Chinese Foreign Policy: a Chronology April – June 2009 Catharine Melvin

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Chinese Foreign Policy: a Chronology April – June 2009 Catharine Melvin Research & Assessment Branch Special Series Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chronology April – June 2009 Catharine Melvin 10/03 Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chronology April – June 2009 Catharine Melvin 1 April 2009 President Hu Jintao met British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in London to discuss bilateral relations, on the sidelines of the G20 summit on the financial crisis, a follow- up to last November's G20 meeting in Washington. 1 April 2009 Hu Jintao and US President Barack Obama met in London to discuss Sino-US ties and the financial crisis. Hu said that China-US ties have got off to a good start since Obama took office: "I have been keeping close relations with Obama and the foreign ministers of both countries have exchanged visits in a short time." Hu invited Obama to visit China in the second half of this year, which Obama accepted. The two leaders decided to establish the "China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue", and agreed that the first round would be held in Washington DC this summer. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo will chair the 'Strategic Track' and US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan will chair the 'Economic Track' of the dialogue, each as special representatives of their respective presidents. Admiral Gary Roughead, US Chief of Naval Operations, will visit China upon invitation in April to attend events marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 1 April 2009 Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met in London to discuss Sino-Russian ties and the global financial crisis. 1 April 2009 China and France released a press communiqué in both Beijing and Paris. In principle both agreed to form a new strategic dialogue, while France reaffirmed its ‘One China’ policy: “…France fully recognizes the importance and sensitivity of the Tibet issue and reaffirms its adherence to the one-China policy and the position that Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory, in accordance with the decision made by General Charles de Gaulle, which has not changed and will remain unchanged. Based on this spirit and the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, France refuses to support any form of 'Tibet independence'. The two sides hold the view that in the context of profound changes in the international political and economic situation, China and France, both as permanent members of the UN Security Council, shoulder major responsibilities in maintaining world peace and promoting development. The two sides stand ready to strengthen dialogue and coordination and jointly respond to global challenges including the international financial crisis. Acting in this spirit, the two sides decided to conduct high-level contact and strategic dialogue at a proper time to enhance bilateral cooperation in various fields and 1 Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chronology April - June 2009 Research & Assessment Branch 978-1-905962-80-8 February 2010 promote the harmonious and steady growth of China-France relations.” 1 April 2009 Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei led a delegation to the Hague, Netherlands on 31 March to attend the international conference on Afghanistan. Wu announced that China would provide an “extra US$ 75 million of free assistance in the coming five years” to Afghanistan. While supporting counter-terrorism efforts, China nevertheless hoped that “at an early date” the Afghan government and army would take over “the responsibility of maintaining their own national security and stability”. This would suggest that China is not hugely in favour of Obama’s ‘surge’ strategy. China, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), favoured an active role for the organization in Afghanistan: “China supports the Organization to continue its active role in regard of the issue of Afghanistan.” During the conference, Wu also met UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as well as foreign ministers or representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, the United States, Iran, India, and Romania, and had exchanges of views with them on Afghanistan. 2 April 2009 Hu Jintao participated in the second G-20 Leaders Summit on Financial Markets and the Global Economy in London. Hu Jintao delivered a speech entitled "Cooperating Hand in Hand and Pulling Together in Times of Trouble". Vice-Premier of the State Council Wang Qishan also attended the meeting. On international co-operation to revive the world economy Hu said: “We should push forward international cooperation in new industries, particularly in energy conservation, pollution control, environmental protection and new energy, which may become new growth areas in the world economy... Second, international financial institutions should give more assistance to developing countries...Improve the governance structures of the IMF and the World Bank and increase the representation and voice of developing countries.” 2 April 2009 London - Hu Jintao met Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso. Wang Qishan, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning, and Dai Bingguo were also present. Hu underlined the importance of Chinese-Japanese relations particularly because of their economic interdependence. Hu used the crisis to emphasise the need for China and Japan to work together to mitigate the effects of the downturn – particularly by promoting East Asian Free Trade Zones: “There is a need to jointly support the relevant countries in this region in dealing with the international financial crisis, promoting the construction of East Asian free trade zones, expanding regional common markets, and pushing forward regional economic and financial cooperation.” 2 April 2009 London - President Hu Jintao met Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. While Hu recognised the tensions between China and Australia wrought by the economic crisis, he continued to support the stalled bilateral free trade agreement: “Under the complex and volatile world situation at present, strengthening Sino- Australian relations not only has practical significance but also has strategic significance… The international financial crisis has brought difficulties to the trade relations between the two countries. We are willing to strengthen cooperation with Australia to overcome the difficulties. We must step up the pace of negotiations on bilateral free trade agreement …” Wang Qishan, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning, and Dai Bingguo were also present. 2 April 2009 London - Hu Jintao met Brazilian President Lula. Wang Qishan, Ling Jihua, Wang Huning, and Dai Bingguo were also present. Hu welcomed President Lula’s arrival in China in the next month, and promoted a ‘joint action programme’: 2 “The Chinese side welcomes President Lula to pay a state visit to China again next month, and hopes that both sides will closely cooperate to ensure the success of his visit. The Chinese side is willing to work with the Brazilian side to start the formulation of a 'joint action programme' as soon as possible so that it will become a guide to cooperation in various fields between the two countries.” 2 April 2009 At a naval base in the port city of Zhanjiang, headquarters of the South Sea Fleet, Navy Commander Adm. Wu Shengli authorized the deployment of a second group of Chinese navy escort ships to set sail to Gulf of Aden to replace a flotilla sent earlier to guard against pirates, led by Rear-Adm. Yao Zhilou. The task force, which includes the destroyer DDG-167 Shenzhen and the frigate FFG-570 Huangshan, will relieve two destroyers and rendezvous with the supply ship Weishanhu, which will remain in the Gulf. With two helicopters and total crew exceeding 800, including navy special forces, it is mainly tasked with ensuring the safety of Chinese vessels passing through the gulf and waters off Somalia and those of international organizations like the World Food Programme shipping humanitarian goods. The flotilla will traverse 4,600 nautical miles, passing the Xisha and Nansha Islands, the Singapore Strait, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean before it arrives in the Gulf of Aden. China initiated its three-ship escort task force on Dec. 26 2008 after the United Nations Security Council called on countries to patrol the gulf and waters off Somalia, one of the world's busiest marine routes, where surging piracy endangered intercontinental shipping. 2 April 2009 Beijing - Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said that China sought joint efforts with the United States to push for "substantial progress" out of the newly-upgraded Strategic and Economic Dialogue. He said the decision to upgrade the dialogue to cabinet level meant a new historic start for China-US relations, and reflected the growing importance of bilateral cooperation. London - Vice Premier Wang Qishan of the State Council, who is accompanying President Hu Jintao at the G-20 London financial summit, met US Treasury Secretary Geithner. 2 April 2009 London - Commerce Minister Chen Deming made that clear China will conscientiously resist trade protectionism and oppose inappropriate protectionist measures adopted by other countries against China. Chen Deming revealed that during the current London summit, he met World Trade Organization (WTO) Director General Pascal Lamy, who expressed satisfaction with the trade measures taken by China since the start of the financial crisis. 2 April 2009 Beijing - China signed a contract with Argentina to exchange 70 billion yuan, (10.24 billion US dollars) in their respective currencies for use in trade and investment. This will mean that there is no need for each other's companies to buy dollars to pay for transactions. It has been treated as a step to reduce reliance on the dollar. 2 April 2009 Beijing - Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang called on parties involved in the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue to safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula and northeast Asia. "All relevant countries are obligated to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia as well as to push forward the six-party talks." Qin's remarks came in response to a question concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) planned satellite launch.
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