AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF
Ahmad Jarer Mahmod for the Master of Science Degree in Social
Science presented on May 14, 1982.
Title: Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Emirates
Abstract approved: ~f. ~ /I
The universally Nationalist movement emerge~ during the nineteenth century. It resulted in many international changes. The Arab
Nationalist movement emerged in the early years of the twentieth century. In the beginning, it was confused with Islam because of historical circumstancos. During its development, Arab nationalism had three stages: (1) Pan-Islam, (2) liberal nationalism, and
(3) radical nationalism.
The results of Arab nationalism's revival was diversified
--in time and power--among the Arab countries, according to each one's conditions. The Arabian Gulf Emirates were not influenced by Arab nationalism except in the late 1950's. The main reasons were: the British domination over and isolation of the Emirates, in addition to their poverty and backwardness.
In the late 1960's Britain announced her intent to withdraw from the area. This announcement put the Emirates in a critical political position in spite of their economic improvement because of their oil exports since the early 1960's. During that critical era Arab nationalism had a great influence, which determined the attachments and the identity of the emirates.
Arab countries, motivated by Arab nationalist feelings, contributed to the Emirates (before and after the British withdrawal), by offering them large missions in many fields such as administration, education, health, military assistance, etc.
On December 2, 1971, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were formally established as a federal state of seven emirates. The
UAE in the same year became a major participant in any regional activity. It also became a member of the Arab league, the United nations, and many international organizations.
In spite of many favorable factors available to the UAE, there have been some obstacles to its success; however, these obstacles could be overcome through effort and time. The UAE is a young Arab country. It has many prerequisites of success and is expected to attain more solidarity and power.
As Arab nationalism was a contributing factor to the UAE, the UAE experiment made a strong argument for the theory of Arab nationalism and its main principle and goal, the Arab unity. ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
A Thesis
Presented to
the Department of Social Science
EMPORIA STATE UNIVERSITY
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
By
Ahmad Mahmod
May, 1982 . ,f'\ , •
1 J'. (,
Department
-~~.- -Approved for the Graduate Council
Hli:". ~130232 MEMORIES
A mixture of feelings and thoughts occupied my mind when I
looked through the window of the plane to the Gulf I loved after many years of living on its shores and after fluctuations between success and failure, rest and struggle, and many other contradictions.
My feelings and thoughts, which lasted much longer than the several hours of the flight to the United States, did not relate to my personal experience in that land of the Arabian Gulf as they related to the incredible changes that occurred in the few years
I spent there.
In my imagination were two extremely large colored pictures of the same place, but I could hardly remember the old one, "The
Trucial States," to which I came some years ago, and I could scarcely distinguish the new one, "The United Arab Emirates," which I was leaving. The place~ were the same, but the features Were different.
The first picture was darker brown, dusty, shredded, poor, and isolated while the second was brighter brown with large green spaces, clean, shiny, unified, and related nationally and internationally.
Now, and maybe forever, I still remember my first day in the
Trucial States and how it took me the whole day to reach the place that I was heading for, a whole day between the airport in Abu
Dhabi and AI-Ain--"one emirate"--of heat, humidity, stuck in the burning sand and passing three immigration centers and the last day in the United Arab Emirates when it took me two hours over a soft highway in an air-conditioned car passing no imnligration centers between Al-Ain and Dubai (two Emirates) .
These two pictures are just the first and the last; between them lay years of my life, which I spent looking for adventure, wealth, and knowledge. From my knowledge and efforts a great part of this research developed.
iii ACKNOWLEIX;MENTS
First, I wish that every person mentioned could read my native language (Arabic) because what I am going to say could be said much better, either in shape or meaning, if I could write it in Arabic.
However, I hope that the mentioned persons, in addition to the readers of this thesis, will excuse my simple English language because the barriers of the language could be better understood by those who express their thoughts in a foreign language.
In simple English I extend my deep thanks and appreciation to
Emporia State University, the administration, and the faculty, and in particular Dr. Philip Kelry, who gave me more than I could expect of his time, effort, and cooperation, in addition to his continuing encouragement, which improved my attitude toward writing and researching. ~1r. Earl Rohrbaugh gave much time and advice either inthis study or during my repeated visits to ask questions and consult him. Dr. Harry Waters' humbleness and encouragement were always greatly appreciated. Gratitude is expressed to President
Dr. Visser, who was the first of my encouragers when I first'attended
Emporia State University, and Mr. James Harter, the adviser of international students, for his simplicity and cooperative spirit at all times.
I also thank all of the Emporia people for being great people and for making that town a great place in which to live. I also
:Lv thank all of my friends in Emporia for giving me a pleasant time and life there.
Outside of Emporia, I thank Dr. Mahmod Ghandeo for being such a good and helpful friend and Loda Newcomb for her assistance in editing and typing this work and helping me avoid many language problems.
In my private life I thank my wife Hayat, who sacrificed her own rest and carried without any complaint the family responsi bilities, either while residing in the UAE, where she fulfilled her job's duties and her family duties, or while she was in the
United States and saved my life from loneliness while exerting efforts to help in keeping our house clean and a lovely place.
Last but not least, I apologize to my children for the time that
I may have taken from them and for being absent from them either in the UAE or most of the daylight hours in the United States.
A. J. M.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
MEMORIES ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS vi
LIST OF TABLES x
LIST OF FIGURES xi
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Importance of the Study 5
Statement of the Problem 6
Nationalism 7
Definition of Nationalism 8
Arab Nationalism . . . 12
Determinant Factors of Arab Nationalism 13
Language 13
History 14
Race .. 15
Religion 16
Historical Background 17
Arab Nationalism in the Arabian Gulf Region 23
Islam and Nationalism 25
v:i Chapter Page
II. THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 28
Geographical Concept 28
Population 29
Historical Background 32
Social Concepts 41
Origin of the UAE Population 41
Social Characteristics 43
Nomadic Life 43
Tribalism 43
Traditionalism 44
Religion . . . 44
Classlessness 44
On the Way to the Union 44
Period of Uncertainty, 1968-1971 . 48
Stage of Negotiations and Achievements . 53
III. FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE FACTORS 59
Favorable Factors 59
Arab Nationalism 59
Historical Factor 60
Geographical Factor 61
Political Factor . 61
Domestic Factors 61
Regional Factors 63
Social Factors . . 63
Economical Factors 6L.
v:Li. Chapter Page
Unfavorable Factors 69
Lack of a Strong Central Power 69
Dual System of the Government Structure 69
Mismanagement 70
Social Problems 71
Nomadic Life . 74
Tribal System 75
External Obstacles 77
Education 79
Federal Planning 80
Governmental Management 80
Nomad Settlement . . . . 81
Labor and Labor Organization 81
IV. THE UAE TODAY 83
Level of Unification Existing in the UAE 85
Federation Structure 86
The Supreme Council of the Union 87
The President and the Vice President 89
The Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) 91
The Federal National Council (FNC) 92
The Judiciary 94
Political Development Achievements 95
V. Sill1MARY 101
Arab Nationalism 102
Arab Nationalism in the Arabian Gulf 103
Islam and Nationalism 103
viii ...... ---- ------...... _---_...._---
Chapter Page
The United Arab Emirates • 104
On the Way to the Union 105
Favorable and Unfavorable Factors 106
The UAE Today 106
Conclusion . • . 107
Factors Related to the Concept of Nationalism 108
Factors Related to Arab Nationalism 108
Factors That Hastened the Steps Toward Unification 110
Factors That Pointed the Directi.on of the Union 111
Factors That Supported and Facilitated the Success of the Federation 112
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
ix ". ~, ;.", .
LIST Ol~ TABLES
Table Page
1. Increase of Population of Emirates and Main Cities in the UAE, 1968-1975 31
2. Oil Production in the UAE 65
3. Abu Dhabi Annual Development Programs, 1972-1974 Budget Provisions ...... • . 67
4. Grants Offered by Arab-OPEC Countries to the Third World, 1970 and 1973-1977 ...... 98
5. Participation of Arab Financing Organization in OPEC, 1973-1977 ..•...... • 99
x LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. UAE Government Structure, 1972 ...... 87
xi LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Increase of Population of Emirates and Main Cities in the DAE, 1968-1975 31
2. Oil Production in the DAE 65
3. Abu Dhabi Annual Development Programs, 1972-1974 Budget Provisions ...... 67
4. Grants Offered by Arab-OPEC Countries to the Third World. 1970 and 1973-1977 ...... 98
5. Participation of Arab Financing Organization in OPEC, 1973-1977 . 99
x I ~~~~~~~~------~-----,_.-----
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During this decade the name of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
has become known worldwide (1) because of its large oil export.s to
western and eastern countries, (2) through its effective contri
butions to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and (3) because of its increasingly important participation in
international political and economical matters.
Before the discovery of oil in the UAE in the early 1960's,
few individuals, even leaders and scholars, had knowledge concern
ing these tiny emirates,and their location on the west southern l coast of the Arabian Gulf or their inhabitants of one fourth of
a million people. Even most Arab countries ignored these emirates
(shaikhdoms)2 until recently.
They have been excluded from outside attention and considera
tion in political and economical aspects, not because other Arabs
excluded them from the Arab nation3 but because they believed these
lArabian Gulf (Map 1): The Gulf bordered by Iran on the north and by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE on the south. It is connected with the water of the Indian Ocean on the eastern side.
2Shaikhdom: A political body governed by a Shaikh, who is a ruler of a tribe or tribes.
3Arab nation: All of the Arab population in Asia, Africa, or elsewhere.
1 2 _.--.
N IillGB uover 500m t Kilometres 200 .-:.., o- 50 100 150 0 o ! R.A N
ARAB/AN GULF
S AU D I A R A B I A
i\'t/\lrfA.N C 'LTC --
~ , ~"'" '
3
tiny bodies were unable to assume a substantial role in the Arabic
envirorunent.
The geographical boundaries of the Arab nation traditionally
recognized by Arabs and non-Arabs lie between the Atlantic Ocean
on the west and the Indian Ocean on the east with the Arabian Gulf
area an essential part of the Arab-land core. 1 When nationalism developed in the Arab wor1d in the early
decades of the twentieth century, the movement included all of the
political bodies of the geographic area, no matter how large or .3 small the political entities. Differences occurred and continue
to occur in the reaction of individual Arab states toward the general
nationalistic movement. Such differences most frequently reflected
explicit internal circumstances existing in each country.
The reaction toward Arab nationalism in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt,
and Yemen has been significant in creating changes, revolutions,
and great movements toward Arab unification; reactions in other
areas, such as the Arabian Gulf, did not provide such t;esults .
Thus, the Arab Emirates2 were an area in which circumstances
did not allow an effective movement toward Arab nationalism except
after the many economic and political achievements of recent' years.
Lately, nevertheless, certain advancements have resulted in a unity
1Arab world: All Arabs in all Arab countries, The term in cludes the concept of population and geography,
2An Emirate (Amarat): A political body governed by an Ameer (a prince). In the Arabic sense it is equivalent to the shaikhdom.
3Ya018 Ahmad Batreq. Studies in the ~rab Society. Dar Al NnhaT A1 Arabia, Beirut, Lebanon, 1969, p. 115. 4
among them, and the establishment of the UAE in 1971 as an important
and participating organ of the Arab countries.
Arab nationalism, as a part of universal nationalism, has
produced many changes in the Arab community as world nationalism
produced many changes in the international community.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the contribution
of Arab nationalism to the establishment of the most successful
experiment of unity among the Arab countries, the UAE.
j This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter discusses the concept of nationalism, in general, and Arab national
ism, in particular, in order to trace the emergence of Arab national
ism, its development through various historic stages, and the ways
in which it has been able to produce some examples of unification
in the Arab world, among which the UAE has been the recent and
most successful event.
The second chapter gives a geographical and historical back
ground of the UAE to help the reader establish an image of the
UAE.
The third chapter explains the factors favorable to the estab
lishment of the UAE and also explains the obstacles that faced
this new state.
In the fourth chapter the UAE political structure and function
ing, the presidency, and other similar aspects are explained.
F:lnal1y, in the fifth chapter conc1us:Lons nre given and answers to
the questions raised concerning the role of Arab nationalism in
the unification of the Arab emirates are provided.
-- 5
Importance of the Study
Nationalism is not a new word in world politics. Since nation
alism has emerged in the world stage, new national states have been
created because of its influence, which created political borders
and conflicts and war during the late 1800's and the early 1900's.
A large number of books and other kinds of publications have been
written about this fundamental issue.
Although most of the writings about nationalism were European
or about European nationalistic movements, a number of publica
tions about Arab nationalism have been written by Arab and foreign
authors.
Since the UAE began to occupy its significant place in regional,
Arabic, and international societies, many experts have begun to
write about this newly established state. In addition, the ministry
of information of the UAE published many reports and studies con
cerning aspects in the UAE.
Thus, Arab nationalism as a part of world nationalism and the
UAE have been subjects of many writings and much discussion, but a
study that connects the two issues does not exist. This study
is important because it joins these two issues, the Arab nationalism
and the UAE,under one concept and explains the relations that existed
and still exist between them in the different stages of their re
actions toward each other. Establishing a hypothesis that governs
the interrelationship between the Arab nationalism and the DAE
adds importance and uniqueness to this study.
-_..... ----..... :'~ .,
6
Statement of the Problem
Arab nationalism has been a main cause of change in the Arab
world. The quantity and quality of change have been dependent on
the particular stage of Arab nationalism development. During the
early years of the recent revival of Arab nationalism, Arabs' demands
were merely a recognition of a distinct Arab nation by the Ottoman
authorities. Later, when Arab nationalism reached a stage of radi
calism, even independence became an insufficient goal of the Arab
struggle. New demands inevitably occurred; the principal demand
has been for IIArab unity."
During the Arab history, Arab unity paralleled the revival
of Arab nationalism. The first experience of this parallelism
occurred during the expansion of the Islamic state in the seventh
century. The second experience occurred in the thirteenth century,
following the dismissal of the crusades from the Arab landj the
third experience has developed since the early decades of the current
century. Among the numerous attempts at unification in the Arab
world was the establishment of the DAE.
The principal goal of this thesis is to study the DAE as one
of the recent responses to Arab nationalism. The DAE was analyzed
geographically, historically, politically, economically, and socially
to reach a hypothesis about the relation between the success of
this experiment and the Arab nationalism and to discover to what
extent Arab nationalism was a main reason for the unity among the
Arab Emirates of the Gulf. 'Jp
:.",'
7
Nationalism
Nationalism is one of the most important factors in forming
or reforming borders of contemporary nation states. Countries that
are not established upon nationalistic bases and that do not suffer
interior nationalistic conflicts are scarce in today's international 1 society.
Nationalism historically served as a main support for the
unification of small political entities and the creation of new
and large political units in the form of nation states such as those
that occurred in Europe during the nineteenth century and the early
twentieth century. In some other experiences, nationalism did not
change the borders but created mental and emotional power, which
in the end effected a rebirth of SOme countries, such as China,
under the communist government in the 1950's and the 1960's.
At certain times the concept of nationalism was to create
problems similar to what happened during the early 1900's to the
European colonial powers. Colonialism broke apart certain countries
and annexed some territories to other entities, which could not
absorb their dissimilar people and cultures. Examples of these
practices are represented in the Middle East as follows: Iskandarona
Province, which the French government took from Syria and gave to
Turkey; Lebanon Mountain (Lebanon), which the French government
took from Syria to establish the state of Lebanon according to
1 It can be easily noticed that countries including different nationalities suffer continuous problems and clashes between those nationalities, no matter how large or powerful these countries are. Examples: USSR, Iran, Cyprus. The most important exception of this generalization is the USA. 8
religious factors,l the division of what historically used to be
known as Al-Sham2 into many handicapped states (Palestine, Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon) and finally the creation of Israel in the care
of the Arab nation, Palestine.
Thus, nationalism is a concept that can be used as a double-
edged weapon. It can help to solve national and international
problems. At the same time it can create problems if it is used
in a bad manner. In addition, nationalism has been changing and
developing according to the dominating ideas in the environment.
It varies from people to people, from time to time, and from one
theorist to another.
Definition of Nationalism
Perhaps the most argued point on the subject of nationalism
is the accurate definition of the term. Some writers attempt to
explain the meaning of nationalism by providing their own or others'
definitions,of the word, but other writers do not clearly define
the term, not because they are unaware of any definitions of nationalism
but because a universal definition of the term is still lacking.
lThe state of Lebanon has been established as a Christian state under the protection of the French government. In spite of the Lebanese goverrunentls refusal to report any information about popula tion, it is well known that Christians in Lebanon were and still are a minority. The Lebanese state's discrimination against other re ligions was one of the main reasons for the civil war in Lebanon, which has been taking place since 1976.
2Al-Sham: An Arabic term that used to be a region including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. •
9
Nationalism is what the nationalists have made it. "It
is not a neat fixed concept but a varying combination of be
liefs and conditions."l
The word IInationalism" is derived from nation, but the
etymology of the word IInation" helps little, for it comes
from the Latin word "natio," which has the same stem as IInatus, II 2 and both come from "nascor," which means "I am burn. 11 To
cast the light on the concept of "nationalism,tl the word should be related to the nation in its modern understanding. Thus,
explaining the concept of "nationtl is the crucial step to reach
a comprehension of the term "nationalism."
In this sense, many definitions were given to the word
"nation. II The following ones present an example of the difference between one definition and another. The Oxford Dictionary de
fines the nation as "an extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people usually organized as a separate political state and occupying a definite territory. ,,3
Earnest Renau stated, "The concept to continue life in' common is the basic factor in the foundation of a nation. 1I4
1Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism, Myth and Reality. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1955, p. 7.
2Ibid., p. 11. 30xford Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 30. /.~Hans Kohi.Ll, Nationalism, Its Meaning and History. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New York, 1955, p. 139. 10
Universally, there remains disagreement about defining the factors that form a nation, but general agreement exists that certain factors must be presented for the forming or the creating of a nation. These factors can be summarized as history, language, race, customs, and religion. Theories and theorists disagree on the exact ranking of such factors.
As disagreement concerning the definition of nation exists, a larger disagreement also exists concerning the definition of nationalism. Thus, national theorists or scholars have given many definitions of nationalism.
The Oxford Dictionary gave more than one definition of nationalism. According to it, "nationalism is the doctrine that certain nations (as contrasted with individuals) are the object of divine election or devotion to one's national aspira tion, a policy of national independence."l While Hans Kahn defined nationalism as "A state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of 2 the individual is felt to be due the nation state."
Among the Arab national theorists, Abud Rahman Al-Bazzaz defined nationalism as "The effective belonging by feeling and belief to a group whose individuals think alike or are mutualiy responsive in feelings and aims of certain common goals which they select to attain in their own political ways. ,,3
1 Oxford Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 30. 2 Kohn, Sl..p. cito, p. 9. 3 Tnreq Y. Ismael, The Arab Left. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 19i6,--p. 6. 11
Indeed, the fact that the meaning of nationalism historically
has been changing added more difficulty to the task of attaining
a universal definition of the term since it appeared in Europe in
the early 1700's.
The first reference to the word "nation" appeared at Leipzig
University after a religious and scholastic dispute in Prague
involving Bohemian and non-Bohemian nations. The sense in which
the term was used was restricted thus by A union to defend the
common interests of the compatriots of one of the four "nations" 1 among the Leipzig professions.
In England, the term was used for the first time in 1836
in the Oxford DictionarY,and the dictionary gave the "previously
mentioned" definition of nationalism. However, in addition to
the differences of definitions, there is still a difference in 2 how the term is currently used.
lAnthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. Harper and Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1971, p. 167. 2The word "nationalism" can mean one or more of the following: 1. National character or nationality 2. An idiom, phrase, or trait peculiar to the nation 3. A sentiment of devotion to one's nation and advocacy of its interests 4. A set of aspirations for the independence and unity of the nation 5. A political program embodying such aspiration in organization form 6. A form of socialism based on the nationalization of industry 7. The doctrine of divine election of nations 8. The whole process of the formation of nations in history Ibid., p. 168.
Iibz p
'j.",
12
Arab Nationalism
Nationalism is a universal concept since it has mutual charac
teristics and determinant factors. Differentiations occur only
in some nonessential points such as the main factors among the
determinant factors and stages of development. Thus, Arab
nationalism does not differ in its core from the European, Chinese, l or any other nationalisms in theory or practice.
Al-Bazzaz, a foremost exponent of what has been termed
"Liberal Arab Nationalism," defined nationalism as "the effec
tive belonging by feeling and belief to a group whose individuals
think alike or are mutually responsive in feeling and aim of
certain common goals which they select to attain in their own 2 political ways."
In this definition, Al-Ba~zaz included important ingredients
and provisions that are necessary to fulfill the requirements of
the concept of nationalism (1) A group of people distinct from
other groups, (2) the individuals' feelings of belonging to this
people or society, (3) goals of the majority of people, and (4)
chosen political ways of achieving the goals. Thus, Al-Bazzaz's
definition of nationalism is the one considered in this study.
IExcluding some European practicing of nationalism such as Nazism. 2 IsmaeJ., .Q.P~~~t., p. 6. 13
Determinant Factorsof Arab Nationalism
Determinant factors of nationalism, in general, are similar.
Geography, history, language, race, literature factors, etc. are among the factors that affect the existence of any nationalism.
The difference between a certain nationalism determinant facto~; f such as Arab nationalism, and other nationalism factors, exists in the emphasis each nation places on each factor. According to
Arab nationalism, the main factors that need to be discussed follow.
Language
In the ancient history of Arab, before the era in which Islam emerged, Arabs were known as "a people of language." Language to them was not just a medium through which people expressed their minds and emotions, but it was also their main instrument for communicating, for fraternizing, for fighting, and for recording 1 history. When Islam came and the Holy Quran was revealed in the Arabic language, the language was given a significant boost.
During the Golden Era of the Islamic State in the seventh century, the Arabic language became even more powerful. Its importance to all levels of people did not decline but increased, especially with the existence of the Classical Arabic Literature. During the
Dark Ages of Arabia in the fourteenth century, under the Ottoman
Empire md later the European colonial period, the Arabic language did not lose its glory, but the Arabs themselves did.
lThe holy Quran (Karan): The holy book of the Is lamic religion . • 14
The discovery of the Arabic classic literature in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century by intellectual
Arabs and the cultural revival movement were the major stimuli of the Arab awakening. One can say that the Arabic language is l the soul of the Arab nation and that Arab national theorists consider it as the main determinant of Arab nationalism.
History
History is second to language as a determinant of Arab nationalism. Al Husary, who asserted that language and history are the basic constituents of Arab nationalism, stated, IIWhile language forms the soul and life of a nation, history forms its memory and feeling. 1I2
Arab history is sufficiently long and rich to promote the creation of common feelings among the people of the Arab nation.
Memories of Arab llistoric achievements are still very much alive in the minds of contemporary Arabs, giving them pride in the past and aspiration for the future. Whereas Arab historians did not ignore non-Arab history, neither did they neglect the contribu tions of other peoples and cultures such as Roman, Persian, .
Indian, and Greek Ancient cultures.
IArab national theorists: Arab intellectual who formalized and defined or clarified Arab nationalism; among those were Zurayk, 'l'ahlaw, Al-Bazzaz, Al-Husari, and Sayeg.
2M. F. Anabtawi, Arab Unity in Terms of Law. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963, p. 32. 15
Arab thinkers and writers still argue whether race is a deter minant factor of Arab nationalism. The majority of Arab national theorists do not classify "race" as a determinant factor of Arab nationalism although a tiny majority of them) such as Darwaza, still attribute to race a leading part in the formation of Arab nationalism.
"It is not because unity of race is a prerequisite to na tiona lism," he said, "but because such a unity, if it existed, would strengthen the bonds of nationalism."l
He also advocated that early Syrians,Egyptians, Sudanese,
Phonicians, and Berbers are said to have descended from races, mainly Arab, which originated in the Arab peninsula. However,
Darwaza is one of the few individuals who' believed in effectiveness of race as a determinant factor of Arab nationalism.
In contrast, the majority of Arab scholars do not consider this factor because of (1) assuming a pure race of a nation means the isolation of the people from other peoples for many centuries.
This cannot possibly occur theoretically and practically. In addition,
Arab history stands as a witness against this assumption. (2) The
Arab national theorists' fear that this concept could be us~d against
Arabs by developing racial feelings among minorities in the Arab war 1d.
The example that disproves the effectiveness of the race factor is the consideration of the JeWish state (Israel) as an
lIbid., p. 5. 16
enemy of the Arabs while Jews historically share the same race
and origin as Arabs. l
Religion
Undoubtedly the Middle East is one area where religion is mixed
closely with most concepts of the daily life. Islam, the major
religion of Arabs, influenced the formation of Arab nationalism
in its earliest stages, when Islam and Arabism were mixed in a
confusing manner.
This issue has been the subject of many arguments. Scholars
also were divided into supporters and opposers of the importance
of Islam's effect in the creation of Arab nationalism. Supporters 2 such as C. Earnest Dawn, Fayez sayagh, and Zuryk considered the
Islam religion a great contribution to Arab nationalism while
opposers such as Nuseibeh, Husari, and M. Aflaq3 did not give
lArabs are descended from Qahtan (Ebr) , the great grandson of Shem, who is also the great grandfather of the Jews. 2C• Ernest Dawn stated, "For many centuries, Moslems viewed nationalism in terms of religion and dynasty." C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 1973. Fayez Sayegh said, "Is lam has been called by Arab Theorists 'the greatest fact ... in the Arab nation's history" while Zuryk, the Arab Christian, argued, "Arabs cannot understand their old legacy which is a part of contemporary Arab culture without understanding Islam as a religion." Anabtawi, op. cit., p. 31.
3Nuseibeh advocated, "One of the main reasons for rej ecting religion as a factor of Arab nationalism is the existence of an important Christian Arab element in the more populous and advanced areas of the Arab world." Anablawi, op. cit., p. 33. M. Aflaq stated, "Contemporary Arabs do not des ire to have their nationalism based on religion. 11 Anablawi, op. cit., p. 3LL ',ii'
17
the religious factor any consideration. They believed that
"Islam ceased to be completely linked with Arab nationalism ever
since the Arab conquests resulted in people being arabisized with
out adopting Islam and in other professing Islam without being I arabisized," as Husari stated.
As a matter of fact, it is impossible for nationalism, which
means an aggregation of certain groups facing other human groups
to find its support in an international religion such as Islam.
Islam emphasizes its universal continuation and has no restric
tion on the spreading of its ideas. Thus, considering Islam as a
determinant factor of Arab nationalism seems irrational and
includes a contradiction within the Islamic religion itself.
Historical Background
The Arab awakening to their nationalism can be divided into
two historical periods. The first era occurred during the seventh
century before Islam's emergence. Arabs inhabited the Arabian
peninsula and founded cities in the Yemen and the Hejaz, villages
of Najd and elsewhere. They possessed their own culture, tradi
tions, habitations, meeting places, religion, and language. Groups
of them began to spread into areas contiguous to the Arab peninsula;
thus, from them came the Lakhmids of Iraq, the Nebataean and
Ghassanids of Syria, the Harranids of Harran, and the Tadmurites . 2 between I rag and Syrla.
2 Lakhmids, Nabataeans, Gassanids, Harranids and Tadmurites are ancient people who lived in the Arab area. They form the origins of the contemporary Arab people. · :,','
18
These small units clashed many times with their powerful
neighbors, the Persians and the Byzantines. Since that time,
Arabs' realization of their unity began to take place and was
more important than other feelings such as religion.
@len Islam appeared; Arabs were influenced by its message
and emerged from their peninsula to spread its word. During the
battles between Moslems and Persians, Christian Arabs of Hirai
joined the Moslem Arabs, and the two parties fought side by side
against the Persians. 2 With the coming of Islam and the establish
ment of a powerful Islamic state,3 Arab nationalism gained support
and became clearer and more obvious.
The other awakening and realization of Arab nationalism began
in the nineteenth century. A movement toward this feat was first
organized in 1875, when five Christian Arabs formed in Beirut a
secret society that later enrolled 22 persons belonging to various
creeds and representing the enlightened elite of Lebanon. Their
activities were restricted to displaying in the cities of Syria a
series of anonymous placards that contributed to violent denuncia
tion of evils of the Turkish rule and exhorted the Arab population
to rebel and overthrow the Turkish leadership.
lHira: An old Arab city in the contemporary Iraq.
2Elie Kedourie (Ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa. An Nal Book. The World Publislling Company, New York, 1970, p. 294.
3The Islamic state gained tremendous power and international importance since the year 697, when Moslem armies conquered the Persians in ItAl-Qadesiah nattle. lI This possession of power and importance continued until 1097, when the crusades succeeded in destroying the Ar.ab state. · ;.1.'
19
"s ince 1918, II as C. Ernest Dawn stated, "the doctrine that
Arabs are a nation and that nationality is the basis of politics
has come to be accepted by a very large majority of Arab political 1 leaders."
In the process of tracing the development of modern Arab
nationalism, one can discern three distintt stages: pan Islam,
Liberal, and Radical. In the first stage Arab nationalism had
been viewed as a movement of realization of Arabism, and Arabs
demanded that Ottoman authorities recognize them as a distinct
nation. In addition, Arabs demanded freedom, such as autonomy,
and some rights, such as electing local congresses. During that
time, Ottoman Empire was still seen by Arabs as legally inheriting
the Islamic Khilafat: and thus it was considered as the main Islamic
state, which all moslems should follow and obey. This theme did not
allow the idea of an Arab diversion from the Ottoman Empire to
come to mind.
In the First Arab Conference (Paris, 1913), all of the conference
members emphasized that the Arabs belong to the Ottoman State as
i~ represented to them the legal Islamic state. 2
In this stage, the Turks were pleased with the attitudes of
the Arabs. At certain times Turkish intellectuals led that movement
and tried to appease the Arabic anger and absorb their excitement.
1 Dawn, op. cit., p. 122.
2Yonis Ahmad Batreeg, Studies in the Arab Society. Dar Al Nahdah Al-Arabia, Beirut, Lebanon, 1969, p. 117. 3 Kh:Ullfat mvnns: following in power. In the Islamic concept it means the ruling or the Muslim state. 20
This stage of Arab nationalism, which depended on the cooperation of the Turks, did not last long and did not serve the Arab's purposes.
The second stage, or what the Arab theorists called liThe
Liberal Nationalism, II emerged in the 1920' s although it continued to be confused with other factors such as religion and dynasty.
Tareq Ismael stated, "In 1920's there were two types of nationalism l in that area (The Arab countries) dynasty and liberal." Dynasty
Nationalism, as in Hejaz and Saudi Arabia, was hardly nationalism as the world generally understandsit today, and Liberal National ism, which most fully developed in Egypt, was frankly imitative of western ideas, institutions, technology, and aims. Four common concerns that set Arab Liberal Nationalism apart from both the earlier pan Islamists and from the later radical nationalists included:
1. The modernization of the Arab world
2. The relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism
3. The relationship between individuals and the state in the Arab society
4. The Palestine defeat and the nature of the Zionest threat
In this stage, concepts such as independence, unity, and freedom became clear and hypothesized. The most influential persons in spreading the new ideas were: Rifaah Al-Tahlawi of
Egypt, Constantine Zuryk of Syria, and Al Bazzar of Iraq. 21
The third stage, Radical Arab Nationalism, can be traced to
the Palestine War of 1948 and the consequent emergence of Israel.
This transformation shifted the emphasis of Arab nationalism from
the glories of the past to the failures of the present.
Tareq Ismael stated, ItThe palestine defeat sounded the death
of Liberal nationalism in the Arab world."l That defeat proved
that Arab nationalism failed to create the necessary Arab unity
and power to face their enemies militarily and socially.
Many questions were asked, and hundreds of books and articles were written during the Palestinian crisis. The great question was,
"Why did Arabs lose Palestine?" sayagh answered by stating, "All
reached the same conclusion: We (the Arabs) lost the Palestine
battle not only because we were naive enough to believe that since
right is on our side, the whole world will be on our side .
but also and particularly because Arab society was sIck and defec
tive, and because our energy was paralyzed by the diseases of our 2 society."
From such conclusions, the so-called Radical Arab Nationalism developed. That nationalism was very effective when it was combined with other aspects of the Arab world such as the development of education, economic power, and social movements.
The result of the convergence of Arab nationalism cannot be extensively discussed in this study, but the most important results were:
lIbid., p. 13. 2 MIt Anabtawi. fl-rab Unity in Terms of Law. Martinus Maijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963, p. 44. 22
1. The rise of some radical Arab parties and
movements such as Bath Arab Socialist Party,
Arab Nationalists Movement, National Union Front
(later known as the National Union of Popular
Forces). In addition. the rise of socialist
and communist ideas in the Arab world and the
establishment of many branches of the communist
party in most of the Arab countries can be
attributed to Radical Arab Nationalism.
2. In the political field during this period many
revolutions overthrowing old regimes. which were
linked with the growth of the new political move
ment, occurred. The most important revolutions
were: The Egyptian Revolution of 1952. the Al
gerian Revolution of 1954. and the Iraqi Revolu
tion of 1958. In addition, more revolutions took
place later in Libya. Yemen, Aden, and Oman.
3. In the nationalistic field resulting from the
Radical Arab nationalism categorizing "Arab
Unity" as a main principle and demand of Arabs,
there existed many attempts and experiments of
unity between Arab countries, such as: The United
Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) 1958, the Arab
Hashimite Union (Jordan and Iraq) 1958, the United
Arab Countries (Egypt and Yemen) 1958, The Central 1 ! \ r , ~ j , ;,1'"
23
Confederation (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) 1963, and
the latest union between the Arab Emirates of
the Arabian Gulf (The United Arab Emirates)
1971.
Practically all of these attempts except the UAE, which is
the major concern of this thesis, failed. The success of the UAE
to date marked an important and significant new departure in the
political history of the Arab world.
Arab Nationalism in the Arabian Gulf Region
"When the Arab tribes burst into the Mediterranean and Levantine
world," as Barbara Ward stated, "they carried with them a language
and a faith. These were planted from the shores of the Atlantic
to the mountains of India,"l Thus, Arab borders bet.ween the Atlantic
Ocean and the Indian Ocaan are well recognized by non-Arabs while
Arab borders are not an arguable subject for the Arab individual.
Those people who were residing on the Gulf shores and the Arab
Sahara around it, in spite of their relative isolation from the
center of events in the Arab world in the 1920's and 1940 l s,were
aware of and concerned with every incident that took place there.
As Arabs in all of the Arab world, they suffered from the Ar~b
defeat by Israel and from the Palestine crisis. Many educated
individuals from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Shargah (members of the UAE)
reacted deeply and loudly, literally and politically as other Arabs
did.
lEarbara Ward, Five Ideas that Change the World. W. W. North and Company, Inc., p. lIZ. 24
Poverty and backwardness of the Arab Gulf people made it
impossible for them to help other Arabs in that time. When
the Gulf states and emirates made their fortune with the oil discoveries, they became the strongest supporters of other Arab countries. They offered tremendous financial aids to the so called "first-line Arab countries" or "the facing Arab countries."l
Even before that, when thousands of Pa1estineans left their home land, the Arabs' national feelings made these states the best shelter for their Arab brothers "the Palestineans."
Those people for a long time had only their own world to live in without any disruption of their simple life except by 2 some natural intervention such as an aggravated "Touz" on their desert, some floods on their coasts, or a bad fishing season in their coastal waters. Those people were living in the area since their emergence on the earth, and they knew that they were Arabs without any questioning about their Arabism. They were born Arabs, talked and wrote the Arabic language, and lived and were proud of the Arabic customs. Ever since they existed, they have known who their brothers in Arabism were and who their enemies or neighbors from non-Arab countries were.
Obviously, Arab nationalism, as it is known today, did not exist, but they were Arabs before its existence and they had their
lFirst Line Arab countries for Facing Arab countries are the Arab countries that border Isreael, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.
2'1'oU8: very strong dusty winds blow in the interior parts of the Arab desert. 24
Poverty and backwardness of the Arab Gulf people made it
impossible for them to help other Arabs in that time. When
the Gulf states and emirates made their fortune with the oil
discoveries, they became the strongest supporters of other Arab
countries. They offered tremendous financial aids to the so
called "first-line Arab countries" or "the facing Arab countries."l
Even before that, when thousands of Palestineans left their home
land, the Arabs' national feelings made these states the best
shelter for their Arab brothers "the Palestineans."
Those people for a long time had only their own world to
live in without any disruption of their simple life except by 2 some natural intervention such as an aggravated "Touzll on their
desert, some floods on their coasts, or a bad fishing season in
their coastal waters. Those people were living in the area since
their emergence on the earth, and they knew that they were Arabs
without any questioning about their Arabism. They were born Arabs,
talked and wrote the Arabic language, and lived and were proud of
the Arabic customs. Ever since they existed, they have known who
their brothers in Arabism were and who their enemies or neighbors
from non-Arab countries were.
Obviously, Arab nationalism, as it is known today, did not
exist, but they were Arabs before its existence and they had their
IFirl'lt Line Arab countries for Facing Arab countries are the Arab countries that border Isreael, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt.
2Tous : very strong dusty winds blow in the interior purts of the Arab desert. 25
distinguishable "Being, II which caused manY.attempts to contain
them within the great neighboring empires of Persia and Rome to 1 fail. The same Arab feelings caused Arabs in Hira and Busra
to get military support very easily from the Arabs of Najd and
Hijaz in their skirmishes against the Persians and the Romans.
During the European colonial expedition in the Arab world,
colonialism did not affect the Arabism of the Gulf area. The
Portuguese invasion of the Gulf coasts and the British coneen
tration over the Gulf did not touch the cor e of the people's
lives or their principles. It dealt only with some of the leader
ship and power symbols and did not touch the inside life or
feelings of the Arab masses in the Gulf area.
Islam and Nationalism
The belief that Mohamad was the last messenger to be sent by God is the main principle of the Islamic religion. According to this belief, Islam is supposed to be a universal religion that does not distinguish between individuals.
This truth has been asserted in the holy Quran, the heavenly book of Islam, more than once. In addition, Mohammad himself emphasized the universality of Islam and an absolute equality between human individuals without any distinction Dr discrimination according to color, race, or nationality. Distinction could be made only by normative measurements, such as education, conduct,
Ill'-lra an'd J'~l1sra: Two historical Arab cities in Iraq and Syria. ,"'..-.------
i."" 26
1 and fear of God. In the Hadeeth, the second resource of Islamic
law and understanding, Mohammad, the messenger of God, said,
"You are all equal. An Arab is not better than non-Arab except
by the fear of God."
In short, all Islamic resources (Quran, Hadeeth and explana
tions) had affirmed the absolute equality between mankind indi
vidually, but there are some points of confusion according to
the following facts:
1. Quran has been revealed and then written in the
Arabic language.
2. Mohammad, the Islamic prophet, was an Arab.
3. Quran and Hadeeth included the traditional Arab
moralities.
4. Islam was the medium through which the Arabs
contributed to the history.
These facts made a group of Arab and Moslem scholars mix
in a confusing way Arab nationalism and Islam. To other scholars,
all of the previous points did not mean any special position to
the Arabs or to Arab nationalism.
The important point in this field is that most of the
scholars who advocated the tie between Arab nationalism and Islam
were Christians. Some of those Christians, such as Constantine
Zyrayk and Meshil Aflag, were the pioneers of the Arab nationalism
1 lladeeth: Speech; in the Islamic sense Hadeeth means every speech Moharmnad made concerning the. Islamic religion rules and explanations. 27
movement. Constantine Zurayk, who is considered the intellectual father of the liberal ntaionalist tradition argued, "In 1920' s
Arabs needed a sense of collective responsibility, a feeling of belonging to a nation but one of special sort, a nation which draws its inspiration from a religion; for the Arabs, this religion 1 can only be Islam. II
This confusion between Islam and Arab nationalism can be ex plained through three facts. (1) Islam has been playing a great role in the life of Arabs since its emergence; (2) the confusion has been produced by the Ottoman authorities to convince the
Arabs of the eligibility of the Ottoman domination and gain their support and their recognition of its legality; (3) finally, some modern Arab media worked hard to keep this confusion and to gain 2 politically from the Arabic world and the Islamic world.
However, it is important to notice that there is not any degree of paradox between Arab nationalism and Islam; on the con trary, there is a great deal of harmony between them. If both of them could be found in the heart of an individual or a country, this combination should lead the individual or the country toward perfection.
1 Tareq Ismael. The Arab Left. Syracuse University Press, New York, 1976, p. 3. 2 Egypt led Arab national movement from 1952 until the early 1970' s. At the same time she emphasized :f.ts Islamic face. In the mid 1970's and after its break with Arabs because of her negotiations with Israel, Egypt for the first time since its Arabisization, allowed some artJ.cles to be published in the main government' s newspaper, questioning thL~ relation betweon Egypt and the Arabs in terms of origin, nationality, or other aspects. CHAPTER II
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Geographical Concept
The United Arab Emirates consist of seven entities: Abu
Dhabi, Shargah, Ras Al-Khaima, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm
Al-Quwain. The states are located between the 22nd and the 26th
lines of latitude and the 51st and 56th lines of longitude. To
the north and the northwest are the Arabian Gulf and Qatar; to
the east is the Indian Ocean. Directly west and south is Saudi
Arabia, from which it is separated by the Rub-Alkali (Empty
Quarter). To the east the Emirates border Oman, which also has an enclave of the Musandam Peninsula, which commands the Straits of Hormuze and separates the Gulf from the Indian Ocean.
The UAE covers 32,000 square miles (close to 82,000 sq. km);
86.67 percent is contained in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,1 in addition to the land area, about 200 islands in the Arabian Gulf are under the control of the UAE. These include Abu-Dhabi, where the capital of the state is located, Das Delma, Umm al-Nar, Al 2 Sadiat, Al-Hamra, Tonb the small Abu Musa and Toub the great.
IMinistry of Information and Culture UAE, Facts and Numbers. Information Documentation Center, Abu Dhabi, 1980, p. 1.
2Toub the Small, Abu Musa and Tonb the Great Islands were occupied by Iran in 1971.
28 ....
: ~, .."
29
Extending to the Tropic of Cancer, the DAR experiences
extreme heat in the summer (100-120 F.); moderate temperatures
and north winds prevail from December to March. Humidity is
very high in the coastal areas, especially in the summer, rang
ing from 70 percent to 100 percent, and daily winds blow in from
interior areas, causing tremendous sand storms (Taus).
Population
In spite of the scarcity of population in the Gulf Region,
many workers from the Emirates emigrated to neighboring Arab
countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, in search
of work following the decline of the pearl industry at the end
of the second world war. At times emigration was also caused
by political disputes that arose between the ruler of one emirate
and various member tribes.
The inhabitants of the Arab Emirates in 1964 numbered
84,000, representing the lowest population of the Arab Emirates
during the present century because of the inhabitants' departure
for work in other countries. Following the commencement of
oil exports in commercial quantities in 1962 and the estab1ish
ment of the UAE in 1971, the population of the country began
to increase its number, rising from 84,000 in 196LI to 179, 000 1 in 1968, 656,000 in 1975, and 1,OL,0,275 in December, 1980.
lMinistry of Information and Culture. Facts and Numbers. Information Documentation Center, Abu Dhabi, 1980, p. 10. • ;J.," 30
Table 1 illustrates the increase of population of Emirates 1 and main cities in the UAE during the period of 1968-1975 as
well as the percentage of youth of the population and the percentage
of urban population.
Although statistical details about the UAE population are
not the main concern of this study, some points must be clarified.
1. UAE citizens comprise less than 25 percent of
the total population.
2. The tremendous population increase in such a
short time was not a natural growth of popula
tion but was a reflection of a large influx of
skilled and unskilled labor from the Arab
countries and from outside countries, such as
India, Pakistan, and Iran, for work in the
numerous developmental programs in the UAE.
3. Influenced by the previous factors, the 1981
survey showed a significant inequality in the
lThe year 1975 indicated the beginning of internal economic crises. During the following years, the economical crisis ap peared very clear in the disruption of economic growth, combined with deterioration of the building sector activities, banking business, hoding and even some increase in crime percentage because of the unemployment of thousands of foreign workers. The main reasons for this crisis were (1) misplanning, especially in the construction sector, (2) intensive intervention of state offici.als in the economy, particularly in rrfinancing" of the huge number of buildings by the banks in wrong ways. r' --,-_.".",~ ,. ~_.''""'--
TABLE 1
INCREASE OF POPULATION OF EMIRATES AND MAIN CITIES IN THE UAE, 1968-1975
Urban Population 1968-1975 Urban Population Population as Percent of Population Percent of as Percent of united Arab Emirates 1968 1968 Population 1975 Annual Growth 1975 Population
Ab-Dhab 116,375 47.5 235,662 26.1 85 Abu Dhabi City 22,023 200,000 37.0
Dubai 58,971 97.5 209,231 41.8 96 Dubai City 57,469 - 200,000 20.0
Shargah 31,668 60.6 88,188 15.8 85 Shargah City 19,198 - 75,000 21.0
Ras al Khaima 24,387 21.5 57,282 13.0 44 Ras Al Khaima Town 5,244 - 25,000 25.0
Fujaira 9,735 8.0 26,498 15.4 17 Fujaira Town 777 - 5,000 30.0
Ajman 4,246 87.7 21,566 26.1 93 Ajman Town 3,725 - 20,000 27.0
Umm Al-Qaiwain 3,744 78.2 16,879 24.0 59 Umm Al-Qaiwain Town 2,728 - 10,000 19.0
w ...... Source: Alvin J. Cottrell, (ED.) The Persian Gulf States, A General Survey. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980, p. 261. p ... , <_ x
32
sex of the population (717,475 males and 1 323,800 females) because workers arriving
in the DAE left their families in home
countries.
4. The tremendous population increase in the
noncitizen sector did not influence the
political power of the traditional ruling , 2 e 1ltes.
Historical Background
As part of the so-called "old world" the UAE has a long
history. Many times it was considered as a part of the Arab
Peninsula, and sOTIletimes it was considered as a distinct area.
The history of the area can be traced back to 550 B. C., when Cyrus
the Great founded the first empire, and then to 326 B. C., when
lMinistry of Information and Culture, The Emirates. Information Documentation Center, 1981, p, 10.
2The noncitizen sector of the population consists of two sub sectors: the Arabs, who occupy a large sector of the governmental jobs in addition to a notable sector of trading and services. The Arabs, whatever their occupations are, never attempted to interfere in the local political situation. They always tried to serve the states as much as they could by following their Arab national feeling and, of course, their own personal interests of achieving a better economical position and a better relation with the DAE government and people. The non-Arab sector consists of ma:Lnly nonsk:i.llec1 workers who are seeking only material goals. In other words, they are looking only for their jobs, salaries, and savings, without any consideration or attempt to interfere or influence the political position in the DAE.
i ,r
~- - ~l l r . ;,1'-'
34
luxuries during the recently ended Morish occupation. This motive
was combined with a spirit of discovery and a real crusading mission.
Thus, the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean was in a sense a
logical culmination of Christendom's anti-Moslem character in the area. 1
During the Portuguese presence in the area, European influence
on the common life of the people went unnoticed and did not extend
to more interior areas despite the fact that they were not seriously
challenged by other European powers until much later. In the 18th
century traders from France, Holland, and Britain began to infil
trate the Gulf and to attack the Portuguese monopoly in the further
ance of their trade with India. Eventually the Portuguese lost their
hold, and a long period of rivalry between Dutch and British traders
followed as they attempted to gain control of the region.
France entered the competition after the formation of the
East India Company in 1664 but did not succeed in maintaining a
strong foothold. Relations between Dutch and British merchants
appeared to have been cordial during the earliest part of the 18th
century, but early in the second part of the century they became
hostile. The initial Dutch predomination was gradually challenged
by the British until in the 1760's the Dutch influence in the Gulf
came to an end. Thereafter Britain predominated over other European
powers in the area.
---lIbid. ,-P. 69. This may explain the cruelty of some of their methods;for instance, Vasco da Gama overtook and captured an armed vessel carrying between 200 to 400 Moslem pilgrims to Mecca. The Arab captain told him that his ship would be loaded with pepper and drugs free if they put into Calicut, but Vasco da Gama retorted: Alive you shall be burned and I say that for nothing in this world would I desist from giving you a hundred deaths if I could give so many. f { i 35
The British involvement in the area did not begin by the
British state or government but by the private enterprise of a
body of merchants called the East India Company. This company
attained an importance never before seen and never since equaled
by a trading company. It had its own armies and navies and con
ducted political negotiations with eastern potentates. Eventually
the British government took over the political role but not the
trading activities of the company.
During the 18th century, the lack of maritime authority in
the Gulf enabled the local seafaring inhabitants of the coast to
interrupt European traffic by attacking many ships passing through
the area. Thus, for a long time the coasts of the Gulf were called
"The pirate coast. 1I By the beginning of the 19th century the total
fleet of the inhabitants of the Gulf had become very powerful
and \l1e11 organized. Clud Moris stated, 1I0nce the Royal British
Navy entered the port of Ras Al-Khaima, there were sixty-three
(100 ton load) ships, in addition to 800 small ships full of cloth, . 1 sugar, slaves, coffee, and expensive spoils."
Attacks on British shipping exasperated the East India Company
to such an extent that they dispatched a large naval and military
force in 1820 to destroy what they called "the pirate fleet" and
their bases. The town of Ras Al-Khaima was attacked, its ships
were burned, and the fort was demolished. Fearing such reprisals,
lelud Moris, .Falcon of the Deser.t. Ministry of Information and Culture, U.A.E., Abu Dhabi, 1974, p. 25.
L. 36
the shaikh of Dubai and other rulers in 1820 signed a treaty agree ing not to interfere with freedom of navigation in the Gulf.
This treaty was followed in 1835 by another treaty whereby the shaikhs agreed to bind themselves to a maritime truce, not to engage in hostilities by sea for six months during the pear ling season.
The advantagesof this treaty were so profitable that the rulers were subsequently persuaded to renew this truce indefinitely. > , Finally in 1853 a "Treaty of maritime peace in perpetuity" was concluded between all of the shaikhs of the Trucial Coast; the peace was enforced by the British Indian 'Government.
Though Britain was ultimately 'responsible for protection, the actual handling of most governmental affairs was delegated to other authorities. Until 1858 the East India Company handled all diplomatic and administrative matters. Until 1873 the government of the British India in Bombay assumed the responsibility. After
1947, when India attained independence, and up to 1971 all nego
tiations and contacts were effected through the Foreign office in
London and a political resident in Bahrain, with political agents in Dubaiand Abu-Dhabi.
Another treaty between Britain and the rulers of the Trucial
Coast in 1892 made the British government responsible for the external affairs of the Trucial states; however, Britain never did hold sovereign rights over any of the shaikhdoms. British interests, however, !'demanded that there should be Some form of state organizing on a territorial basis rather than by a fluctuating tribal 37
organization, and hence encouragement was given to those rulers who
could s peak with authority for their own areas." 1
The relations between the Arab Emirates and Europe were pre
dominate1y one side of the modern history of these emirates. In
the Arab Gulf area there were two other regionally powerful neigh-
bars, Saudi Arabia (S. A.) and Iran.
According to Saudi Arabia, the most important period of its
modern history was after 1926, when Abdul-Aziz Bin Saud (the originator
of the recent ruling dynasty) was proclaimed king of the Higaz. In
1927 he became king of Saudi Arabia with complete sovereignty over
an area larger than that of Britain, France, the Benelux, West
Germany, and Spain combined. 2
Throughout the period of his expansion and following the
establishment of his kingdom, Bin Saud had little direct contact
with the Trucia1 Coast (which was under the protection of Britain) )
particularly in view of his great territorial advancement elsewhere
in the peninsula. He recognized the value of an alliance with
Britain and showed a marked interest in maintaining this friend
ship. Traditionally, relations between Bin Saud and the shaikhs
of the Arab Emirates were peaceful, and Bin saud did not want' to
arouse the animosity of the British by interfering in the Trucial
Coast. In addition, the shaikhs of the Arab Emirates realized
1K. G. Fenelon, The U.A.E.: An Economic and Social Survex. I Language Group Ltd., New York, 1976, p. 21.
2Roscmario Saicl Zahban, Origins of the U.A.E. The Macmillan I Press, Ltd., London, 1978, p. 74. ( ( 38
their position and did their best to maintain good relations with
their powerful neighbor by negotiations, personal visits, and
friendship missions.
In spite of the relatively peaceful history between Saudia
Arabia and the Arab Emirates, SOUle disputes occurred between Saudia
Arabia and the Emirate of Abu-Dhabi; they were border issues con
cerning the Oasis of Al-Buraimi located between the borders of
Saudi Arabia) Abu Dhab, and Oman, 1869. Some members of the Wahhabi
Movement (the religious movement that brought Bin Saud to power)
occupied some parts of this oasis, but the Wahhabies failed to maintain their position in the oasis, and a treaty to divide the
oasis between Abu Dhabi and Oman was signed later. In 1952 another
Saudi group occupied some parts of the oasis again, and the dispute arose but did not contain military threats. Britain held nego
tiations with Saudi Arabia in Geneva concerning the saudi occupation, but they did not reach a resolution. Later Britain used her military
power in the Gulf to return the occupied part of the Oasis to Abu
Dhabi in 1955. 1
Although an agreement concerning Al Buraimi Oasis dispute was never concluded between Saudi Arabia and Abu-Dhabi, good'rela tions between them gained momentum when the UAE was established with repeated visits of the UAE ruler and officials to Saudi Arabia.
However, since the establishment of the UAE, many agreements of coopera tion between the two countries to cover many fields were
1 Donald Hawley, The Trucial States. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.) London) 1971, p. 1.91. D
39
signed. The recent form of cooperation between them was their
participation in the formation of the "Gulf Cooperation Council)"
which includes also Bahrain, Kuwait) Oman) and Qatar. This Coopera
tion Council was established on February 4-5, 1981) during a meeting
of the foreign ministers of the six countries in Rayadh (saudi
Arabia).
Follpwing a further meeting of the foreign ministers in Maskat
(Omman) on March 9-10) the heads of states of the member countries
of the new Cooperation Council held the first summit conference
in Abu-Dhabi (DAE) on May 25-26 and approved the statutes of the
new counc~'1 . 1
Historically the relations between the UAE and Iran, the second
powerful neighbor) have been full of hostilities. The modern
unfriendly relationship between them began after the early 1920's
when Riza Shah came to power and began to maintain military power
accompanied with resurgence of nationalism in Iran.
1 h . T e a~ms of the council were defined as follows: 1. To achieve coordination, integration, and cooperation among the member states in all fields in order to bring about their unity. 2. To deepen and strengthen the bonds of cooperation existing among the peoples in all fields. 3. To draw up similar systems in all fields, including econo~ics and finance) trade, customs and transportation, education and culture) health and social welfare, information and tourism, and judicial and administration. 4. To promote scientific and technical progress in the fie"lds of industry) minerals) agriculture, sea wealth and to establish scientific research centers and college projects. Facts on File) July 24) 1981, p. 30982-3. >
40
In 1924 his forces were strong enough to tackle the province
of Arabistan, which an Arab shaikh, Sheih Khazal of Mohammarah,
governed. In 1925 Khazal was arrested and sent to Tehran despite l the British government's opposition to this action. The beginning
of that new regime in Iran gave the rulers of the Arab Emirates a
sample of what they were going to face from their rising neighbor
across the Gulf. Since then, their relations with Iran have become
full of fear and cautions.
The Iranian's claiming of Bahrain, its occupation of three
Arab Islands in the Gulf and its threatening of the entire area
were among the most effective factors that hastened the creation
of the UAE; however, the Arab Emirates before and after their
confederation found no other way to deal with Iran than to emphasize
the necessity of good relationships between neighbors and to ex
change political missions and other friendly communications with
Iran.
To complete the UAE's historical background, it is important
to describe Oman as another important neighbor engaged in border
disputes with the Emirate of Abu-Dhabi, especially in Al-Buraimi
Oasis, and Ras Al-Khaima. These disputes, just as the disputes
with Saudi Arabia, remain unsolved to date, and they represented
only minor disputes because Oman lacks the power to threaten the
security of the UAE. Nonetheless, after the establishment of the
UAE and the rise of Qabous as a sultan of the sultanate of Oman,
lzahban, Oil. cit., p. 79. ---.ji5S.....------,------
, I•• ·• 41
no more threatening disputes occurred between the two states. On
the contrary, friendship and cooperation, either dual or within
regional terms, in many fields occurred between the two countries,
with effective and continued political communications between the
two neighbors. \ Social Concepts
Because of the rapid increase in the population of the UAE
and because of the large number of emigrants from different coun
tries, many social changes have taken place during the past decade.
Thus, the following description of some social aspects pertain
only to the native population, the people originally inhabiting the
Gulf area, in general, and within the UAE borders, in particular.
Origin of the UAE Population
All Arab tribes that inhabit the Gulf area share similar
Arab origin. Historically, they migrated from the south of the
Arab Peninsula as a result of the final collapse of the great dam l in Marib (city in Yemen) northeast of Sana (capital of Yemen)
during the first and second centuries A. D.
A leading tribe in the Gulf area is the 'tBani yas, II the
tribe of the recent ruler of the UAE. When the Islamic
religion emerged in the sixth century, the Bani yas resided
in Najd, a part of the contemporary Saudi Arabia. Mohammad, the
IThe great dam of Marib is said to be the oldest dam in the Arab history; in addition, the beginning of Arab culture began around that dam. ------
42
prophet of Islam, sent them a mission, which resulted in their 1 following the Islamic re1igion. In the beginning of the six
teenth century, the Bani yas moved from Najd to a new area located
between the eastern coast of Qatar and the Oasis of Buraimi. In
1761 they discovered the Island of Abu Dhabi and began to use it
as a base for their pearl diving. In 1794, Abu-Dhabi Island became
the main base of the Bani yas, and in 1818 the first relations
between them and Britain began when a British captain visited 2 the area. In addition to their residing on Abu-Dhabi Island during
the fishing and pearl-diving seasons, they also controlled many
areas of the contemporary Abu-Dhabi, including many oases such as
Liwa, Dhafra, and A1-Buraimi. In short, they have continued to
live in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to the present time.
Bani yas is not the only tribe inhabiting that area, but
other tribes of the UAE people, Manasir, Awamir, Duaher, A1 Bu
Shamis, Mazari, Bani Qtab, Qawasim, Qubaysat, Bani Kab, and many
other tribes also share Bani yas's living, disputes, common life,
and traditions. In the 1960's the population of the UAE (citizens)
was considered pure Arabic in origin, mind, and spirit, excluding
a minority of blacks who were descendants of some slaves absorbed
and arabisized during their living in that area.
1 Moris, op. ciL, p. 32. 2 I Ibid., p. 22. I t I 43
Social Characteristics
Desert life and historical circumstances created certain
characteristics in the people of the UAE. At times these charac
teristics were helpful, and at other times they were a great
challenge to this people. They were helpful in maintaining the
style of life that harmonized the relation between inhabitants and
the desert's natural roughness and austerity, but were among the
main obstacles to the creation of a unified state. The most
important of these characteristics follow.
Nomadic Life. As the main resource of the UAE people is
their animals (camels and sheep)~ they are obliged to live a
nomadic life, moving from place to place and seeking pastures
for their animals. The nomadic life results in a high level of
individualism, illiteracy~ and restlessness. On the other hand,
it provides the society with favorable values of hospitality, l generosity, courage, honor, and self-confidence.
Tribalism. Living in a cruel desert, moving in unfamiliar
areas under unknown circumstances causes people to live in smaller
units while facing their challenges. Tribalism gives them some
power against nature and against human danger and provides indi
viduals with some security in their own environments. Unfor
tunately, it also provides that society with reasons for disputes
and conflicts.
lRaphnel Patai. The Arab Mind. Charles Scribner's Sons, j New York, J.973, p. 43. s 'U i.U A
44
Traditionalism. Desert life and isolation from other modern societies provided the UAE society with many traditions and customs.
Written laws, central authority, literacy, and concentration of government never occurred, and customs became the main records for this simple society and the best measurement of good or bad, justice, etc.
Religion. Living under the mercy of nature and depending on nature for their livelihood emphasized the religion and its role in the UAE people's life. These exaggerated religious feelings led to a misunderstanding of the woman's role in the society, in addition to the lack of types of work that a woman could do in that simple life. Later this misunderstanding resulted in a de crease in women's activities and roles in the life.
Classlessness. Nomadic life and the tribal system caused all individuals of a tribe to live very closely together and have direct relations with one another. No consideration was given to certain groups or levels. Even the leader, the Shaikh, was considered the same as any other individual of the tribe. His respect was con nected with his individual characteristics, not with his position.
This characteristic can be easily noticed in any domestic meeting between a shaik and other individuals in the UAE society.
On the Way to the Union
The Arab nationalist movement in the nineteenth century con s is ted of many El t tempts toward Arab unity, but lit t Ie ear ly progress --~--..------'-
45
was detected in the Arabian Gulf 'area. This slow development
was not because of the lack of the Arab unity factors (history,
language, culture, etc.) in the area but because of the British
isolation imposed on it. In addition, some local border disputes
took place from time to time; however, the treaties of 1820 and
1835 among the Emirates and between the Emirates and Britain brought
an end to hostilities in the Gulf area. The Arab Emirates' attacks
against the British ships and other border disputes ended during
that time also.
After the border disputes w,ere settled and the "Trucia1
States" had been established in 1835, Arab Emirates had the oppor
tunity to develop more effective forms of unity. Br~tain, by the
establishment of the Trucia1 States, did not intend to help create
Arabic unity but ~ere1y planned to serve her own purposes, which
were (1) the protecting of her trade ways with India and the Far
East and (2) the gaining of a strong position of power in the area,
competing with the other European powers such as the Dutch and
French. The proof of these intents is the British ignorance of any
land-b'order dispute between the Emirates in the treaties of 1820
and 1835 or other treaties; meanwhile, the British emphasis had been
given only to hostilities at sea. Those early treaties attracted
the rulers and the people of Arab Emirates because the treaties were
symmetric with the Arabic hope of unity. The Treaty of 1820 was
supposed to be only a six-month treaty; however, because of its
adequacy for Arab Emirates, it was renewed automatically until 1853,
when the permanent treaty was signed. 46
In spite of the official British domination over foreign
affairs and practical domination over the interior affairs of
the area, Britain did not expend much effort to assist the people
of the Trucial States. Their political, economical, and social
standards did not improve and perhaps deteriorated during the
British domination era from 1820 to 1968. In this first experiment
of unity the Trucia1 States failed for the fo1l~wing reasons to
achieve the unitY,for which Arabs hoped:
1. The experiment was conducted in a haphazard
and unplanned manner; neither Britain nor
the Emirates effectively planne? for eventual
national development.
2. It was built on the dependence on foreign power
while isolated from the Arab regional environ
ment and stimulations.
3. Central power (state or person) to lead the
process toward the advanced stage of unity was
lacking.
4. The British neglected the development of the
area and dominated the exterior and interior
affairs of the Trucia1 States. To maintain
'this domination, Britain forced the Arab
Emirates to sign the 1892 Treaty, which has
r ~ I -
47
been called "the preventing trea ty.1l1 In the
preventive treaty the Emfrates waived their
right to negotiate with any foreign country
without securing British permission.
Affected by Arab nationalism's revival in the 1950's and
watching with admiration new Arab unification attempts in Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and other countries, ruler& of Arab Emirates
felt that the accomplishment of the Trucia1 States were insuffi
cient. They realized their need for more steps toward unity.
Also important was the fear that disunity might encourage larger
and more powerful nations to claim rights, over some of the Emirates
with the British eventual departure.
The first important step toward bringing the rulers together
to consider common problems was the form~tion in 1952 of the Trucia1
States Council and its development office fund. 2 Though the council
had no power to enforce common action, as any action had to be
undertaken by each ruler separately, it did much to promote unity
among the rulers by bringing them together.
1Ministry of Education U.A.E., U,A.E. Establishment and the Most Important of Its Achievements. U.A.E., Abu Dhabi, 1981, p. 7. The preventing treaty is the treaty signed between Britain and the Gulf States. According to this treaty, the Gulf States agreed not to negotiate with any foreign country, to' prevent the establishment of any foreign agency, and not to give any privilege except with the British knowledge and permission.
2Fene10n, op. cit., p. 21.
• 48
The second step, brought about by the suC'cess of the first one, was the establishment in 1959 of the "Federation of Arab 1 Emirates of the South," which included the same Trucial States as the later UAE. This was an attempt to promote a more advanced
level of ,unity between Emirates.
Because of the federation's connection with the British, 2 it could not live long in the practical sense although it con tinued officially until 1971. The great local opposition directed against Britain and motivated by Arab nationalists in the Emirates and in other Arab countries caused the death of the Federation and any attempts toward unification under the British-Crown domination.
By the end of the first and the second unification experiments, the Arab Emirates closed an era ·of foreign domination and were about to begin a new, more distinct stage, which could be divided into two periods. The first period from 1968 to 1971 was full of confusion, conflict, and uncertainty; the second stage, be ginning in 1971, was one of hopes, achievements, and development.
Period of Uncertainty, 1968-1971
Similar to other nations under colonial or under domination of foreign authorities, the people of the Arab Emirates were waiting
IN. A. Shilling, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States. Inter-crescent Publishing and Information Corporation, New York, 1975, p. 394. 2The period that followed the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt was marked by a high level of Arab hostility toward Britain and the western countries. In addition, it was a period of Arab nationalism revival led by the revolutionaries in Egypt. •
49
eagerly for the day that foreign domination over the Gulf area
would end, but Britain's sudden announcement of her intention
to withdraw from the area, including Bahrain and Qatar, caused
negative reactions among the rulers of the Trucial States, not
because of their support toward Britain but because they were
not ready to face the withdrawal consequences.
The ruler of Bahrain, whose sahikhdom was claimed by Iran
until as late as 1971, feared the worst possible consequences.
The ruler of Abu Dhabi was expecting new Saudi claims for the
Al Buraimi Oasis and other terri·tories, and the ruler of Dubai,
most of whose population descended from Iranian origin, was
concerned about the difficult position in which Britain would put
them. This fear caused the ruler of Abu Dhabi to offer to pay
the costs of retaining the British military forces in the Gulf.
Soon after the British announcement, Iran and its western
allies formulated the so-called "Emptiness Theory" or "Vacancy 1 Theory." They argued that British departure from the Gulf area
would leave a vacancy in military power, which would attract some
external powers to the area. Thus, Iran began to prepare itself
1 The Theory of Vacancy goes back to the year 1946, when Mr. Etly (Klement Etly, prime minister of the British government of 1945) stated, "It is impossible for the old position there (in the trucial states) to continue, but we (the British) cannot withdraw and leave vacancy behind us." Clud Moris. Falcon of the Desert, p. 39. 50
to fill that expected vacancy. New Iranian claims of Bahrain and
some islands in the Gulf revived, and later Iran attempted to
assume police power in the Gulf area.
The main Arab power capable of standing against Iran at that
time, after the Arab defeat of 1967 in the war with Israel, was
Saudi A~abia, which played a protective role toward the Arab
Emirates during that critical time.
Saudi Arabia refused the idea that Britain give the Arab 1 Emirates, as a present, to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia was of great assistance to the Emirates before and after the UAE
independent existence.
These factors strongly motivated the Emirates to substitute for the "Federation of Arab Emirates of the South" and "The Trucia1
States" a new form of federation suitable for the new stage of national development, which would be recognized regionally and universally. Arab nationalism, in that stage, played an important role in determining the members and the national identity of the expected federation.
In 1960, Jam~s Graivsh, the former British minister of
Colonies, said, "Nothing remained for Britain in the Arab Gulf 2 except a leased and doubted land." That was the reality of the
lThe possibility of giving the Arab Emirates as a present to Saudia Arabia was discussed in lithe Times" August 28, 1957. Britain was seeking the Saudi's inclination. Moris, op. cit., p. 39. 2 Ibid., p. 50. •
51
British position in the Arabian G~lf) mainly after the Arab
revolution in Aden) and in Dhafar (Oman) led by the Arab na
tionalist movement and Arab nationalism's revival. In the Arab
Emirates) which are very close and have large connections with
Aden. Oman, and other parts of the Arab world. Arab nationalism
also moved toward the rejection of any connections with Britain.
which effected, as previously mentioned, the collapse of the
"Federation of Arab Emirates of the South."
On the other hand, other independent Arab countries, such
as Iraq, Syria. Saudi Arabia) Jordan, Egypt, and Kuwait, realized
that the glory of the Gulf Arab Emirates was coming soon. Their
Arab nationalist obligations resulted in providing the Emirates
with many kinds of assistance, mainly in manpower, experience,
and advice. Thus, many missions from differeht Arab countries
moved to the Emirates to lead the developmental process in such
aspects as education, health, housing, communications, defense, . 1 1 poIice, agr~cu ture, etc. Those Arab missions were offered to
the Arab Emirates almost free. They consisted of the best intel
lectuals and experts of the Arab countries. The existence of
( Arab nationalism's determinant factors in the Gulf left no doubt :I 1
I The effective role of the Arab missions and workers can be I noticed in some declarations given by officials of the UAE. As an official responsible for developmental planning in the area stated, "Were the Egyptians to be removed. many of the school systems would have to close; were the Palestinians to be forced to leave, the media would cease to function; were the Jordanians, Yemen and Omani soldiers to be expelled, the defense and internal security network would collapse." John Duke Anthony. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politi.cs, Petroleum. The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., 1975, p. 21. >
52 "
that the identity of the next federation would be pure
Arabic.
Although Ras Al Khaima is much closer to Iran than
to Abu Dhabi and Iranians represented a great portion of
the population in Bahrainand Dubai before the British with
drawal in 1971, any connection or unification at that time with
Iran seemed impossible, because that would have been a contra
diction with Arab nationalism.
Thus, Arab nationalism nas been the most powerful factor
in determining the direction of the next experiment. At the
same time Arab national feelings and connections were the best
support for the new attempt at fulfillment and success. Saudi
Arabia, in favor of the establishment of a new independent Arab state in the Gulf, renounced. all of her previous territorial claims
to Abu Dhabi and offered advice to the Emirates rulers~ Oman,
also an important figure in the Gulf, renounced some historical I claims in Al Bureaimi Oasis of Abu Dabi and some border disputes with Ras Al Khaima. In addition, Oman allowed her citizens to
join the UAE police and military forces after the UAE was formed.
Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, either before or after the confederation
of the UA~, offered many professional people in such fields as
education, health, defense, and agriculture and also police and
military personnel. Among the Gulf states, Kuwait was of great
help in the fields of education, health, legislation, and foreign
affairs. -
53
The two following questions conclu~e this discussi~n: Could
the Gulf Emirates have maintained an identity other than an
Arabic one? Could the Gulf Emirates have received outside assistance
and encouragement without being considered as a member of the
Arab Nat·ion?
Stage of Negotiations and Achievements
In the earlier stage of n~gotiations concerning the establish
ment of a confederation as a substitute for the Trucial State
the Emirates of Bahrain and Qatar were involved in the issue.
Although Bahrain and Qatar were essential members of the so-called
"Gulf Emirates~II they never were members of the Trucial States,
the Confederation of Arab Emirates of the South, or other Gulf
mutua1 agreements preVlOUS'h"to t 1S perlad. 1
The first step toward implementing the idea of federation
was taken at a meeting held in Dubai on February 18, 1968, during
which the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai agreed to form a union
between the two Emirates. This agreement covered foreign affairs,
defense~ security~ social services~ and immigration. The two
rulers further agreed to invite the rulers of other Trucia1 States
1The importance of Bahrain in the Gulf area could be seen as the British political residence used it as a control center to cover the nine Emirates. Bahrain was selected as a control base in the Gulf because it was the most developed Emirate in . the Gulf area. Bahrain also was the last place in the Gulf area that the British soldiers left in November, 1973. - ~ . _ H' A $ . 1 J..~. ~ t. _" ,_, _
54
to participate in the federation and to invite the rulers of Bahrain ;; 1 and Q,atar to join in discussions on the future of the area. 2 These invitations were accepted, and all of the rulers met
in Dubai on February 28, 1968, and signed the agreement for setting
up a fed~ration under a super council of the nine rulers.
This council in June of the same year appointed a consti
tutiona1 expert to draft a constitution. They mentioned a temporary
federal council as the executive branch of the supreme council.
Various committees were established to report on such matters·as
unification of education, health, labor, communications, currency,
labor laws, and the adoption of a national flag and a national
anthem.
By October, 1969, considerable progress seemed to have been
made. In that month the supreme council. of rulers held an important . meeting to study an agenda prepared by the deputy rulers. No
agreement was reached at that time, and the communique the council
issued stated that the conference was adjourned to allow time for
consultation. With that curt statement, the movement toward
federation seemed to have reached a dead end.
Hoping to revive the movement toward federation, the deputy
rulers of the Emirates next held a meeting on June 13, 1970.
1Ministry of Information and Culture. United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi, 1974, p. 15. 2Such invitations or calls are always accepted by the official Arabs even if they come after a long time of informational hostili ties or clashing ideologies. The Arab world experienced much evidence that proved that the response to Arab nationalism and unity, was always stronger than any surface Arab disagreements. Different Arab attempts toward unification are among that evidence. 55
Again they were not successful. Some differences of opinion and
the growing inclination of Bahrain and Qatar to go their own ways
as independent states hindered further progress. In an attempt to
iron out the difficulties, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sent different
high-powered missions to the rulers. As the date fixed for the
British withdrawal approached and as it became obvious that the
British decision was final, a great sense of urgency arose. The
ruler of Abu Dhabi said in a public statement that Abu Dhabi was
Willing to form a federation with any number of states, not necessarily
all nine or even seven. Envoys sent to all rulers urged them to make
a tina1 decision about the federation. In July, 1971, Abu Dhabi
introduced extensive administrative reforms in its own government
to enable it to emerge as a modern and fully viable state when the
British left.
Differences between the rulers' stands were not related to
the core idea of unification but to some formal point such as: , 1. Location of the federal capital 2. Distribution of power within the federation
I 3. The issue about whether representation in th~
i ~ federal assembly should be equally appointed
by Emirates or in proportion to the population.
These differentiations resulted in Bahrain's and Qatar's decision
to plan for separate independence in 1971. That same month
agreement was reached at a meeting of the rulers in Dubai j and six
of the states finally announced their intention to establish the •
56
"United Arab Emirates." The seventh Emirate, Ras A1 Khaima, post
poned, its decision. Subsequently it applied to join the other six
and was formally admitted on February 10, 1972.
The United Arab Emirates officially came into being on Decem
ber 2, 1971. Later that month they were admitted to membership
of the Arab League. Early the following year the UAE was elected
to membership in the United Nations, becoming the 132nd member
of that body. This represented full acceptance into the inter~
national community.
Shaikh Zaid Bin Sultan A1-Nahayan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, became
the first president of the Federation, and Shaikh Rashid Bin Said
A1~Maktum, ruler of Dubai, was its first vice-president. A pro
visional constitution containing about 150 clauses was prepared for the new federation.. Among them were, provisions for the setting up of a Federal Cabinet headed by a prime minister. A Federal
National Consultative Assembly consisting of eight members was to
act as a legislative branch of the UAE government. The federal
capital is located in Abu Dhabi. Federal responsibility extended
initially to foreign affairs, education, health, and essential
public works. It also covered justice and communications. The
expenditures of the Federation were to be provided by a 10 percent
contribution of the income of each member to the federal budget;
but, in fact, Abu Dhabi met the budget requirements in full for almost
five years and is meeting about 60 percent of the requirements
today. >
57
Early in 1972 the Trucia1 States Development Office and the
Development Fund ceased functioning, and their duties and responsi
bi1ities were divided among the new federal ministries. The work
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain formerly carried on in connection with
educati~n, health, and other services was transferred to appro
priate ministries of the Federation. The Kuwait office in Dubai
was closed. In December, 1971, the British Political Agency was
raised to the status of an embassy.
In conclusion, one can say that from 1968 to 1972 was the
most critical period in the modern history of the Arab Emirates.
Events were transpiring simultaneously in two directions, psycho
logically and practically. In the psychological area there were
confused and emotional fluctuations. In the practical area there
were tasks, efforts, negotiations, and solid achievements. During
that period the rulers were trying to balance their loss of some
traditional autnorities in their own Emirates and their gains from
the suggested Federation. Not forgetting the sacrifices that they
had to make for the sake of Arab unity, the people of the Emirates,
who had nothing to lose except some characteristics of their tribal
system, were eager for unity because unity to them meant the ful
fil1ment of their Arab national hope and aim, in addition to more
power, larger borders, more jobs, better distribution of wealth
(oil income), etc. Finally, the previous attempts at unity (Trucia1
States, The Trucia1 States Council, and the United Arab Emirates,
which included Bahrain and Qatar) provided the Emirate rulers 58
with experience needed to attain s~ccess in the last experiment,
The United Arab Emirates (UAE). CHAPTER III
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE FACTORS
The UAE did not come into existence suddenly or by chance.
Previous' attempts toward unification, beginning with the Trucial
States, were all steps that led to the contemporary DAE. In addi tion, the formal establishment of the Federation did not end all of the problems among the states but did end same of them and at the same time produced new problems. A state the size of the UAE area with a population including 55 nationalitiesl could be expected to have unfavorable factors hindering its total success. On the other hand, the UAE had favorable factors that enabled it to develop in many areas, mainly economical and pol~tical areas.
Favorable Factors
Favorable factors include the development of Arab nationalism, in addition to historical, geographical, political, and economical advances.
Arab Nationalism
The effective contribution of Arab nationalism in establishing the UAE occurred through two channels. The first was the spontane ously Arab nationalist feelings among the masses, which always
lAl Khalij (The Gulf) Newspaper, July 24, 1981, p. 4.
59 •
60
demanded close relations and connections with other Arab countries
at the public level. The other was the conscious realization of
Arab nationalism by the rulers of the Emirates and by intellectuals
who expended a great deal of effort to achieve "Arab Unityll on the
coast or the Arabian Gulf.
Another role of Arab nationalism in the UAE has been the
fundamental help, which was mentioned in the previous chapter,
.many Arab countries offered in every possible field before and
after the existence of the UAE.
Historical Factor
Just as history has been a determinant of Arab nationalism,
it also has been a determinant factor in establishing the UAE. The
history of the Arab Gulf area includes (1) the ancient period,
when Alexander the Great ordered his military assistant SparcQux 1 to occupy it 23 centuries ago, (2) the era of the Islamic Empire, 2 when Amr Bin AI-As cleared the area from any Persian existence,
(3) the modern history, .when the area fell under the British
Colonialism, and (4) the creation of the UAE. All of this united
history made impossible any theoretical or practical separation.
of the seven Emirates.
1 Ministry of Education, U.A.E.: Establishment and the Most Important of Its Achievement. U.A.E., Abu Dhabi, 1981, p. 6.
2Ministry of Information and Culture, United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, 1974, p. 12.
------, p
61
Geographical Factor
Geographically, the seven Emirates of the UAE have consider
able unity. The coast, which all of the Emirates share, is mainly
flat and sandy. A strip of gravel plain is connected directly with
a large 'desert. Mountains are rarely found except one range in Ras
Al-Khaima. Thus, the Emirates consist of one geographical unit
without any notable hindrances to prevent the population from
moving and communicating with one another. In addition, unity of
climate resulted in creating similarity of conducts, ideas, means, and
methods of living among the inhabitants of the area. This 'unity of
geography and climate in the UAE contributed to a united society.
The society of the DAE consists of two main parts, according to
the way inhabitants earn their living. The population in the
coastal region depends on fishing and pearl diving for a living;
the interior of the desert society depends on animals for a living;
thus, they move in the desert to provide pasture for their animals.
Political Factor
Domestic Factors. In the interior two main characteristics
were effective in facilitating unification among the Arab Emirates.
The first was the existence of a small number of power centers, 1 which were represented by the rulers or the shaikmsofthe Emirates.
Concerning the first characteristic (power centers), it could
be said that the absence of political powers, except shaikhs, such
1 In the tribal system of Arabia a shaikh mayor may not be a ruler, but a ruler must be a shaikh. ....
62
as parties, unions, organizations, as other forms of political
institutions made negotiations work without any expectations of
opposition by other forces. In addition, tribal loyalty to the
Emirate's shaik~ who were usually the rulers, made negotiations
less complicated.
Concerning the second characteristic (fluidity of borders),
traditionally the concept of ruling an emirate did not include
determined and well-drawn borders. This concept had been mostly
concerned with population (the tribes) because a ruler's borders
were where his tribes resided. This position remained until 1853,
when Britain gave the Emirates the status of states in the Trucial
States. When the oil era began in the early 1960's, the concept
of the ruling process began to be connected with borders but not
to a large extent. When negotiations began between the rulers of
the Emirates, the concept of borders was still not clearly compre
hended. Thus, the border issue was of minor importance at the
time of negotiations.
In addition to these two major political characteristics, the
following other political factors also existed:
1. The similarity in political system in all of
the seven emirates.
2. The small size either in area or population of
most of the seven emirates. This factor did not
help these emirates to establish individual, inde
pendent states •.
I 63
Regional Factor~. Regionally, continued threats from Iran were very effective in bringing about the union among the Emirates.
In this sense, the establishment of the Federation (UAB) did not mean that this new state was capable of coping with the Iranian power; however, the idea fulfilled a legal and psychological need.
Psychologically, the establishment of a new and unified state gave the local people a sense of power and security. It gave the neigh bors, including Iran, the impression that the new state would maintain the power to resist any invasion or military act.
Legally, the unification of the small political units into a state will make this new state eligible to be a subject of inter national community and law.
The last factor that encouraged unity in the political sense has been the importance of the large countries among the inter national society, with the success of these large countries to occupy the effective positions in the world. The rulers of the
Emirates, through their communications with other countries,l could easily notice the advantages of ,large political units in peace or war.
Social Factors
In the social field, as mentioned previously, the many similar characteristics of the UAE people made it a harmonious unit.
~ost of the rulers, particularly Shaikh Zayed, the ruler of the contemporary union, visited many eastern and western countries. He began his visits in 1953, when he visited Britain, the Uni ted States, India, Iran, France, and other European countries, 64
These shared characteristics, such as origin, social and political system, and society structure, made it very easy for the people of the seven Emirates to mix into one unit without social conflicts.
In addition, the unified culture, language, religion, and tradi tions strengthened the unity once achieved.
As a matter of fact, historically the people of the seven emirates are unified in spite of some disputes over the borders or other issues. Moreover, since they are relatives either by blood or by marriage, borders could never separate them from one another, especially during their wandering in the desert, follow ing their animals, and establishing strong relations with others day after day.
Economical Factors
All of the pre~ious factors and circumstances could not have caused success in establishing the UAE without the emergence of a new economic position in the emirates, that of petroleum discovery and production in commercial quantities in the emirates, particularly in Abu Dhabi, began in 1962; it began in Dubai in
1969 and in Sharguh in 1974 (Table 2). Rapid development of oil production in quantities made Abu Dhabi one of the richest countries in the world.
As the issues of oil discovery, industry, and revenue are not a major concern of this thesis, the emphasis is placed on the role that oil played in the establishment of the Federation. ,
65
TABLE 2
OIL PRODUCTION IN THE UAE (BARRELS A DAY)
Year Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjai Total
1962 16,434 16,434 1963 44,973 49,973 1964 189,159 189,159 1965 281,906 281,906 1966 359,668 359,668
1967 381,957 381,957 1968 498,254 498,254 1969 599,446 34,236 633,682 1970 693,784 85,812 779,601 1971 934,185 125,071 1,009,256
1972 1,049,665 152,848 1,202,513 1973 1,303,058 219,746 1,522,804 1974 1,411,340 241,530 53,866 1,706,736 1975 1,403,658 254,368 38,198 1,696,224 1976 1,586,040 313 ,842 36,995 1,936,877
1977 1,651,412 319,328 28,208 1,998,648 1978 1,437,307 362,346 22,132 1,821,785 1979 1,446,227 354,293 12,770 1,813,390 1980 1,444,100 349,346 10,809 1,804,255
Source: Ministry of Information on Culture, The Emirates. Information Documentation Center, 1981, p. 14. 66
Wealth, which oil provided, contributed to the DAE ,establish ment in three ways:
1. The tremendous wealth of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi,
with its relative largeness in area and population,
enabled the Emirate to lead the process toward
unification and to find for the first time in
the Arab Gulf Emirates' history a central power
economically able and willing to expend great
effort toward the area's consolidation. Further
more, Abu Dhabi was able to alter her govern
mental structure in order to make the expected
changes by utilizing oil revenue.
2. Table 2 shows that oil did not exist in all seven
of the Emirates. This factor created an inequality
of wealth distribution among the Emirates. Thus,
poor Emirates, to a certain extent, were compelled
to join the Federation because of the economical
needs and the political benefits.
3. The continuous increase of wealth enabled the
Emirates, after the federation, to keep increas
ing its expenditures in more interior areas such as
information, housing, and education, which could
strengthen the unification in practical and mental
senses. (See Table 3.)
These favorable factprs encouraged the Emirates' rulers and people to establish the DAE and help the federation to remain uuusau= A ••
67
TABLE 3
ABU DHABI ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 1972-1974 BUDGET PROVISIONS (MILLION DI~)*
Sector 1972 1973 1974
Education 61 101 103
Health 18 42 93
Agriculture 19 27 32
Water, electricity, and industries 217 159 299
Communications 157 145 189
Municipalities 197 245 362
Housing 24 35 85
Labour and social affairs 3 3 8
Infonnation 13 21 30
Public buildings 41 91 151
International loans , 120 76 144
Total 870 945 1,496
1 *One Dirham = 3~ dollars
Source: F. G. Fenelon. The V.A.E.: An Economic and Social Survey. Longman Group Ltd., New York, 1976, p. 157. 68
successful after independence. Other factors, such as language,
religion, and culture, added more power to the previous main
factors. In addition, one should remember that the existence of all factors mentioned could not result in such unity without the existence of Arab nationalism. In Arab nationalism all ingredients were mixed to provide the contemporary UAE.
The Abu Dhabi Emirate, with her tremendous oil revenue, large area, and many inhabitants, could have established an independent state larger and richer than Bahrain, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait.
Arab nationalism in this sense had a great effect since it directed l the efforts of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and some intellectuals 2 3 such as Ahmad Khalifa Al Swidi and Saif AI-den Bin Gubash toward the main principle of Arab nationalism, Arab unity.
Deep Arab national feelings made them sacrifice their wealth, power, and authorities for the sake of the Gulf unity. This can
lThe ruler of Abu Dhabi, Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahuyon, had descended from a pure Arab dynasty (Bani yas), had been raised according to the Arab culture, and was aware of Arab history. In addition, he gained political experience during his relations with the British.
2Ahman Khalifa Al Swidi: one of those who built the federa tion on Arab foundations. Many times he was the representative of the ruler of Abu Dhabi to the negotiations of the federation and to other political conferences. He was the first foreign minister of the UAE. Recently he became the political counselor of the UAE president.
3Saif Alden Gubash: An educated citizen of Ras Al Khaima (before the UAE establishment). He was the first state minister of foreign affairs of the UAE. He was killed by mistake during an attempt to assassinate the Syrian foreign minister in Abu Dhabi airport in 1979. 69
be seen clearly by the insistence of the rulers of Abu Dhabi and
Dubai on the establishment of a union of only two Emirates.
Unfavorable Factors
While there have been many favorable factors facilitating
the establishment and the survival of the DAB, there were also
obstacles to the UAE's development. They were:
1. Lack of a Strong Central Power
The Federation's existence did not significantly affect the
authority of each ruler in his own Emirate. Rulers of the seven
Emirates with their ruling families and elites maintained almost
the same power they had before the Federation. Thus, besides the
central power in the capital, ~here are seven separate semi-local
governments trying to gain more power and benefits for her Emirate
and people.
2. Dual System of the Government Structure
Governmental work and authorities are divided between two govern mental systems: (1) central ministries and departments and (2)
local ministries and departments. Dualism in governmental work,
caused problems in the efficient functioning of government.
Differentiation between these two systems occurred not only in
the jurisdictional field but also in legislation, budgeting, em 1 ployment, salaries, and ~ther faci1ities. Many times practical
lTwo employees having similar qualifications and doing the same job in the same office may not have equal salaries. The only reason for this inequality is that one of them is employed on the budget of a central ministry or department and the other is employed on the local ministry of the ~epartment. 70
problems occurred because of an overlapping between the' two 1 systems.
3. Mismanagement
Lack of population in the UAE, particularly lack of educated individuals, forced the government of each Emirate (before the federatron) and the federal government after the federation to hire noncitizen Arabs to satisfy the growing need for manpower in the governmental sector.
As a matter of fact, emerging from Arab national feelings, those employees served the UAE well either before or after the federation. Many of them were more jealous and concerned with the Emirates' interests than the UAE citizens. Their desire to help and to maintain success' for the new state made them work as hard as they could.
The problem in this aspect was that noncitizen Arabs were coming from different Arab countries. They had various images, comprehensions, and models of governmental systems. These dif ferences led to variations in the governmental functions from place to place. Thus, the same purpose of governmental work
lShifting an engineer from an Emirate to the capital some times seems impossible, regardless of practical necessity, be cause he was employed in the local department. 71
could be achieved simply in a department, but it might be very l complicated in another.
The DAE, seeking urgent substitutions for "some of the non citizen employees, hired some local individuals, mainly for the high levels of government. The new citizens still lacked knowledge and experience in the management field. Thus, instead of facili tating improvement in the governmental work, complications and deterioration quickly developed.
In addition, a minority of the thousands of noncitizen Arab employees were seeking only physical gains and adventures. This minority created more complications and inefficiency in the govern mental sector.
4. Social Problems
Accompanied by the need for governmental employees, which has been satisfied to some extent by noncitizen Arabs, was the need for a tremendous number of workers to fulfill the needs of other developing sectors in the country. The most demanding
1 To renew a car license in AI-Aim (Abu Dhabi) the following are needed: 1. Application of two pages full of details 2. Four per sonal photographs (picture-s) 3. Photo copies of the first four pages of the passport, the page where the visa is issued-of the old license 4. Letters from the employer 7 5. Hospital report of ability to drive 6. Signatures of clerk, cashier, one officer, head of traffic section, file section, traffic section 7. Two to six hours of continuous (outdoor) moving from one office to anether In another city, such as Ras Al-Khaima, fewer than half of these requirements are needed. 72
" '
sector of workers was the constr~ction sector, which included
buildings, roads, bridges, etc. This sector needed many trained
and untrained workers and technicians. Living conditions and 1 wages could not attract Arab workers to immigrate to the UAE
in larg~ numbers. Thus, a majority of the labor sector came from
India, Pakistan, Iran, and Korea.
The main characteristics of this majority of the labor
sector, which forms a substantial proportion of the population
in the UAE, are:
1. The absolute majority of the immigrating group
is males and a very small minority is females.
2. The majority of the males did not have families
in the UAE.
3. A high percentage of them entered the country
illegally.
4. They live in groups of 20 to 40, sharing one
house and having the lowest standards of living.
IWhen the writer visited AI-Ain, the second city in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi after the capital, there was not more than one generator providing electricity to a small number of houses, where the new school teachers were residing, only during the night and some hours of the day. In addition, the main road to the capital was still under construction.· There were shortages of'clean water and many other facilities. A worker at that time could not earn more than 7-9 Dirhams ($2-3) a day, and the average salary of a school teacher or an employee varied between 100 and 700 Dirhams monthly ($200-$250). 73
5. On one hand, they share t~e same or similar
background and religion; on the other hand,
they share literacy, poverty, and hopes for
fast wealth.
Afier examining these characteristics of an important sector of the UAE population, one can expect a social crisis. Two factors prevented the occurrence of such a crisis •. The first factor was the Islamic religion, and the other factor was the strict
treatment of workers by the government. Because most of the workers are Moslems and because the Islamic religion emphasizes good conduct and opposes adultery and sinful deeds,l the Islamic religion could serve as a preventive factor against the existence of conduct deterioration.
The second factor is the effective punishment for crime in the UAE. For instance, the penalty for a theft could range from a six-month jail sentence and dismissal from the country to cutting a hand or whipping in public. The punishment for adultery and rape could range from a l5-year jail sentence to hanging.
However, the problem that the vast increase in population causes is mostly related to disruption of the planning authorities, espe cially in service sectors such as electricity, water, health, education, and social planning. In addition, an intensive need
lSinful: This word in its Arabic pronunciation (Haram) is usually intensively used in Arabia to mean any forbidden or illegal action: Theft, calling of bad names, adultery, etc., are among the meanings for sinful. 74 for police power, a justice deparbnent, and immigration control is created. Staffing in these functions proved to be very dif ficu1t for the authorities.
5. Nomadic Life
The nomadic life, which the majority of the UAE population used to live, is one of the most enormous problems the UAE govern ment faces; on one hand, the UAE (shaikhs) do not want to end this style of life, neither do the Badu. 1 The shaikhs want to keep this traditional living style as a part of their beloved past.
The ruler of Abu Dhabi (the president of the Federation), for ins"tance, always reminds his followers and his people that he is a nomad and is proud to be one. On the other hand, the UAE modernization, at least its development, conflicts with this style.
In addition, the problem of the continuously changing of the population's residences2 makes it very difficult for the govern ment to keep offering such services as health, education, housing, etc. Another problem focusing on the difficulty of utilizing this population is satisfying the country's need for employees in the police and army sectors.
Furthermore, an enormous problem results from the natural characteristics of a nomad. An individual nomad usually has a
1Badu is the Arabic word for nomads.
2Even if the nomads agree to stay in one place, usually they settle in their traditional places, where they are still very far from the major cities or villages. 75
great deal of individualism and a natural tendency to resist laws
except his traditions and customs; his "loyalty is directed only
to his tribe and his shaikhs. He resists modernization and refuses
to recognize the state as a higher authority.
6. Tribal System
The tribal system in the UAE can be considered not only as
one of the most important obstacles toward unification but also
as a threat to the survival of the UAE itself. This considera
tion comes from the fact that this system deals with the govern ment's functioning in many aspects, particularly in political
and constructural aspects.
Traditional loyalty directed to the tribe and shaikh made
shifting this loyalty toward the new state difficult. Decentrali zation of physical power has been one of the important factors
that led to the continuation of an active tribal structure in the sedentary communities in the UAE. At the same time the tribal system led to the continuation of decentralization of power.
However, the main problem of tribalism is not the resulting de centralization. The problems caused by tribalism are:
1. Existence of numerous decision-making powers.
Because of the continuation of power within
shaikhs of tribes, many times this position led
to clashes between the central governmental
authorities and the regional effectiveness of
local shaikhs. 76
2. Favoritism and intercession. During their
nomadic life, the majority of the UAE popu
lation kept in continuous touch with their
shaikhs. After many things changed, par
ticularly in the political process, those
people could not comprehend the new existing
situation. They still live with their old
understanding of the ruling process where
their needs have to be satisfied by the
shaikh. This direct contact between the
shaikhs and the people created many diffi
culties because it worked through different
channels than the official ones and made it
difficult for officials' plans to obtain
official strength and validity.
3. Hindrance of complete incorporation. Means
of tribalism are used not only by people
but also by leaders or the shaikhs of the
tribe. Tribalism, in addition to fulfill
ing a psychological need for the tribal
members, also fulfills psychological and
political needs of the local political
leaders. Tribal system survival keeps these
leaders in power and causes them to continue
to be important 'in local affairs. Because - 77
of this tendency to support tribalism in
mind and in practice, full incorporation
comes to be very difficult.
4. Competition among tribes. The last effect
of the tribal system is the creation of
strong competition between tribes, which
sometimes leads to violence or to a whole
tribe's moving from one emirate to another
or even from one country to another.
External Obstacles
External obstacles were expected to come from Saudi Arabia,
Oman, and Iran. Saudi Arabian and Oman officials continuously nego tiated and exchanged visits with the concerned parties. Such visits clarified misunderstandings or tensions. During a visit of the
UAE ruler to Saudi Arabia in 1973, King Fysa1 of Saudi Arabia said,
"There are no borders between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and UAE 1 lands are in the heart of the Saudi land."
Thus, disputes between the UAE, on one side, and Saudi Arabia and Oman, on the other side, were settled in peaceful and friendly ways. The border issues became merely his tory.
Events in Iran proved that the Arab E~irates' fears and expec tations from that sector were real. Soon after the British with drawa1 from the Gulf, Iran claimed three Arab islands in the Gulf
1Ministry of Information and Culture, United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi, 1974, p. 45. To the non-Arab reader this statement may mean that saudia Arabia is claiming the UAE lands, but in the Arabic expression, it emphasizes generosity and forgiveness and that the two countri.es are considered as one country without any problems between them. 78
(Abu Mosa, Tonb the Small and Tonb the Great) belonging to the
UAE and then occupied them in the early' 1970's.1 Relations
between the UAE and Iran have always been ready to explode at any
time in spite of the apparent coolness and exchanged visits between
officials of the two countries.
After the Iran revolution, the new Islamic government is ex
pected to develop friendly relations with the UAE for the fol1ow
ing four reasons:
1. At the present time and maybe for some decades
Iran may not be prepared for a war because of
its internal problems.
2. The Iraq-Iran war represented to Iran a position
that it will face in case of any aggression against
the UAE by Iraq or by other Arab countries.
3. The UAE is a country recognized by the Arab
League and by the United Nations. This recog
nition gives the UAE regional and international
protection against any Iranian act of war.
4. In spite of the unfriendly declarations by
some Iranian officia1s,2 the Islamic regime in
Iran is not expected to expand in the Gulf or
1Assayad, Vol. 1919, August 14, 1981,pp. 52-55. Berurt, Dar As Sayad, Hazimeia Pops, 1038, Beruit, Lebanon.
2In his statement to A1-Nahr AI-Avabi Wa1 Dawli magazine, Vol. 151, 3124, 1980, Bani sadr affirmed, "Iran will not withdraw its forces from the three Arab islands that were captured during the Shah's regime, nor will it return them to the Arabs. Furthermore , Iran does not consider the Arab countries of Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Oman, Dubai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as independent sovereign states." Iraq Forced to War. Office of the Press Counselor, Washington, D. C., 1981, p. 12. 79
or to establish hostile relations with moslem
neighbors. Such hostilities represent a con
tradiction to the Iranian Islamic government's 1 strategy.
Thus, external obstacles do not seem to threaten the deve1op ment or the survival of the UAE. The federal government took many effective steps in different fields, such as education, planning, management, nomad settlement, and labor to solve internal problems.
1. Education
The main field expected to affect the present and the future generations is education. It should create and strengthen attitudes toward unification and aid the ·government in solving many interior problems. In addit~on to the increasing number of schools at all levels, 211 in 1977-78 with an enrollment of 75,000 students, including the UAE University, emphasis has been placed on other types of education, such as
a. Technical training schools, 3 in 1977
b. Military school courses in the secondary school
and during the summer vacation
c. .Quran memorizing centers counted more than 60 centers
in 1977-78.
d. Youth social clubs, more than one in every city
l:As a proof of Iran's good intention, she withdrew her military force from Dhufar (Oman) who were fighting against Dahafari revolu tionaries, by an arrangement between the Shah and the Omani Sultan. 80
e. Adult education, 102 centers in 1977-78
f. Cultural festivals, which included lectures on
different subjects and speakers from different
countries, to educate the public
2. Federal Planning
The following federal bodies have been established:
a. Civil Service Council, which determines the
provisions, salaries, qualifications, etc.,
of all government employees
b. General Planning Department, which determines
the federal plans and coordinates them with
local plans
c. Federal Committee of Budgeting, which coordinates
federal and local budgets
d. Federal Accounting Administration, which is
the highest authority of accounting in the
federation, in addition to its responsibility
for financial inspection in federal and local
ministries and departments
3. Governmental Management
The following steps were accomplished:
a. Holding many training courses for the
governmental employees, mostly intensi
fied, under the supervision of local
IMinistry of Education. The UAE Establishment and the Most Important of the Achievements, Abu Dhabi, 1981. 81
institutions or international organizations
such as the UN. Those courses'covered dif
ferent fields such as administrational, political,
social, and organizational fields
b. Sending hundreds of students to study in many
foreign countries to become better qualified
c. Appointing professional assistants for each
of the high-level governmental employees
4. Nomad Settlement
The following steps have been taken:
a. Preparing agricultural lands and giving them
free to the nomads to transfer them from the
stage of nomads to the stage of farmers
b. Building thousands of houses and giving them
free to the nomad tribes to induce them to
leave their tents in the desert
c. Offering the nomads many services such as
education, health, etc., in their residences
in the desert to encourage them to stay around
those services for a long time
5. Labor and Labor Organization
A great deal of authority has been given to the ministry of labor to enable it to handle the problems of labor. In addition, strong connections between this ministry and the ministries of the interior and immigration have been established to facilitate solving 82
labor problems legally and practically. In addition, missions from 'the labor ministry attended many international labor conferences to gain the necessary knowledge and experience to free any problems in this sector.
The last comment in this discussion is that the existence of such obstacles in a newly established country, after a long period of backwardness, illiteracy, colonial domination, etc., does not seem strange. In addition, most of the internal obstacles need only time, effort', and patience to be brought under control. • 1
CHAPTER IV
THE UAE TODAY
Thirteen years ago the Arab Emirates were pushed toward uni
fication'by the British withdrawal from the Gulf. That does not
mean that unification among these Emirates was out of the Emirates
rulers' and people's minds. The previously mentioned prevailing
circumstances after the British withdrawal from the area demanded
"II urgent and large steps toward unification. ·~1d.· .~ An examination easily reveals that, in spite of many unfavor :$
able factors in the federation process, the UAE could attain a
remarkable success whereas Great Britain's previous attempts during .... 1952-1968 to leave behind as independen~~ a vi~ble federation in
South Arabia failed. One of the principal' reasons for the success
of the DAE and the failure of the joint (British-Arab) attempts was the Arab nationalism.
Arab countries and Arab people, including the Arabs of the
Emirates, refused to be involved in a federation engineered and
led by Britain. At the same time many Arab countries, such as
Egypt, Adden, Iraq, and Jordan, were fighting the British colonialists.
A federation under the British domination could not be successful even if it had all favorable factors because of its conflict with
the Arab national feelings and Arab nationalism in its radical stage.
83 84
In addition to Arab nationaltsm's·resistance against that
federation, there were other reasons that resulted in the failure
of the earlier efforts toward federation in the Gulf. These
reasons could be summarized as follows:
1. An Egyptian expeditionary force stationed in
neighboring Yemen from 1962 to 1967 was de
termined to undermine any federal govern
ment established under the British umbrella.
2. The consent of an unwieldy number of rulers
had to be secured.
3. The state of poverty that existed in the
Emirates area before the oil emergence in
the 1960's.
On the contrary, the situation of the Federation UAE, Arab nationalism, was very helpful in its establishment and survival, as explained before. Other reasons that facilitated the success of the UAE were:
1. A general acceptance of the federation scheme
by powers other than the Emirates, such as other
Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Oman and
even Iran and Britain
2. The comparatively small number of rulers whose
agreement to the principle of federation had to
be secured. 85
3. A relatively acquiescen~ population
4. The existence of vast petroleum wealth in
the key federating state (Abu Dhabi)
Because of some obstacles to the federation, one cannot
expect greater achievements than the DAE attained during such a
short time (ten years). In general, the federation has passed
the most critical stages and made a great deal of progress toward development.
Level of Unification Existing in the UAE
To explain the kind of union that the UAE represents and the
level of unification that exists in the UAE, a detailed description of political structure and political institutions of the union is provided.
Before delvitlg into these details, it may be fitting to point out what aims and purposes the provisional constitution spelled out for this amalgamative undertaking. Specifically, the union is sup posed to strive toward three sets of aims and purposes. Oh a general and abstract level, the union has the avowed purpose of making a better life, obtaining a more stable situation, and a higher inter national status for the emirates and the people. Then, as a pre liminary step in the interpretation of these general goals at the national level, the union is to strive to preserve its independence, sovereignty, security, and stability; to repel any aggression against its entity or the entity of member emirates; to safeguard the rights and liberties of the people of the union; to develop a ..
86
cohesive cooperation among the Emirates on the basis of mutual
respect for independence and sovereignty in matters relating to their
internal affairs; and to work for a better life for all citizens of the federation.
The third set of aims revolves around the constitution's
prescription of ends toward which the foreign policy of the union
is supposed to be geared. In this respect, the support of Islamic l and Arab issues and interests and the consolidation of "ties of
friendship and cooperation with all states and nations on the basis 2 of the United Nations Charter and the International Code of Ethics"
are clearly stipulated.
Federation Structure
The UAE governmental system is structured along classical western lines in the sense that power is theoretically divided into separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Figure 1).
The executive part consists of the Supreme Council, the presidency, and the Council of Ministers. The legislative part consists of ..1',' I the Federal National Council. The judicial part is represented by the Supreme Court.
lIn a press conference in Abu-Dhabi Ahmad Khalifa at Swaidi, the UAE foreign minister said, " ••• Our policy springs from our nationalistic feeling. . . . We deeply believe in Arab unity and we hope that our unity will be a step toward the Arab unity. We are nonseparable part of the Arab homeland .•.•" Ministry of Informa tion and Culture, United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, 1974, p. 35.
2Ali Mohammad Khalifa. The UAE Unity in Fragmentation. West view Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1979, p. 38. ~U~:4~A:-:G~O~V:E:-~,.~~.IE~'fIJ~··j'·.s·r·R·U·C·T·U·R·li·,·19·1·4···················. LEG '::O!...ATLJR E l"'CUTIVE 1 Natiunal Council (40 members) r'-'-'-'-' - ·1 I L_ r -_L I Prime Minister (Dubay)
I I oj. Deputy Prime Minister (Dubay)
Council of Ministers 126 ministers with ·portfolios plus ministers of state} L------_.~/ -r INDIVIDUAL I AMIRATE Ra', Umm Abu Dhabi FUjolyrah Shaqah GOVERNMENTS al'Khaymj al..Qay",.yn
Symbols;
C--;> elected ---~)o 9"nerally appointed by the individual Rulers but specltic mode of delegate selection varies among amirates, ,-•-•-•- cOntrol -'--- ex-()fficio ...... I,.~.... ------appointed , , .• , •.•. appellate'route : II
FIGURE 1
UAE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, 1972
Source: Ali Mohanuned Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unitx. in Fragmentation. West View Press Inc., Boulder, Colo rado, 197~, p. 52.
The Supreme Council of the Union
The Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) represents the highest authority in the coun.try. It COllS1;-;ts of all rulers of the member
Emirates or their deputies 1 in case ;lriy of the: rulers should be
lThe ruler's dupuliusunll.y if; hl.:-; ~j()n; tlnw, Home L'tllul's., mainly thl; old ones, such as I;hL: r111,:L' or: Ajllldt1 L~lIliL'at:(~, L'ilrely attended SCD sessions. ------88 unable to attend the session for any reason. The council holds its ordinary closed sessions every two months in the federal capital or any place it chooses for an annual term less than eight months.
The council also can be convened at the invitation of its chairman or any of its members. For its meetings to be legal, at least five of its seven members, including Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have to be present. Each member Emirate has one vote in the council, but these votes are not of equal weight. Important decisions, such as substantive matters concerning the union's general policies, ratification of international treaties, agreements drafting laws,
app~intment of the prime minister, a declaration of war, etc., need a majority of five votes, including those of Abu Dhabi and
Dubai.
However, the SCU can be seen as a body of collective leadership
that has the final decision in nearly all significant matters in
the union's authoritative structure.
The SCU has several constitutional powers; the most important
ones are: ..
1. It plans the general policy of the union in pur
suance of the aims and the purposes set forth by
the constitution.
2. It elects, among its members, both the president
and the vice president of the union for a five-
year term.
3. It has the powe~ to decide the admission of
new members into the federation. 89
4. It has the power to ratify the appointment,
resignation, or dismissal of the federal
prDne minister J the president, and member
judges of the Federal Supreme Court.
5. It ratifies international treaties and agree
ments, announces the validity of martial law,
and declares war. It also ratifies all federal
laws.
7. It has the authority and the power to super ,.,..... vise all internal and external union affairs. "oM., ; ..." ".' iI'S '.•Ii1 8. Its approval must be secured before any of
the member emirates are able to utilize union ::~:lIi '.:J~ troops. ".;,all
The President and the Vicelpresident
The president and the vice president are the two legislative- executive posts of great significance. Both are elected by the seD for five years subject to renewal. Both have to be sworn before J the SCU before assuming their responsibilities. The vice president has all of the responsibilities of the president when the president is absent.
lThe vice president of the UAB has been given a great deal of emphasis, perhaps no less than the president himself, either theo retically (by the constitution) or practically. This emphasis could be explained by the personal political power of the vice president Shaikh Rashed Bin Saed A1-Maklum, who influenced this side during the federation's negotiations and also during the writing of the UAE cons t itut ion.
117'" 90
The president of the union has a wide range of constitutional powers. His duties and responsibilities could be divided into these three categories: (1) the duties that he discharges on his own and through his office, (2) the responsibilities that he exer , cises in conjunction with the scu alone or with scu and the Council of Ministers together, and (3) the powers that he exercises through the Council of Ministers.
In the first category the president represents the Federation both domestically and internationally. He also convenes the seu, presides over its meetings, directs the discussions, and declares an end'to its sessions. He may convene both seu and the Council of Ministers for a conference whenever necessary. The president also presides over the meeting of the Supreme Council of Defence
(SCD) in hi~ capacity as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
He also accepts foreign diplomatic representatives.
In the second category the president signs and issues all , federal laws, decrees,and decisions, including decrees pertaining to the conclusion of treaties and international agreements, the declaration of war, and the imposition of martial law. He appoints the president and member judges of the supreme court. , In the third category the president is responsible for super vising the execution of all federal laws, decrees, and decisions through the Council of Ministers as a group or individually. In addition, the president,with the approval of the council, appoints all senior federal and member judges of the high court. He also 91 appoints the deputy prime minister and other members of ,the cabinet. 1
The Council of Ministers (the cabinet)
The Council of Ministers (the cabinet) is the third federal authority specified by the UA! constitution. Although the cabinet was supposed to meet immediately after the federation was estab~
1ished in 1971, the first cabinet was held in 1974. Long discussions and negot ations concerning the cabinet's members took place; thus,
instead of twelve members, according to the constitution, the first cabinet consisted of 28 members, eight of whom were ministers without min'is tries. 2
The main reason for that huge number of ministers was the attempt to secure representation of all member emirates in the cabinet.
1With the advice of the prime minister 2The constitution specified twelve ministra1 portfolios to form the first Council of Ministers. In addition to the prime minister and his deputy, these portfolios are: foreign affairs, interior, defense, education, public health, public works and agriculture, communications and PTT, labor and social welfare, information, and planning. The first Council of Ministers consisted of finance and industry, public works, interior, defense, foreign, justice, trade and commerce, health, labor, education, oil and mineral resources, transportation, social affairs, water and electricity, information, agriculture and fishing wealth, housing, I~lamic affairs, youth and sports, planning. Ministers without ministries were: State Minister of Supreme Council Affairs, State Minister of Financial and Industrial Affairs, State Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Minister of Informa~ tion Affairs, State Minister of Council of Ministers Affairs, State Ministers of , State Minister of United Arab Emirates, op. cit., p. 25. 92
The Federal National Council (FNC)
The Federal National Council consists of 40 members (seats) distributed among the seven member Emirates proportionally according to their population and their influence as follows:
Abu Dhabi 8 representatives
Dubai 8 representatives·
Shargah 7 representatives 93
. , Ras Al-Khuima 6 representatives
Ajman 4 representatives
Ummal Qiwin 4 representatives
Fujairah 4 representatives
Each Emirate is free to determine its own method of choosing
delegations. A member of this council (1) should be a citizen of
one of the Emirates of the union and a permanent resident in the
Emirate that he represents t (2) be 25 years old or more, (3) have 1 full civil rights, a good reputation and no criminal record.
A delegate is selected to the FNC for a two-year term with
the possibility of unlimited renewal. An FNC member cannot hold
any other federal post, and he enjoys commonly granted parli. mentary
immunities. The annual session of the FNC is six months, starting
in November, but it can be convened any "time the situation demands.
The annual session of the FNC is usually opened by the president;
he gives a speech before this body, explaining the condition of
the country and the governmental plans. A reply to the president's
speech should be prepared by a committee elected by the council.
After the council appr"ves the reply, it should be sent to the
president, who, in turn, presents it to the CSU.
The FNC is a consultative body. It can merely give recommen
dations and observations about the draft laws that are sent to it
by the council of ministers.
I IMinistry of Information and Cultu~e. United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi, 1979, p. 32. 94
The Judiciary
The Judiciary at the federal level consists of a supreme court
and a number of Federal Courts of First Instance. The Supreme
Court is the highest Judicial authority in the country and its
members are appointed by the president of the federation. The most
important assignments of the supreme court are:
1. It adjusticates disputes between any member
emirate and the federal government or between
the emirates themselves.
2. It determines the constitutionality of federal
laws.
3. It interprets the provisions of the constitution.
4. It may question ministers or other federal offi
cials regarging their performance and official
behavior.
5. It may investigate crimes committed against the
nation and its security.
6. It rules in jurisdictional disputes between
federal and local jurisdictions or between
judicial bodies in the member emirates.
Courts of First Instance are limited to administrative and civil disputes between the union and individuals as well as crimes committed within the limits of the federal capital.
According to the type of state that the UAE represents 1 one could say that the UAE represents a "Federal State" according to ~------~---_._~----
95
the measurements of international law and its interpretations.
The UAE is a permanent union of several previously independent
states with a governmental organ of its own and power over its
member states as well as over the citizens of the individual
states. In addition, the central government has extensive authority
over the citizens of the separate member emirates. The federal
government alone is competent to declare war, make peace, and conclude l international treaties and agreements.
Political Development Achievements
In the political field achievements were in two areas:
interior (domestic) and exterior (international). In the domestic
field the great shift was from a simple nomadic life, which involved
c~rtain relations between the individual and his shaikh, contact
with the ruler, loyaity to the tribe and the shaikh, and simple and
traditional customs. The new form of political life was completely
different. The differences included different loyalties, different
relations between the individual and the ruler, and a difference
in government, laws, social organizations, etc. All of these
factors could be considered the greatest achievement the UAE could
attain in the relatively short time since its estab+ishment.
In the international field the UAE activities and participation
can be divided into three parts according to th~ geographical con
cept. In the Gulf area, which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, the UAE is very active in any
lThis description of the federal state is derived from Gerhard van Glahan's description of the federal state in his book Law among Nations. 96
mutual effort politically, economically, and socially. 'Evidence
of this participation can be found daily.
In the frab area, the UAE also is an active member of the
Arab society and Arab league. Since 1971 the federation has partici
pated in the political and economical life of the Arab world.
UAE gra~ts to Arab countries, particularly to those who border Israel,
are numerous; in addition, the UAE was the first Arab state to
establish the Arab oil embargo against the USA and other western
countries in 1973. 1
The UAE also could bypass the Arab area to the global area
so that it became a member of the union as soon as it was established.
The UAE contributed to the UN and some international organizations
by offering grants to those organizations, such as the grant of one
million dollars to the UN in 1973 and offering facilities for the
UNESCO Conference in Abu Dhabi in the same year. 2
For the most part, the UAE's international participation was
financial or was related to financial matters.
Its lack of surplus manpower, while it had wealth, directed
the UAE's participation and contributed to the international society.
At the beginning and until 1974, the UAE emphasized its aids and grants to the Arab countries for two reasons: (1) the political
1Researching and Documentation Center, Events of UAE. Abu Dhabi, March, 1981, p. 228.
2Ibid ., p. 55 and p. 217. 97
condition under which the Arab couptries suffer and (2) the DAE government's knowing more about Arab countries than other coun tries. Later the DAE began to distribute its grants and aids farther than the Arab world.
With the end of 1977 the Abu Dhabi fund for integration dis tribute~ $138 t OOO t OOO in 12 Arab countries t 7 Asian countries, 1 and 5 African countries. The total funds reached $400,000tOOO.
In addition to the financial aid, the DAE also helped many less developed countries by selling them oil at cheap prices.
Although the economical aspect of the UAB is not a major concern in this thesis, Tables 4 and 5 show the great effort and contribution that the UAE offers to the world, especially to the Third-World countries either bilaterally or multilaterally.
To summarize the contemporary position in the DAE, one can examine the federation in two ways, theoretically and practically.
~rom the theoretical sphere t the UAE provisional constitution assures the federal structure of the state and includes the member emirates.
In addition t it assures the independence of each member in its interior affairs while the federal government dominates the exterior affairs of the whole union. The constitution also emphasized the
separation between the executive, 1egislative t and judicial authori ties; it guaranteed the freedoms and rights of all DAE citizens.
1 Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Trade and Commerce, Vol. 56, July, 1979, p. 61. -,"",,-"-,'",. '. ","'. -, . ' ~_.~ ,~ ><.,--=-...... -"'...---...... """"""""...------~-~------__- TABLE 4 GRANTS OFFERED BY ARAB-OPEC COUNTRIES TO THE THIRD WORLD, 1970 AND 1973-1977 Percentage of GNP Million Dollars 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1970 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1970 . Algeria 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.39 0.31 0.01 46.7 53.6 50.7 46.9 25.4 1.0 Iraq 0.28 1.46 1.66 3.99 0.21 0.04 35.4 231. 7 218.4 422.9 11.1 2.0 Kuwait 10.18 4.34 6.52 5.70 5.76 1.80 1~441.8 614.3 975.3 621.5 345.2 130.0 Lybia 0.63 0.61 2.13 1.23 3.32 1.14 109.4 93.6 261.1 147.0 214.6 63.0 Qatar 4.71 7.95 15.62 6.26 15.62 - 117.6 195.0 338.9 185.2 93.7 S. A. 4.82 5.84 . 6.01 4.56 3.75 1.69 2,373.0 2,407.1 1,997.4 1,029.1 304.9 155.0 UAE 10.97 10.74 11.74 6.66 12.03 - 2,261.8 1,060.2 1,046.1 510.6 288.6 Source: Ministry of TLade and Commerce. Trade and~ommerce, UAE, Vol. 56, July, 1979, p. 54. *GNP =.Gross National Product \0 (Xl 99 TABLE 5 PARTICIPATION OF ARAB FINANCING ORGANIZATIONS IN OPEC, 1973-1977 (Million $) 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 Abu Dhabi Fund 138.1 169.3 46.2 55.1 Arabic Fund 362.6 336.3 200.8 127.3 Arab Fund of Integration in Africa 76.0 79.5 Islamic Integration Bank 120.3 Kuwaiti Fund 411.8 324.5 343.1 143.4 9.5 Special OPEC Fund 243.0 42.7 Saudi Fund 841.1 458.3 282.7 Total 2,192.9 1,410.7 872.8 325.8 59.5 Source: Ministry of Trade and Commerce. Trade and Commerce, UAE, Vol. 56, July, 1979, p. 55. 100 In the practical sphere, the UAE could carryon most of the const.itutional recommendations mainly in accordance with the govern mental structure and political bodies of the federation. It also could take large steps in moving the ruling system from a simple system that occurred among the nomadic society toward a modern model of ruling and governmental system. Accompanied with this shifting, great social and economic changes in the whole society of the DAE took place. Besides these interior movements, the DAE also could achieve success in the ex terior political sphere regionally in the Gulf area, in the Arab world, or in the international society. 'Evidencesof this success are innumerable and can be noticed in many areas that could not be included in this summary. CHAPTER V SUMMARY Nationalism is one of the most important factors in forming or reforming the contemporary nation states, wh~ch constitute the majority of international society. Historically, nationalism served subjectively by unifying small entities and creating large powerful political units. The growth of unifying sentiments of loyalty toward the nation gave the nation state a strength and a coherence that other forms of political organizations had lacked. In addition, "nationalism tends to differentiate beyond the area which it can unify, increasing'the difficulties of conquest 1 by power." Yet colonial powers used nationalism in a negative way when they ditched some parts of the mother state and annexed them to different states, where the ditched population became a minority. In such cases, nationalism created domestic problems because it tended to emphasize the minority's problems in any country. Minority problems, however, did create a domestic instability and, as a, result, produced international instability. However, nationalism and the strengthening of the nation state in the nineteenth century were the main reasons for the "Balance of 1Morton A. Kaplan arid Nicholas De B. Katzenbach. The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law. Reported in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIll, September, 1959, p. 696. 101 102 Power" system in the world. It dominat~d Europe and the inter national society until the first world war. In spite of the importance of nationalism, the variety of conditions and experiences prevented any single definition from being accepted. Thus, a global united definition is still lacking. Because.of this lack, emphasis usually is centralized on the other points related to nationalism, such as determinant factors, effects, stages, etc. Arab Nationalism Nationalism is a universal concept. It cannot be divided according to regional considerations (Arab, America, British, etc.). In addition, its determinant factors are almost the same. Dif ferences between one region and another occur in areap such as historical development and ranking of the determinant factors. According to Arab nationalism, the determinant factors such as language, history, race, and religion need to be discussed. Historically, Arab nationalism began before the emergence of Islam. The modern Arab nationalism began in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century. some steps taken involved Arab nationalism in practice. However, modern Arab nationalism had three stages of development. The Pan Islam Stage, 1875-1920; the Liberal Nationalism Stage. 1920-1948, and the Radical National ism Stage, 1948--, which is still existing. The third and con temporary stage of Arab nationalism was the most effective in producing many social and political changes in the Arab world. 103 Arab Nationalism in the Arabian Gulf Because of its strategic location to the trade route, the Arab Gulf area has been subject to many i~ternationa1 power con quests since its early history. Fortunately, most .of the Arab Gulf conquerors, mainly the Portuguese and the British, aimed only to concentrate on the shores of the Gulf to guarantee their safety on sea and land in this important world passage. Thus, the popu lation of the coastal areas were ones affected by the foreign invasion. The majority of the Arab Gulf population were able to save their Arab traditions and nationalism. When the modern Arab nationalistic movements began to strike strongly in the Arab world in the early 1950' s, "the main target of nationalist feeling in the Gulf at this time was the expulsion of Britain."l And the heat of Arab nationalism brought the Arab of the Gulf with their Arab neighbors together to fight against foreign elements. Islam and Nationalism Because of the great role of Islam in the daily life of the Arab individual, Islam many times was confused or mixed with nation a1ism, either by ordinary individuals or by some scholars. As a matter of fact, Islam does not reserve preference or superiority for Arabs or for any other nation. In addition, because it is a 1George Lenczowski. Oil and State in the Middle East. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1960, p. 39. 104 universal religion, it contradicts nati?nalism as simply a dis~ tinction and preference of one nation over other nations. The United Arab Emirates The UAE, which covers 32,000 square miles, consists of seven emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shargah, Ras Al Khaima, Ajman, Umm al Quwain, and Al Fujairah6 Geographically, the UAE can be divided into two areas, the coastal strip, which borders on the Arab Gulf shore, and the desert lands, which are directly behind the coastal strip. As many other Arabian Gulf states, the UAE used to have a scarcity of population. In recent years its population has been rapidly increasing either because of the improvement in health conditions, which resulted in high birth rate and a low death rate among the UAE citizens or because of the vast econOffiic development of the country, which resulted in enormous numbers of immigrants to the UAE from the Arab world and from other countries, mainly India, Iran, and Pakistan. Both factors made the UAB population reach 1,040,275 in December, 1980. Historically, the UAE has been inhabited by Arabs since the early history of the area, which began before Christ. In addition, the Arab Gulf Emirates, of which the UAE consists, were always forming a unity in history, language, religion, customs, geography, social aspects, etc. Thus, the recent form of unity seems to be a continuation of the past but in a modern form. The most visible period of the UAE's modern history previous to their independence is the period in which the region's history 105 was connected with the British existence in the area. The Emirates' relations with their Arab neighbors Saudi Arabia and Oman curing their old and modern history continued to be brotherly. In spite of some border disputes about the AI-Buraimi Oasis, the disputes never represented a serious threat to the Emirates either before or after the establishment of the federation. According to the other non-Arab neighbor, Iran, there were and still are some problems and national-interest conflicts. Those conflicts have been fluctuating according to the prevailing circum . stances in the area. In the social field the population of the UAE (citizens) is quite harmonious. They share the same origin, history, language, religion, customs, culture, etc. The main social characteristics of the UAE's· population are: nomadic life, tribalism, traditional ism, religion, sentiments, and classlessness. On the Way to the Union Practical steps toward the establishment of the UAE took place following the British announcement in 1968 of her intent to leave the Gulf area in 1971. The period between that announcement and now could be divided into two main phases: the phase of uncer tainty (1968-1971), which included planning, negotiations, and much effort by the Emirates' rulers. The second phase, Which began after the establishment of the federation, could be described as the stage of achievements. During this period the new state had to build up the federation in legal, political, social, economical •• iliaCi. & 106 and international aspects. In short, this period included what could be described as the II cons truction" of the union. Favorable and Unfavorable Factors During the building of the new state many favorable factors helped in building and fulfilling many goals. Some other factors were obstacles to the UAE goals. The favorab1e'factors were: Arab nationalism, historical unity, geographical unity, and political, religious, social, and economic factors. The unfavorable factors were lack of strong central power, a dual system in the government structur~, mismanagement, social problems, nomadic life, and tribalism. These were internal factors. The exterior factors were(l)Iran continued to represent the main threat to the UAE and to the Arab Gulf states. (2) The recent change in Iran and tne emergence of the Islamic revolution and Islamic government made Iran less of a threat to the UAE because of the nature of the Islamic regime and his peaceful intents toward Islamic and Arabic countries. The UAE Today The UAE today represents a federal state according to inter national law. In the interior structure, the provisional consti tution emphasized the separation of authorities in order to guaran tee more freedoms to the government and to the people. Thus, the UAE consists of consultative, executive, and judiciary authorities. 107 Consultative authority is reserved for the Federal National Council (FNC)j executive authority is reserved for the president and his vice president and the supreme counci1j finally, the judi ciary authority is reserved for the supreme court and the courts of first instance. Since the federation was established in 1971, many remarkable achievements have been fulfilled domestically, regionally, and internationally. Domestically many changes and advancements in many fields have been achieved in service sectors such as educa tion, health, social welfare, etc" or in the political structure fields where the simple nomadic society moved sWiftly toward a modern political system. Also, in the regional and international field a great deal of II I~ Ii: advancement and involvement in the regional and international socie ties have been made. The UAE today is an active member in the political field. In the Gulf area it is a member of every activity. In the Arab world it is also very active and is always present in any Arabic mutual activity. In the international community the UAE, in spite of her small size and population, is a partici pant in every international activity in which it can participate, particularly in the social and economical international activities of the UN and the specialized agencies, Conclusion This study is concluded by explaining how Arab nationalism contributed to the existence and the success of the UAE. This 108 .\ contribution can be viewed through. five. categories of factors related to Arab nationalism. 1. Factors related to the concept of nationalism in general 2. Factors related to Arab nationalism 3•. Factors that hastened the steps toward unifi cation 4. Factors that pointed the direction of the union 5. Factors that supported and facilitated the success of the federation Factors Related to the Concept of Nationalism As was mentioned in Chapter I, nationalism keepb any nation from being dissolved by other nations. The existence of a dis tinguished Arab nationalism for a long time helped keep Arabs, including the Arabs of the Gulf, as a distinguished nation among those who neighbored or invaded the Arab world such as Persian and Europeans. In short, the existence of Arab nationalism prevented the Arabs from melting into other nations and thus reserved Arabism in the Gulf. Factors Related to Arab Nationalism Among all nationalisms in the world, Arab nationalism is the only one with the ability to include more than one nation state. In other words, there can be only one Arab nationalism, but there 109 can be different Arab states. Whether this characteristic re sulted from historical circumstances or for other reasons, it helped several Arab countries to exist. Arab countries had nation state provisions and qualifications and at the same time had their own independence in their interior and exterior affairs. This characteristic allowed the main principle of Arab nationalism (Arab unity) not to contradict the sovereignty of any Arab country. Unity is a voluntary act, not unity by annexation to one Arab state. Thus, the allowance of Arab nationalism to more than one Arab state was an important factor in the UAE1s existence. This factor could be viewed from two sides. On the one hand, the understanding of Bin Saud (the originator of Saudi Arabia) of this fact, prevented him from annexing the Emirates to his kingdom while he was powerful. He realized that there was no contradiction between Arab nationalism and the existence of several Arab states. This fact can be understood better if one knows that Bin Saud established his kingdom upon the power and the help of the Wahhabi l religious movement, which believed, as other Sunni muslims do, that there should be only one muslim country in the ~..orld. On the contrary, Bin Saud established good relations with his neighbors, the rulers of the seven emirates. On the other hand, the allowance of Arab nationalism to exist in several Arab countries made it easy for the people and the rulers of the emirates to decide, not only according to their national feel ing, but also according 'to their benefits, about the establishment lSunni: one of the muslim parties. 110 , of an Arab country. In other word~, the establishment of an Arab state, the UAE, was the most beneficial alternative for them. Factors that Hastened the Steps Toward Unification 1. Arab nationalism in its radical stage announced a war against Colonialism and demanded urgent independence of all Arab countries. Practically, this was translated into the fight against colonial powers, mainly the British colonial powers in Egypt, Adden, and Dhaffar (Oman). This war made it impossible for Britain to keep her hold over its old colonies in the area, which used to be called East of Suez canal. The result of this nationalistic war was the British departure from the area, including the Arabian Gulf. Finally, it resulted in the need for unity and the existence of UAE unity. 2. Arab nationalism did not exclude the Arab Emirates; thus, theoretically, the Emirates were eager for unity as a response to Arab nationalism and its main principle, Arab unity. 3. The tremendous subsidiary offered by Arabs, either offi cia1ly by states or nonofficially by individuals, contributed to the UAB in (a) constructing official bodies according to Arabic norms ~nd methods of functioning; those bodies later became the backbone of the official structure of the UAE (department, ministry, etc.),(b) otrengthening and ass~rting the national Arabic feelings among the Emirates' population. In other words, the enlargement and spread of the Arab national movement and power in the area, 111 especially with the large experience of nationalistic activities and the organization that many of the Arabs brought into the emirates. Factors that Pointed the Direction of the Union As mentioned before, the British intended withdrawal left the emirates with the following alternatives: (a) a united Arab federat ion, ,(b) an independent (non-Arab) 1 unio?, (c) independent Arab or non-Arab separated states, or (d) a unification with Iran. The effective rule of Arab nationalism was the prevention of any of the alternatives except the first one; however, the estab lishment of independent states in the seven emirates was not a practical solution because of the incapability of most of them to establish an independent state. In addition, events and theory proved the failure of previous attempts toward the establishment of separate forms o~ unity unrelated to the Arab world, such as Trucial States, in addition to the fact that non-Arab forms of unity, such as the previous ones, would not have the opportunity to live after the British umbrella had vanished. According to the last alternative, it was impossible to imple ment Arabic and Persian national separation, in spite of their sharing the same religion. Added to the theoretical contradiction of this assumption, the historical events, particularly the recent events that made this nationalistic conflict a main reason for instability in the Gulf. lNon-Arab means a union that does not relate to Arabs nationally, economically, politically, etc. 112 The Iranian claims on some parts of the Gulf and sdme times of all the Gulf constituted a threat to Arab nationalism, on one hand, and to the national interest of the emirates, on the other hand. In addition, the Shah's military existence in Oman against Dhaffar~ebellions represented an obvious threat to any liberation movement in the area. Finally, the Shah's plans to convert Iran to police the area represented a heavy stick over the heads of the emirates' rulers and people. Thus, the convenient and effective response to all of these variables was the clinging to Arab nationalism and the achieving of the main principles of Arab unity. The Arab's realization of this nationalistic conflict between Arab nationalism and Persian nationalism emphasized the need for their support of the Gulf emirates. Arabs officially and nonofficia1ly pushed as hard as they could to help those emirates toward an urgent unification as a response to their Arab nationalism. Factors that Supported and Facilitated the Success of the Federation As the UAE was established, Arab nationalism also contributed to the success. Some examples were (a) the Saudi Arabian renuncia tion of her claims in A1 Buraimi Oasis added to the notable support that Saudi Arabia offered to the UAE, especially in the social and interior aspects. (b) the Omani renunciation of her claims, such as Al Wagan and Mezyed. In addition, Oman allowed her citizens to be naturalized by the UAE and allowed them to occupy any official 113 jobs there. The Omani allowance ,of her citizens to worK in the UAE satisfied an important need of the UAE in the army and police, in particular, and in other jobs, in general. (c) Arab national feelings were the main, if not the only, reason that made Abu Dhubi pay almost 90 percent of the union's budget for more than five years, and it is still paying more than 50 percent of this budget. (d) The UAE's direct embarkation in the Arabic community very soon after the establishment mainly politically and economically and its adoption of the Arabic line and its stand toward local and inter national problems gave it a remarkable position in the Arabic sphere. Using her economical resources to help many Arab coun tries, especially those that bordered on Israel, finally her leading role in the 1973 Arab oil embargo gave the new state more political and public support, which facilitated her success domestically and regionally. However, the UAE's participation that emerged from the Arab nationalistic feelings and were upheld by the existence of a strong Arab nationalism are not listed in this study. Those participations supported the success of the UAE both inside and outside her borders. From this discussion one can see that Arab nationalism con tributed effectively to the establishment ·of the UAE by distinguish ing Arabs of the Gulf from their highly populated neighbors, Persia and India. In spite of their small number, they strived against colonial powers, mainly against Turkey and Britain, with the help of their Arab neighbors before and after the UAE establishment. 114 In spite of the importance of ,Arab .nationalism's contribution to the DAE, it was not the only factor in the creation of the federation, but it was supported by other important factors, mainly economical and political ones. The'relation between Arab nationalism and the UAE was one that could be described as reciprocity. The DAE, while she bene fited from Arab nationalism, at the same time contributed to Arab nationalism. This successful experiment of Arab unity proved that 1. Arab nationalism is an effective factor in the Arab life during their weakness or during their power. 2. Arab unity could be shifted from theory to implementation if suitable circumstances occurred for this shifting. The failure of previous Arab attempts toward unity was not caused by the wrong theory but by the wrong application. 3. The success of this experiment opened the door for larger Arab unification either by enlargement of the same base (the UAE) , by including more Arab countries in the federation, or by other existing Arab federations using the experience gained from this experiment. Thus, the relation between the two variables of this study, the UAE and Arab nationalism, is a reciprocity or an exchange relation,and both UAE and Arab nationalism benefited and can benefit from each other. BIBLIOGRAPHY r BIBLl·9GRAPHY Books Abdulaziz, Al-Omair Ali. The Arabian Gulf, University Micro films International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1980. Abir, Mordechai. Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, The Red Sea and the Gulf. Frank Cass and Company Ltd., Portland, Oregon, 1974. Almond, A. Gabriel. Political Development, Essays in Heuristic Theory, Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Anabtawi, M. F. Arab Unity in Terms of Law. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1963. Anthony, John Duke. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, and Petroleum: The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975. Batreeq, Yonis Ahmad. Studies in the Arab Society. Dar Al-Nahdah AI-Arabia, Beirut, Lebanon, 1969. Bill, James A. and Carl Leiden. Politics, Middle East. Little, Brown and Company (Canad~t), Ltd., 10'10. Bin Abi Talib, Ali. Nahj Al Balagha, explained by Shaikh Mohammad Abdoh. Dar AI-Thaqafah, Beirut, Lebanon. Cassadio,' Gian Paolo. The Economic Challenge of the Arabs. Saxon House, D.C., Heath Ltd., Lexington, Mass., 1979. Cottrell, Alvin J. The Persian Gulf States, a General Survey. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1980. Dawn, C. Ernest. From Ottomanism to Arabism. The Board of Trustees of the University o~ Illinois, 1973. Demir, Soliman. The Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development, Praeger Publishers, New York, New York, 1976. Arab Development Funds in the Middle East. Pergamon Press, New York, 1979. Deutsch, Karl W. and William J. Folt~. Nation Building. Atherton Press, New :lork I 1966. Elle, Ke~nurie (ed.) Nationalism in Asia and Africa. The World Publishing Company, New York, Cleveland, 1970. 116 ? 117 Fenelon, K. G. The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey. Longman Group, Ltd., London and New York, 1976. Glahan, Gerhard von. Law Among Nations, 4th Edition, Mac millan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1981. Hawley, Donald. The Trucial States. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1971. Hayes, Carlton J. H. The Historical Evaluation of Modern Nationalism. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1959. Hopwood, Derek (ed.) The Arabian Peninsula, Society and Politics, George Allen Unwin Ltd., 1972. Ismael, Tareq Y. The Arab Left. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1976. Kaplan, Morton A. and Nicholas Katzenbach. ".The Patterns . of Internationl:!-l Politics and of International Law," IrtThe American Political Science Review, Bobbs Merrill Reprint Series in the Social Sciences, 1959. Khalifa, Ali Mohammed. The United Arab Emirates, Unity in Fragmentation. West View Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1979. Kohin, Hans. Nationalism, Its Meaning and History. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York, New York, 1955. Laffin, John. The Arab Mind Considered, A Need for Under standing. Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., New York, New York, 1975. Lenczowski, George. Oil and State in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1960. Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., New York, New York, 1966. Moris, C. Falcon of the Desert, Publication of the Ministry of Information and Culture, V.A.E., Abu Dhabi, 1974. Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1973. Peterson, J. E. Oman in the Twentieth Century, Political Foundations of an. Emerging State, Croom Helm Ltd:, London, 1978. Polk, William R. and William J. Mares. Passing Brave. Alfred A. Knop, Inc., New York, 1973. 118 Raban, Jonathan. Arabia Through the Looking Glass. William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd. London, Glasgow, 1979. Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture, trans. by Ray Echose, Rocker Publications Committee, Los Angeles, California, 1973. Saunders, J. J. A History of Medieval Islam. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1965. Shafer, Boyd C. Nationalism, Myth and Reality. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1955. Shilling, N. A. Doing Business in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States. Inter-Crescent Publishing and Information Corporation, New York, New York, 1975. Simmons, Andre. Arab Foreign Aid. Associated University Press, Inc., East Brunswick, New Jersey, 1981. Snyder, Louis L. The Meaning of Nationalism. Trustees of Rutgers College, New Jersey, 1954. Smith, Anthony D. S. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, New York University Press, New York, 1979. Theories of Nationalism. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1971. Sugar, Peter F. and Ivo Jilederen. Nationalism in Eastern Europe. University of Washington Press. Tandon, Raj K. World's Richest Nation, United Arab Emirates. Rangnath Publications, New Delhi, India. Ward, Barbara. Five Ideas That Change the World. W. W. North and Company, Inc., McVail-Ballou Press, U.S.A., 1959. Zahban, Rosemarie Said. Origins of the United Arab Emirates. The Macmillan Press, London, 1978. Publications Ministry of Education, V.A.E. Establishment and the Most Important of its Achfevements, Abu Dhabi, 1981. Ministry of Presid~ncy Affairs, Lectures of the Cultural Festival, 1973-1973. Abu Dhabi. 119 Ministry of Information and Cu·lture, U.A.E. United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, 1974. Ministry of Trade and Commerce, U.A.E. Trade and Commerce Vol. 56, July 1979, Abu Dhabi. ' Ministry of Information and Culture, U.A.E. Facts and Numbers, Information Documentation Center, Abu Dhabi, 1980. Ministry of Information and Culture, U.A.E. The Emirates, Information Documentation Center, Abu Dhabi, 1981. Ministry of Information and Culture, U.A.E. Gulf Cooperation, Abu Dhabi. Research and Documentation Center, U.A.E. The Events of V.A.E., 1973, Abu Dhabi, 1981. Research and Documentation Center, U.A.E. Documents of U.A.E., 1973, 2nd Vol. Abu Dhabi, 1980. Ministry of Information, Iran. Allaho Akbar. Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, 1982. Ministry of Education. An Introduction to Saudi Arabian Antiquities, Department of Antiquities and Museums, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1975. Magazines Time, V.A.E. 1977, special report concerning U.A.E. AI-Mustaqbal AI-Arabi, Vol. 21, November 1980. AI-Mustaqbal AI-Arabi, Vol. 19, September 1980. Assayad. Vol. 1919, August 14, 1981, pp. 52-55. Beirut, Dar Al-Sayad. Hazimeia Press, L~banon. Pamphlets United States, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. V.A.E., Background notes. Facts on File, July 24, 1981, p. 30983. ... 120 "I 'i Iraq Forced to War, a PnblicatiQl1 of, Iraqi Interest Section, Washington, D.C. Dictionary The English Oxford Dictionary, Vol. VII, p. 30.