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Insider Threat Mitigation Guide

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Insider Threat Mitigation Guide Insider Threat Mitigation Guide NOVEMBER 2020 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [This page left intentionally blank] Insider Threat Mitigation Guide Table of Contents Letter from the Acting Assistant Director ....................................... v Introduction .................................................................................. 1 Costs of Insider Threats ................................................................................2 Return on Investment for Insider Threat Mitigation Programs ...........................4 Insider Threat Mitigation Program .................................................................5 Defining Insider Threats ................................................................. 8 Definition of an Insider ..................................................................................9 Definition of Insider Threat ............................................................................10 Types of Insider Threats ................................................................................12 Expressions of Insider Threat ........................................................................13 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................18 Key Points....................................................................................................19 Building an Insider Threat Mitigation Program ................................ 20 Characteristics of an Effective Insider Threat Mitigation Program ......................21 Core Principles .............................................................................................23 Keys for Success ..........................................................................................26 Establishing an Insider Threat Mitigation Program ...........................................28 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................51 Key Points....................................................................................................54 Detecting and Identifying Insider Threats ....................................... 56 Threat Detection and Identification ................................................................57 Progression of an Insider Threat Toward a Malicious Incident ...........................58 Threat Detectors ..........................................................................................61 Threat Indicators ..........................................................................................63 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................70 Key Points....................................................................................................72 Assessing Insider Threats .............................................................. 73 Assessment Process ....................................................................................74 Violence in Threat Assessment .....................................................................80 Profiles – No Useful Profile in Threat Assessment ...........................................83 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency iii Insider Threat Mitigation Guide Making a Threat vs. Posing a Threat .............................................................84 Leakage in Targeted Violence ........................................................................85 Awareness of Scrutiny ...................................................................................85 Use of a Behavioral Scientist.........................................................................86 Case Considerations for the Involvement of Law Enforcement ..........................86 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................87 Key Points....................................................................................................89 Managing Insider Threats .............................................................. 90 Characteristics of Insider Threat Management Strategies ................................91 Intervention Strategies .................................................................................93 Managing Domestic Violence .......................................................................95 Managing Mental Health ..............................................................................96 Use of Law Enforcement in Threat Management .............................................97 Suspensions and Terminations for Persons of Concern ...................................98 Monitoring and Closing a Case .....................................................................99 Avoid Common Pitfalls ..................................................................................100 Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................................100 Key Points....................................................................................................103 Conclusion .................................................................................... 105 Appendix A. Summary of Key Points ............................................... 107 Chapter 2: Defining Insider Threats ................................................................107 Chapter 3: Building an Insider Threat Mitigation Program .................................108 Chapter 4: Detecting and Identifying Insider Threats .......................................109 Chapter 5: Assessing Insider Threats .............................................................110 Chapter 6: Managing Insider Threats .............................................................111 Appendix B. Tools and Resources ................................................... 114 Program Management ...................................................................................114 Detecting and Identifying Insider Threats ........................................................117 Assessing Insider Threats .............................................................................119 Appendix C. Terms and Acronyms ................................................... 121 Terms ..........................................................................................................121 Acronyms .....................................................................................................127 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency iv Insider Threat Mitigation Guide Letter from the Acting Assistant Director America’s critical infrastructure assets, systems, and networks, regardless of size or function, are susceptible to disruption or harm by an insider, or someone with institutional knowledge and current or prior authorized access. This status makes it possible for current or former employees, contractors, and other trusted insiders to cause significant damage. Insiders have compromised sensitive information, damaged organizational reputation, caused lost revenue, stolen intellectual property, reduced market share, and even harmed people. Allowing America’s critical infrastructure to be compromised by an insider could have a debilitating effect on the Nation’s economic security, public health, or public safety. That is why it is important to understand this complicated threat, its many dimensions, and the concepts and practices needed to develop an effective insider threat program. To mitigate physical and cybersecurity threats, it is important to understand the risks posed by insiders and then build a comprehensive insider threat mitigation program that accounts for operational, legal, and regulatory considerations. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) plays an integral role in supporting public and private sector efforts to prevent and mitigate a wide range of risks, including those posed by insiders. This Insider Threat Mitigation Guide is an evolution in the series of resources CISA makes available on insider threats. This Guide draws from the expertise of some of the most reputable experts in the field to provide comprehensive information to help federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; non-governmental organizations; and the private sector establish or enhance an insider threat prevention and mitigation program. Moreover, this Guide accomplishes this objective in a scalable manner that considers the level of maturity and size of the organization. It also contains valuable measures for building and using effective threat management teams. Through a case study approach, this Guide details an actionable framework for an effective insider threat mitigation program: Defining the Threat, Detecting and Identifying the Threat, Assessing the Threat, and Managing the Threat. On CISA.gov, visitors will find extensive tools, training, and information on the array of threats the Nation faces, including insider threats. They will also find options to help protect against and prevent an incident and steps to mitigate risks if an incident does occur. The measures you incorporate into your practices today could pay for themselves many times over by preventing an insider threat or mitigating the impacts of a successful attack in the future. I urge you to use CISA.gov and this Guide to increase your own organization’s security and resilience. Sincerely, Steve Harris Acting Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
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