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Russia-China Relations Cool. Implications for the Asia Pacific Volume 6 | Issue 6 | Article ID 2769 | Jun 01, 2008 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Russia-China Relations Cool. Implications for the Asia Pacific M K Bhadrakumar Russia-China Relations Cool. Implications the U.S. has had a cultural, economic, for the Asia Pacific educational, geographic, historical, and political presence in Asia since the 19th M K Bhadrakumar century,” alluding presumably to the colonial conquest of the Philippines as the foundation for its subsequent advance. Whatever can be said about who’s up and who’s down at any particular point in time in Gates also gives his listeners some neighborly Asian great power politics, one immutable fact advice: as the US view of security in the region is that three major powers – Russia, China and is one that leaves “little room for a separate Japan – are geographic neighbors. Living in ‘East Asian’ order,” the only real option is proximity in a region with a long history of acceptance of a framework of common warfare and protracted struggles overcooperation guided by Washington. resources, the three countries have powerful incentives to negotiate energy, trade and arms In Guam, the US has made clear the lengths it limitation agreements and establish conditions is ready to go to realize its Asia security conducive to a peaceful and prosperous co- dreams. According to the May 30 International existence. Herald Tribune, the US military intends to bulldoze any “remaining jungle” in Guam to But what of the United States, the Asia-Pacific’s make way for vast new basing facilities that fourth and strongest power both as thewill house some forces presently based in dominant military force in the region and as a Okinawa. At the same time, China and Russia major economic player? The US is now laying face an expansive US-Japan security claim not only to recognition of its strength in relationship that extends throughout the Pacific the region, it is also insisting on its geographic to the Middle East and Central Asia. place at the table in Asia-Pacific affairs. This is by way of introduction to M K Speaking before a pan-Asian gathering of Bhadrakumar's analysis of recent conflicts, or senior security officials in Singapore on May at least cooling, in Russia-China relations in the 31, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates areas of energy cooperation and arms trading informed his audience that the US is athat this former diplomat in India’s Foreign “resident power” in Asia. “By that term I mean Service believes “have undoubtedly introduced there is sovereign American territory in the an element of chill into bilateral ties.” These western Pacific, from the Aleutian Islands all two countries recently issued a joint the way down to Guam,” he explained. declaration that opposes US missile defense, advocates peaceful diplomacy with Iran and As he tells it, “America’s status in Asia rests on supports an expansion of Russian civilian long-standing interests and deeply held notions nuclear technology trade to China. Now the US about the basic character of the United States. is invoking island possessions, national Projecting outward from our Pacific coastline, character and history to claim and justify an 1 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF authentic Asian identity. If the Asia Pacific becomes more politically and militarily contested, will this lead to strengthened Russia-China bonds? Possibly, but as described by Bhadrakumar some significant bilateral differences apparently need to be addressed first. John McGlynn Kremlinology is back in vogue. Experts and analysts have come out of the woodwork to run a fine-tooth comb through Kremlin events, searching for clues on the direction of Russian policies under new President Dmitry Medvedev. Often in the Soviet era, during feverish over- analyses by foreign experts, the obvious would get elbowed out in favor of tantalizing interpretations over men and mice. Could history be repeating itself? Much has been made of Medvedev's choice of Kazakhstan and China as his first destinations after assuming office from Vladimir Putin on Medvedev and Hu Jintao May 7. Was it a deliberate signal to Western capitals? Moscow pooh-poohed the suggestion. Equally, in May 2003, Chinese President Hu A prominent Moscow commentator pointed out, Jintao's first foreign visit took him to Moscow. "It would be best to go to the East and West at The government-owned China Daily newspaper the same time, but that is impossible." aptly commented on the day of Medvedev's arrival in Beijing on Friday: "The first foreign But the disarming explanation overlooked the trip of any head of state should be a carefully fact that Medvedev after all did make a choice calculated move. The country he or she visits is in traveling to Beijing via Astana last weekend. supposed to be important to his or her own Eight years ago, in 2000, when Putin went country's foreign relations. Little wonder that abroad as Russia's president for the first time, Medvedev's two-day China visit has generated he travelled to London via Belarus. At that much interest ... Clearly, new leaders of the time, Moscow let it be known there was rich two countries have put their bilateral relations symbolism in Putin's choice, which wason top of their foreign policy agenda." intended to convey that Russia wanted closer ties to the West. Pragmatic cooperation The Chinese comment stated the obvious to emphasize the bilateral content of Medvedev's visit. In fact, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Li Hui told the media at a briefing that Medvedev's visit would have four "goals": one, to establish a "working relationship and 2 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF personal friendship" at the leadership level; agreement. two, to oversee the fulfillment of bilateral cooperation in practical terms; three, to The talks are expected to begin at the EU- increase political trust and extend mutual Russia summit meeting in the town of Khanty- support on "issues concerning sovereignty, Mansiysk in Russia's Siberia on June 26-27. security and territorial integrity"; and, four, to Moscow is keenly listening to the new voice of deepen "pragmatic cooperation". realism ringing in Brussels, with both Old and New Europe alike advocating a new The fourth "goal" - pragmatic cooperation - partnership with Russia. As noted Russia hand captures the quintessence of the so-called Jonathan Steele of the Guardian newspaper of strategic partnership between the twoLondon wrote, "The reality is that interaction countries. China would have no difficulty to between Russia and the EU is bound to develop know that Russia has been and will remain in all these areas, however they are labeled." essentially Western-centric (as distinct from "pro-West"). Over two-thirds of Russia'sFrictions in cooperation population live in its European part and the locus of economic and political power lies Moscow would have reason to worry that there. frictions have appeared in two areas of its ties with China, which are critical to sustaining the But that does not detract from Russia's abiding momentum and verve of the strategic interest in China, which is natural andpartnership. First is the energy relationship. historical as a neighboring country, andThe implementation of the multi-billion combines pragmatically in the present day with contracts signed in 2006 for Russian energy the imperatives of China's phenomenal rise. At supplies to China has run into difficulty. the same time, Russia realizes that it is only Russia's Rosneft oil company is threatening to one among many big players seriouslyterminate the contract unless China agrees on engaging China and cannot hope to claim a a price increase. privileged partnership with it. This may also complicate the signing of a new No sooner had Medvedev concluded his two- agreement for the supply of 50 million tons of day China visit on Saturday, South Korea's Russian oil to China in 2010-2015. In turn, this newly elected "pro-American" President Lee puts a question mark on the efficacy of the Myung-bak arrived in Beijing on a four-day trip. Chinese branch to the East-Siberia Pacific China followed the United States and Japan in Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, which Russia is Lee's itinerary. South Korea's trade volume constructing. In an interview with Chinese with China is four times that of Russia's. journalists in Beijing prior to his departure for Moscow, Medvedev said Russia and China have A free trade agreement between the two reached a "basic agreement" on the ESPO and countries is under negotiation. China hopes to that the negotiations on oil price are "nearly collaborate with South Korea in finessing a complete". Expressing willingness to set up regional security mechanism for the Asia- new oil refineries in China, he said natural gas Pacific region. Similarly, by Monday, Moscow's cooperation with China is also "under attention had already began drifting westerly discussion". But there was no concrete outcome toward Brussels, where European Union (EU) during the visit. foreign ministers finally announced plans to commence negotiations with Russia over a new The root of the problem in energy cooperation strategic partnership and cooperationlies in Russia's focus on expanding its European 3 6 | 6 | 0 APJ | JF market, which is where the money lies. Unlike the Europeans, China constantly seeks discount prices. Also, Russia's deposits are mostly in western Siberia, which is closer to Europe than China. The existing pipeline system is also orientated heavily toward supplying the European market. Russia's priority lies in buying downstream assets in Europe. All in all, China is quite a long way from becoming an alternative market for Russian energy exports, which in turn acts as a disincentive on Russia In 2005 China purchased Russian IL-76s and IL-78s committing investments on projects geared for China.
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