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MONITOR STRATEGIC Revistă editată de Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare şi Istorie Militară, membru al Consorţiului Academiilor de Apărare şi Institutelor de Studii de Securitate din cadrul Parteneriatului pentru Pace, membru asociat al Proiectului de Istorie Paralelă pentru Securitate prin Cooperare. REDACTOR-ŞEF • General-maior (r) dr. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, directorul Institutului pentru Studii Politice de Apãrare şi Istorie Militarã, Ministerul Apãrãrii Naţionale, România Redactor-şef adJUnct • Şerban Filip Cioculescu COLEGIUL DE REDACŢIE • Prof. asociat dr. JORDAN BAEV, Colegiul de Apãrare şi Stat Major, „G.S. Rakovsky”, Sofia, Bulgaria • Prof. univ. dr. DENNIS DELETANT, University College London, Marea Britanie • SORIN ENCUŢESCU, Preşedintele Asociaţiei „Manfred Wörner”, Bucureşti, România • Lector univ. dr. IULIAN FOTA, Consilier prezidenţial, Preşedinţia României • Dr. SERGHEI KONOPLIOV, Harvard University Program for Black Sea Security, SUA • Prof. dr. CRAIG NATION, Department of National Security&Strategy, US Army War College, USA • Prof. dr. REINER POMERRIN, Universitatea din Dresda, Germania • Prof. dr. ERWIN SCHMIDL, Academia Naţionalã de Apãrare, Viena, Austria • Prof. univ. dr. MICHAEL SHAFIR, Universitatea „Babeş Bolyai”, Cluj-Napoca, România • Colonel (r) dr. SHAUL SHAY, Senior research fellow, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel • Prof. univ. dr. VASILE SECÃREŞ, Şcoala Naţionalã de Studii Politice şi Administrative, România • Dr. JEFFREY SIMON, Senior research fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington D.C., SUA • Comandor (r) GHEORGHE VARTIC, istoric militar, C.S.E.E.A., România ADRESA Str. Constantin Mille nr. 6, sector 1, Bucureşti, cod 010142, telefon: 0040 21 315.17.00, fax: 0040 21 319.58.01 www.mapn.ro/diepa/ispaim e-mail:[email protected] Revista a fost inclusã în baza de date a Consiliului Naţional al Cercetãrii Ştiinţifice din Învãţãmântul Superior, fiind evaluatã la categoria „C”. Monitor Strategic 1 SUMAR Zona EXtinsă A MăRII Negre IN actUalUL conteXT EUROPean DE secUritate / 3 Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu – Eastern Partnership. A geopolitical clash. The case of Ukraine – I / 5 Identitate ŞI secUritate ÎN EUROPA DE EST / 23 George V. Tiugea – Eastern European Identity - Current Perspectives. A Romanian View / 25 Armen Hovhannisyan – Interaction between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy Making Process:Social Constructivist Approach / 36 OPinii / 47 Dr. Michael Andregg – Breaking Laws of God and Men: When is this allowed for Intelligence Professionals? / 49 Recenzii, docUmentare / 61 Dr. Silviu Petre – recenzie a volumului Epoca de aur a incertitudinii. America şi China, ideile şi Primăvara arabă, Clio, Clausewitz şi Lady Gaga la începutul secolului XXI, autor: Adrian Cioroianu, Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2011 / 63 Dr. Angela Gramadă – Newsletter al crizei din Ucraina (octombrie 2013 – septembrie 2014) / 67 3 - 4 / 2014 C I TEG A TR S TOR I ON M Tehnoredactor: Maria Dumitru ISPAIM — B 00136/05.08.2014 2 Monitor Strategic ZONA EXTINSă A MăRII NEGRE ÎN ACTUALUL CONTEXT EUROPEAN DE SECURITATE Monitor Strategic 3 EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: A GEOPOLITICAL CLASH. THE CASE OF UKRAINE-I* Mihail E. Ionescu, PhD UKraine: economic crisis Domestic crisis and A geoPolitical TROPHY At the end of October 2013, the Ukraini- ‘The Vilnius Moment’ (the Eastern Part- an government was in the midst of negotia- nership Summit of November 28th - 29th 2013) ting a new loan with the International Mo- has signaled a turning point for Ukraine. A netary Fund. The IMF’s lending conditions at few days prior to the Summit (on Novem- the time gave an indication as to how serious ber 21st, 2013), Kiev has announced that it the country’s economic difficulties were. -Ac suspends preparations for signing the asso- cording to a report regarding the negotiati- ciation agreement, presenting instead its as- on process, Ukraine implemented a series of sociation with the customs union between measures: raising natural gas tariffs by 60% for households with a consumption that exceeds Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, in order to 3.5 thousand m³ of natural gas per year and de- alleviate Ukraine’s dire economic situation. veloping a program to stabilize public finances While at the Vilnius Summit, President Vik- (the program might have included a delay in tor Yanukovych has stoically resisted pressu- profit tax rate cut, a revision of tax privileges res from European representatives to respect for business and social benefits for population, prior commitments regarding the signing of etc.). This would have allowed the public sector the Association Agreement with the Euro- deficit to be reduced to around 4% of GDP in pean Union. Needless to say that following 2014. The national currency would have been lengthy negotiations, the signing of the agree- 1 allowed to fluctuate up to UAH 8.5 per USD. ment was all but sure . With the IMF program in place, Ukraine’s The public reaction was swift and the external liquidity and fiscal challenges would events that unfolded shook up Ukraine and have been reduced, bringing the country onto lead to a widespread geopolitical confronta- a more sustainable path of growth2. The same tion in Europe. Essentially, we have witnessed report mentioned that following four quarters the most serious international crisis since the of negative growth, real GDP may pick up in end of the Cold War. Next I will briefly explo- the third quarter of 2013 thanks to a significant re the chronology of events that lead to this grain crop and continuing gains in private con- outcome. sumption. Moreover, the agricultural sector’s strong performance has been supported by * This work was supported by a grant of the Roma- steady improvements in animal breeding and nian National Authority for ScientificResearch, CNCS – poultry. UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1014. Real wage growth in this sector remained Project manager: Professor Mihail E. Ionescu. robust (up by 9.3% over the first eight months Monitor Strategic 5 of the year), supporting personal consumption Also, such tendencies have a negative impact expenditures (retail sales rose by 10.2% over on investors’ mood, making it more difficult the period). In July 2013, world steel prices for the government to borrow on international have begun recovering, helped by a modest markets.” Golovach stated that if the Ukrainian recovery of the global economy and low steel government delayed the changes until after the stock. The positive impact of such develop- presidential elections in 2015, the economic ments was however outweighed by trade re- situation may be seriously affected: “Ukraine strictions imposed by Russia, that had a no- needs to start reform this year or next year at table impact on Ukraine’s machine building, the latest, preferable reaching a deal with the metallurgy, manufacturing of food products, IMF. [...] Then its economic growth may acce- chemicals as well as performance of wholesale lerate to 1.5 percent next year and 3 percent trade and cargo transportation. Therefore, in- in 2015.”4 dustrial production continued to decline, with An analysis done a year after the November output down by 5.4% in August 2013. Due to 2013 episode is extremely relevant for what ac- a relaxation of trade tensions with Russia since tually happened within the Ukraine-EU-Russia late August 2013, Ukraine was forecast to con- triangle at the time. Two extracts from this tinue recovery in the fourth quarter of 2013, analysis suggest that Ukraine’s decision to avo- although at a slow pace. Real GDP was pro- id signing the EU Association Agreement was jected to increase by 0.3% in 20133. According the result of geopolitical pressure, while the to an optimistic scenario regarding Ukraine’s economic situation was less relevant in taking relations with Russia, it was estimated that the the decision that officially stated: short-term losses generated by the imposition 1. “/…/Moscow, Military Airport, Nov. of trade restrictions by Russia would be softe- 9,2013: It doesn’t happen often that Vladimir ned by the EU’s compensatory measures. As a Putin attends a meeting at a site other than the result, real GDP growth was forecast to acce- Kremlin or his residence on the outskirts of lerate to 2% in 2014. Moscow. But on that Saturday evening in Oc- The situation regarding Ukraine’s external tober, he unexpectedly agreed to a confidential debt was extremely bleak. The country had tête-à-tête at the military airport not far from to repay about $1.6 billion to the IMF in the the Russian capital. His interlocutor? Viktor fourth quarter of 2013 and an additional $3.5 Yanukovych. It was the second conversation billion in 2014, while total repayments of pu- between the two presidents within the space blic and publicly guaranteed debt have been of just a few weeks, with the first having taken estimated at around $7 billion in 2014. Such place on Oct. 27 in the Black Sea resort of So- high external debt repayments put pressure on chi. Putin had nothing but disdain for Yanuko- both the fiscal balance and local currency. The vych, loathing the Ukrainian leader’s constant negotiations for a new loan with the IMF had wavering. In the past, he had often left Yanuko- been stalled because the Ukrainian authoriti- vych waiting for hours like a supplicant and the es were reluctant to implement an increase in Kremlin was convinced of Yanukovych’s unre- natural gas prices that would have triggered a liability. Though the man from eastern Ukrai- public outcry. On October 7th 2013, Ukraine’s ne was much less pro-European than his suc- economic situation was unanimously percei- cessor, he had continued to stubbornly resist ved as serious – „[...] an adjustment is inevita- requests from Moscow. Ever since Putin came ble. The only question is whether Ukraine will to realize that Yanukovych was in fact conside- reform now or will adjustment be delayed” ring signing the EU association agreement, he read one report of the World Bank.