and not because of intrinsic motivation, as Aristotle had pleaded. According to Beeckman, the structure of nature is materially linked by mechanical contact, as

95 Kenny, 2007: p. 518. 96 De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 24-25. 97 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 106

23 one large mechanism, from the heavenly bodies to the smallest particles of the world. As Van Berkel has put it, Beeckman saw the world in terms of matter and motion, linked by mechanics. The universality to be found in this view on the structure of nature is both a blessing and a curse: it gives Beeckman the necessary tools to disenchant the world around him and yet it is the most limiting element of Beeckman’s thinking. The idea of matter and motion, linked by mechanics is applicable to many problems, but when talking about the mental faculties its claims become less certain. With regard to perceptual cognition, the mechanistic principle however still plays an important role. The questions Beeckman asks himself in his Journal are continuously infused with the idea that the appearance of objects and phenomena is different from the objects and phenomena themselves. When Beeckman speaks of colors, for example, he notes in 1614 that they are the secondary qualities of material objects. It is only the presence of light and the angle of refraction that creates different colors in the human eye and mind.98 Wondering about this, Beeckman asks if images [species] can be corporeal bodies [corpora] in themselves, as separated from the material object that is seen. Similarly, Beeckman proposes that air is the general base [subjectum generale] of our hearing; it is sound matter that only becomes sound when it arrives at the human ear.99 Beeckman is not original in engaging in these questions, rather he is drawing conclusions similar to ideas already postulated in ancient Greece.100 In the same period, Beeckman further develops the ideas on light and air as the fundament of seeing and hearing respectively. Taking the eye, ear and other senses as portals of mediation, Beeckman describes the situation in our mind. He asks: ‘when arrived at our mind, whether by our senses or through ‘the direct’ [immediate], the images that fly around and are being imprinted on our brain, can we call them memory or imagination?’101 Beeckman adds a further doubt to his concept of mental representations, when he asks whether this imprinting happens by material-, or other images, ‘sive id fiat corporeis aut alijs, id generis si quid est, simulachris’102 Especially id generis si quid est –presumed something like that (a mental image) even exists – is a strong indication that Beeckman’s matter oriented physics not only functions in the natural world, but also applies beyond the doorstep or our body.

98 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 28. / Appendix no. 1. 99 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 29. / Appendix no. 2. 100 Kenny, 2007: p. 601 The notion of primary and secondary qualities is present in Aristotle’s account of perception. However, throughout the Journal there are examples of Beeckman constructing a these or theory first, while discovering shortly after that this was found already by other thinkers. 101 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 35. / Appendix no. 3. 102 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 35. /Appendix no. 3. Sive id fiat corporeis aut alijs, id generis si quid est, simulachris: whether this happens by material or other (non-material) ‘images’, presumed something like that (a mental image) even exists. In addition: there is a fragment, where an example is given that Beeckman does not believe that anything “new” can be invented; memory and imagination are intertwined. According to Beeckman it is possible to dream in fluent Latin, but if you have never heard, read or spoken Latin this is not possible: Ergo: it is not possible to imagine something completely new, and therefore other than material images –images that were not preceded by sensuous perception- do not exist. De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 270-271. / Appendix no. 15.

24 Indeed, input of the external world is gained through contact: perceptions of objects and phenomena are (mechanically) impressed upon certain sheets or membranes, which Beeckman elsewhere calls vellekens or membranulas.103 This idea is not originally Beeckman’s. Aristotle already mentioned the process of perception as comparable to the imprint of a golden ring pressed in wax; the image of the ring was present in the wax, but not in terms of goldness.104. Moreover, as has been briefly discussed chapter 1, Beeckman held an atomist perspective on how the world functions and followed the traditional atomist account, which holds that local motion is the immediate or proximate cause of change in the sense organ.105 For Beeckman, the very thin membranes remain an important element in his mechanical worldview. Whereas in his early years he predominantly seems to locate the membranes in the brain, Beeckman speaks in 1620 of omnibus humani corporis membranis – all membranes of the human body.106 He furthermore states that these membranes are the markers of pain, pleasure and other bodily sensations. The membranes are, according to Beeckman, connected with the brain through a moving life spirit or spiritus. What Beeckman follows here, is the Stoic tradition of describing the nervous system: a system that is linked throughout the body by the lightest of spirits.107 These spirits function as transporters of sensory information, but are also steered from the brain towards the body to, for example, lift hands or feet.108 That Beeckman was aware of this Stoic account of the nervous system is not all that strange, since he studied medicine in the years prior to this quote from 1620. What is interesting though, is the fact that Beeckman in the same paragraph denotes that this system of life spirits and membranes also registers things that do not reach our intellect. This is exemplified in various notes, which concern the life spirits travelling back and forth through the body, taking care of random bodily functions: the tickling of the bladder, the feeling of pain and the movement of hands and feet etc. Especially the last example is a large mystery for Beeckman, because it is so ordinary and habitual to man.109 Thus Beeckman distinguishes between unconscious and conscious functioning of these spirits, which resembles the traditional account of the three souls: the vegetative, animalistic and intellectual soul.110 So far, there is a diminishing scale of certainty in Beeckman’s notion of perceptual cognition to discern. The material object in the external world, a wooden chair for example, is seen as a material species or an image consisting of – or transported by refracted light. The species of light is then, with mediation of the eye, imprinted upon the membranes of the brain,

103 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 175. / Appendix no. 26. 104 Sepper, 1996: p. 16. 105 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 161. 106 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 28. / Appendix no. 20. 107 Kenny, 2007: p. 82. 108 Sepper, 1996: p. 26. For Beeckman’s account: see Appendix no. 25. 109 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 121 / Appendix no. 9. 110 See: Kenny (2007).

25 connected through the body by the rather obedient life spirits. In grasping these spirits active in the human body and brain, Beeckman uses many analogies that relate the concealed bodily processes to mechanisms in the external world. For example, Beeckman ponders upon the question how heavy bones and flesh can be moved by the life spirits, which he considers to be the lightest elements to be found in the human body.111 For Beeckman, this miraculous idea of something inconceivably light that is able to move limbs is analogous to gunpowder being able to move large bodies of matter. This idea is again taken from the Stoic interpretation of the nervous system.112 Applying this metaphor of fire’s energy to his own experience, Beeckman continues to declare that the convulsion of a muscle is similar to the shimmer of a candle; the surplus of energy generated by the life spirits causes unexpected movements, whether it is flesh or wax that is being moved.113 Beeckman’s explanation of the physiological working of muscle contraction is similar to the way he understands the activity of dreaming. The fact that we can see colors, hear sounds etc. is, according to Beeckman, because the images which are stored in our memory – ‘which hangs onto the brain after being perceived’114 – tend to dwell in our head. The reason for this dwelling is to be found in the relation between body and mind: at night the body rests, which means that the life spirits are not needed throughout the whole body. This allows them to be present only in the imagination, according to Beeckman. This causes a surplus of energy in the faculty of imagination and explains the dwelling of images in the mind. For Beeckman, the dream shows things that are already present in the brain, a revelation brought forward by the virtue of conjugated spirits.115

2.2 Artisanal practices: repetition and proportionality Beeckman’s architecture of the mind is, up until this point in my analysis, a rather material and mechanistic account. The human body, including the mind, operates in similar fashion as, say, a water circuit. For Beeckman, this does not seem to be a problem and neither does it impel him to dwell on the mental faculties any further. Indeed, his interest in the inner workings of humans is not explicated any further in the Journal. And yet, if we focus on paragraphs where Beeckman’s view on perception and imagination is expressed implicitly, a clearer image can be distilled. As has been described in the first chapter, Beeckman was accustomed to manipulate matter from an early age onwards, by reshaping wax into candles or separate pipes into water circuits. In doing so, Beeckman developed a strong practical and mechanistic worldview. This is

111 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 173. / Appendix no. 24. 112 Sepper, 1996: p. 26. 113 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 175. / Appendix no. 26. 114 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 136. / Appendix no. 10. 115 De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 270-271. / Appendix no. 15.

26 a dominant feature in Van Berkel’s account of Beeckman. He characterizes Beeckman as follows:

“His philosophy was in essence the philosophy of someone who was accustomed to manipulating nature rather than contemplating it; someone who knew that the bodily encounter with matter produced knowledge as much as studying ideas in books.”116

Van Berkel thus describes the methodology of Beeckman as a physically active one. Beeckman is not only engaging in the exploration of nature in a scholarly manner, but he also examines natural phenomena by hand. I add to this that the focus on craftsmanship and artisanal knowledge demonstrates two other phenomena in Beeckman’s thinking that buttress the idea of an intuitive understanding of nature: repetition and proportionality. Together, these two concepts build up a rather implicit methodology present in Beeckman’s Journal. They link to artisanal practices in the sense that a craftsman produces sequences of products, whether these are candles, water circuits or lenses. Furthermore, these products all bare some proportionality to one another: they create an awareness of sameness and difference.117 A reflection of this practice can be found in the Journal: even though a topic has been described many times already, Beeckman keeps devising similar and yet slightly changing speculations, as various versions of the same product.118 Let us, however, look on a more profound level at the reflection of artisanal practices in the Journal, by focusing on the individual concepts mentioned. The importance of repetition can first of all be seen when Beeckman further develops his thought on perceptual cognition. The aforementioned vellekens or membranes function in such a way that a perceived species is imprinted upon it, leaving a druksel, a print. This in itself does not give the perceiver any information, for it is only a second impression that causes understanding; only then there is a prior perceived impression to refer to and to compare the new impression with.119 As an example, Beeckman describes the working of a musical octave, which is more pleasant to our ears in comparison to other intervals. Our perception, including the imagination, does not understand a tone if it is without context; only the second tone gives context and direction to the first tone. Similarly, a visual perception is only pleasurable when it is repeated; only then an understanding of a thing or phenomena that is seen, arises. The first impression leaves an imprint on our vellekens; the second matches with this first imprint and enables us to recognize it, and give meaning to it.

116 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 183. 117 Sennett, 2008: p. 72. 118 In the last part of the Journal, Beeckman immerses himself in the production and understanding of lenses. This is refracted in the Journal by the extensive number of notes on lens grinding that appear. They vary from materials to polish to geometrical representations of small instruments that Beeckman devises, for grinding under a specific angle. See De Waard (III), 1945. 119 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 52. / Appendix no. 4.

27 It must be emphasized here that the process of first and second impression are material, according to Beeckman. In describing the process, the terminology is drained with physicality. Beeckman sees the second impression as being clung or stuck to the first impression (haeserit). This is insightful in two ways. First, Beeckman’s conception of perceptual cognition resembles the doctrine of imagination of Aristotle very closely. In De Anima, Aristotle claims that imagination is a power of discrimination that is able to act without an object present, and yet needs a prior perceived image as reference. In other words: there is no thought without phantasms.120 According to Beeckman, we could add: there is no understanding without a second phantasm. Second, the idea of the second impression is also informative when it comes Beeckman’s artisanal roots. The artisan makes sequences of products and Beeckman made, among others, sequences of candles. The literature on tacit knowledge of artisans suggests that repetition creates judgements of the product made, on which I will elaborate further in chapter 3. The fact that Beeckman is essentially focused on this second repetition with regard to the first, is an implicit artisanal judgement on the level of sameness and difference. Having established this idea of the importance of second impressions for understanding in Beeckman’s philosophy, we now can further examine how imagination operates with this process of first and second impressions. In a note dating from September 6th 1618, Beeckman points out that proportionality is the key to pleasure of perception; such as harmony in music and ratio in architecture.121 Taking the latter as an example, Beeckman notes that the eye searches for proportion in columns of buildings. Important here is the fact that this searching happens instantaneously and rather unconsciously. Beeckman does not include a form of will or soul into the quest for proportion; it is an intuitive practice that excludes a deliberate decision. Another paragraph on proportionality and beauty, dating from the same period, reinforces this claim. Beeckman asks:

“Hoe komt het dat men d’een mensch frayer acht te syn dan d’ander? Ist omdat men meest gewent is fraeye lieden te sien? Maer daer syn meer lelycke lieden in de werelt dan fraye. Nochtans segge ic, dat dese gewoonte een groot deel is van de reden.”122

The explanation of Beeckman’s answer, which holds the very simple assertion that humans are accustomed to see certain facial features, shows his emphasis on proportionality of a specific entity within a group of entities. Just like one would determine the political center by taking the

120 Sepper, 1996: pp. 8 and 17. 121 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 213. / Appendix no. 12. 122 Ibid: p. 240. Translation: “Why do we consider some humans to be more beautiful than the other? Is it because we are most used to see handsome folks? But there are more ugly people in the world than beautiful. Still, I say, that habit is a large part of the cause.”/ Appendix no. 14.

28 middle of a spectrum of political views, Beeckman asserts that ‘what is perceived as beauty’ is explained by a certain ‘accustomedness’ to specific features. By imagining a spectrum of specificities for each facial body part – for example, a nose: color, shape, distance to mouth etc. - one can hypothesize a completely average face, which would be called beautiful. Again, this is originally not a thought by Beeckman. The idea that sensation is some kind of proportional discrimination and that beauty resides in proportionality goes back at least to Aristotle, but is also present in Platonism and the works of Augustine and Aquinas, to name a few.123 The idea of proportion thus can be regarded as part and parcel of discussions on sensation and perception in the seventeenth century scholarly discourse. Its presence is however informing Beeckman’s use of imagination. To sum up, Beeckman’s ideas of perceptual cognition have a strong naturalistic base: he explains the mental architecture of our mind according to the same laws and forces that are used to explain physical phenomena in the natural world. His worldview is mainly an accumulation of ideas of other scholars, such as Aristotle, Plato, Lucretius, Democritus and Augustine, amongst others. The dominant features of Beeckman’s theory are the mechanically informed explanations of perception, the nervous system which hints at a unison of mind and body, the idea that impressions must be repeated to gain a second impression which creates understanding, and lastly the proportionality as a base for beauty. It is not a very original account, and yet, two elements are important two keep in mind. First, there is entanglement between the scholarly and experiential way of gaining knowledge: the ideas postulated in the works read by Beeckman at the University of Leiden during his self-study and the writing process of his dissertation have close connotations with the artisanal background of Beeckman. The preference for practicality and picturability, to me very clearly rooted in his artisanal experience, seem to have steered Beeckman towards theories that are applicable to practical problems, such as those of Stevin and Ramus. Second, and based on the prior element, this entanglement has created in Beeckman a tacit methodology that is based on the certainty that a craftsman portrays when practicing his craft. Just as a woodworker knows how a specific type of wood will behave when he saws, cuts or chisels it, Beeckman portrays a trust his understanding of the processes present in the natural world. With this in mind, one can imagine that the relationship between Beeckman and Descartes was indeed one of a mentor and a student: Descartes who had just left La Fleche rather uninspired, seeking for solid bases of knowledge, found in Beeckman and his solid principles of knowledge an inspiring teacher. To see how he developed his perspective on imagination, let us now turn to Descartes’ publications and his explanation of perceptual cognition.

123 Sepper, 1996: p. 40.

29 2.3 Descartes mechanistic and symbolical account of imagination As has been described in the first chapter, in 1619 the relationship of Beeckman and Descartes can be described as between a mentor and a student. It becomes clear from correspondences of the time they met that Descartes finds in Beeckman someone who is able to ‘fire his imagination with mechanical problems’, as Gaukroger has put it.124 I would add that not only mechanical problems were fired by Beeckman at Descartes imagination. Also, Descartes’ understanding of imagination is heavily dominated by a strong naturalistic account of perceptual cognition. As we have seen, Beeckman portrays imagination by following the ancient idea of this concept as a synthetic power, residing between the senses and the intellect and memory. What makes it naturalistic, is the fact that there are no spiritual or supernatural elements in his explanations: the process of perceptual cognition falls under the same laws and forces as phenomena in the physical world do. In other words, imagination functions in similar terms as processes in the natural world: mechanistically. That Descartes is strongly influenced by this idea, becomes evident from his texts in Compendium Musicae (1619) and the Regulae (1619-28). In the Regulae Descartes explicitly tries to formulate general rules for knowledge acquisition, which involves an analysis of how perception takes place. Though it is not precisely known when the different rules were formulated, Gaukroger has convincingly argued that Descartes account of perceptual cognition dates from somewhere between 1626 and 1628.125 Specifically important is rule 12, in which Descartes gives an explanation of how perception functions:

“First, in so far as our external senses are part of our body, sense perception is properly speaking merely passive, even though the application of the senses to an object involves an action, namely local motion, and it occurs in the same way that wax takes an impression from a seal. I am not just using an analogy here: the external shape of the sentient body must be thought of as being really changed by the object in just the same way that the surface of the wax is altered by the seal. And we must admit that this is so, not just in the case where we feel the body to have a shape, or to be hard, or rough to the touch etc., but also in the case where we have a tactile perception of heat, or cold, etc. The same is true of the other senses: thus, the first opaque membrane of the eye takes shape impressed upon it by many colors of the light; and in the ears, nose and tongue, the first membrane that is impervious to the passage of the object thus takes on a new shape from the sound, the smell, and the flavor respectively.”126

124 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 59. 125 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 112. 126 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 161.

30 Descartes clearly bases himself on Aristotle and the early atomists here, whose accounts were similarly taken by Beeckman as the underlying basis for his idea of perception. Given their collaboration and close relationship in 1619, this is not strange. More specifically to the faculty of imagination, Descartes conceived it to be a synthetic conceptive power, which operates on sensation. Impressions or moments that are being presented to it successively, are gathered by the imagination and unified by determining the proportional relationships they bear to one another.127 In the Compendium Musicae for example, Descartes notes that beat or percussion clearly emphasizes the different sections of a musical piece. This aids the imagination in structuring the piece and discriminating among the different parts, thereby recognizing the proportional relationships and thus enjoying the music.128 In both Beeckman and Descartes, this consciousness of the proportional relationship between parts of something larger, resonates in how they envision acquisition of knowledge to take place: if a phenomenon or problem cannot be grasped in its entirety, it must be divided into smaller parts which are graspable.129 The example taken from the Compendium Musicae is but one of many lines of thought in which Descartes and Beeckman think the same way. René Descartes of the 1620’s therefore has a rather similar approach to conceptualizing imagination as Beeckman, though Beeckman is not very explicit about his version. However, Descartes’ explanation of perceptual cognition and the position of imagination in it outweighs Beeckman’s understanding by far in terms of ingenuity and depth. Beeckman claimed that it is not possible to imagine something that has not been perceived previously by the senses, a commonplace in seventeenth century discourse. Beeckman recalled himself dreaming of speaking and reading fluent Latin. He added that this was only possible because he knew Latin, although he did not speak it fluently. According to Beeckman, someone who never learnt the language cannot imagine himself to read or speak it fluently.130 This follows the Lucretian example, where the alphabet consists of a limited number of letters and yet the number of possible combinations is infinite.131 For Beeckman, this idea was not worthwhile analyzing any further. The reason for this his conception of God as the author of nature, as briefly discussed in chapter 1. For Beeckman, to extensively investigate the tools given to man for knowledge acquisition was a step too far for his practically oriented philosophy. For Descartes, however, the idea of recombining earlier perceived images (or sounds, smells, tastes) is of importance for his conception of imagination. The fact that Descartes became aware of his own ‘phenomenological attention’, as Sepper puts it, by understanding that we can only reckon with that what is already in the mind, heavily dominated his view on the process of

127 Sepper, 1996: p. 45. 128 Sepper, 1996: p. 44. 129 Gaukroger. 1995: p 190 130 De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 270-271. / Appendix no. 15. 131 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 132.

31 discovery.132 As is clear in Rule 14, Descartes becomes more and more intrigued by how our mind obtains possession of the things in the external world and, subsequently, how then our mind recombines the things perceived by sensory perception. Descartes claims:

“The proper objects of the intellect are completely abstract entities and are free of images or bodily representations. But the intellect can also apply itself to ideas in the imagination. In doing so it also carries out an operation which is proper to it, but which the imagination cannot carry out, namely that of separating out components of these ideas by abstraction. It is here that the necessity for the imagination arises, because the intellect by itself has no relation at all to the world. Entities conceived in the intellect are indeterminate. The imagination is required to render the determinate.”133

The way Descartes further explains this idea, is by the term ‘fiveness’. The intellect is able to grasp the idea of ‘fiveness’, but it does not relate to something specific in the physical world. It is an abstract entity or indeterminate, and here the imagination is needed to give it a symbolical meaning; to render it determinate.134 The fact that Descartes uses a numerical example here is not a coincidence. In his collaboration with Beeckman, Descartes was already advancing in a mathematical explanation of physical phenomena. Their joint Physico-Mathematico is in effect a methodological precursor for Descartes’ explanation of the way imagination functions: if we want to gain an understanding of the world, we should reduce a problem or phenomenon to quantitative entities. I will discuss the instrumentalization of imagination further in chapter 3. Yet, it is important to mention that the mathematical advancement in epistemological perspective is but one of the two perspectives taken on by Descartes. In dividing Descartes’ scientific career into two parts, I follow the account given by Hatfield, formulated in his general article on Descartes in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.135 Hatfield sees a change in Descartes’ thinking around 1629, the so called ‘metaphysical turn’. In short, this refers to the abandonment of the Regulae, in which mathematics provided the model for his method. From 1629 onwards, Descartes focuses his inquiry on metaphysical questions such as the existence and nature of God and the soul.136 In these questions, mathematics can no longer form a connection between sense perception and the intellect, thus including the idea of legitimation into the process of knowledge making. This is a new idea: many of the scientific frontrunners of the seventeenth century such as Kepler,

132 Sepper, 1996: p. 288. 133 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 171. 134 Ibidem. 135 Although Descartes’ scientific career can be divided in periods in many ways, depending on the perspective taken, I will follow this general account of Hatfield (2016) 136 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016.

32 Galileo, Mersenne and also Beeckman, believed that the mathematical laws were God-given, and that they were at the path to uncovering truths of nature.137 The metaphysical turn is a definitive break away from the parallel with Beeckman’s perspective on perceptual cognition and imagination. Whether we read the Discours de la Méthode (1637) or Les Passions de l’Âme (1646), it becomes clear that Descartes’ awareness of the epistemological questions on the nature of how our mind and body interact with the natural world and with God, distances him from a mechanically and practically informed philosophy. The imagination is no longer of support to the intellect, as it was when it symbolically represented ‘fiveness’, for example. On the contrary, in a letter to Mersenne dated in the early 1640’s Descartes even claims that ‘imagination is rather harmful than helping, with regard to searching most basic truths of all, those of metaphysics’.138 Thus, in Descartes’ later thinking the idea appears that imagination is something that is involved with things that are not real per se, and yet in his earlier work imagination played a pivotal role in the acquisition and establishment of knowledge. Because the later conceptualization of imagination is very distinct from Beeckman’s use and ideas, I will not dwell upon this period or Descartes’ later conceptions of imaginations any further; many scholars have done so already.139 Let me return to something that is more closely related to Beeckman’s ideas and which still appears in Descartes’ later publications. In the Compendium Musicae, a short musical tract dedicated to Beeckman, Descartes speaks of the human voice as follows:

“[…] And so, because of all things it [the human voice] is most in conformity to our spirits, it appears to make the human voice most pleasing to us. Thus perhaps [the voice] of a closest friend is more pleasing than that of an enemy, from the sympathy and antipathy of affections.”140

This is almost a copy of Beeckman’s account of beauty in people; from a spectrum of sounds, the most heard is the human voice and therefore men have a certain accustomedness to perceive it. Therefore, it is most pleasant to us or, in other words, we find it most beautiful. What is interesting here, however, is the fact that Descartes links it to the affections. He adds a judgmental connotation towards the principle of being accustomed to certain sounds. There is a sense of qualitative judgement here, namely sympathy and antipathy, that is also present well after Descartes’ metaphysical turn, most distinctly in Les Passions de l’Âme. In this publication, Descartes speaks about the passions, the prime passion being ‘wonder’. In his appreciation for

137 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 209. 138 Sepper, 1996: p. 3. 139 See Cole (1992), Scholl (2005) and Sepper (1996). 140 Sepper, 1996: pp. 37-38.

33 this passion, Descartes resembles the notion that Beeckman held with regard to wonder. Thus, although his conceptualization of imagination changes, turning away from Beeckman, there is still a closeness to Beeckman within Descartes’ later works. This has to be kept in mind when focusing on the instrumentalization of the imagination of both philosophers.

34 3. Instrumentalization of Imagination

Let me start this chapter by repeating Ludger Schwarte’s definition of instrumentalization, which I already briefly discussed in the introduction:

“We must understand the manipulative behavior directed towards objects, and the symbolization that makes something (an aspect, a goal) visible in relation to an object as preparation for controlled making. Instrumentalization is the organization of operative possibilities, which can be mobilized for an anticipated goal.”141

Explained in this way, instrumentalization is an active force: its intent is to work towards a goal. With regard to Beeckman’s and Descartes’ instrumentalization of imagination, this goal is essentially their quest for knowledge of the natural world. This quest is both ontological and epistemological. Chapter 2 has dealt with the ontological status of imagination: it has described what imagination is and what it does, according to Beeckman and Descartes. This chapter will focus on the epistemological aspects of imagination, by asking how it is made instrumentalized in Beeckman and Descartes. In other words: the instrumentalization of imagination in Beeckman and Descartes is a way of structuring the process of their knowledge acquisition, from their forging of and image or imagining to the explication and communication of this image. In doing so, the notion of somatic tacit knowledge is the theoretical component that will allow me to distinguish the differences in this process in Beeckman and Descartes.

3.1 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: artisanal intuition As already stated in the first chapter, if one has to define the striving of Beeckman’s writings in the Journal, then God holds a central position. at the end of the definition there is God. For Beeckman, God is the author of nature and it is by his grace that we are given the instruments, such as imagination, reason and intellect, to distinguish phenomena, to structure our perception of them and to give an explanation of their causes. The base for this idea lies in Beeckman’s use of the fundamentals or primordia, which are fundamental building blocks of everything in the natural world.142 There is a limited number of primordia with different shapes, which by recombination can create endless possibilities. God did not create every single creature or thing in the world. Rather, he presented the universe with the fundamentals that constitute creature or phenomenon, which essentially makes all creations the intention of God.

141 Schwarte, 2008: p. 177. 142 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 90.

35 Here, Beeckman clearly links God to the ideas of atomism with the Lucretian notion of the limitedness in recombining a limited number of shapes.143 This is ultimately Beeckman’s world: a set of God-given fundamentals that construct reality around you, or shorter, matter and motion. Moreover, this world is perceivable and understandable by our mental capacities, which are equally God-given. As we have seen, Beeckman is predominantly interested in the mechanics of this reality, also when it comes to explaining imagination. The use of imagination by Beeckman is, however, present on a more implicit level. The implicit instrumentalization of imagination that can be found in Beeckman’s work seems to be a method based on intuition rather than on the principles and methodologies that Beeckman himself advocated. I will illustrate this with an example from the Journal, dating from August 1618. Here, the atomist perspective that Beeckman adopted early in his career is applied to his theories of light. Within Beeckman’s world, visual perception is dependent on light that is refracted upon objects and is perceived by our eyes.144 The simple assertion that an object, for example a stick, that is stuck in water is seen in a distorted way under the water level, is something that can be observed easily. To explain how the distortion under water comes about, Beeckman represented the refraction of light as follows:

Refraction of light according to Beeckman (De Waard (I), 1939: p. 211).

The refraction of light was very commonly discussed amongst early seventeenth century natural philosophers. Beeckman’s example is rare because he visualized light (DC) as a sequence of circles, or igniculi, instead of a line.145 Van Berkel attributes to this drawing a reinforcement of Beeckman’s strong beliefs in the reality of atoms. I would like to add that this drawing is an indication of Beeckman’s intuitive understanding of nature, which has its basis in craftsmanship.

143 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 90. 144 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 28. / Appendix no. 1. 145 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 88.

36 Van Berkel’s characterization of Beeckman as ‘someone who was accustomed to manipulating nature rather than contemplating it’, is well put. As discussed in the first chapter, Beeckman familiarized himself with the transformational aspects of craftsmanship. From an early age onwards, Beeckman became ingrained with the notion of metamorphosis, whether it was grease being reshaped into wax candles, separate pipes into a system of flowing water or, at the end of his career, reshaping glass into lenses. The example of the representation of light by circles, as opposed to a single line, shows that Beeckman had awareness of its transformational quality. Let me clarify the picture by making it physical and transporting this idea to the here and now: imagine cutting a line length from paper and also imagine cutting out separate circles. Now juxtapose them as two lines, and imagine creating different curves or refractions. Whereas the line-length is of ontological ‘oneness’ and therefore hard to refract without losing its original shape, the separate circles hold their shape when altered into a curve. The fact that Beeckman thinks of light this way, holds a strong link to artisanal practices, where ingredients – whether these are pigments, pipes, or pieces of wood – are combined by the craftsman into something that is one, or whole. This point needs clarification. As stated in the introduction, the influence of artisanal practices on knowledge production in the early seventeenth century, can be expressed with the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’. Michael Polanyi’s explanation of this term is short, but clear and distinct: ‘we know more than we can tell’.146 The term is further nuanced by Harry Collins, who distinguishes three levels of tacit knowledge: somatic, relational and social tacit knowledge.147 For a craftsman and for this thesis, the first form of tacit knowledge is important: somatic tacit knowledge is knowledge embodied in the human body and brain.148 Here the claim, ‘we know more than we can tell’ can be justly used. As Richard Sennett has described, the repeated process of metamorphosis creates an awareness of sameness and difference in matter, which is hardly explicable. Indeed, judgements about mixture and synthesis of matter are often formed intuitively, based on the internal evolution of a prototype in the mind of the craftsman, as Sennett has suggested.149 With the abovementioned theories in mind, let us now return to Beeckman’s example of visualizing refraction. In this visualization, I see a clear indication of the intuitive understanding that Beeckman has of the physical properties of light, and nature in general. The two- dimensional representation of light into a sequence of igniculi derives from an intuitive understanding of metamorphosis, ingrained by artisanal practices. To put it more generally: Beeckman’s explicit thought is informed by his tacit knowledge. Polanyi mentions that a pianist

146 Polanyi, 1966: p. 132. 147 Collins, 2010: p. 2. 148 Ibidem. 149 Sennett, 2008: p. 129.

37 is trained to play without pondering upon every note – indeed, when focusing their attention on their fingers, musicians tend to make mistakes – which enables him to trust his hands during a performance.150 Similarly, Beeckman – growing up as a craftsman – is explicitly trained in reforming matter, which according to Sennett creates an implicit awareness of sameness, difference and goal. Thus, the way Beeckman imagines the refraction of light to take place is geometrical and yet, as I have stated, it is buttressed by a physicality which points towards symbiosis of the methods displayed by both artisans and scholars. The implicit training of imagination during Beeckman’s youth and adolescence is thus based on a certain accustomedness or to a habitual practice. As we have seen in the second chapter, Beeckman also used the idea of accustomedness to specific facial features to give meaning to the conception of beauty. In a short note, dating from June 1621, Beeckman asks himself how people can physically move themselves and wander in the world. His answer is that it happens by habit, just as one has the habit of making good candles.151 What is ventilated here, is an explanatory cause that has its roots in craftsmanship: the repeated production process is mirrored in the psychology of man. Both fall under Beeckman’s idea of accustomedness. Schuster’s characterization of Beeckman in chapter 1 can now be complemented. Schuster said:

“[…] What Beeckman demanded in natural philosophy was the application of criteria of meaningful communication between mechanical artisans – the appeal to a picturable or imaginable structure of parts whose motions are controlled within a theory of mechanics. His central contention was that there is no point in talking about effects if you cannot imagine how they are produced, and the exemplar of imaginatively controlled efficacy is the mechanical arts where men do command nature at the macroscopic level.”152

Whereas Schuster’s quote is accurate in saying that Beeckman demanded picturable and imaginable ideas as explanations for physical structures, it does not address how Beeckman actually makes use of his imagination. Here, it becomes clear that this happens through the artisanal notion of repetition that creates an ingrained accustomedness. If we recall Beeckman’s firm believe that our cognitive faculties are God-infused and God-given the Beeckman’s Lucretian and atomist account of the natural world, this is not a strange way of instrumentalizing one’s imagination. On the contrary, the material awareness and tacit knowledge of a craftsman has towards his product, can have its intellectual equivalent in the epistemological awareness and educated intuition of a scholar. It is also not a coincidence that Beeckman encountered scholars such as Simon Stevin and Petrus Ramus during his studies,

150 Polanyi, 1966: p. 134. 151 De Waard (II), 1942: p. 173. / Appendix no. 24. 152 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 71.

38 who were the more practically oriented scholars of their time, as we have seen in chapter 1. They preached the importance of practical application theory (Stevin) and picturability (Ramus), and Beeckman has shown to be sensitive to their ideas. Therefore, it is not at all strange that in Beeckman’s methodology there are traces of his artisanal background present: clear and vivid, or picturable ideas can only be characterized as such, if in them there are some elements to which one is practically accustomed. The translation of bodily tacit knowledge to an intellectually tacit grasp of nature and its laws, is a complex one. It is however a form of instrumentalizing one’s imagination. Imagination is made operational precisely by the implicit transferal of artisanal methods such as repetition, composition and proportionality to the process of intellectual knowledge acquisition. If we perceive Beeckman’s implicit method this way, at first glance it does seem to contradict the general tendencies of contemporary scientific endeavors in which an explicit methodology became of increasing importance for knowledge acquisition. This development mainly aimed to overthrow the ancient autonomy of knowledge. As Francis Bacon has put it in his Novum Organum: ‘for the discovery of things is to be taken from the light of nature, not recovered from the shadows of antiquity.’153 However, as becomes clear from the works of Sennett and Smith, the early modern period was also the time of synthesis of artisanal and scholastic knowledge. The fact that there are examples of artisanal experience that refurbished the knowledge of nature, such as Kepler’s use of the camera obscura and the subsequent alteration of our understanding of the eye, underscores this. With Kepler’s example in mind, it can be expected that, besides the use of mechanical instruments from the artisanal practices for scholarly endeavor, also more implicit rules and methods were exchanged.154 Beeckman, accustomed to trust his expectations with regard to the behavior of wax when making candles, translates this mechanism implicitly to the scholarly realm in a letter to Marin Mersenne. Beeckman finds it useless to determine by experiment whether a wooden ball would fall more slowly than an iron ball of the same size. After all, Beeckman says, reasoning tells us again and again that it must be so.155 Much like Beeckman’s representation of the refraction of light, there is an intuitive understanding of nature to discern here. In addition, this example also portrays the high level of trust towards his own judgements. Indeed, Beeckman was so sure of his explanation of natural laws that he would rather leave observations unexplained, if they would contradict his system.156 This is, essentially, a reinforcement of his worldview that is built from a limited number of fundamentals, which are linked mechanistically and which can be discriminated by

153 Dear, 2001: p. 59. 154 I am aware of the anachronistic character of the word ‘discipline’. 155 De Waard (IV), 1953: p. 184. 156 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 80.

39 our God-given cognitive tools. The mechanical aspect gives an imaginable structure to his world, and yet it also presents Beeckman’s most prevailing limit: things, phenomena, observations that do not match his mechanistic worldview, are excluded. In other words: Beeckman’s accustomedness to how nature works, prevents him from adopting an altogether different perspective, even if the evidence suggests otherwise. Again, Beeckman’s implicit method is one of in- and exclusion, like a craftsman separating the useful ingredients from waste material. There is a strict separation of useful ideas, such as his primordia and ideas that do not serve any purpose in Beeckman’s process of knowledge making. As will become clear further on in this chapter, it is here where Descartes leaves the intellectual wings of his Dutch mentor. Whereas Beeckman is consistently convinced of his mechanistic worldview, Descartes arrives at the point where he no longer shares Beeckman’s principles. Before turning towards the French philosopher, however, let me return to Beeckman’s idea of God as the author of nature.

3.2 Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination: transition of wonder There is a note of October 1618 where Beeckman states that God will gladly allow humans to be called the author of the things or phenomena they have discovered and of which they are sure.157 If we recall Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination that brings about an intuitive understanding of natural laws, the things he knows ‘for sure’ comprise a certain accustomedness. As noted before, Beeckman allows in philosophy nothing that is not represented to the imagination as if it were observable.158 Also, in the way Beeckman distinguishes between the things or phenomena that are observable by the imagination there seems to be a focus on accustomedness, as I have previously proposed. Therefore, viewing the process from this perspective of accustomedness, there is always an element of something that one is only tacitly aware of. Polanyi can be of help in clarifying this claim. According to him, the process of discovery involves a reciprocal movement between imagination and intuition:

“The honors of creativity are due then in one part to the imagination, which imposes on the intuition a feasible task and, in the other part, to the intuition which rises to this task and reveals the discovery that the quest was due to bring forth. Intuition informs the imagination which, in turn, releases the power of the intuition.”159

When applied to Beeckman’s case, there is within his tacit understanding of natural laws, a reciprocal relationship between his intuition and imagination. Beeckman’s intuition provides the imagination with a basic understanding of how reality is structured. This allows him to imagine

157 De Waard (I), 1939: pp. 228-229. / Appendix no. 13. 158 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 81. 159 Manno, 1980: p. 175.

40 solutions to specific problems which in turn inspires new explanations about the physical world. However, this happens only as long as the fundamentals that constitute these explanations match Beeckman’s intuition. If this is not the case, new ideas cannot arise; they are not clearly and visually represented to the imagination. With this in mind, the concept of wonder poses an epistemological problem: the word refers to something that exceeds the boundaries of the known, of that to which one is accustomed. In their monographic account of the early modern wonder from 1100-1750, Kathryn Park and Lorraine Daston have pointed towards the ambiguous relationship between the concept wonder and nature, and how to make sense of both. Most natural philosophers held a skeptical stance towards wonder. Most of them marginalized both the concept ‘wonder' as well as the passion of wonder, by putting wonders into the category of the praeter naturam; outside or beyond the course of nature, and therefore not of interest to the natural philosopher.160 Although there are not many formal records of Beeckman disputing wonders, it is not surprising that he is more rigorous than his colleagues. As Schuster has rightly described it, Beeckman would and could never account for occult explanations. According to Beeckman, wonders did not reside in the category of extra-natural phenomena, for in his view no such category existed. Beeckman explained wonders rather differently. In October 1619, he posed the question: ‘why does something appear to us wondrous and miraculous?’161 Beeckman answers that wonders are much like the magic of magicians. The reason why people tend to define something as a wonder, is that they are not able to grasp the mechanism of something, whether this is a magic trick or a natural phenomenon. The tendency towards magical explanations is however still present in the seventeenth century, for example in the process of childbirth. As nature could be hostile and childbirth was a very delicate occasion, the process was surrounded with magical beliefs, to chase away anxieties and sorrows.162 However, when Beeckman’s niece was born and it turned out she was missing a limb, he did however not ascribe any occult explanations to this. Rather, he hypothesized that mother and child are in fact like two strings on a guitar: when one is being played, the other resonates along. When a mother is very anxious and thinks about the deformities that could arise, the close relation established by the life spirits (nervous system), causes the anxiety to be transported, because ‘spiritus matris et infantis sint aequalium partium et subsitatis’.163 Not so much the imagination of deformity is being transferred, it is rather the anxiety of this imagination that creates the restriction in development of the infant. While Beeckman does not

160 Daston and Park, 1998: p. 110. 161 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 341. / Appendix no. 17. 162 Roodenburg, 1988: p. 703. 163 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 121. / Appendix no. 9. Translation: “Because spirits of mothers and children are equal parts and substantial”.

41 explicitly dwell on this mechanism any further, it may have become clear that he always sought for a clear and understandable explanation of wondrous phenomena. From this perspective, Beeckman’s motto van wonder tot gheen wonder can easily be explained.164 His motto basically contains the idea that for all wonders there is in fact an explanation to give, which makes it not a wonder. However, Beeckman’s choice for this motto reveals more. As an important source for practicality that is present in Beeckman’s thinking, I have mentioned the works of Simon Stevin. This slightly older contemporary of Beeckman held the motto wonder en is gheen wonder, which makes it instantly clear that Beeckman’s motto is inspired by Stevin’s.165 And yet it is not precisely the same. If one says that wonder is not a wonder, as Stevin does, there is a sense of untruth in calling something a wonder in the first place. For Beeckman, however, the wonder exists, but is altered to something that is not wondrous. In other words: by the grammatical alteration that Beeckman has made he proposes a transition, while Stevin presents an error. This transitional aspect of the concept wonder as postulated by Beeckman, is only an underscoring of the previous characterization of Beeckman’s instrumentalization of imagination. The relation between wonder and imagination is informed by Beeckman’s implicit methodology with regard to problem solving: if there is a phenomenon that does not directly create for Beeckman an imagination of its cause, Beeckman starts speculating. The idea that the phenomenon does not fit his mechanical worldview is out of the question. Allowing this intuition to inform the imagination that it is possible to find the causes for the wondrous phenomenon perceived, is also present in Polanyi’s description of the tacit process of discovery.166

3.3 Descartes’ instrumentalization of imagination: rhetorical practices Let’s start of rigorously: Descartes’ instrumentalization of imagination differs fundamentally from Beeckman. This difference is caused by three elements. First of all, there is no implicit methodology based on experience in the artisanal practices present in Descartes. Second, Descartes uses his imagination predominantly and explicitly to create a new perspective on reality. Third, in his explanations there is an awareness which is not present in Beeckman. This awareness is rhetorical rather than artisanal, it is the imagining of a reader, who is to be persuaded. In describing these differences, I will be short on the first and extensive on the other two. The tacit knowledge that is implicit in Beeckman is – although Descartes definitely used instruments to aid his examinations – not present in the French philosopher’s methods. If we

164 Translation: “From wonder to no wonder”. 165 Translation: “What appears a wonder is not a wonder” 166 Manno, 1980: p. 175.

42 only look at the youth and education of Descartes, we can see that before leaving La Fleche, there is no sign of manipulating matter frequently. On the contrary, for reasons unknown, Descartes was allowed to sleep in longer than other students and throughout his life he rather spent his hours in bed, contemplating philosophical matters than practicing an artes or being amidst people.167 This, of course, is an oversimplification of his character and life. Also, it is not my intention to paint the portrait of an isolated, lazy philosopher who did not want to get one’s hands dirty. I am merely ruling out the possibility for a practical character of his education and early life. Indeed, the idea that in 1614, Descartes was very eager to explore the world because the knowledge in books had disappointed him, contributes to the idea that at La Fleche he had developed himself more intellectually and rhetorically, than artistically.168 Indeed, as Gaukroger has pointed out, there was at La Fleche an emphasis on the styles of writing and persuasive speech and conveying an argument.169 There is no point in elaborating upon this any further; it is clear from here onwards that a focus on artisanal practices is lacking in Descartes’ youth and education. Beeckman and Descartes do share an interest in the combination of physics and mathematics. To illustrate this, I refer to a quote from Beeckman, written down shortly after his meeting with Descartes in 1618:

“Physico-mathematicians are very rare. Monsieur du Perron [Descartes] says he has never met anyone other than myself who pursues his studies in the way I do, combining Physics and Mathematics in an exact way. And for my part, I have never spoken with anyone apart from him who studies in this way.”170

Advancing in a combination of physico-mathematico is already quite imaginative, for it clearly was going against the Aristotelian division of the genera, as was still dominant, which separated physics and mathematics and did not allow for intermingling of their respective principles.171 It becomes clear however, from the correspondences around 1619, that Descartes is not fully satisfied with the fact that mathematics were only being applied to single physical problems, but that he is searching for an overarching method, rooted in mathematics. The letters that Descartes writes to Beeckman are eloquent, but full of an almost restless ambition. Van Berkel has insinuated that Beeckman even tried to warn Descartes that he should not become a charlatan, who does not finish writing the books he is intending to write.172

167 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 48. 168 I refer to the general artes of the seventeenth century. Ergo: Descartes did not engage himself much in manual, artisanal work. 169 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 50. 170 De Waard (I), 1939: p. 244. 171 Gaukroger, 1995: p. 58. 172 Van Berkel, 2013: p. 27. Based on De Waard (IV), 1953: p. 65. The alleged warning from Beeckman comes in the form of a letter to Descartes. In this letter Beeckman tells an anecdote of a man who claim to have knowledge of all things, but

43 As has been described in chapter 2, there is a large overlap to be found between Descartes’ early writings and Beeckman’s Journal. However, it becomes evident that the naturalistic account of perceptual cognition that Descartes develops, is by far the more advanced of the two. As Sepper has described it, Descartes becomes aware of the fact that by isolating the relevant factors, and their proportional relationships, any problem can be solved. Sepper points towards the ‘new algebra’ of Descartes, in which there are potentially no limits to the questions one can ask, when these questions concern anything that stands in some order or proportion to other things.173 This grasp of how to reduce physical problems to mathematical explanations, however, means a new endeavor for Descartes: the devisal of a general method. The explication of this plan, whether in the Regulae or Discours de la Méthode, is in fact an instrumentalization of one’s imagination. As a starting point to the idea of finding a method there is the anecdote of Olympia, an early publication of Descartes in which he, allegedly truthfully, describes three consecutive dreams on the night of 10 November 1618.174 The important part for this thesis is that in the dreams, Descartes is ‘shown’ metaphorically that he shall create a new method or new understanding of nature. Whether this account is accurate is not at stake here. It becomes evident from reading his works, that such a story could have happened and that he at least has spent the larger part of his life searching for epistemological solid grounds upon which to build his system of knowledge. This is, in fact, an instrumentalization of the imagination. By keeping track of his search, in his publications, there is an explicitness in Descartes’ use of imagination that is not present in Beeckman’s.175 One example where Descartes explicitly instrumentalizes his imagination reads as follows:

“Physics start neither with experience nor with a review of existing opinions, but with an exercise of the imagination: allow your thought to wander beyond this world to view another world – a wholly new one which I [Descartes] shall bring into being before your mind in imaginary spaces.”176

Not only did Descartes develop the concept of imagination further than anyone else had done, he also instrumentalized it by devising the formulations of methods, in ways of which he thought would ascribe to the imagination of others. Sepper has stated that there are not many scholars who can match Descartes’ use and conceptualization of imagination. Descartes would describe

when asked about several phenomena in nature, he in fact knew nothing. Whether this is an actual warning can never be determined, and furthermore, it is not even known whether Descartes actually received the letter. 173 Sepper, 1996: pp. 286-287. 174 See Jones (1979). 175 This can also be explained by their different media. Beeckman never published his texts and therefore did not have to be explicit. Descartes on the contrary, did publish his texts. 176 Gaukroger, 2000: p. 149.

44 this in similar terms; he thought of himself as sufficiently imaginative, and exercised his ingenium in it for a long time.177 There is however, still the third element of difference to describe, namely the fact that Descartes uses the concept of imagination in a rhetorical way, as opposed to Beeckman’s artisanal understanding. If we take the previous quote of Descartes, where he says that physics starts with an experience of the imagination, it becomes evident that he writes eloquently. Not only does Descartes explicate the imagination in physics, he does it in a rhetorical style that can easily be traced back to his education at La Fleche. There, a strong tendency towards military practices that could be seen at La Fleche, with the prime example of discussions having rituals that mirrored the protocols in jousting.178 It seems from his writings, that Descartes is fully aware of the fact that convincing a reader is an essential battle. As has been pointed out, he not only did groundbreaking work on many topics in early modern science, he also communicated them in a way that could be heard and followed. The following fragment from the Cogitationes Privatae, already introduced in the first chapter, is dated around 1620. In it, Descartes tells us how imagination functions:

“As imaginations uses figures to conceive bodies, so intellect uses certain sensible bodies to figure spiritual things, like wind, light: whence philosophizing, we can by cognition raise the mind higher in the sublime. It can seem amazing, why pregnant meanings [are] in the writings of poets more than of philosophers. The reason is that poets write through enthusiasm and the force of imagination: there are particles [or seeds] of science in us, as in flint stone, that are educed by philosophers through reason, [but] that through imagination are shaken loose by poets and shine out more.”179

Here, Descartes explicitly describes how imagination functions and at the same time, this is also a chief example of his instrumentalization of imagination the first part is perceptually informed; the collaborations between imagination and intellect is explained. The second part however, shows that Descartes has a strong belief in the powers of the imagination. Although it is reason that allows us to conceive causal relations and make sense of the world, it is imagination that enables us to fully grasp a concept. The fact that Descartes exemplifies this by juxtaposing philosophers and poets and their respective methods for communicating knowledge, is yet another contribution to the idea of his emphasis on a rhetorical use of the imagination. Within the same example, Descartes even manages to plant in us, his representation of this, namely the image of a flint stone shaken loose. In Les Passions de l’Âme Descartes describes the passion of wonder as the first of all passions, for

177 Sepper, 1996: p. 289. 178 Gaukroger, 2000: p. 150. 179 Sepper, 1996: pp. 4 and 47.

45 it is the passion that precedes our understanding of something.180 When explaining the passion of wonder, Descartes defines it as a sudden overwhelming which causes a soul to focus all of its attention on the wondrous phenomenon.181 What Descartes understood very well, is the fact that also a text could be wondrous and in his means to conveying a message, he sparked the passion of wonder in the minds of his readers. As has been touched upon in chapter 1, Descartes was aware of the fact that eloquence can attribute truthfulness to a message. As his publications testify, Descartes used these rhetorical practices in communicating his ideas more vividly. The abovementioned examples illustrate this perfectly. Descartes speaks of new worlds, thoughts to wander, our minds as mountains with flint stones of science in them. In doing so, his use of imagination – he imagines the reader – is an instrumentalization of imagination by means of rhetoric, which makes it fundamentally different from Beeckman’s intuitive instrumentalization of the concept.

180 Descartes, 1641: p. 113. 181 Descartes, 1641: p. 123.

46 Conclusion

This thesis started with the invention of a new mill, which was said to rest on the principles of perpetual motion. Beeckman’s claim that ‘only God makes living gears or perpetual motion’ revealed his acquaintance with the mechanical laws applied to practical machinery.182 By now, something else should be added to this revelation: the instrumentalization of Beeckman’s imagination provides him with an intuitive understanding of how nature functions. As many might have wondrously expected the mill to function, Beeckman was resolute in his refusal. His strong belief in an atomistic worldview and mechanistic account of the processes that take place in the world, made it impossible to wonder along with laymen. His artisanal roots however, prohibited him from devising purely theoretical explanations. As such, this episode underscores the importance of artisanal practices in Beeckman and, in turn, how he applied his intuition in terms of knowledge acquisition. In providing arguments for this these, it has been examined how the philosophers Isaac Beeckman and René Descartes have conceptualized and instrumentalized their imagination. Since these two natural philosophers have worked together closely, there is a clear link between the intellectual development of both philosophers. Whereas Descartes has gone ‘beyond anyone else in his cultivation and understanding of imagination’ in the seventeenth century, Beeckman’s theories are however more limited and equally marginally discussed by scholars.183 This difference has presented the methodology for this thesis: a comparative analysis between Descartes well formulated theories on imagination and Beeckman’s fragmented account of the concept, scattered across the Journal. In addition, also in describing the instrumentalization of imagination, Descartes has functioned rather as a passive mirror than an equal part of the analysis: it foremost Beeckman’s artisanal instrumentalization of imagination that has been discussed. The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis can be separated into two categories. The first is Beeckman’s ontology of imagination as discussed in chapter 2. The second category is the epistemological value of imagination (chapter 3), present in Beeckman on a more implicit level. Because of this implicit level, which is to a large extent contextualized by Polanyi’s notion of ‘tacit knowledge’, the latter chapter has been of tentative nature. However, it has been pointed out that imagination still remains one of the uncharted domains of human cognition.184 Therefore, in explaining the implicit functioning of imagination, this tentativeness can be accounted for. As a consequence, the conclusions on this part are equally tentative; they require further research.

182 De Waard. 1942: pp. 358-359 183 Sepper, 1996: p.289 184 Byrne. 2005. pp. xi

47

Let us, however, first deal with the more palpable conclusions from the ontological account of imagination. The frontispiece of Bacon’s Novum Organum has provided a metaphor to situate visually the state of knowledge in the early seventeenth century. Imagination becomes important because of artisanal instruments, transformed from tools to scientific instruments, start to reveal cracks in the certainties of knowledge.185 Whereas Bacon’s frontispiece provides a metaphor suited for embedding Beeckman’s and Descartes’ use and conceptualization of imagination, the frontispiece of the present thesis is similarly useful, only specifically with regard to Beeckman. What is seen is a drawing Beeckman made in 1626. It represents a visual speculation on a mechanical system which consists of connected axes [axis, plural] and gears. The system portrays, in an oversimplified and abstracted way, the worldview of Beeckman. This is a system of fundamentals or primordia, which are linked through contact and function mechanistically. An extension of this basic principle is the representation of light, as has been discussed in chapter 3: the light is conceived of tiny particles that move and refract by contact. With regard to Beeckman’s imagination, this worldview presents opportunities as well as limitations. In comparison to Descartes, Beeckman is able to provide solutions to many problems, relying on his understanding of the structure of nature, which impresses and inspires Descartes upon their meeting. Descartes however, as stated in chapter 3, goes well beyond his understanding of imagination, by allowing hesitance to be a part of his system of knowledge. Furthermore, he is also able to instrumentalize the rhetorical aspects of imagination, that is, to imagine the receiver of the a message. In their acquisition of knowledge, Descartes is thus aided by Beeckman’ structural understanding of nature. Beeckman, in turn, is limited by this structural element. Indeed, if something did not fit his worldview, he was able to refute this phenomena, even though repeated experience proved otherwise. A rather telling way to introduce the conclusions of the second –and more implicit- level of instrumentalization of imagination, is a quote given in the book Instruments and the Imagination:

“Instruments have a life of their own. They do not merely follow theory; often they determine theory, because instruments determine what is possible and what is possible determines to a large extent what can be thought.”186

As stated above, on an explicit level there is limitation in Beeckman’s thought. Taken the idea of imagination as instrument, as something that is instrumentalized, the artisanal practices of Isaac

185 I have shown this by introducing Kepler’s discovery in visual theory. A similarly disrupting example for the idea of certainty, as Galileo’s discovery of the ruptures on bodies in the cosmos: it proved that there was no heavenly perfection in them, as was prior assumed.. See: Vogel (2008) 186 Hankins, 1995: p. 5.

48 Beeckman and Rene Descartes’ rhetoric are insightful. An instrument can indeed determine theory, and it can do this in ways that could not be foretold . Here, the artisanal practices come into play. As Sennett has postulated, it is through its intuitive leaps that knowledge is developed.187 In chapter 3, the image of Beeckman being accustomed to manipulate nature rather than contemplating it, is opposed to Descartes who is classified in the contemplative, rhetorical corner. This results in an analysis that anchors repetition and proportionality in Beeckman’s implicit methods and intuitive understanding of nature. The role that imagination plays here, is that of mediator between the intuition and passion of wonder: it is central to the process of van wonder tot gheen wonder; going from wonder to no wonder. Although Beeckman is explicit about his motto, the underlying mechanism is largely implicit: it is the ingrained accustomedness of the craftsman that enables Beeckman to intuitively understand the natural world. Mirroring this image with Descartes, crucial differences can be detected. Already at La Fleche, Descartes became acquainted with an emphasis on stylistic writing and speaking, a school culture highly informed by military protocol and the pre-occupation with symbols. In instrumentalizing his imagination, he is not only aware of imagination’s force to create new ideas. Descartes also envisions the receiver of these ideas, and is aware of the rhetorical use of imagination in persuading his reader or listener to accompany him into ‘wholly new worlds’.188 In this rhetorical instrumentalization of imagination, Descartes is miles ahead of Beeckman in communicating his ideas to others. This has also to with the notion of medium: whereas Beeckman never published, Descartes did so numerously. Still, for this thesis the central contention has been the artisanal practice of Isaac Beeckman and their relatedness to the instrumentalizaton of imagination, Thus, the acquaintance with artisanal practices is of major importance for Beeckman’s implicit methodology in three ways. First, it has ingrained in Beeckman the possibilities in transforming matter. In his motto, Beeckman clearly proposes a transition: ‘from wonder to no wonder’. When stumbled upon a wondrous phenomenon, Beeckman reshaped it cognitively from a wonder to something understandable. This process of creation and recomposing the elements involved and imagining its mechanism from beginning to end, is an artisanal thing to do. Second, it has instilled in Beeckman the judgements of sameness and difference, through repetition of the production process. Though the basics of Beeckman’s notion of beauty and proportion is taken from classical theory, his explanation resembles the judgement about a sequence of artisanal products: the ultimate middle of the spectrum is explained as beauty. Third, it helped shaping the fundamental atomistic idea that the world consists of many parts, or

187 Sennett, 2008: p. 213 188 See: note 176

49 ingredients, which are linked by mechanics. Thus, a comparison can be drawn between the scholar Beeckman and the craftsman Beeckman: being accustomed to transform raw materials into objects and designing functional structures it is not strange that his epistemology can largely be characterized in similar terms. In conclusion, this thesis has sought to round out the existing knowledge on Beeckman. With regard to van Berkel’s account, the lacuna is filled partially: the conceptualization and instrumentalization of imagination in Beeckman is addressed and analyzed extensively. The tentative character of this analysis allows for more research upon this topic and Beeckman’s Journal is an inviting primary source for any scholar interested in the early modern period. Indeed, his diary remains a rather unique book with numerous day-to-day thoughts, not yet polished for the reading by other eyes than Beeckman’s. Regarding the Journal as such, the reflection of Beeckman’ speculative and imaginative mind is again ready to be nurtured by new scholarly inquiries.

50 Bibliography

Alpers, S. De Kunst van Het Kijken. Nederlandse Schilderkunst in de Zeventiende Eeuw. Bert Bakker: Amsterdam, 1989.

Arthur, R. ‘Beeckman, Descartes and the Force of Motion’. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2007): pp. 1-28.

Baigrie, B.S., ed. Picturing Knowledge. Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art and Science. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1996.

Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) en de mechanisering van het wereldbeeld. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983.

Berkel, van K. Isaac Beeckman on Matter and Motion. Mechanical philosophy in the making. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Berkel, van K., Helden, van A., Palm, L., eds. A History of Science in the Netherlands. Survey, Themes and Reference. Leiden: Brill, 1999.

Boehm, G., Alloa, E., Budelacci, O. and Wildgruber, G., eds. Imagination. Suchen und Finden. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2013.

Brann, E.T. The World of the Imagination. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991.

Bundy, M.W. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought. Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1928.

Byrne, R.M.J. The Rational Imagination. How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.

Clarke, D. M. and Wilson, C., eds. The Oxford handbook of philosophy in early modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Cocking, J.M. Imagination. A Study in the History of Ideas. London: Routledge, 1991.

Cole, J. The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of Rene Descartes. Illinois; University of Illinois Press, 1992.

Daston, L., ed. Things that talk: object lessons from art and science. New York: Zone Books, 2004.

Daston, L. and Park, K. Wonders and the order of nature. 1150-1750. New York: Zone Books: 1998.

Dear, P. Revolutionizing the Sciences. Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2001.

51 Descartes, R. Discours de la Méthode, 1637. Transl.: Veitch, J. Discourse on Method and Meditations on the First philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004.

Descartes, R. Les Passions de L’Âme (1646). Transl.: Verbeek, T. Passies van de Ziel, Descartes. Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 2008.

Doel, Maria J. E. van den. Ficino en het voorstellingsvermogen: phantasia en imaginatio in de kunst en theorie van de Renaissance. Haarlem: St. Hoofd-Hart-Handen, 2008.

Dijksterhuis, E.J. De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld. Nijmegen: G.J. Thieme, 1950.

Funkenstein, A. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Gantet, C. Der Traum in der frühen Neuzeit: Ansätze zu einer kulturellen Wissenschaftsgeschichte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010.

Gaukroger, S. Descartes. An Intellectual Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Gaukroger, S., Schuster, J. and Sutton, J. Eds. Descartes’ Natural Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2000.

Hankins, T.L, Silverman, R.J. Instruments and the Imagination. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Hatfield, G., "René Descartes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Zalta E.N. ed, URL:

Holton, G. The Scientific Imagination: Case Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Jones, W.T. ‘Somnio Ergo Sum’. Diss. California Institute of Technology, 1979.

Kenny, A. ed. A New History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Koyré, A. Galileo Studies. Transl. Mepham, J. Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978.

Lipking, L. What Galileo Saw. Imagining the Scientific Revolution. New York: Cornel Press University, 2014.

Manno, B. ‘Creative Imagination as a Basis for Relating the Sciences to the Humanities: the Epistemological Perspective of Michael Polanyi’. Philosophy Today. Vol 24, No. 3 (Summer 1980): pp. 171-184.

Nauta, L., Pätzold, D., eds. Imagination in the later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Leuven: Peeters, 2004.

52 Nauta, L., Vanderjagt, A., eds. Between Demonstration and Imagination. Essays in the Hisory of Science and Philosophy presented to John D. North. Leiden: Brill, 1999.

Ong, W. Ramus: method, and the decay of dialogue. From the art of discourse to the art of reason London: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Otterspeer, W. Het Bolwerk van de Vrijheid. De Leidse Universiteit in Heden en Verleden. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008.

Polanyi, M. The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1966.

Ronzeaud, P. ed. L’imagination au XVIIe siècle. Paris; Honoré Chamption, 2002.

Roodenburg, H. ‘The maternal imagination. The fears of pregnant women in seventeenth century Holland.’ Journal of Social History. Vol 21, No. 4 (1988): pp. 701-716.

Scholl, A. Descartes’s Dreams. Imagination in the Meditations. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005.

Schwarte, L. ‘The Anatomy of the Brain as Instrumentalization of Reason’. Instruments in Art and Science. On the Architectonics of Cultural Boundaries in the 17th Century. Schramm, H, Schwarte, L. and Lazardzig, J. eds. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008.

Schuster, J. Descartes and the Scientifc Revolution, 1618-1634. Ann Arbor: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Searle, J. Mind. A brief introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Sennett, R. The Craftsman. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2008.

Sepper, D. Descartes’ Imagination: proportion, images and the activity of thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Smith, P. The Body of the Artisan. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Smith, M. ‘Knowing Things Inside Out: The Scientific Revolution from a Medieval Perspective.’ The American Historical Review. Vol. 95, No. 3 (June, 1990): pp. 726-1744.

Vogl, J. Transl.: Hanrahan, B. ‘Becoming-media: Galileo’s Telescope.’ Grey Room. Vol. 29 (Winter 2008): pp. 14-25.

Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1955.

53 Appendices

N.B.: These appendices consist of the 26 texts of Beeckman’s Journal that I have selected for this thesis. They are the result of scheming through Beeckman’s diary multiple times and filtering the parts that are insightful with regard to the concept of imagination. The texts are either in Latin or in Dutch (black), the English translations are my own (blue).

Waard, de C. Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604 à 1634. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1939-1955.

1. 1613-1614, I 28

Lux Light

Ab omnibus rebus, propter motum earum (moventur autem manifeste a radijs siderum), certum est aliquid indesinenter fluere. Quid enim non valet mutare edax vetustas?*) Among all things it is certain that, by a movement affected upon it (and they are clearly influenced by the radiation of the stars), something is constantly flowing from it. Because, what does not change over time?

At dubitabit forsan aliquis num etiam species°) rerum sint fluxus corporei ex rebus. Si id affirmetur, cur de nocte non videmus? An igitur species visibiles corpora quidem sunt, sed non rei visae? verum lux ipsa ex corpore luminariorum prodeuns, et refracta ad res visas, in oculos nostros incidens? Modus autem diversus incidentiae, diversitas reflectionis ex poris rei visae, copiâ lucis creat colores diversos, diversasque modos videndi et specierum visibilium. [>] And perhaps someone will question whether images of things are corporeal radiations from these things. If this would be confirmed, why don’t we see them at night? Are visible images perhaps bodies, but not of the things seen? Indeed, is light itself coming from the body of the light sources and, refracturing on the objects we see, falling into our eyes? And a different way of falling, a difference in reflection coming of the objects’ pores, causes different colors [depending] by the amount of light, and [thus] causes different ways of seeing and of visible images.

2. 1613-1614, I 28-29

Aer est materia soni. Air is matter of sound

Sic dubitabit aliquis num materia soni ex re sonorâ vel auditâ prodeat. Quod si sit, cur chorda tensa et remissa eundem aut aequalem sonitum non reddit? So, someone will ask if the matter of sound [sound matter] comes from the resonating or heard thing. If this is so, why does a stretched and released string not give the same sound clang constantly?

An igitur, ut lux est subjectum generale visûs, sic etiam aer subjectum generale auditûs et adaequata materia soni quae animae instrumenta tangens, sonus vocatur? Is then, like light being the general base for seeing, also air the generale base of hearing and suitable soundmatter which, if it touches the instruments for wind [ears], is called sound?

Cujus diversitas pendet a diverse moto aere animumque in instrumento auditûsdiversi modo afficiente, non absque tactu corporali, vel immediato vel saltem mediato.

54 The difference of it [auditory perception] rests on differently moved air, and air that affects in an instrument of hearing the spirit in different ways, not without tangible contact, direct or indirect.

3. 1614-1615, I 35

Si animus sensitivus tangitur ab objectis – atque is tactus sensus appelatur – sive mediante oculo et caeteris sensibus, sive immediate, quando imagines in cerebro quovis modo expressae volitant – quis negabit, simulachris in cerebro quiescentibus, moto animo sensitivo aut spiritibus, per eadem simulachra cerebro impressa sensum fieri et memoriam vel imaginationem appelari? Sive id fiat corporeis aut alijs, id generis si quid est, simulachris. If the sensitive/sensory spirit is touched by objects – and this touch is called sensation – whether this happens through the eye and other senses, or direct/immediately, when the sharply displayed imaginations fly around in the brain, who will deny that, while those images rest in the brain, as soon as the sensitive spirits are being put into motion, because [of] the same images are pressed into the brain a sensation arises which is called memory or imagination? Whether this happens by material or immaterial images – given that something like the last even exists.

4. 1614-1615, I 52

Quaeritur nec immerito cur consonantia octava dicta tam jucunde aures nostras feriat. Respondeo: quia ferme unisonus est. Unisonus autem maxime delectat. Uno enim momento sensus noster nihil perfecte percipit; optat igitur repetitionem. Sic si quodcumque pulchrum oculis nostris obijcitur eos adeo non delectat primo momento quam cum jam aliquantusque visus rei illi haeserit. Nec mirum. Non enim sufficienter primo momento sensus erat affectus, nec rem penitus perspexerat. Ut enim quod dolorem nobis infert, primo momento nos non afficit sensibiliter, nec laedit manifeste, sic res dulcis vix perceptibili quantitate nos vix delectat. Sic quodcumque subito movetur et absque mora oculos nostros praetervolat, id nullo modo nos afficit aut delectat. Ignoti enim nulla est jucunditas. Sonus ergo, quia subito ferit aures nostras, parum afficit non repetitus; audito ergo sono primo, sensus petit eum repeti, ut perfecte intelligat. Omnis enim scientia jucunda est desiderabilis. It is not unjustly asked why the harmony called octave strikes our ears so pleasantly. I reply: because it is more or less uniformous in sound, indeed uniformity pleases the most. Because one moment/movement is not understood perfectly by our perception, so it wishes repetition. So, if something beautiful is held before our eyes, it does not please in the first moment/movement, until another (second) visual perception, sticks onto it. Not miraculous. Because the sensation was not adequately touched by the first moment/movement, neither did it [sensation] perceive the object adequately. Like that which hurts us [sorrow], which does not affect perception in the first moment, and neither does hurt us in a way that is perceivable, something pleasant affect us barely, because its quantity is not perceivable. Similarly, that which is suddenly moved and directly passes before/through our eyes, affects or pleases us in no way. Because there is no pleasure in the unknown. Sound, because it strikes our ears so suddenly, affects us too little if it is not repeated. When a first sound is heard, perception asks for a repetition, to understand the whole. Because all pleasant knowledge is worth striving for.

55 9. 1616-1618, I 121

Men is verwondert, dat een vroue, die swaer gaet, deur haer gedachten soo een groote veranderinge in het kint brengen kan, als, by exempel, dat het wel somtyts gebeurt, dat het kint daerdeur syn handeken verliest, oft lyncken daerin krygt, gelyck ick selve gesien hebbe in myn nichten kint. Ende men verwondert hem niet sonder reden. Maer daer gebeuren wel meer sodanige dingen, daer men niet over verwondert is, omdat se so ordinaris syn. Ist niet vremt, dat men handen, voeten ende leden roeren kan, als men wil, deur gedachten? People are wondering, that a woman who is pregnant, can bring about so big of a change in the child by her thoughts, as, for example, that it sometimes happens that the child loses is hand or gets sick because of it [the thoughts], as I, myself have witnessed with the birth of my niece. And people wonder not without a reason. But there are more of these things, of which not is wondered about, because they are so ordinary. Isn’t it strange, that one can move hands, feet and limbs, if one wants to, by thoughts?

Sunt igitur spiritus in homine, quibus totius hominis omnia vasa referta sunt. Cerebro enim imulso, impelluntur subjecta propter constinuationem instanti; ac necesse est, ut sit quaedam diversitas spirituum pro diversis partibus, quas movent. Nam moto indice dextrae manus, si quem digitum in sinistra manu movere velis, etiam indicem movebis, et magna molestia movebis simul indicem dextrae manus et medium digitum sinstrae. Non absurdum igitur videtur, matris spiritibus motis quae ad manum pertinent, propter cogitationem manus abscindi. Infantis enim spiritus omnes et singulis maternis spiritibus sunt similes; et propter tenuitatem spirituum magna confusio in manu corrumpit reliquam manus substantiam, cum spiritus matris et infantis sint aequalium partium et substilitatis. There are spirits in man, who are filling/travelling the parts of all humans. The most deep in the brain, cause the subjects/concepts are being constituted instantly; and it is necessary, if there are some different spirits for different parts, which are moving. Because when I move the index finger of my right hand, and I want to move the same finger on my left hand, it is a frustration when if you move the index finger of your right hand, but the middle fingers of your left hand. Therefore, it is no absurdity, that the spirits of a mother insistently move to the hands, because thoughts [fears] of an amputated hand. For the spirits of all infants and mothers are similar; and because of the attraction of spirits to the hand a big confusion arises, which corrupts the corporeal substance of the hand, because the spirit of mother and infant are equal and substantial parts.

Exempla ubi similia movent similia, habes in chitarra in qua duabus chordis, aequaliter tensis, unisonumque vel octavum sonantibus, motaque alterutra, reliquam ita motam vidi, ut paleam dejiceret, quod inaequaliter tensis chordis numquam fiebat. An example where similar move the similar, is in the guitar with two strings, with equal tension and tuned to an octave, where one moved, I saw the other in movement as well, who would not have move when the tensions of the strings was made unequal.

Hinc colligere est, Verder kan genoemd worden dat,] alsser een vliege op u aensicht geseten heeft, oft als ghi u ogen toe doet ende meent, dat men u in u aengesicht raken sal, ende dat iemant anders syn vinger nae u aensigt steeckt, de plaetse, die ghy denckt, dat geraeckt sal worden, sal haer vertrecken, al wort sy niet geraeckt, sooseer, dat het jeuckt ende een weinig seer doet, alsoo dat men begerich is om den hant daeraen te doen ende de jeucksel te verdriven Furthermore, it can be mentioned that, when a fly has sat on your face, or when you close your eyes and think that someone will hit you in the face, and that someone points his finger to your face, the place, which you think will be touched, you will convulse the place, even though it is not being touched, so much that it itches and hurts a little, so that one is eager to scratch the place with your hands.

56 10. 1616-1618, I 136

Insomnia quae fiant. Dreaming, what happens.

Quî fit nos in somniis videre colores, sonos, audire etc., cum alibi dixerim [<] sensûs externos potissima subjecta esse singulos suorum objectorum? Verum intelligendum est species visibiles per oculos ulterius pergere in cerebrum atque ibi haerere, et memoriam constituere, quae species in cerebro aliquando vagantur, etc. How do we see colors, hear sounds etc. in dreams, whereas I have stated elsewhere that external perception/sensations are the chief subjects/basis of their own objects? We must imagine however, that the images proceed through the eyes to the brain and that they will keep hanging there, and make a memory, and that these images are dwelling in the brain sometimes etc.

12. 1618, 6 September, I 213

Het dunckt my een groote ende fraye saeck te syn te konnen reden geven van de proportien in architectura, dat is, waerom dat de pedestalen, colommen, capiteelen, lysten, etc. sulck een proportie juyst moeten hebben, gelyck mense na de konste geeft, dat is, waerom datse, also na de konste gemaeckt synde, d'ooghen best bevallen. Dat men een gelyckenisse neempt van een man, vrouwe, dochter, dat en voldoet my niet geheel, want men siet, dat de kleeren niet na het lyf gemaeckt en worden, den hoedt hoogher, de broeck wyt, ende het wambuis al anders dan de borst is, waeruyt blyckt, dat de forme van de mensche de ooghen niet best en bevalt. Het ware oock fray, de reden te konnen geven, waerom datter soveel verscheyden fatsoenen van kleeren syn ende waerom dat elcke natie een bysonder fatsoen kiest ende dat oock dickwils verandert. Om hiervan wat te segghen ende een beginsel te geven tot voorder bedenckinghe, so vraghe ick, waerom dat een kleyne deure qualick staet aen een groot huys? Antwoorde: Omdat men gewent is te siene een deure wat langher ende wat breeder als een man van ordinare grootte, twelck een ygelick door de gewente pertinent dinckt, een fondament maeckende van aedificien, dat het ordinaire fray schyndt. Want het gebeurt wel dat een dinck alleen door het lanc gebruyck ons ogen wel bevalt, hoe veel te meer hetgeen in de heel stadt gebruyckelick is. Nu de heele stat gebruyct ordinaris eenderley fatsoen, omdat het bequaemst was, alst eerst gebruyct wiert, gelyc de ordinare deure is nae een mensche gemaect om deur te gaen en weynich plaetse te benemen. Alsmen nu een groot huys syet, so begeert de ooghe een deur daernaer advenant te sien, dat is, gelyck hem hout het ordinaer huys tegen syn deure, soo moet hem oock het groot huys tegen syn deure houden. Soo ooc naedyn dat een man, vrouwe, dochter, ordinare ende altyt voor oogen staende, eenparige dingen syn, soo en ist niet vrempt, dat men de leyngde ende dicte der colummen daernae neempt. Maer dewyl datter in de colummen noch ander gebruycken syn, soo soect de ooghe noch andere proportien van dingen, die ten naesten met het gebruyck der colummen overeenkomen ofte die ergens in gelycken. Als omdatse effen en lanck syn, so moetense hoe hooger hoe dunder syn, gelyck boomen. Alsoo ooc ist met de capiteelen ende pedestalen, diet vinden konde etc. Dit alles niettegenstaende, so isser noch een reden, die in de nature bestaet, gelyck ooc de soetluydicheyt in de musycke, want de oogen hebben soo wel een geneuchlicheyt als de ooren. Want allen dingen syn fray, die op deen syde gelycken op dander, als smenschen lichaem, te midden deure gecloven van boven tot beneden, schynt aen de rechte syde gelyck aen de slincke etc. De his latius ante. It appears to me large and neat idea, to give reason of the proportions in architecture, that is, why the pedestals, columns, capitals, frames etc., must have such a proportion, like humans want in art, that is, why artworks after they’re being made, please the eyes most. That one takes similarities of a man, woman, daughter, satisfies me not completely, because one can see that clothes are not made after the size and shape of the body; the hat is higher, the pants wider, the camisole different than the chest, which underscores that the form of men does not really please

57 the eyes. It is also neat, to give the reason, why there are so many fashions of clothing and why every nation a special fashion chooses and that it so often changes. To say something about this and to give an introduction to further inquiry, I ask, why a small door does appear unpleasant in a large house. Answer: because one is used to see a door which is long and broader than a man of ordinary proportions, which actually seems pertinent to us, because of habit. Because it does happen that a thing pleases our eyes only by a long period of usage, and all the more so if something is customary throughout the city. Now the city uses habitually one fashion, because it is most suitable, or because was used first, similarly the normal door is made after human to pass through that door but, still not take up a lot of space. If one now sees a large house, so the eyes are longing for a door that is proportional to it. That is, like a small house is proportional to a door, a large house should hold a similar proportion. Also, whereas man, wife, daughter are one-pair-things, standing before the eyes, it is not weird, that one takes the length and thickness of columns after their size. But whereas there are different usages in the columns, the eyes searches for other proportions of things, who are sided with the use of columns show comparison with things that look alike. Because if they are smooth and long, they must be become thinner when height increases, just like trees. The same goes for capitals and pedestals, who can find it. In spite all of this, there is another reason, which exists in nature, similar to the harmony in music, because the eyes have as well as the ears a radar for pleasure. Because all things are beautiful, who do look like one another, like the body of humans, amidst doors that are separated in half, the right side is equal to the left side.

13. 1618, 16-28 October, I 228-229

God beschikt. […] dewyl geen medicyn so expert can syn als een ambachtman int smelten (niet omdat int een meer onsekerheyt is als int ander, maer omdat de medicyne moyelicker is om te leeren en verstaen), soo schryft men met recht Gode toe, hetgeene de medicyns door haar cleen verstant niet seecker weten en konnen. Want God beschict beyde: hetgeen dat wy weten, en hetgeene dat wy niet en weten. Maar hetgeene wy door neersticheyt ondervonden hebben en seecker weeten, daer laet hy geern ons den autheur van genoempt worden; maer hetgeene, dat wy noch niet seecker ende sonder foute doen en connen, daer wilt hy noch den beschicker van genoempt worden, tot dat wyt oock eens seecker comen te weten. Verbi gratia: eer dat men de ecclipsen seeckerlick conde voorseggen, soo moest men seggen, dat se God tewegen brocht om tvolck tot hemwaerts tot vreese te brengen ofte om den vyant den stryt doen te verliessen. […] Dan nochtans groote en gewichtge saken worden hem noch dickwils met recht toegeschreven, al synse geschiet door een oorsaecke, die wy wisten, dat seeckerlick gebeuren soude, gelyc men mach God wel dancken, dat hy op die ure den nacht liet comen, daerdoor wy de victorie gekregen hebben. Want God is autheur van de nature selve. Ende ten dien aensien moet men hem alle goede ende gewichtighe saecken toeschryven, tsy dat mense voorseggen konde oft niet, tsy dat mense selve doet oft niet. God disposes. […] while no doctor can be such as expert as a craftsman [candler] is in melting (not because in one is more uncertainty than in the other, but because the medicine is harder to learn and understand) so it is rightfully ascribing to God, the things which doctors, because of their small apprehension, cannot know with certainty. But the things we have found by hard work and endurance and are certain of, he [God] lets us happily be called the author of; but the things we cannot yet do without making mistakes, of these things God wants to be called the disposer, until we will know these things for sure.

58 For example: before one was able to foretell an eclipse, one had to conclude, that God made the eclipse appear to make people turn towards the sky with fear, or to make the enemy lose the battle. […] The big and important matters are being ascribed to him justly, although they happen by a cause, which we knew, that would happen for sure, similarly we may thank God, that he let it come on that time of day, since because of it we have gained victory. Because God is author of nature itself. And in this way, one must attribute to him all good and important matters, whether people can foretell these things or not, whether humans do these things themselves or not.

14. 1618, 11-23 November, I 240

Hoe komt het dat men deen mensch frayer acht te syn dan dander? Ist omdat men meest gewent is fraeye lieden te sien? Maer daer syn meer lelycke lieden in de werelt dan fraye. Nochtans segge ic, dat dese gewoonte een groot deel is van de reden. Want het is wel waer, datter minst fraye menschen syn, alsmen spreect van alle de leden wel tsamen en fray geproportioneert; maer alsmen spreect van elc lidt int bysonder, so salmen bevinden, datter een soorte van neusen is van sulck een groote, van sulck een fatsoen, van sulck een couleur, van sulck een proportie tegen tgeheel hooft en tegen de mont etc. Welcke soorte van neusen hebben wel drie menschen tegen één, dat is te seggen, daer syn wel drie menschen, die sulck een lengde van neusen hebben, datter niet één en is, die een ander gestelde lengde heeft; en daer synder wel drie, die sulc een breette hebben daer der niet één is, die een ander gestelde breette heeft. Want al synder mogelyc méér, die een ander breette hebben, dese breette en is niet eenderley, maer deen van dander verscheyden; daerom segge ic een gestelde breette. Wederom, daer syn wel drie menschen tegen één, wiens neuse soo verre van de mont staet, daer der niet één en is, wiens neuse effen een eender verte van de mont heeft. Alser nu een mense is, die sulck een lengde, sulc een breette, sulcke een verte van de mont etc. heeft, daer wel drie syn, die elck een conditie int bysonder hebben tegen één, die een ander gestelde heeft, dat moet een fraye mense syn. Want elc conditie wort meest gesien in de menschen. Die dan daerby een mont heeft en de conditie, die men meest gewoon is te sien, en soo vorts alle de leden van het aensicht, en so vorts alle de leden van het lichaem, dat wort een fray mensche geacht, want hy is vol van gestaltenisse, die men meest gewent is te sien. Why do we consider one human to be more beautiful than the other? Is it because we are most used to see handsome folks? But there are more ugly people in the world than beautiful. Still, I say, that habit is a large part of the cause. Because it is true, that we consider people to be the least handsome, if we speak of all the parts together and nicely proportionated; but if we speak of each member/part on its own, so we will find, that there are types of noses with such a size, such a fashion, such a color, such a proportional relationship to the size of the head and mouth etc. Some types of noses are carried by three persons to one, that is, there are three individuals who have a certain length, that there is not one of them who has a different given length; and there are three persons, who have a certain broadness of whom no one has a given different broadness. Because although there are possibly more persons, with a different broadness, but where one is able to distinguish one from another, that is why i say a given broadness. Again, there are three people against one, where the nose is so far from the mouth, that there is no one, whose nose is a little bit further from the mouth. If there is such an individual, with such a length, such a broadness, such a distance from the mouth, and that there are three who have one special feature against one, then it must be a beautiful person. Because every feature that is seen most in people. He who has a mouth [accompanying the nose] with the features that we most often see, and so on for all the facial parts, and so forth for all the body parts, will be judged as a beautiful person, for he is full of display – that which we are most accustomed to see.

59 15. 1619, 10 January – 2 March, I 270-271

Te nacht droomde ic, dat ic in eenen boeck las so perfect, dat ick hetgeen ick ééns gelesen hadde, soo dicmaels overlesen konde als ic wilde, sonder een tittelken te missen. Onder anderen wasser een woort van 12 of 13 syllaben, dat las ic 3 oft 4 mael over, juyst gelyck de eerste reyse. Ic ben versekert, en mercte bescheelyck, wacker geworden synde, dat ic dat niet en soude heben connen doen, wacker synde, op verre nae niet. Want hetgene ic scheen te lesen, imagineerde ic maer voor my te staen; en oft ic dat nu, wacker synde, wilde naedoen en my een boeck imagineren en daerin lesen, het waere onmogelick noch eens hetselvige, dat ic te voren las, noch eens te lese Dit gebeurt my dicwils; soo oock sonder twyffel ander menschen. Waeruyt volcht, dat d'imaginatie stercker is als men slaept en droomt, dan alsmen wacker is; en geschiet, omdat men op één dinge maer letten kan, al de sinnen vacerende; soodat al de spiritus en crachten des geests in de imaginatie alleen vergaderen, waerdoor sy uyttermaten crachtich en behendich wort. Alsoo bevint men, dat die een gebreck oft twee hebben, in d'ander actien te cloecker syn: die syck oft sinneloos syn, spreken en doen, tgeen sy anders niet en conden. Want al dat eenichsins in de hersenen verborgen licht, dat openbaert sich dan door de deucht der geconjungeerde geesten. Die geen goet latyn spreken en connen, spreken dan goet latyn, omdatse de fondamenten van goet latyn wel int hooft hebben, maer en weten niet te passe te brengen, als sy wel by haer sinnen syn, omdat het verstant dan tot te veel plaetsen verspreyt wert; maer die noyt geen latyn en hebben hoorenspreecken, en connen gantsch door siecten ooc niet spreken sonder mirakel. That night, I dreamt, that I read in a book so perfectly, that I could repeat over and over the things I read once, without making a mistake. Amongst others, there was a word of 12 or 13 syllables, which I read 3 or 4 times, just as the first trip. I am assured, and noticed, having woken up, that I could not have done so, being awake, far from it. Because the things I thought I read, I only imagined to be in front of me; and whether I could repeat myself, being awake, and imagine a book and to read in, it was impossible to do the same; that which I read before, to read again. This happens to me often; and without a doubt also to other people. From this I interfere that the imagination is stronger when one sleeps and dreams, as opposed to when one is awake; and it happens, since one can only pay attention to one thing, all the passions are unattended; this way the spirits and powers of the mind gather in the imagination alone, which enables it [imagination] to become very powerful and skillful. If one finds oneself having two flaws or so, in other actions one acts smarter; who are sick or senseless, speak and act, which they otherwise could not have done. Because all that, to some extent, lies hidden in the brain, is revealed by the virtue of conjugated spirits. He who cannot speak Latin very well, speak Latin fluently, because they have inside their head the fundaments of Latin, but cannot operate these fundaments well, if he is awake, because mind or cognition is spread to much; but he who never heard any Latin, will not be able to speak it without a miracle.

17. 1619, 6 - 19 October, I 341

Waerom schyndt ons yedt wonder ende miraculeus? Om dieswille dat men de reden van t'gene geschiet, niet en verstaet. Daerom ist, dat wy ons over het guygelspel van de haessackspeelders verstelt staen, alsoo datmen dat dickwils voor tooverye oordeelt, omdat men niet en siet, hoet geschieden can met reden. Deselve oorsaecke maeckt, datmen snachts soo licht verveert wort, want van het minste datter gebeurt, dat men hoort, oft tast, oft siet, daervan en siet men de reden niet door de duysterheyt, dewelcke maeckt, datter veel dingen ons verborgen syn, die tot de reden verheyscht werden; ende waert, dat men die sage, men en soude sich niet verwonderen. Why does something appear to us wondrous and miraculous? Because of the fact that one cannot see the cause of something. That’s why we are amazed by magicians and we judge it to be magic or wizardry, because we cannot see how it happens, through reason. The same effect causes, that at night we are easily brought into an attentive

60 mode, because not a lot has to happen, which one can hear, feel or see, which we cannot explain because of the darkness of the night, which makes that there are many things hidden, darkened from reason, but if one would see more clearly, one would not wonder.

20. 1620, March, II 28

[…] Hic ille est spiritus, per quem uterus semen attrahit, embryonem novem mensibus retinet et tanta violentia excludit; omninoque idem est substantia cum eo per quem incedimus, ambulamus, id est qui musculis motum suum praebet, estque communis omnibus humani corporis membranis, quae omnes suo modo sentiunt per eos spiritus; per eosdem aversantur aliena et attrahunt retinentque homogenea. This is the spirit, that attracts seed through the uterus, keeps embryo’s nine months from harm; the substance is completely the same as that which we walk, it is this one who enables the muscles to move, and is common to all membranes of the human body, that are all able to feel something [to be sensitive] by this spirit; by the same process they turn away from what is alien and keep what is homogenous.

Ne igitur existimemus eas partes duntaxat sentire quas intelligimus sentire,] id est quarum sensum animadvertimus, sed statuamus multas esse sensiles partes, quarum sensus nullo modo intellectum nostrum ferit, alias vero quarum sensus animum tangit obscure, quae tamen non minus, imo nonnumquam acutius, sentiunt ijs partibus quarum sensus a nobis animadvertitur. Sic ipsum cerebrum interdum sentit nobis nescientibus, ut in epilepsia etc. So let us not assume that only the body parts that are sensitive, of which we are aware that they are sensitive, in other words, the body parts of which we notice sensation, but let us claim that there are many more feeling/sensing perceiving parts, of which perception not one bit touches upon our intellect/apprehension, but that there are others [sensitive body parts] which affect the spirit/mind in a unclear/obscure manner, who do not less, yes sometimes even more sharply perceive than those parts of which the sensation is noticed by us. The brain itself is thus sensing, while we do not notice it, such as in epilepsy.

24 1621, 21 june, II 173

Gevraecht synde van vader hoet kompt, dat een mensche voortgaen kan ende sich bequamelick beweghen sonder erop te dyncken hoe men elcken voet stellen sal, antwoorde ick, dat daerin geen onderscheydt en was van de beesten; ende geschiet door de gewoonte evenals men gewent is goede keersen te maken: de ooghen sullen dat al doen, al ist dat men op ander dynghen geduerich dinckt. Daerom — waert dat een mens che tot syn 20 jaer onbeweechlick gehouden wierde — hy soude sich moeten leeren beweghen; ende int eerste soude hy dickwils syn handt willen roeren ende soude syn voet roeren, ofte willen synen duym roeren, soude hy syn pyncke roeren etc It is asked by father why it is so, that a man can move without thinking about how every foot must be placed, I answer, that therein we do not differ from beasts; and it happens through habit just like one is accustomed to make good candles: the eyes will do this already, whether on other things we tend to think longer. That’s why – If a human would be held still from birth until his 20th year – he would have to learn how to move; and at first, he would often move feet whereas he planned to move his hands, or when he wanted to move his thumb, he in fact would move his little finger.

25. 1621, 21 July, II 174

Spiritus cerebri quomodo tam gravia ossa moveat. How the spirits of the brain move such heavy bones.

61 Quaesivere multi, atque ipse quoque hîc ante [<] aliquoties quaesivi, quo pacto fieri possit quod quotidie toties fieri videmus, viz. ut tot ossa et carnes, quales sunt pedum et manuum etc., a levissimo spiritu, e cerebro prodeunte, queant moveri? Videmus enim ossa attrahi cum nulla in promptu sit tanta vis, quae nervos apprehendendo ad sese rapiat. Imo, si tanta vis foret, ea esset procul dubio in cerebro; ast ibi nervorum origines tam sunt molles, ut prius frangerentur quam ijs mediantibus quicquam grave moveretur attrahereturve. Many have asked themselves, including myself many times before now, how can be done what we so often see happening, namely that so many bones and flesh, such as from hands and feet etc., by the lightest of spirits, coming from the brain, can be moved? For we see that bones are being pulled, whereas so much power is nowhere visible, [a power] which is quickly attracted by the employment of nerves. Moreover, if such a brute force would be there, it would unquestionably be in the brain; but there the nerves are so soft, that they would break than that something heavy could be moved or attracted with it.

Quid igitur respondes? inquies. Nempe causam materialem omnis motûs revera esse in cerebro, spiritum videlicet animalem. Hic, cum sit levis, nullo negotio a virtute appetibili cerebri per nervos ad musculos demittitur, quorum calore dilatatus, extendit eos atque ita totum crus etc. attrahitur; calefactus vero, per poros avolat evanescendo cogiturque cerebrum, quamdiu actionem velis continuari, novos spiritus succedentes mittere. Hinc fit cerebrum fatigari spiritusque ejus exhauriri toto die, qui noctu iterum restaurantur ex cibo pridie ingesto. What is your answer to this? you will ask. That there truly is a material cause for every movement in the brain, which is apparently the life spirit.189 Because it is light, it will be sent effortlessly by a striving of the brain through the nerves to the muscles, and, because of the warmth of it, it stretches this [muscle] and so the whole leg is being pulled etc.; but made warm it flies away through the pores, and this evaporation forces the brain to send new spirits in their place, as long as you want to proceed with the action. In this way, the brain is being tired all day, and their spirits exhausted, who at night will recover from the food, eaten during the day.

Neque nimium mirari decet tam subitam mutationem et alterationem dilatationemque spirituum a calore musculorum: multo enim celerius dilatatur pulvis pyrius ignis vi levissima tantosque globos tantum spatium per aera ducit, cui non alia subest motûs causa quam ignis pulverem eum attenuans, de quo ante alubi loquutus sum. And we should not be too surprised about this sudden change and expansion of the spirits by muscle-warmth: indeed, gun powder expands much faster a very weak force of fire, and it brings large balls at a large distance through the air, of which there is no other explanation of movement than the fire that makes the powder thinner, whereof I have spoken elsewhere.

26. 1621, 14 August, II 175

Palpitationum in musculis ratio. Cause of convulsion in muscles.

Simile quid indies in nostro corpore contingit quando membra et musculi corporis palpitatione vexantur. Tum enim manifeste animadvertimus humores tenues, aut potius vapores crassiusculos, ad membrum hoc dimitti eosque subito attenuari atque ita membrum attollere, statim evolare novumque vaporem in procinctu esse ut quoque attenuetur. Something similar happens every now and then in our body when limbs and muscles of the body by a convulsion are moved heavily. Then we notice unmistakably that thin liquids, or rather thicker vapors, are send to this member and that they [vapors] suddenly are diluted and lift the member because of it, that they immediately evaporate and that new vapors are available to be diluted as well.

189 Aristotles division of spirits.

62 Atque ita saltus quidam fit membri involuntarius, non aliter quam in candela ardente, ac subinde salitante, fieri aliquando demonstravimus [<]; nam plano eodem modo saevum quoque vicissim ad flammam rapitur attenuaturque versumque in flammam evanescit, ita ut singulis momentis alia atque alia sit flamma; neque, ut quidam existimant, perpetuo eadem numero flamma conspiciatur. And so arises some unwanted jump of the bodily member, not different from the flickering of a burning candle, that happens from time to time, as we have stated before: because in the same manner grease of candles is also alternately pulled towards the flame and diluted, and brought in the flame it evaporates, in such a way that on different moments it has this form rather than that, and sometimes the other way around, and that not, as some have postulated, constantly the same flame is being seen.

Spiritus ergo cerebri frigidior existens, in locum calidiorem musculorum perveniens, aptissima est materia quae attenuetur ac dilatetur. Non est igitur necesse ut via, a cerebro ad musculos perveniens, fit dura, tenax aut quae non facile frangi queat; sed sufficit membra membris alligata esse fortibus tendonibus quibus inferius membrum possit attrahi a superioris musculo dilatato, (modum attractionis per musculum dilatatum nemo non intelligit). Os igitur ossi proximo duntaxat fortiter alligatur, ac sufficit exigua quaelibet via inter tendones latitans, per quam spiritus in carnem exiguosque nervos musculorum perveniat. Thus, the spirit of the brain that is originates quite coldly, is, when he arrives at a warmer place in the muscles, a very suited material to be diluted and expanded. It is therefore not necessary that the way, which goes from the brain to the muscles, is hard or firm, or not easily to break; but it is sufficient that the limbs are attached to one another with strong sinews, with which the lower member can be pulled up by the higher membrane, if the muscle is broadened (the way of pulling by means of a broadened muscle is understandable to everyone). A bone is thus only bound firmly to the adjacent bone, and it is enough if between the sinews a small pathway is free, through which the spirits arrives in the flesh and thin.

63