Legislating During War: Conflict and Politics in Colombia Juan S. Morales∗ Collegio Carlo Alberto University of Turin July 24, 2020 Abstract This paper studies how politicians and their constituents respond to political violence by investigating the case of the Colombian civil conflict. I use data on rebel attacks, legislators’ tweets and roll-call votes, and I employ event study and difference-in-differences empirical methods. Twitter engagement (as a proxy for popular support) increases after rebel attacks for both incumbent party legislators and for tweets with a "hard-line" language. Legislators increase their support for the incumbent party after attacks, but only when the government has a hard-line policy position, as inferred both from the recent historical context and from text analysis of the president’s tweets. Though the effects are initially large they last less than two weeks. The empirical results are consistent with a political economy model of legislative behaviour in which events that shift voters’ views, and the presence of rally ‘round the flag effects, elicit different politician responses depending on the policy position of the incumbent party. Finally, I identify a set of potentially affected congressional votes, suggesting that these conflict-induced swings in incumbent support can have persistent policy consequences. JEL Codes: D72;D74;H56;O10 Keywords: civil conflict; legislative decision-making; roll-call votes; political language; social media ∗Collegio Carlo Alberto, Piazza Arbarello 8, 10122, Torino, TO, Italy (e-mail:
[email protected]). I thank the editor, Maria Petrova, and anonymous referees for their careful reviews and suggestions. I am grateful to Gustavo Bobonis, Albert Berry, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Michel Serafinelli for their guidance and support.