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The Nicaraguan Revolution and Revolutionary Theory

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The Nicaraguan Revolution and Revolutionary Theory Mark Everingham. Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. xvi + 218 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8229-3933-7. Reviewed by Charles L. Stansifer Published on H-LatAm (April, 1998) A decade ago, when I read John A. Booth's The (1938), in which he discusses common elements in End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolu‐ the English, French, American, and Russian revo‐ tion, I was mildly disappointed by his neglect of lutions, have not failed to search for parallels theoretical causes of revolution. Now that I have among Latin American revolutions. Throughout read Mark Everingham's Revolution and the Mul‐ this book Everingham makes numerous compar‐ ticlass Coalition in Nicaragua, which attempts to isons between the Nicaraguan revolution and oth‐ put the Nicaraguan revolution in theoretical con‐ ers. The problem here, and it is a serious one, is text, I am ready to conclude that with regard to that the reader is not provided with a defnition of the Nicaraguan revolution, the less theory the bet‐ revolution that could be used to make a meaning‐ ter. To be fair, Everingham deserves praise for ful comparison. The failure to distinguish be‐ contributing, in the frst two chapters, a cogent lit‐ tween genuine social upheavals with significant erature survey of revolutionary theory and of de‐ changes in the balance of political power and so‐ pendency. The principal problem is that in the at‐ cial classes on the one hand and mere movements tempt to be comprehensive (among those summa‐ against authoritarian rule on the other leads to rized are Easton, Frank, Goldstone, Gurr, Hunting‐ confusion. ton, Lipset, Moore, Poulantzas, Przeworski, Sck‐ Although Everingham appears to believe that ocpol, Tilly, Wallerstein, and Wickham-Crowley), what happened in Nicaragua in 1979 was a signif‐ the Nicaraguan revolution still appears to Ever‐ icant social upheaval, it helps little to compare ingham, a professor of social change and develop‐ such movements as the overthrow of Alfredo ment and political science, to be "unique." Most Stroessner of Paraguay in 1989 and the movement historians, perhaps because of their distrust of against Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1990 with the theory, had already arrived at that conclusion. Sandinista revolution. With more justification, Ev‐ Historians of revolution, following Crane eringham compares Nicaragua with Cuba and Brinton's classic The Anatomy of Revolution Mexico. Even in these cases the comparison is of‐ H-Net Reviews ten superficial. For example, in comparing the Salvador--a hated personalist dictator like So‐ Nicaraguan and Mexican revolutions, Evering‐ moza--was not the crucial factor in the failure of ham repeatedly refers to the alliance of the busi‐ the FMLN. The failure of the Salvadoran revolu‐ ness elites with the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua tion, he concludes, was a result of the inability of and with the Porfirio Diaz dictatorship in Mexico. the revolutionaries to crack the solidarity of the In the effort to show that business elites of business elites. Unlike Nicaragua, the business Nicaragua were unusual in joining popular class‐ elites of El Salvador remained solidly behind the es against Somoza, he appears to assume that government and the military. business elites were uniformly supportive of Diaz. While I believe this comparison of El Salvador However, a significant segment of business elites and Nicaragua is much needed, I am not at all in Mexico in 1910 were unhappy with Diaz and convinced that Everingham's interpretation is cor‐ joined with other classes in the revolution to over‐ rect. It leaves out too much. For example, the de‐ throw him. It is enough to remember the role of gree of anti-Americanism in Nicaragua in 1979, a Francisco Madero to make the point. Unfortunate‐ heritage of a perceived too close relationship be‐ ly, in my opinion, the drive to ft a particular tween the United States government and the So‐ event in the theoretical literature and the lack of moza dynasty and the presence of United States definitional precision get in the way of an under‐ Marines on Nicaraguan soil for many years, had standing of the Nicaraguan revolution. no counterpart in El Salvador. Also, there is the is‐ Nevertheless, there are two significant contri‐ sue of timing, not discussed at all by Everingham. butions of this book. As the title indicates, Ever‐ While one might argue that the momentum of the ingham's thesis is that business elites in Nicaragua FSLN victory might have carried over to the were sufficiently dependent on the Somoza dicta‐ FMLN, which is certainly what both movements torship since about 1950 that they could not, as a hoped for, the counterargument that the FSLN class, support the revolution. His careful analysis victory led to greater resistance by business class‐ of banking, agribusiness, commerce, and industry es in El Salvador and a greater commitment by and their halting attempts to fnd a political posi‐ the United States to insure that the next revolu‐ tion apart from the Somoza dictatorship goes be‐ tionary effort did not succeed is even more per‐ yond previous studies of Nicaraguan politics and suasive. A comparative analysis of the FSLN lead‐ business before 1979. Everingham makes excel‐ ership with that of the FMLN might also provide lent use of the political diary of Pedro Joaquin insight into the contrasting results of the two Chamorro and extensive interviews of represen‐ movements. That is also missing. Lastly, the vast tatives of the Nicaraguan business elite of the difference between the appeal to Nicaraguans of 1970s to clarify the relationships of various busi‐ Augusto Sandino, who was a Nicaraguan patriot ness groups to the Somoza dictatorship. first and no ideologue, and the lack of appeal of A second contribution is the lengthy discus‐ Farabundo Marti, a Communist, to the vast major‐ sion of the success of the Frente Sandinista de Lib‐ ity of Salvadorans, must have had something to eracion Nacional as compared with the failure of do with the failure of the FMLN. Everingham's dis‐ the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Na‐ cussion of the two significant movements in cional en El Salvador. The decision to compare the neighboring Central American countries is highly two cases is valid and could be an important step useful, but it is not necessarily convincing. in understanding Latin American revolutions. Ev‐ Copyright (c)1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ eringham discounts the dictatorship argument, served. This work may be copied for non-profit, suggesting that the absence of an easy target in El educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ 2 H-Net Reviews thor and the list. For other permissions, please contact H-Net at [email protected]. If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-latam Citation: Charles L. Stansifer. Review of Everingham, Mark. Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua. H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. April, 1998. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1966 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 3.
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