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fA fA Deceber l988/January 1989 The newspaper of the Anti-Apartheid Movemnent I 30p Pafrtijpats in a raly in Winlnk to cebibrate tNmibia Day -- iPatient før fredøm NEWS OFROM SOUTHERN AFRICA bna7 ANIARPTHEIDNEWS'a cls snt ta all nato1al r emnbeas of the AltI-Aparbid Moraitent sea membership trm an back page for DESIGNED by Rager Huddla, Artwakea TYPESET by Nancy Wbite PRINTED by East End ifsot Lid, Empsen Sweet, Bromley-by-Bow London E3 3LT ISSN M3-558 onternational etannhtiocSom deli-d :. ; reinted materialfoin bem exponetnd to Sonthi Afrc.a. Although resolution 418 O th, N'atibia-Angla border September 19 (1977) lame tote and ita traps -but there ara many more still totg tersfl wyre not comprehensive enoagh, if enfred World Campaign against and deal strictly it cild hve par- Military and Nuclear Cola- cases. lyed many of South Afriit's boration with SouthAfrica. proposal man wapon sti. The Front Line States iadvidui _awapos _yst _s and the liberation move- With byAbdul S Miaty men . were comulted and the ap Ilote cooperatin main- trying However, experience tatiedwiththem. keepo since has shown that, lile It was enpected that Mirage the earlier non-mandatory after some initial work by helicopt UN arm, embargo of 19631 the World Campaign the UN If the 64, most of the key western arms embargo committee more a governments have inter- could be strengthened but, compreh preted It narrowly and left with the coming to power devastati many loopholeswhich were of the Reagan administra- capabilit e aipltd hyretdria to tion, that became even more African obtain u large quantity'of its diffi-t1. (SADF) military needy from abroad. Since then, the Thatcher, is not s From the early t960s Reagan alliance has virtually producti South Africa began t o paralysad the UN machinery It is develop its internal arms and the World Campaign has paigning prodaction capability with had to continue its work other a the assistance of western companies. Thh 'mouledT 0oape tfirmsJapansus] aiaembling vaioas items ~ ~ l~~ mthr than making them www.nuance.com even day it doe. ot have uranium tb the industrial platform neceaaary to produce modemPDF military equipment. Create! FourJapaneseelectricpower partner, 5 Trial It developed close colla- companies are phasing out TheJ boration with Israel during purchases of South African is now athe mid-1971s and later and Nainibian uranium in a corporal with Taiwan and Chile for move that will halt sales discretic the joint production of arms from South African suppliers South and ammunition, andfromRTZ,whichcanIn1977, the UN Security tols the Rowing uranimm Council established a special mine in Namibia. SOVIE comnamittee to monitor the The Tohoku, Kansi, The AA arms embargo. It had very Chubu and Kyushu compa- approac] limited powers and all nies say theywill increase of the U attempts at effective nports from Australia, enrichit enforcement have been Canada and the USA instead. South blocked by the major ThegiantTokyo Electricfollowinwesternpowers. Companyis also considering the Fi Britainhasbeenthemain aban. informa culprit - in 1980 it entered Their decision follows Campaig a reserve on all 16 proposals the recent suspension of Uraniun made by the arms embargo sales of South African (CANU committee to strengthenthe productsbya numberof InIannaembargol Japaneseretail chains,and athe AAI The AAM has campaigned reduction in vehicle exports the Soi for an arms embargo since to South Africa by majorstrictp1960andmadenamerous manufacturers. enricm representations in Britain It reflects international processil and abroad to secure an pressure on the Japanese nating effective end to all forms of government to enforce sanc- Namibia military and naclea clla- ions, at the end o1 a year in Altbi boration with South Africa. which Japan's trade with with rei In 1979,at thesuggestion South Africaexpandedby USSR F of the United Nations 19% and the country in core Special Comnamittee Against replaced the US as the has bee, Apartheid, it initiated the regime's number one trading USSR d with a variety of It has submitted a to the UN and to ai governments. the help of Israel, arthoid regime is to modernise and erational very old and other aircraft, er, and submarines. embargo ia applied tricty and made ensive, it canhave a ingeffect onthe ty of the South Defence Force since South Africa elf-sufficient in the on of arms. vital that in cam. for economic and auctions, the arms embargo is not neglected if it is made more effective the Pretoria regime will not he able to carry out its military aggression and dostabilisation in the region and within South Africa, apartheids 'last line of defence', the SADF, can be seriously undecmined. World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, PO Box 2, Lindeherg- Gaard, N-1007 Oslo 10, Norway Tel: 010-472 301345 Fax: 010-472 303381 Tel- 72314 AAM N Telogrammes: Antiapoarthaid Oilo ?ends ade Namibian and South African Japanese government uranium, this banapparently ncouraging Japanese does not cover uramnium ions to 'exercise originating in South Africa n' in dealings with and Namibia which has been Africa. 'hexed', Le converted into uranium hexafluoride. Both the AAM and the TUNION NamibiaSupportCommittee has made a further have obtained evidence that to the government uranium originatinginSouth ISSR over its role in Africa and Namibia is being g Namibian and processed by British Nuclear African uranium Fuels Ltd into uranium .g the publication in hexafluoride and then nancai Times of shipped to the USSR for tion compiled by the enrichment. The AAM has in Against Namibian again called on the Soviet Contracts Union to cease this practice. C). he past 12 months, BRITAIN i has been pressing The Namibia Support Conat Union to adopt a mittee reports that shippolicy banning the ments of Roing uranium ent or anyother to Britain have been greatly ng of uranium orgi reduced as a result Of n South Africaor boycott action through a- trade union blockades. ough in meetings In Liverpool the Mersry presentatives of the Dock Cowww.nuance.commpany iscontinuing oreign Ministry and its efforts to get the boycot spondence the AAM lifted, but TGWU dockinformed that the worker' stewards have been does not enrich standing firm. NamibiaPDF- independence Create! 5 Trial in 1989 Chester Cracker, architect of the US Policy since 1980 of 'constructive engagement in Southern Africa, is of appeasing Pretoria in order to extend US influence especially in Angola, is walking off with the media plaudits. The commentators gave him the credit for the S eneva agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban too ps from Angola. What is the reality? The FAPLAs (Angolan armed forces) and Cuban internationalists gave Pretoria a bloody noew in early 1988, proving that no military victory could be achieved in Angola. For P W ftha to continue the war now would mean to lose more white soldiee. and mere planes - ireplaceable because of the arms embargo. The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), aimed wing of SWAPO, has sho a tenacity which has constantly stretched the occupying forces and upped the cost of the illegal occupation. Speculation of a South African debt default in 1989 is rift in tha City. The Botha regime is staggering under the impact of the combined effects of sanctions, disinvement, and the costs of sustaining the regional war, the occupation of Namibia, and the top-heavy apparatus of apartheid and repression in South Africa. As Anti-Apartheid News goes to press, South Africa has not yet endorsed the agreement reached between officials in Geneva. The Pretoria regime now has to weigh two unappetsing options. Either they can approve the Geneva deal, accept a new UN Security Council decision on a date for Namibia's independence, allow in the UN Transitions Assistance Group (U NTAG). and proceed to Namibia's independence late in 1989. The predictable outcome is a SWAPO victory in the 5Nsupervised elections, and the rapid disintegration of Unite as a mitrry surrogate for Pretoria's armed forces. Or they can reject the Geneva deal, continue the occupation of Namibia and the war in Angola by supporting Unite, risk much tougher international sanctions, and be forced to default on the foreign debt whose repayment is already obliging Pretoria to run gold stocks dangerously low. If Pretoria new goes for the first option, it will hope to salvage from the wreckage of its dream of regional domination ewe consolatioe prizes. In Namibia, by spending lavishly on the election campaign of the puppet groups, and sabotaging wherever possible SWAPS's campaign, it will seek to deny SWAPO an outright victory. Internationally, it will press its western allies to put a freeze on sanctions, or batter, get the US and EC measures withdrawn, and seek to renegotiate its debt on easy terms, RES 435 IN PRACTICE Initially, a formal ceasefire between South African forces and SWAPO will need to be signed. The sequence thereafter is laid down in the plan Which was adopted by the UN Secarity Council in resolution 435, as follows: Date X (still to be agreed) for start of implementation: SN Special Representative (UNSR) arrives with civilian and military staff. UNTAG forces (ultimately to reach strength of 7,500) to begin to daploy in Namibia, and to emitor policn forces. Release of political prisoners to comemenc. Two weeks after ceasefira: Demilitarised zone (DMZ) 50km en either side of the Namibia/ Angola and Namibia/Zambia borders to be esteblished, Within sic weeks of date X: South African forces to be reduced to 12,000. Within nine weeks; South African forces raduced to 8,000. Completion of release of political prisoners. Within 12 weeks: South African forces reduced to 1,500 and restricted to two bases Start of week 13: Official election campaign to start and ran for about four months.