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EUBAM Libya Strategic Review 2021

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EUBAM Libya Strategic Review 2021 EEAS(2021) 174 Limited EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISP) Working document of the European External Action Service of 19/02/2021 EEAS Reference EEAS(2021) 174 Limited Distribution marking To [and/or GSC Political and Security Committee (PSC) distribution acronyms] Title / Subject EUBAM Libya Strategic Review 2021 [Ref. prev. doc.] ST 7248/20 EEAS(2021) 174 ISP.3 1 Limited EEAS(2021) 174 Limited Strategic Review of Operation EUBAM Libya – 2021 REFERENCES: A. COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2018/2009 of 17 December 2018 amending and extending Decision 2013/233/CFSP on the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya); B. Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya – EEAS (2020) 397 07 April 2020; C. Strategic Review on EUNAVFORMED IRINI – EEAS (2020) 13878 10 December 2020; D. EUBAM Libya Six-Monthly Report (2020) 10382 01 September 2020 E. UNSC Resolution 2510 (2020) of 12 February 2020 on the Berlin Conference; F. Operational Plan for the CSDP Mission EUBAM Libya EEAS (2020) 15023 30 November 2018; G. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact 14305/18 19 November 2018; H. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations of 18 June 2013, ST 7660/2/13. EEAS(2021) 174 ISP.3 2 Limited EEAS(2021) 174 Limited I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The outbreak of violence in Libya in April 2019 has severely affected institutional reunification and stability in Libya. However, the UN SRSG's three-step plan and the subsequent international conference in Berlin held on 19 January 2020 supports paving the way for intra-Libyan talks and conflict resolution. Elections have been announced for the 24 December 2021 and a Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 23 October, although its provisions (notably the withdrawal of all foreign fighters and the setup of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism) have not yet fully materialised. On 5th February, the 74 members of the LPDF selected a transitional unified executive authority for Libya composed of Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah as the Prime Minister and Mohammad Younes Menfi as the head of the Presidential Council. Menfi will serve with Mossa Al-Koni, and Abdullah Hussein Al-Lafi as vice-presidents in the Council. The process for the nomination and parliamentary endorsement of a new transitional government should be finalised by 19 March 2021. 2. The EU strongly supports the implementation of the Berlin process for Libya and the UN-led efforts to push for progress in the intra-Libyan talks on the political process, security and economy. As a decisive step, the EU launched EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI. In addition, the Council expressed the EU commitment to support the operationalisation of each of the six thematic baskets agreed at the Berlin conference. 3. The political situation and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected the deployment and activities of a number of international actors throughout Libya. The security situation remains of concern in the country, and even more with regards to human rights and gender. Border management, counter-terrorism and fight against organised crime continue to show severe lacks. The current threat rating assessed as "high" in Libya, the political and security situation, as well as the current COVID 19 pandemic are likely to continue hampering the international support to the peace process in Libya. 4. International efforts to stabilise the country through the full implementation of the Berlin process are led by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), under the principle of national ownership. UNSMIL is mandated to provide for the coordination of international assistance, advice and assistance to the internationally-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) to consolidate the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Libyan transition process. EEAS(2021) 174 ISP.3 3 Limited EEAS(2021) 174 Limited 5. The EU is actively engaged in support to the UN-led efforts both through CSDP (and the EULPC) and cooperation/financial support. The EU Liaison and Planning Cell provides significant support to UNSMIL and EU on security analysis. In addition, EU Member States are engaged in Libya on a bilateral basis or in support to broader actions. International actors are also involved in an increasing manner. Some international actors’ involvement include defence and military support at various degrees. 6. While there has been considerable progress made by the Mission in implementing its mandate, the security and political environment and the COVID-19 pandemic have severely affected EUBAM's efforts to fully achieve its objectives. EUBAM Libya remains, however, a credible and high profile actor amongst its Libyan counterparts and within the international community. It is deployed in Tripoli and implemented activities when many others have not been able to do so. 7. EUBAM’s support has, to date, been limited only to the (internationally recognised) GNA which has prevented EUBAM from exploring the possibilities to support other relevant Libyan non-State actors (where there is little or no GNA control or presence, including in the Eastern part and the South). The recent election of a new interim executive authority, welcomed by the international community, may address this gap in the future. However, at the time of drafting this SR, the appointment of a new government and its endorsement by the Parliament has not yet taken place and uncertainties remain on future political developments. 8. Looking at possible future scenarios for Libya, there remains a degree of uncertainty in regard to a possible ceasefire and a political process leading to the establishment of a unity Government, despite the selection of an interim executive authority on 5th February. Much will depend on the progress of the UN Action Plan and the Berlin process, but should there be a political breakthrough, good opportunities should arise for further enhancing the contribution of EUBAM Libya in the implementation of the Berlin Process. 9. This review looks to identify opportunities which could derive from improvement in the political and security conditions in Libya and progress within the framework of the Berlin process. The Mission mandate should allow appropriate flexibility and readiness in responding to emerging needs in the future. Therefore, it is recommended: - To extend EUBAM Libya's mandate for two years until 30 June 2023; EEAS(2021) 174 ISP.3 4 Limited EEAS(2021) 174 Limited - To amend EUBAM's Libya's mandate with the addition of a second strategic objective to support the UN-led efforts as a visible sign of the EU's commitment to operationally contribute to the outcomes of the Berlin process: o Strategic Objective 1 - EUBAM Libya is to assist the relevant Libyan authorities in the building of state security structures in Libya, in particular in the areas of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice, with a view to contributing to efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved notably in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism in Libya and the Central Mediterranean region. o Strategic Objective 2 - Within the scope of its core areas of engagement (law enforcement, border management and criminal justice) EUBAM Libya is to contribute to the UN-led efforts for the peace process in the country. As for Strategic Objective 2, the Mission may provide additional support on the basis of a dedicated strategic analysis to be conducted by the EEAS and presented to the Council for decision. - To coordinate with Operation IRINI and EULPC as appropriate and seek best ways of cooperation and mutual support, as well as with CSDP Missions and Operations in Sahel. - To coordinate as well, with the same purpose and as appropriate, with other EU actors engaged in Libya, including EU-funded projects. - To continue to implement relevant and appropriate commitments of the Civilian CSDP Compact. - To continue the dialogue with the Libyan authorities to secure the legal status of the Mission (SOMA). EEAS(2021) 174 ISP.3 5 Limited EEAS(2021) 174 Limited II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 10. This Strategic Review (SR) of EUBAM Libya assesses the progress of the Mission in implementing its current mandate and the relevance of its mandate in regard to the political and security situation in Libya as well as what other actors are or intend to do in the country and region. This SR also looks to identify opportunities for continued engagement in Libya and sets out recommendations for the way ahead. Finally, it provides an outline of the EU Liaison and Planning Cell (EULPC) activities and informs on its potential ways forward. 11. The SR has been conducted against the backdrop of a much-changed context, due to the progress of the Berlin Process for Libya, the evolution of the conflict dynamics, and the agreement on a country-wide ceasefire reached between the parties on 23 October 2020. 12. The current mandate of EUBAM Libya will expire on 30 June 2021. A decision by Member States on the future of the Mission needs to be taken in light of Council working group discussions on the findings of this SR and the broader political and security situation in Libya, the Central Mediterranean and the surrounding region. 13. The last EUBAM Strategic Review was presented to the Member States on 7 April 2020, but was not discussed in substance: PSC took note of the SR and a one-year “technical” extension was granted, with an “unchanged mandate”. This SR is, therefore, based on the EUBAM mandate adopted by the Council in June 2018, also taking into consideration the main findings of the last SR distributed to Member States in April 2020. 14. The SR has been conducted in compliance with the "Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations - June 2013" and under the responsibility of the High Representative (HR).
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