Putin Creates a Fantasyland - WSJ 8/19/15, 15:44
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
What Peace Plan Between Russia and Ukraine ?
RUSSIA UKRAINE WHAT PEACE PLAN BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ? REPORT OF THE COMMISSION "TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WITH THE MEDIATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION" MaxxjaNe / Shutterstock.com RUSSIA - UKRAINE WHAT PEACE PLAN BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ? REPORT OF THE COMMISSION "TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE WITH THE MEDIATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION" Resolutions of the four seminars organized in France and Ukraine in 2018-2019 SUMMAY PREFACE 1ST SEMINAR 2ND SEMINAR 3RD SEMINAR 4TH SEMINAR EDITORIAL PRESS REVIEW "There is still today a chance for peace between Russia and Ukraine" (CTJR, December 2019) Drop of Light / Shutterstock.com PREFACE In this general report of the Commission "Truth, Justice and Reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine with the Mediation of the European Union" (TJR), you will find the results of the four sessions held in 2018-2019 in France and Ukraine at the initiative of the Collège des Bernardins (Paris), the Mohyla Academy (Kyiv), the Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv) and the NGO "Memorial" (Moscow), in partnership with several media outlets: French (ouest-france.fr), Russian (graniru.org), Ukrainian (radiosvoboda.org), English (uacrisis.org) and with the support of several organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Forum Normandy for Peace, the Open Dialogue Foundation or the Oeuvre d’Orient. This Commission is the only existing structure in the world that has been able to bring together eminent institutions, recognized by the States and the civil societies to which they belong, and having been able to produce a peace plan taking into account the strategic interests of the Russian and Ukrainian nations. -
Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine: State Responsibility, Individual
Alexander Antonov University of Southern Denmark, Odense Delivery day: 10th July 2018 Faculty of Business and Social Sciences Number of keystrokes: 191747 Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: State Responsibility, Individual Responsibility and Accountability Scrutinizing Ukraine’s Application at the ICJ, Ukraine’s Acceptance of the ICC’s Jurisdiction Pursuant to Art. 12(3) of the Rome Statute and the Role of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis Author of the Thesis: Alexander Antonov i Alexander Antonov Summary The majority of legal practitioners and liberal democratic states hold the same opinion: Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support to the rebels in Eastern Ukraine constituted an act of aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine. Four years have passed since fighting erupted in Ukrainian regions adjacent to Russia leaving thousands of innocent civilians dead, traumatised or homeless. Families have been torn apart. Despite a vast amount of evidence, Russia has continued to deny the facts that it breached international law by annexing a foreign territory and supporting the so---called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic after the ousting of the former pro---Russian president Viktor Yanukovych at the end of the Maidan revolution in February 2014. Most researchers expounded on the international norms Russia has put at stake and pondered over Russia’s unreasonable legal justifications for its actions in Crimea. The Ukraine crisis has been dealt with extensively both from a political science and legal perspective but only a few scholars discussed the tools international law provide to establish Russia’s responsibility for its wrongful conduct and to hold individuals responsible, suspected of having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes on Ukrainian territory. -
Geopolitics in the Black Sea Region - Tendencies and Challenges
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge Centar for strategic researching and national security - CESNA B, Belgrade, Serbia BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTE FOR CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH ON NATIONAL THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES AND KNOWLEDGE SECURITY - CESNA B, BELGRADE, SERBIA THEMATIC PAPERS PHILOSOPHY NOWADAYS PHILOSOPHY GEOPOLITICS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION - TENDENCIES AND CHALLENGES PHILOSOPHY NOWADAYS SECOND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS E D I T O R S Slobodan Neskovic, PhD Bogdana Todorova, PhD 1 Belgrade, 2019 Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge Centar for strategic researching and national security - CESNA B, Belgrade, Serbia Center for Strategic Research on National Bulgarian Academy of Security - CESNA B, Sciences - Institute for Belgrade, Serbia the Study of Societies Romanian Academy of and Knowledge Sciences - Institute of Political Science and International Relations “Ion I.C. Brătianu” University of Bucharest, University of Liège, Romania - Faculty of Belgium - Department of Philosophy Philosophy Azerbaijan National Slovak Academy of Academy - Institute of Sciences - Institute of Philosophy Philosophy Polish Academy of Uludag Sciences - Institute of University, Turkey - Philosophy and Sociology Department of Philosophy TEMATIC PAPERS GEOPOLITICS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION - TENDENCIES AND CHALLENGES PHILOSOPHY NOWADAYS SECOND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS EDITORS Slobodan Neskovic, PhD Bogdana Todorova, -
Discourse in Danger: Attacks on Free Expression in Putin's Russia
DISCOURSE IN DANGER ATTACKS ON FREE EXPRESSION IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA DISCOURSE IN DANGER: ATTACKS ON FREE EXPRESSION IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA January 25, 2016 © PEN American Center 2016. All rights reserved. PEN American Center is the largest branch of PEN International, the world’s leading literary and human rights organization. PEN works in more than 100 countries to protect free expression and to defend writers and journalists who are imprisoned, threatened, persecuted, or attacked in the course of their profession. PEN America’s 4,300 members stand together with more than 20,000 PEN writers worldwide in international literary fellowship to carry on the achievements of such past members as James Baldwin, Robert Frost, Allen Ginsberg, Langston Hughes, Arthur Miller, Eugene O’Neill, Susan Sontag, and John Steinbeck. For more information, please visit www.pen.org. Cover photography by Sergey Norin CONTENTS Introduction 4 Overview and Methodology 5 Legal Framework 6 Regulating the Information Space: Roskomnadzor 9 Shaping Children’s Minds 16 Closing Intellectual and Cultural Spaces 19 Reining In Civil Society 22 Conclusion: Navigating the Closing Space 24 Acknowledgments 26 Appendix 1: PEN American Center Letter to the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. 27 Appendix 2: Response from Russian Embassy to PEN Request for Comment 28 Endnotes 32 INTRODUCTION Freedom of expression has been one of the worst casu- alties of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 15-year as- Putin has seized upon sault on democratic institutions and values. When Putin first came to power in 2000, he began systematically to information as a key dismantle, weaken, or fundamentally undermine dem- ocratic institutions, beginning with the press.1 Despite weapon in his fight this frontal attack on the media, some independent voic- es in traditional media remained strong and the rise in to promote Russia’s internet access and social media allowed independent online resources to flourish, including internet news sites, blogs, and social media sites. -
Russia's Foreign Policy: the Internal
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY FOREIGN RUSSIA’S XXXXXXXX Andemus, cont? Giliis. Fertus por aciendam ponclem is at ISPI. omantem atuidic estius, nos modiertimiu consulabus RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: vivissulin voctum lissede fenducient. Andius isupio uratient. THE INTERNAL- Founded in 1934, ISPI is Actu sis me inatquam te te te, consulvit rei firiam atque a an independent think tank committed to the study of catis. Benterri er prarivitea nit; ipiesse stiliis aucto esceps, INTERNATIONAL LINK international political and Catuit depse huiumum peris, et esupimur, omnerobus economic dynamics. coneque nocuperem moves es vesimus. edited by Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti It is the only Italian Institute Iter ponsultorem, ursultorei contern ultortum di sid C. Marbi introduction by Paolo Magri – and one of the very few in silictemqui publint, Ti. Teatquit, videst auderfe ndiissendam Europe – to combine research Romnesidem simaximium intimus, ut et; eto te adhui activities with a significant publius conlostam sultusquit vid Cate facteri oriciamdi, commitment to training, events, ompec morterei iam pracion tum mo habem vitus pat veri and global risk analysis for senaributem apecultum forte hicie convo, que tris. Serum companies and institutions. pra intin tant. ISPI favours an interdisciplinary Bonertum inatum et rem sus ilicaedemus vid con tum and policy-oriented approach made possible by a research aur, conenit non se facia movere pareis, vo, vistelis re, crei team of over 50 analysts and terae movenenit L. Um prox noximod neritiam adeffrestod an international network of 70 comnit. Mulvis Ahacciverte confenit vat. Romnihilii issedem universities, think tanks, and acchuiu scenimi liescipio vistum det; hacrurorum, et, research centres. -
DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS the Official Journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
ISSN 2500-9478 Volume 1 | Number 1 | Winter 2015 DEFENCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS The official journal of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Russia’s 21st century information war. Moving past the ‘Funnel’ Model of Counterterrorism Communication. Assessing a century of British military Information Operations. Memetic warfare. The constitutive narratives of Daesh. Method for minimizing the negative consequences of nth order effects in StratCom. The Narrative and Social Media. Public Diplomacy and NATO. 11 RUSSIA’S 21ST CENTURY INFORMATION WAR: WORKING TO UNDERMINE AND DESTABILIZE POPULATIONS Timothy Thomas For many months now Russia has engaged its domestic and international audiences in a massive information campaign. The goal of the campaign is to persuade and influence local and foreign populations that Russian territorial claims in Ukraine are based on legitimate responses to world events. This media offensive has used both old and new forms of persuasion to strategically communicate its goals. This article discusses the components of Russia’s information war offensive to influence Western and domestic opinion. Russia is accomplishing this information war both at home and abroad through a number of methods that will be described in the paper. These include the use of deception, deflection of responsibility, outright lies, and the creation of an alternative reality. There is no Russian equivalent for strategic communications, so a definition of information war from a Russian perspective is offered in its place. NATO defines strategic communications in the following manner: Strategic Communication is the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities—Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations, and Psychological Operations, as appropriate—in support of Alliance policies, operations, and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.1 Russia, on the other hand, does not appear to use the term strategic communications itself. -
Foreign Visitors and the Post-Stalin Soviet State
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The Post-Stalin Soviet State Alex Hazanov Hazanov University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Hazanov, Alex Hazanov, "Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The Post-Stalin Soviet State" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2330. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2330 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2330 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Porous Empire: Foreign Visitors And The Post-Stalin Soviet State Abstract “Porous Empire” is a study of the relationship between Soviet institutions, Soviet society and the millions of foreigners who visited the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. “Porous Empire” traces how Soviet economic, propaganda, and state security institutions, all shaped during the isolationist Stalin period, struggled to accommodate their practices to millions of visitors with material expectations and assumed legal rights radically unlike those of Soviet citizens. While much recent Soviet historiography focuses on the ways in which the post-Stalin opening to the outside world led to the erosion of official Soviet ideology, I argue that ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin era structured institutional responses to a growing foreign presence in Soviet life. Therefore, while Soviet institutions had to accommodate their economic practices to the growing numbers of tourists and other visitors inside the Soviet borders and were forced to concede the existence of contact zones between foreigners and Soviet citizens that loosened some of the absolute sovereignty claims of the Soviet party-statem, they remained loyal to visions of Soviet economic independence, committed to fighting the cultural Cold War, and profoundly suspicious of the outside world. -
Kesarev Memo | New Russian Government | January 2020
Kesarev phone: +32 (2) 899 4699 e-mail: [email protected] www.kesarev.com NEW RUSSIAN CABINET: STAFF “REVOLUTION” INSTEAD OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS? Summary On January 21, 2020, President Putin approved the structure of the new Russian Government and appointed Deputy Prime Ministers and federal Ministers. New Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was appointed on January 16. What are the key specifics of the new Cabinet? The key specific feature of the new Russian Cabinet is that while the structural changes are minimal, the staff reshuffles proved to be radical, both in terms of the number of new people appointed to top offices and change of political status of key Cabinet members (how close they are to the President). This is an extremely atypical decision for Putin, compared to previous Cabinets over the entire period of his stay in power. Earlier, as a rule, the Cabinets included influential figures close to the President and personally associated with him, and a system of checks and balances between different elite groups existed. But at the same time, the decision to change the approach to the Cabinet appointments is logical in the context of a broader presidential “staff policy” over recent years - the so-called “technocratisation” of power (the appointment of young “technocratic” governors, the penetration of such figures into Medvedev’s second Cabinet, the appointment of the head of the Presidential Administration, a “technocrat” Anton Vayno during the Parliamentary election campaign in 2016 and the launch of “Leaders of Russia” contest in order to select and train a “succession pool” for the top positions in the federal and regional civil bureaucracy). -
Amerimuncvi BG Russia-Mjb3.Pdf
© 2018 American University Model United Nations Conference All rights reserved. No part of this background guide may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever without express written permission from the American University Model United Nations Conference Secretariat. Please direct all questions to [email protected] Nisaa Chaudhry & Emily Devereaux Chairs Delegates -- My name is Nisaa Chaudhry and I am a first year public health major on the pre-med track here at American. I did Model UN throughout high school and hosted a few high school-level conferences, as well served as part of the conference’s secretariat. I am a D.C. area native, so I love showing my friends around the city and trying new things with them. Outside of class, you can catch me tutoring with D.C. Reads, cheering on the Wizards, or watching re-runs of Scandal. Being a part of Model UN is one of my most cherished high school memories, and I am very excited to take part in AMERIMUNC VI. From my time in Model UN, my biggest takeaway is to recognize the importance of teamwork. Each delegate has the ability to pitch in ideas that can ultimately craft viable solutions, so do not be afraid to say what’s on your mind. Recognizing the importance of teamwork will not only help you become a stronger delegate, but it will also allow you to learn something new. My name is Emily Devereaux and I am a first year international relations major on the pre-med track. I did Model UN throughout high school, and I am also on American’s Model UN team. -
The Report of the 12Th December of the Round Table Committee On
The Report of the December 12 Roundtable Committee on the Public Investigation of the Events of May 6, 2012 on Bolotnaya Square Moscow April 22, 2013 Report Summary .......................................................................................................... 5 1. Committee Status, Objectives and Principles ..................................................... 22 2. Сomposition of the Committee ............................................................................. 25 th 3. The Public Situation Prior to the 6 of May Events ........................................... 26 The events of May 6, 2012 were preceded by a huge outbreak of civil activity. Yet it cannot be called unexpected. The ground for it was prepared by three interconnected tendencies. ......................................................................................... 26 Conclusions of the Chapter ....................................................................................... 29 4. Organization and Conduct of Public Events ....................................................... 31 4.1 Preliminary legal comments, describing the Committee’s approach to the issues related to the freedom of peaceful gathering ............................................................................................................................. 31 4.1.1 The international and Russian legal acts, guaranteeing the realization of the right to free and unarmed gathering ....................................................................................................................... -
Ngos As a Tool for Russia's Projection of Influence
Olga Shorina NGOS AS A TOOL FOR RUSSIA’S PROJECTION OF INFLUENCE Washington, DC - Bonn, 2018 Editor - Olga Khvostunova, Adjunct Fellow of Institute of Modern Russia and Free Russia Foundation [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] CONTENTS Author’s Note 4 Acknowledgments 5 Introduction 6 Terminology and Timeline 7 Controlling Civil Society through Funding 11 Design and Activities 20 Propaganda 23 Kleptocracy 23 Intelligence Activities 24 Case Study: Russian NGOs at the OSCE Meetings 24 Dealing with the Kremlin’s NGOs 29 Recommendations 29 Concluding Notes 29 Olga Shorina AUTHOR’S NOTE This report started off as a study about the government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) operated by Kremlin to promote its views and pursue its interests. But in the course of the research, it became clear that the network of these Kremlin-run organizations is much more complex and diverse, stretching far beyond Russia’s borders. It also became clear the term “GONGO” does not fully describe the variety of these organizations. While it is true that the Kremlin is using GONGOs to manipulate civil society in Russia and abroad, there are many other organizations that it is relying on to achieve its goals. To address this issue, the author initially suggested a broader term—“GONGO & Co.”—but eventually rejected it as it failed to fully reflect the complexity of the phenomenon examined in this report. The author’s discussions of the term with various experts in the field provoked lengthy debates about the formal status of the pro-Kremlin NGOs, all the while distracting from a much more crucial problem—their impact on the third sector and the civil society as a whole. -
Spring 2018 Kimberly Marten
Russia and the West POS W4875 Spring 2018 Mon. and Wed. 2:40-3:55pm Room: Barnard Hall 409 Prof. Kimberly Marten Office: 1215 IAB (Columbia campus) Office Hours: Tues, Wed. 4-5pm email: [email protected] Twitter: @KimberlyMarten Course Description Throughout history Russia has had an ambiguous relationship with the Western world. Sometimes the West has been vilified as a threat or an enemy, and other times it has been held up by Russians as a model to emulate. Russia and the West have never treated each other with indifference, and this love/hate relationship is in full force today. Historical memories and parallels abound in popular discussions. In this course, we will examine why this has been the case and what it means for Russian foreign and security policy today. Drawing on contributions from philosophers, historians and international relations scholars and practitioners, we will discuss whether Russia’s interaction with the West has been driven by realist great power considerations, by a cultural cycle of Orthodox Slavic nationalism or “Eurasianism” vs. pro-Western internationalism, by domestic economic pressures, or by the idiosyncratic visions and interests of individual Russian leaders—and in turn, how choices made by the West have affected all of these things. Students will be encouraged to come up with their own answers to these riddles, in class discussions and assignments including a final independent research paper. This is not a survey course, but no background knowledge is required—only a deep interest in understanding Russia and its relationship to the West. There are no prerequisites.