The Crisis of NATO Political Consultation, 1973–1974 from DEFCON III to the Atlantic Declaration

The Crisis of NATO Political Consultation, 1973–1974 From DEFCON III to the Atlantic Declaration

✣ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

Introduction: The 1973 Crisis and the NATO Context

By the early 1970s, the international community found itself facing a new and expanding agenda. “New frontier” issues, such as human rights, scien- tiﬁc cooperation (computers, satellites, the sea bed, the environment, etc.), monetary affairs, and the 1973–1974 energy crisis posed thorny problems for diplomats and political leaders, who additionally had to cope with older power struggles, upheavals in the Third World, and the problems accompanying the pursuit of détente with the USSR. An ambitious European Community (EC), strengthened by its northern enlargement, tried to institutionalize its political cooperation and sought a new voice in its dealings with its major partner, the United States. The U.S. government, under President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, undertook creative initiatives toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China but became impatient with the European allies and suffered disappointments in the Third World. The “Year of Europe” in 1973, proclaimed unilaterally by Kissinger, embarrassed the Europeans whom it intended to honor and ended inglori- ously when West European ofﬁcials saw U.S. initiatives during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war as heavy-handed and potentially dangerous for the security of the alliance. Dependent on Arab oil, many European allies refused to support U.S. policy in the Middle East, and Nixon and Kissinger, for their part, felt that U.S. allies had let them down at a critical moment.1

1. On transatlantic dilemmas and the 1973 war, see, inter alia, Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 404–457; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 195–201; Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since

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This article discusses the crisis that the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war sparked in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. initiatives caused a strong reaction by the Europeans and led to a search for improvements in allied consultation, especially with regard to “out-of-area” crises. However, it soon became clear that the problem could not be solved merely by the adoption of new procedures and instead was a matter of the “will to consult.” By summer 1974, the crisis had been partly defused with the publication of the “Atlantic Declaration” and a more practical restructuring of consultation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and at lower levels. Dur- ing an era of multiple transitions, NATO opted to contain the problem rather than to adopt a radical solution. At the same time, the episode attested to the resilience of institutionalized transatlantic bonds, which NATO expressed. This article is not an account of the wider transatlantic crisis and dilemmas of 1973 but of only one aspect of the problem, the process of intra-alliance consultation. The article is based on NATO, U.S., and British archives. The United States and Britain had pivotal roles in NATO political consultation, and their primary sources offer a valuable picture of intra-alliance deliberations, complementing the alliance’s own archival material. NATO was always more than a strictly military structure: It was a union of sovereign (though unequal) states coming together to defend territory as well as values. This aspect of the alliance was one of NATO’s major advan- tages during the Cold War.2 The coordination of ﬁfteen sovereign states in an

1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 142–167; Marc Trachtenberg, “The Structure of Great Power Politics, 1963–1975,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 482–502; Matthew Ferraro, Tough Going: Anglo-American Re- lations and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 (New York: iUniverse, 2007); Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 166–195; Salim Yaqub, “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Con- flict,” in Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 227–248; Geraint Hughes, “Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies,Vol.10, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 3–40; Alex Spelling, “‘Recrimination and Reconciliation’: Anglo-American Relations and the Yom Kippur War,” Cold War History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 2013), pp. 485–506; Daniel Möckli, “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity: the EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of Europe,” in Matthias Schultz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds., The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 195–220; Luke A. Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World (New York: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2015), pp. 103–157; and Effie G. H. Pedaliu, “‘A Sea of Confusion’: The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969–1974,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 735–750. 2. Jeremi Suri, “The Normative Resilience of NATO: A Community of Shared Values amid Pub- lic Discord,” in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, eds., Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 15–30; Beatrice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideas and Costs (London: Royal Institute of Inter- national Affairs, 1996); and Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and

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intergovernmental organization (one that worked on the principle of unanimity) was a momentous task requiring significant diplomatic skill. The prime aim of NATO—the very precondition for fulfilling its role in defense—was thus the guarding of its own unity. However, unity became significantly more difficult to attain in the 1960s, when the immediate danger of war in Europe receded and Charles de Gaulle mounted his challenge to the United States and NATO. The two major reforms of the alliance, in 1956 and 1967, focused on the need to improve political cooperation that would guard transatlantic unity. The 1956 “Report of the Three” set up a mechanism of allied political and economic consultation; namely, the two standing Committees of Political and Economic Advisers.3 The 1967 “Harmel Report” created a more partici- patory structure for the alliance, which would also assume significant roles in the search for détente.4 Allied cooperation was a multifaceted challenge. It was evident that NATO should consult and plan its actions to defend the North Atlantic area according to Article 5 of the 1949 treaty. However, the problem always appeared in more acute form when “out-of-area” crises arose.5 Consultation among NATO members about these issues was an accepted norm, although they had no obligation to agree on action about them. Consultation on out- of-area problems developed slowly after the 1956 Suez crisis, when the Politi- cal Advisers and specialized expert working groups prepared biannual reports on the Middle East (from 1957), the Far East (1958), Africa (1959), Latin America (1961), and the Mediterranean (1970).6 The problem was that in the 1960s and 1970s the Cold War in the periphery was intensifying—a sign

Policies, 1949–56,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 35, (Washington, DC: Cold War International His- tory Project, 2002). 3. Winfried Heinemann, “‘Learning by Doing’: Disintegrating Factors and the Development of Polit- ical Cooperation in Early NATO,” in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conﬂicts (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2008), pp. 43–57; and Evan- this Hatzivassiliou, NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Analysis and Reporting, 1951–1969 (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 56–74. 4. See mostly James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–1968 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 108–116, 170–178; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 320–374; Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, Amer- ica and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–68 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 135–137; and Andreas Wanger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74. 5. Frode Liland, “Explaining NATO’s Non-policy on Out-of-Area Issues during the Cold War,” in Gustav Schmidt, ed., A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, 3 vols. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), Vol. 1, 173–189. 6. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Out-of-Area: NATO Perceptions of the Third World, 1957–1967,” Cold War History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 67–88; and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The Cold War as

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of the globalization of Cold War power struggles.7 NATO was not equipped to deal with these crises. Indeed, Vietnam caused huge internal problems in the alliance: European reserve about U.S. policy strengthened political forces in the United States, even in Congress, who were calling for reductions in U.S. military forces in Europe. This in turn tended to amplify the constant Euro- pean fear of “abandonment” from the major ally.8 In his memoirs, Kissinger suggests that the attitude of the European NATO members during the Yom Kippur War was “legalistic.”9 This was only partially accurate. The problem of out-of-area crises was an old and constant one and went much deeper than just legal issues. In the case of the October 1973 war, the challenges of an out-of-area crisis emerged in completely new forms and threatened to endanger the alliance’s established processes. Moreover, the 1973 war was the catalyst that highlighted the need for readjustment at a time of greater transitions in international affairs. The EC members, who were in the process of reasserting their own roles and projecting a regional policy in the Mediterranean, feared that superpower détente could entail U.S.-Soviet deals over their heads or that superpower tension in the Middle East could start a major conﬂict in which they would inevitably be involved.10 By autumn 1973, President Georges Pom- pidou’s France was making a “return to ‘Gaullist orthodoxy,’” and this also played a role in the ﬁrst months of the crisis when Paris appeared extremely upset, even at times aggressive, over U.S. conduct.11 At the same time, the EC’s growth created fears in NATO. For example, in 1972 the Secretary General of the alliance, Joseph Luns, repeatedly expressed to the British his concern

a Frontier: The Mediterranean Cleavages and the View from NATO, 1967–1982,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 21, No.1 (Summer 2015), pp. 13–32. 7. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 158–249. 8. See, Effie G. H. Pedaliu, “Transatlantic Relations at a Time When ‘More Flags’ Meant ‘No Euro- pean Flags’: The US, Its European Allies and the War in Vietnam, 1964–1974,” International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Summer 2013), pp. 556–575. 9. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), p. 711. 10. See, among others, Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, “Europe between the Superpowers, 1968– 1981,” in Antonio Varsori and Guia Migani, eds., Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s: Entering a Different World (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 85–97; Hubert Zimmermann, “Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965–1973,” in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 127–155; and Elena Calandri, “The United States, the EEC and the Mediterranean: Rivalry or Complementarity?” in Elena Calandri, Daniele Caviglia, and Antonio Varsori, eds., Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 33–48. 11. Georges-Henri Soutou, “Georges Pompidou and US-European Relations,” in Trachtenberg, ed., Between Empire and Alliance, pp. 157–200.

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that the nascent EC political cooperation would allow EC members to reach agreements outside NATO and present the alliance with faits accomplis.12 U.S. policymakers were also at a difficult juncture. In the spring of 1973, the State Department noted that “[a]llied cohesion is likely to be threatened by increasing centrifugal forces, accentuated by pressures for détente” and by the assertion of the EC’s new political identity.13 However, by October 1973 the pressure was immense on U.S. policymakers, who needed to make far- reaching decisions instantly, without having the time to consult the Euro- peans in any meaningful way. In turn, European reserve tended to maximize American disappointment with the allies. To make matters worse, the crisis coincided with the peak of Watergate. With President Nixon preoccupied by his internal problems, the burden of decision-making on the external front was placed on Secretary of State Kissinger. In his memoirs, Kissinger expresses resentment toward the allies who could not deliver. He accuses the EC members of using the deliberations concerning an Atlantic Declaration “for forging their own emergent institutions.” In the Arab-Israeli war, he noted, Europe pursued a policy not only “separate” but also “objectively” in conflict with U.S. policy. French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert was “the impresario of el- egant obfuscation.”14 Kissinger was sincere in his memoirs. The documents of 1973–1974 show this is exactly how he felt. Thus, the 1973 war, the idiosyncratic personality of Kissinger, and the historical moment (a time when Europe was seeking a new institutionaliza- tion, but also the time of the first oil shock that damaged the West’s economic self-confidence) combined to raise important questions about the nature and the functions of the Western alliance. It was a crisis of adjustment to the new trends of globalization that were becoming manifest exactly then.

DEFCON III

The search for improved consultation in NATO had started before the Arab- Israeli war. The idea of an Atlantic Declaration had been suggested in April

12. Record (Luns, Douglas-Home), 27 March 1972, in FCO 41/967, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK); and Record (Luns, Greenhill), 28 March 1972, in FCO 41/967, TNAUK. 13. “NATO’s Long-Range Prospects,” Paper presented in the Bureau of European and Canadian Af- fairs, n.d. [ca. Spring 1973], in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 49–60 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers). 14. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 700–720.

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1973 by Kissinger as a way to revitalize the alliance. Initially, he had envisaged two separate declarations, one on Atlantic relations and another between the United States and “the Nine.” By early autumn, the NATO Senior Political Committee had reviewed the drafts for the Atlantic Declaration that various delegations had submitted and referred the issue to the NAC.15 At that point, the French tabled their own draft. This was warmly welcomed by the other delegations insofar as French participation opened the way for a substantive declaration, but at the same time it brought to the fore U.S.-French disagreements over the functioning of the alliance. The French wanted the declaration to acknowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union were vulnerable only to strategic nuclear weapons, whereas the European NATO members also had to consider tactical nuclear and conventional warfare. The French also wanted a reference to the progress of the EC but did not bring up the issue of burden sharing, which the United States had raised in the alliance. The NAC discussed these issues throughout October, together with the Arab- Israeli war.16 For some time, since September 1973 a parallel discussion had been taking place on the possible restructuring of the ministerial sessions of the NAC and of NATO’s Defence Planning Committee (DPC). The United States was in favor of abandoning the prepared statements by ministers and instead simply circulating them beforehand in writing so that discussions could be more focused. However, the smaller members were actively opposed to such a change. They wanted to take advantage of the alliance forum to present their perspectives, fearing that they would be eclipsed in a general discussion. France and Italy were against the restructuring of the ministerial NAC sessions, although they were receptive to applying such new procedures in the DPC.17 This was the context in which the October 1973 Mideast War posed unprecedented challenges for the NATO consultation machinery. In mid-October, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Andrew J. Goodpaster, signaled the NAC that the confrontation in the Middle East might proliferate and even involve NATO forces. He asked

15. NAC Memorandum, “Atlantic Relations,” 4 September 1973, CM(73)74, in NATO Archives, International Staff, Brussels. 16. North Atlantic Council Records CR(73)56, 16 October 1973, CR(73)57, 19 October 1973, CR(73)58, 26 October 1973, CR(73)59, 5 November 1973, CR(73)60, 7 November 1973, in NATO Archives. See also Rumsfeld to State Department, 12 and 19 September 1973, 3 October 1973, 04743 and 04768 of 5 October 1973, 04830 and 04831 of 10 October 1973, in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973– 79/Electronic Telegrams. 17. Luns to Permanent Representatives, 11 September 1973, PO/73/127, in NATO Archives; and NAC Record, 16 November 1973, CR(73)61, in NATO Archives.

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for a political appraisal, assessing the implications for the alliance, as had happened during the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis.18 On 15 October the Military Committee and the Political Committee discussed the SACEUR’s signal. The chairman of the Political Committee, the assistant Secretary-General for Po- litical Affairs, Jörg Kastl, noted that “it was of course not NATO’s business to go into the rights and wrongs of the conflict,” but to study the possibility of “escalation and its effects for the alliance.”19 Yet, a discussion of an out-of-area crisis was no simple matter. In its instructions to the British permanent representative, Sir Edward Peck, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) predicted that the discussion would prove embarrassing because some of the SACEUR’s points were “highly political and potentially divisive within the alliance (not least between us and the United States). . . . Against this background I am afraid you will have to stall to the extent possible.”20 Officials in Washington, however, were going even further than Goodpaster. On 15 October 1973, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council (NSC) staff expressed his disappointment to Kissinger: “A Europe that wants to be treated as an identity and as an ‘equal’ factor in international affairs, at the same time runs for cover in fear and aloof- ness, seeking to maintain the benefits of its association with us while avoid- ing the burdens.” Sonnenfeldt called for a common NATO action program.21 This mixture of reservations and expectations was a recipe for trouble. During the NAC session of 16 October, the U.S. permanent representative, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that the United States saw a collective role for NATO in the crisis. He pointed to the Soviet airlift, which had forced the U.S. government to start its resupply of Israel in order to maintain the Mid- dle Eastern balance. The West needed to draw red lines on détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which must not be permitted to think it could intervene in such an area with impunity. Rumsfeld proposed several steps to rein in Moscow: (1) a slowdown of Western participation in the talks to arrange the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); (2) pressure on pro-Arab countries such as Hungary and Yugoslavia to moderate their stance; and (3) a review of bilateral agreements with Moscow. However, the other NATO envoys saw the Rumsfeld statement as an attempt to impose U.S. policy concerning an out-of-area issue. André de Staercke, the Belgian permanent

18. Political Committee Record, 17 October 1973, AC119-R(73)121, in NATO Archives. 19. Peck to FCO, 15 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 20. Douglas-Home to Delegation NATO, 16 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 21. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 15 October 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 164–167.

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representative and dean of the Council (he had been serving on the NAC since 1952), was the person the Europeans relied on whenever they were anxious about heavy-handed U.S. policies. He accepted the need for allied solidar- ity but noted that the United States should keep the others fully informed. He also wondered: “Were we on the road to a new Cuban crisis?” The other European permanent representatives echoed his views.22 Reporting to the FCO, Peck was pessimistic. He thought the United States had made a mistake in bringing up the subject in that manner. Luns had been heard to say that détente was “dead as a dodo,” which embarrassed many allies. There was a prospect of an intra-NATO division between the countries that wanted a realistic settlement in the Mideast even at the cost of détente (the United States, Britain, West Germany, Greece, Turkey), and those that preferred to maintain détente in Europe (e.g., France), even if that meant ignoring developments elsewhere.23 The FCO agreed it was doubtful that Canada and the Europeans would support a U.S. policy on the Middle East that had been undertaken unilaterally. As for Rumsfeld’s suggestions, the FCO was quite reserved. A slowdown of the CSCE (which had now become a European responsibility) would prove ineffective. Would the United States also slow down the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks for which it was mainly responsible? No effective pressure could be brought to bear on Hungary and Yugoslavia, plus it was impossible to imagine the Hun- garians preventing the Soviet Union from using Hungarian airﬁelds. Eco- nomic measures would be only “a pinprick against the Soviet Union.”24 The FCO noted that economic measures against the Soviet Union would “embrace the whole Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia in a blanket barrage, which I should hope to avoid in almost any circumstances.”25 The employment of the term “blanket barrage,” so familiar because of Vietnam, was telling of the growing psychological tensions. On 17 October at the NAC, the allies, led by de Staercke, stressed that they wanted to help the United States but needed to be kept informed. François de Rose, the French representative, said that détente in Europe should not be put at risk because of an out-of-area conﬂict. But de Rose was

22. Peck to FCO, 16 October 1973 (two telegrams), in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. See also, Hughes, “Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War,” pp. 25–26; and Ferraro, Tough Going, p. 57. 23. Peck to FCO, 16 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 24. Douglas-Home to Delegation NATO, 17 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 25. Notes taken by Killick, 19 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; and Notes taken by Bullard, 23 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK.

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quickly isolated when Luns and the West German envoy, Franz Krapf, replied that détente was indivisible. On the same day, the Political Committee examined Kastl’s first political assessment, which laid the blame for the escalation on the Soviet Union and noted that détente was a global, not merely a Eu- ropean concept. Soviet behavior tested détente in Europe as well.26 However, others doubted this analysis. The British regarded the Soviet airlift as an as- surance against an Arab defeat, a step compatible with the effort to attain a negotiated settlement. Hence, in this judgment, the United States was probably overreacting.27 In the face of such disagreements, the new NAC session on 19 October was inconclusive. The session also suffered because of a leak of the previous NAC discussion to The Times of London. These leaks always angered U.S. officials, and Kissinger had already expressed reservations about the security of NATO procedures.28 He and others in Washington were bit- terly disappointed by the allies. On 23 October, Kissinger told his staff that “the Europeans behaved like jackals. Their behavior was a total disgrace.”29 The clouds were already gathering, but the “dramatic maneuver” to raise the U.S. alert to DEFCON III created a huge problem.30 Kissinger took this initiative at a moment when the Soviet Union was threatening to take unilateral action in the Middle East. He thus tried to draw a red line for Moscow and limit its freedom of action.31 In NATO, however, the U.S. move created multiple tensions. On the morning of 25 October, as press rumors circulated about the U.S. alert, Rumsfeld notified his NAC colleagues of the U.S. decision but asked them not to inform their governments. This was self-defeating. The Europeans were notified, not consulted, after the news had become common knowledge, and even then their permanent representatives were asked not to inform their governments of something that was being discussed in the press rooms. Rumsfeld had even asked everyone except the ambassadors to leave the room before making his announcement. On the next day at the NAC, many of the Europeans, with the French taking the lead, accused the United States of endangering the treaty area without consulting its allies. The

26. Peck to FCO, 17 October 1973 (three telegrams), in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 27. Notes taken by Killick, 19 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; and Notes taken by Bullard, 23 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 28. Peck to FCO, 19 October 1973 (three telegrams), in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 29. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, 23 October 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. 25, p. 692; and Record (Kissinger, Schlesinger), 24 October 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. 25, p. 724. 30. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 430. 31. See, inter alia, William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg, “Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate,” in Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn Lefﬂer, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War,3 vols. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Vol. 2, pp. 88–111.

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French were particularly angry that U.S. forces in Berlin (namely within the NATO area) had moved to higher alert without their French counterparts being informed. This time, de Rose was not isolated. De Staercke spoke in terms he had never used before of the U.S. government’s “manipulation” of its allies: “It should be blindingly obvious that if unilateral action by one country had consequences for the others, there was a legal and a moral duty to consult.” Italy and the Netherlands were also critical of U.S. policy. Only Peck noted that in times of crisis there was “a need for a single hand on the driving wheel.” Subsequently, Rumsfeld thanked Peck for his intervention.32 Admittedly, all sides had a point in the quarrel. The European objections involved both procedure and substance, as well as the apparent neglect of good manners in the NAC. For their part, U.S. ofﬁcials convincingly pointed out that they had little time for consultation given the pressing circumstances and that the cumbersome NATO procedures would be an obstacle for a quick decision. However, in his memoirs Kissinger makes an additional point that reveals an unusual degree of lack of conﬁdence in the allies:

We chose this timing above all because we knew that to obtain allied support we would have to give reassurances of the limits of our commitment; we preferred that these not reach Moscow via our allies until the Politburo had made at least a preliminary decision.33 The events of 25–26 October shocked the alliance. For several weeks, the foreign ministries appeared uncertain about what had happened and tried to assess the implications. Peck reported the fear of the European permanent representatives that Kissinger’s “brieﬁngs of NATO Ambassadors in Washing- ton should become the substitute for consultation in the NATO Council.”34 For the European members, the NAC, with its intergovernmental character (and their powers of veto), was their most important safeguard against U.S. domination. Although the British had been notiﬁed bilaterally by the United States, they were disappointed by what they described as the excessively secre- tive “Kissinger technique,” which failed to understand the difference between

32. Peck to FCO, 26 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; and Wiggin to Henderson (Bonn), 6 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK. See also Peck to Wiggin, 13 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK; Minute (Tickell), 30 October 1973, in FCO 41/1180, TNAUK; and Scott, Allies Apart, pp. 187–188. Even the British were embarrassed by the fact that U.S. nuclear forces stationed in Britain had moved to higher alert: See Hughes, “Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab- Israeli War,” pp. 28–31. 33. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 713. 34. Peck to Tickell, 29 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; and Cromer to Tickell, 6 Novem- ber 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK.

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notification and consultation on such a serious matter. An FCO minute, with the telling title “The Cuba Crisis,” implies that the United States had kept the European allies informed during the 1962 events, at least about the U.S. alert.35 In mid-November 1973, Peck pointed to what alarmed the allies about Kissinger’s methods. Kissinger, Peck stressed, “reacts strongly (rightly or wrongly) on the spot and then moves on so fast that his subordinates fail to catch up with him to seek authority to apply plasters, put up light- ing conductors or/the boat to an even keel (Sorry, my metaphors have got really mixed).”36 The British embassy in Washington remarked: “We are very far from the situation which existed in 1956.”37 This was an indication that the British perceived a real crisis of confidence. At the same time, in a rather clumsy effort to place the blame somewhere else, Kissinger’s aides implied to the allies that at the 16 October NAC Rumsfeld had overstepped his instructions. However, the British were certain this was not the case. Peck was sitting next to Rumsfeld during that session and noted that he was reading from his telegrams. In any case, U.S. diplomats commented to the British that the wording of the démarche was reminiscent of Kissinger.38 Kissinger in his memoirs notes that, although the British had been notified in advance, they simply “fell in with the prevailing brouhaha over inadequate consultation.”39 He refused to see the essence of British reserve. Amid the tension, mutual recriminations continued. Nixon and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt had a bitter exchange of letters regarding Bonn’s failure to allow the movement of military supplies from West Ger- many during the U.S. airlift to Israel, on the grounds that they were not intended for NATO purposes.40 By late October, U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey, and Nixon himself publicly expressed their disappointment with the European attitude, something extremely rare in NATO history. These statements embarrassed U.S. diplomats in Europe. Rumsfeld flew to Washington to plead for

35. Minute (Kerr), “The Cuba Crisis,” 30 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; Cromer to Peck, 12 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK; and Washington to FCO, 16 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK. 36. Peck to Wiggin, 13 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK. 37. Sykes to Peck, 16 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK. 38. Minute (Tickell), 23 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; Tickell to Sykes, 31 October 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK; Tickell to Sykes (Washington), 31 October 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK; Cromer (Washington) to Tickell, 6 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK; and Peck to Tickell, 8 November 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK. 39. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 712. 40. Kissinger to Embassy Bonn, 31 October 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 167– 170.

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better consultation with the allies.41 Early in November, during a ministerial session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group at The Hague (held immediately after the issuing of a statement of the Nine distancing them from the United States), the British Defence Secretary Lord Carrington quarreled with Schlesinger. The latter dismissed comparisons with 1962, stressing that the Soviet missiles then needed three to four weeks to become operational, whereas in 1973 there was no time because “Soviet troops had been ready to embark on their aircraft.”42 Meanwhile, the problem was exacerbated by the ongoing disagreements in the NAC over the Atlantic Declaration. In late October, de Rose noted that these deliberations should be deferred “after the events of the last few days.”43 This was subsequently presented by Kissinger as a suspension, not a mere postponement, of the discussions by the French, but the NATO documents do not conﬁrm such a grave assessment.44 The discussions restarted by mid-November, and a new French draft was criticized by the Canadians (and also by Luns) for treating NATO as “a bipolar relationship between a developing European Community and the United States without adequate reference to broad North Atlantic considerations.”45 In early December, the submission of detailed U.S. proposals about the declaration brought the U.S.- French differences fully to light.46 Last but not least, in the second half of November, the leak of the French draft of the declaration to Le Figaro and The New York Times added to Washington’s disappointment with the allies.47 The Figaro leak, especially, upset the Europeans as well. De Rose was clearly embarrassed, and de Staercke admitted in the NAC that it was like “Moses publishing the Ten Commandments before God gave them to him.”48 As the situation became increasingly confused, all parties tried to tone down the quarrel, mostly to avoid a further showdown at the forthcoming

41. Minute (Tickell), 30 October 1973, in FCO 41/1179, TNAUK; and Minute (Wiggin), 1 Novem- ber 1973, in FCO 41/1180, TNAUK. 42. Carrington (The Hague) to FCO, 6 November 1973, in FCO 41/1178, TNAUK. 43. McAuliffe (NATO) to State Department, 31 October 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 44. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 714. 45. NAC Record, 20 December 1973 (meeting of 21 November), CR(73)65, in NATO Archives; and Rumsfeld to State Department, 15, 21, and 22 November 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 46. NAC Record, 19 January 1974 (meeting of 5 December), CR(73)73, in NATO Archives. 47. Luns to Permanent Representatives (Council), 15 January 1974, PO/74/5, in NATO Archives. 48. Rumsfeld to State Department, 16 November 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams.

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ministerial NAC in December. Boosted by Rumsfeld’s advocacy, the State De- partment argued that all-out pressure on the allies would be counterproduc- tive. The United States had to improve NATO’s consultation machinery.49 But even this was attempted in a clumsy manner and created new problems. Dur- ing the permanent representatives’ lunch on 27 November, when the agenda of the forthcoming ministerial meeting was discussed, Rumsfeld suggested that the private meeting be conﬁned to the ministers, without the presence of the ambassadors. This suggestion had come from Kissinger but was a direct insult to the permanent representatives. As Peck reported, the idea “was wildly shouted down by the rest of us.” In a compromise typical of NATO processes, the envoys agreed that only ministers would be at the table, but the permanent representatives would be sitting on rear benches.50 During the ministerial NAC in Brussels on 10–12 December, the atmo- sphere was tense and was becoming worse because of ongoing transatlantic disagreements about the energy crisis. On 9 December, the foreign ministers of France, West Germany, Britain, and the United States had an inconclusive discussion. Kissinger complained that the Europeans were establishing their unity through a confrontation with the United States. The Europeans protested that they were not adequately informed about U.S. policies.51 This was hardly a good start. During the session of the ministerial NAC, Luns, from the chair, called for prudence and unity, as any NATO Secretary General was expected to do. But a quarrel broke out immediately afterward. French Foreign Minis- ter Jobert insisted that the United States had no right to demand common NATO action on an out-of-area crisis. Moreover, he noted, the June 1973 U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war made the Europeans doubt the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Kissinger refuted the latter allegation and expressed regret that Washington was unable to consult more fully with its allies about the 25 October alert. At the same time, he spared no words about the European failures to consult the United States on various levels, and he demanded reciprocity in consultation. He denied that the United States was trying to conﬁne the Europeans to a regional role. Quite the opposite, he said; it was the Europeans who acted timidly, as if they

49. Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff, “US Relations with Western Europe,” n.d. [Fall 1973], in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E- 15, pt. 2, pp. 170–172; and Memorandum, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “US Pressure Points on Western Europe,” 24 November 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 172–178. 50. Peck to McLaren (FCO), 27 November 1973, in FCO 41/1142, TNAUK. 51. Memorandum of conversation, 9 December 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 178–186.

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were merely a regional power. He suggested a restructuring of allied procedures, including meetings of the permanent NAC with political directors of the foreign ministries, in the model of EC processes. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home then stepped in to urge caution, reminding his colleagues that the Soviet Union still represented a severe threat. He suggested that NATO produce regular political-military assessments of crisis situations, which would give the allies the opportunity to gauge one another’s views. Finally, the ministers called for an improvement of allied consultation on out- of-area problems. Douglas-Home reported to London that the NAC ended better than it had begun, after Jobert and Kissinger had vented their com- plaints. Kissinger, for his part, informed Nixon that his tough line had an impact, and the Europeans would need to take it into account.52 In late December 1973, Rumsfeld’s quarterly assessment of the alliance described the recent Arab-Israeli war as one of the most divisive events in NATO history. He noted that the Europeans resented U.S. unilateralism in dealings with the Soviet Union and were “uncertain about where the Atlantic Alliance ﬁtted into the United States’ projection of multipolarity.” Thus, the United States needed to show that NATO “comes ahead of possible arrangements with the Soviet Union.”53 Rumsfeld cautioned the State Department that transatlantic relations would go through a difﬁcult period.

Soul Searching in the Alliance

The ministerial meeting had agreed to improve alliance consultation, but the practical implementation of this policy posed serious challenges. At the NAC on 19 December, Luns presented several options. The NAC could hold regular meetings with “political directors,” as Kissinger had suggested; the ministerial NACs could abandon the practice of long prepared statements, and trans- lation facilities could be developed to ease the language problems of many ministers; the private session could be held early during each ministerial NAC to facilitate frank discussion; and the alliance’s regional expert groups could

52. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 10–11 December 1973, CVR(73)74, pts. 1–2, in NATO Archives; Beith to FCO, 10–11 December 1973, in FCO 41/1143, TNAUK; Peck to FCO, 11 De- cember 1973, in FCO 41/1143, TNAUK; and Kissinger (Brussels) to State Department, 06060 and 06066, 11 December 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Tele- grams. See also Scowcroft to Nixon, 10–11 December 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 186–190. 53. Rumsfeld to State Department, 29 December 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams.

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be used as a forum for out-of-area consultations. The NAC was not enthusiastic about the last idea because the regional expert groups were producing papers on a biannual basis that were inadequate in fast developing situations. The British presented their ideas of regular political-military assessments.54 In early January, Luns echoed U.S. concerns by reminding the allied delegations that consultation was a two-way street and that the Europeans should also consult the United States. For example, he said, NATO was not consulted regarding the French “arms for oil” agreement with Saudi Arabia.55 Luns’s proposals dominated the agenda over the next several months. The idea of holding meetings of the NAC with “political directors” sparked concern. The French and the West Germans feared that it might lead to the re- placement of the NAC by a wider body.56 Once more, the Europeans rallied to defend the role of the NAC, the major political organ of the alliance, which they suspected the United States wanted to undermine. The British were not enthusiastic either. In London, the head of the FCO’s Western Organizations Department, Sir John Edward Killick, suggested that the idea of a meeting with political directors was “useless but harmless.” Still, he was scheduled to be on leave in February, and “one thing I cannot really contemplate is chang- ing my leave arrangements just for the sake of a lunch party in Brussels.”57 The British thought Kissinger’s wording was clumsy. He should have suggested a “reinforced Council” with the participation of national ofﬁcials, a phrase that had been used in NATO before. In late January 1974, the French came out against the idea of involving the political directors.58 In early February Rumsfeld spoke with many of his colleagues to elicit their support for a “reinforced Council.”59 De Rose, however, was adamant. He claimed that consultation was a process involving the treaty area and that out-of-area problems required only an exchange of information. To this, however, the others objected, with de Staercke leading the way. Consultation

54. NAC Record, 29 January 1974, CR(73)75, in NATO Archives; Logan to FCO, 20 December 1973, in FCO 41/1141, TNAUK; and Prendergast to State Department, 06197, 06198, and 06205, 19 December 1973, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 55. Rumsfeld to State Department, 9 January 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Peck to FCO, 8 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 56. Logan to FCO, 20 December 1973, in FCO 41/1141, TNAUK. 57. Minute (Killick), 9 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 58. Rumsfeld to State Department, 22 January 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Wiggin to Peck, 14 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK; and Peck to Wiggin, 22 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 59. Rumsfeld to State Department, 9 February 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams.

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involved both categories of problems, he argued.60 De Rose was isolated but did not give in. During the NAC of 20 February, he insisted the procedure would reduce the authority of the Council “which would inevitably develop the habit of referring important decisions to the special meetings with Politi- cal Directors.” Still, the allied states decided to hold a “reinforced” session in March, to which France would not send a national ofﬁcial.61 Luns’s other suggestion to involve the alliance regional expert groups produced little results. Most delegations, as well as the Political Committee, wanted no change in the procedure of these groups. Still, in view of the conspicuous failure of experts on the Middle East to anticipate the October 1973 war, the expert groups dealing with the Maghreb and the Middle East were merged, if only to reduce the danger of duplication.62 But these bodies, meeting biannually, were hardly up to the task of producing more-detailed and up-to-date assessments. Meanwhile, little progress was made regarding the British idea to produce political-military assessments of out-of-area developments. In mid-January, Kastl drafted a document describing the envisaged process, but this was not regarded as adequate by the members of the NAC.63 Moreover, despite Peck’s strong advocacy for the idea, the FCO now had second thoughts, and was coming to accept, in its own words, a “minimalist approach.” On 4 February, Douglas-Home instructed Peck to play down the idea. As he noted, NATO studies usually produced only the lowest common denominator, and members refrained from disclosing sensitive information for fear of leaks or because of political sensitivities. The product often remained unread, and even if the report made recommendations, difﬁculties tended to multiply and spark intra- NATO disagreements. The FCO now suggested drawing up a list of sensitive issues on which any member could propose discussion if the need arose. The “will to consult,” the FCO insisted, was more important than procedure.64

60. NAC Record, 11 March 1974, CR(74)6, in NATO Archives; Peck to FCO, 13 February 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK; and McAuliffe to State Department, No. 00803, 13 February 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 61. Peck to FCO, 20 February 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. See also NAC Record, 11 March 1974, CR(74)8, in NATO Archives. 62. Political Committee Record, 5 December 1973, AC/119-R(73)141, in NATO Archives; Political Committee Record, 18 January 1974, AC/119-R(74)5, in NATO Archives; and de Bausse to Political Committee, 25 February 1974, POLADS(74)7, in NATO Archives. 63. Staples (NATO) to Tickell, 21 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK; Peck to Tickell, 23 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK; and Rumsfeld to State Department, 18 January 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 64. Douglas-Home to Delegation NATO, 4 February 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. See also, Minute (Wiggin), 22 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK; and Cradock (Cabinet Ofﬁce) to Tickell, 25 January 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK.

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Peck presented this idea to his colleagues during their lunch on 13 February, and all agreed with the need for lower-level consultation, which was, in practice, a way to defer decisions.65 Other ideas for the improvement of NATO consultation were also aired. The Committee of Nine of the North Atlantic Assembly suggested summit meetings between the United States and the Eu- ropean members, but this seemed too grandiose, and if a major disagreement occurred at that level it might prove fatal.66 A major dispute took place at this time between Luns and de Rose. Dur- ing the permanent representatives’ lunch on 5 February, de Rose challenged Luns’s recent public remarks that the United States would continue fighting even if Europe were occupied and that the United States might not come to Europe’s aid in all eventualities. De Staercke, true to his role as the Nestor of the Council, intervened, noting how important the representatives’ lunches were as safety valves and in providing opportunities for frank, informal discussion. De Staercke stressed that Article 5 had not set up an automatic guaran- tee. Automaticity was the result of military integration, and it was strange that France, which had withdrawn from the military command, should complain about the lack of integration.67 At this point, with the whole process facing multiple dead ends, things threatened to take a dramatic turn for the worse. In early March, following strong urging by Rumsfeld, Kissinger agreed to make a gesture of good will toward the NAC. Still, this coincided with novel EC decisions to further the Euro-Arab dialogue, and it backfired exactly because the Europeans had again neglected to consult the United States. On 4 March, Kissinger made a personal two-hour briefing to the NAC on U.S. initiatives vis-à-vis the Mid- dle East. He complained about the tendency of the Nine not to consult the United States on their new Euro-Arab dialogue, and he asked for reciprocity in consultation. He expressed irritation that “the Americans were allowed to learn the political decisions of the Nine only through the instructed representative of the latter who appeared to have less flexibility in his instructions than [Soviet Ambassador Andrei] Vishinsky had had in the United Nations during the ‘50s.”68 Kissinger’s meeting that same day with his West German counterpart, Walter Scheel, as a spokesman of the Nine, went exceptionally badly. Kissinger accused the Nine of failing to consult with the United States

65. Peck to Wiggin, 13 February 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 66. Booklet, Committee of Nine, North Atlantic Assembly, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 67. Peck to Wiggin, 7 February 1974, in FCO 41/1415, TNAUK. 68. Peck to FCO, 4 March 1974 (two telegrams), in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK.

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regarding their policy toward Arab countries and of pursuing a “ﬂoating” foreign policy. He even suggested that, in response, the United States might also allow its policy to “ﬂoat.”69 Kissinger was now genuinely angry at the Europeans. The next day, he told his aides that he was ready to seek a confrontation with the Nine.70 Nixon wrote to Brandt protesting the EC’s unilateralism toward the Arabs.71 During a meeting in the State Department on 11 March, Kissinger again appeared eager for a showdown with the Nine. Seeking to “shock” the Europeans, he wanted to scrap both the U.S.-EC declaration and the Atlantic one. The Eu- ropeans, Kissinger noted, “are more hostile day by day.” He continued:

Iamtiredofacrisiswiththemeverysixmonths....Asitnowstands,theEu- ropeans get free defense and give nothing for it. They are just like an adolescent; they want to be taken care of and at the same time, kick the hell out of their parents. Several of Kissinger’s aides, especially Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman, stepped in and prevented a confrontation. They noted that Kissinger’s line would simply conﬁrm European suspicions of U.S. dis- engagement from Europe. Moreover, Hartman noted, the Nine and NATO were partly different groups: “Although we should keep full pressure on the Nine it would be disastrous to hold NATO responsible for the Community’s actions.” These arguments convinced Kissinger to drop the U.S.-Nine declaration but not the Atlantic one. However, Nixon postponed his scheduled trip to Europe to celebrate NATO’s 25th anniversary. The signing of the At- lantic Declaration, which anyway was not yet ready, was moved from April (the 25th anniversary of the alliance) to a special session of the NAC in June.72 The “reinforced NAC” took place on 14 March but produced limited results. The United States was represented by Sonnenfeldt and Hartman, and the French did not send a national ofﬁcial. A tour d’orizon on East-West relations was followed by a discussion of allied consultations. On this subject, tensions resurfaced. Norway, Greece, and Turkey criticized the exclusiveness of the political consultation among the Nine, which gave the impression of

69. Record (Kissinger, Scheel), 4 March 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 204–207. 70. Memorandum of conversation, 5 March 1974, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 208– 215. 71. Kissinger to Embassy Bonn, 6 March 1974, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 216–217. 72. Memorandum of conversation, 11 March 1973, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 218– 225.

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an intra-alliance bloc. De Rose protested that the Nine were being asked to subordinate their political processes to NATO. Sonnenfeldt proposed distin- guishing between “fast moving tactical situations” and other developments arising over time. NATO consultation, he noted, was always more fruitful in the latter case. He implied that there were instances when the United States had little time to initiate procedures in NATO. Luns made things a little more difficult, suggesting that the EC members were not united but merely presented a façade of unity, which was the main reason they often appeared reluc- tant to consult. The exclusivity of the Nine was thus divisive for the alliance. Luns also insisted that the Nine did not have to set up a crisis management system because NATO had already put one in place in 1968. Other representatives then stepped in to call for prudence. The Dutch led the way, stressing that the efficiency of consultation was “a gauge of the Alliance’s health.” The Canadian ambassador, John Halstead, agreed that it was natural for the Nine to seek common positions, but they had to accept the need for wider consultation: “The guiding rule on consultation should be common sense.” The British FCO’s envoy, Killick, amplified the point: The “will to consult” was more important than procedure. The West Germans took a similar position. Finally, the assembled delegates agreed that the drafting of the Atlantic Dec- laration (which since January had been referred to a small drafting group) should continue.73 Thus, little new emerged from this meeting, and no arrangements were made for scheduling a new one. The climate of insecurity remained. As Rums- feld indicated in his quarterly review, the differences between the United States and France had sharpened, and a central question needed to be an- swered: What would be the future relationship between the United States and an emerging Europe? Rumsfeld emphasized that the United States had to con- vince the other allies to follow its lead, not France’s.74 In April he also reported that the meeting of the “reinforced Council” had left the French isolated on allied consultation. The United States, he said, should not take the lead in rebutting them and should allow the others to do it.75

73. NAC Record, 11 April 1974, CR(74)11, in NATO Archives; Peck to FCO, 14 March 1974 (two telegrams), in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; Peck to Killick, 18 March 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; and Rumsfeld to State Department, 15 March 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 74. Rumsfeld to State Department, 30 March 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 75. Rumsfeld to State Department, 6 April 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Rumsfeld to State Department, 24 April 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams.

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TheRoadtoOttawa

In April and May new elements entered the scene. In the first half of 1974, governmental changes occurred in Britain, France, and West Germany. The advent of Harold Wilson’s government in Britain, the death of French Presi- dent Georges Pompidou in early April, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s resignation in early May removed from the scene the European leaders who had been at odds with the Nixon administration. The new French president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was not a Gaullist and distanced himself from the adversarial posture of his predecessor. The carnation revolution in Portugal pointed to problems within NATO’s ranks and amplified the tendency to close ranks. However, the importance of these developments should not be exaggerated. They affected the dynamics of intra-alliance relations, but the crisis was defused thanks to practical arrangements. Some of the initiatives were even undertaken before the governmental changes. The British government during these months strove to achieve a clearer definition of priorities in European security. In late March, Peck expressed his concern at the development of EC crisis management procedures. He noted that the EC was entitled to establish a position on matters of trade or its special interests but should avoid touching upon security problems. Duplica- tion with NATO would lead to a “schizophrenia of Governments,” whereby countries could express differing opinions in the alliance and the EC. NATO action, already difficult, would be inhibited, and the smaller members (and also Canada and the United States) would feel that the EC had formed an intra-NATO bloc.76 In late April, the UK’s new ambassador to Washington, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, endorsed Peck’s points. He noted that U.S. officials wanted a “verbal ceasefire” but were often consumed by the relentless pressure of international affairs. Ramsbotham agreed with Peck that the highest priority was NATO consultation.77 Subsequent changes facilitated this approach. In early April, the FCO re- assured Peck that EC proposals were moderate and aimed to create no elabo- rate machinery for crisis management on security matters. Moreover, a change was now taking place in London. The new Labour government “attach[ed] the highest importance to maintaining good relations with the Americans [and] will not wish to pursue co-operation among the Nine at the expense of

76. Peck to Killick, 22 March 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 77. Ramsbotham to Killick, 22 April 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK.

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co-operation with the US.”78 Indeed, messages on improving NATO consultation had already been exchanged between Kissinger and the new British foreign secretary, James Callaghan. The FCO once more opted for a pragmatic, minimalist approach, noting the impossibility of drawing a line between issues requiring unanimity and those on which divisions could be tolerated. “Would we have relished being asked by the Americans to consult in NATO, and produce an agreed Alliance position on, policy over the Vietnam war?” Thus the FCO wanted to search for practical arrangements rather than an all-embracing solution. “In the first as in the last resort the will to consult is paramount. With that any procedure will work; without it none will.”79 Essentially, this would now be attempted in the alliance. On the road to the Ottawa ministerial NAC, a reform of the organization of the ministerial sessions was finally agreed. In February, Scheel revived the idea of abandoning prepared speeches in the ministerial NACs.80 The NAC discussed this in successive meetings (including the reinforced session of 14 March), but once again most member-states, especially the smaller ones, were against the concept and were supported by de Rose.81 Then, in May and early June, Luns revived another idea: The private meeting of the ministers would take place on the first day of the session and would include the permanent representatives and high-level officials (e.g., political directors). The ministers could still make prepared speeches if they wished, but the hope was that after the early private meeting the discussion would focus on specific topics.82 This was a functional change and contributed to more focused ministerial discussions in Ottawa and in subsequent ministerial NACs.83

78. Killick to Peck, 8 April 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; and Tickell to Logan, 2 April 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 79. Minute (Tickell), 13 May 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. See also minute (Wiggin), 14 May 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 80. Minute (Wiggin), 7 January 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; Peck to Tickell, 14 February 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; Sinton (NATO) to Lever, 28 February 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; and McAuliffe to State Department, No. 00788, 13 February 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 81. Pansa Cedronio to Permanent Representatives, 22 March 1974, PO/74/27, in NATO Archives. See also Rumsfeld to State Department, 27 February 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 82. Pansa Cedronio to Permanent Representatives, 4 June 1974, PO/74/74, in NATO Archives; and NAC Record, 24 June 1974, CR(74)25, in NATO Archives. See also Rumsfeld to State Depart- ment, Nos. 02957 and 02988, 29 May 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973– 79/Electronic Telegrams; and McAuliffe to State Department, 1 June 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 83. On the December 1974 NAC, see the provision for an early private session in Pansa Cedronio to Permanent Representatives, 5 December 1974, PO/74/162, in NATO Archives.

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Emphasis was also placed on the Atlantic Declaration. Progress was made following a suggestion by Scheel in April 1974 that the Nine should adopt a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to consultation with the United States. Thus, even before Brandt had to resign, the Nine conceded the U.S. point on consultation. In early June, a meeting between Rumsfeld and de Rose was crucial in paving the way for the final agreement.84 The climax came in mid-June at the Ottawa ministerial NAC. As Kissinger wrote to Nixon, the meeting went “extremely well.”85 An important change came with the appearance of the new French foreign minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, who adopted a friendlier attitude and noted that his country was a full member of the alliance. The new West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, declared that NATO and European integration were complementary processes, especially because the latter could be accomplished only under the security umbrella of the former. Kissinger remarked that although the allies had differed, no one had disputed the value of the alliance. But he reminded his colleagues that the Arab-Israeli war had showed that NATO’s security could be endan- gered by events outside the area, and that this should be taken into account.86 During the private session, Kissinger informed his colleagues about Nixon’s scheduled visit to Moscow. Kissinger himself promised to brief the Council immediately after the conclusion of the visit. He took pains to reassure the allies: Détente was no substitute for the Alliance. People should shed any unjustified fears that they might have that the United States government would consciously jeopardize their allies’ interests, or would seek to cover new ground in areas of general allied concern, without full prior consultation.87 In Ottawa the Atlantic Declaration was finalized and then signed on 26 June during the heads-of-government session of the NAC (the first since 1957).88 The declaration reaffirmed the allies’ simultaneous pursuit of defense and dé- tente and stressed the U.S. commitment in Europe and the importance of the Canadian security contribution, but it also noted that European integration

84. Rumsfeld to State Department, No. 02984, 29 May 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; Rumsfeld to State Department, No. 03238, 6 June 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Briefs Nos. 4 and 5 (ministerial NAC), June 1974, in FCO 41/1419, TNAUK. 85. Kissinger to Nixon, 19 June 1974, in FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. E-15, pt. 2, pp. 241–242. 86. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 21 June 1974, CVR(74)28, pts. 1–3, in NATO Archives; and Johnston (Ottawa) to FCO, 19 June 1974, in FCO 41/1418, TNAUK. 87. Callaghan, circular, 21 June 1974, in FCO 41/1418, TNAUK. 88. NATO Summit Record, 26 June 1974, CVR(74)31, in NATO Archives.

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would have a “beneﬁcial effect” on common defense. Article 11 underlined the importance of “close consultation, co-operation and mutual trust,” which would foster “the conditions necessary for defence and favourable for detente which are complementary.” Thus the allies agreed to strengthen consultation in all matters affecting their interests as members of NATO, “bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world.”89 This was not exactly a happy ending, but it came close. In early July, Killick wrote to Ramsbotham that the period of mutual recriminations and the consultation crisis were probably over: “The main thing is that the disease should cease to be endemic and revert to sporadic.”90 In his midyear assessment of NATO, Rumsfeld appeared more jubilant but reached similar conclusions. The Atlantic Declaration, coming after the resolution of the U.S.-EC trade disputes, was a “symbolic end to a difﬁcult phase in Atlantic relations and the beginning of a more hopeful period.” The second quarter of 1974 “constituted one of the most thoughtful and productive periods in recent Al- liance history.” Rumsfeld also stressed that Kissinger’s and Nixon’s pledge to consult better with the allies, and the advent of “less dogmatic leadership” in France and West Germany, had helped the process. It was important, however, that all allies—especially the United States—live up to the commitments made in the Atlantic Declaration, including consultation.91

Beyond Ottawa: The Search for Practical Adjustments

The new balance was unstable and was upset once more during the Turkish in- vasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, especially during its second phase in August, when desperate calls for a NATO stance by the new Greek democratic government were ignored. The allies clearly did not want to reopen the issue of NATO’s role in an out-of-area crisis, especially one that did not directly affect their prime interests and involved two alliance members. The stakes of October 1973–June 1974 were too high, the effort was too painful, and the compromise too precarious for the NATO members to revisit the issue.

89. NATO Press Ofﬁce, Declaration on Atlantic Relations, 19 June 1974, in FCO 41/1418, TNAUK. On the declaration, see also Linda Risso, Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 130–131. 90. Killick to Ramsbotham, 1 July 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 91. Rumsfeld to State Department, 3 July 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams.

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Thus, the NATO members opted for practical solutions designed to com- plement the Atlantic Declaration on various levels. The United States took the lead. Following Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in early July 1974, Kissinger personally briefed the NAC on 4 July, which evidently pleased the allies.92 This was an important gesture on Kissinger’s part and arguably provided for a continuation of another process: Over the past month the allies had shown discomfort with a proposal by Luns (also supported by the United States) for a new “reinforced Council.”93 However, following an invitation by Rumsfeld for national officials to attend the Kissinger briefing, many came to the NAC session.94 This was not a proper reinforced Council, but it came close to being one. Direct contact between national policymakers and the NAC was accel- erated. In October, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, known for his reserved attitude toward NATO, took part in a NAC session, where the permanent representatives seem to have played a crucial role in showing him the alliance perspective.95 A few days later, Sonnenfeldt informed the NAC about Kissinger’s talks in Moscow. The West Germans presented a full account of the visit of the new FRG chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, to the Soviet capital.96 This greater contact of major political figures with the NAC—which was not institutionalized but became an informal practice—pointed to the existence of the “will to consult.” Complementary practical solutions at a lower level were also discussed, especially arrangements involving the Political Committee and the regional expert groups. In April 1974, the United States had again put forward the idea of using the regional expert groups to identify issues for study outside the area, but the other members showed little interest. The British argued that the groups merely produced “studies which run into the sands.”97 Another U.S. suggestion was adopted, however. The NAC would examine only two regional reports at a single session—not all at the same time. This was another low-key

92. Rumsfeld to State Department, 5 July 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 93. Rumsfeld to State Department, 6 June 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Staples to McLaren, 6 June 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 94. Rumsfeld to State Department, 28 June 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 95. NAC Record, 13 November 1974, CR(74)51, in NATO Archives; and Peck to FCO, 24 October 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 96. Peck to Morgan, 31 October 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK. 97. Logan to Tickell, 25 April 1974, in FCO 41/ 1416, TNAUK.

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option to encourage more substantive discussion of out-of-area issues.98 The NATO International Staff subsequently reviewed the working of the regional expert groups, especially the uniﬁed one studying the Middle East and the Maghreb. The possible broadening of the role of the Political Committee “as the NATO institution with primary responsibility for work on areas outside the Treaty” was proposed by the United States and discussed in successive meetings but was met with little enthusiasm by the others.99 Additional practical arrangements were sought. In May, the NAC approved a previous idea to set up a new concept for ADP-assisted information systems to support command and control and consultation. This involved automatic data-processing techniques and would not solve the political problem of the “will to consult”; it was merely a better mechanism to improve information management. As the relevant report noted, the new system “is not all embracing. It is only an aid to the consultation and decision-making process not a substitute for it.”100 Also in May, U.S. ofﬁcials informed the Political Committee that they would be circulating a larger number of their assessments through the NATO Situation Center.101 In November, the Politi- cal Committee discussed the use of the NATO-wide communications system for the wider exchange of information and assessments.102 At the same time, the notion of political-military assessments made some progress. This issue had been discussed in NATO since 1972, but the 1973 consultation crisis brought it to the fore. The alliance’s study of the lessons of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war had focused mainly on operational military issues (mostly the problem of warning time) but had also underlined the need to consider whether such political-military assessments in evolving situations were necessary.103 The DPC thus instructed the Council Operations

98. Rumsfeld to State Department, 12 April 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 99. Political Committee Records, Kastl to Political Committee, 5 July 1974, POLADS(74)15, in NATO Archives; and de Bausse to Political Committee, 28 August 1974, POLADS(74)21, in NATO Archives. See also Political Committee Records, AC/119-R(74)71, 23 July 1974, in NATO Archives; Margetson (NATO) to McLaren, 31 October 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; Rumsfeld to State Department, 10 July 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Tele- grams; Rumsfeld to State Department, 18 July 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Goodby to State Department, 1 August 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 100. NAC Memorandum, “NCCIS,” 4 June 1974, CM(74)3, in NATO Archives; and Luns to Per- manent Representatives (Council), 9 May 1974, PO/74/51, in NATO Archives. 101. Political Committee Record, 9 May 1974, AC/119-R(74)45, in NATO Archives. 102. Political Committee Record, 29 November 1974, AC/119-R(74)122, in NATO Archives. 103. Luns to Permanent Representatives (DPC), 1 April 1974, PO/74/31, in NATO Archives. See also NAC Record, 14 May 1975, CR(75)20, in NATO Archives; Beaumont (NATO) to Tickell,

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and Exercise Committee (COEC) to report on these needs. The latter noted that such evaluations could not be limited only to the treaty area.104 New deliberations followed, and in December the COEC submitted its ﬁnal report. Purely political issues would remain the competence of the Political Commit- tee and purely military ones of the Military Committee. Yet, the report proposed that the NATO alert system be complemented with two new bodies. A Current Operational Group would gather information (but refrain from making assessments) and would report in parallel with the Current Intelli- gence Group. A second body, the small, high-level Crisis Assessment Group (CAG), would monitor developing situations on behalf of the Council. The CAG would consist of the assistant Secretary General on political affairs, the assistant Secretary General on defense planning and policy, the assistant directors of the Operation and Intelligence Divisions of the International Military Staff, and possibly national ofﬁcials. This body would produce assessments at the request of the Council. Finally, the report called for the new system to be tested in a major NATO exercise.105 In February 1975, the NAC approved the report and decided to test the new machinery in the next high-level exercise (HILEX).106

Conclusions

The NATO consultation crisis of 1973–1974 went deeper than mere alliance procedure. The proclaimed Year of Europe was proving to be a time of acute tensions in transatlantic relations. The rise of European political cooperation meant that NATO processes needed time to ﬁnd a new balance. Both the Cold War and the West were becoming more complex, and NATO’s older dilemmas were coming to the fore in new forms and with an unprecedented intensity. The October 1973 Mideast war made clear that out- of-area issues would increasingly pose challenges for NATO. In early June

8 April 1974, in FCO 41/1416, TNAUK; Rumsfeld to State Department, 3 April 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams; and Rumsfeld to State Department, 24 April 1974, in NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams. 104. NAC Memorandum, “Arrangements for the exchange of Information and Intelligence in Times of Crisis and Tension Outside the NATO Area,” 23 August 1974, CM(74)45revised, in NATO Archives. See also Political Committee Records, 20 May 1974, AC/119-R(74)48, in NATO Archives. 105. NAC Memorandum, “Arrangements and Procedures for the Production of Politico-military As- sessments in Times of Crisis and Tension,” 9 December 1974, CM(74)52revised, in NATO Archives. 106. NAC Record, 7 March 1975, CR(75)7, in NATO Archives.

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1974, the alliance’s Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (a body of planners rather than “experts”) stressed the need to adjust to the growing globalization of the problems:

While the East-West relationship in Europe had, in the past, remained less affected than might have been expected by situations outside the Atlantic area, this could not be counted upon for the future. International problems were increasingly global in character; not only could they at any time have repercussions on East-West relations, but it was increasingly difﬁcult, as a matter of general practice, to treat East-West relations separately and in isolation from other issues.107

NATO’s response was the issuing of the Ottawa Declaration and the implementation of functional reforms either in the NAC or at lower levels. This was not a very imaginative approach. Mostly it was designed to allow members to reassure one another and to guard NATO’s essential unity. No breakthrough was sought, and hiccups continued. By 1977, the idea of a reinforced NAC on events outside the area was revived to deal especially with Africa, which was in turmoil. However, the French again made it very difficult to hold this meeting.108 In May 1978, during the Washington heads-of-government meeting to discuss the alliance’s comprehensive study of East-West relations, Luns went out of his way to stress that the new report offered tangible proof that the commitments of the Ottawa Declaration were being upheld.109 Still, two years later (during another period of successive crises), in his annual political appraisal, the Secretary General again lamented the tendency of member- states to inform their allies rather than consult them.110 Nor was the issue of politico-military assessments fully settled. By 1978, the experiment of the CAG and its test in the HILEX exercise had shown “little or no success.” The NATO authorities then examined other options, such as the creation of an informal briefing group consisting of officials from the International Staff and the International Military Staff.111 However, NATO, as an institution of the West, managed to pass the test of that transitory period. The will of the members to do so was evident.

107. NAC Memorandum, “APAG,” 19 July 1974, CM(74)47, in NATO Archives. 108. Record (Owen, Luns), 28 March 1977, in FCO 46/1476, TNAUK; and Powles (NATO) to Holding, 11 November 1977, in FCO 46/1476, TNAUK. 109. NATO Summit Record, 30 May 1978, CVR(78)22 pt. I, in NATO Archives. 110. NAC Memorandum, “Annual Political Appraisal 1980,” 12 June 1980, CM(80)28, in NATO Archives. 111. UK military representative, NATO, to FCO, 14 June 1978, in FCO 46/1682, TNAUK.

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This brings us to an evaluation of the Kissinger touch, one of the most hotly-debated subject in recent scholarship.112 This article cannot present a comprehensive interpretation of Kissinger’s leadership, but it is possible to offer some points—or at least some hypotheses—based on the evidence of the NATO crisis. Kissinger understood the importance of Western processes, and in his book on NATO he makes the important observation that the development of the “Atlantic relationships” was the U.S. government’s “most constructive policy in the post war era.”113 In the Third World, Nixon and Kissinger wanted the United States to have the role of an “overseer” rather than of an “intervener,” although this was difficult to implement in practice.114 On the other hand, Kissinger had a special way of understanding international affairs. As a realist, he respected power. He thus proved able to deal magnif- icently with the power centers of the Soviet Union and of China, and he always displayed an understanding of (though not agreement with) de Gaulle’s attitudes, which also gave primacy to national power and national interest. Mostly, Kissinger respected the ability of a great power to make decisions and act. It was toward such great powers—the Soviet Union and China—that his (and Nixon’s) policies were successful and even enlightened. But whatever Kissinger did not recognize as “power” (defined as such in a rather traditional manner) did not have much significance for him. He had little time, and held little respect, for powerless actors. His greatest failures involved countries that did not wield power: Cambodia, Laos, Chile, and Cyprus. In his “hierarchical” understanding of the international system, small states—even friendly small states—mattered little. Even in his cele- brated Troubled Partnership, he does not deal with Canada, a pivotal NATO

112. See, among others, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 274–308; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Mario del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Fredrik Lo- gevall and Andrew Preston, “Introduction: the Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” in Lo- gevall and Preston, eds., Nixon in the World, pp. 3–21; Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy,” in Logevall and Preston, eds., Nixon in the World, pp. 67–84; Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalization,” in Niall Ferguson et al., eds., The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 173–188; and Thomas A. Schwartz, “Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Strug- gle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft,Vol.22,No.1 (Winter 2011), pp. 121–141. 113. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 3. 114. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 197.

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member.115 After ascending to his high-ranking post, Kissinger neglected to re- ceive the Canadian ambassador, and one scholar’s comment is telling: “Canada and Cadieux [the ambassador] were small matters.”116 This goes beyond cri- tiques of “cynicism” or the allegation that he ignored local circumstances.117 After all, in NATO, the question was not of local particularities but of the workings of the West itself. Kissinger, however, failed to comprehend the kind of power that the EC and its members (“middle powers” as national actors) represented. The EC did not fit his criteria for power.118 For him to act with minimal understanding of the sensitivities of what he saw as his minor allies was thus natural. As the British ambassador to Washington, DC, Lord Cromer, reported to the FCO in late 1973: They [the Americans] find it hard to take seriously Europe’s political pretensions when it has no real economic or monetary base. Moreover, they are baffled by the spasmodic processes of unification within the European Community. . . . The sort of diplomacy practiced by the President and Dr. Kissinger has proved peculiarly ill-suited to dealings with the European allies. Obsession with secrecy, the tendency to divide and rule, the use of threats, lack of consultation, have all characterized United States diplomacy. They have proved duly unproductive in achieving American goals. Indeed, they have only furthered suspicions in Europe of secret American deals with the Soviet Union. Lack of advance consultation has been perhaps the greatest blunder.119 These were complemented by Kissinger’s excessive self-confidence in his own mental abilities (a common trap for exceptionally able and intelligent political figures), which led him to believe he could tackle any problem.120 Thus, he was remarkably efficient when he dealt personally with great powers in brief and focused international meetings, but it was impossible to keep the Atlantic relationships afloat with personal diplomacy alone. By the early 1970s the At- lantic world had been institutionalized and was based on procedure as well as

115. Anna Locher, Crisis? What Crisis? NATO, de Gaulle, and the Future of the Alliance, 1963–1966 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), p. 25. For the point about Kissinger’s “hierarchical” understanding of states, see Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, p. 488. 116. Robert Bothwell, “Thanks for the Fish: Nixon, Kissinger and Canada,” in Logevall and Preston, eds., Nixon in the World, pp. 309–328. 117. Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “An Elusive Grand Design,” in Logevall and Preston, eds., Nixon in the World, pp. 25–44; and Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, pp. 488–489. 118. See also this observation in Matthew Jones, “‘A Man in a Hurry’: Henry Kissinger, Transatlantic Relations, and the British Origins of the Year of Europe Dispute,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 77–99, esp. 82. 119. Cromer to FCO, 2 December 1973, in FCO 41/1144, TNAUK. 120. Kissinger “believed he could recalibrate events so delicately that he could control every outcome.” See Ferraro, Tough Going, p. 123.

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on political will and personal ability. Thus, it was also based on the ability of the State Department (the same department Kissinger tended to downgrade) to keep the allies regularly informed. When problems refused to go away, even in the face of Kissinger’s “rational” initiatives, he naturally grew impatient. Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that Kissinger’s style is what caused the problems of 1973. Rather, his style merely aggravated challenges that were caused by a variety of factors in an era of monumental transitions in the international system.

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