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How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones

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How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones C O R P O R A T I O N KATHARINA LEY BEST, JON SCHMID, SHANE TIERNEY, JALAL AWAN, NAHOM M. BEYENE, MAYNARD A. HOLLIDAY, RAZA KHAN, KAREN LEE How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones Background, Analysis Frameworks, and Analysis Tools For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2972 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0287-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Rick Penn-Kraus Cover images: drone, Kadmy - stock.adobe.com; data, Getty Images. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report explores the security implications of the rapid growth in unmanned aerial systems (UAS), focusing specifically on current and future vulnerabilities. We propose conceptual approaches meant to enable the enumeration and categorization of UAS- related cyber threats, covering the use of UAS as both targets and vectors of cyberat- tack, as well as their use by both allies and adversaries. These approaches have been applied to real-world threat scenarios to test their validity and illustrate the types of attacks that are currently feasible. Industry trends and the implications of these trends for cybersecurity are presented as well. Finally, we consider the UAS-related cyberse- curity threat from the perspective of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This research should be of interest to individuals within DHS that have respon- sibilities related to the operation of UAS, those responsible for ensuring the cyberse- curity of DHS and DHS-protected facilities and assets, or anyone concerned with the way that UAS proliferation may change the cybersecurity landscape. About the Homeland Security Research Division This research was conducted using internal funding generated from operations of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division (HSRD) and within the HSRD Acquisition and Development Program. HSRD conducts research and analysis across the United States Homeland Security Enterprise and serves as the platform by which RAND communicates relevant research from across its units with the broader Home- land Security Enterprise. For more information on the Acquisition and Develop- ment Program, see www.rand.org/hsrd or contact Emma Westerman, Director of the Acquisition and Development Program, by email at [email protected] or phone at (703) 413-1100 ext. 5660. For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/ RR2972. i Contents Preface ...................................................................................................i About the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center ..................................i Summary .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgments ...................................................................................xv Abbreviations ....................................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Background and Purpose ............................................................................. 1 How This Report Is Organized ...................................................................... 2 CHAPTER TWO Understanding the UAS Threat Space ............................................................ 5 Enumerating and Categorizing Threats: The STRIDE Taxonomy .............................. 6 Discovering Threats in a Scenario: The Cybersecurity Kill Chain .............................. 9 Visualizing Threats: The UAS Cybersecurity Diagram Template ..............................11 CHAPTER THREE The UAS and Cybersecurity Threat Space Today .............................................15 The Extent of UAS Cyber Vulnerabilities ..........................................................15 Vignettes of Selected UAS Cyberattacks ...........................................................17 CHAPTER FOUR Industry Trends and the Future of UAS Cybersecurity ..................................... 27 Technological Innovation and UAS................................................................ 28 Emerging UAS Industry Trends .................................................................... 30 Industry Trends: Conclusion ........................................................................47 CHAPTER FIVE UAS, Cybersecurity, and the Department of Homeland Security ..........................49 Attacks Against DHS Assets .........................................................................49 iii iv How to Analyze the Cyber Threat from Drones DHS Offensive Cyber Actions with UAS as Vector ..............................................51 DHS Components and Offices as Mitigators .....................................................51 Relevant DHS Projects ...............................................................................53 Current and Future Policy Related to DHS and UAS Cybersecurity Concerns ............. 54 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion and Recommendations ..............................................................55 Recommendations ....................................................................................55 APPENDIX A Attack Categorization ...............................................................................57 References .............................................................................................67 Figures 1.1. Categorizing UAS-Related Cyber Threats ................................................... 2 2.1. The STRIDE Threat Taxonomy ............................................................. 7 2.2. Simple Quadcopter Data-Flow Diagram with Single Radio Controller ................. 9 2.3. Cybersecurity Kill Chain .....................................................................10 2.4. UAS Attack-Surface Illustration Template .................................................11 2.5. UAS Information from Communications and Observations .............................12 2.6. UAS Attack-Vector Illustration Template ...................................................13 2.7. Example of a “Split-Screen” Illustration for Attack Surface and Attack Vector ........14 3.1. Breakdown of Prevalence of Selected Cyberattack Characteristics in Literature .......18 3.2. UAS Attack to Access and Delete Files Midflight .........................................19 3.3. UAS Attack to Fool Hovering Feature with Spoofed GPS Signal .......................21 3.4. UAS and the Cybersecurity Kill Chain—”UAS as Vector” Exploit (A Drone Botmaster) ............................................................................... 22 3.5. Attack by Drone Hijacks Open Networks and Overrides Networked Devices ....... 23 3.6. Attack by Drone to Overcome Proximity-Based Control of Smart Lightbulbs ....... 24 4.1. Number of UAS Patents ..................................................................... 28 4.2. Generic S-Curve ...............................................................................29 4.3. Annual Patent Output for the United States, China, and the Rest of the World, 2001–2017 ............................................................................... 30 4.4. Communications Related to UTM .........................................................35 4.5. Decentralized Asset Manager for Swarming .............................................. 38 4.6. Number of Publications on UAS Swarming .............................................. 40 4.7. Network of Swarming Publications ......................................................... 40 v Tables 4.1. Top UAS Patenting Organizations ..........................................................31 4.2. Affiliation of Authors of Swarming Publications ..........................................41 4.3. Summary of Key UAS Features and Trends................................................47 A.1. Attack Categorization .........................................................................58 vii Summary In a world of constant and rapid technological change, minimizing vulnerabilities is a never-ending race against one’s adversaries—a race against their technology and its exploitation, as well as their devices, ideas, modes of operation, and tactics. In this report, we examine the cybersecurity implications of one key technological trend: the advancement and proliferation of public-use unmanned aerial
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