Al-Buraimi Dispute: a Case Study in Inter-Arab Politics

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AI-Shamsi,Saeed Mohammad

THE AL-BURAIMI DISPUTE: A CASE STUDY IN INTER-ARAB POLITICS

The American University PH.D. 1986

University Microfilms

I n ter n âti 0 n SI300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

IN INTER-ARAB POLITICS by

Saeed M. Al-Shamsi submitted to the Faculty of the College of

Public and International Affairs of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Signatures of Committee: Chairman: / \ f I U J P. C&j BSanof the College

Date 1986 The American University (fiUol Washington, D.C. 20016

THE AffiBICAH UHIVEESITY LIBRARY

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE AL-BURAIMI DISPUTE; A CASE STUDY

OF INTER-ARAB POLITICS

By Saeed M. Al-Shamsi ABSTRACT

The Al-Buraimi dispute has been briefly written about in most of the political and legal literature related to the region. The main thrust of this thesis is to examine the

issue of the Al-Buraimi dispute as it influences the poli

tical transition, in the region, from a tribal to a modern nation-state. The study also examines the historical and

current relationship of the Oasis and its people to the

surrounding region. This work provides further knowledge of the influence and work of the British and American oil

companies in the region. It also assists in understanding

the process of political modernization. Since the Western concept of politics and the nation

state system is a institution recently introduced to the

traditional tribal way of life, this study is based on an historical descriptive approach to examine the issue. At

the same time the integrative Federation of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), is examined, as well as the Arabian Gulf

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Cooperation Council (AGCC) and how the border disputes influence the process of the federations in the region. The findings of this study show that traditional tribalism is deeply rooted in the political system of the U.A.E., as well as the AGCC. Finally, the study shows that the Al-Buraimi dispute could be resolved by a combination of tribal loyalty and the principle of self-determination under international law, however, this achievement will depend on the degree to which the people of Al-Buraimi are directly represented during the negotiations.

Ill

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my family, my teachers my friends and a special person

for their support and encouragement

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ABSTRACT...... Ü

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... vi INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND...... 8

A. The Gulf of Eastern Arabia...... 8 B. The Tribal Social Organization...... 15 C. The Disputed Areas...... 23

1. Al-Udaid Area...... 26 2. Liwa Area...... 31 3. Al-Buraimi Area...... 36

Buraimi, Kenasa, Al-Ain, Al-Jini, Al-Hili, Al-Mutiridh, Al-Muwaifi Al-Qattarah, Sa'arah

CHAPTER II; THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN INTERESTS...... 46 A. British Presence...... 49

B. Saudi Arabian Presence...... 53 The First Saudi Dynasty...... 53

The Second Saudi Dynasty ...... 57 The Third Saudi Dynasty...... 59 C. U.S.A. Presence...... 63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLAIMS AND CHARGES, 1949-1955 ...... 70 Claims and Counter-Claims ...... 71

CHAPTER IV: THE TURNING POINT, 1952-1955 ...... 93 The International Tribunal...... 109 CHAPTER V: THE PEOPLE OF AL-BURAIMI AND THE ENDLESS NEGOTIATION...... 119 A. Exile to Saudi Arabia...... 121

B. Going Home...... 124 C. The Negotiations...... 126 Negotiations 1934-1949...... 133 Negotiations 1949-1955...... 134 Negotiations 1955-1970...... 135 Negotiations 1970-1975...... 137

CHAPTER VI: THE TRANSITION OF TRIBAL SOCIETY TO A MODERN FEDERAL STATE...... 140 A. The United Arab Emirates...... 150

B. The Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC)...... 161 CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION ...... 172 APPENDICES...... 185

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 254

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Maps 1. Tribal Map of the Arabian Peninsula...... 17

2. Central and Southern Arabia...... 25

3. Southeast Arabia ...... 33 4. Al-Buraimi Villages...... 41 5. ARABIA Circa 1925...... 73 6. The Saudi Arabia— Abu Dhabi Frontier, 1955-77. . . . 131

7. The Internal Land Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates...... 157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

The history of Ancient Eastern Arabia is characterized

by alternating periods of tribal war and peace. These rivalries, however, never forced the combatants to leave tribal properties and lands. The usually brief and narrow conflicts involved disputes over the location of water

wells, camel herd ownership, farm land jurisdiction, and matters of honor. While the pattern of movement of Bedouin tribes is normally fixed, occasionally it may vary in response to changes in grazing due to rainfall or other

factors. In order for the chief of a tribe to claim the territory over which his tribe roams, he must establish and maintain the loyalty of the people. Traditionally,

territorial boundaries were of little significance because Tribal allegiance— not territory— defined political relationships.^ However, the loyalty of a tribe was not always constant. It might be shifted from one ruler and

pledged to another or even withheld completely. This type

of pledge of loyalty could lead to conflicting claims over the territories of the defecting tribes and become objects

^Alastair Drysdale, and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa; A Political Geography (New York, N.Y.; Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 8-89.

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of dispute. For these reasons, the concept of territorial sovereignty in the Western sense did not exist in the Eastern Arabian Gulf. However, the traditional tribal order could not

withstand the tide of 19th Century British colonialism and the subsequent discovery of major oil reserves in Arabia in

the first half of this century. These two develoments injected the modern concept of territorial sovereignty and, for the first time, necessitated the delimitation of

boundaries in the region. The undefined borders constituted

a major obstacle to the precise deliniation of oil con cessions secured by competing Anglo-American oil companies

during the first half of this century. The problem was particularly complicated in the border areas with large potentials in oil reserves, as in the case of Al-Buraimi.

This study deals with the case of the Al-Buraimi territorial dispute, which has been a source of continuing tension and feuding among neighboring Saudi Arabia, United

Arab Emirates, and Oman. The study is designed to serve several interrelated purposes. First it is the most comprehensive and systematic

study of the Case of the Al-Buraimi dispute undertaken to date. In this regard, it serves to fill an existing gap in the knowledge about the historical, political, social, and

economic aspects of the case.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 Secondly, it is anticipated that the study will provide insights into similar, and as yet unresolved, border disputes which affect the relations among the Arabian Gulf States.

Thirdly, the study will also be concerned with the socio-economic and political impact of the dispute on the

tribes that inhabit the Al-Buraimi Oasis. The Fourth objective of this study is to elucidate how the resolution of the dispute could enhance the prospect for

strengthening cooperation among the Arabian Gulf Corporation Council (AGCC) States.

Finally, the broader objective of this study is to determine how traditional tribal authority over land can be reconciled with the modern concept of territorial sover

eignty, as defined in international law. The approach to this study is historical. It will

describe and analyze the dispute; its origin and evolution. In addition the study will highlight the political, legal,

economic, and social implications. The study will be based primarily on tribal materials and governmental documents. Extensive use will also be made of English and Arabic

secondary sources— both published and unpublished. The

study also utilizes information and data gathered by interviewing leading personalities from the Al-Baraimi Oasis and recording their personal accounts of the events.

Similarly, leading American and British participants in the

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events influencing the dispute have been interviewed for the

purpose of this study. The study is devided into seven chapters, preceded by the present introduction. Chapter I provides a general background by describing the traditional region in dispute;

its people, their tribal , social, and political organiza

tion and way of life. Chapter II is an historical examination of how Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, and the United States established

their presence and influence in the region. The development and evolution of the conflict is

presented and analyzed in Chapter III. The first American oil concession granted by the Saudi Government, and how it led thereafter to the debate concerning the frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, is described. Claims and counter-claims over Al-Buraimi Oasis and the surrounding

territory became the dominant factor in the relationship between Britain (on behalf of Abu Dhabi and Oman) and Saudi Arabia— who was supported by the American oil companies and,

later on, by the government of the United States. This chapter explains the early process of the development of the

Al-Buraimi dispute and the growing tension over the issue.

The political assumptions and perceptions of the tribes in the disputed area with respect to sovereignty of the land

are also discussed.

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Chapter IV deals with the Anglo-Saudi attempt to settle the dispute through arbitration during 1952-1955». During this period the Al-Buraimi dispute became quite

visible internationally and the growing influence of ARAMCO over Saudi policy in the matter became evident. The failure of the International Tribunal and the role of the United

Nations in the dispute are examined in this chapter as well. Chapter V analyses the changing relationship and attitudes of the people of Al-Buraimi toward the Saudis. As a consequence of three days of military conflict in 1955, between the British and the people of Al-Buraimi (who

represented the Saudis) many of the Al-Buraimi people were forced into exile to Saudi Arabia, where their discontent

increased. Shaikh Zayed encouraged the people of the Oasis to return to their farms and land. The conclusion of the

chapter will provide a summary of the negotiation period over the Al-Buraimi dispute leading to the agreement of 1974, which was neither ratified or published. Chapter VI examines the transitional period from

tribalism to nationalism and nation state in the U.A.E. In this connection the study will focus on the political, economic, and social integration which took place at that

time. It discussess how each force— tribalism and nationalism— functioned and how they interacted within the

federation.

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The major factors which influence the U.A.E. will be examined. These factors are oil, border disputes, conflicts of tradition, and security. Finally the chapter will review

how internal and external threats led to closer cooperation

and increased integration among the Arab Gulf states. The final Chapter VII will present the findings of the study and its theoretical implications. It will analyze the

findings concerning the Al-Buraimi dispute with particular reference to the "dispute" seen as a major factor in the

shaping of the politics of the region— in particular its impact on the politics of the Federation of the United Arab Emirates. It should highlight what the dispute meant to the people of Al-Buraimi and neighboring areas, how the sover

eignty of Al-Buraimi should be determined, what the impact

of the discovery of oil has been on traditional tribal loyalties and identities, and how moral issues affect the local tribes and inhabitants. Also it should show the impact of the new concept of state sovereignty over a specific territory as it replaces the traditional tribal

property and ownership methods in Al-Buraimi territory. The chapter also points to the lack of concern by the British Government as they withdrew from the region without

settling the border dispute (internal or external disputes), the role of international law vs. tribal law, the role

played by the British and American oil companies, the ambiguous agreement of 1974 over Al-Buraimi dispute, and the

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Saudi Arabia hegemony in the region, in particular through

the AGCC. The conclusion of the study makes recommendations which

the writer believes to be supported by the research. In the translation of the names of people and places, the author has referred to the style of the Documentation Center of the government of Abu Dhabi in the U.A.E. An

attempt has been made to be as conventional as is possible.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. THE GULF OF EASTERN ARABIA THE Gulf of the Eastern Arabian Peninsula has been

known as the Persian Gulf for a long time. However, by 1955, faced with emerging nationalism in the Arab World, Arabs began to print maps in which they named the area of

the "Arabian Gulf". It became almost obligatory in all Arabic speaking countries, schools, newspapers articles, radio broadcasting, speeches and books to make a point of

referring to the Gulf as the Arabian Gulf or the "Gulf" The Arabian Gulf is an inland sea about 500 miles long, and on average 100 miles wide. It lies roughly North-West-

and South-East between latitudes 30 and 24 North and longi

tudes 48 and 57 East.^ The vast land of Iran and Arabia lies to the North and South of the Gulf. They form a pla teau of considerable elevation separated from the Gulf by

the low-lying coastal plains. The Gulf of Oman and Straits of Hormuz are coextensive on the south of the Gulf and they

^Since this study is related to the Arab side of the Gulf, I will refer to it as the "Arabian Gulf" or the "Gulf."

^sir Rupert Hay, The Persian Gulf State: (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1959), p. 1.

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both form a single waterway which has for millenia served as

a highway of commerce and communications between the Medi terranean world and South Asia, as well as an easy avenue for local trade and migration. Contacts and exchange be tween the Arab and Persian coasts were far easier, in the

past centuries, than between the coasts on either side and

its arid and inhospitable hinterland. The Arabian Gulf, through history, has maintained its

importance, not only to its people on both sides, but also to the great foreign powers from East and West who were attracted by its strategic location. The importance of the Gulf of the British became clear when they established their

role in the area to assure the security of the sea routes to India and Far East countries, where the British had great trade interests. They had no desire whatsoever to become

involved with it beyond the strictly limited purpose of

preserving peace in the waters of the Gulf and its approaches. Their role and material interests in the coast

of the Arabian Gulf were to end the piracy which harried

their trade ships and which was based in its innumerable creeks, and to exclude other foreign powers whose ambition

might threaten the security of the Indian Empire. The capture of Hormuz from the Portuguese by the

British in 1622, followed by the decline of the Portuguese power in the Gulf area, did not eliminate all of the British difficulties and did not give them a secure position in the

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area.^ By the end of Seventeenth Century the position of the British had vastly improved causing the Dutch commercial competition to fade out of the picture and leaving supremacy

to the British. As for the French, they had played a limited political and commercial role in the events of the

Gulf region. With time the British became more predominant in the area and their initial interest in the routes to India became more secure when, in 1773, the British Parlia ment passed the Regulating Act. This gave the British

Government and its Parliament, for the first time, certain control over the East India Company at home and over its

administration.^ Because of such a reform of the adminis

tration, the military and political activities in the Gulf area and along the route to India were increased and began

to influence the inhabitants of the region. At the same time the British attitudes toward power and zones of influ

ence were gradually changing to become more effective and they started to use their growing sea power to enforce their will. However, the growing power of the British in

the region was faced by the strength of the al-Qawasim confederacy.^ Having that sort of power in the hands of the

^Abdulamir Amin, British Interests in the Persian Gulf Region; Study in British Imperial Policy (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 6-9.

^Amin, ibid., p. 108. ^J.B. Kelley, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (London; Ely House, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 111.

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al-Qawasim, the ruling family of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah,

the British needed some ruler from the same region to help them maintain peace and order in the Gulf. Since they had a special relationship with the Sultans of Muscat and Oman,

the British turned to them for help, especially since the Sultans at that time had the most important Arab port in the region. Muscatad Oman and its territory occupied the south

east corner of the Arabian Peninsula with unknown boundar ies, for no one was in a position to define them. Backed against the Arabian Gulf and the Vast sand desert of the

Rub-al-Khali, Muscat and Oman protrudes as a great promon tory across the Arabian Sea to Karachi and Bombay. Because

of this, Muscat and Oman had become a port of entry for much of the trade of the western India Ocean, and especially that between India and the Arabian Gulf. Without British naval support the Sultan of Muscat's projected imperial structure

would have tottered precariously between sand and sea; the

British and the Sultan held a mutual interest in supporting one another, and Britain obviously needed Muscat's support for the campaign to suppress what the British called

al-Qawasim piracy and the foreign slave-trade which was flourishing in the region of Arabia from Basra at the top of

the Arabian Gulf to Aden at the bottom of the Red Sea. The treaties which the British imposed on the rulers of the area also contributed to a better and tighter control to serve

British needs. The following are some of the earliest

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 treaties between Britain and several of the Gulf Shaikhs :

(1) First, there is the undertaking, known as the Com- lanman, of 1798 from the Imam of Oman to East India Company. The effect was simply to expel the French and Dutch, especially the former, to support the British

control over the harbor at Muscat, and to facilitate a British factory and garrison. The Governor-General in Bombay "ratified" this document. (2) The General Treaty of 1820 was between the British

Government and the "Arab Tribes". A number of Shaikhs

signed it. Most well known to the British was, Ras al- Khaimah, others who signed were Abu Dhabi, Dubai,

A]man, Umm al-Qawain and Sharjah. It forbade piracy,

plunder by sea, and distinguished between such action and an acknowledged war. Piracy included the slaughter of captives and transport of slaves by sea. This

treaty did not formally exclude any third party beside the Arabs and the British, but provided for the British

to carry out the treaty, mentioning no others. (3) The treaty of Perpetual Maritime Truce of 1853 recog

nized the benefits of the maritime truce and the media tion of the British Resident and proclaimed a perpetual

peace at sea. It further provided that the signtories would not retaliate against any breach but inform tne

British authorities, who "will forthwith take the nec essary steps . . . for reparation". Finally, it pro

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vided that the British Government would "watch over the maintenance of the peace which had been concluded, and take steps to ensure observance of the articles".® These exclusive treaties were the basic charters of British rule over and relations with some of the region's tribes. A variety of arrangements and understandings took

place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which gave

the British even more control in the Gulf. All this led to the Gulf Arabs and their territories being isolated for more than a century and a half from the growing socioeconomic and political development in the rest of the Arab World and the

Middle East in general. The British realized that these 'exclusive treaties' were important to them in order to strengthen their future and establish hegemony in the Arabian Gulf. By the early part of the twentieth century,

the British were so entrenched along the coastal region of Arabia from Basra to Aden as to make it definitely and practically exclusively a British sphere of influence. Through the years from 1891 to 1914 the Gulf area

became the scene of intensive rivalry between the major

European powers. The French, the Germans and the Russians not only sought free access for their commercial enter

prises, they went further and challenged the British right to treat the Gulf politically as a 'British lake.' However,

®B. R. Pridham (ed.) The Arab Gulf and the West. "The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties: A British View by David Roberts (London and Sydney: Groom Helm, 1985), p. 2.

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by firmness and diplomacy as well as some coercive measures, the British emerged completely victorious.

World War I and the Russian Revolution effectively ended great power rivalries in the Gulf area for several decades, although Britain remained very powerful at sea. The years between the two wars thus relatively quiet and

peaceful in the Gulf. History almost seemed to have passed by the region. But appearances to that effect were deeply deceiving because major oil exploration was carried out, in large part by American and British interests, and commercial

arrangements concluded which permitted the rapid expansion

of oil production from the Gulf in the years after 1945. The inter-war period presented the American economic activi

ties in the Gulf with a better chance than others, espe cially after the oil strike in Bahrain in 1932.? By the end of the second World War two things began to happen. First,

there was the rapid run-down of the British Empire, and with it the contracting of its military power from Suez to India.

Secondly, the growth of oil activity on the Arab shores of

the Gulf drew Britain into greater involvement on the land,

which until then had been studiously avoided. Thus, Britain inevitably became party to tribal conflicts and disputes

over the various claims and ambitions in the area. The discovery of oil contributed to serious frontier disputes

^Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates; A Modern History (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), pp. 57-8.

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between Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, and the growing expectation of more oil in adjacent areas exacerbated the problem. Thereafter, the development of events in the dis puted areas led to a change in the political and legal sys

tems of the Gulf region as will be explained later on in this study.

The British Political Residents in the Gulf reacted strongly to American oil concession gains by adopting a policy of interference. They supported their position by

citing their treaties with the local rulers. Meanwhile, they were also attempting to gain the major share of future oil concessions for British companies.

The Anglo-American race for oil in the Gulf area was on. But the ill-defined boundaries separating the Sheikh

doms and Trucial Coast/Saudi Arabian frontiers presented a problem. As a result, the relations between Saudi Arabia

and British represented Abu Dhabi and Oman were confused by conflicting claims, both on- and off-shore. The most cele brated controversy, however, came over al Buraimi Oasis.

B. THE TRIBAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION In order to have an understanding of the social organi zation of the tribal society one must begin with a clear

delineation of the various groups that compose this society.

Also, the economic and ecological environment contributes to the conditions in which the tribes of this region live.

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There are those who travel extensively and spend most of their time living in the open under a thorn tree, those moving about within their tribal areas depending on the

seasonal rain falls and grazing, and those who are already

settled in oases and villages. In general, their life is a simple one characterized by the outward relationship with their environment and an in ward one with their tribal organization. It should perhaps be remembered that the tribesmen base the naming of geo

graphical areas on human and hegemony factors. These are determined by the importance of family lineage, upon which

Arabian society, in general, stands. The areas in which these groups move to and from are called "Ahram* (singular "Haram") which means forbidden.

They are allowed to be used only by members of the group. Each tribe would normally have more than one distict, depending on the season, and they would be scattered all over the desert. Most of the Ahram would be owned by the members of the tribe, especially when it comes to the oases,

villages and farming areas. (See Map 1.) However, the tribal situation should not be thought to

be in any way a static thing. It is constantly changing not only between one tribe and another, but within a tribe as

well. Occasionally when a section of a large tribe splits

off and becomes independent with its own leadership and

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•SF^ « U W A W M K, TRIBAL MAP OF THE h» ARABIAN PENINSULA

Arabian

Map 1. SOURCE: R. Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 22.

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'Ahram* (the area on which they live). Thus the al Bu

Shamis have split off from the Na'im tribe. However, they remain a part of the same descent-group and family tree. Once a tribe became recognized by others and established its

identity, it usually grew and perhaps gave rise to new smaller tribes. Conversely a new tribe may become weak and be absorbed by a stronger neighbour or enter into a client relationship. Since ownership in the tribal organization is very important each tribe has its own camel brand which has

been compared to a coat of arms. This type of identifi cation then further emphasizes sectional and individual ownership. Therefore the normal movement of tribal members

from one place to another, and the splits which take place, cause the same tribe to be present in more than one area, such as a Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Jordan. But each section or group of this tribe would be loyal to a

different authority depending on its location and in many

cases, to its Shaikh or Chief. This seemingly restless movement is nothing more than a readjustment by a tribe to accommodate itself to the supply

of food and the maintenance of numerical strength sufficient

for defensive purposes. Donald Cole has illustrated the way in which al Murrah

Bedouin tribe of the Empty Quarter of Arabian Peninsula,

forms their Tribal organization. The most basic unit of their society is the local household composed of an old man, an old woman.

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their sons, wives and their children. Household average is about seven people. Above the level of the household is the lineage which includes all the people descended from a male ancestor who lived about five generations ago; a lineage averages about fifty households. From four to six lineage units, according to the patterns of partialineal descent, to form clans. The Al Murrah tribe which includes all the descendants of Murrah, is composed of seven clans.® It is generally supposed that an Arab tribe is composed

on the descendants of one man. However, it was observed by J.R.L. Carter that "this situation is rather an exception," simply because, "large areas conquered by the Arabs, both

geographically and historically have combined to complicate the original simple structure of a tribe.At the same time the regions that are involved in this study have two types of tribal community, the Bedu and Hader, both of which

are related to one another and both rely on their descent- group for political importance and leadership. The Hadder tribes are those who live in fixed settle

ments such as oases, villages and coastal towns. Therefore,

their political structure is more recognizable to those outsiders who come into contact with them, and because of their fixed location the foreign traders, invaders, passers-

by and visitors, find it easier to deal with them rather

than Bedu community, because of its continuous movement.

®Donald P. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 24.

®J.R.L. Carter, Tribes in Oman (London, England: Peninsular Publishing, 1982), p. 12.

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Through both communities' lives are changing rapidly, the Bedu's existance still revolves around their camel and most

of their lives are spent finding water and fodder for them, while the Hadder's existence revolves around fixed farming of arable land and in comparison to the Bedu is more comfor

table. Yet some of the Bedu, because of family ties, have integrated with the Hadder and started to become semi settled owning some farming areas which they visit every year for the harvest season. The fragmentation of the Bedu social and economic structure may be clearly seen in the fact that the number of

tribes owning allegiance in whole or in part to a larger,

stronger tribe, or to the settled Hadder, becomes very important. The relation of Bedu or Hadder is made even more important by the existence of traditional alliances and traditional enmities between tribes, and occasionally

between sections of a single tribe. At the same time the complexity of religious school, political and social life

should be considered. Of all the aspects of tribal life, we find political status is the most confusing one. There were two political

confederations in the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Dr.

Anthony describes them as follows; GHAFIRI-HINAWI. The two major tribal confedera tions in Oman. The Hinawi tribes tend to be of Yammani (also known as Qahtani, or Southern Arab) origin and of the Ibadisect of Islam while the Ghafiri tribes tend to be of Adnai (also known as Nizari, or Northern Arab) origin and of the Summi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 sect of Islam. The development of this dichotomy dates from the first half of the 18th century at the time of the civil wars over the succession of the Imamate of the Ya'Arabia Dynasty. The two sides coalesced behind the Bani Hina and Bani Ghafir tribes (thus the names of the confedera tions ). The political nature of the division of the underscored by the existence of Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes within each province and frequently in the larger towns, which are traditionally divided into Alayah (upper) and Sifalah (lower) quarters. In the last two centuries, the success of tribal rebellions and the periodic revivals of the Ibadi Imamate depended heavily on the extent to which the tribal leader of Imam could count on support from these factors. Added to these political confederations, one may observe that there are: (1) groupings according to religion, Ibadi tribes and Sunni tribes,

(2) groupings according to factors, Ghafiri tribes and Hinawi tribes, (3) groupings according to mode of life, settled tribes and bedu tribes,

(4) groupings according to the degree of control exercised by a certain higher authority, tribes fully under control of such authority,

(5) groupings according to the degree of loyalty of smaller tribes to a larger one. Alliances and emnities that may cut across the group

ings set forth above makes the tribal political behaviour unstable. Ibadis tend to side with Ibadis in opposition to

Sunnis, but every so often Ibadis turn against others of their own persuasion, and then they may seek support through

an alliance with Sunnis. Ghafiri tend to side with

lOjohn Duke Anthony, Historical and Cultural of the Sultante of Oman and the Emirates of Eastern Arabia (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1976), p. 36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 Ghafiris, and Hinawis with Hinawis, but these tendencies are far from being established rules.

The undercurrent of hostility between Bedus and Hadder

that is so strong elsewhere in Arabia in general and in other desert land also exists in the eastern region of

Arabian Peninsula, but there are settled tribes that have budouin sections or clients, or that ally themselves with bedu elements in their struggles with other Hadder or townsmen. Furthermore, a leader of a tribe, the Shaikh, is

responsible for the welfare of the members of his tribe in peace and war. At the same time his friendship is usually sought by the rulers on the coastal towns, for his control

over a section of the hinterland and its people place him in a position of great strength. An important point to keep in mind, especially when

such groupings are constantly changing, is that Ibadis are

on occasion converted to Sunnis, and Sunnis to Ibadis. More than one tribe has shifted from the Ghafiri faction to Hinawi, and vice versa. The degree of allegiance offered by

a tribe to higher authority may remain relatively unchanged over a long period, or it may shift fairly rapidly. Infor

mation on the tribes that was true yesterday may still be true today, or it may stand in need of considerable

modification.

This tribal pattern was further characterized by a tendency to form tribal coalitions in times of external dangers; however, these coalitions

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rapidly shifted according to the vicissitudes of tribal relations.il

C. THE DISPUTED AREAS The region whose sovereignty is claimed in total by the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in different proportions by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Oman lies, as presented in the Arbitration of 1955,1% between the

northern edge of the great desert of Rub al-Khali and the Arabian Gulf and between the great desert of Jafurah to the

west, and the mountains of Oman of the east. This region consists of a desert coastal tract, together with its adjacent islands and shoals; a desert

hinterlands of lighter sands, ending at the heavy sands of the great deserts of Rub-al-Khali in the south and Jafurah

in the west; and the two large oases of Al-Buraimi, which is

situated on the extreme east on the frontier of Oman, and Liwa, which is situated in the Interior of the desert

hinterland, towards the center of the geographical region.

(See Map 2.)

llAli Mohammed Khalifa. The United Arab Emirates; Unity in Fragmentation. (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, Inc., 1979). p. 8. l^Both Saudi Arabia and Great Britain (acting on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and Sultan of Muscat and Oman) agreed to submit their serious quarrel over the location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and the sovereignty of the Al-Burami Oasis, to an international tribunal on July 30, 1955.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Map 2. Central and Southern Arabia.

SOURCE: Arbitration Concerning Buraimi and the Common Frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia: Memorial submitted by the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (London: HMSO, 1955), Vol. I., map. 1.

Key:

A - "Blue and Violet Lines" 1913-1914 B - "Red Line" or "Faud's Line" of April 1935 C - "Green Line" or "Rayan's Line" of 25 November 1935 D - Saudi’s claim of 14 October 1949 F - Abu Dhabi's claim of Jan. 1952

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Map 2. Central and Southern Arabia

k £ 3 !2 Ê

| t %

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 However, recently, the frontier dispute has been mainly over al-Udaid and later on the frontier problem spread eastward to include the Liwa Oasis and the Al-Buraimi areas

as well.13 The dispute over Al-Buraimi was of special significance among the rest of the disputes, for Al-Buraimi was a focal point for the crossing of many travel routes in the Eastern

region of the Arabian peninsula as well as the locale in which they based their claim to the region. Therefore, in this study the Al-Buraimi dispute will be the main theme to represent the inter-Arab border disputes in the region,

knowing that such a dispute has become an issue not only

between great Britain (on behalf of Abu Dhabi and Oman) and Saudi Arabia, but also between Great Britain and the United States. The old Anglo-American rivalry for oil rights

within the area has again appeared on the surface.

1. Al-Udaid Area Al-Udaid area is located to the south of the Qatar

peninsula and to the North of Abu Dhabi along the coastal

line of the southern shore of the Arabian Gulf. It is an area where the claims of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi meet. It consists of a coast with winding channel running inland in (See Map 2) a southwesterly direction which opens

into a lagoon. Near the entrance to the main inlet is an

l^Abdullah, United Arab Emirates, p. 159.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 anchorage known as Badar al-Udaid and not far away from this anchorage a small peninsula juts out into the Channel. Jabal (mountain al-Udaid is located directly south of the

base of this peninsula and the former settlement of al-Udaid stood near its tip. The longstanding dispute over this area was stimulated again early in 1949 when survey parties of the Arabian- American Oil Company (ARAMCO) began to look for oil to the east of Qatar penetrating the Al-Udaid area. The dispute

would probably have been settled in a friendly way had only grazing rights and water wells been involved. However, for some time, and particularly since 1940, geologists of some western oil companies had suspected that the chance of oil

discovery in the peninsula of Qatar or those neighboring

territories which extend through Trucial Oman and to the area of Buraimi and into the desert of Rub-al-Khali was highly likely; and, in the absence of advanced equipment for oil exploration available, they had to seek as much land as possible from the rulers and the tribes of the Eastern

Arabian region. The more land they gained the better were the chance of finding oil. In April of 1949 the British political officer in Trucial Oman, P.D. Shobart, received a complaint from the

ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, regarding an

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ARMACO camp on the coast near Ghag. "sland.14 a result of

this investigation, Stobart found that %MACO had two camps in the area which was claimed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi. One camp was at Ain Baiwa, two and a half miles south

of Ras al-Sila, the other, with an air-strip, was twelve miles south of Khor al-Duwaihin, a port in al-Udaid area. Saudi officials and guards were attached to this ARAMCO camp by orders of the Emir Saud ibn Jalawi, Governor of

al-Hasa.lS stobart handed the leader of the ARAMCO party a

written protest against their trespassing on Abu Dhabi territory. During the next few weeks the governments of Saudi Arabia and Great Britain kept exchanging protest and counter protest notes as a result of the incident. King Ibn Saud, in accepting the British invitation to renew discus

sions concerning the frontiers in dispute, based his claim

to the land upon evidence of the tribes, a great many of whom he claimed had acknowledged Saudi authority over a long period. The criteria, he said, should be the effective collecting of Zakat (an alms tax paid by rich people to the poor of their own community) and the existence of grazing

rights. However, the British government rejected this as a basis for the delimitation of frontiers. In June 17, 1949,

B. Kelly, Eastern Frontier Arabians. (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1964), p. 142.

ISlbid., p. 152.

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the British Government informed the Government of Saudi

Arabia of their rejection of entering into a possibly protracted and inconclusive series of arguments about tribal

migratory routes and alliances; arguments which could produce no agreements and were bound to be unsatisfactory.

There is a wide difference between the extreme limits of a tribes wanderings and territory within which it may be predominant. For this reason it has, in the conditions existing in Eastern Arabia hitherto, been impossible to get on comparatively well without fixed territorial frontiers; but now, with the activities of the Arabian American Oil Company and the extension of governmental adminis tration, it is unfortunately inevitable that we should try to reach agreement on fixed territorial frontiers represented by a line on the map and on the ground. It is important to point out that the establishment of such a frontier need not restrict the movement of tribes who normally move to and from across the area in question. His Majesty's Government have on their side no intention of establishing a closed frontier which would be a bar to the normal wondering of Saudi Arabian or other tribes. The frontier would serve to mark the limits of concessions granted by either party and the limits of their governmental suzerain; it need not have any other effect on the inhabitants of Arabia.1° The British government gave clear indication to the government of Saudi Arabia and the tribes of the regions

that their particular desire in the demarcation of the frontier was only for the purpose of the discovery and

exploitation of oil and limitation of governmental adminis tration. The British had no desire to interfere with the

United Kingdom. Arbitration Concerning Buraimi and the common Frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia; Memorial submitted by the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (London: HMSO, 1955), Vol. II, p. 183.

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tribal way of life or of restricting them from wondering across the region. Nor did they wish to become involved with the improvement of the status of the inhabitants of the region beyond the strictly limited purpose of preserving

material interests and oil concessions for themselves. Since oil was the main British concern, it might be assumed

that Saudi Arabia similarly pressed its claims to the dis puted region on the same ground. The British used their

treaties with the rulers of the area for self-interest and

gain, and the Saudis used the loyalty and alliances of some of the tribes in the region for Saudi-American interest and

gain (this point will be discussed in detail later in this

study). The exchange of notes between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Saudi Arabia continued

to claim and counterclaim the disputed area; and with every note exchanged there was a rejection and proposal by one government or the other. By the end of World War II the

growing expectation of more oil in adjacent areas led to growing differences over the location of the frontiers.

With the arrival of the Saudi, Amir Turki ibn Abdullah ibn

Utaishan, to Hamasa village in the Al-Buraimi Oasis, the friendly negotiations ceased and were replaced by confronta tion between 1952 and 1954. In 1955 the dispute was taken

to international arbitration to be resolved. However, the

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detail later on in this study).

2. Liwa Area Another disputed area is Liwa (or al-Jiwa) Oasis. It

is another location where many tribes find wells of water and groves of palm trees. Members of the Bani Yas Federa tion and the Manasir tribes lived amicably together there

for more than a century, cultivating their palm trees, graz ing their herds in the nearby deserts, and fishing together off the coast and islands to the north. It extends for a distance of between 40 and 50 miles from west to east, and

has an average width of about 25 miles from south to north.17 The Liwa Oasis consists of a long, narrow strip

and is in fact made up of a string of tiny oases shaped in an arc from south-west to south-east (See Map 3). It has a plentiful supply of water only four feet below the surface

which supports numerous groves of date palms growing on the sheltered side of a large white, undulating sand dunes, and

in many places the owners live above their gardens on the

dunes themselves, where there is less humidity and a chance

of catching a cooling breeze. Both Saudi Arabian and British memorials claim the

ownership of the oases. However, the British present a better argument with which to show the rule of Abu Dhabi

l^u.K. Memorial, Vol. I, p. 17.

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SOURCE: Adopted from U.K. Memorial, Vol. I., map and map 2.

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Map 3. Southeast Arabia.

m %9. I

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over the oases, for there are many forts which were evidence of their authority, and having been built and maintained by

the al-Bu Falah Shaikhs from the tribe of Bani Yas. The following is a list of these forts; as presented in U.K.

Memorial: • Al-Idd. Built about 50 years ago, by Manasir (al Bu

Mundhir). Now in ruins. • Al Marriyah al Ghariyah. Built 40-50 years ago, by a Baluchi builder on the orders of Shaikh Hamdan bin

Zayed.

• Al-Jabbanah. Destroyed by Shaikh Jasim of Qatar in 1889. • Khannur. Built by the Bani Yas, in the early days of

Shaikh Shakhbut's region. • Humar. In the Batin. The oldest in Liwa, of which

only the barest traces remain. • Mauqab. Built by Shaikh Sultan bin Zayed. Now in

ruins. • Dhafir. Built about 40 years ago in the Bani Yas. • Huwaila or Um al-Hisn. Built by the Manasir at the

time of the Qatar-Abu Dhabi War (1883-1890).

• Numail. Built by the al Bu Falah, but destroyed by Shaikh Jasim at the same time as al-Jabbanah.l® The tribal hospitalities and relationship on Shaikh

Jasim's side (Shaikh of Qatar) makes it clear that the ruler

l®Ibid., p. 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 of Qatar regarded the Manasir as subjects of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, and Liwa as a part of that ruler's territory. Meanwhile, the Saudi Memorial attaches less importance

to the existence of these forts, and refers to their present

state of ruin as indicating that the security provided by Saudi rule renders them unnecessary. However, it does not indicate the type of Saudi rule, except when it comes to collecting Zakat from the Manasir tribe in the area and

their loyalty to the House of Ibn Saud. Liwa was unknown to the Western World until the first

part of the twentieth century, and later on it was visited on several occasions by Europeans - by Wilfred Thesigner in March and November, 1948, and twice in 1952, by Lee Oldfield of the Desert Locust Survey, and by the British Assistant

Political Agent in Trucial Oman.^® When Liwa became one of

the disputed frontier areas in the late 1940s it was not fully populated, for its people had migrated to Abu Dhabi and other growing villages in the regions. However, the

owners of the palm groves (from the Bani Yas and Manasir

tribes) would pass the summer in Liwa tending their trees and enjoying a cool humidity-free climate. Though the greatest number of the oases in Liwa lie in

the zone prohibiting oil exploration, established by the exchange of notes accompany the Arbitration Agreement of 30

July 1954, the dispute over Liwa was submitted as a part of

l^U.K. Memorial, p. 18.

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3. Al-Buraimi Area Al-Buraimi Oasis is a pivotal point for the crossing of many travel routes in the eastern part of the Arabian penin sula, including most of the major approaches from the coast

al towns of the Arabian Gulf to the desert hinterlands of Oman (See Map 3). It is also the crossroads of tribes coming from the deserts of Saudi Arabia, and a meeting place of many nomadic tribes in the region.

The original name of Al-Buraimi and the whole group of oases was Tawwam. It then became known as Al-Buraimi after

a merchant named Buraimi who was living in the oases. The tribes used to buy their goods from his store so every time

they went into the oasis they would say they were going to Buraimi.20 The Al-Buraimi Oasis area, as defined by an arbitrary

circle containing about 37 square kilometers (15 sq. miles), is a small part of a large disputed territorial region. It is located approximately half way between Suhar and Abu

Dhabi. Its central location gave it its importance in the history of the regions. It was the gateway to a fertile and populated region which, throughout history, has been on the

^^Based on interviews with a numbker of Al-Burami inhabitants, in particular Fatema Saeed Al-Shamsi, Sharjah, U.A.E., October 10, 1986.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 direct route of invaders. It was an important base and

headquarters for such invaders, whether they were coming

from the sea invading inland areas, or inland invading the coastal town areas. When al-Muatadhid-bi-Illah, the Abbasid Caliph at

Baghdad (A.D. 8 9 2 - 9 0 2 ) ordered his Wali (Governor) of Bahrain, Muhammad bin Nur, to invade Oman by land, he had to capture the Al-Buraimi Oasis first, from hence he and his

army marched inland towards Oman and captured Nazwa.21 in

May 1736 the Persian Commander-in-Chief, Taky-Khay, was able to advance inland towards al-Dhahirah desert where he met the rival Imam, Belarab-bin-Himyar, who had collected a

large force from the area tribes to oppose the Persian invaders. An engagement between the two armies resulted in the Persians occupying the Al-Buraimi oasis, and from there

they were able to march inland as far as the interior of the

Omani cities of Obra, Behla, and N a z w a . 2 2

In the early part of 1800 a new and far more formidable threat appeared on the horizon of Oman, Muhammad-ibn-Abdul

Wahab, an eighteenth century religious reformer in central

Arabia. Ibn Saud supported the new religious movement and together he and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab formed a religios- military confederacy with which they were able to gain the

2^Badger, George Percy, ed., History of the Imams and Seyyid of Oman, by Salil-ibn-Razik (New York, N.Y.: Burt Franklin, Publisher, 1871), p. XVI. ZZpadger, ibid., p. XXXIX.

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acceptance of central Arabian tribes and with them the

leadership of Ibn Saud was spread beyond the confines of

Najd and moved in all directions in the Arabian peninsula,

including the eastern part of Arabia. At this time Ibn Saud

sent Salim bin Belal al-Harik, one of his Nubian slaves, to

Oman with a force of 700 cavalry and he waged war upon the

tribes of al-Dhahirah, Bani-Yas, Nuaim, Bani Qatab, and

al-Bu-Shamis. The people of al-Dhahirah eventually yielded

to him. He took as his residence 'Tawwam', or Al-Buraimi

and levied from the people whatever amount of zakat he

chose.23 With Al-Buraimi as his headquarters he made

frequent inroads into al-Batinah in Oman.

The possession of Al-Buraimi affords an invader a

secure base for raids to the coast and on the towns of Oman

to the south. Understandably it has always been the first

objective of invaders in the area, whether they were Saudis

or Omanis. The Oases of Al-Buraimi consists of nine vill

ages, each with its water well, date groves and cultivated

farms, separated from each other by ribbons of heavy sand

dunes which merge in the south into the huge desert of

Rub-al-Khali (the empty quarter of the Arabian Peninsula).

While Rub-al-Khali does not provide any grazing, the desert

and dry steppes to the northwest and northeast of the Oasis

are used by some of the tribes which inhabit Al-Buraimi as

foraging grounds. Other tribes graze their animals on the

23sadger, ibid., p. 230.

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Elopes of the mountains of Oman, to the east and southeast of the Oases. Since camels, goats and sheep are the major animals in the Oases the very scanty vegetation in these

areas become essential to the well-being of the inhabitants of Buraimi who depend very much on the products from these

animals which supplement the Oases' harvests of dates, millet and barley. For water the Oases depends upon the run-off from the nearby al-Jahar and al-Hafit mountains, which is brought to the Oases farms in underground water

channels known locally as Aflaj; (singular; falaj). There are well-recognized routes connecting the nine villages of Al-Buraimi with one another and with the rest of

the regions of the Trucial Coast, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The nine villages are Buraim, Hamasa, Al-Ain, Al-Jimi, Hili,

Al-Mutiridh, Al-Muwaiji, Al-Qattarah and Saarah (Saara). All these settlements in the Oases have been occupied by

different tribes, and some of the neighboring settlements by related tribes. It has also been the center of trade for

the tribes of the surrounding deserts of Al-Khatam, Ramlat

Al-Hamra and Al-Dhahirah. The population of Al-Buraimi region is almost wholly

tribal in organization. These tribes are ruled by a Shaikh or ruler, depending on the size of the tribe whose authority

is not only limited to spiritual powers, but includes con trol over secular affairs. In ruling, however, the leader is obliged to follow the advice and guidance of the people

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since it is stipulated in the Quran that the affairs of

Moslem people are decided by council among themselves". 24

A further prerequisite for the authority of the Iman^S Shaikh or ruler is that he should observe the principles of justice and equity (See Map 4). The nine villages of Al-Buraimi, as described in the

Saudi Memorial, are the following;

Buraimi Lying at the centre of the Oasis, it is commonly called

al-Hillah by its inhabitants, the al-Bu-Khuraiban of the Nuaim tribes. It is also called Al-Sharq (The East), being to the east of Hammasa village. It boasts one of the larg

est markets in the area which serves other settlements as well. The local Shaikh and head of the al-Bu-Khuraiban is

Saqr ibn Sultan al-Nuaimi who lives in the fort of Qasr al-Hillah.

Hamasa It also has one of the largest markets in the Oasis. It deserves to be treated as a special entity because of the

Saudi relations with its tribe the al-Bu-Shamis, one of the

24a ü Moulana Muhammed, The Holy Ouran (Lahore, Pakistan, 1951), Chap. 42, V. 38, p. 293. 25"Imam" comes from an Arabic root signifying to aim at, to follow after. Thus Imam means, primarily, an exemplar, or one whose example ought to be imitated, it also means a leader and head of Muslims in religious matters.

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HILI Kilometers O 1 2

~N“ T SA'RA ALrOIMI

HAMASA BURAMI

AL-MUWIQI1

(5 ^ AL-MITTARADH AL-AIN

?? ALJAHU

JabalXHofit

Map 4. Al-Buraimi Villages.

SOURCE: Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968, Map 4, pg. 336.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 Nuaim tribes who live under the leadership of Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad al-Shamsi. The date groves of the villages of Hamasa and Buraimi form a single cluster of greenery along the southern edge of which stands Hamasa. It plays an

important role in supporting the Saudi claim to the Oases since it served as a base for a unit of about 40 Saudi Arabian soldiers in the area, and it is the land that was occupied by the Saudi- Wahhabi invaders during various periods in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Al-Ain This village is at the southeastern most part of the

settlement of Buraimi, lying at the tip of the long northern side of Hafit mountain. It has many date groves and a plen

tiful supply of water, making it one of the most prosperous in the Oases. Its market is small, however, and its people frequently go to Hamasa or Buraimi for their provisions. Since the early decades of the 19th century the Bani Yas tribes have used Al-Ain as their summer resort. Shaikh Zayed

bin Khalifah established two villages, al-Jahili and

al-Masaood.26 other tribes living in the area on their own

quarter in the western part of Al-Ain were al-Nawasir and al-Mata'wiah of the al-Bu Shams. On the northern edge of Al-Ain is the Kuwaitat quarter, who trace their ancestry to

immigrants from Kuwait. The eastern part of Al-Ain at that

26Morsy, p. 160.

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time was settled by a group of al-Najadah who trace their ancestry to people from Najd, in the centre of Saudi Arabia, but who are now considered to belong to the al-Bu-Khuraiban of Nuaim. Each of these groups had their own Chief or

Shaikh to whom they reported, and they all lived in harmony with one another without any major conflict, until the time of the oil discovery in the region as a whole.

Al-Jimi It is a small village which depends on the market places of the neighbouring villages of Hamasa and Buraimi

and at the same time receives its water from the underground

aflaj which pass under the villages of Hamasa and Buraimi. Its inhabitants are mainly members of the tribe of

al-Dhawahir led by its most prominent figures in the village such as Ali bin Ghanim bin Humudah, Shabib bin Muhammad bin Hilal and his brother Saeed, and Abd Allah bin Ahmad bin

Muhammad al-Dhahiri.

Al-Hili Another small village similar to Al-Jimi in its depen dency on other larger villages in the area. The majority of its inhabitants are from the al-Dhawahir tribe, but also

elements of the tribes of Bani Ka'b and Bani Qitab were

found in the village.

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Al-Mutiridh The smallest of the villages of Al-Buraimi Oases, it is in the southern part between the estates of al-Muwaiji to the west of al-Jahili to the east. The majority of its

inhabitants are members of the al-Dhawahir tribe whose leader is Sultan bin Surur al-Dhahiri and his brother Ahmad.

Al-Muwaiji This is one of the new villages in Al-Buraimi Oases

area. It is located to the west of al-Mutiridh and consists of a few buildings and a handful of scattered huts used by retainers and servants of the al-Bu-Falah who cultivate the

date groves, and most of the estate of this settlement is

owned either by Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalifa, or by one of

the other al-Bu-Falah Shaikhs. It is used as their summer

resort.

Al-Qattarah It is a small settlement like most of the others. The

date groves of al-Qattarah adjoin those of al-Jimi to the south. Most of the people are of the tribe of al-Dhawahir; however, the family of al-Dharmaki provide the leadership in this settlement, namely, Saeed bin Sultan al-Dharmaki and his brothers, Rashid and Muhammad. There are also some

settlers of the al-Bu Hamir and the al-Mashaghin, a section

of the Bani Qatib.

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Sa'arah The extensive date gardens of Sa'arah lie immediately

east of those belonging to Buraimi village, from which they are separated only by a narrow neck of uncultivated land throughout most of the year. Sa'arah is under the authority

of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Nu'aimi and its population consists mainly of members of the al-Bu-Khuraiban, some

elements of the Bani Ka'b, Bani Qitab, and al-Bu Falasa. These villages form a circle in relation to one another and the geographical and economic facts explain the division

of the Oases amongst all these above-mentioned tribes and

families who lived together as one large society, but with different Shaikhs as their heads of tribes. Their inter dependency brought the population of the settlements to

share the underground water of the aflaj and to use the same market places without any conflict of interest amongst them, except for some minor alterations more or less related to

the daily life of any society. The close distance between the villages also contributed to a large number of inter marriages between their inhabitants which increased the

blood relations among the tribes of the Oases. Only during

the recent history of the area in general, with foreign interest in the new economic and strategic factors, has it become of international importance to the rest of the world,

triggering the conflicts over disputed areas.

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PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN INTERESTS

As described in the previous chapter, the concept of territorial sovereignty as it is known in the West did not exist in Eastern Arabia until the advent of the British

colonial rule in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The tribes of the Arabian peninsula, in general, had little need for precisely defined boundaries because the peninsula was so sparsely populated. In addition to this some terri

tories were inhabited mainly by nomadic tribes such as the Bedouins of the peninsula and these tribes had their own

customary ways of establishing territorial domains, depend ing on their needs and usage of the areas. Many of the

intertribal disputes in the past, before the discovery of oil, were related to other conflicts of interests, but not boundaries. J.B. Kelly, in his book Eastern Arabian

Frontiers, summed up the territorial pattern as follows;

The concept of territorial sovereignty in the Western sense did not exist in Eastern Arabia. A ruler exercised jurisdiction over a territory, by virtue of his jurisdiction over the tribes inhab iting it. They, in turn, owed loyalty to him and not to the Sheikhdom, emirate, or sultanate, in which they dwelt. Political allegiance to a territorial unit, such as is implicit in the European states system, is unknown to the Arabian tribesman. His loyalty is personal to his tribe, his Shaikh, or a leader of greater consequence,

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and not to an abstract image of the state. In so far as he conceives of a territorial loyalty, it is to his domestic abode, his wells, his gardens, his palm trees, or, in the case of the nomad, his dirah, or tribal grazing grounds. A claim to jurisdiction over him, therefore, amounts to a claim of jurisdiction the land he occupies. In the case of the settled populations of the sea ports or oases such claims do not normally give rise to any difficulties. Applied to nomadic tribes, however, they almost inevitably produce complications. For a ruler to claim possession of the area over which a tribe roams, on the grounds that is owes loyalty to him, is tantamount, in theory, to this claiming possession of an area not only of considerable size but also one whose limits may fluctuate. Sometimes to a large degree.... But a tribe's loyalty is not always constant. It may be, and sometimes is, withdrawn from one ruler and transferred to another, or even withheld completely.^ The extent of land ownership belong dependent on tribal strength, tribal loyalty was focussed on the chiefs of the

tribe with whom members lived daily. National loyalty, as it exists in the West, is alien to the Arabian tribal con cept because there is no statehood, only the property on which the tribes live. The tribesman's attachment is to the

wells, the pastures, the palm trees which provide the suste nance of his wandering life. Any ruler's claim to a spe cific territory is inconsistent with a nomadic existence.

Tribal loyalty, too, maybe ephemeral and might be trans

ferred to another chieftain, which is, also, a contributory

factor to a fluidity of frontiers.

Ij.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 18.

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The historical and political factors which led to tribal disagreements only rarely caused major conflict. The vast expanses of desert areas traversed by the tribe induced an attitude of indifference towards the claiming of terri

torial rights, and restrained conflicts except in the case of limited tribal raids. Only during recent times (mainly because of escalating British presence in the early 1800s, followed a century later by the American search for oil) did such tribal wars

become directed towards territorial and boundary disputes

and to serve as international disputes. Britain's colonial designs on the Arabian peninsula combined with the entry of the United States of America into Saudi Arabia catapulted both countries into high stakes oil competition which set

native against native in the race to acquire land from each other. This traditional way of life became rapidly transformed during the current period consequent to the exploitation of the petroleum resources in the Arabicn peninsula. This

exploitation of oil needed international boundaries and

international law, not tribal arrangements, with which any oil concession dispute could be solved. The border questions on the Eastern frontiers of the

Arabian peninsula became increasingly, extraordinarily, complicated, especially with the discovery of oil in desert

lands where every ruler and his tribes claimed the right of

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granting the oil concessions in the area. There were almost

no data to work from in defining the interior of the vast desert, resulting in unlimited scope for every kind of

dispute.

A. BRITISH PRESENCE Among the many corners of the earth with which Britain

became associated during her imperial age was the Eastern Part of the Arabian Peninsula, which became known, later on, as the Trucial Coast (on the Arabian Gulf side). When the British presence began to take shape in the Gulf area it was

initially based on their interest in the routes to India and in maintaining safe passages for their ships along those

routes. But the fact of the matter was that British over seas expansion, though initially motivated by considerations of trade, later on became a matter of conquest and rule.

With the decline of British control in India and Persia the determination of the British to increase and jealously guard their sphere of influence in Arabia, and particularly so in

the coastal principalities of the Arabian side of the Gulf,

became evident. The outward evidence of this was the estab lishment of landing fields throughout this area, by the increased strength of their naval force, and by the superior

buildings erected to house the personnel of their political agencies. The first local Residency Agent was appointed in

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Sharjah in 1823, and reported to the British Political

Residency in Bushire on the affairs of the Arabian C o a s t . 2

With the withdrawal of the British from India and Persia, their sphere of influence became larger on the Arab side of the Gulf through an increasing number of treaties with the rulers of the principalities. These treaties were administered by the British Political Residents in the Gulf

region. The role of the British Political Residence is summed up by Dr. Husain M. Al-Baharna as follows: The British Resident in the Gulf to whose name the word 'political' was added in 1862, has, since 1 April 1947, been responsible directly to the British Foreign Office. In 1946, the British Residency was removed to Bahrain. The British Resident is 'graded' Ambassador in the Gulf Region. He attends to his responsibilities towards the Gulf States by maintaining a number of representatives, referred to as 'political agents', in Bahrain, Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In the other Trucial Shaikhdoms he has political officers who are attached to the British Agency at Dubai. The duties of the political Resident are, interalia, to maintain, though his political agents, close contact with the rulers and govern ments of the Shaikhdoms and safeguard their political and economic interests and the interests of the British Government on the basis of the treaties and agreement's governing British relations with these Shaikhdoms.3 The British interests were adequately served by the presence

of the Residency Agents, and they were allowed to run the

2Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 12. ^Husain M. Al-baharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problem (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 foreign relations of the Shaikhdoms as long as they did not interfere between the rulers and their subjects. By 1932 the Gulf was opened up to the rest of the world when the Arabian air route was introduced, with Imperial

Airways flying planes between Britain and India and landing at the British staging post at the Sheikhdom Sharjah en route.4 Imperial Airways maintained a weekly air service

between London and India via the Gulf. Flying fields were maintained at Basrah, Kuwait, Bahrain, Sharjah and Gwadur in

India, and each of these places had a regular stop. This new flying route came about as a result of the truculent attitude of the Persians towards the British, who had to wait anxiously for three years to obtain a renewal of the

Imperial Airways agreement which the Government of Persia in the end refused.5 As a consequence, the British intention

to dominate most of Arabia, if not all of it, and particularly its coastal region became firmer than ever. Britain made it clear to the rest of foreign powers who

might show some interest in the region that the coastal

region of Arabia from Basrah, up north, down south, was a British sphere of influence. By the second half of the century British supremacy in the Gulf region was unchallenged and they secured this position through the

4Margaret McKay, Gulf Saga (New Delhi, India; Al-Asr Publications, 1985), p. 284. Sibid., p. 284.

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treaties they had signed with the rest of the rulers and

local powers in the region.

It seems that the British, more than any other foreign power, realized early on the importance of maritime supre macy in the Arab Gulf for the purpose of establishing their hegemony over the Gulf countries. (This supremacy would

serve well later on during the discussion for oil conces

sions which involved British and American interests). While the British were not much inclined to interfere in the purely local administration of the Arab Shaikhdoms, any

matter affecting foreign interests or relations were definitely dealt with and controlled by the British. It became a concentrated effort by the British in the consoli

dation of its influence throughout the Gulf for the

following reasons: 1st: Strategic, that is from a military point of view in respect to India and British Far Eastern possessions.

2nd: Economic, that is, from the point of view of exploiting of local resources. 3rd: The logistical, that is from the point of air communications to India and the Far East from Cairo via Red Sea and Aden. Of the first nothing more need to be said for it was

obvious. As regards to the second, it was already evident

that the natural resources of Arabia may prove to be found increasingly important. Oil had already been found in Bahrain in 1932, and Bahrain was the first among the Gulf

Shaikhdoms to show the existence of oil fields in the Arab

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Shaikhdoms of the Gulf.® Indications were that it would also be found in other regions of Arabia. With the estab

lishment of air landing fields throughout Arabia and with the increased use of automobiles, this hitherto inaccessible country would be opened up, its potential resources exploit

ed, and the increased use of foreign goods developed. As

regards to the third consideration, the British had commenced, and completed a series of emergency landing fields reaching from Basra to Aden. It was becoming increasingly necessary because of the fact that patrolling

by the Royal Air Force of that line by flying boats, was impracticable during the monsoon reasons. In addition regular patrols by aircraft proved to be very useful in

maintaining order among the desert tribes. Control the

hinterland of Arabia was only possible by the use of aircraft. The activities of the British throughout Arabia

made it clear that it has their determined policy to

dominate that area.

B. SAUDI ARABIA PRESENCE

The First Saudi Dynasty The first Saudi's family was founded by Amir (Prince)

®Muhammad T. Sadik and William P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates; Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 Mohammad bin Saud bin Migrin, in the Oasis of Dar'iya, to

follow Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in his preaching and reforming of the Islamic religion. In the early part of the eighteenth century Ibin Abdul Wahab, who was born in 1703, was a follower of the Hanbali School of Islamic thought.

Emphasizing basic Islamic doctrine, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and Muhammad bin Saud joined hands together in an alliance of religious and political forces to form what is called the

"Unitarians" (the Wahabis).? They expanded their territorial influence through central Arabia outward, and once the tribes of Najd had become part of Saudi's force the Unitarians were effectively

unconstrained. After the death of the founders the Unitar ian movements and its expansion were continued by Muhammad bin Sadu's son, Abdul Aziz. Before the end of the nine

teenth century most of the Arabian Peninsula was under the domain of the first Saudi Rule.® George Rentz described the

Unitarian expansion: Muhammed ibn Abdul al-Wahhab and the House of Sa'ud were occupied during the better of the second half of the eighteenth century in consoli dating their position in the heart of Arabia. Once Najed had been unified, the Unitarian power was free to expand in other directions.... By 1800 the Unitarians, moving overland, had arrived at the Western gates of Oman. The first base they

?McKay, Gulf Saga, p. 245. ®Roy Lebkicher, George Rentz, and Max Steineke, with contributions from other ARAMCO employees, ARAMCO HANDBOOK. (The Netherlands: Arabian American Oil Company, 1960), p. 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 seized was the Oasis of al-Buraimi,... from al- Buraimi they could advance with ease along the Arab Coast, across the mountains towards Muscat, or straight into the interior of Oman.®

During that period Saudis were able, through securing converts and allies, to establish themselves in the eastern

region. Because of the religious influence the rulers and people of the Arab Coast (such as Al-Qwassim and Al-Nua'mi) also embraced the Unitarians (Wahabi), and they were able to

severely harry the sea-borne commerce of the British. This brought the Unitarians into conflict with the British. To the Unitarians, attacking British and other foreign inter

ests in the Gulf area was not a mere matter of piracy, as

has been indicated by many Western authors, but a means of waging holy warfare against the profane and imperialistic foreigners and their followers, who were desecrating the land. Therefore on the Arab coast of the Gulf the Unitar ians encouraged the local tribes to face up to the Britain’s

increasing domination in the area. At this time the Unitar

ians built a fort and stationed a garrison at Buraimi because of its strategic importance, the Wahabi general

al-Harig, a Nubian slave, extended his control over the interior of Oman, inhibiting the inland caravan commerce and serving the policy of collecting the Zakat from the tribes

of the region in the name of Islam.

®Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Oman and the Southern States of the Persian Gulf. (Dhahrain: published by ARAMCO's Research Branch, 1952) p. 13.

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However, not every tribe was converted to the teaching of the Unitarians, and many of them were bitterly opposed.

The religious conflicts that developed from their opposition helped to prevent the people of the interior of Oman and some of the coastal tribes from agreeing among themselves

throughout much of the nineteenth century. By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century the first Saudi State was established. Its success,

however, was also its downfall. The original religious

impulses began to fade and were replaced by force in collecting Zakat from the tribes of the peninsula. But equally important was the fact that Saudi Government chall

enged powers far greater than itself. The British were consolidating their role in the eastern region of the penin sula and the Gulf area, while the Ottoman Empire has to the West of Egypt, and to the north of the peninsula. Both

powers found the Saudi expansion throughout the Arabian peninsula a threat to their interests. As a result, the British had the coastal tribes of the eastern part of the

peninsula sign a formal maritime truce which gave them

control over the area until 1971. In the West and North the Ottoman Sultan felt that his Islamic leadership and position

as a Calipha of the entire Muslim world had been challenged

by the Saudis. Therefore, he ordered Muhammad Ali, the governor of the Ottoman province of Egypt, to undertake a

lOlbid., p. 14.

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punitive expedition against the Saudis and to re-establish Ottoman authority over the Holy cities and outlying regions.

It took several years for Muhammad Ali and his two sons (Tusun Pasha and later Ibrahim Pasha) to regain control of Mecca and Medina, and by 1818 Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Najd,

central Arabia and besieged and captured the town of Al-Dir'iyah, the capital of the first Saudi regime. Abdullah al-Saud, a Saudi chief, was sent as a prisoner to

Constantinople and beheaded.

The Second Saudi Dynasty Under the leadership of Prince Turki ibn Abdu Allah Al-Saud, a successful attempt was made to free Najd from the

Turks (Ottomans) in 1824 and he established a second Saudi

S t a t e , 12 taking Riyadh as his capital. It has remained the

capital of the Saudi dynasty ever since. Prince Turki pro

ceeded to reconquer Najd and what is now called the Eastern province, but was assassinated in 1834. His successor was

his son Faisal, who had no better luck than his father, for

he was captured and imprisoned twice by the Turks in Cairo. However, Faisal was able to escape from Egypt and to re-

l^McKay, Gulf Saga, p. 260. 12Abdulrahman H. Said, "Saudi Arabia; The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State", A dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1979, P.33.

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establish himself as the ruler of Najd.l® But the history of

the House of Saud immediately after the death of Faisal in 1865 became complicated and obscure. The rivalry between two of Faisal's sons, Abdullah and

Sa'ud, developed into a civil war that lasted for some years, thereby causing an opportunity for the occupation of the eastern seaboard by the Turks in 1871. This second period of the Saudi state was wrecked by the eldest sons of Faisal. Holder and Johns describe the end of the second

state of Al-Saud as follows.: In the process they gave the Turks a second chance to reduce Saudi power. In 1871, seizing the opportunity of an invitation from Abdullah to help him against his brother, Turkish soldiers occupied the whole of the eastern province of Hasa, on the shore of the Gulf, as far as little Sheikhdom of Qatar. At the same time, the Turkish government found another, rival leader to support in the dynamic Muhammad bin Rashid of Hail who was just then emerging from a bloodbath of his closest relations as the undisputed leader of the Shammar Tribe. This time the Turks did not need to emulate Ibrahim Pasha's feet of half a century earlier and march on the Saudi capital. Cut off from the sea in the east, attacked by the Rashid from the north and mortally wounded by its own family hostilities, the proud Saudi State crumbled again. In another ten years the Al-Rashid had virtually taken over the Saudi domain, leaving Faisal's third son, the pious but ineffective Abdul Rahman, in Riyadh as a little more than a licensed governor. With the death of the rival brothers, the third brother

Abdal al-Rahman, the present king's grandfather, became the

13lbid., p. 34. l^David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud (Britain: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981), p. 25.

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head of the Saudi family. He and his allies challenged the

new rule of the House of the Al-Rashid, but at length they were badly defeated. In 1891 the House of Al-Rashid placed a governor and garrison in Riyadh, and Abd al-Rahman was

forced to take his family into exile in K u w a i t .

The Third Saudi Dynasty Abdul Aziz, the son of Abd al Rahman Al-Saud was the founder of the third and present Saudi Empire. Abdul Aziz's recapture of Riyadh, in 1902, was inspired by the memory of

his family's proud achievements as bearers of the Wahabi

banner. His control over Riyadh and its surroundings proved to be a turning point in the history of Arabia. It took Ibn Saud over thirty-five years to accomplish a recognizable and established state, ruled by him and the rest of his family members. George Kherallah has summarized the major events

of those thirty five years of continual war, which shaped Saudi Arabia, as follows.: *Battle of As-Sarif...... February 16, 1901 Occupation of Riyadh and al-Arid and named Amir of Najd and Imam of Wahabis...... January 15, 1902

Annexation of Karj, Mahmal and Washm...... 1902 - 1903

Conquest of Qasim 1903 - 1906

Occupation of 'Unaizah'...... March 23, 1904 "Battle of Shananah" September 29, 1904

l^Said, "Saudi Arabia," p. 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 Meadows of Mahanna-Death of Ar-Rasheed...... April 14, 1906 Pacification of Tribal Revolts...... 1906 - 1909

"Battle of Tarfiyah" September 14, 1907 Occupation of Buraidah...... May 23, 1908 "Battle of Hadiyah (the gift)" January 10, 1910

Conquest of al-Hasfa April 13, 1913 "Battle of Jerah" January 24, 1915

"Battle of Turbah" May 25, 1919 Abdul Aziz elected Sultan of Najd ...... 1921 "Battle of Homs"...... 1919

"Battle of Jahra October 11, 1921 Surrender of Haiel, Jauf, and Wadi Sirhan...... November 2, 1921 "Battle and Occupation of Tayif"...... September 7, 1924

Occupation of Mecca (without fighting)...... October 18, 1924

Surrender of Medina after ten month siege December 22, 1925

Abdul Aziz Elected King of Hajez January 19, 1926 Protectorate of Tihamah...... 1926

Abdul Aziz Elected King of Najd and its Dependencies January 19, 1927 "Battle of Sobla" March 30, 1929

Crushing of Ikhwan Rebellion...... 1928 - 1930

Unification of Country as Saudi Arabian Kingdom September 22, 1932

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Annexation of Najran and District of Yam Settlement of Saudi, Yemni Boundaries...... 19341®

So was created a single sovereign state that would be known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is clear that Abdul Aziz had no interest in al-Buraimi Oasis and its surroundings;

however, he would lay claim to it, (Chap. Ill) based on historical Saudi occupation of the area, and more

importantly, at the urging of the American Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO). In 35 years Abdul Aziz had succeeded in establishing his authority, and ultimately that of the Al-Saud family more effectively than had any Ruler. He understood inter-tribal relations and stressed equality of

men under Islamic-Wahabi teachings. He tried to reduce the social status differentials between tribes, and to strike a

balance in his dealings with the chiefs that followed him. 3-?

This stress of relative equality gave Abdul Aziz and his

family a better opportunity to expand not only their terri torial authority but their influence. As an independent

leader, Abdul Aziz was unlike the other Arab rulers of the Arabian Peninsula, such as the Trucial Emirates in the East

and Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait in the North, who were under the British mandates or protection. He was creating a

^®George Kheirallah, Arabia Reborn (Albuquerque, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952) pp. 151- 152. l?Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia Evolution of Political Identity, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1981, p. 70.

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"nation-state", and he sought lasting boundaries. Shifting tribal loyalty could only gain him more land to rule. But

Saudi territorial expansion brought on boundary conflicts with neighboring protected entities. Therefore, the Saudis were eventually forced, by the foreign colonial power in the

area at the time, to define their nation state on a terri torial basis'l® and not on the Wahabi's expansion.

By now Abdul Aziz was in full control of his kingdom and his policy became clear and known. As he once put it, saying to one of his foreign visitors; "We raise them not above us, nor do we place ourselves above them. We give

them what we can; we satisfy them with an excuse when we cannot. And when they go beyond their bounds we make them taste of the sweetness of our discipline."1® His wisdom and simplicity were the force behind his rule of the kingdom and

its foreign policy. It was his intention in his development

plan for the kingdom to help his people live fuller lives

and utilize the best economic and agricultural techniques that the Western World had to offer, to serve his people and

kingdom without upsetting the basic religious and social

pattern of his countrymen.

l®Ibid., p. 272. l®David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, p. 100.

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U.S.A. Presence Probably there was no direct American contact with

Arabian peninsula before the Declaration of Independence. 20

However, since the Independence of the U.S. "Commerce and Evangelism" were the basic roots of U.S.-Arab relations,

which led, later on, to increasing commercial involvement of

Americans in the a r e a . 21 Meanwhile and in view of her posi

tion in India, Britain marked out the Arabian peninsula for infiltration early in the nineteenth century. This colonial era provided an opportunity for minor American traders and

missionaries to move about under the protection of the

British e m p i r e . 22

The United States, prior to WWI, was concerned mostly with religious, educational, archaeological, and humanitar

ian deeds in the Middle East.23 But the real American

interest in the region began with the discovery of oil in the area. Between the wars, the American holdings in the

area became visible and considerably enlarged in the 1930s. "Just before WWII there were 273 American residents Saudi

20Joseph J. Malone, "America and the Arabian Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years," The Middle East Journal, Volume 30 (November 3, 1976), pp. 406-424.

21john Duke Anthony, "Arab American Relations: From Evangelism to Interdependence," MEED (November, 1977), pp. 9-12.

22ibid., p. 9.

23e.A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 223.

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Arabia, about 60 percent of the total in the p e n i n s u l a , ^4

but direct government participation in the enterprise, to parallel Britain's, was still lacking. However, American entry into Arabian oil exploration occurred at time when Ibn

Saud was in need of financial aid to meet the expenditures

of his kingdom. He expressed this need to H. St. John B. Philby saying that, "I tell you Philby, that if anyone were to offer me a million pounds now he would be welcome to all concessions he wants in my country".25 An agreement of a

concessions signed by Mr. Lloyd Hamilton on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California, and Shaikh Abdullah

Sulaiman al Hamdan signed on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government, in 1933, contributed to Ibn Saud's wish; for he

received the first payment of a loan of L30,000 in gold sovereign to the Saudi Arabian government.26

Dr. Malone noted that the Americans asked for more than

half of Saudi Arabia as a concession area. When they received it in 1933, the British Minister in Jiddah was thunderstruck.27 The size of the concession was an area of

315,000 square miles. As a result of this concession addi-

2^Malone, p. 406

25h . St. John Philby, Arabian Days: An Autobiography (London: Robert Hale, 1948), p. 291. 26%.s. Twitchell, with the collaboration of Edward J. Jurfi and R. Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia: with an account of the development of Its Natural Resources (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 222.

27Malone, p. 418.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 tional companies subsequently joined the venture. They were the Texas Company, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (renamed Socony Mobil Oil Company,

I n c . ) . 28 The four of them formed one company operating in Saudi Arabia, known as the "Arabian American Oil Company,"

(ARAMCO), in 1944. This and later concessions contributed to the origin of some border conflicts in the region.

Just as World War I changed the balance of power

throughout the region and brought the Ottoman empire to an end; so World War II undermined the big power spheres of

influence that had been established throughout the region during the inter-war period. Both the last war and the

comfortable assurance of a sufficient supply of oil altered the nature and increased the scope of U.S. involvement in

Saudi Arabia. The emergence of the U.S. as a highly inter ested party in world affairs brought about a further de crease in Europe's long-time leadership, especially Britain.

However, the establishment of a real diplomatic rela tionship between the government of the U.S. and the govern

ment of Saudi Arabia did not come about until 1942. The

first American governmental delegation was led by Karl Twitchell, a geologist and oil company employee,who happened

to be a former and close associate of King Ibn Saud. In his

party were the U.S. Minister to Egypt, Alexander Kirk, who

28r . Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 224.

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was commissioned to establish diplomatic relations between

the two governments, and a small group of agricultural

experts to survey the water resources of N a j a d . 2 9 By May

1943, the American Embassy, with the first full-time resi dent minister. Colonel William Eddy, was established.^® At the end of the same year Prince Faisal and Prince Khalid

visited the U.S. seeking the experience and technological

aid of the West for the future development of Saudi Arabia. When the Americans became involved in the war in 1942 the oil supply of Saudi Arabia assumed great importance. Soon the U.S. government began to encourage ARAMCO to press

ahead with the development of their Saudi resources on a scale that British could not compete with in the region.

Though the British had tried to exercise a reasonable balance between imperial interests and a doctrine of

national self-determination in the Arab world, ever since WWI., it failed in Saudi Arabia. The Americans made

fundamental and far-reaching changes in Saudi Arabia which the British could not match in any other place of the Arab World. ARAMCO based its headquarters in Dhahran, which is

situated on the hill of that name which rises 300 feet above

the Arabian Gulf, about 5 miles from the coast. Mr. Twitchell described Dhahran, in 1947, as follows :

Z^Holden and Johns, p. 124,

3®Twitchell, p. 199.

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Dhahran seems like a bit of the United States transported to Saudi Arabia. In addition to its extensive shops, offices, and storehouses for the work of the company, it possess a hospital, moving picture theater - the only one at present in Saudi Arabia - tennis courts, baseball park, golf course, swimming pool, and a modern steam laundry. The resident staff members live in air-conditioned houses. Food for this thriving oil town is largely imported from America.

At the end of 1956 ARMACO had 20,346 employees, of whom 19,632 were in Saudi Arabia. Of these 13,213 were Saudi Arabs, 2,575 Americans, and 3,541 of sixteen other national

i t i e s . 32 By 1976 the number had increased nearly to 20,000

American heads of families.33 The development of the oil

fields in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia meant the development of the country as a whole. ARAMCO could not

rely on the use of camels and asses for transportation and communications. Therefore ARAMCO had brought its own auto mobiles, railways and airplanes and introduced them to the

Saudis as well. As a result roads, railways, aviation, shipping and communications began to grow in the kingdom. Dammaun and Khubar which happened to be in the vicinity of Dhahran were transformed from two ancient fishing villages

into rapidly growing cities with large ports. Tremendous development took place in the country through the efforts of ARAMCO (whose concession covered the eastern two thirds of

3lTwitchell, p. 126,

32%bid., p. 235.

33]aalone, p. 406.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 Saudi Arabia) in almost all fields, such as health, educa tion, industrial training centers for its employees in Dhahran, home ownership program, ARAMCO television and many

other projects; like Agricultural did, local purchasing,

medical services, and trachoma research. There has also been some training assistance by the United States under the Dhahran Airfield Agreement of June 18, 1951, which expanded under a 1956 exchange of notes with

Washington. 34 This type of agreement provided the U.S. with

a lease for the use of Dhahran as a military base, in spite

of Saudi dislike of foreign interference and intention. In

return, in addition to cash, the Saudis got a supply of American weapons, training for the Saudi Army, and the

opportunity to build up a small air force and navy. With

the increasing American involvement in the region, a special bond developed between U.S. and the Saudi Arabia. For many

years the major and important Saudi projects were performed

by American companies. Most of these projects were channel

ed through ARAMCO and the US Army Corps of Engineers,35

located in Dhahran. Through its oriental research depart ment, headed by George Rentz, ARAMCO welcomed the opportun ity to help the Saudi Government in their international

affairs, including, in 1950, the Al-Buraimi dispute in which

34Twitchell, p. 174. 35Anthony, "Arab American Relations," p. 11.

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ARAMCO assisted in defending Saudi Arabia's territorial claims and accumulated an archive of historical material.36

36Qeorge Rentz is an American Scholar and Arabist.

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The Development of Claims and Charges. 1949-55

When Al-Saudi's family reconstructed its territorial

expansion in the Arabian peninsula for the third time, Al-Buraimi and its surroundings was not part of their collection. During the continual war of thirty-five years in which Ibn Saud was able to create his kingdom, this was not one of his targets to control or rule. It had little to

offer, it was not like Al-Hijaz, the site of Islam two holy

cities (Medina + Mecca) which rendered annual revenue for

the pilgrimage, which ibn Saud needed Co support his new

kingdom. The importance of Al-Buraimi did not across Ibn Saud's mind, and if did, it came with oil discovery in the

eastern region of the Arabian peninsula. Furthermore, the people who represented the Saud side of the Al-Buraimi dispute were non-Saudis or non-Saudi in origin, except for

Prince Faisal, who left the matter in the hands of Fuad

Hamzah. The problem of Al-Buraimi began with the first oil

concession the Saudi government granted to the Standard Oil

Company of California in 1933. The size of the concession was increased at a later agreement and more American oil

companies became involved to form one oil company called

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 ARAMCO, the sole operator in the area of the concession. ARAMCO requested that the government of Saudi Arabia to supply them with Saudi territorial maps of the eastern

province of the Kingdom in order to limit their survey with the area. But Saudi Arabia was not prepared nor had

definite borders between it and the British protected Trucial Shaikhdoms, as she had defined her border with Kuwait and Iraq, in 1922. As a result the question of the eastern frontier between Saudi Arabia and neighboring Abu

Dhabi, Oman and Qatar became important to resolve.

Claims and Counter-Claims Since there was no information of territorial borders

to the east and south-east of Saudi Arabia the area was available and given to Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) by the Saudis at the time of the signing the oil concession

with them. The oil company acquired the information from the British through the U.S. State Department. On 24 of April, 1934, the United States Embassy received note number

E2451/279/91 from the Foreign Office of the British govern

ment which indicated the following; The frontiers between Saudi Arabia and the British spheres of influence in South Eastern Arabia is thus a line running from the head of the bay immediately to the south of Zaknuniya Island, a little to the east of Ugair, in a due southerly direction to a point on parallel 20 North in the Middle of the Ruba (sic) al Khali desert, and thence running south-westward, at an angle of 45°, down to the frontier between the Aden Protectorate and what is now the territory of the Imam of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72

Yemen. King Ibn Saud has of course succeeded to Turkish Sovereignty on the west and northwest of that line, Saudi Arabia being one of the Turkish succession states.^ This frontier, described in the mentioned note, came as a result of the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of July 29, 1913 and March 9, 1914 (See Maps 2 & 5) in which the two govern

ments agreed to the above border.lines, which came to be known as the "Blue Line" and the "Violet Line". SOCAL and the Saudi government were not happy with this line and it

was not to their satisfaction, therefore, the Saudis attempted to argue that King Ibn Saud's recognition by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda of the Special Treaty rela tions with the Trucial Shaikhs did not imply any recognition

of any particular frontier; but the British government

pointed out that its recognition of a valid claim by such a Shaikh to any particular place formed part of its treaty

relations with that Shaikh, and must be regarded as covered by Ibn Saud's recognition of its special relations with him. But, since SOCAL wanted the oil badly and they wanted the

money, this argument was not accepted by them and they began

to collect their own information to establish their own border line in the south east of the Arabian peninsula. In 1935, Saudi Arabia presented the first of its territorial maps (See Maps 2 & 3) in which their border line, which

became known as the "Red Line", was about 100 miles away

lu.K. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 145.

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•K>l IIM IRAQ KAPBM.A

Oml >1 * • S iU k a IRAN (S^T NAFUD^^

.H.,1 .s„, Jucayi « S u n iO i NEJO 0.1 3j.,i

Ra&gM • Al Huful Q;^ib*ya* JaXiinV «AI Khurtnift Twfib* MUSCAT SAUDI ARABIÀ Al Liin OMAN Al Q u n fiC ^

/ Eastern t'ont er of the AFRICA iiniAQ ot N«id U 9eted — -*■— ,n the AnçiO'TurH'ih Con* vcntion of 29July I9i3 m e Blue L«rc]

acasted from Bertnolomewe mao of the MIDDLE EAST AR A B I A circa 1925

Map 5.

SOURCE: Gary Troeller. The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud. (Great Britain: The Garden City Press Ltd., 1976), p. 268.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 from the Al-Buraimi Oases region. It appears that when Fuad

H a m z a ^ presented this territorial claim to the British Embassy in Jeddah, showing the Saudi's frontier with Qatar,

the Trucial Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, he made sure to include a part of the coast between Abu

Dhabi and Qatar to belong to Saudi's territorial search. At this time Al-Buraimi was not the issue, simply because the Standard Oil Company of California (The Arabian California

Oil Company) was exploring near Qasr of Salwa, in the Khuar

al-Udaid area between Qatar and Abu D h a b i ; 3 and Al-Buraimi Oases remained out of the dispute. Six of the Al Buraimi

oases were under the Abu Dhabi association and care and the other three were looked after independently by their own

people in association with both Abu Dhabi and Muscat. While the Saudi government gave the right to SOCAL to operate in

what she believed to be its territories, the British govern ment on behalf of Abu Dhabi believed differently for the

following reasons: 1. In 1878, Britain held the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi responsible for the pirates activities in Khaurd al-Udaid. 2. In 1881, Shailch Qasim ibn Thani of Qatar asked the British Government for permission to construct a

^Fuad Hamza: A Druze Sheikh from Palestine who secured a job as the King's chief executive in foreign affairs, under Prince Faisal.

3saudi Arabia. Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Arbitration for the Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other, (Cairo n.p. 1955), Vol II, p. 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 building in Kaur al-Udaid, but his inquires were rejected by the British who informed him that area belonged to Abu Dhabi.

3. In 1890-1, the Turkish Government tried to place a "mudir" (a director) in Khaur al-Udaid, but the immediate diplomatic reaction of the British Government on behalf of Abu Dhabi led to the with drawal of the Turkish representative from the area. 4. Though the British Government denied Shaikh Zaid bin Khalifa of Abu Dhabi rebuilding in Khaur al-Udaid for the reason that such a move might cause unpeaceful result, she recognized Khur al-Udaid was within his boundaries and that Britain therefore was prepared to prevent its occupation by any one else, but h i m s e l f . 4 A settlement of the frontiers, between Saudi Arabia and

the British at this point did not seem to be possible, for while Saudi Arabia was insisting on the "Red Line" of the

3rd of April, 1935, (it is also known as "Fuad's Line"), to be the border line between her and the neighboring Emirates; the British were insisting on the "Violet Line" of 1914 and

"Blue Line" of 1913, which were resulted from the Anglo-

Turkish Convention. The British Government made it clear that she contended that the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1914, which came into force of June 5 of that year, effected

a boundary settlement delimiting the frontier, and the king dom of Saudi Arabia, as successor to Turkey in the sover eignty of Najad and Hasa, was under a legal obligation to

respect that boundary settlement and to be bound by the "Blue line" except to modifications of the line that may

4 i b i d , p. 51.

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have been agreed to by the British Government.^ But when

the British felt that exchange of notes and the discussion

of the boundaries between them and Saudi Arabia began to crystalize into a more serious dispute, they conceded and changed their position in regard to the "Blue Line" and

produced a new suggested "line". The new British offer, as

a result of much hard work and many long meetings between the Saudi team and the British, was presented on 25 of

November, 1935, finally put forward the "Riyadh Line", (it is also known as "Ryan's Line" or the "Green Line"), which

started at the head of the Dohat al Salwah southeastward passing by a point about 5 miles north east of Sikak, from

this point running south in a direct line, leaving Bonaiyan about 5 miles to the east, to latitude 20 N; from this

point it would run southwesterly eventually meeting the "Violet Line" at a point to be agreed upon during the future discussion.6 But the Saudi government found the "Green

Line" unacceptable and would not change its position on its territorial right which she based on her "Red Line" of the

3rd of April 1935. In the Middle East generally, but in 1936 in parti

cular, a new trend began in the international politics and many events led the British to seek better relations with

Saudi Arabia. As Dr. Morsy Abdullah explains;

Su.K. Memorial, Vol. I, p. 123.

Gibid., p. 155

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During 1936 the threat posed by Italian activities in the Red Sea area following their Ethiopian expedition, the growing danger of European war and especially the increasing difficulties in Palestine, all served to strengthen Rendel's determination to work for a settlement with Ibn Sa'ud. Between April and December 1936 a serious revolt broke out in Palestine and obliged Britain to ask King Ibn Sa'ud and the Arab Rulers to mediate between themselves and the Palestinian leaders. Thus the Palestinian question for the first time became officially an Arab question involving Arab governments. Rende1, who appre ciated the role displayed by Ibn Sa'ud during the last crisis in Palestine in persuading the Palestinian leaders to abandon their campaign of violence, considered that the King's friendship was of vital importance.'

In the view of the efforts of Sir G.W. Rende1^ to improve relations with the Saudis, he felt that if Ibn Saud should give to the British territory that he claimed, he would appear weak, especially after his help to the British

in Palestine.9 Therefore, on 4 December 1937, his Royal Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Prince Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz received diplomatic note number 195/1658/430/66 from Sir R. Bullard,1® British Minister at

Jeddah. In this note the prince was informed that since

Ryan's proposals of November of 1935 there had been a modif ication in favor of the Saudi Arabian Government, following the ascertaining of the exact location of Sufuk (Safq)

^Abdullah, p. 195. ®Sir George W. Rende1 was the leader of the British delegation, 1934-7, in the Eastern frontier question.

^Abdullah, p. 197. l®Charge de-Affairs of the British Legation.

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well,which bordered the Saudi's line 25 miles to the south and which had not been included in "Fuad's Line" of

April 1935. The British hoped that such modification would lead to the re-opening of negotiations on the frontier on the basis of the "Ryan's Line" (also known as "Riyadh Line")

but Prince Faisal insisted, again, that as long as the British regarded the "Riyadh Line" as an acceptable fron tier, a settlement to the problem would be very difficult.12 For the next few years and during WWII negotiations on

the frontier dispute remained at a standstill. Meanwhile,

the economic life of the region affected the general rela tions between the local tribes, Shaikhdoms, the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia and the interested outside powers concerned. The question of oil in the region had provided a valuable vehicle for political development and control over regulat ing inter-tribal relations, irrespective of the social

status of the tribe. At the same time it brought the inter-Arab dispute to the attention of the international communities through the British-American competition in the

region. During the war frontier discussions were suspended. But at the time the ARAMCO Research Department, headed by George Rentz, began to collect historical facts, whatever

was available which might link the authority, or influence

lly.K. Memorial, Vol II, p. 173. 12lbid., p. 174.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 of the Saudis in the disputed area. Rentz, through his primary research and survey of the area, was aiming at

securing the hereditary rule of the Saudi family and extend

ing the limits of their territory as far as possible against

the British sphere of influence in the area.13 Rentz focused on gaining the allegiance of additional tribes by means of Wahhabi proselytizing and raids and thereby obtain ing rights to the territory of these tribes.14 But the lack

of accurate historical records had led to differences amongst the concerned parties.

On the other hand, the British oil companies in the area followed the same path of the Americans by preparing

for the coming negotiations over the disputed area, and

though the British government has its own well documented archives of the Foreign and Common Wealth Office, "had in the past concentrated its attention on the Coast and had had

its treaties with its Shaikhs. British knowledge of the interior was to a large extent vague until the immediate

pre-war years."15 Therefore, the British government relied on the help and assistance of the representative of their

oil companies who lived in the hinterland area exploring and getting to know the tribes of the region and their seasonal

13interview with George Rentz, on Thursday, Feb. 19, 1981, Washington, B.C.

14ibid.

l^Abdullah, p. 202.

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data to be used for further negotiation with the Saudis. Two of those people who helped to collect the information were:

E.F. Henderson, the oil company's representative in Muscat together with Dubai after 1948, in Abu Dhabi in 1950 and finally in Bahrain, responsible for political concessionary dealings. The second was Ali al-Jafir, who was on the staff of the company headquarters in Bahrain and had frequently visited the coast from 1938 on and had remained in Dubai after 1952, Hence All's conviction of the rightness of Abu Dhabi's and Muscat's cause grew, as did his enthusiasm in cooperating with Henderson to collect material for this cause.1®

So while the American oil company team was researching for the Saudi government, the British oil company team was researching for the British government.

ARAMCO's drilling continued to bring more fortunes to the company. By the end of the war the importance of Saudi oil became very visible to the Western political and eco

nomic interests, and the oil certainly identified inter

national rivalry which carried with it danger as well as promise for the local population. The danger was the

prospect of a foreign battleground, and the promise was contained in the evolution and the development of the region. An Anglo-American bloc (in the region) appeared to

be the prime objective of these two countries. However, the

Americans had higher significant interests in the Saudi's strategic value of its oil reserves which were centrally

IGlbid.

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located and, as yet, virtually untapped. The Americans found in this reserve the substitute for the enormous drain on their oil resources in the post-war period. The British oil exploration in Oman and Trucial

Shaikhdoms was resumed after 1945. This exploration, by 1945, led to the Al-Buraimi area where the British Petroleum

Concession Ltd. tried to survey it. But the resistance of the Al-Shamsi and Al-Na'imi tribes brought the survey to

a halt, believing that the exploration was an intervention

and intrusion of the autonomy of their land. Richard Bird, in the summer of 1948, obtained permission from the Sultan

of Muscat to examine Muscat territory "around Al-Buraimi" and "stating that he would handle any dealings with the oil company in the future".1? But the Sultan authority in

Al-Buraimi was very nominal, as Thesiger,^® who was in the

area at that time describes it: The Iraq Petroleum Company had signed agreements with the Sultan of Muscat and with the Trucial Sheikhs, covering the area around Buraimi, and Bird was now trying to persuade the tribes to accept these agreements. It was not easy, since Zayid had no authority South of Buraimi, and the Sultan, whose authority there was at this time purely nominal, had no effective representative in the area.

ITpichard Bird was a British political officer in Bahrain and in 1948 became a representative of Petroleum Concessions Ltd. l^Kelly, Eastern Frontier of Arabia, p. 140. l^Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 254.

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It was clear that while Shaikh Zayed had authority over six of the Al-Buraimi villages, the Sultan of Muscat was not

able to retain the firm authority over Buraimi and Hamasa villages which he had held for over two decades and it was

growing weaker. At the same time the chiefs of the tribes

wanted to bargain their own oil deals with the interested investors. Thesiger continues: Each Shaikh, excited by avarice, was noisily asserting his independence, while each of his tribesmen fancied that he could get special terms for himself by refusing to acknowledge any authority other than his own.20 Without a doubt the smell of oil and the prospect of

unaccustomed wealth had a profound effect on the economy and a way of life of the tribes in the region. This led to a

new political awareness in their relations toward one another. Though the Shaiks were denying that they owned any allegiance to the Sultan, for the sake of oil and wealth

they agreed to enter into an agreement of cooperation with him on the issues of political and economical interests. The chiefs of some the tribes (Rashid ibn Hamad al-Shamsi, Muhammad ibn Salimin al-Shamsi, Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Salt, and Ubaid Ibn Juma Al-Ka'bi) agreed to appoint Shaikh Saqr ibn Sultan Al-Na'imi as their spokesman and contact with the

Sultan in Muscat regarding any matter of mutual interest amongst them. The agreement read as follows :

2®lbid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 All agreed in the presence of Sayid Ahmed bin Ibrahim, the Director if Internal Affairs, to entrust their affairs to Saqr bin Sultan, and to delegate him in all political and economical matters. They will undertake to support him, and agree with him in every matter of common interest. He will represent them, and it is his responsi bility to take care of their interests... He is their representative in communicating with His Majesty, God Save him, in all requests and matters issuing from His Majesty. They all agree to dele gate the aforementioned Shaikh to His Majesty in every request, whether in the matter of materials, and there will be no opposition from them. Shaikh Saqr has recognized that he is absolutely accre dited to his Majesty and is responsible on behalf of the aforementioned Shaikhs, so that there will be no concealment.21

Though the British government used this agreement to

support the Sultan's claim, later on, Al-Buraimi, the

independence of those Shaikhs and their tribes from the authority of the Sultan is clearly indicated, otherwise he

would not have needed to reach an agreement with them to extend his authority and the British oil companies con

cessions in their region. It is also clearly shown that trust was placed in Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan to handle their

political and economic affairs with the Sultan and not directly in the Sultan himself. At the same time Shaikh

Segr was the messenger carrying the "requests" of the sultans to the Shaikhs and taking back the "requests" of the

Shaikhs to the Sultan. It was obvious that the Sultan could not order the people of the region as if they were his subjects and he needed an agreement with them to organize

21u.K. Memorial, Vol I, pp. 41-43.

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the relationship and a way of communicating with them.

Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan was not popular in the area, particu larly among his cousins of Al-Bu-Shamis in Hamasa and their chief,22 Rashid bin Hamad.

When Rashid bin Hamad was asked why he or any one of

the other tribal chiefs did not become the representative of the group his answer was that none of them wanted to have a direct contact with the Sultan through this agreement which

might indicate the Sultan's direct authority over their land, and at the same time to avoid direct commitment to him. But for Shaikh Saqr, who was known to be an oppor tunist and was favored by the British and the Sultan, the

role was more fitted, and that is why the agreement between the Shaikh of Al-Buraimi and the Sultan was by proxy.23

On the American side, in 1945 "a United States Army survey unit mapped the coast from Qatar to Sharjah, after securing permission to do so from the Trucial Shaikhs

through the British Government. No permission was sought from the Saudi Government, nor was any protest made by them

about the s u r v e y . "24 Later on, in 1947-8, both the British

Royal Navy and the Petroleum Concession Ltd. carried out

22Abdullah, p. 204

23interview with Rashid bin Saeed Al-Shamsi, a cousin of Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad and his clerk, Sharjah City, U.A.E. on Friday, January 18, 1985. 24Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, p. 141.

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some surveying and exploration in the same area without any objection by the Saudis to these operations.25

It clearly seemed that each side was preparing itself

for a new round of negotiations, but this time claims to a

larger area, especially now that the ghost of Al-Buraimi loomed through the mists of discussions to appear on the next claiming maps of Saudi Arabia, who claimed that the

whole area had been Saudi since the eighteen century. After WWII, many changes took place in the relations among the involved parties and many traditional influences

and been replaced by Western influences and know-how,

especially between the Saudis and the Americans. The his toric meeting of 1945 between King Ibn Saud and President

Roosevelt added a new dimension to the two countries

relations. Landing facilities and an American air force base at

Dhahran were granted and leased to the American government, and British military personnel were replaced by Americans to train the Saudi army. All this took place as a result of

the harmonious relationship between the ARAMCO officials and

the Saudi Arabian Government. ARAMCO became an important "semi-conductor" in Saudi international affairs, especially in its relations with the American government. As Mikesell

and Chenery explain:

25ibid.

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In all of Saudi Arabia's relations with the United State Government the Arabian American Oil Company has played a major role. Company officials fre quently serve as informal advisers to the king and his ministers and perform the function of an unofficial ambassador in Washington where the company maintains an office. This type of rela tionship, although admittedly subject to abuse, appears to have been quite advantageous for a government which until the last few years has had little diplomatic or economic contact with the outside world. Moreover, so long as the foreign oil policy of the United States coincides more or less with that of the oil company, the arrangement may continue to be useful to the United States Government.26

The growing relations between the Saudis and the

Americans had without a doubt influenced and weakened the relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia, which in turn affected the events relating to the frontiers dispute. There was an incident after the War, in April 1949, when

ARAMCO an exploration team, accompanied by an armed Saudi force, was operating in a disputed area to the east of Qatar across the "Green Line" of Ryan. The British on behalf of Abu Dhabi had protested the ARAMCO operation and resumed

their politics of correspondence by handing to the party a

note insisting on their withdrawal from the area. The note

read: Before going, I should like to point out the ex treme delicacy of the present position regarding ARAMCO's work in this area. His Majesty's Govern ment in the U.K. have always recognized the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi as extending up to Khor Udaid and it is therefore natural that the ruler

26Raymond F. Mikesell, and Hollis B. Chenery, Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 should regard your company's presence at points North of Sufk as an incursion, particularly as the company have Saudi soldiers... in disputed areas be withdrawn before any possible incident occurs between the Saudis and the subject of Abu D h a b i . 2'

The note was signed by the British political officer in

the Trucial Oman, Mr. P.D. Stobart. On 25 of April Mr. P.W. Obliger, the Vice-president of ARAMCO responded to Mr.

Stobart's note saying; It is not for ARAMCO to enter into discussions involving the boundaries between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, nor does it desire to do so. Aramco parties work only in the places to which they are taken by Saudi guides assigned by their Government to accompany our missions within the boundaries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. If there are objections to the arrival of our geological parties at the points referred to by you, we believe that they should be directed to the Saudi Arabian government.28

It was clear that the frontiers were not settled on maps and therefore ARAMCO had relied on using a Saudi guide to show them what the Saudis claimed to be their territory for exploring. Whatever Ibn Saud's belief in Saudi rights

to survey and explore in that area the British protested and

logged a counter-protest against the Saudi Government's violation of Abu Ohabi's right and sovereignty. To the

British a discussion of the matter was the only way to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Since the Saudi's emphasis was

directed toward the discovery of oil in the disputed area

using the tribal loyalty as a vehicle to this end, the

27s.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 63.

28ibid., p. 64.

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British suggested the following in their note of June 17,

1949: That the frontier would serve to mark the limits of concessions granted by either party and the limits of their

governmental sovereignty; it need not have any other effect

on the inhabitants of A r a b i a . 23 But by now, Saudi Arabia

was more prepared than before, for the ARAMCO research team was finalizing a new study for which Rentz and his colleag

ues collected the material. Rentz admitted that when he first went to the Saudis "they did not even know where Buraimi was, and they were not even sure of the name of it. There are different versions of the name in British

sources. It was really almost Terra incognito— unknown

territory."30 However, there was "Fuad's Line" composed in 1935, but

Rentz found this line too questionable and according to Rentz "I think you will find question marks there [on Fuad's

Line] He [Fuad Hamzah] did not know the geography very well, and it is very difficult to determine just how the line

r a n . 31 At this time Prince Faisal was the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Saudi Arabia, yet he

left the whole issue in the hands of Faud Hamzah and he ran the show. But by 1937 Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, the deputy Saudi

Foreign Minister, took personal charge of the case.

2®u .K. Memorial II, p. 183.

3 ®Rentz, interview.

31Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 "However, Yusuf, like Fuad, started out knowing very little about the people, very little about the geography.As a result of the lack of knowledge on the side of the Saudi government of the geography of the eastern area of the

Arabia peninsula and its people, ARAMCO prepared a book called "The Eastern Reaches of the Al-Hasa" which was,

simply, a compilation of the knowledge that it researchers had regarding the geography and the people, "making no attempt to say where the boundary should be." Another study

was prepared by ARAMCO called "Oman and the Southern coast of the Persian Gulf." Rentz recalled that at the time of

this study one of the amazing interviews he had was with Prince Saud bin Abdulla Al-Jalawi, the Amir of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where the headquarters of ARAMCO

was located. Rentz said: The interesting thing is, that in that book we quote Saud ibn Jalawi as saying that Al-Buraimi is not part of Saudi Arabia, that it does not belong to Saudi Arabia. That was what he told me! Actually Saud was something like Yusuf Yasin... even though he was the governor, he did not know much about the territory.33

Those two studies provided to the Saudi government, were soon to influence the frontier question. Based on the

earlier time when this information was gathered Saudi

Arabia, on 14th of October 1949, submitted to the government

of the United Kingdom its definition of the boundaries

32ibid. 33Ibid.

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between its territory and Qatar's on one hand arid them and Abu Dhabi on the other. The diplomatic note explained that:

The Saudi Arabian Government considers that the boundary line between it and Abu Dhabi begins at a point on the coast of the Gulf between Bandar al-Marfa and Bandar al-Mughaira, lying two kilo meters east of Bandar al-Marfa (point A). The line runs due southeast (on the map the line run due southwest] from this point until it meets latitude 23'56* (point B). From this point the line runs straight until it meets longitude 54' (point C ). From point C the line runs straight until it meets the point at intersection of latitude 24*25' and longitude 55*36* (point D).34

This new line of Saudi Arabia claimed a huge area, including

all the Gulf adjacent to Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Liwa Oasis,

the ancestral home of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, and all the mainland to the West and Southwest of the Gulf

Coast. Yet the boundary line stopped short of al-Buraimi Oasis. Saudi Arabia considered that these new proposals for the frontiers reflected the reality of their territorial

claim based on the right of the Saudi tribes in the area

which happened to belong to the kingdom: Bani Hajir, the Manasir, the * Awamer, A1 Murrah, the Dawasir, and other

tribes. None of the tribes mentioned lived in Al-Buraimi

area and, until 14th of October 1949, the Saudi government did not put forward a claim for Al-Buraimi or its people as

subjects of its authority. When Rentz was asked about it

his answer was: The Saudi Arabian Government retained Judge Manley Hudson. He was a very distinguished authority on

34S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 65.

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International Law. He was the American judge on the World Court. He was also a Professor of International Law at Harvard University. He had had one or two heart attacks and his doctor would not allow him to travel by air. So he sent his associate Richard Young, who prepared the legal argument. ARAMCO was called in to provide information be cause they had facilities that the Saudi Arabian did not have at that time. And actually the maps in the Saudi Arabian Memorial were prepared by us. So, Yusuf proposed a new line, which was his idea, although he had consulted Young and he had the information we gave him. The line that he proposed starts on the coast, but it does not reach Buraimi. It stops before Al-Buraimi. Because Yusuf was not sure about Al-Buraimi. 35

However, the Al-Buraimi Oasis was referred to as a Shaikhdom in paragraph 5 of the Saudi's statement (of the

14th of October, 1949) confirming that Al-Buraimi is under

the authority of its own tribal and village Shaikhs who had no treaty relationships with the British Government. For this reason, the boundary between the Government of Saudi

Arabia and these Shaikhs had to be agreed upon between the Saudi Government and the Shaikhs referred to.36 In this paragraph Saudi Arabia not only denied the

British, Abu Dhabi and Oman their sovereignty to Al-Buraimi, but since denied her own right to Al-Buraimi. It showed clearly the independence of the tribes and their Shaikhs from any outside claimed authority or title to their land.

35interview with Rentz.

36s.A. Memorial, Vol. II., p. 65.

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For Ibn Saud to gain a foothold in the Al-Buraimi area he

had to first discuss the matter with its Shaikhs. In the series of letters exchanged between the British

and the Saudi Governments, the Saudis received the British

rejection of its memorandum, not only that, but the British informed the Saudis that the document did not seem to pro vide an acceptable basis for further discussion, and the

British had no option to offer the Saudis except taking up their old position and based their claim on the "Blue Line" and the "Violet Line" as defined by the Anglo-Turkish Con

ventions of the 29th of July 1913, and the 9th of March, 1914. At this time the Saudi Arabian Government was trying to get the tribes of the Al-Buraimi area to subject them

selves to its authority. ARAMCO was behind this move and

Rentz was meeting some of the tribesmen individually, who were brought in by Yusuf Yasseen in an effort to collect

snippets of knowledge about the eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and accumulating an archive of historical material

and records on zakat collections in the disputed a r e a . 37

Aramco at this time was more Saudi than the S a u d i s . 38

37lnterview with Rentz.

38nolden and Johns, p. 145.

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THE TURNING POINT 1952-1955

Early in the 1950s, in response to rising inter

national oil sales, prices, and profits, the 4-shilling royalty per ton was replaced and the new 50-50 profit- sharing formula gave more power to the economy of Saudi Arabia. The growing oil industry provided a substantial

flow of revenues with which Saudi Arabia could support its claim in the region. So far most of the area that Saudi Arabia claimed was barely populated or inhabited by

settlers. Therefore, Saudi Arabia looked to the Al-Buraimi tribes for alliance and to support its claim. At this time Shaikh Zayid, as Shaikh Shakbhut's representative, con trolled six of the villages in the Al-Buraimi, while three

Hamasa, Buraimi, and Sa'ara were under the control of the Al-Bu-Shamis and Al-Na'imi respectively. In order for Saudi Arabia to gain time to establish a stronger relationship

with the Al-Buraimi Shaikhs, whose influence in the region would give the needed support for the Saudi's claim to the

area, the Saudi government had repeatedly requested in her political correspondence with the British Government the

establishment of a "joint technical commission" composed of representatives of the two sides accompanied by the

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necessary experts.1 At the same time both Governments had agreed that no pressure or irregular influence be exerted on

the work of the commission during its investigation of the disputed areas. While the process of forming the said commission was taking place, Yusuf Yasin requested of the British that any new operation in the disputed areas be prohibited until agreement can be reached on the definition

of the boundaries".2 This request was indirectly aimed at

preventing any new oil exploration on the British side in the disputed area, while ARAMCO had already established its

position in the same area, but the request has denied by the

British Government and the British would agree only to the "perpetuation of the existing state of affairs in the way it

was before the arrival of the last c l a i m s , " 3 of October

1949, of the Saudi Government. Meanwhile, the British kept

practicing their rights in the disputed area based on their treaties with the Shaikhs. To the British Government Mr. Yasin made a second request that "what has already been said on the subject of the Anglo-Turkish line not to be repeated, because this repetition does not help the solution of the

problem".4 One of the continuing disturbing issues for the

Saudi Government was the British repeated claim— based on

Is.A. Memorial, Vol. II., p. 79.

2lbid., p. 86.

3u .K. Memorial, Vol. II., p. 192.

4s.A. Memorial, Vol. II., p. 86.

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the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 and 1914— that Ibn Saud had been a Turkish subject and he was, therefore, bound by those conventions, which Mr. Yasin never accepted. However, for a long time, and until British withdrawal from the

region, they relied on the treaty between Ibn Saud and the Ottoman Government^ as the only legal ground on which the frontier dispute would be resolved. According to international law. His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Al Saud is the successor authority of the Turkish Government, to which His Majesty acknowledged his dependence in the Treaty of 1st May, 1914, with that Government. The Turkish Government,by signing the Anglo-Turkish Conven tions of 1913 and 1914, acknowledged that their authority in Arabia did not extend east of the lines laid down in those conventions if, then. His Majesty desires to establish a claim to any such area, it is for him to prove that since 1914 he has acquired sovereignty in that area in accordance to International Law and for this purpose to put forward any facts and events subsequent to that date on which he relies to support his claim.®

This statement had been delivered to the Saudis on many occasions to the point they became infuriated by the con

stant reiteration. At this stage each side wanted the other to produce and supply in advance detailed proof of their

right to those territories in dispute.

Finally, and as a result of the tremendous correspond ence exchanged between the two Governments they had agreed on the procedural steps which the Joint Committee would

3See Appendix A.

6u .K. Memorial, Vol. II., p. 193.

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follow during this investigation. Some of the main points they had agreed on were: (a) It is understood that pending and during the commission’s investigations both sides will abstain from any measure of pressure or inducement on persons or tribes who may be called upon to give evidence before the commission. (b) The Saudi Arabian Government agree that the Commis sion should be empowered to discuss, as part of their general investigation, the situation in regard to Bureimi [Buraimi] and the areas claimed by the Sultan of Muscat; and (c) For the reasons given... (During correspondence) the Saudi Arabian Government are prepared to furnish detailed evidence in support of the claims east of the Blue and Violet lines of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 and 1914 which they have put forward.'

The details of the formation of a mixed Committee were worked out and the first meeting took place on the 8th of August, 1951, in London, at the Foreign Office. The Saudi

delegation consisted of Amir Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, Shaikh

Yusuf Yassin, Shaikh Hafaz Wahba, Shaikh Ibrahim al Sulaiman and Ali Alireza. On the British delegation there were Mr. Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. R.J. Bowker, Mr. W.V.J. Evans and Mr. W.P. Cranston.® The first

Conference ended on the 24th of August with a little success. The two Governments agreed to the following:— A. A meeting should be held in the near future at a place to be agreed upon to be attended by His Highness the Ruler of Qatar, His Highness the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, and rulers of other regions who are concerned with the matter, under the

?Ibid., p. 194. ®Ibid., p. 203.

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leadership of a British delegate who will serve as Chairman of the group of rulers in treaty rela tions with the British Government, and delegates of His Majesty King Abdal-Aziz al Saud. This meeting shall study what in fact belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or to any of those Rulers and Shaikhs on the coast of Oman, in order to reach an agreement for the fixing of the bound aries justly and in accordance with what belonged to His Majesty King Abdal-Aziz and his forefather and what has belonged to those Rulers and their forefathers in the disputed area.

B. Until the conclusion of the conference to be held in the coming winter, the movements and activities of representatives of the oil companies on both sides and also movements and activities of the Trucial Oman Levies® would be restricted to areas outside that which will be the subject of discus sion at the conference. During the London Conference Prince Faisal tried to

ascertain just how much of a legal right could be presented by the British against his government based on International Law. At the same time he put forward his protest against

the establishment of the "Trucial Oman Levies," which were

under the control of the Political Resident in the Gulf, insisting upon their withdrawal from the area because their

presence would influence the tribes in the disputed area. But again this Conference ended with no change in the status

quo in the disputed area. So far the British thought that they had the upper hand

in the affair, simply because to them for Ibn Saud to have

®"The Trucial Oman Levies" latter to be named "The Trucial Oman Scottes," was established in March of 1951 to serve and keep the internal security of the Trucial Shaikdoms. 10S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 114.

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sovereignty in the disputed areas, in accordance with the

International Law, he would have to prove that the area in question was inhabited by a sedentary tribe which, by a

continuous and regular course of conduct extending over a period of years up to the present date, is proved to have

definitely acknowledged allegiance to Ibn Saud.Mean while, the Anglo-Saudi Frontier negotiations had revealed to the Saudis and especially Mr. Rentz and his team at ARAMCO's

office, what information the British had— and didn't have—

relating to the Sovereignty of the Al-Bureimi Oases. Based on the tremendous amount of information Rentz gathered from the past negotiations he and the Saudi Government realized

that the tribes of the Al-Bureimi Oases were extremely important to its claim. The turning point in the negotia

tion began when Saudis established contact with these

tribes. Mohammed bin Salmin Al-Shamsi of al Sunainah,^^ on his pilgrimage to Mecca, he was invited to stop in Riyadh,

and he visited with Prince Faisal. It was a customary practice of tribal way of life that when a chief or a high

ranking individual visited a country he would take the opportunity of extending his greetings to the head of that

country. In return, he would usually receive ikramiya or Sharhah (money and/or, clothes) as an appreciation of his

lly.K. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 208. l^Ai-sunainah is one of the disputed areas to the South of Al-Buraimi.

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visit. But for the Saudis, this time the visit meant an opportunity to establish the much needed loyalty from one section of the Al-Shamsi tribe. According to the Saudi Memorial (the English version) Mohammed bin Salmin visited

Prince Faisal in Riyadh, and wrote him a letter in late 1950 with the purpose of reporting to him about the oil explora

tion of the British companies in Oman and stating that the

British had control neither over him and his people to represent his area of influence nor over all the other

chiefs of Oman.^3 However, through the research for this

study, this letter was not found in the original, Arabic version of the Saudi memorial. The Saudi Memorial which was

translated from Arabic into English also contained a letter from Shaikh Rashied Ibn Hamed Al-Shamsi, of Hamasa village

in Al-Buraimi Oases, dated the 14th of June 1951, in which Rashid referred to his conversation with Abdullah ibn Ali Al-Mahmud, in which Abdullah warned him of "the imperial istic foreigners and the mischief-making Arabs, who are acting in accordance with the demands of the foreigner,"^4

at the same time Shaikh Rashid was invited to visit King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia. This type of letter was

followed by many others. Though the Government of Saudi Arabia began to solicit these letters in late 1950, such letters and reports were

^3See Appendix B. 14see Appendix C.

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never revealed during the conference of London, nor later when the second conference was held in Dammam, Saudi Arabia

between January 25-February 14, 1952. This conference had for the Saudis Prince Faisal ibn Abdul-Aziz, Amir Saud bin Jalawi, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin and representing the British were

Mr. C.J. Pelly, Mr. W.V.J. Evans, Mr. M.S. Weir, Shaikh Ali

bin Abdulla of Qatar and b.B. Shaikh Shakhbut bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi. It appeared that Saudi Arabia suggested the con ferences with the sole intention of gathering more infor

mation on which it could base its claim. Using those letters and in the hope of processing more due to the Saudi Government's secret contact with the remainder of the

tribes. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin suggested to the conference of Dammam that the following points should be used as criteria in determining sovereignty in the various disputed areas:

(1) The names and allegiance of the tribes

(2) The Dirah (town, village, or oasis) occupied by one or a number of tribes (3) The exercise of jurisdiction and collection of taxes in the various areas since the year 1915.15

In response to this suggestion the British showed their

readiness to examine these points; however, they pointed out that an overlapping of tribes and jurisdictions were likely

to slow down the process toward final settlement on the

frontiers.

ISu.K. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 219.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 Two weeks, after the Dammam Conference was ended. Prince Faisal met with the British Ambassador at Jeddah to inform him that the meeting held in Dammam was only for the

purpose of ascertaining the facts regarding what belonged to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi's forefathers, and that the

Saudis would not accept any solution impairing any of their

rights.16 This meeting ended any further negotiation and led the dispute to a more aggressive approach in handling

the matters.

The free flights from Al-Buraimi to Saudi Arabia (given to the chiefs and family members of the local tribes by the

government of Saudia Arabia) attracted many Shaikhs to perform their pilgrimage and during the visit they were

given an audience with Saud Ibn Jalawi, the Amir of "the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia who turned them over to

Rentz who was collecting information on the Al-Buraimi area, to help writing Al-Saud's memorial.1? Among those Shaikhs was Rashid Ibn Hamad Al-Shamsi who was the main force behind

the Saudis. On his pilgrimage trip in 1952 he agreed to

offer an outpost for a police force in Hamasa, a village

that he ruled. This agreement was implemented when Rashid bin Hamad returned to Hamasa accompanied by the Saudi

appointee Amir Turki ibn Abdullah Ibn Utaishan, formerly governor of Ras Tanura (where ARAMCO has its refinery

1®S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 118. l^Interview with Rentz.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 installation), accompanied by forty armed retainers. This move came as a result of the establishment of the Trucial Oman Levies which might have caused a threat to Rashid and

his people. On his arrival at Hamasa, Turki Utaishan dispatched his credentials, written by Amir Saud Ibn Jalawi, to the tribes in the disputed area saying "In view of the repeated request made by our Tawa'if [tribes related to one

another] in Oman and the visit to Dammam of Rashid bin Hamad Al-Shamsi for himself, and on behalf of them, for the appointment by us of a representative in their country, we

have appointed our servant Turki bin Abdullah bin

Utaishan."!® The following chiefs received letters of Turki's appointment: Al Bu Sbamis including Rashid bin Hamad of

Hamasa, Mohammed bin Salmin and Mana bin Ali of Al-Shamsi Tribe of Sunainah, Matar bin Salim, Ahmad bin Mohammad al-Hayayi of Dhank and Hamdan bin Khalfan bin Quiaisha of

Wasit (wadi al-Jizzi), Al-Na'im including Saqr bin Sultan of Buraimi, Hamaid bin Rashid, cousin of Saqr, Muhammad bin Ali bin Awwad of bafit and Ahmad al-Salf of Hafit, also; and

from Bani Ka'b tribe was their chief Ubaid bin Juma, of Mahadha, from Al-Awamir tribes. He addressed Salim bin Rakkadh and Salim bin Hamm of Katam, and last, but not the

least, Al-Boluch Rashid bin Said of Araqi.

18U.K. Memorial, Vol. I, p. 104.

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In response to the Saudi act, the British took the

following action; (a) Detachments of the Trucial Oman Levies were sent

to al-Ain and Muqatara.

(b) R.A.F. aircraft from Sharjah patrolled Hammasah, and dropped messages from the Sultan to encourage

his supporters. (c) Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi sent a garrison of 20

manasir (Al bu Khail section). (d) The Sultan sent vehicles and 60 men to reinforce Saqr bin Sultan in Buraimi.

(e) The Sultan collected a tribal force of 8,000 men

at Sohar, and a further 800 men assembled at Dariz.!® However, all these precautions did not result in physical engagement and the British Charge d'Affaires at

Jeddah protested to the Saudi Government against the intro

duction of Turki Utaishan into the Al-Buraimi area. While the Saudi move into the disputed area was contradictory to

the previous Anglo-Saudi negotiations, the British Govern ment did not stand up to what they considered aggression.

It was slow and hesitant to deliver a firm response, there fore Turki continued calling on the tribes of the area to meet him and sign their loyalty to Saudi Arabia against sum of money and food. For the next two years diplomatic

l®Ibid.

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correspondence of protestation was the form of communication

between Saudi Arabia and Britain. By the 15th of September 1952, Turki Utaishan was able to reach and gather over 28 Shaikhs who signed a 'Declaration' of guardianship of their

affairs to the Saudi Government.20 The tribes of the area

did not understand the oil politics nor the meaning of the

declaration commitment that was imposed on them by the Saudis, yet they kept signing letters of allegiance at the Saudi's request. Finally, the exchange of numerous com

plaints resulted in a 'standstill agreement' which the

American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Raymond Hare, had pro posed. Based on his instructions from the State Department

Ambassador Hare hoped that the standstill agreement would restrain the conflicting parties from escalating the dis

p ute.21 But the Saudis never intended to abide by the

"standstill agreement"22 for they continued to seek further

commitments from the tribes. In addition when Britain sug

gested the re-opening of the discussions on the frontier

question Saudi Arabia, once again, made it clear to the British that Al-Buraimi was not part of any further discus

sion, for the territory and its people were considered

Saudi. Therefore, in order to deter Saudi activities in Hamasa the British placed the Trucial Oman Levies in Buraimi

20see Appendix D.

2lHolden and Johns, p. 147. 22See Appendix E.

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village and in Western areas through which supplies were received by Turki, and a blockade has imposed upon the people of Hamasa and Turki's retainers. The exchange of diplomatic notes on the violation of the Standstill Agree

ment continued between the two Governments. King Abdul-Aziz wrote the British Prime Minister informing him that: The blockade of the people of Buraimi has been tightened and their provisions, which they import from other areas, have been confiscated. This cannot be considered helping a weak friend [Abu Dhabi] against a strong friend [the Saudis], as you mentioned in your previous message. All the forces I control in that region, the area of which is more than a hundred thousand kilometers, do not exceed forty men, while the British Government concentrated in the region, before the Standstill Agreement, a number of soldiers and military supplies that greatly exceed what I have there. What danger can threaten those in whose name the British Government is acting in that area by reason of a mere forty men, whose presence was required fgr the maintenance of peace and security?23

However, while King Abdul-Aziz was seeking peace and security according to the Standstill Agreement, Turki

Utaishan was becoming more successful in running his show and the payoff approaches were gaining more ground for the Saudi cause. Even Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan of Buraimi vill

age, who was one of the first to receive the Ibn Jalawi

letter, declined the invitation, refused to join, and also refused to yield to the united power of Turki's kitchen and

purse. In addition he aided the British in maintaining the blockade of Hamasa village, in order to prevent

23S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 181.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 "unauthorized" goods from reaching Turki. In the end,

however, the price was right and the Saudi Government’s assault on Saqr's loyalty was successful. By the end of

1954 Saqr was hoisting the Saudi flag over his v i l l a g e . 24

The provocative activities between the parties continued. It became clear to the British that every time negotiations

and conferences broke down it was as a result of the Saudi’s

principal objective of manufacturing evidence to enable it to gain sovereignty of the Al-Buraimi zone, especially after

the British lost Bursimi village and its Shaikh to the Saudi side. Another turning point resulted from the British

disbelief in the sincerity of Saudi Arabia to conclude the frontier dispute to a peaceful settlement. Britain suggested arbitration concerning Buraimi and the Common

Frontier between Abu Dhabi and Oman, on one side, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This suggestion was welcomed by the

Saudis. On October 26, 1953 an agreement was reached be

tween the two governments and the discussions on the terms

of the arbitration itself began in London in December 1953. The agreement was finalized and became effective on 30th

July 1954. The arbitration pointed out the importance of an independent and impartial tribunal to decide the following: (a) The location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within the line claimed by

24Rashid S. Al Shamsi, Interview.

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the former in 1949 and that put forward on behalf of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952. (b) Sovereignty in the area comprised within a circle whose center is in Buraimi village and whose circumference passes through the point of junction of latitude 24 degree 25 minutes North and longitude 55 degree 36 minutes East. At the same time it was asked of the Tribunal to take in consideration, beside its own investigation, the following: 1. historical facts relating to the rights of the rulers concerned and their forefathers; 2. the traditional loyalties of the inhabitants of the area concerned; 3. the tribal organization and way of life of these inhabitants; 4. the exercise of jurisdiction and other activities in the area; and 5. any other considerations brought to its attention by either party.25

The tribunal requested the involved parties to present

simultaneously to the tribunal a memorial setting out its submissions regarding the territories and frontiers in dispute, within a period of six months from a date to be

fixed by the President of the Tribunal. Then each of the two parties would have the right to a further period of six

months to reply to each other's claims. By the end of 1954,

the names of the members of the Tribunal were agreed upon: Dr. Charles de Visscher (Belgium), a former judge of the International Court of Justice, President.

Sir Reader Bullard (Britain), a retired member of the British Foreign Service who had been Minister to Saudi Arabia, 1936-9.

25gee Appendix F.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia Dr. Ernesto de Dihiga (Cuba) and Mr. Mahmud Hassan (Pakistan),2®

An exchange of notes, on 30 July 1954 between the two

governments cleared the way for the tribunal to begin its work in accordance with the following points;

1. Turki bin Utaishan and his forty retainers were to

withdraw from the Al-Buraimi zone to Saudi Arabia, at the same time the Trucial Oman Levies, another armed force

(British flights over Buraimi), and officials introduced into the zone after August 1952, were to withdraw to undisputed areas in the Trucial Shaikhdoms. The local

tribes in Al-Buraimi Zone (especially in Hamasa village) were asked to bank their arms and rely on a small police force of 15 men from each side to ensure security in the

disputed area. 2. Tents for the small police force, were placed within the Al-Buraimi territorial zone, but outside the populated

villages. The role of the two police camps was to maintain

peace and good order between the disarmed tribes in the Al-Buraimi zone and not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs, administration or policies of any tribes.

In the event of an outbreak or disorder then the police should intervene, provided that the leaders of the two

constituent parties agreed.

26Kelly, Eastern Frontiers, p. 174.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 3. It was agreed that both parties undertake to refrain

from action which would prejudice the holding of a just and impartial arbitration.2? At the same time, both governments

agreed that there should be no oil operations in any case in the Al-Buraimi Zone during the period of arbitration. And

by September 1955 the tribunal constituted under this agree ment met in Geneva and began its proceedings.

The International Tribunal As mentioned above, the tribunal had to base its

investigation and judgement, on which party had authority over whom in what area. At that time on both sides such

authority was not based on today organized military forces to maintain sovereignty over certain territorial limits, but

rather on the support of the friendly tribes, who happened to live in the desired territory, and their changing loyalty which depended at any given time on their relationship with

local rulers. While the tribunal was studying the presented memorials and claims, the Saudis felt that their historical claim to

occupy the Al-Buraimi Oasis during various periods between

1800-69 would never stand a chance in establishing their sovereignty over the disputed area because each time they

occupied the Al-Buraimi they were eventually evicted by the

27por more details on the Tribunal Agreement, see Appendix F.

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local tribes with help of neighboring tribes such as the

Bani Yas of the Abu Dhabi Shaikhdom. This defacto rule failed then and failed again when Turki Utaishan and his party retainers occupied Al-Buraimi to resume the rule of de facto in obtaining sovereignly over the Oasis.

One of the main legal arguments the Saudi memorial presented to the tribunal was the payment of "Zakat" (Islamic Tax) to which the Saudis attached great weight as a

support for their claim to sovereignty in the disputed area,

and the memorial states the following; The tax levied upon the inhabitants of the dis puted areas was and is the Zakat enjoined by Islamic Law. Despite confusion arising from the occasional misapplication of the word to other funds of payments, Zakat is not a political tri bute, nor is it a voluntary gift to a solely religious leader, such as Peter's pence received by the Pope. By origin an assessment for the relief of the poor and unfortunate, Zakat early on became the chief general tax imposed on the Muslim. On him who has the right to collect it rests a corollary duty to Protect those who pay it, no collection, as has been said, without protection.28

The Saudis made it clear that their argument was based

purely on collecting the Zakat imposed by the Islamic

religion and its significance as an element in the

determination of sovereignty.

28S.A. Memorial, Vol. I, p. 495.

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According to Sait Al-Qadhi^^ Zakat is an important pillar of the Islamic religion, and the worship of God is

not complete without it. However, Zakat is also a basic social balance of wealth distribution from those who "have" to those who "have not" i.e., it is a social obligation im

posed by one of the five Islamic Pillars which have become the basis of the Muslim society. Mutual responsibility for

it is paid directly from the rich to the poor. Zakat does not involve expressed intention, it is a must. When a Muslim does not pay it the immediate authority ruling his

society becomes charged with collecting the Zakat, forcibly

if necessary. However, most Muslims dispense their Zakat during the holy month of Ramadhan, or even when they feel it is due. It is an annual taxation on Muslims who have mater

ial possessions well beyond their needs for daily living. A Muslim does not pay Zakat if he is poor or in debt. The Zakat, or alms tax, is the third of the five pillars of

Islam and one of the most important acts of worshipping

Allah. The other four are the profession of faith (Shahada), i.e. there is no God but Allah and Mohammad was

his last prophet to the world, praying (Salat), five times a

day. Fasting (Sawm), during the holy month of Ramadhan and

the pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca at least once in a life time

2®interview with Saif Al-Qadhi, May 24, 1985. He is one of the local judges and an Imam of a Mosque in Hamasa village.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112

for those Muslims who are financially and physically able to

do so. Islam insists that these five Pillars are practiced by

the faithful without pressure or imposition from any politi cal Leader, or any legal authority. Yet when a Muslim does not practice his religion then his local religious leader may prevail upon him to do so. Therefore these five Pillars of Islam show that a Muslim's loyalty and obedience is to

'Allah' and no one else. The Saudis used to collect Zakat, not only from the people of the disputed area, but even from the Shaikhs, like Al-Qawasim in Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaima,30 yet the Saudis

never claimed sovereignty over them. However, the Saudis

used the collection of Zakat to build their political expan

sion and influence. All the people of the disputed area or non-disputed area who happened to be known as Wahhabis (be long to the school of Mohamad bin Abdul Wahhab), used to

donate the Zakat, on and off, to the Saudis as supporters of

the Wahhabi movement. Therefore, when the Saudis realized that the Zakat collection would not strongly support their claim as pre

sented in the third volume of their memorial, they relied on

the friendly nature of the local tribes to support them. Therefore they tried to re-gain sovereignty over Al-Buraimi

30lnterview with Rashid Obaid Al-Shamsi, Sharjah, on October 10, 1986.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 through occupation, but this time, based on interpersonal relations and contributions of money and materials. To reinforce this one of the first acts of Turki Utaishan when he arrived in Al-Buraimi was to marry a woman from one of

the well known families from Al-Shamsi tribes. Tribal politics in the Arabian peninsula, in general, were based on self-interest which determined to whom Zakat was to be paid and allegiance given, and it was common for a tribe to switch its loyalties from one leader to another.

To gain such loyalty the Saudis attempted to buy the tribes' "self-interest" by giving them cash in return for signed letters of committed loyalty to the Saudis.31 One of

the many occasions on which money was passed from the Saudi representative in Al-Buraimi to its people was when Hamad

Bin Saeed Al-Shamsi— a cousin of Shaikh Rashid bin Hamed

Al-Shamsi— received a sum of money and the Saudi flag from Abdullah bin Nami and delivered them to Shaikh Saqr bin

Sultan Al-Nu'aimi,32 during the arbitration period. This

exchange of Saudi money in return for letters33 from tribal

chiefs went on during the arbitration and led to its final collapse and the British broke off the proceedings of the

Tribunal.

31lbid. 32ibid. 33ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 On 28 October 1955, the President of the Security Council of the United Nations received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia in which he de

scribed the Trucial Scouts (levies) in Al-Buraimi (mainly Hamasa Village) informing him of:

The grave situation in the Buraimi Oasis and adjacent areas resulting from acts of armed aggression on 26 October 1955 by forces acting under the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom. These acts, which effected a forcible military occupation of large territories in Eastern Arabia, brought about the wounding of 2 Saudi Arabian officials in Buraimi and the capture and detention of a number of others.34

The British Government responded to the Saudi letter on 20

October 1955 by explaining that: For many years Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have sought to reach agreement by friendly negotiation with the Saudi Arabian Government on the location of the frontiers. These efforts have led only to steadily increased Saudi claims against the territory of the two Arab Rulers (Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Muscat). Finally, in August 1952, the Saudi Official, Turki Bin Atashan... invaded the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and established himself in a village belonging to the Sultan in the region of Buraimi. These facts, combined with the conduct of the Saudi Government in relation to the Tribunal itself, have led Her Majesty's Government to con clude that the Saudi Arabian Government is no more willing now to reach an equitable solution by arbitration than they were previously by negotia tion.... Her Majesty's Government therefore felt

34united Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated October 28, 1955, from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia, addressed to the President of the Security Council, October 28, 1955, S/3450, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 obliged.... to protect the legitimate interest of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of M u s c a t . 35

By now, the Al-Buraimi problem had became an official

part of the United Nations documents, and it became so when the British Government was on the defensive against Arab Nationalism which was spreading throughout the Arab world

and presented by many Arab voices at the U.N. At the tenth session of the first committee of the General Assembly of the U.N. in 1955, Mr. Shukairy, the representative of Syria

on 7 December, described Western colonization which sup pressed the national liberation movement in North Africa, brought about the Palestine tragedy, the bombardment of South Yemen and raids on Buraimi. All of those events, and

more for the past century and a half had been the responsi bility of the Western powers, and to him it was in the hands

of the Western powers to make amends. His Government's aim

was merely to emancipate the Arab world from the vestiges of

imperialism, colonialism and all forms of aggression, in order to reestablish its unity and freedom. At the same

tenth session of the first committee, the Saudi represen

tative, Mr. Sultan, gave a detailed account of the exper ience of his Government in attempting to settle peacefully the Al-Buraimi dispute with United Kingdom. But, according

to him, his Government was disappointed by the British act

35united Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 29 October 1955 from the Representative of the United Kingdom Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 29 October 1955, S/3452, pp. 1-3.

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of armed aggression on Al-Buraimi which took place on 26 October 1955. And he stated that it was quite apparent that his Government had no recourse but to resolve the dispute

with all the peaceful methods at its disposal. It had invited the United Kingdom to suggest any method within the framework of the internationally accepted arbitration pro cedure, capable of effecting a peaceful settlement of the

British created problem in the Arabian peninsula. He referred to the agreement of 30 July 1949. The Saudi Arabian Government had also proposed that the disputed area should be supervised by international observers and further

more had advanced the concept of an internationally super vised plebiscite. It was undisputable, therefore, that his Government had

sought the United Kingdom's agreement to sill the principles and procedures set forth in article 33, paragraph 1, of the

U.N. Charter. In conclusion, he questioned the sincerity of the

policies of the United Kingdom regarding measures for the relaxation of international tension. He hoped that those

who preached peace would follow the example of Saudi Arabia in attempting to resolve disputes by peaceful means. By now the Al-Buraimi dispute had become an item on the United Nations agenda, known as the Question of Al-Buraimi, which Saudi Arabia kept asking the Secretary General of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 United Nations to investigate, hoping that his efforts would

culminate in an amicable solution to the problem. Meanwhile, Secretary General Hamarskjold was able to convince King Saud, Prince Faisal, and the United Kingdom

Government not to force the issue into a public confronta tion, but to agree to confidential negotiations and consul tations with the assistance of his representative. The

advice was heeded by both parties and the process was set into motion in September 1959.36 The Secretary General of

the United Nations appointed a special representative.

Ambassador De Rissing, to look into the question of Al-Buraimi but his efforts failed to settle the problem of

the people of Al-Buraimi who were exited to Saudi Arabia by the British in 1955. The Saudi Arabian Government then insisted that the return of the people of Al-Buraimi must be

accompanied by the establishment of some kind of "natural authority" in the Oasis to guarantee the safety of its

people before any arrangements could be put into effect. This was not acceptable to the British Government or

the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Oman, since it would have derogated the sovereignty of the Rulers con cerned, and the Sultan was not prepared to agree to any form

of United Nations presence being established in Al-Buraimi. As the Saudi Arabian Government continued to insist on these

36venkata K. Raman, ed., Dispute Settlement through the United Nations, (Dallas, Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1977), p. 641.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 conditions, no progress with regard to the return of refu gees had been possible.3?

Another attempt to promote a settlement of the dispute took place in August 1964. The British put forward a pro

posal for the establishment of a joint oil exploration area along the Southern boundary of Abu Dhabi and the granting of

a right of access from the neighboring area of Saudi Arabia to the Abu Dhabi coast for oil pipeline and roads. They

also proposed the return of the people of Al-Buraimi under

guarantee for supervision by the United Nations. This time the Saudi Government rejected these proposals without discussion, which indicated they knew that the British

withdrawal from the Gulf area was imminent.38

Up until the time of its withdrawal from the Gulf in

1971 the British Government continued to look for ways forward but it was difficult to make progress while Saudi Arabia continued to maintain her 1949 claim to the greater part of Abu Dhabi territory and to the whole of the

Al-Buraimi Oasis.

37Rashid Saeed Al-Shamsi, interview, 1985. 38ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V

THE PEOPLE OF AL-BURAIMI AND THE ENDLESS NEGOTIATION

Having Al-Buraimi Oasis as a key to the surrounding region, and as a prize of intrinsic worth, it attracted many traders and invaders of all kinds. Its capture had often been the dream of the warring tribes of the Arabian Penin

sula, especially the neighboring principalities. As a result of its location, it had changed hands many times in the course of its history. Yet the tribes of Al-Buraimi maintained their settlement in the region undaunted by any invaders or change until 1955 when the

Trucial Oman Levies, on the morning of 26 October, moved into the Oasis, particularly into Hamasa village, and forced the surrender of Abdullah ibn Nami, the Saudi Representative and his detachment.^

A1 Bu Shamis who lived in Hamasa village fought for

three days. According to Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad's wife, the Trucial Oman Levies led by a British Officer attacked Abdulla ibn Nami's post almost before dawn and he was captured after he was injured. Then they advanced to Hamasa

^Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, p. 205.

119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. village from the direction of Al-Ain with the help of the

Al-Ajam family who lived in that corner of Hamasa village. They took over the house where Turki Utaishan lived and captured the guards and they found a cache of arms were

hidden in the house. The machine guns, cannon, and war planes shelled Hamasa

from 2 A.M. until 10 P.M. of the next day. Then a messenger came from the attackers ordering Rashid bin Hamad to give up

himself or the attack would continue. After consultation with his family and the other Shaikhs who lived in Hamasa, and when he found out that the Saudis would not support his

fight against the British, he surrendered along with Shaikh

Saqr bin Sultan Al-Nu'ami and Obaid bin Juma Al-Ka’abi.^ on the fourth day they were taken to the British Air Force Base

in Sharjah. According to Henderson^ he arrived at Al-Buraimi from

Bahrain one hour after the battle broke out, at 6 A.M. His

instructions were to stop the bloodshed. He was stationed

in Al-Jimi village and was able to observe the battle going on between some of the Al-Shamsi tribe and the Trucial Oman Scouts who had been able to take over a big square house in

^Interview with Shaikhah Moza bint Saeed Al-Shamsi (Shaikh Rashid's wife and cousin), Sharjah, February 25, 1985. ^Interview with E. Henderson, Summer 1979, Washington, D.C.

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the southwest corner of Hamasa village (it was Turki's House). He was instructed to induce the people of Hamasa to

persuade their Shaikhs to go to Oman and pledge their obedience to Sultan Said bin Taimur. However, if they refused to do so then he was to offer them one of two choices, either give up their authority in the region or be

exiled to any place they wished. Henderson had no choice but to grant them their wish by sending the Shaikhs, their families and their followers who wanted to leave Al-Buraimi to Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, the British Government considered that the issue was at an end,

with three villages under Oman authority and the remainder

of Al-Buraimi village under Abu Dhabi authority.

A. Exile to Saudi Arabia The Shaikhs' families and their followers were brought

to the British military base in the Emirate of Sharjah where the shaikhs had been brought the night before. The Shaikhs,

Rashid bin Hamad Al-Shamsi and his son Sultan, Saqr bin

Sultan Al-Nu'ami* and Juma bin Obaid Al-Ka'abi^ and his

son Ahmed were placed in isolation from one another and they were interrogated for three days during which their families

4See Appendix G. 5see Appendix H.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 and followers were placed in tents nearby.^

Later, the Shaikhs and their families were united in three boats which sailed to Saudi Arabia, departing from Dubai. Deprived of their authority the Shaikhs preferred to

go to Dammam in Saudi Arabia rather? than return to

Al-Buraimi which is what the British tried to convince them to do.

They spent four days at sea and on their arrival in

Dammam in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia they were met by Turki Utaishan and some Saudi officials who provided them

with cars and housing. The three Shaikhs were followed later on by other

Shaikhs, namely; Sa*id Sultan al-Darmaki and his brother

Muhammad ibn Sultan al-Darmaki, Shaikhs of al-Qattarah village®. Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal and his brother

Shabib ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal Al-Dhahiri, Shaikhs of al-Jimi village®, Paris ibn Ghanim al-Mazrui, Shaikh of al-Mazrui's tribes^®. Said bin Rashid al-Baluchi^^, Ali bin Muhammad bin Rubayyi of Bani Qitab^^ and many others.

®Mozah Al-Shamsi, interview. ?Ibid.

®See Appendix I.

®See Appendix J. l®See Appendix K. l^See Appendix L. IZpahid Obaid Al-Shamsi, interview.

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Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad Al-Shamsi was the spokesman of the group. He met with King Saud bin Abdul Aziz on many

occasions and also with Saud bin Jalawi to discuss the Al-Buraimi problem and the possibility of he and his people

returning.

Shaikh Rashid was eager to establish his status in Dammam, but the Saudis were slow to respond to his requests

for clarification and they even stripped him of his juris diction and authority over his followers. He was regarded

by the Saudis as an ordinary citizen of Saudi Arabia, rather than a respected Shaikh of Hamasa Village. His attitude was

reinforced by the fact that he travelled to Cairo on a non-

diplomatic Saudi passport which showed only his name and omitted his title. He realized that what the British had

failed to make him do, the Saudis had been successful in tricking him into, by indirectly taking his tribal authority

away from him.l® As a result of the new situation he became ill and was sent to Egypt, on 5th of July 1956 for treatment, accom

panied by his cousin Shaikh Hamad bin Said and one of the

Al-Shamsi tribe named Salem bin Omaeer. They remained in Cairo until the 19th of October 1956. During this time he

met with Shaikh Saleh bin Issa Al-Harthi and Sulaiman bin

Hamyar, who were also exiled from Oman by the British and

^3Shaikhah Mozah, interview.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 were staying in Cairo^4, when Rashid went back to Dammam he

indicated to his sons and cousins that he was thinking of returning to his village to try to come to an understanding with the British and the others and to restore peace in the

region without the Saudi's help.1®

But Rashid did not live long after his return from Egypt. His health worsened and he was admitted to the ARAMCO hospital where he remained until his death in early 1957. With his death the Al-Buraimi issue was solely in the

hands of the Saudis. The Al-Buraimi dispute did not became a focal point in the Arabian Peninsula again until January 1968 when the British announced their intended withdrawal from the region by the end of 1971.

B. Going Home When Shaikh Zayed deposed his brother in 1968 and became the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, new hope was born for the

people of Al-Buraimi to return home. Since he was respected

and trusted by the tribes of the region, and he did much to improve conditions in the Oasis, most of the people of Al-Buraimi, if not all, began to return to their home

l^interview with Salim bin Omeer Al-Shamsi, Al-Ain (Salim was injured in the three day war and at the present time is working in Al-Ain museum). May 16, 1986. l^Rashid bin Saeed Al-Shamsi, interview. IGlbid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125

accepting the rule and authority of Shaikh Zayed. His for giveness and generosity attracted back all the leaders of

the tribe who had left for Saudi Arabia, especially after the neglect they had faced by the Saudi Government. Not only that but Shaikh Zayed assigned them to some important

jobs in his Government in Abu Dhabi. Paris bin Ghanim Al-Mazrui was killed by the Al-Manasir

tribe in revenge in the early 1960s but his two sons live in Abu Dhabi. Ghanim is the head of the Private Department of H.H. Shaikh Zayed and Suhail is the Deputy General Manager

and Exploration & Production Director of Abu Dhabi National

Oil Company. Al-Shamsi's family is the largest, therefore they have

returned to different places in the U.A.E. However the elder son of Shaikh Rashid is Humaid and he is living in Abu

Dhabi as a guest of Shaikh Zayed. His younger brother Khalifah works as the head of the engineering department

with the private department of H.H. Shaikh Zayed. As far as the rest of the Al-Buraimi people who re

turned to their home are concerned, they have a much higher

standard of living than they had in Saudi Arabia. What Saudi Arabia failed to offer them Abu Dhabi gladly granted

them. Both families of the Al-Baluchi and Bani Qitab went

back to Oman where Sultan Qabus appointed some of their members in key positions. Abdullah Saeed Al Baluchi was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 Omani Ambassador to India for several years and at the

present time he is the Omani Ambassador to Turkey. Abdullah bin Ali Al-Qitabi is the Under Secretary of the Ministry of

Interior in Oman.

C. The Negotiations Abu Dhabi/Omani presence at Al-Buraimi since 1955 has

politically bolstered their claim to the Oasis by confirming the de facto jurisdictional division of the oasis between them. Now they have their people and Shaikhs living under their authority. The situation made the credibility of the

Saudi Arabian Government's claim to the oasis increasingly difficult to sustain. Therefore, just before the Federation

of the Emirates was about to be formed, the call of King Faisal in 1970 for the resumption of direct negotiations to resolve the issue came at a time for which Abu Dhabi was not

prepared. The new Saudi threat to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and its Federation was the subject of an article in a Kuwaiti

newspaper, "ALRAI AL AAM". The headline on its front page,

carried in large letters, read, "The Saudi Restore Al-Buraimi Oasis", followed by this story; ALRAI AL AAM newspaper has learned from its own source that Saudi Arabia is determined to restore the Al-Buraimi oasis after the British forces withdraw from the region at the end of 1971.... ALRAI AL AAM has reported that Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, was approached by the Saudi authorities about this issue. The Saudis informed the ruler that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 Al-Buraimi is a part of Saudi soil and is on portion. If certain conditions existed in the past [referring to the British protection] now these are finished. It is only normal that the part should return to the motherland. Al-Buraimi oasis belonged to Saudi Arabia. It was governed by a Saudi ruler named Turki Utaishan. Our own sources added, the Shaikh Zayed trip to Teheran [capital of Iran] has a relation with this issue. He may visit Kuwait for the purpose of attempting to resolve this dispute. But Saudi Arabia Intends to restore Al-Buraimi oasis. This matter has debarred any friendly intercourse.1? By now, shaikh Zayed was confronted by many problems in the new Federation, including unsettled boundary disputes

between its members, friction between certain rulers and the question of common defense and external security.

King Faisal made it clear that "while his territorial demands upon Abu Dhabi remained unsatisfied he would not recognize the existence or legitimacy of the U.A.E.l® Shaikh Zayed as the President of U.A.E., a small Gulf power, was fully aware of the attempts by the two major powers, Saudi

Arabia and Iran, to exercise influence throughout the region. Therefore, under these circumstances an agreement

was said to have been reached between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi on the Al-Buraimi dispute. Many authors have commented on this agreement of 1974

in different ways, without understanding it fully. For example, J.B. Kelly wrote the following;

^?ALRAI AL AAM, Tuesday, May 19, 1970, Tenth Year, No. 2436, Kuwait. (An Arabic newspaper). l®Kelly, Arabia, The Gulf and the West, p. 210.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 After occasional exchanges between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi between 1972 and 1974, in August of the latter year a compromise was apparently reached between them. What exactly was contained in the agreement signed on 21 August 1974 is not certain, for the details of the agreement were never made public by either side. It would seem, however, that Zayed gave the Saudis nearly every thing they wanted— a corridor to the sea, west of the Sabkhat Matti, separating Qatar from Abu Dhabi and affording Saudi Arabia an outlet to the lower Gulf; a good slice of the western part of his Sheikhdom; and, in the south, the bulk of the Zarrara oil field,!" (gee Map 6) Kelly who wrote an earlier book on the issue. Eastern

Arabian Frontier, seems to be unhappy with this agreement.

He wrote the following to express his dissatisfaction: In return, Zayid [Zayed] secured Faisal's recogni tion of the UAE and withdrawal of the Saudi claim to the Buraimi oasis and the corridor of territory leading to it, a claim that was, in fact, as base less as Faisal's claim to the western and southern areas o f ^ u Dhabi which Zayid had seen fit to concede.20

John Duke Anthony finds the negotiation to end the conflict, widely interrupted by overriding interests of the

traditional rule in the area.2! Therefore neither did he

find much to write about the 1974 agreement except the following:

According to the formula, the two states acknow ledged in principle that Abu Dhabi sovereignty would be recognized over six of the villages in Buraimi [Al-Buraimi] oasis region previously

!®Ibid. 20ibid. 2!John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf : People. Politics, Petroleum. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1975), p. 148.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129

claimed by Saudi Arabia; that the rich Zararah (Shaybah) oilfield previously in dispute would be divided between them, and that Saudi Arabia would obtain an outlet to the Gulf through Abu Dhabi in the Khor al-Udaid area.22

Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, Director of the Centre for Documentation and Research of Abu Dhabi, in his book The

United Emirates— Modern History, wrote only the following on the 1974 agreement: The creation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the energetic activities of Ahmad Suwaidi, the Foreign Minister, the establishment of stable government and a speedy start to the development of the area, as well as the efforts of Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz were all factors helping to further friendly relations and mutual cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the new state. Finally in 1975 a frontier agreement was signed by both heads of state, which put a satisfactory end to the problem.23

It is clear enough that the three authors did not get hold of the agreement to write with better understanding on the issue. All of them were aware of existence of the agreement, but none of them knew of its content. Because of

Saudi recognition of the UAE, the three authors came to the conclusion that the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia was settled. However, Kelly seems to be more inform

ed on the issue and wrote the following:

A new agreement was apparently reached in the early summer of 1977, although again its details were not disclosed. However, an oil concessions

22ibid.

23Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 212.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Map 6. The Saudi Arabia— Abu Dhabi Frontier, 1955-77.

SOURCE; Kelly, J. B. Arabia, The Gulf and the West, New York: Basic Books Inc., 1980, pg. 211.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131

m g A M

ê . % f

s*sr>TjE Jl \r ;i V».' /jt:'::-.!

/ ' ï ;— L_L

ii.^>..

Map 6. The Saudi Arabia— Abu Dhabi Frontier, 1955-77,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 map put out by the UAE Ministry of Petroleum in June 1977, without any accompanying statement or explanation, depicted the Abu Dhabi/Saudi Arabian frontier as starting on the coast some twenty miles west of the Sabkhat Matti and following a course very similar to that of the original Saudi claim (the Red Line) of 1 9 3 5 .

The nature of the agreement has not been disclosed and

Kelly based his speculation and assumption on the oil con cessions map. A map of this nature cannot be considered a political map of the Federation's international borders. The official political maps are usually produced by the Photogram Department, which does the survey of its country's

boundaries. Therefore maps which are used for negotiations

have to be produced by this department. Until now there is no final map related to the issue.

There were a number of reports from various quarters

reporting that "serious technical defects in the supporting maps and documents to the agreement might precipitate a revival of the dispute,"25 and therefore it seems that the

agreement has never been finalized to the satisfaction of all parties and the on-off negotiations remain as a movement to the political history and relations of this region.

To sum up the negotiation periods over the Al-Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi one finds that

24Relly, Arabia, The Gulf and The West, p. 211.

25Litwak, Robert, Security in the Persian Gulf; Sources of Inter-State Conflict, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers Inc., New Jersey, 1981), p. 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133

Saudi Arabia always wanted to have its own way, in disregard

of both tribal and international law.

Negotiations, 1934-49 Although the British Government believed that under

international law the Blue and Violet Lines were binding on the Saudi Arabia Government, (as the successor to the

Ottoman Government), they agreed to examine ibn Saud's claims to the territory east of the "Blue Line." In 1935 the Saudi Government put forward a claim to a frontier known

as the Red Line or Fuad's line (See Map 2 & 3). As far as Abu Dhabi was concerned, this started on the coast sixteen

miles south of Khur al-Udaid and ran south and southeast to the intersection of longitude 56 E and latitude 22 N (the

point shown to the east of Umm al Zamul on the map). This claim recognized that the Liwa and the land to the north of it belonged to Abu Dhabi and the "Red Line" did not

approach within 100 miles of Al-Buraimi oasis at any point. After discussions, the British Government, acting on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman,

made an offer of a new frontier line which conceded con siderable territory to Saudi Arabia. This line, offered in

November 1935, became known as the Riyadh Line or Ryan's Line. (See Map 2 & 3) It was rejected by the Saudi Govern ment and the discussions continued for a further two years

in the hope of achieving an acceptable compromise.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 Another move by the British Government offered a mod

ification to the "Riyadh Line" in 1937 to take account of

the fact that the Safaq wells had been found to be nearer to the coast, but the discussions came to nothing. The Saudis continued to maintain their claim to the 1935 line and in

particular to Khor al-Udaid.

Negotiations, 1949-55 Discussions began again in 1949. In the course of these the Saudi Arabian Government put forward a claim to a

further area of over two-thirds of Abu Dhabi territory, which was based on alleged tribal allegiance in the areas

concerned. The Saudi Arabian Government did not actually lay claim to the Al-Buraimi oasis at that time, their line

stopped short of it. This claim was rejected by the British Government, but

the discussions continued and culminated in the Dammam Con ference early in 1952, which ended in failure. During this conference Abu Dhabi put forward a claim to its frontier

with Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis rejected it. In August 1952 the Saudis managed, with the use of their money, to gain the loyalty of the Al-Buraimi tribes,

in particular the Al-Bu Shamis. Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad,

the Shaikh of Hamasa village, and his brother Muhammad accompanied Turki Utaishan into their village to represent

the Saudi Government in it. During his stay in the area he

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was able to buy more tribal notes and allegiances with the

Saudi money. By 1954 proposals for an international arbitration tribunal were accepted by all concerned. The Saudi pre

judiced the arbitration by their continued money offering

and by the open bias of the Saudi member of the tribunal Yusuf Yaseen. Consequently, the proceedings collapsed in 1955, following the resignation of the British member, followed by that of the president and one of the neutral

members.

Negotiations. 1955-70 In October 1955 the Trucial Oman Levies occupied the Al-Buraimi oasis, capturing documents which were in the

possession of Abdulla bin Nazi, the second Saudi representa tive during the arbitration. These established beyond all

doubt Saudi subversive activities, and the British Govern

ment unilaterally declared as the recognized Saudi Arabia/Abu Dhabi frontier the modified "Riyadh Line" of

1937. Thereafter the British Government considered that the dispute was at an end and that this line formed the fron

tier. The Saudi Arabian Government, however, considered that the arbitration agreement, including the accompanying

standstill on oil operations in the frontier area, was still in force. In 1960 they asked the Secretary-General of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 United Nations to use his good offices, in particular with the regard to the problem of Al-Buraimi people who had been

exiled and left the oasis at the time of the 1955 war and took refuge in Saudi Arabia. The Secretary-General appointed a special representa

tive, the Swedish Ambassador to Spain, Mr. Herbert de Ribbing, to look into this question. By 1962, a large measure of agreement had been reached

on arrangements for the return of the people of Al-Buraimi, but the Saudi Arabian Government then insisted that this must be accompanied by the establishment of some kind of

neutral authority in the oasis to guarantee the safety of its people before the arrangement could be put into effect. This was not acceptable to the British Government which had

already lost its faith in the sincerity of the Saudi

Government. In August 1964, in a further attempt to promote a

settlement of the dispute, the British Government put for ward a number of proposals including the establishment of a joint oil exploration area along the southern boundary of

Abu Dhabi and the granting of a right of access from the neighboring area of Saudi Arabia to the Abu Dhabi Coast for

oil pipelines and roads. They also proposed, again, the return of the oasis people under guarantees of supervision by the United Nations. But these proposals were rejected by

the Saudi Government without discussion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137

Since that time it has been difficult to make progress

while Saudi Arabia continued to maintain her 1949 claim to the greater part of Abu Dhabi territory and to the whole of the Al-Buraimi oasis.

Negotiations, 1970-75

As the British presence diminished, Saudi Arabia felt increasingly strong. After the British announcement of their withdrawal in 1968, most of the Al-Buraimi people, if

not all, began to return home privately knowing that their leader Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad was no longer there and that the Saudi Government never intended to serve their interests.

In 1974 the UAE Federation was established and Shaikh Zayed, being its President, found himself faced with the task of reaching some sort of settlement. As a result a new

round of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi began from 1970-74, but the negotiations did not end the dispute as might have been thought, although it brought

about the recognition by the Saudi Arabian Government of the United Arab Emirates. This agreement of 1974 has been described by many; among them the following statement by Robert Litwak seems

most relevant and to the point: While the ambiguities clouding the bilateral 1974 agreement leave the Buraimi frontier technically undefined, there is a clear preference on the part of the parties involved— including Oman— to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138

maintain the territorial status quo at the oasis and its environs. Indeed, the factors which brought about peaceful resolution of the dispute in 1974— the mutual desire of conservative monarchical regimes not to destabilize each other needlessly— have, if anything intensified given the disruptive nature of recent political trends within the region (e.g. the sectarian resurgence accompanying the Iranian Revolution). Under the conditions, it is unlikely that even the discovery of new oil finds in the area would lead to a situation which could not be managed throughout recourse to diplomatic negotiations.2°

In brief, the Al-Buraimi dispute began as one of the conflicting interests between the British and Americans over

concessions in ill-defined tribal regions, which triggered acrimony, reversed the truth of the matter, and provided the Saudi Arabian Government with considerable political

domination in the region on the account of Al-Buraimi people and Abu Dhabi independence. Oil has been the basis for

political cohesion in the UAE. On the tribal organization of the area's people it has imposed the concept of terri torial sovereignty associated with the modern state. Prior

to both the discovery of oil and the arrival of the British,

the people of the region were divided into tribal groups.

Leadership of the tribe or group held the connotation of personal, but not territorial, association. Territory only

took on significance in the context of domination of certain

spots of strategic or economic importance, such as anchor

ages, valleys, oases, water holes, and grazing grounds. When the British came they brought the notion of the state

26ibid., p. 55.

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as "the sum of political influence that one of the under standing Shaikhs could master among the tribes." To this

idea of a "Trucial State" which could negotiate treaties or preserve the peace at sea, the discovery of oil attached the concept of territorial sovereignty by requiring establish

ment of title of the land on which oil was drilled.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI

THE TRANSITION OF TRIBAL SOCIETY INTO A MODERN FEDERAL STATE

The littoral countries of the Gulf regions Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were already internationally recognized as independent before World War II. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman also was already independent but maintained no rela

tions with any external power without British knowledge and advice. The rest of the Sheikhdoms in the area; Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven so called Trucial States of Abu Dhabi,

Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Quwain, Ras al Khaimah, and

Al-Fujairah, were basically hereditary autocracies claiming the loyalties of familial and tribal groups rather than specific, easily delimitable, and geographically definable

territories. However, all of these Sheikhdoms had enjoyed the British protection until their independence came about

in the early 1970s. Because of the oil factor Iran and Saudi Arabia were the main recipients of United States support and influence

in the area, and as the dimensions and effects of British

withdrawal had become more apparent, both Iran and Saudi Arabia came to see themselves as the logical heirs to Britain's former position of preeminence. When the British announced their withdrawal in 1968, which become effective in 1971, the Sheikhdoms were not

140

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ready for their independence; "it was apparent that if the Rulers were resisting anything it was the idea of indepen dence itself."! There were too many unsolved border claims between the Sheikhdoms and neighboring countries, as well as

among the Sheikhdoms themselves. "The ruler of Bahrain,

whose Sheikhdom was claimed by Iron until as late as 1970, feared the possible consequences, and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, who was concerned lest British troops be withdrawn prior to a settlement of Saudi Arabian claims to a large portion of Abu Dhabi's territory, offered to meet the costs

of retaining the British military presence. Since 1820 international trade, regional relations,

foreign and defence policies, and lately the oil industry, which had been administered by the British, now had to be administered by the rulers themselves, without British

protection. Therefore, the traditional tribal system and the history of intertribal wars and conflicts had to come to a

halt. One of the most distinctive features of the hist ory of the Trucial Shaikdoms is the frequency with which their rulers have been challenged by ambit ious members of their own families in unmasked struggles for power ... much of this turmoil has been coming to the absence of the law of primo geniture, and of any other fixed procedure for the peaceful succession of rulers. The struggle for power has been almost a natural adjunct to the

^Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 5.

Zibid., p. 5.

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death, natural or otherwise, of a ruler, and successors have had to make sure of wresting complete control of the Sheikhdom from their relatives before beginning to exercise absolute power.3 With this background of tribal leadership and tradi

tional rivalry among the rulers, the new political system of

integration becomes difficult to obtain, especially when the basis of social organization is a tribe. As Sadik and

Snavely stated; The tribal nature of these communities precluded any form of central authority except that of their own tribe; for political authority requires a settled life, and mobility is antithetical to centralized political authority. The love of these tribesmen for freedom and their resentment of any action which would check their movement in search of the needs for survival generated in them a basic hostility to any form of authority other than that of the head of the t ribe.4

Another aspect of the difficulty of integration was tribal movement which became very difficult to subject to

government control. Wars and tribal rivalries were constant

among the Sheikhdoms and their tribes which created long standing animosity and instability in the region. The constantly shifting pattern of tribal loyalties, with each

Shaikh trying to gain advantage over the other, led to further disintegration among them.

^Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), p. 34. ^Muhammad T. Sadik, and William P. Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Aram Emirates: Colonial Past. Present Problems, and Future Prospects. (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1972), p. 120.

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Before the discovery of oil the inhabitants of the Gulf had a simple life based in oases and coastal centers. They

lived largely in extreme poverty, living off maritime and overland trade, fishing, pearling, and whatever the harsh desert life would offer them of money they had little need

and such exchange as they required was done mostly by

barter. But now, with oil wealth on the horizon, the tribal system had to be replaced by a state system. The oil

royalties which poured into the pocket of the rulers,5 now ought to be put to serve the creation of a modern state with

a settled population. The traditional tribal occupations

also, had to be replaced with jobs at new locations around the oil fields, or in other sectors sparked by the oil boom.

Yet the most important of such change in the systems was to enlarge the population concentration in and around the major

towns and cities to support the creation of constitutional

states. The British Government had hoped to influence the

change from tribal societies to state societies long before the time of its 1971 withdrawal from the region. The first attempt by the British toward this change was to encourage

all seven trucial Shaikhdoms to merge into what became known

as the "Trucial States Council 1952-1968." This council was supported by the Trucial Oman Levies to keep order and

Sibid., p. 120.

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security among its members. The objectives of the council included economic development, resolution of common prob lems, and discussion of matters of mutual concern such as driving regulations and the administration of regional facilities.6 This council consisted of the seven Emirates'

rulers, and it was presided over by the British political

agent who was replaced, in March 1966, when Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad al Qasimi, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah was elected as Chairman of the Council.? Then, in October 1968, Shaikh

Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qasimi became the Chairman of the Council when he was chosen, by the British, to replace the former ruler of Sharjah, Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi (1951-1965).8

In 1965 the Trucial States Development Fund was formed,

and received its capital contributions from Britain, Qatar, the Arab League and others to a lesser degree.® When Shaikh

Zayed bin Sultan replaced his brother Shaikh Shakhbut, in August 1966, as ruler of Abu Dhabi, he provided the Develop

ment Fund with 70% of its capital.!® Unlike his brother Shaikh Shakhbut, Shaikh Zayed was more progressive in

^Anthony, The Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 98. ?Sadik and Snavely, p. 187. ^Interview with Shaikh Mohammed bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, Sharjah on January 11, 1985. ®Sadik and Snavely, p. 188.

!®A1-Qasimi, Sharjah, 1985.

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political and social attitudes, and without his cooperative spirit and good will, the poorer Emirates would still not

have the few facilities they enjoy today. A spirit of close cooperation flourished among the members of the Council which caused a change in the leader

ship among some of the rulers in the Trucial Shaikhdoms,

including Oman. The Ruler of Sharjah Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, towards the end of the 1960s, was not willing to co-operate

with the British and he was influenced by the ideas of pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism. His contact with Gamal

Abdul Nasser and the Arab League provided encouragement and

guidance to his nationalism and what so called "Nasserism".ü The British were opposed to his moves and he was removed from power after he was accused, by the British

Political Resident in the Gulf, of "conspiring to promote

disturbances along the Trucial C o a s t . "!2 since at all levels

of the tribal politics, the family is important to the social and political structure, the British kept the line of

authority within the same distinguished families of the

rulers. Therefore, they replaced Saqr with his cousin Khalid, (both were from the al-Qawasim ruling family). The

British followed the same method when they deposed Shaikh

ÜAl-Qasimi, Sharjah, 1985. l^Kelly, J. B., Arabia, The Gulf and the West, p. 96.

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Shakhbut and put in his place ruling the Emirate of Abu Dhabi his brother Shaikh Zayed. A third replacement took place in neighboring Oman,

just before the British withdrawal from the area. With the approval and help of the British, Qabus the present Sultan of Oman made his move against his father. Said bin Taimur Al Bu Said, on 23 July, 1970, and took over the throne sending

his father into exile where he lived the remainder of his life. He died in the Dorchester Hotel, London, in October

1972. As pan-Arabism and anti-colonialism in the early 1970s

began to influence the Arab world so the Gulf region had its

share of such influence. In June 1970 signs of revolution ary activities akin to that in Dhofar (where the popular front for liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf, PFLOG) surfaced in central Oman.!^ The collapse of the traditional

ruling family in neighboring Yemen put the British on alert. Consequently they replaced Sultan Said by his stronger, military educated son, Qabus, in order to control the spread

of the revolutionary attitudes in Oman. The British were in

a hurry to leave the region, but not before they established some sort of true internal stability to preserve the future

relations between its Government and the rulers of the

region.

13Ibid., p. 141.

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J.B. Kelly described the situation which led to Qabus

rule as follows: He [Said bin Taimur] would have to go, and go quickly, especially if his deposition was to be accomplished, and his successor given time to consolidate his rule, by the close of 1971, which so far as the Foreign Office [of the British Government] was concerned, was the date fixed for Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf. ..., the coup when it came was in large measure made possible by the participation in it of the British military Commander in S a l a l a h . ! *

Since that time the Sultan has been Qabus who graduated from

the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and served for a year afterwards with the Camerorians, as part of his

training.!5 It was understood that traditional authority patterns in the tribal social form had to be preserved, even when the

changes of modernization began to influence the tribal social structure. As a result of this understanding the

British, in all three changes of rulers, observed this

point. Another attempt towards integration came about in February 1968 when Abu Dhabi and Dubai concluded an agree ment on establishing Al-Ittihad Al-Thuna'i (The Federation

of Two). This Federation of Abu Dhabi and Dubai was designed to create a federal government in the area of

defense, foreign affairs, internal security, health.

14ibid., p. 142. ISlbid.

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education, immigration and judicial affairs. But at the same time the two rulers would look after their own internal affairs.!G This Federation of Two left the door open for the

rest of the Gulf Shaikhdoms to join. It eventually turned out to be nothing more than a paper Federation and proved

abortive. However, it provided impetus for new direction and further attempt at new schemes of regional cooperation. In response to the invitations of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, in 1968, to consider the future of the Gulf Shaikhdoms after

Britain's withdrawal from the region, a total of nine Shaikhdoms were represented at the rulers' conference in Dubai, including the seven trucial Shaikhdoms, Bahrain and

Qatar. "Al-Ittihad al-Tusa'e"!® (The Federation of Nine)

run into some major obstacles from the start; area, size, population, geographical location, dynastic, tribal affin ities, and boundary disputes. However the rulers of the

nine Shaikhdoms tried to resolve their differences and over come the obstacles through a series of conferences which took place between 1968 to 1971. But their efforts to reach

a conclusion agreeable to all of them failed. The nine

rulers, throughout their meetings, felt that each one's Emirate claimed to be the first among equals.!® The three

year (1968-1971) period of negotiation was centered to reach

an agreement on the following;

!®Saif A. Ramahi El-Wady, Economic and Political Evaluation in the Arabia Gulf States. (New York: Carlton Press Inc., 1975), p. 165.

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1) The location of the Federal Capital. 2) The formation of the Council of Ministers 3) The creation of a federal defense system

4) The establishment of a federal consultative Assembly 5) The means to select or elect the rulers to fill the presidency and the Vice Presidency of the Federation

6) The drawing up of a defense budget.!? Furthermore, the traditional mutual enmity, because of territorial disputes between Bahrain and Qatar began to surface during those meetings and caused the failure of their participating in any meaningful collective effort.

Saudi Arabia watched with interest the evolution of the political system in the region and realized that a Federa tion of the nine Shaikhdoms would reduce its influence over

Bahrain and Qatar, therefore, the less members the Federa tion had, the greater the influence the Saudi Government

could exert in the region. Besides, Saudi Arabia wanted to

solve its dispute over Al-Buraimi with Abu Dhabi prior to the establishment of any Federation.!® On the other side of the Gulf, the Shah of Iran held

back his support for the Bahrain entry into such union. Iran had had its claim to Bahrain outstanding for long a

!?Enver M. Koury, The United Arab Emirates; Its Political System and Politics, (The Institute of Middle East and North African Affairs, Inc., Hyattsville, Maryland, 1980, p. 53.

!®Anthony, The Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp. 31-32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 time. Also, having Bahrain as an independent state with 50%

of its population Shi'ite muslims, Iran would still be able

to influence its behavior in Gulf politics. Finally, when

Iran's claim to Bahrain was dropped as a result of the United Nations settlement in May 1971, Bahrain, whose social

structure, system of administration and services were far more advanced than those of its proposed partners, lost all interest in the proposed Federation and opted, as was only

natural, for complete independence.!* Bahrain signed a new treaty of friendship with Britain and was admitted to the United Nations and the Arab League.

Qatar soon followed suit. With this, the attempt to form a

federation of the nine Shaikhdoms failed.

A. The United Arab Emirates The traditions political structure of ruling in the

Gulf Shaikhdoms remained largely intact. The determination

of Britain to pull its military forces out of the Gulf

Shaikhdoms (one of its military bases was in Sharjah), made the seven rulers, Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan ( Abu Dhabi), Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum (Dubai), Shaikh Khalid bin

Muhammed al Qasimi (Sharjah), Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid al-Nu'aimi (Ajman), Shaikh Ahmad bin Rashid al-Mualla (Umm

al-Quwain), Shaikh Saqr bin Muhamed al-Qasimi (Ras al-Khaimah), and Shaikh Muhammed bin Hamad al-Sharqi

!*Zahlan, p. 1955.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 (Fujairah) concerned themselves with the discovery of oil reserves and its administrative apparatus, the rulers of the oil rich emirates realized that they needed a governmental apparatus to deal with the new wealth and its influx,

modernization, which the oil revenues made possible, and for

the first time, since British protection was no longer available to them, they had to think of their future security. To this end the rulers met to discuss their mutual

problems headed by a priority to provide for their security needs. However their interests varied from one to another, time and circumstances, plus geography and socio-economic and political forces made the idea of a United Arab Emirates Federation inevitable.

The Union, at last, was formed on 2 December 1971, and

four days later it joined the Arab League. In the following year it joined the United Nations and all its affiliated bodies. The Emirate of Ras al Khaimah, influenced by Saudi Arabia, stayed out of the Federation until February 1972.2®

Abu Dhabi’s Shaikh Zayed was elected by the other Emirates’ Rulers as the Federation President, and Dubai's Shailch Rashid bin Said al-Maktum as Vice President, and in

1979 he also became the prime Minister replacing his son Maktum who was appointed as Deputy prime Minister. The

Federation's political structure of Government was based

2®A1-Qassimi, interview.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 theoretically on the western concept of dividing the power

into separate executive, legislative and judicial branches.2! This Federation under the provisional constitu

tion is headed by the Supreme Council which is composed of

the seven Rulers and the presidency. Each one of them is

given one vote in recognition of the equality of his Emirate. Yet Abu Dhabi and Dubai have a "Veto" power in the Council. But a proposal "submitted by either Abu Dhabi or Dubai can be defeated by a coalition of three Emirates."22

The voting power is based on wealth, population and terri

tory among the Emirates of the Federation. The Supreme Council appoints the Council of Ministers and the Federal National Council. However, the power of decision making on

the important issues is in the hands of the members of the Supreme Council but in practice the power accorded to Abu Dhabi and Dubai respectively has been considerable. As John

Duke Anthony commented; Between them they [Zayed and Rashid] also control either directly or indirectly most of the presti gious positions in UAA [UAE] officialdom. Shaikh Zayed, for example, in addition to being President of the Union, is commander in chief of the Union Defense Force.23

At the same time. Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed, the Crown Prince

2lAnthony, The Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 99. 22Roury, p. 84.

23&nthony, The Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 105.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 of Abu Dhabi, is the Deputy commander in Chief of the Union

Defense Force. To balance Abu Dhabi's position within the Union political structure. Shaikh Rashid of Dubai has been main

taining the Vice Presidency and the Prime Ministership, in

addition his three sons hold key position in the federal government. Maktum, the Crown prince of Dubai, is the Deputy Prime Minister, Hamdan is the Minister of Finance and

Industry, and Mohamed is the Minister of the Federal De fense. These two Emirates have been accumulating political power and official authority since the establishment of the

Federation. This domination of the majority of the Emirates by the

minority caused a series of strains within the Federation. Such as the problem of the federal budget, unifying the

armed forces, refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal Court, and violation of naturalization and

immigrations laws. Despite these signs of splits between the two groups

the Federation is surviving. This survival is mainly due to

the external threat which each Emirate cannot face on its own and to the internal financial inability of the majority

of the Emirates their own to carry on programmes. Both external and internal forces combined to stabilize the

status quo preserve the Federation.

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The lack of coordination among the Emirates' local

authorities has been a major problem facing the Federation. An effective coordination of Federal Government, Emirate Government, and even municipality development plans, has yet to be introduced at a national level with regular coordina tion on a Federal wide basis to aid the Federal decision

making process. But the combination of the Emirate differ ent plans for their own development, their disregard for the proper distribution of projects among all Emirates, and the

varying needs of each Emirate, put a great strain on the

Federal Budget which has been facing a fewer revenues in a

less lucrative oil market. During its fifteen year existence the United Arab

Emirates is still influenced by the old traditional family

and tribal bonding, as Anthony describes; Given the background of family and tribal bonding characteristics of the area as a whole, it is not surprising that little sense of a federal culture or common national identity exists yet among the Rulers. Collectively plagued by a legacy of rivalries, few of the Rulers have had good relations with their neighbors in the past. Characteristically, owing to their conflicting territorial claims, they have had poor relations with their immediate neighbors and good relations with the Ruler just beyond.24

The federal Supreme Council has not so far resolved the

manifold dispute over borders within the Federation. The tribal loyalties as a determining fact of authority over their lands caused the fragmentation of the Federation's

24ibid., p. 109.

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territorial disputes, (Abu Dhabi vs Dubai, Fujairah vs Sharjah, Dubai vs Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain vs Sharjah) to

strengthen the ties of national integration, which was hard to achieve as long as tribalism continued to be the identity over the nation state. (See Map 7) Yet this weakness of the

Federation could be eliminated simply by having a clear provision which draws a line between the powers and functions of the Supreme Council and those of the Emirates. Secondly, the timely contribution of each Emirate's dues to

the Federal budget will enable the Federal Government to carry out its duties and the successful conduct of

inter-nation relationships.

In the United Arab Emirates, despite its dynastic, territorial and the rulers' personal rivalries disputes occur within a relatively homogeneous political and ideo logical milieu, therefore, the Rulers' mutual concern for

their survival has been manifested chiefly in common efforts to maintain the present political framework.25

In an interview with an offical of the Federal Govern

ment, he stated that as long as the Emirates continue to

contribute to the Federal budget the Federation would con tinue its solidarity and progress. Each Emirate is com mitted to contribute 50 percent of its revenue to the

25Anthony, p. 228.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Map 7. The Internal Land Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates.

SOURCE; Muhammad Morsy Abdullah. The United Arab Emirates; A Modern History. New York; Harper and Row Publishers, 1968, Map 8, p. 340.

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ôTKAlfOP HORHIK

L R M M T U H I^ U 6RSATERTUN»

IWEGULF GULF OMAN RÂ6 AL.KHAIMAH

UMHAL jOM\mMN HAMIRVYAH A J M ^ N HTrah HOR PAKMKI ouajk3 RJJAIRAH KALSA DUgA m

SULTANAT ABO DHABI ^ OMAN UNITED ARAB EMIRATE6 '?MILB5 O IS k c o m k t k m

KEY TD ENCLAVES A AJMAN D DUBAI 6 SHARJAH AD AIMA n .OMAN SO 5HARJAH.0MAN

Map 7. The Internal Land Boundaries of the United Arab Emirates.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158

Federal budget.2® He recognized, also, that the budget of

1986 would be more than 30 percent lower then the year

before. The Federal budget for the fiscal year 1986 has yet to be approved, therefore, at the present time the govern

ment is operating on the bases of the 1985 budget.

On Sunday, October 12, 1986 the Supreme Council was

attended by all the Rulers except Shaikh Rashid of Dubai, due to his illness. Neither did his son the Crown Prince,

Shaikh Maktum attend. However, his other two sons. Shaikh Hamdan bin Rashid, the Minister of Finance and Industry and Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid, the Minister of Defense did

attend. The Gulf News (English language newspaper) reported

that the Agenda of the Supreme Council meeting included a

memorandum on the financial situation of the country, a

review of the country's foreign policy and the development of the Federation and progress of national projects.2? The

Supreme Council met for four hours and a half and then they

adjourned until Wednesday, October 15, 1986. On this date the Supreme Council meeting resulted in the following

decisions : 1. Unanimously endorsed a further five year term of

2®interview with H.E. Said Al-Ghaith, Minister of State for Ministers Council Affairs, Abu Dhabi, October 15, 1986.

2?Gulf News, Dubai, October 13, 1986.

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office for H.H. Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan as

President.

2. Endorsed K.H. Shaikh Rashid bin Saeed al-Maktum as Vice President and Prime Minister. 3. Extended the provisional constitution under which the Federation was established in 1971.

Though the Supreme Council did not announce any deci sion related to many of the federal problems it pledged that "the Council would exert its utmost to realize the people's aspirations and bring about further progress and pros perity. 2® It seems that the push-pull process of advancing

federal unity, while enabling each Emirate to evolve on its own, has at times produced some strains, but the commitment

of all the Emirates to the federal concept has never been in

doubt. After 15 years of Federation, the longest in the Arab World, one should regard the U.A.E. as a successful union.

In the modern history of the Middle East many regional inte grations have been attempted before but without success. The

problems of tribalism, wars, sudden wealth and rapid socie tal changes in the region of the Gulf and in particular in the U.A.E. helped to test the integration process and it

proved to be solid and growing stronger.

Unity among the Sheikhdoms of the Arabian Gulf was fostered during British domination by the formation of the

2®lbid.

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Trucial States Council in 1952. Although it had no powers

to enforce common action, as each shaikh was expected to carry out his own policies, it did provide a forum for discussion of common problems. It also was the basis for efforts to form a federation of the gulf’s nine sheikhdoms,

including Qatar and Bahrain. Negotiations for a united state were later hastened by the impending departure of the British from the area, which was announced in 1968, and the

necessity of ensuring the future stability, security and prosperity of the area against outside domination. Impetus for federation was provided by the economic disparity among the sheikhdoms, and the fact that none of

the seven, which now make up the UAE, had an adequate

resource base to survive independently of the others. Although three of the emirates, Abu habi, Dubai and Sharjah

have oil reserves, only Abu Dhabi has sufficient natural wealth and territory to exist as a separate political

entity. Despite its relatively favored status, even Abu

Dhabi lacked the diversity of resources necessary to meet

its own needs adequately. Therefore, the ’’have-not" Emirates depended on the financial assistance of the "haves" to achieve prosperity. The "haves," in turn, revealed their willingness to assume the common financial burdens of state

hood. This mutual dependence is enshrined in Article 23 of the provisional constitution which stipulates that "the natural wealth and resources in every emirate shall be

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considered as belonging to that emirate. Society shall regulate the protection and beneficial exploration of such resources for the good of the national economy." Politi cally, it signalled the willingness of the rulers of the

various Shaikhdoms to look beyond their own parochial interests and to establish the foundations of a national

identity. Traditionally the government has taken a tactical rather than a strategic approach to decision-making, retaining many of she characteristics associated with tribal

society. Above all, this is attributable to its recent emergence as an independent state beset by complex problems for which there has been no previous experience to draw on. Problems have had to be deals wish as they have arisen, resulting in a relatively informal, personal, reactive, and

ad hoc, but nonetheless authoritative approach. Federal authority has been enhanced by the tremendous energy and vision of Shaikh Zayed, who has put his weight behind decisions to unify educational and health systems at

the Federal level. The rapid expansion of the economic and social infrastructure has also contributed greatly to devel

oping a sense of community of one nation.

B. The Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council In response to the invitation of His Highness the

President of the United Arab Emirates, a meeting was con-

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vened in Abu Dhabi, the capital of UAE, between 25-26 May 1981 which was attended by the following: H.H. Shaikh ZaYed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the President of UAE, H.H. Shaikh Issa

bin Salman Al Khalifa, the Ruler of Bahrain, H.M. King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, H.M. Sultan Qabus bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, H.H. Shaikh

Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, the Ruler of Qater, H.H. Shaikh

Jaber al Ahmed al-Sabah, the Ruler of the state of Kuwait. This conference established "the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf" more commonly known as the

"GCC". The six heads of states agreed to:

Set up a Council to unite their states to be called the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and have proceeded in signing the charter^? of the Council which aims at developing cooperation between these states and expanding their relations; to effect coordination, the integrations between their people in various fields; to establish joint projects and to for mulate comparable regulations in all economic, educational media, social and legal fields in order to serve their interests and strengthen their power to adhere to their beliefs and values.3® The broader obligation of the GCC is therefore to apply a transnational cooperation in all fields tailored to fit this

emerging political union. As a regional grouping of states, the GCC serves a community with an historically common cultural and economic

2*See Appendix N. 2®"Final declaration of the regular session of the Supreme Council" of the GCC, issues in Abu Dhabi, May 26, 1981.

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background; and at the same time seeks to achieve a commu nity of interests among its members, to promote interstate harmony, regional security and socio-economic cooperation.

But to each of the member states, the notion of the nation state, its sovereignty, its persistent reliance on its laws

and regulations and on its individual political and legal system, remains a living reality.

The establishment of the GCC was viewed by some observers as necessary for the Gulf states' own security, especially at that time, of a world energy crisis; the

Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, the escalating risks of the Arab Israeli conflict and, most importantly, the Iragi-Iran war. All

contributed to the impetus of the GCC. The idea of Gulf collectivity had been presented by the larger states in the area. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia,

ever since the announcement of the British withdrawal, had been interested in advancing their hegemony in the Gulf region, but there was no enthusiasm among the smaller states which privately deplored the advance of Iranian and Iraqi

hegemony in the Gulf.®! However, in the economic area the Gulf States, including Iraq, formed the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy in November 1976, which was

®!stork, Joe, "Prospect for the Gulf."(MERIP REPORTS; The Future of the Gulf), Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc., No. 312, Vol. 15, No. 4 (May 1985), p. 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 geared towards establishing a Gulf common market.3% Others saw it as a force separating the "rich states" from the

"poor states" of the Arab world and at the same time parallelling the Arab League. However, many have agreed that its establishment followed the pattern of post-World

War II regionalism in the world community of states, which was exemplified by the formation of the European Economic Community, the Organization of African Unity, and other multinational associations and alliances.

The history of the Middle East and the Arab World has been full of failures of alliance and regional unity

efforts, the United Arab Republic, the Baghdad Pact, and the

multiple unity schemes involving Libya, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan which all ended in failure. Thus, the GCC constitutes a brand new attempt at regional cooperation against the weight of historical experience.

But events changed the situation in the Middle East

causing the Gulf States to cooperate and form a closer association with a view towards unifying policy on internal

and external issues. A change in world politics, beginning with British policy in the late 1960s, led to the Federation of UAE and by late 1970s, a drop in the price of oil, the Afghanistan

war, a weakening of the Arab League and Arab disunity in general, and perhaps most significant of all, the

32%bid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 implication of the Iranian revolution followed by the Iran- Iraq war, contributed to the establishment of the GCF.

Additionally, one observed that all the member states of the GCC shared traditional family regimes, based on tribal affiliations, all of them except Saudi Arabia had been under

British colonial domain, and had no history of sustained

decolonization s t r u g g l e s . 33 Therefore, the establishment of

the GCC was in response to the historical, social, cultural, economic, political, and strategic conditions that the Gulf region had been experienced.

Since its inception, the GCC has held seven summit meetings. The first was between May 25-27, 1981, hosted by

the UAE in which the integration of the six states was agreed upon and announced.

The second was held in Saudi Arabia on November 10-11, 1981. It reviewed the political, economic and security

situations in the Gulf area. The GCC announced its rejec

tion of any attempt by any foreign power of aggrandizement in the Gulf region which could harm its security and

sovereignty. At the same meeting the summit approved a joint economic agreement of the GCC.

The third summit was held in Bahrain, on November 9-11, 1982. The main point endorsed by the GCC was to build-a- GCC

force and reinforce military coordination among its members.

33ibid.

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The fourth summit of the GCC was held in Qatar, on 7-9 November, 1983. This time the summit, deeply concerned over the inter-Palestinian fighting which was raging in Lebanon,

decided to send the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait and Qatar to Damascus in an attempt to settle the conflict. On the

Iraq-Iran war, the GCC renewed its readiness to resume efforts, already undertaken by the UAE and Kuwait on behalf

of the GCC, to find a peaceful settlement of the war. The move reflected the GCC's full support for the U.N. Security Council's resolution on October 31, 1983, which called for an end to hostilities between the two belligerents and an

immediate halt of attacks on civilian targets. The fifth summit was held in Kuwait on November 27-29,

1984. In this summit the leaders reviewed the causes of the

disintegration in the Arab world and announced their support of the Palestinian struggle. They also reviewed ways and means to build a stronger GCC force to protect their independence. It also focused on the economic achievements

within the past four years. The sixth summit was hosted by Oman on November, 3-6, 1985. By now, the summits of the GCC had been held in all

members states' capitals. This meeting dedicated its effort to renewing its willingness to resume communication between

Iraq and Iran in an effort to stop the war. At the same time the leaders reviewed their countries' and the GCC

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forces* ability to face any external threat and their readiness to defend the GCC members.34

By now, the GCC was six years old and its summits had been held in every member state. Therefore, the seventh summit of the GCC was held in the capital of the United Arab

Emirates, Abu Dhabi, for the second time since its establishment in 1981.

As usual, this summit received considerable publicity, but the result; was no different than the previous ones.

The meetings of the Heads of the member states was held on

2 - 5 November of this year, 1986. After four days of meet

ings, the final communique affirmed the following points: 1. Its commitment to UN Security Council resolutions 582 and 588, which call for an immediate cease fire, withdrawal of troops to the international border, and seeking to solve the conflict between the two (Iraq and Iran) states

by peaceful means. 2. Its adherence to Security Council resolutions number 540 in 1983, and 552 in 1984, which reflected the position of

the international community on the freedom of navigation in international waterways, and the freedom of commercial

navigation to and from ports in the GCC states. This summit also ratified the Unified Economic Agree-

34&i-Khaleei, No. 2751, November 2, 1986, p. 40 (special edition). (Arabic Newspaper, published in the Emirate of Sharjah).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 mentis which helps to achieve complete economic integration

among the GCC members. All GCC citizens would be entitled

to the same facilities and privileges and also be subject to

the same obligations in the other member states as granted to their own nationals. This is the basic policy which is to be implemented gradually. It approved the GCC Informa

tion Charter and unified law governing the flow of foreign information into member states. It said that the flow of alien information should be in such a way as it does not affect Islamic traditions and heritage of this region and

its people. The communique briefly mentioned that the GCC Supreme Council had studied the development in cooperation and coordination among members in the political, security, military, economic and social fields since their sixth

summit in Muscat in November, 1985. The Supreme Council

praised the military cooperation among member states and what had been achieved by the "Peninsula Shield Forces" as a

symbol of common determination towards collective defense, but it also affirmed the importance of self-reliance of the

member states. On the Arab World situation, the summit stressed the

importance of eliminating differences among Arab States and overcoming disunity. It reviewed Palestinian developments and reaffirmed its support for the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and

35see Appendix 0.

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determination and an independent homeland. The CGG leaders affirmed their continued support of the "legitimate quarters" to preserve the unity of the country. They

appealed to all the feuding parties in Lebanon to end the bloodshed and to reach a political accord that would restore

the unity of Lebanon. So far, throughout all the seven summit meetings of the

GCC, the economic and security issues have been the main concern of the member states. Yet, they never passed any effective resolutions and it seems that these summit meet

ings have been nothing more than ceremonial events that show the prosperity of member states to one another. The follow ing vocabulary has been used in all of the GCC meeting

communiques: Regrets, Affirmed, Reaffirmed, Reject, Studied, Express, Reviewed and Praise. This diplomatic language is

nothing more than ceremonial cliche. But the real facts of the problems existing among the

GCC members have not been discussed, especially the recent dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over the Fasht Ad Dibal

coral reef. On 17 of April 1986, GULF NEWS reported the following:

Four unidentified helicopters attacked a reef between Bahrain and Qatar yesterday where the Dutch company Ballast Nedam is building a coast guard station for Bahrain, informed sources said. Qatar declared the area around the Fasht Ad Dibal reef a restricted zone an hour after the attack.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 which the sources said was at noon.

One source said he understood a dredger with a crew of 35 had been attacked. Another said he believed no dredger was in the area at the time but that a tug under contract to Ballast Nedam was attacked. A spokesman for Ballast Nedam told Reuters no dredger had been hit, but he declined to comment further, referring queries to the Bahrain Defence Force.

There was no immediate comment from either the BDF or Bahrain government officials. None of the sources had any information on the identity of the attacking helicopters. The Qatari warning, carried by Radio Qatar, instructed all vessels to stay away from the reef, some 18 kilometers west of its northern tip and 23 kilometers east of Bahrain's Muharraq island.

This conflict between Bahrain and Qatar came as a surprise to the rest of the GCC members. Without wasting

time, Sultan Qabus of Oman, who was chairman of the GCC at that time, sent messages to the rulers of both states as

part of the ongoing efforts by the GCC to resolve the owner ship of Fasht Ad Dibal coral reef. The U.A.E., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also, have participated in trying to settle the

conflict, but diplomatic moves apparently made little pro

gress in reconciling the two sides.

Many political observers thought that the conflict would be on this summit agenda, but to their disappointment

it was not, and not only that but the two leaders of Bahrain

and Qater were not seen talking to one other. There are no close ties between the two families of the two countries.

Instead, there has been protracted animosity between the two

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 dynasties over historical territorial claims.

This incident, clearly showed the fragile structure of

the GCC and its weakness, and even its inability to solve its own problems. These territorial disputes (not only

between Bahrain and Qater, but also, U.A.E.-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, Qatar-Saudi Arabia and Bahrain-Saudi

Arabia, U.A.E.-Qatar, Oman-Saudi Arabia and Oman-U.A.E.)

constitute a major challenge to the GCC.

Though the GCC has a commission for settlement of disputes, the rulers of the member states prefer to use

bilateral negotiation and mediation to resolve their differ

ences. As long as the member states are unable to settle their traditional conflicts the GCC will remain an apparatus for passing resolutions without implementation. It seems, therefore,that the only force holding the GCC members to

gether as a regional political entity is Iran, a powerful and potentially disruptive force, and the Gulf states are extremely worried about the Iranian revolutionary threat.

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CONCLUSION

The geographical location of the Arabian Gulf and its

coastal Shaikhdoms has made this area a target of European

interests. Some of the international rivalry over the region included Portugal, Poland, Britain, and France. Britain was able to maintain her grip over the region by

using her exclusive treaties with the Shaikhs of the larger tribes in the area to colonize the Shaikhdoms and isolate them from the rest of the world, until her withdrawal in 1971.

The importance of the region became more visible when oil was first discovered in the area. This oil discovery

contributed to serious frontier disputes between Abu Dhabi,

Oman, and Saudi Arabia; and the growing expectation of more oil in adjacent areas exacerbated the problem. The oil

exploration in the region prompted major American and British companies to make commercial arrangements with the concerned rulers and with some of the tribes in the Gulf

area. But the growing demand for Gulf oil created an

Anglo-American race to obtain more and larger oil conces sions in the area. At this time the British imposed their "exclusive treaties" on the Trucial Shaikhdoms to isolate

172

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them from any foreign intervention which might conflict with their own interest in the area. Although the tribal appara tus was not influenced by any British presence in the area, the tribes' foreign contacts were conducted by the British

until the Shaikhdoms' independence in 1971. The oil concession granted by the Saudi Arabian

Government to the California Oil Company and the search for

oil by this company in unmapped territory opened questions concerning the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. Since the Saudis presented no information on territorial

border lines to the American oil companies, the U.S. State Department requested this information from the British Government on behalf of these American companies. The

answer to the border situation in the region was the Anglo- Turkish Convention of 1913 and 1914. But the dissatisfac

tion of ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia with the Anglo-Turkish conventions led Saudi Arabia, in 1935, to set up its own border line, which became known as the "Red Line." Thus the

first complications in defining boundaries were created.

The increasing oil exploration and growing claims of Saudi Arabia were the principal factors behind the Al-Buraimi

dispute. In my investigation of this general background I found

that the following factors began to turn the Al-Buraimi dispute into a lasting political issue in the region;

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a) The initiation and efforts of ARAMCO's Research Depart ment to collect historical material in order to link the authority of the Saudis or their influence to the Al-Buraimi

Oasis and other disputed areas; b) The money spent by Saudi Arabia's Government to buy the

alliance of some of the tribes in the disputed areas,

including Al-Buraimi; and c) The protection ultimately granted by the Saudis to Rashid bin Hamad Al-Shamsi after he had refused to cooperate with the British oil companies in his area, which advanced the

Saudi's claim in the area. Yet the Saudi Government based its claim to the

Al-Buraimi Oasis on the following contentions: (a) The nineteenth century historical background, which

showed the Saudi's unbroken control over the area of the

Al-Buraimi Oasis, and its tribes inhabiting these areas, except for brief intervals; (b) The presence of Saudi tribes

in the disputed area; (c) the Saudi collection of taxes in the area and (d) the preservation of public security by the

Saudis.^ In rebutting these contentions, I was able to point to

historical records which show that Saudi tribal control by forces of arms, using the Al-Buraimi Oasis as a center point for invasion in the area, existed for relatively short

periods between 1800 and 1869. Since then the Saudis have

Is.A. Memorial, pp. 485-502.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 had no foothold in Al-Buraimi until 1952-55, when the tribe of Al-Bu Shamis supported their representation in Hamasa Village.2 Researching the notion that Saudi tribes were present in the disputed area, I found that the tribal

organization and way of life were based on settled tribes

who live in farming villages and or fixed settlements (in Arabic, known as dirah). while other types of tribes preferred to remain "nomads" searching for fall rains & grazing place. None of the Saudi tribes have been proven to be settled in any of the disputed areas, or there would be

no debate over their legal right to live in their area, as it is the case within the internal boundaries of the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the authority of the Saudi

Government might retain valid over their nomadic tribes who lived in search for water and grazing places for their camels and who occasionally resorted to raiding the local

tribes in the ar e a . 3 And since the political attachment in

the nomadic, tribal way of life follows the rule of the tribe, and not that of the territory which the tribe survey for a living, the Saudis have no right to claim territorial gain, especially now that their nomadic tribes have become oil workers, living in the Eastern Province of Saudi

Arabia.4 The taxes and preservation of public security seem

^Rashid S. Al-Shamsi, interview.

3lbid.

4ARAMCO Handbook, p. 220-221.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 to be an ARAMCO Research Department concept of evidence to support the Saudi claim. It is, without a doubt, a concept belonging to the Western political system which did not

exist in Eastern Arabia at that time. All through its history the Al-Buraimi Oasis had held the key to the surrounding areas and attracted many invaders of Eastern

Arabia, including the Saudis. The Saudi tribes, conse

quently, have always been invaders and aggressors, rather than protectors. However, their claim to taxes was nothing more than payment collected by force to cover the cost of

and to serve as a prize of their i n v a s i o n . 5

^he Al-Buraimi dispute became recognized internation ally as a result of the 1954 special arbitration tribunal

between Saudi Arabia and Britain, with the latter formally acting on behalf of Abu Dhabi and Oman. The breakdown of the arbitration in 1955, as a result of bad faith between the two parties, led to the Trucial Oman Levies occupying

the Al-Buraimi Oasis and removing the Saudi's presence from the Oasis.

Not only did the Arab League condemn the British occu pation of Al-Buraimi, the Russians rushed to offer Saudi

Arabia "material and moral help" on the issue, which Saudi

Arabia welcomed.® A few months later, in Washington, it was

®Shaikah Maza Al-Shamsi.

®The Times, Wednesday, 16 November, 1955, p. 10, col. 7.

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reported that both the British and United States Governments

desired a peaceful settlement of the issue.? During his visit of January 1956, Sir Anthony Eden expressed his con

cern to President Eisenhower in order to persuade ARAMCO to

refrain from action that "may weaken British claims to the potential oil deposits of the Persian Gulf."® The legality of Al-Buraimi was not of primary concern to both governments as long as their oil companies would share the benefit of the region's oil concessions. "Thus the recent history of

Buraimi, together with its economic and strategic factors gives the area international importance in modern times.

The oil discovery, without a doubt, caused the tradi tional tribal loyalties to be shifted from one ruler to another, influenced by oil money rather than the historical

inter-tribal association. Therefore, the increasing discov ery of oil in the region began to affect the local tribes and inhabitants who transferred their tribal solidarities and intensified the traditional divisions among themselves. The disintegration of the tribal societies led to a new

integration under a Western model of bureaucracy. As such,

the tribes became disoriented, and they are still trying to adjust to the new concepts of social and economic reality

which accompanying the creation of the state. They still

?Ibid, Monday, 23 January 1956, p. 6, col. 5,

®Ibid., 31 January 1956, p. 8, col. 5. ®Ibid., Abdullah, Morsey Mohammad, p. 160.

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attempt to view the ascent of oil as only an economic boon, rather than as a social reconstruction. As the process of detribalization continues, the attraction of a new life

style and status have gained momentum in the region as a result of the increasing capacity of the nation's economy to

expand. Yet there is still considerable difficulty in trying to reach a consensus in terms of how the new nation

state should integrate its national development. Though the British withdrawal from the region led to the independence of the Trucial Shaikhdoms and the formation

of the United Arab Emirates as a modern nation-state,

Britain left behind unsolved and troublesome border problems. The development of oil in the Shaikhdoms made the task of settling disputes much more complex. Border disputes still exist within the neighboring Emirates as well as external disputes between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.

Consequently, when the Federation of United Arab Emirates was formed, its president Shaikh Zayed had to face Saudi Arabia's renewed claim relative to Al-Buraimi. This continuing dispute kept the Saudis from extending their

recognition to the new Federation until 1974. However, according to the unannounced comments of some officials related to Al-Buraimi, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi is still alive and no final agreement has been

reached.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179 The research indicates that, despite the change in the political structure of the region, authority and political

relationships are still rooted in the ties of tribe, kin ships, and blood. Consequently, international law has never been given an opportunity to replace the tribal bilateral

negotiation among rulers used in solving their border disputes.

While the new political changes have had a stimulating effect on the social and economic development of the region,

currently the major force for change in the area seems to be

the need to develop stability and security. As a conse quence, the Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council has become the

new regional club for the U.A.E., Bahrain, Oman, Saudi

Arabia, Qatar and Kuwaite. With Iran and Iraq at war, Saudi Arabia remains strong enough to play a larger role in the region and to assume its

hegemony over the rest of the Gulf state through the AGCC. Physical, cultural, environmental factors, and similarities

in the nature of their tribal political system served as the basis for the establishment of the AGCC. However, after six

years of its existence it has became obvious that the AGCC

had been established primarily for the purpose of providing collective security for its members against external threat rather than providing a better cooperation among its

members. The above lends credence to the view that self- serving practical considerations are more potent factors

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than the more abstract goals of political Federation. Knowing that the AGCC has a commission for settlement

of disputes, one has to wonder why it has not yet been put to work on the border disputes among the members. One of the most celebrated disputes of 1986 among the members is

the recent one between Bahrain and Qatar over the Fasht Ad Dibal coral reef. This outstanding dispute between the two governments led to an armed conflict, just as had the Al-Buraimi dispute. This recent conflict clearly demon

strates that what happened thirty-one years ago is still happening today, in spite of the fact that a westernized

political system of the 1980s is used by the Gulf States as

a framework for their cooperative efforts. In the same manner Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi tried to resolve their dispute on the basis of the conclusions of traditional tribal bilateral agreements— agreements, which for the most

part, are never formally ratified. Thus, it becomes clear that as long as Saudi Arabia mediates between Bahrain and Qatar— ignoring the new regional system and its guidelines

for the settlement of disputes, and continuing to play the role of the Big Brother in the GCC affairs— the prospects

are not hopeful for an early resolution of the historical disputes among the two feuding traditional dynasties.

It is reported that when Shaikh Issa Al-Khalifa was

traveling to the Seventh AGCC meeting, his plane was not permitted by Qatar's authority to fly over Qatar's space on

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the way to Abu Dhabi. During the meetings of the AGCC both rulers, Shaikh Khalifa or Qatar and Shaik Issa of Bahrain,

who had never before met privately, failed to greet one another. These rebuffs further demonstrate that the Saudi's methods of mediation are not successful and furthermore,

that the confrontation is growing into a personal conflict between the two rulers. As a result of this study one can see that, though the Arabian Gulf region and its states have been propelled into

the twentieth century and have become developing nations— with the adoption of a Westernized social, economic and political system— their traditional sociological behavior

adheres to patterns based on tribal tradition. Currently

there seems to be no positive cohesive force that binds them. Only the combined negative power of internal and

external threat keeps them from fragmentation. The Al-Buraimi dispute not yet settled. It is still on

the negotiation table between Saudi Arabia and the government of Abu Dhabi of the U.A.E. It seems that international law and international

relations within the regional states, and what the AGCC members perceive as their interests with one another, will remain part of their traditional personal association. (Kuwait is an exception to this suggestion). Therefore, my

recommendation is that in order to settle the present

Al-Buraimi dispute both the law of tribal loyalty and the

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international law of the world community must be brought to

bear. Both approaches can unite in one concept of "self- determination." Tribal loyalty and alliance determine the

higher sovereign authority over the tribal land, however, this study has shown that such tribal loyalty can be withheld or shifted from the authority of one ruler to another. Therefore the right to the territory of a tribe

follows the loyalty and alliance of the Said tribe. But the sovereignty of a nation-state over its territorial land is not attached to the loyalty of its inhabitants. For these

tribes changing loyalty and alliance (in this case, changing their nationality) means to remove themselves from their

nation state and to move to another country. Therefore, applying both concepts to resolve the as yet

ongoing Al-Buraimi dispute, "self-determination" will deter mine the tribes' loyalty and then, according to the tribal

law, the loyalty will ultimately determine the authority

over the land and its sovereignty.

Finally, further research should be undertaken, not just by outsiders who sometimes use a descriptive, over simplified and biased approach, but by native specialists of the region. This research would hopefully more accurately

reflect the complexities of the social reality of the region. Efforts should also be made to develop research

tools and a research methodology which is more suitable to

examination of the structure of the region.

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Furthermore, the human rights dimension of the

Al-Buraimi people should serve to enhance and encourage the concerned governments of the Al-Buraimi dispute to extend and protect such rights, not only to improve the status of the people of the Al-Buraimi, but other minorities living

within the structure of their authority.

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184

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A

Treaty between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ottoman Government, May 15, 1914

[Foreign Office Papers, 371/2769]

Translation of Treaty between Ibn Saud and the Turks

Dated 4th Rajab 1332 - 15th May 1914

(Original found among Turkish records at Basrah)

Wali of the Vilayet of Basrah. Suleiman Shafik bin Ali Kumali.

Article 1. This Treaty is signed and executed between the Wali and Comandant of Basrah, Suleiman Shafik Pasha, who is specially empowered by Imperial of Iradeh, and H.E. Adul Aziz Pasha Al-Saood Wali and Comandant of Najd. This Treaty is relied on by the Imperial Government and consists of 12 articles, explaining secret matters mentioned in the Imperial Firman dated...... With reference to the Vilayet of Najd. The text of this Treaty shall be secret, and relied upon.

Article 2. The Vilayet of Najd is to remain in charge of Adul Aziz Pasha Al-Saood so long as he is alive, according to the Imperial Firman.

After him it will go to his sons and grandsons by Imperial Firman, provided that he shall be loyal to the Imperial Government and to his forefathers, the previous Valis.

Article 3. A Technical Military Official shall be appointed by the said Wali and Comandant (i.e. Bin Saud) to live wherever he wishes, if he sees fit and necessary he may introduce Turkish officers for the fundamental technical training of Local Troops, and their number shall depend upon the choice and wishes of the said Wali and Commandant (i.e. Ibn Saud).

Article 4. A number of soldiers and gendarmeire, as deemed fit by the Wali and Commandant aforesaid, shall be stationed at seaports such as Katifr and Ojair, &c.

Article 5. All the business of the Customs, Taxes, Ports and Light houses shall be exercised subject to the international rights of Governments, and shall be conducted according to the principles of the Turkish Government under the direction of the said Wali and Commandant.

185

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Article 6. Till the sources of the revenue reach a degree sufficient to meet the requirements of the Vilayet and the local expenditure and military disposition according to the Present circumtances and normal conditions of Najd, the deficiency in the budget shall be met from the Customs, Post, Telegraphs and Ports revenue; and if there is a surplus, it should be sent to the Porte with a report. If the local revenue is sufficient to meet all expenses the income of the posts. Telegraphs and Customs shall be remitted to their respective Departments. Also as regards local incomes other than those mentioned above, if there is any surplus, 10 percent of it shall be sent to the Government Treasury.

Article 7. The Turkish flag shall be hoisted on all Government buildings and places of importance on the sea and on the land, and also on boats belonging to the Vilayet of Najd.

Article 8. Correspondence shall be conducted with the Marine Department for the regular supply of arms and ammunition.

Article 9. The said Wali and Commandant is not allowed to interfere with, or correspond about foreign affairs and international treaties, or to grant concessions to foreigners.

Article 10. All the correspondence of the Wali and Commandant shall be direct with the Imperial Ministries of Interior and Marine, without intermediary.

Article 11. Post Offices shall be established in the Vilayet of Najd, in order to facilitate communication; and arrangements shall be made to dispatch posts to the necessary places in a fitting manner; Turkish stamps shall be affixed to all letters and packages.

Article 12. If, God forbid, the Government should have to fight with a foreign power or if there should be any internal disturbance in any Vilayet and the Government asks the said Wali for a force to co-operate with its own forces it is incumbent on the Wali to prepare a sufficient force with provisions and ammunition, and to respond to the demand at once, according to his power and ability.

Signed. Abdul Aziz, Wali of Najd Wilayet, and Commander of its Army.

Signed. Suleiman Shafik Bin Ali Kamali. Wali of Basrah Wilayet, and Commander of its Forces.

SOURCE: U.K. Memorial, P. 19-20.

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APPENDIX B

Muhammad ibn Salimin of al-Sunainah to H.R.H. Prince Faisal

[late 1950]

H.R.H. Amir Faisal, son of King 'Abd al-'Aziz, may God support him and make him victorious.

Greetings and deepest respect.

About myself : I arrived in the dirah [Riyadh] and fortunately [found] that you had arrived there too, praise God. We report to Your Exalted Highness the news of On?n.

We have reported to His Majesty the news of Oman and its hinterland, such as Buraimi and the areas connected with it, namely that the British are asking us to allow companies to explore in Oman, but we, the people, rulers, and shaikhs of Oman, all refused. We did not want to become involved with them without an order from the King. Today, praise God, you arrived. The people of Oman are followers of the Arabia Reformation. They wish to have the rule of the King in Oman and to have him install a deputy in Oman. [And they wish] the Company to be under his supervision. The British have no control over us. The have contacts with the people of Oman only, the people of the sea [coast], who are not of us. They are under the Government of the British and we have no relations so far with them. I have come on behalf of the entire people of Oman, sent by them to represent my country and what is connected with it and all the rulers of Oman.

I wish to confer with you on confidential information. I hope you will not refuse us, as we are in a hurry to return home. Please take thé matter up with the King, may God give you both long life and peace.

From your servant,

MUHAMMAD IBN SALIMIN IBN RAHMAH

of Buraimi, Oman

[Source: S.A. Memorial, P. 124 and PP. 256-7.]

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Statement of Muhammad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah of Nu'aim

[9 April 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

I, Muhammad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah A1 Bu Shamis, Shaikh of A1 Bu Shamis of Nu'aim, bear witness before God Almighty that since the fall of Hasa to A1 Sa'ud, only A1 Sa'ud have collected the zakah from all of us of A1 Bu Shamis and only they have managed our affairs and have taken back from us what was not ours and restored to us what was ours. This was so in the time of the late 'Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi and, since his death, [has been so under] his son Sa'ud, since we are under the authority of Hasa. The persons who collect the zakah from us are Su'ayyid A1 Faisal, Salih ibn 'Adhl, and Muhammad al-Sahli, may God have mercy on them, and Muhammad Ibn Mansur, Falih ibn Shuwaishan, and Hayif Abu Shuqrah, who are still alive, and other servants of A1 Jiluwi. I bear witness to this, but God is the best witness and surety. 16 Sha'ban 1374 [9 April 1955]. True.

[Seal]

Muhammad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah

We the undersigned, Siddiq ibn Muhammad Sami' and Ahmad ibn Khalafibn 'Utaibah, testify before God Almighty that the seal impressed above is the seal of Shaikh Muhammad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah A1 Bu Shamis, Shaikh of A1 Bu Shamis, and we hereto set our hands. Written on 2 Ramadhan 1374 [24 April 1955].

Witness Witness

Siddiq ibn Muhammad Sami' Ahmad ibn Khalaf ibn 'Utaibah

[Seal]

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I verify the authenticity of the hands of the above witnesses, since they signed before me. This has therefore been written, on 2 Ramadhan 1374 [24 April 1955].

Registrar in Dammam

[Seal]

Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

[Signature]

'All ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, P. 124 and PP. 256-7.

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APPENDIX C

Rashid Ibn Shamis of Hamasa to H.M. King 'Abd al-'Aziz

[c. 14 June 1951]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

To His Majesty the King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman A1 Faisal, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, may God lengthen his days.

Peace be upon you and the Mercy of God and His Blessings, and we ask God that He support you in His victory and continue His bounty to you. We arrived in al-Hasa, thanks to your grace and wisdom, at which time we saw our dear brother and your servant, 'Abd Allah ibn 'Ali Al Mahmud, on his way to Your Majesty. We are honored by the presentation of this letter to Your Majesty [through him] since he is the only spokesman of your Government, and he is the one who has clarified the realities and dispelled the misconceptions which prejudiced people have purveyed. He warned us of the schemes of the imperialistic foreigners and the mischief-making Arabs, who are acting in accordance with the demands of the fbreigner. He asked us to visit Your Majesty as he asked the other Amirs of the tribes of Oman, explaining the truth to them. We are now, God willing, going back home and waiting for that happy day in which your reign will be proclaimed. We, our towns and our lands belong to you. If God wills, we will continue to send you letters and news of these regions by means of your above-mentioned servant,'Abd Allah ibn 'Ali Al Mahmud. God lengthen your life and make you a support of Muslims and Islam. This is what is necessary.

We send our greetings to His Highness the Crown prince and the noble Amirs. From among us your servant and my brother, Muhammad ibn Hamad, and his sons send their greetings. Farewell. 9/9/1370.

Greetings from Your servant,

RASHID IBN HAMAD IBN SHAMIS

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Statement of Rashid ibn Hamad al-Shamis of Al Bu Shamis

[9 April 1955]

I, Rashid ibn Hamad al-Shamisi, Shaikh of Al Bu Shamis, bear witness before God Almighty that, since the fall of Hasa to Al Sa'ud, only Al Sa'ud has collected the zakah from any of us of Al Bu Shamis and only they have taken back from us what was not ours and restored to us what was ours. This was so in the time of the late 'Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi and, since his death, [has been so under] his son Sa'ud, since we are under the authority of Hasa. The persons who have collected the zakah from us are Su'ayyid Al Faisal, Salih ibn 'Adhl, and Muhammad al-Sahil, may God have mercy on them, and Muhammad Ibn Mansur, Falih-ibn Shuwaishan, and Hayif Abu Shuqrah, who are still alive, and other servants of Al Jiluwi. I bear witness to this, but God is the best witness and surety.

16 Sha'ban 1374 [9 April 1955]. True.

[Seal]

Rashid ibn Hamad ibn Shamis

We the undersigned, Siddiq ibn Muhammad Sami', Ahmad ibn Khalaf ibn 'Utaibah, and 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn 'Utaibah, certify that the seal shown above is the seal of Rashid ibn Hamid al-Shamisi, Shaikh of Al Bu Shamis, and we hereto set our hands.

Written on 28 Sha'ban 1374 [21 April 1955].

Witness thereto Witness thereto Signature

Ahmad ibn Khalaf ibn 'Utaibah 'Abd Allah ibn Siddiq ibn Ahmad ibn 'Utaibah Muhammad Sami

[Seal] [Signature]

I verify the authenticity of the signatures of the witnesses indicated above, since they affixed their signatures before me, 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad al-Zahid, Assistant to the Registrar of Dammam. 28 Sha'ban 1374 [21 April 1955].

[Signature] [Seal]

'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad al-Zahid Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

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Statement of Rashid ibn Hamad al-Shamisi of Nu'aim

[16 May 1955]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

His Excellency the Respected Amir 'Abd Allah ibn Nami, whom God guards.

After expressing my greetings and respects, may God preserve your life. I wish to inform Your Highness, on behalf of the Shaikhs of the Dhawahir, who were called by the [British] Resident at Dubai, of the discussion that took place between them.

He asked them first about the lands that belonged to them. They answered him, "Our lands [extend] from al-Nikhrah south to the villages of Buraimi."

Secondly, he asked them whether Shakhbut was their Shaikh. They answered him, "He used to have no control over us. Previously we were free and the Shaikhs of ourselves and our subjects. But at this time he is Shaikh over us by force.

He also asked them whether Shakhbut collected the zakah from them. They answered him, "No, the zakah on our people belongs to us. He deprives us of half of it by force and takes it without our consent."

He did not ask them about anything else. At the end of the meeting he ordered a thousand [1000] rupees (to be given) to Sultan ibn Surur, six hundred to Mani', and four hundred to 'Abd Allah in settlement on his part. The decision is up to you. May God preserve your life.

24 Ramadhan 1374 [16 May 1955].

Your brother,

Rashid ibn Hamad al-Shamisi

[Seal]

Those present with them [at the meeting] were [Salim ibn Muhammad] ibn Hamm, [Muhammad ibn Khadim] Abu Hulaibah, and Ibn Tahi.

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, P. 119, 220 and 265.

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APPENDIX D

Declaration by Notables of the Buraimi Region

[15 September 1952]

We bear witness to God Almighty that the document consisting of two sheets, the first containing a statement and the second containing signatures, issued by the Shaikhs of Oman, Bedouins and townsmen, regarding the statements they have made of loyalty to H.M. King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud, is a true [document] and has so been certified.

25 Dhu al-Hijjah 1371

Shaikh Mubarak ibn Shaikh Saif ibn Muham- H.R. Shaikh 'Ahd 'Ali mad Al Madfa' Allah ibn Sulaiman The religious The Qadhi of Sharjah Al 'Abd al-'Aziz scholar of The Qadhi of Buraimi Dubai Praise be to God. True. Written by the [Seal] The matter set hand of the servant of the forth in this the noble law of Islam document is true. in Sharjah Written by the hand of [Signature and Seal] Saif ibn Muhammed Al [Signature] Madfa' Mubarak ibn 'Ali

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

On the 25th day of the current month of [Dhu] al-Hijjah 1371 we assembled, we being the Shaikhs of Nu'aim, the Shaikhs of Bani Ka'b, the Shaikhs of Al Bu Shamis, the Shaikhs of the 'Awamir, and the people of the land, to wit. Shaikh Ahmad ibn Muhammad Al Saif, Shaikh Muhammad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah, Shaikh 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah, Shaikh Mani’ ibn Rahmah, Shaikh Faris ibn Ghanim al-Mazru'i, Shaikh Humaid ibn Rashid al-Nu'aimi, Shaikh Hamid ibn 'Ubaid al-Ka'bi, Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Rahmah, Shaikh Hamad ibn 'Ali ibn Rahmah, Shaikh Sultan ibn 'Ali Al Saif, Shaikh Rashid ibn Hamad Al Bu Shamis, Shaikh Matar ibn Salim al'Azizi, Shaikh Hamdan ibn Rashid al-Nu'aimi, Shaikh Rashid ibn 'Abd Allah, Shaikh Hamdan ibn Hamad ibn Rakkadh, Shaikh Hamad ibn Muhammad ibn Rahmah, Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn 'Awwad, Shaikh Mubarak ibn Khalfan, Shaikh Fadhil ibn Muhammad ibn Rahmah, Shaikh Sultan ibn Muhammad ibn Rahmah, Shaikh 'Ali ibn Muhammad

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ibn al-Hayy, Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Khalfan, Shaikh Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn Duyain al-Ka'bi, Shaikh Hamdan ibn Khalfan, Shaikh Muhammad ibn Hamad Al Bu Shamis, Shaikh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sultan Al Bu Shamis, Shaikh Falih ibn Saif Al Bu Shamis, and Shaikh Hamad ibn Sulaiman al-Nayili.

We, the people of the land of Oman, assembled, and the representative of H.M. the King, Turki ibn 'Abd Allah ibn 'Utaishan, requested us to give our opinion and to affirm what we consider to be in our interest and in the interest of our land. Likewise, with regard to Shaikh Saqr ibn Suitin, the Saudi, and the advice we have given him. For this reason, we all affirm that the land is our land, and we have expressed loyalty to our lord His Majesty the great King. Our affairs are in his hands, and he may command us as he wishes, for he is the guardian of our affairs. We therefore affix our signatures.

Written on 25 Dhu al-Hijjah 1371 A.H.

Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah Shaikh Ahmad ibn Salimin ibn Rahmah Shaikh of Bani Ka'b Muhammad Al Saif

[Seal] [Seal] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Mani'ibn 'Ali Shaikh Faris Shaikh Humaid ibn ibn Rahmah Shaikh of the Mazari' Rashid al-Nu'aimi

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Hamid ibn Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh Hamad ibn 'Ubaid 'Ali ibn Rahman 'Ali ibn Rahmah

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

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Shaikh Sultan ibn 'Mi Shaikh Rashid ibn Shaikh Matar ibn Al Saif Hamad Salim al-'Azizi Shaikh of Al Bu Shamis

[Thumbprint] [Seal] [Seal]

Shaikh Rashid ibn Shaikh Salim ibn Shaikh Hamad ibn 'Abd Allah Hamad ibn Rakkadh Muhammad ibn Shaikh of the 'Awamir Rahmah

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Fadhil ibn Shaikh Sultan ibn Shaikh Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Rahmah Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn 'Awwad Rahmah

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Mubarak ibn Shaikh Hamdan ibn Shaikh Sa'id ibn Khalfan Rashid al-Nu'aimi Muhammad ibnDuyain

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh 'Ali ibn Muham- Shaikh Hamdan ibn Khalfan al-Maktumi mad ibn al-Hayy Khalfan al-Shamisi

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh Muhammad ibn Shaikh Hamad ibn Shaikh Falih ibn Saif Hamad Al Bu Shamis Sulaiman al-Nayili al-Shamisi

[Seal] [Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

Shaikh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sultan al-Shamisi

[Seal]

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, PP. 133-135.

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APPENDIX E

Buraimi Standstill Agreement

[26 October 1952]

With a view to promoting the peaceful adjustment of matters in the the Buraimi region and its vicinity on the 10th October, 1952 (20th Moharram, 1372) His Majesty King Abdul Aziz put forward proposals for a complete standstill in the Buraimi oasis. On the 12th October, 1952 (22nd Moharram, 1372) these proposals were accepted in principle by Mr. Eden and the standstill agreement proposed by His Majesty thereupon came into existence.

2. The text of the proposals which have thus been agreed in principle by both Governments is as follows

a) The British shall remove the restrictions and obstacles imposed by them (such as flying low over Buraimi, stopping the supply of provisions and restrictions on normal movements), it being understood that the Saudis are also to desist from provocative actions. In other words life is to revert to its normal course.

b) The two sides shall remain at present at Buraimi and maintain their present positions.

c) After that discussions will be resumed between the British and the Saudis.

It was further stated that the provisioning of men of both parties established in that area would not be considered incon sistent with these proposals; and that the foregoing was also to apply to those in whose name Britain was acting.

3. His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal and Her Majesty's Ambas sador at Jedda, each acting on instructions and intending to put the meaning of the standstill agreement beyond doubt, have agreed upon the clarifications and definitions set out below.

a) The parties at present in Bureimi shall remain as they are in their present positions. No reinforcements are to be sent by any party whatsoever. Visits of the minimum necessary number of personnel accompanying provisions, or the replacement of personnel withdrawn, will not be considered as prohibited reinforcements.

b) The Royal Air Force flights over Bureimi will be suspended. No threatening maneouvers will be made by any

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armed forces. c) Life is to revert to its normal course without the inter ference of any party. No restictions are to be imposed on the normal movements of persons and the passport regulations for the Trucial Sheikhdoms will not be applied in a manner to restrict such movements. No restrictions will be imposed on normal trade. It is the intention of all parties to avoid any movement prejudicial to a final decision on the sovereignty of the area.

d) There will be no restrictions on the sending from the towns of the Trucial Sheikhdoms of normal non-warlike provisions necessary for the contingents existing in Bureimi according to the regulations usually recognized to be applicable on normal trade.

e) The right of the local inhabitants voluntarily to visit the representatives in the Bureimi area of the various parties will not be interfered with nor will they be encouraged to do so; and no one will have the right to prevent anyone from expressing his political sentiments and inclincations. All the parties in Bureimi are to desist from provocative actions. All parties shall cease propaganda or any action to influence the tribes. No party shall issue in Bureimi nationality documents which were not formally customarily issued.

f) Every endeavour will be made by all parties to avoid infringement of the spirit and letter of this agreement. Should however any incident occur the two Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of ensuring the fulfilment of the agreement.

4. This standstill agreement is without prejudice to the claims of all parties regarding which negotiations are to take place for a final solution of the problem.

5. Discussions will now be resumed between Her Majesty's Govern ment and the Saudi Arabian Government for a solution of the problem by friendly means.

6. Her Majesty's Government is authorized to state on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat that His Highness fully accepts and adheres to this standstill agreement as set out in the above paragraphs.

7. The Arabic and English texts of this document are of equal validity. FAISAL PELHAM Riyadh, 26th October, 1952 7th Safar, 1372

SOURCE: S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, p. 156.

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APPENDIX F

The Arbitration Agreement of 30 July 1954

Jedda, July 30, 1954

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Considering that there is a dispute as to the location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia dn Abu Dhabi and as to the Sovereignty in the Buraimi oasis; that Abu Dhabi is a state for the conduct of whose foreign relations the Government of the United Kingdom is responsible Eind that His Highness Sultan Said bin Taimur has appointed the Government of the United Kingdom to conduct all negotiations and proceedings on his behalf for the settlement of the dispute in so far as it relates to territory in the Buraimi oasis claimed by him to belong to Muscat and Oman;

Considering that it has proved impossible to settle the dispute by direct negotiations;

Desiring nevertheless to find a permanent solution by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the tradition of friendship and goodwill that long existed between them;

Have accordingly decided to submit the dispute to an independent and impartial Tribunal for arbitration; and, for this purpose.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Tribunal shall consist of five members selected as follows:

(a) Each of the two Parties to the present Agreement shall nominate one Member, provided that, if either Party fails to nominate its Member within 60 days from the date on which this Agreement comes into force, the other Party may ask the President of the International Court of Justice to make the nomination.

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(b) The three remaining Members, none of whom shall be a national of either Party, shall be chosen by agreement between the two Members nominated under paragraph (a) of this Article; of the three, one shall be designated by the selecting Members as President of the Tribunal. If within a period of 90 days from the date on which the appointment of the last named Member under paragraph (a) is notified to the other Party, the membership of the Tribunal is still incomplete or the President has not been designated, either Party may request the President of the international Court of Justice to make the appointments or designation period.

(c) If any Member of the Tribunal should die, resign, or become unable to act before the Award has been given, the vacancy shall be filed by the method laid down in this Article for the original appoitment.

(d) If the President of the International Court of Justice is a national of either Party or is prevented from acting as requested in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, the Vice-President of the Court may be requested to take the necessary action. Any nomination, appointment or designation made by the President or Vice-President of the Court under this Article shall be final and binding on both Parties.

Article II

The tribunal is requested to decide:

(a) The location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, within the line claimed by the Saudi Arabian Government in 1949 and that claimed on behalf of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952;

(b) Sovereignty in the area comprised within a circle whose centre is in Buraimi village and whose circumference passes through the point of junction of latitude 24 degrees 25 minutes North and longitude 55 degrees 36 minutes East.

Article III

Each party shall be represented before the Tribunal by an Agent, who shall be responsible for its part in the proceedings. Each Agent may be assisted by such advisers, counsel and staff as he deems necessary.

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Article IV

In conducting its proceedings and in formulating its Award, the Tribunal shall have due regad to all relevant considerations of law, fact and equity brought to its attention by the Parties under Article V and VI or disclosed through the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Article VII. In particular, but without being limited thereto, it shall take into account the following factors in so far as it deems them relevant :

(a) Historical facts relating to the rights of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia and his forefathers and the rights of the other Rulers concerned and their forefathers;

(b) The traditional loyalties of the inhabitants of the area concerned;

(d) The exercise of jurisdiction and other activities inthe area concerned;

(e) Any other considerations brought to its attention by either Party.

Article V

(a) Within a period of six months from a date to be fixed by the President of the Tribunal as soon as possible after the organisation of the Tribunal, each of the two Parties shall present simultaneously to the Tribunal a Memorial setting out its submissions regarding the territories and frontiers in dispute, and the considerations on which its submissions are founded.

(b) After the period fixed in paragraph (a) of this Article, each of the two Parties shall have the right, within a further period of six months, to present to the Tribunal a reply to the Memorial presented by the other Party.

(c) On the application of either Party, the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, grant an extension of either or both of the periods fixed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article.

(d) The Tribunal shall be responsible for communicating the Memorial and the Reply of the one Party to the other Party and shall inform the Parties how many copies are required.

(e) After the submission of the Reply of each Party, there shall be no further written submissions, except as provided in

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Article VII (b) or Article X (b), unless the Tribunal otherwise directs, and then only within such limitations as the Tribunal may prescribe. If either Party is permitted to make further written submissions under this paragraph, the other Party shall have an opportunity of commenting upon them and of submitting documents in support of its comments.

Article VI

(a) Subsequent to the conclusion of the written proceedings called for in Article V, the Tribunal shall sit for the purpose of hearing oral argument by the Parties. Subject to the provision that each Party shall have equal opportunity to be heard, both on principal argument and in rebuttal, the Tribunal shall prescribe the procedure and time limits to be observed.

(b) With the consent of both Parties, the Tribunal may dispense with oral arguments.

Article VII

(a) In addition to considering the submissions of the Parties, the Tribunal shall have power on its own initiative to call witnesses (other than the Ruler of any of the territories concerned) to conduct enquiries, and to visit particular localities in the area in dispute whenever, enquiry or such proceedings useful. Any such examination of witnesses, enquiry or visit may be delegated by the Tribunal to one or more of its Members or to one or mroe other impartial persons whom it may appoint for that purpose.

The 'area in dispute' means the area referred to in Article II (b) of the present Agreement and all other land claimed in both Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi between the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952.

(b) The Tribunal shall inform each Party whenever it resolves to exercise any of the powers specified in paragraph (a) of this Article, and each Party shall have the right to appoint representatives (not exceeding four in number for visits to the area in the dispute) to be present at the proceeding; to put questions to anywitness, under the control of the Tribunal or person or persons conducting the enquiry; and to receive any reports of enquiries or visits and to comment thereon orally or in writing.

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of inquiry, any of the powers specified in paragraph (a) of this Article, but the Tribunal may declijne at its discretion to accede to such a request.

Article VIII

(a) Any written submission by either Party shall contain a statement certifying the authenticity of the documents quoted or referred to therein and copies of all such documents shall, where possible, be annexed to the submission.

(b) At the request of the Tribunal, either Party shall, if possible, produce the original or an authenticated copy of any document referred to in its written submissions or oral argument, and if unable to do so shall explain to the Tribunal the reasons for such inability. In ability to produce the original or an authenticated copy of any document shall not preclude its consideration by the Tribunal, but shall be taken into account by the Tribunal in determining the weight to be given to the document concerned.

(c) The Tribunal shall satisfy itself as to the authenticity of any documents disclosed in the course of any proceedings which it may conduct under the powers conferred on it by Article VII.

Article IX

(a) The Parties shall present their written submissions and any documents annexed thereto in both English and Arabic, together with a translation into such other language or languages as the Tribunal may request.

(b) The Parties shall present their oral arguments in either English or Arabic. The Tribunal shall make such arrangements for translation and interpretation as it deems necessary.

(c) The Tribunal shall provide for the keeping of a verbatim record to each of its sittings, othter than its private deliberations. Copies shall be made available to the Parties as soon as possible.

Article X

(a) If the Tribunal considers it necessary, it shall have the right to arrange for an expert opinion to be given by any person or persons selected by it.

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(b) Any expert opinion given under paragraph (a) of this article shall either be in writing and communicated to the Parties, or by giving orally before the Tribunal in the presence of the Parties. In either case the Parties shall have the right to comment upon the opinion and, under the control of the Tribunal, to put questions to the person or persons responsible for it.

Article XI

The Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, determine the location of the frontier in dispute section by section and may give its award in respect of each section when it is ready to do so without waiting until it is in a position to give its Award in respect to the whole frontier in dispute

Article XII

The Tribunal shall have power to determine all questions of procedure not regulated in the present Agreement, including the power to fix the dates and places of its sittings and to decide upon the public or private character of each.

Article XIII

(a) The Award of the Tribunal, and all decisions on questions of procedure, shall be given by majority vote.

(b) The Tribunal shall be given the reasons for its Award.

(c) The Award shall be given in the language selected by the Tribunal and shall be printed and communicated to the Parties simultaneously. There shall be communicated to the Paties at the same time translations of the Award into English or Arabic or, if the Award be given in some other language, into both English and Arabic. The Tribunal shall state which text or texts are to be regarded as authentic. The original of the Award and all official translations thereof shall bear the certification of the President of the Tribunal.

(d) The Award of the Tribunal shall be final, binding upon both Governments (including the Rulers on whose behalf the Government of the United Kingdom is acting), and without appeal.

Article XIV

(a) As part of its Award, the Tribunal shall appoint an expert commission, composed of one member nominated by each of the

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Parties, and a neutral chairman nominated by the Tribunal, to direct the demarcation on the ground of the frontier line fixed by the Tribunal. If either Party fails to nominate its member of the commission within 90 days after the Tribunal has requested it to do so, the right to make the nomination shall pass to the Tribunal.

(b) The demarcation commission thus appointed shall erect such markers and take such other steps as it deems necessary to demarcate the frontier line adequately in relation to the needs of the various areas through which it may pass. The chairman of the commission shall have power to authorise slight deviations from the line defined by the Tribunal, not to exceed at any one place one kilometre to either side or five kilometres in length, where the nature of the terrain presents unusual difficulties to demarcation.

(c) The demarcation commission shall endeavour to complete its work within two solar years from the date of the Award of the Tribunal. On completion, it shall submit to both Parties a full report of its activities, including such maps, photographs and other data as will enable the frontier line to be accurately maintained thereafter.

(d) The members of the demarcation commission shall be remunerated at a rate to be fixed by the Tribunal at the time of their appoitment. The remuneration and all expenses of the commission and its work shall be borne by the two Parties in equal shares, to be paid in such manner as may be arranged between the Parties and the commission.

(e) In the event of the death, disability or resignation of either the Saudi or the British member of the commission, his Government shall name a successor within 90 days after receiving notice thereof, and if it fails to do so the other Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the nomination. In the event of the death, disability, or resignation of the neutral chairman, either Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint a successor. If the President of the International Court of Justice is a national of either Party or is unable to act for the purposes of this paragraph, the Vice President may be requested to take the necessary action.

Article XV

After the Tribunal has given its award, either Party may publish any of the proceedings in the case.

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Article XVI

(a) The Tribunal shall have the power to engage such staff, and at such remuneration, and to rent such premises and to purchase such equipment, as it considers necessary, and to make all such arrangements as may be requisite for the holding of any oral hearings or for visits to any particular localities by the Tribunal or bgy any person or persons appointed by it under Article VII (a).

(b) The records and papers of the Tribunal and the personal effects of its Members, as well as the records, papers and personal effects of each Agent, shall be considered invilate, and shall be exempt from the dues, inspections or border formalities.

Article XVII

(a) The President and other Members of the Tribunal shall be entitled to payment of their expenses and to remuneration on a scale to be agreed by the Parties.

(b) The remuneration of the President and Members of the Tribunal and the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by the Parties in equal shares and shall be paid in such manner and at such times as may be arranged between the parties and the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall, subsequent to its Award, deliver a final account of all the expenses incurred.

Article XVIII

Each Party shall pay the expenses of the presentation and conduct of its own case before the Tribunal.

Article XIX

The Tribunal shall have the power to decide any question that may arise as to the interpretation of any provision of the present Agreement.

Article XX

The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

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Article XXI

The present Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Jedda this thirtieth day of July, 1943, corresponding to the twenty ninth day of Dhu'al gada, 1337, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being eventually authmtic.

G.C. PELHAM, FAISAL, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs Ambassador Extraordinary of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Plenipotentiary

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EXCHANGE OF NOTES

No. 1

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda to the Saudi Arbian Minister for Foreign Affairs

British Embassy, Jedda July 30, 1954 (Dhu'al qada 29, 1371)

Your Royal Highness,

I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's Government, acting on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and His Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur, agree to submit the dispute on the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and the question of sovereignty over the Buraimi zone to the arbitration without prejudice to the claims of any of the parties on the following conditions.

(i) Turki bin Ataishan and his party shall withdraw from Buraimi zone to undisputed Saudi territory; the Trucial Oman Levies, other armed forces, and officials introduced into the zone after August 1952, shall withdraw therefrom to undisputed territory in the Trucial States; and local armed groups shall be disbanded. A small force to which each side shall contribute a party of up to 15 men shall be substituted for the forces that are withdrawn for duty in the zone.

(ii) The police force referred to in (i) shall be stationed in the Buraimi zone in tents at any mutually agreeable place which is not inside the villages. The task of the group shall be to maintain peace and good order between the tribes in the Buraimi zone. It shall not interfere in any way in the internal affairs, administration, or politics of any tribe and shall take action only in the event of an outbreak or disorder provided that the leaders of the two constituent parties agree;

(iii) The Trucial Oman Levies, other armed forces, and officials introduced into the other disputed areas after August 1952, shall be withdrawn fromthose areas, and local armed groups shall be disbanded;

(iv) Neither side shall introduce additional officials or forces into the Buraimi zone or into the other disputed areas; both parties undertake to refrain from action which would prejudcie the holding of a just and impartial arbitration;

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it is understood that restrictions on entry of additional officials shall not apply to Government officials engaged in the arbitration or to persons asked by the arbitral tribunal to attend it; it is also agreed that the tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to supervise the execution of this agreement and to adjudicate on matters arising out of its application and to issue such orders and take such action as it sees fit in this respect;

(v) For the purpose of oil operations only and without prejudice to the rights of the parties to the frontier dispute, the region lying between the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward in 1952 on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi shall be divided in the following manner:

(a) in the area bounded on the west by longitude 51 degrees 35 minutes East, on the south by latitude 23 degrees 15 minutes North, and on the East by a straight line connecting the Eastern termini of the Saudi Limited, and D'arcy Exploration, Limited, may conduct oil operations during the period of arbitration;

(b) in the area bounded on the east and west by the same lines as in sub paragraph (a), on the north by latitude 23 degrees 15 minutes North shall be permitted during the period of arbitation;

(c) in the area west of longitude 51 degrees 35 minutes East and in the area bounded on the north by latitude 23 degrees 00 minutes North and on the east by the same line as in sub paragraph (a) and (b), the Arabian American Oil Company may conduct oil operations during the period of the arbitration.

It is understood that there shall be no oil operations in any case in the Buraimi zone during the period of arbitration;

(vi) these conditions shall take effect from the date on which the arbitration agreement comes into force and the withdrawals referred to in conditions (i) and (iii) shall be completed within one month from that date;

(vii) for the purpose of implmenting the foregoing conditions, Buraimi zone means the area comprised withina circle whose centre is in Buraimi village and whose circumference passes through the point of junction of latitude 24 degrees 25 minutes North and longitude 55 degrees 36 minutes East; 'disputed areas' mean the Buraimi zone and all other land claimed by both Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi between the Saudi 1949 claim and the claim put forward on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Dammam Conference in 1952.

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If His Majesty's Government also agrees to these conditions I am to suggest that this letter, together with Yo’r Royal Highness reply to that effect, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, which shall be binding on all the parties concerned.

Pray accept, &c. G.C. PELHAM.

No.2

The Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Ambassador of Jedda

Jiddah, 29 Dhu alQadah 1373 July 30, 1954

Your Excellency,

I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter of today's date which reads as follows:

[As in No. 1]

In accordance with the suggestion in your Excellency's letter. His Majesty's Government considers that letter and this reply thereto to constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall be binding on all the parties concerned.

Accept, &c FAISAL

SOURCE: S.A. Memorial, V. II. p. 1.

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APPENDIX G

Statement of Saqr ibn Sultan ibn Muhammed Al Hamad of Nu'aim

[13 June 1955]

I, Saqr ibn Sultan ibn Muhammad Al Hamud al-Nu'aimi of Buraimi, Shaikh of the tribe of Nu'aim, [state that] I and my family and those related to them of the people of Buraimi and its dependencies consider ourselves and our ranges and lands as subject to H.M. King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, just as we used to be subjects of his father and of his forefathers. We pay the zakah on our livestock and our palm trees to his representative, whom he sends to Buraimi and the towns around it. Since the fall of Hasa to His Majesty only Al Sa'ud have restored to us what was ours and taken from us what was not ours. Amir'Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi has been sending his servants to us to collect the zakah. These servants are Su'ayyid Al Faisal, Muhammed Ibn Mansur, Falih ibn Shuwaishan, Muhammad al-Sahli, Shamrukh al-'Umani and others. In the past and in the future sovereignty and influence have been and will be theirs in our towns and among our people. Since we still owe allegiance to the Government of King Sa'ud ibn'Abd al-'Aziz, this has been written on the of 1374. True.

[Seal]

Saqr ibn Sultan

We the undersigned, Salim ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi, Muhammad ibn Salim al-Shamisi, Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, and 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, bear witness to the correctness of the contents of this document, the statement of Saqr ibn Sultan Al Hamud al-Nu'aimi, who has impressed his seal above and who is known to us in person and by descent. To this we set our hands relying on God. Written on the of 1374.

[Seal] [Thumbprint] Salim ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi [Thumbprint] [S ignature] Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi Muhammad ibn Salim al-Shamisi

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I verify the authenticity of the hands of the above witnesses on their statement, since they set their hands to it before me in the office of the Registrar in Dammam on the twenty- second of Shawwal in the year one thousand three hundred and seventy-four [13 June 1955].

Registrar [Signature] [Seal] 'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, P. 222-23.

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APPENDIX H

'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah of Bani Ka'b to H.R.H. the Crown Prince

[5 October 1952]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

To His Royal Highness, the great Crown Prince, my lord, Amir Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud. May God help him. Peace be upon you, and the Mercy of God and His Blessing forever. The Creator perpetuate your existence, preserve, you and watch over you.

My lord, we praise God who has bestowed your reign upon us, and has granted you success in taking your land, Oman. This is a blessing from God Most High for we have always wanted God to give you success in this work for which we ourselves have yearned. Now God has made real that for which we had genuinely hoped from the bottom of our hearts. We send to you our profuse thanks and our good wishes.

Today, Your Royal Highness, we and our sons and our country and our subjects belong to God, then to you, obedient to your command. We hope, if God wills, that you will be pleased to do for our country, what is righteous in heaver and on earth. God grant you every success and may we long enjoy you. Verily, He is the Listener and the Respondent. Please accept our regards and respect.

Sincerely yours,

'UBAID IBN JUM'AH AL-KA'BI

[seal]

15 Muharram 1372

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Statement of 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah with respect to British Activities

[June 1953]

In the Name of God Almighty

From 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah al-Ka'bi to His Highness Amir Turki ibn 'Abd Allah ibn 'Utaishan.

Peace be with you and God's mercy and blessings.

We inform you that the British forces attacked us and al-Burj and occupied al-Burj and al-Jabal first. The airplane dropped bombs and killed one of our servants, Suhail, in al-Burj; while Sa'id ibn 'Ali Ba al-Hajj al-Maktumi was machine-gunned and killed. I was near al-Burj with one of my men when the plane dropped some bombs on us, but God saved us.

When we returned to town we saw the [British] cars on the fields of your town Mahdhah, and the plane circling over the town. We stayed for some time on the mountains near the town, and found out that the people gathering there were our people who had left [the town], one group after another running away from the plane circling over the town. [The British] had warned the people that unless they went to meet with them they would destroy the town. They were forced to go and see them in a state of humiliation. A messenger came from town and reported to us on the meeting, and we were delayed.

[Finally] we left. With us came our children, Nasir and Ahmad, and Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Khusaibi, and our cousin Sa'id ibn Muhammad, and some of our men. The families and children here escorted to your town, al-Khatwah, by special attendants. And now this has become my town.

We sent three written messages to [the British] telling them that our houses, lives and territories are to God [first] and then to His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud. This made them more cruel and furious. We shall not accept nor allow ourselves to be under British protection as long as we are Muslims and as long as we are under the protection of King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud.

And now we beg of you to tell us either to go and see His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud and send us letters [of introduction] with our messenger, the bearer of this letter, or tell us what it is best to do under the circumstances. Please inform us of whatever you think is suitable.

There is no peace for us in Oman, nor can we decide to settle there unless it is your order that we do so. We have spent all our efforts and provisions in fulfillment of and for the cause of His Majesty King Ibn Sa'ud. Had it not been for the fear

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of the plane circling over us and the death of our children and men, we would not have left [the town] except dead.

We carried nothing with us except ourselves and the children and men. All our property was left behind in the town, and we could get none of it out. This is also true of those who left with us — namely. Sa'id ibn Muhammad, our cousin, and Ahmad ibn 'Abd Allah al- Khusaibi, and our children — Nasir and Ahmad. The children and men who left with us were counted. They were sixty.

We are staying in your town, al-Khatwah, until we receive your reply. You will leam the facts from [our messengers] Hamdan ibn Rashid and Humaid ibn Musa'id. May you remain safe, and peace be with you. Our children, Nasir and Ahmad, and Ahmad ibn Muham mad al-Khusaibi, and Sa'id ibn Muhammad, our cousin, and the [rest of] the people send you their regards.

[Seal]

'UBAID IBN JUM'AH

1372

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Statement of Ubaid ibn Jum'ah of Bani Ka'b

[13 June 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

I, 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah, Shaikh of all Bani Ka'b, [state that I and my people] consider ourselves, our country, and our people as subject to H. M. King Sa'ud ibn'Abd al-'Aziz, just as we were subjects of his father'Abd al-'Aziz before him. All the zakah of Bani Ka'b is paid to his representative in Buraimi, just as our forefathers used to pay it. Since then we have paid it to the messengers of His Majesty who collect the zakah. We do not owe [allegiance] to any one but His Majesty's Government. We still adhere to our allegiance to His Majesty's Government, regardless of the circumstances and conditions which we have had to endure and which are known to every one, such as the attempt on the part of the British Government to divert to some one else our traditional allegiance to the Government of our Lord the King. We do not accept and will never accept any authority over us other than that of the Government of H. M. King Sa'ud ibn'Abd al-'Aziz. To this I affix my seal.

22 Shawwal 1374 [13 June 1955].

'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah

[Seal]

We the undersigned, Salim ibn Khalifah al-Habbayi [al-Yahyayi], Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi, Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, and 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, testify to the authenticity of the contents of this document, the statement of Shaikh 'Ubaid ibn Jum'ah, Shaikh of all Bani Ka'b, whose seal appears above and who is known to us in person and by descent. To this we set our hands and on God we rely.

Written on the of 1374.

Salim ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi

[Seal]

'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi

[Thumbprint]

Sa'id ibn Muhammad [al-Naj-adi]

[Thumbprint]

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Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi

[Signature]

I testify to the authenticity of the hands of the above-mentioned witnesses to the above statement, as they set their hands before me at the Registrar's office in Dammam on the twenty-second day of Shawwal in the year one thousand three hundred and seventy-four [13 June 1955].

Registrar Official Seal

[Signature] [Seal]

'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

SOURCE: S.A. Memorial, PP. 141, 238-39 and 274-275.

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APPENDIX I

Annex 129

Statement of the Shaikhs of al-Qattarah and Hili with Respect to Tax Payments

[23 April 1955]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

We, Sa'id ibn Sultan al-Darmaki and Muhammad ibn Sultan al- Darmaki, testify that, since the decline of the rule of al Sa'ud, our zakah and that of our people in dates and rice have been in our own hands as Shaikhs of the town of al-Qattarah and [the town of] Hili. Since [the decline of] Al Sa'ud we have never paid [the zakah] to any one [else], either Falahi [of Al Bu Falah] or Sa'idi [of Al Bu Sa'id]. God is the best witness and surety.

30 Sha'ban 1374 [23 April 1955].

[Seal] [Seal] Muhammad ibn Sultan al-Darmaki Sa'id ibn Sultan al-Darmaki

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Annex 131

Statement of Shaikha of al-Qattarah and Hili

[13 June 1955]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

We Sa'id ibn Sultan al-Darmaki and Muhammad ibn Sultan al- Darmaki, Shaikhs of the two towns of Hili and al-Qattarah in Buraimi, [state that] we and our people consider ourselves, our country, our territories, and our lands as subject to H. M. King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, just as we and our fathers and forefathers were subjects of his father 'Abu al-'Aziz before him. We pay zakah on our livestock and palm trees to his representative who is sent to Buraimi and its environs. Our forefathers used to pay Zakah to his representativbe in Buraimi. Since then we have never paid it to any one [else] whatever. In His Majesty we see our King. We live and die under his orders and authority. He is [our] merciful father and just king. May God bear witness to what we say.

22 Shawwal 1374 [13 June 1955].

[Seal] [Seal] Muhammad ibn Sultan al-Darmaki Sa'id ibn Sultan al-Darmaki

We the undersigned, Salim ibn Khalifah al-Habbayi [al- Yahyayi], Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi, Sa'id ibn Muhammad al- Najadi, and 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, testify to the authenticity of the contents of this document, the statement of Sa'id ibn Sultan al-Darmaki and Muhammad ib Sultan al-Darmaki, whose seals appear above and who are known to us in personand by descent. To this we set our hands and on God we rely.

Written on the of 1374.

[Seal] [Thumbprint] Salim ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi

[Thumbprint] [Signature] Sa'id ibn Muhammad Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi

[Signature] [Seal] 'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khorbar and Dammam

SOURCE: S.A. Memorial, Vol. II, pp. 268, 270-271.

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APPENDIX J

Statement bf Shaikhs of the Town of al-Qimi with Respect to Tax Payments

[23 April 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

We, Shabib ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal and Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal, Shaikh of the town of al-Jimi [al-Qimi], testify before God Almighty that, since the decline of the rule of Al Sa'ud, our zakah and that of our people in dates and rice have been in our own hands as Shaikhs of the town. Since [the decline of] Al Sa'ud we have never paid [the zakah] to any one [else], either Falahi [of Al Bu Falah] or Sa'id [of Al Bu Sa'id]. God is the best witness and surety.

True signature of Sa'id ibn True signature of Shabib ibn

Muhammad ibn Hilal Muhammad ibn Hilal al-Dhahiri

[Signature] [Signature]

30 Sha'ban 1374 [23 April 1955].

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Statement of Shaikhs of the Town of al-Qimi

[13 June 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

We, Sa*id ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal and Shabib ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal, Shaikhs of the town of al-Jimi [al-Qimi] in Buraimi, [state that] we and our people consider ourselves, our country, our lands, and our territories as subject to H. M. King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, just as we and our fathers and forefathers were subjects of his father 'Abd al-'Aziz before him. We pay zakah on our livestock to his representative who is sent to Buraimi and its environs. Our forefathers used to pay zakah to his representative in Buraimi. Since then we have never paid it to any one [else] whatever. In His Majesty we see our King. We live and die under his orders and authority. He is [our] merciful father and just king. We will never accept any one else in his place, whatever we may suffer from the tyrannical usurper who is trying to conquer our homeland. May God be surety for what we say.

22 Shawwal 1374 [13 June 1955].

Signature of Shabib ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal

True signature of Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal

We the undersigned, Salim bin Khalifah al-Habbayi [al-Yahyayi], Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi, Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, and 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, testify to the authenticity of the contents of this document, the statement of Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn Hilal, whose signatures appear above and who are known to us in person and by descent. To this we set our hands and on God we rely.

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Written on the of 1374.

Salisi ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi

[Seal]

'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi

[Thumbprint]

Sa'id ibn Muhammad

[Thumbprint]

Hamad ibn Salim al Shamisi

[Signature]

I testify to the authenticity of the hands of the above-mentioned witnesses set to their above statement, as they set their hands before me at the Registrar's office in Dammam on the twenty-second day of Shawwal in the year one thousand three hundred and seventy-four [13 June 1955].

Registrar Official Seal

[Signature] [Seal]

'Ali-ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, PP. 267 and 272-73.

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APPENDIX K

Paris ibn Ghanim of the Mazari' to H.M. King 'Abd al-'Aziz

[undated]

In the Name of God Almighty

From Paris ibn Ghanim al-Mazru'i to His Majesty King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn'Abd al-Rahman Al Sa'ud.

Peace be upon you, and the mercy and blessings of God. I submit to His Highness [sic] His Majesty My Lord the King that I have been to His Highness Amir Sa'ud ibn' Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi and informed him of the facts, and today I am coming to you. I belong to God and then to you. My sons, my people, and my lands belong to God and then to you. I am leaving my people and my sons behind until I come [back] to you. Please think of them as your subjects and of my sons as your servants. The decision is God's and then yours. If you wish, enroll them [among your men]. It is from you that instructions [come]. I came alone and could not decide anything without your order. May the Creator preserve you. Peace [be upon you].

Submitted by your loyal servant, Paris ibn Ghanim, Amir of the Mazari'.

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Statement of Paris ibn Ghanim of the Mazari' with Respect to al-J iwa

[13 June 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

I, Paris ibn Ghanim al-Mazru'i, Shaikh of the tribe of the Mazari', who live in Khannur, Himar, al-Taraq, al-Hamrur, al-Mariyah, Abu Saddain, Muqab, al-Haumani, Shidq al-Kalb, Hafit, Latir, and other places in al Jiwa, consider ourselves, our people, and our ranges as subject to Al Sa'ud. I am now more than seventy years old, and for, as long as I remember. I, Paris, and likewise my brother al-Afandi ibn Ghanim before me, have not had the zakah collected from us by any one other than Al Sa'ud or had [any one other than Al Sa'ud] take from us what was not ours or restore to us what was ours. Since the fall of Hasa to His Majesty the King and Amir 'Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi, he has been sending his servants, Muhammad ibn Mansur, Palih ibn Shuwaishan, Muhammad al-Sahli, Shamrukh al-'Umani, and Su'ayyid Al Paisal to us to collect the zakah and they have restored to us what was ours and taken from us what was not ours. We still adhere to our allegiance to the Govenment of H. M. King Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. To this we set our hand.

22 Shawwal 1374 [13 June 1955]

[Thumbprint]

Thumbprint of Paris ibn Ghanim

We the undersigned. Shaikh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Shamisi, Shaikh Hamad ibn Sa'id al-Shamisi, Shaikh Hamdan ibn Khalfan al-Shamisi, Shaikh of the town of Wasit, and Shaikh Salim ibn' Abd Allah al-Jarrahi, testify to the veracity of the contents of this document, the statement of Paris ibn Ghanim al Mazru'i, Shaikh of the tribe of the Mazari' whose thumbprint above and who

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is known to us in person and by descent. To what is stated above we affix our signatures, and in God we trust.

[Signature] [Signature]

Rashid ibn Sa'id al Shamisi Hamdan ibn Sa'id al Shamisi

[Thumbprint] [Thumbprint]

I testify to the authenticity of the signatures of the above witnesses on this statement, since they signed before me at the office of the Registrar in Dammam on the eighth day of Dhu al-Qa'dah in the year one thousand three hundred and seventy-four [25 June 1955]. This has accordingly been set down and verified.

Registrar Official Seal

[Signature] [Seal]

'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

SOURCE; S.A. Memorial, PP. 247-49.

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APPENDIX L

Rashid ibn Sa*id of the Baluchis to Shaikh Yusuf Yasin

[c. 20 July 1951]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

To His Excellency the respected Shaikh and Minister, Yusuf Yasin, may God preserve him. Amen.

This is to inform Your Excellency that the British, through the Sultanate of Muscat and Al Bu Falah, are still trying to establish contacts with us, the Baluchis, the people of al-Mazim, al-'Araqi and Subaikhi, and the tribes that follow us. We refer our problem to God and then to His Majesty the King, may God preserve him. We have sent our son. Sa'id ibn Rashid, and his group. They met Shaikh Fuad Hamzah and reached an agreement with him. We and the tribes which are with us will follow King Ibn Sa'ud. We request a Saudi flag. All those who love you from among the people of Oman and who have a letter from us are truthful. Those who are coming to you are our men, Hamad ibn Rashid and Salim ibn Khalifah and their group. They will inform you of the facts. Farewell.

Written on the 15th of Shawwal 1370

RASHID IBN SA'ID IBN ALI AL-BALUCHI

Amir of the Baluchis who are in Oman

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Statement of Sa'id ibn Rashi-d Al Isma'il of the Baluchis

[13 June 1955]

In the Name of God,

the Merciful, the Compassionate

I, Sa'id ibn Rashid Al Isma'il al-Baluchi, Shaikh of the tribe of the Baluchis, inhabitants of al-'Araqi, al-Mazim, al-Subaikhi, al-Ghabbi, Masharib, and their dependencies, consider ourselves, our people, and our lands as subject to His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, just as we and our fathers and forefathers were subjects of his father'Abd al-'Aziz before him. We pay zakah on our livestock and palm trees to his representative who is sent to Buraimi and its environs to collect the zakah. Our forefathers used to pay this zakah to his representative in Buraimi, as attested to by the facts we have Submitted to His Majesty's Government. Its history goes back approximately a hundred years. We see His Majesty [as a King who is] our own and a merciful father. To this I set my hand and seal. 22 Shawwal 1374 [13 June 1955].

[Signature and seal]

Sa'id ibn Rashid Al Isma'il al-Baluchi

We the undersigned, Salim ibn Khalifah al-Habbayi [al-Yahyayi], Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi, Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi, and 'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Shamisi, testify to the authenticity of the contents of this document, the statement of Sa'id ibn Rashid Al Isma'il al-Baluchi, who has set his hand and seal above and who is known to us in person and by descent. To this we Set our hands, and on God we rely. Written on the of 1374.

Salim ibn Khalifah al-Yahyayi

[Seal]

'Ubaid ibn Muhammad al-Najadi

[Thumbprint]

Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Najadi

[Thumbprint]

Hamad ibn Salim al-Shamisi

[Signature]

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I testify to the authenticity of the hands of the above-mentioned witnesses to the above statement, as they set their hands before me at the office of the Registrar in Dammam on the twenty-second day of Shawwal in the year one thousand three hundred and seventy-four [13 June 1955].

Registrar Official Seal

[Seal] [Signature]

'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Hudaib Registrar of al-Khobar and Dammam

SOURCE: S.A. Memorial, PP. 120 and 280-81.

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APPENDIX M

English Version of the Agreement of

27 February 1968, forming the

'Federation of Arab Amirates'

PREAMBLE

In view of the agreement signed by the Amirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai on 20 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1387, corresponding to 18 February 1968, to form a federation out of their desire to preserve stability in their countries and to realise a better future for their peoples; amd Because it is unanimously agreed that the formation of a federation to include all of the Arab Amirates in the Gulf, including the Amirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, is more satisfactory for the realisation of the purposes of these two Amirates and is wanted by the peoples of all the area; and In order to support the strong fraternal bonds among all the Arab Amiirates in the Arabian Gulf and to affirm the numerous strong ties among these Amirates; and Because of a desire to direct all possible efforts of these Amirates toward their good and toward the security of their future and toward the good of all the Arab people; and In response to the desire of the people of the area to strengthen the means of stability in their countries and to realise a collective defence of their existence, and to preserve their peace and security in accordance with the Charters of the U.N. and the Arab League, The signatories of this agreement and their delegations met in Dubai between 26 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1387, corresponding to 25 February 1968, and 28 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1387, corresponding to 27 February 1968, and concluded an agreement and undertaking on the following :

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHMENT OF A FEDERATION FOR ARAB AMIRATES

1. A federation known as 'The Federation of Arab Amirates' shall be formed of the contracting Amirates.

2. The purpose of the Federation is to strengthen the ties among member Amirates, to promote cooperation among them in all fields, to coordinate the plans of their development and welfare, to support respect for each other's independence and sovereignty.

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to unify their foreign policy, to regulate the collective defence of their countries in order to protect their people and to preserve their security, and to consider generally their mutual affairs and interests in a manner which guarantees their aspirations and realises the hopes of all the great Arab homeland.

CHAPTER II

AUTHORITY

3. The affairs of the Federation shall be supervised by a council, known as the Supreme Council, which shall be formed of the Rulers of these Amirates.

4. The Supreme Council shall draw up a complete and permanent charter of the Federation and formulate its high policy in international, political, defence, economic, cultural, and other matters related to the purposes of the Federation as prescribed in Article 2 of this agreement. The Council shall legislate federal laws required in this connection. The Council is the highest authority in defining jurisdictions. Its decisions shall be made unanimously.

5. The Rulers of member Amirates shall alternatively and annually preside over the meetings of the Supreme Council. The president shall represent the Federation internally and to foreign states.

6. The general federal budget shall be issued by a decision of the Supreme Council. Revenues of the budget and the share to be paid by each member Amirate shall be determined by a law.

7. The Supreme Council, in exercising its authorities, shall be assisted by a council known as the Federal Council.

8. The Federal Council shall be the executive body of the Federation. The Federal Council shall exercise its duties in accordance with the high policy decided by the Supreme Council and pursuant to the federal laws.

9. The manner in which the Federal Council shall be formed and its basic rules and system shall be determined by legislation.

10. The decisions of the Federal Council shall not be final until approved by the Supreme Council.

11. The councils and committees necessary to assist the Federal Council in discharging its duties shall be formed and organised by federal laws.

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CHAPTER III

GENERAL RULES

12. In exercise of the right of legitimate individual and collective defence of their existence, the contracting Amirates shall cooperate with each other to support and strengthen their military capabilities. To do their joint duty in repelling any armed aggression committed against any of them, the contracting Amirates shall, according to the resources and requirements [of each], participate in the preparation of their individual and collective means of defence in order to fulfil such duty.

13. (a) The Federation shall have a supreme court known as The Supreme Federal Court. (b) The law shall prescribe the manner in which the court shall be formed, its regulations, and its jurisdictions.

14. The permanent headquarters of the Federation of Arab Amirates shall be determined by a decision of the Supreme Council, which may meet in any other place specified.

15. The government of each Amirate shall manage its internal affairs which are not entrusted to the Federation under this agreement or which are not provided for by federal laws.

16. The Supreme Council of the Federation may, by a decision, amend this ageement— particularly if the amendment tends to make the ties among the member Amirates stronger and more firm. An amendment shall not be considered except in the session which follows the one in which the request for amendment is made.

17. This agreement shall be put into effect as of the beginning of the month of Muharram 1388, corresponding to 30 March 1968, pursuant to the regulations observed in each member Amirate and when a complete and permanent charter has been drawn up for the Federation.

This agreement is done in Dubai on 25 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1387, corresponding to 27 February 1968, in nine copies, one of which has been delivered to each member Amirate.

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SIGNATURES

'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah Ruler of Bahrain Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan Ruler of Abu Dhabi Ahmad ibn'Ali Al Thani Ruler of Qatar Rashid ibn Sa'id Al Maktum Ruler of Dubai Saqr ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah Khalid ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi Ruler of Sharjah Ahmad ibn Rashid al-Mu'alla Ruler of Umm al-Qaiwan Rashid ibn Humay'd an-Nu'aymi Ruler of Ajman Muhammad ibn Hamad ash-Sharqi Ruler of Fujairah

SOURCE: Al-Baharna, The Legal Status of the Arabian States, pp. 228-231.

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APPENDIX N

CHARTER OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL For the Arab States of the Gulf

The States of United Arab Emirates State of Bahrain Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Sultanate of Oman State of Qatar State of Kuwait

Being full aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and Based on their faith in the common destiny and destination that link their people; and Based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and, integration between them serve the higher goals of the Arab Nations; and In order to strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links; and In an endeavor to complement efforts already begun in all vital scopes that concern their peoples and realize their hopes in a better future on the path to unity of their States; and In conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds; and In order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE ONE

Establishment of Council

A council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf hereinafter referred to as Cooperation Council.

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ARTICLE TWO

Headquarters

The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

ARTICLE THREE

Cooperation Council Meetings

The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters and may convene in any member state.

ARTICLE FOUR

Objective

The basis objectives of the Cooperation Council are:

1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.

2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.

3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:

a. Economic and financial affairs b. Commerce, customs and communications c. Education and culture d. Social and health affairs e. Information and administrative affairs

4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, minerology, agriculture, water and animal resources; the establishment of scientific research centers; implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples.

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ARTICLE FIVE

Council Membership

The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign Ministers meeting held at Riyadh on 4 February 1981.

ARTICLE SIX

Organizations of the Cooperation Council

The Cooperation Council shall have the following main organizations:

1. Supreme Council to which shall be attached the Commission for Settlement of Disputes

2. Ministerial Council

3. Secretariat General

Each of the organizations may establish branch organs as necessary,

ARTICLE SEVEN

Supreme Council

1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed by heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotatory based on the alphabetical order of the names of the member states.

2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may be convened ac the request of any member seconded by another member.

3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territories of member states.

4. A Supreme Council's meeting shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

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ARTICLE EIGHT

Supreme Council's Functions

The Supreme Council shall endeavor to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council, particularly as concerns the following:

1. Review matters of interest to the member states.

2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it should follow.

3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval.

4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to prepare.

5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organizations.

6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for settlement of Disputes and nominate its members.

7. Appoint the Secretary-General.

8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.

9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.

10. Approve the Budget of the Secretariat-General.

ARTICLE NINE

Voting in Supreme Council

1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.

2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by majority vote.

ARTICLE TEN

Commission for Settlement of Disputes

1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for Settlement of Disputes" and shall be attached to the Supreme Council.

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2. The Supreme Council Shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the nature of the dispute.

3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.

4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

ARTICLE ELEVEN

Ministerial Council

1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or other delegated Ministers. The Council' s presidency shall rotate among members every three months by alphabetical order of the states.

2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.

3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.

4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.

ARTICLE TWELVE

Functions of the Ministerial Council

The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following;

1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and coordination between member states in the various fields and adopt required resolutions or recommendations concerning thereof,

2. Endeavor to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

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3. Submit recomendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action.

4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector activities, develop existing cooperation between the member states' chambers of commerce and industry, and encourage the flow of working citizens of the member states among them.

5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperations to one or more technical or specialized committee for study and presentation of relevant proposals.

6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate recomendations to the Supreme Council.

7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of Procedures of the Secretariat General.

8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three years.

9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary General, and submit recomendations to the Supreme Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat General.

10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda.

11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.

ARTICLE THIRTEEN

Voting at Ministerial Council

1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.

2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried unanimous vote of the member states present and participating in the vote, and in procedural matters by majority vote.

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ARTICLE FOURTEEN

Secetariat-General

1. The Secretariat General shall be composed of a Secretary- General who shall be assisted by assistants and a number of staff as required.

2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be renewed for one time only.

3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries general.

4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat General's staff from among the citizens of member states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the Ministerial Council.

5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat General and the smooth flow of work in its various organizations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other parties within the powers vested in him.

ARTICLE FIFTEEN

Functions of the Secretariat General

The Secretariat General shall undertake the following functions:

1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, and to integarated plans and programs for member states' common action.

2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.

3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.

4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.

5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.

6. Prepare the Cooperation Council is budgets and closing accounts.

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7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agendas and draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council.

8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary session of the Council whenever necessary.

9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.

ARTICLE SIXTEEN

The Secretary General and the assistant secretaries' general and all the Secretariat General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of the member states.

They shall refrain from any action or behavior that is incompatible with their duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.

ARTICLE SEVENTEEN

Privileges and Immunities

1. The Cooperation Council and its organization shall enjoy on the territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize their objective and carry out their functions.

2. Representatives of the member states on the Council, and the Council, and the Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose between the member states. A special agreement shall organize the relation between the Council and the state in which it has its headquarters.

3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similir organizations.

ARTICLE EIGHTEEN

Budget of the Secretarial General

The Secretariat General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal amounts.

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ARTICLE NINETEEN

Charter Implementation

1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of states of the six member states named in this Charter's preamble.

2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state, pending the establishment of the Secretariat General at which time the latter become depository.

ARTICLE TWENTY

Amendments to Charter

1. Any member state may request an amendment of this Charter.

2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.

3. An amendment shall become effective if unanimously approved by the Supreme Council.

ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE '

Closing Provisions

No reservations may be voiced in respect to the provisions of this Charter.

ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO

The Secretariat General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.

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This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981.

United Arab Emirates State of Bahrain Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Sultanate of Oman State of Qatar State of Kuwait

SOURCE: Gulf Information and Research Center: 12 Henriette Street, Convent Garden, London, WC2.

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APPENDIX 0

THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

With the help of the God Almighty; The Governments of the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council; In accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer reapproachment and stronger links; and. Desiring to promote, expand and enhance their economic ties on solid foundations, in the best interest of their peoples; and Intending to coordinate and unify their economicl financial and monetary policies, as well as their commercial and industrial legislation, and customs regulations. Have Agreed as follows:

CHAPTER ONE TRADE EXCHANGE

Article 1

a. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they shall permit exportation thereof to other member states.

b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin shall receive the same treatment as national products.

Article 2

1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin shall be exempted from customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect.

2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, haulage or unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on domestic products.

Article 3

For products of national origin to qualify as national products, the value added ensuing from their production in

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members states shall not be less than 40% of their final value. In addition, the share of the member states citizens in the ownership of the producing plan shall not be less than 51%.

2. Every item to be exempted hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate of origin duly authenticated by the government agency concerned.

Article 4

1. Member states shall establish a uniform minimum customs tariff applicable to the products of the third countries.

2. One of the objectives of the uniform customs tariff shall be the protection of national products from foreign competition.

3. The uniform customs tariff shall be applied gradually within five years from the date of entry into force of this agreement. Arrangements for the gradual application shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.

Article 5

Member states shall grant all facilities for the transit of any member state's goods to other member states, exempting them from any duties and taxes, whatsoever, without prejudice to the revisions of paragraph 2 of Article 2.

Article 6

Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a member state by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the customs authorities of the member states.

Article 7

Member states shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other states and regional economic groupings and blocs with a view towards creating balanced trade relations and favourable circumstances and terms of trade therewith.

To achieve this goal, the member states shall made the following arrangements:

1. Coordinate import/export policies and regulations.

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2. Coordinate economic policies for building up strategic food stocks.

3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when and if the common benefit of the member states is realized.

4. Work for the creation of a collective negotiating force to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis foreign parties in the field of importation of basic needs and exportation of major products.

CHAPTER TWO MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL CITIZENS AND EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Article 8

The member states shall agree on the executive rules which would insure that each member state shall grant the citizens of all other member states the same treatment granted to its own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in the following fields:

1. Freedom of movement, work and residence.

2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.

3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.

4. Free movement of capital.

Article 9

The member states shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish point ventures in order to link their citizens' economic interest in the various spheres.

CHAPTER THREE COORDINATION OF DEVELOPMENT

Article 10

The member states shall endeavour to achieve coordination and harmony among their respective development plans with a view to achieving economic integration between them.

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Article 11

1. The member states shall endeavor to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, exploitation, of natural gas, and development of energy sources.

2. The inember states shall endeavor to formulate unified oil policies and adopt common positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in the international and specialized organizations.

Article 12

To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the member states shall perform the following:

1. Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms aiming at the industrial development and the diversification of their productive bases on an integrated basis.

2. Standarize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local production units to meet their needs.

3. Allocate industries between member states according to relative advantages and economic feasibilityr encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary industries.

Article 13

Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the member states shall pay special attention to the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industryl agriculture and services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve economic integration, productive interface, and common development on sound economic basis.

CHAPTER FOUR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Article 14

The member states shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical cooperation aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet the region's progress and development objectives.

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Article 15

Member states shall set rules, make arrangement and lay down terms for the transfer of technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve their various needs. Member states shall also whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments and scientific or commercial firms to achieve these objectives.

Article 16

The member states shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs for technical, vocational and professional training rehabilitiation at all levels and stages. They shall also upgrade educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development needs of the member states.

Article 17

The member state shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and standardized criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful competition among themselves and to optimize the utilization of available human resources.

CHAPTER FIVE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION

Article 18

The member states shall accord means for passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the other member states, when transiting or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord to the means of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their own citizens, including exemption from all duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, local transportations are excluded.

Article 19

1. The member states shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation, and communications. They shall also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such as seaports, airports, water and power stations, roads, with a

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view to realizing common economic development and linking their economic activities with each other.

2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies among them and promote all spheres of joint activities at various levels.

Article 20

The member states shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any member state to freely use the various ports facilities and grant them the same treatment and privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage, and docking services, haulage, loading and unloading maintenance! repair, storage of goods and other similar services.

CHAPTER SIX FINACIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION

Article 21

The member states shall seek to unify investment in order to achieve a common investment policy aimed at directing their internal and external investments towards serving their interests, and realizing their peoples' aspirations in development and progress.

Article 22

The member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including an endeavor to establish a common currency in order to further their desired economic integration.

Article 23

Member states shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere of international and regional development aid.

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CHAPTER SEVEN CLOSING PROVISIONS

Article 24.

In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting therefrom, consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development between the member states and the local development priorities of each. Any member state may be temporarily exempted from applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a specified period and shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council.

Article 25

No member state shall give to any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that given herein.

Article 26

a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the Supreme Council.

b. This Agreement may be amended by the consent from the Supreme Council.

Article 27

In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of member states, execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

Article 28

Provision herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreements.

Drawn up at Riyadh on 6 Sha'ban 1401 Corresponding to 8 June 1981.

SOURCE: Gulf Information and Research Center: 12, Henrietta St., Convent Garden, London, WC2.

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APPENDIX P

THE COOPERATION COUNCIL For The Arab States of the Gulf Rules of Procedures Commission for Settlement of Disputes

Preamble

In accordance with the provisions of Article Six of the Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council; and

In execution of the provision of article Ten of the Cooperation Council Charter, A commission for Settlement of Disputes, hereinafter referred to as The Commission, shall be set up and its jurisdiction and rules for its proceedings shall be as follows;

ARTICLE ONE

Terminology

Terms used in these Rules of Procedures shall have the same meaning established in the Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council.

ARTICLE TWO

Commission's Seat and Meetings

The Commission shall have its headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and shall hold its meetings on the territory of the state where its headquarters is located, but may hold its meetings elsewhere, when necessary.

ARTICLE THREE

Jurisdiction

The Commission shall, once installed, have jurisdiction to consider the following matters referred to it by the Supreme Council:

a. Disputes between member states

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Differences of opinion as to the interpretation or execution of the Cooperation Council Charter.

ARTICLE FOUR

Commission's Membership

a. The Commission shall be formed of an appropriate member of citizen or member states not involved in the dispute as the Council selects in every case separately depending onthe nature of the dispute, provided that the number shall not be less than three members.

b. The Commission may seek the advice of any such experts as it may deem necessary.

C. Unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise, the Commission's task shall end with the submission of its recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council which, after the conclusion of the Commission's task, may summon it at any time to explain or elaborate on its recommendations or opinions.

ARTICLE FIVE

Meetings and Internal Procedures

a. The Commission's meeting shall be valid if attended by all members.

b. The Secretariat General of the Cooperation Council shall prepare procedures required to conduct the Commission's affairs, and such procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Ministerial Council.

c. Each party of the dispute shall send representatives to the Commission who shall be entitled to follow proceeding and present their defense.

ARTICLE SIX

Chairmanship

The Commission shall select a chairman from among its members.

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ARTICLE SEVEN

Voting

Every member of the Commission shall have one vote, and shall issue its recommendations or opinions on matters referred to it by majority of the members. In case of a tie the party with chairman vote shall prevail.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Commission's Secretariat

a. The Secretary-General shall appoint a recorder for the Comission, and a sufficient number of employees to carry out the secretarial work.

b. The Supreme Council may create an independent organization carry out the Commission's secretarial work when the need arises.

ARTICLE NINE

Recommendation & Opinions

a. The Commission shall issue its recommendations or opinions in accordar;ce with the Cooperation Council's Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Shari'ah. The Commission shall submit its findings on the case on hand to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.

b. The Commission may, while considering any dispute referred to it and pending the issue of its final recommendations thereon, as the Supreme Council to take interim action called for by necessity and circumstances.

c. The Commission's recommendations or opinions shall spell out the reasons on which they were based and shall be signed by the Chairman and recorder.

d. If an opinion is passed wholly or partially by unanimous vote of the members the dissenting members shall be entitled to document their dissenting opinion.

ARTICLE TEN

Immunities and Privileges

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The Commission and its members shall enjoy such immunities and privileges in the territories of the member state as are required to realize its objectives and in accordance with Article Seventeen of the Cooperation Council Charter.

ARTICLE ELEVEN

Commission's Budget

The Commission's budget shall be considered part of the Secretarial General's budget. Remunerations of the Commission's members shall be established by the Supreme Council.

ARTICLE TWELVE

Amendments

a. Any member may request for amendments of these Rules of Procedures.

b. Requests for amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary- General who shall relay them to the member states by at least four months before submission to the Ministerial Council.

c. Any amendment shall be effective if approved unanimously by the Supreme Council.

ARTICLE THIRTEEN

Effective Date

These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Supreme Council.

These Rules of Procedures were signed at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.

United Arab Emirates State of Bahrain Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Sultanate of Oman State of Qatar State of Kuwait

SOURCE: Gulf Information and Research Center: 12, Henrietta Street, Convent Garden, London, WC2.

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253

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Public Documents

The Arabian Gulf Corporation Council. "The Final Declara tion of the Regular Session of the Supreme Council," issued in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E., May 26, 1981.

Saudi Arabia. Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Arbitration for the Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other, Vol. I, II, III, Cairo, n.p. 1955.

The United Arab Emirates. The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi, U.A.E., 1971.

United Kingdom. Arbitration concerning Buraimi and the Common Frontier between Abu Dhabi and Sa'udi Arabia; Memorial submitted by the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. London: HMSO, 1955.

Books

Abdullah, Muhammad Morsy. The United Arab Emirates; A Modern History. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968. Abshire, David and Cottrell, Alvin. The Gulf; Implication of British Withdrawal. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1969.

Albaharna, Husain M. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States : A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problem. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968. 254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255 Amin, Adaulamir. British Interests in the Persian Gulf Region; A Study in British Imperial Policy. London: Asian Publishing House, 1965. Anthony, John Duke. Arab States of the Lower Gulf; People. Politics, Petroleum. Washington, D.C.; The Middle East Institute, 1975.

______. Historical and Cultural of the Sultante of Oman and the Emirates of Eastern Arabia. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1976.

Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Oman and the Southern Coast of the Persian Gulf. Dhabrain: Research Branch of ARAMCO, 1952. Badger, George Percy, ed. History of Imams and Seyyid of Oman. New York, N.Y.; Burt Franklin Publisher, 1871.

Carter, J. R. L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982.

Churba, Joseph. Conflict and Tension Among the States of the Persian Gulf, Oman and South Arabia. Montgomery, Alabama: The Institute for Professional Development, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 1971. Cole, Donald P. Nomads of the Nomads. Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1975.

Drysdale, Alastair and Blake, Gerald H. The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1985.

El-Wady, Saif A. Ramahi. Economic and Political Evaluation in the Arabian Gulf States. New York: Carlton Press Inc., 1975. Gaury, Gerald de. Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia. London: Arthur Barber, 1966 and New York: Praeger, 1967. Graham, Gerald S. Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise. London: Ely House, Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1967.

Hay, Sir Rupert. The Persian Gulf States. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1959. Hawley, Donald. The Trucial States. London: Lowe and Brydone, 1970.

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Hay, Sir Rupert. The Persian Gulf States. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1959.

Helms, Christine Moss. The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia; Evolution of Political Identity. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Hertz, Robert Anton. Education and Manpower in the Arabian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: American Friends of the Middle East, 1972. Highan, Robin. British Imperial Routes, 1918-1939: The Story of Overseas Airlines. London; The Camelot Press, 1960. Holden, David and Johns, Richard. The House of Saud. Britain: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981. Holden, David. Farewell to Arabia. New York: Walker, 1966. Hopwood, Derek (ed.). The Arabian Peninsula, Society and Politics. Totowa, Rowman and Littlefield, 1972.

Hudson, Michael C. Arab Politics; The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977. Kelly, J. B. Arabia, The Gulf and the West. New York; Basic Books, Inc., 1980. ______. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880. London: Ely House, Oxford University Press, 1968. ______. Eastern Arabian Frontiers. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1964. Kheirallah, George. Arabia Reborn. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952. Koury, Evener M. the United Arab Emirates : Its Political System and Politics. Hyattsville, Maryland: The Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, Inc., 1980. Kumar, Rau. Indian and the Persian Gulf Region: A Study in British Imperial Policy. London: Asian Publishing House, 1965. Lebkicher, Roy; Rentz, George; and Steiner, Max, with contributions by other ARAMCO employees. ARAMCO HANDBOOK. The Netherlands: Arabian Oil Company, 1960.

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Litwak, Robert. Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Inter-State Conflict. New Jersey: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc., 1981. Lorimer, J. G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Oman and Central Arabia. Calcutta: India Office, 1915 and Farnsborough, England: Gregg International, 1970.

Mann, Clarence. Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom. Rev. ed., Beirut: Khayats, 1969. Mikesell, Raymond F. and Chenery, Hollis B. Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East. Chapel Hill: The Uniyersity of North Carolina Press, 1949.

Monroe, Elizabeth. The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf. New York: American University Field Staff, Inc., 1972. Miles, S. M. The Counties and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London: S. M. Harrison and Sons, 1919 and Frank Cass, 1966. McKay, Margaret. Gulf Saga. New Delhi: Al-Asr Publications, 1985.

Muhammad, Ali Moulana. The Holy Quran. Lahore, Pakistan: 1951. Philby, H. St. John. Arabian Days: An Autobiography. London: Robert Hale, 1948.

Raman, K. Venkata, ed. Dispute Settlement Through the United Nations. Dallas, Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1977.

Sadik, Muhammad T. and Snavely, William P. Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates : Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972. Shaudran, Benjamin. The Middle East: Oil and the Great Powers. New York: John Riley and Sons, 1973.

Speiser, E.A. The United States and the Near East. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.

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Twitchell, K. S., with the collaboration of J. Jurji and R. Bayly Winder. Saudia Arabia: With an Account of the Development of its Natural Resources. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Winder, R. Bayley. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 224.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Origins of the United Arab Emirates : A Political and Social History of the Trucial States. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978.

Articles and Periodicals

Al-Khalee1. "The AGCO," No. 2751, November 2, 1986. ALRAI AL AAM, Tuesday, May 19, 1970, tenth year. No. 2436. Kuwait. Anthony, John Duke. "Arab American Relations : From Evangelism to Interdependence." MEED, November, 1977. Gulf News. Vol. 8, No. 210, April 27, 1986. Dubai, U.A.E.

Gulf News. October 13, 1986. Dubai, U.A.E. (An English Newspaper published in the Emirate of Dubai.) Heard-Bey, Frank. "Development Anomalies in the Bedouin Oasis of al-Liva." Asian Affairs. October, 1974.

Hogarth, D. G. "Wahabism and British Interests." British Institute of International Affairs. March, 1925. Kelly, J. B. "The Buraimi Dispute." International Affairs. July 1956. Lewis, C.C. "Ibn Saud and the Future of Arabia." International Affairs. July, 1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 Malone, Joseph. "America and the Arabian Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years." The Middle East Journal. Volume 30, November 3, 1976.

Padeford, Norman J. "Regional Organization and the United Nations," International OrganizationL Politics and Process. Goodrich, Leland M. and Kay, David A., eds. London: The University of Wisconsin Press, Ltd., 1973.

Rejai, M. and Enlose, C. "Nation-States and State-Nations." International Studies Quarterly. Vol. XIII, No. 2, June, 1969.

Roberts, David. "The Consequences of the Exclusive Treaties : A British View,: The Arab Gulf and the West, Pridham, B. R., ed. London and Sydney: Croora Helm Ltd., 1985.

Stork, Joe. "Prospect for the Gulf," MERIP REPORTS : The Future of the Gulf. Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc., No. 312, Vol. 15, No. 4. (May 1985).

The Times. Wednesday, November 16, 1955. Watt, D.C. "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf." Political Quarterly. July-September, 1968. Wilkison, J.C. "The Oman Question: The Background of the Political Geography of South-East Arabia." Geographical Journal, CXXXVII.

Unpublished Material: Dissertation

Said, Abdulrahman H. "Saudi Arabia: The Transition from a Tribal Society to a Nation-State." Ph.D. Dissertation, Uniyersity of Missouri, Columbia, 1979.

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Unpublished Material; Interviews

Al-Ghaith, Said. Personal interview, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. (State for Minister Council Affairs), October 15, 1986. Al-Qadhi, Saif. Personal interview. May 24, 1985. (He is a local judge and Iiranam of a mosque in Hamasa Village.) Al-Qasimi, Shaikh Mohammed bin Saqr. Personal interview, Sharjah, U.A.E., January 11, 1985. Al-Shamsi, Fatema Saeed. Personal interview, Sharjah, U.A.E., October 10, 1986.

Al-Shamsi, Rashid Obaid. Personal interview, Sharjah, U.A.E., October 10, 1986. Al-Shamsi, Rashid bin Saeed. Personal interview, Sharjah, U.A.E., Friday, January 18, 1985.

Al-Shamsi, Salim bin Omeer. Personal Interview, Al-Ain, May 16, 1986. (Salim was injured in the Al-Buraimi three day war and was a companion of Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad on his visit to Cairo in 1956. At the present time, he is working at the Al-Ain City Museum.) Al-Shamsi, Shaikhah Mozah bint Saeed. Personal interview, Sharjah, U.A.E., February 25, 1985. (She is the wife and cousin of Shaikh Rashid.) Henderson, E.F. Personal interview, Washington, D.C., 1979. (He is a representative and British diplomat, now retired and employed at the Documentation Center in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.) Rentz, George. Personal interview, Washington, D.C.: Thursday, February 19, 1981.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.