Government Support for Beagle 2
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House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Government support for Beagle 2 Twelfth Report of Session 2003–04 Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 13 October 2004 HC 711 Published on 2 November 2004 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £17.50 The Science and Technology Committee The Science and Technology Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Office of Science and Technology and its associated public bodies. Current membership Dr Ian Gibson MP (Labour, Norwich North) (Chairman) Paul Farrelly MP (Labour, Newcastle-under-Lyme) Dr Evan Harris MP (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West & Abingdon) Kate Hoey MP (Labour, Vauxhall) Dr Brian Iddon MP (Labour, Bolton South East) Mr Robert Key MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Tony McWalter MP (Labour, Hemel Hempstead) Dr Andrew Murrison MP (Conservative, Westbury) Geraldine Smith MP (Labour, Morecambe and Lunesdale) Bob Spink MP (Conservative, Castle Point) Dr Desmond Turner MP (Labour, Brighton Kemptown) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select Committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No.152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/science_and_technology_commit tee.cfm. A list of Reports from the Committee in the present Parliament is included at the back of this volume. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are: Chris Shaw (Clerk); Emily Commander (Second Clerk); Alun Roberts (Committee Specialist); Hayaatun Sillem (Committee Specialist); Ana Ferreira (Committee Assistant); Robert Long (Senior Office Clerk); and Christine McGrane (Committee Secretary). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Science and Technology Committee, Committee Office, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general inquiries is: 020 7219 2793; the Committee’s e- mail address is: [email protected]. Cover picture © ESA 2001. Illustration by Medialab. Government support for Beagle 2 1 Contents Report Page Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 2 Background 6 UK Space policy 6 British National Space Centre 6 PPARC 7 European Space Agency 8 Previous missions to Mars 8 3 Brief history of project 9 Genesis of Mars Express 9 The genesis of Beagle 2 11 Development of the lander 13 Financial and management concerns 14 Completion of project 15 4 Funding and management of the project: key issues arising 16 Political background to Mars Express and Beagle 2 16 UK Government’s ability to respond to sudden demand 17 Support from UK Government and ESA 19 Introduction 19 Early response from UK Government and ESA 19 Financial support from the UK Government 22 Support from ESA 24 Impact of piecemeal funding on project 26 Mitigating risks and testing 27 Sponsorship 28 Treatment of lander as an instrument 30 Impact of the decision 32 Management of Beagle 2 project 36 The Beagle 2 team 36 Management Effectiveness 36 Oversight of management 39 Heads of Agreement 41 Conclusions 43 Different perceptions of risk 44 Who was in charge? 45 Collective responsibility 46 5 Impact of Beagle 2 48 Aims of Government support 48 Scientific spin-offs 48 2 Government support for Beagle 2 Public understanding of science 49 Education 49 Future participation in ESA programmes 50 UK’s standing in planetary exploration 50 The Aurora Programme 50 6 Publication of Commission of Inquiry Report 54 7 Conclusion 57 Conclusions and recommendations 59 Formal minutes 63 Witnesses 64 List of written evidence 65 Government support for Beagle 2 3 Summary This inquiry focussed upon the way in which the UK Government supported the Beagle 2 consortium in the development of a lander for the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Mars Express mission and the implications of the project for future Government space policy. We found that the Government was admirably enthusiastic about this exciting but high risk project. However, it was unable to respond to its relatively sudden emergence to find the guaranteed financial backing that was needed to support the development of a lander against extremely tight time and mass constraints. As a result of this, and the failure of sponsorship income to materialise, the project could not proceed to its development and testing phases as early as it should, with a consequent detrimental impact on its chances of success. We have called for improvements in the Government’s capacity to respond to major financial commitments at short notice. The decision for the lander to be developed separately from the orbiter has been acknowledged to be wrong. It reduced the scope for flexible and co-ordinated management of the mission. It also contributed to tensions in the relationship between the Beagle 2 consortium, ESA and other contractors, which increased as technical difficulties with the lander created doubts in some quarters at ESA about the viability of the lander. The decision was in line with existing ESA policy. It was also reinforced by a desire on the UK side for the lander to be distinctively British and a reluctance by ESA Member States to take any financial responsibility for a UK-led project. These concerns must be overcome in future, ESA-managed, missions. We found that oversight of the Beagle 2 project, both by ESA and the UK Government, was lacking. When the project ran into difficulties, both sides belatedly intervened to introduce more certainty to the financial and management arrangements, but failed to ensure that the most important weaknesses in the mission were adequately addressed. The Beagle 2 project had wider goals than the search for life on Mars. Technologies developed by UK teams have potential uses in other fields, such as medicine. We welcome the emphasis the Government has given to the science in society and educational objectives behind its support for the project, which helped justify the financial commitment made. The Beagle 2 project also placed the UK in a strong position to contribute to future ESA space exploration missions. These benefits should not be wasted. In this context, we welcome the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council’s (PPARC) decision to fund early UK participation in ESA’s Aurora space exploration programme. Long term participation will be expensive however. In view of the benefits accruing to the wider scientific community and UK science more generally, we have recommended that the Government does not leave it to PPARC alone to fund future UK involvement. Government support for Beagle 2 5 1 Introduction 1. On Christmas Day 2003 the Beagle 2 Mars lander was scheduled to touch down on the surface of the planet and begin its work of looking for any signs of life. It had been launched six days earlier from the Mars Express orbiter as one component of the European Space Agency’s (ESA) mission to Mars. The lander failed to make contact with Earth following its scheduled landing and, in the absence of any evidence of its whereabouts, it was subsequently declared lost. The Beagle 2 lander was a British-led project, supported by a large number of primarily UK-based companies, individuals and organisations, including the Government. In total, the costs to public funds of the UK Government’s support for the project amounted to some £25 million, over half of the overall declared project costs. 2. In February 2004, ESA and the UK Government established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances and possible reasons that led to the failure of the Beagle 2 mission. This inquiry was completed in May 2004. Its full report has not been released; instead, a list of 19 recommendations for the handling of future missions was published. In August 2004 the Beagle 2 consortium published its own report on the project, making available for future missions its assessment of the possible causes of failure, the lessons that had been learnt, and an indication of the scope for technical and project management improvements. 3. We announced our inquiry on 26 May 2004, just after the partial publication of the ESA/UK Report. We have not sought to examine the possible technical reasons for failure. Instead, we have focussed on the environment in which the project developed; the availability and provision of funding; project management and oversight; and the relationship between the UK Government agencies involved and ESA. We have also looked at how the UK Government should use the Beagle 2 experience in developing its space policy. This Report follows previous Parliamentary scrutiny of UK space policy as a whole, by the Trade and Industry Select Committee, which reported in July 2000, and by the National Audit Office in March 2004. Ours is the only Parliamentary inquiry to focus specifically on the Beagle 2 project. 4. In response to our call for written evidence we received nine submissions, including responses from all the key individuals involved in the project. We also asked for, and received in confidence, copies of the ESA/UK Commission of Inquiry’s full Report. Regrettably, we have not been able to reveal details of that Inquiry in this Report, but we have used it to develop our questions to witnesses and to inform our conclusions. We held two oral evidence sessions in July 2004, at which we took evidence from the Beagle 2 project team, led by Professor Colin Pillinger from the Open University (OU); from Professor David Southwood, Director of Science Programmes at ESA; and from the principal Government agencies involved in funding the project, the Minister for Science and Innovation, Lord Sainsbury, the Chief Executive of the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC), Professor Ian Halliday, and the Deputy Director General of the British National Space Centre (BNSC), Dr David Leadbeater.