The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era Author(S): Yosef Lapid Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol

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The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era Author(s): Yosef Lapid Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 235-254 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600457 . Accessed: 02/05/2014 02:59

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This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions InternationalStudies Quarterly (1989) 33, 235-254

The Third Debate: On the Prospects of InternationalTheory in a Post-PositivistEra

YOSEF LAPID CarletonUniversity

The demiseof the empiricist-positivistpromise for a cumulativebehavioral sciencerecently has forcedscholars from nearly all the social disciplinesto reexaminethe ontological,epistemological, and axiologicalfoundations of theirscientific endeavors. The "thirddebate" in the fieldof international relationsparallels this intellectual ferment and constitutesa stillmaturing disciplinaryeffort to reconsidertheoretical options in a "post-positivist"era. This essay explores the etiologyof this debate and criticallyassesses its implicationsfor currentand futuretheoretical practices. Although the debate has triggeredmany different responses, the analysis focuses on only one of them-the optimisticresponse-which both affirmsand celebrates the unparalleledtheoretical potentialities presumably created by the pre- sent intellectualtransition. While acknowledging the considerablepromise of the thirddebate, the essay notes that post-positivismoffers nearly as manydead ends as it opens promisingpaths for future research. The essay issues some warningsconcerning hazards of misplaced or extravagant theoreticalhopes, and it singles out enhanced reflexivityin the scholarly communityof internationalrelations as the notablecontribution to date of the currenttheoretical restructuring.

"The searchfor a bettertheory formsthe third debate . . . [It] is potentiallythe richest, most promisingand excitingthat we have everhad in internationalrelations." MichaelBanks (1986:17) "Our enterpriseshows important signsof maturation." Kal Holsti(1984:361) Excursions into metatheory are notoriously controversial in the social sciences. One finds, on the one hand, the conviction that such concerns "are too important to be taken for granted and too much a part of our ongoing research enterprises to be left to philosophers to think about" (Fiske and Shweder, 1986:3). Furthermore, as Mario Bunge notes, "Those who tryto ignore philosophy only succeed in reinventing

Author'sNote: For their support in the preparation of this article, I thank the Leonard Davies Institutefor InternationalRelations at the Hebrew Universityof Jerusalemand the Departmentof PoliticalScience at Carleton Universityin Ottawa. I am gratefulto Meir Stieglitz,two anonymous referees,and the Editors of ISQ.

? 1989 InternationalStudies Association

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it" (Bunge, 1983:270). One finds,on the other hand, a prescriptionfor a rigorous philosophy-avoidancestrategy for the practicingsocial scientist.Especially in the earlystages of theorizing,so thisargument goes, misplacedpursuits of epistemology and philosophyof scienceare bound to be inconclusiveand are likelyto come at the expense of actual research(Rosenberg, 1986). Be thatas it may,it is hardlydisputable that the demise of theempiricist-positivist promisefor a cumulativebehavioral science recently has forcedscholars from nearly all thesocial disciplines to reexaminethe ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundationsof their scientificendeavors. As a result, the human sciences are currentlyundergoing an acute bout of self-doubtand heightenedmetatheoretical ferment.Indeed, some of the most highlyprized premisesof Westernacademic discourse concerningthe nature of our social knowledge,its acquisition,and its utility-includingshibboleths such as "truth,""rationality," "objectivity, reality," and "consensus,"-have come under renewedcritical reflection (Fay, 1985). AnthonyGiddens (1979:238) has identifiedfour typicalresponses to this re- awakening of metatheoreticalimpulses followingthe collapse of the positivist orthodoxy:the "despairing,"the "dogmatic,"the "celebratory,"and his own,the call for a "systematicreconstruction" of social theory.Alarmed by the conspicuous absence of a single shared convictionabout the nature and destinationof social theory,the despairingresponse articulates an instinctivedesire not to be disturbed by foundational,or "meta"-scientific,problems. Noting that experts in metascience rarelyagree among themselves,this response clings to pre-Kuhnianverities about objectivity,testability, and falsificationand encouragessocial scientiststo go on with some "useful" or practical work. Unfortunately,this retreatistpattern neither addresses nor settlesthe issues raised by the currentintellectual transfiguration. Worsestill, the creative potential of thecrisis is lostin "thehaste of wantingto know." The dogmaticresponse suffers from similar limitations. In the face of expanding confusionand as a resultof a foundationalistcraving to restoreintellectual security, thisresponse appeals to an "authoritative"figure such as Karl Marx or Max Weber. As Giddens indicates,however, this reversionto dogmatismavoids rather than confrontsthe core problem. Certaintyis perhaps artificiallyrestored, but at an excessive scientific price. In sharp contrastto the firsttwo responses,the thirdaffirms and celebratesthe supposedly"liberating" potential of the Babel of theoreticalvoices currently sound- ing over the ruins of the positivistproject. It casts a new lighton the endemic diversityof theoriesby questioningthe assumptionthat convergenceof belief is necessaryfor maturityin science. It seriouslyexamines instead the possibilitythat, within limits,diversity of viewpointsmight be fully compatible with scientific rationalityand objectivity.This is an optimisticresponse, and thus Giddens cau- tiouslyapproves. He insists,however, that simply embracing-or compounding- this conditionof theoreticalpluralism may inadvertentlyaggravate the crisis.His fourthresponse, systematic reconstruction, addresses this problem by trying to order and transcend diversitywithout substituting a new orthodoxyfor the old one (Giddens, 1979:240). As we shall see shortly,this far-reaching and stillevolving intellectual transition in the philosophicaland social disciplineshas leftits markon internationalrelations scholarship.Following the "idealismversus realism" schism of the 1920s and 1930s, and transcendingthe more recent"history versus science" exchange of the 1950s and 1960s, in the late 1980s the disciplinestands in the midstof a thirddiscipline- definingdebate (Maghrooriand Ramberg,1982; Holsti, 1985a; Banks, 1986). It is noteworthythat in termsof methodologicaland theoreticalinnovations the fieldof internationalrelations was and stillis "an absorberand importer,not a producerin its own right"(Halliday, 1985:408). Hence, primafacie, thereare reasons to suspect thatjust as the "second debate"-the "historyversus science" controversy-was

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions YOSEF LAPID 237 wedded to the ascendance of positivismin Westernsocial science,so is the "third debate" linked, historicallyand intellectually,to the confluenceof diverse anti- positivisticphilosophical and sociologicaltrends. Submittingthat the third debate in internationalrelations theory parallels the intellectualferment that other social sciencesare presentlyundergoing and thatthis debateconstitutes a diffuseand stillmaturing disciplinary effort to reassess theoretical optionsin a "post-positivist"era, thisessay explores the debate's etiology and assesses itsimplications for current and futureprospects for theoretical growth. Although all fourresponses enumerated by Giddens are embryonicallypresent in the contextof the thirddebate, this study singles out one of them-the celebratorypattern-as its main focus.' This optimisticreaction has been chosen for threeprincipal reasons. First,it is a salientand provocativeresponse which merits special consideration in view of a lingeringsuspicion that somethingis stillradically wrong withinternational theory.2What, one mightask, is the natureand the originof thisapparent surge of optimism?Are we trulyon theverge of a newera in theoryor are we simplywitnessing an internationalrelations version of the "obsessivediscoverer's complex"?3 Second, froma more practicalpoint of view,the celebratorypattern is intriguing because of itsexplicit focus on some putativemoments of specialproductivity which are presumablyimplicit in the currentintellectual transition. It is interesting,in other words,to see what typesof theoreticalopportunities and potentialitieshave been attributedto the currentdebate and what kind of theoreticalprojects are expected to best realize such promises.And finally,as hintedby Giddens's fourth pattern,systematic reconstruction, the celebratoryresponse needs constructive criticaldelimitation in order to anticipateand preemptthe dangers of indiscriminate theoreticalelation. In directanswer to thesequeries and concernswe positthat the deeper rootsand implicationsof the currentseason of hope in internationalrelations theory are best explored in the contextof a focused effortto understandsome seeminglyfar- reaching ramificationsof the "new," post-positivistphilosophy and sociologyof science. The followinganalysis is presentedin four consecutivestages. The first acknowledges and explains the difficultysome have in identifyinga coherent "debate" in the emergingBabel of discordanttheoretical voices in the international relationsfield. The second seeks to bring the thirddebate into sharper focus by highlightingits distinctivepost-positivist profile. The thirddelimits the parameters of the celebratoryresponse and exploresthe groundsfor the optimisticequation of the currentdebate witha promisinggrowth in internationalrelations theory. The fourth section issues a general warning concerning some notable hazards of misplacedor extravaganttheoretical hopes. While acknowledgingthe considerable

' Brief reference will be made later to the "despairing" response. The orthodox Marxist attack on the "dependency" and "world system"approaches provides good examples for the "dogmatic"pattern (see Denemark and Thomas, 1988). The "systematicreconstruction" response is certainlyvery importantand deserves separate attention. But I agree with Preston that as formulatedby Giddens it comes close to "step number one in the direction of a new orthodoxy" (Preston, 1987:75). And like him I believe that having just escaped from one straitjacketthere is no point in pushing so early fora new one (Preston, 1987). As an example, however,Hoffman's (1987) plea foradopting "CriticalTheory" as "the next stage" in internationalrelations theory certainly qualifies for the systematicreconstruction category. For an interestingexchange sparked by Hoffman'ssuggestion, see articles by Renger (1988b) and Hoffman (1988). 2 See, for instance, Waltz's (1979:18) lament: "Nothing seems to accumulate, not even criticism."Or see Rosenau's (1980:129) despair over the "process of paradigm deterioration"which, in his view,"is underwayin the studyof world affairs."Reflecting this spirit,Gilpin (1984:287) has recentlysuggested that the discipline,no less than its object of study,is in a state of anarchy. ' This "complex" originatesfrom Sorokin (1956:3-20) and refersto the periodic emergence in the social sciences of would-be "new Columbuses" who "discover" hereto undetected leaps of growthin social theory.

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 238 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra promise of the current intellectualferment, the concluding section singles out enhanced reflexivityas the most importantcontribution to date of the current theoreticalrestructuring.

The Third Debate: Disarrayor TheoreticalRestructuring? Few observerswould seriouslycontest the suggestionthat the fieldof international studies has experienced in recent years sustained theoreticaleffervescence. But beyonda vague uneasinessover the factthat no reductionseems to be obtainingin the diversityof conceptualizationsand higher-ordertheories, one looksin vain fora more specificconsensus on the currentstate and futuredirection of the discipline. Echoing Giddens's despairing response, we find at the pessimisticend of the spectrumscholars who are eitherreluctant or unable to detecta coherentpattern in the rampanttheoretical speculation. Such observersdeplore the dazing pace with whichnew ideas are superficiallyintroduced into international relations theory, only to be discarded subsequentlywith inexplicableurgency. They seem thoroughly confused by the "amount of debris on the battlefieldof internationalrelations theory"(Der Derian, 1987:11) and feelunderstandably frustrated at facingthis vast intellectualdisarray "with few guides on makingchoices" (Lyons, 1986:643). Hence, theyconclude that"in both theoryand practiceinternational politics can bringon despair. This is an occupationalhazard in the fieldfor whichthere is no remedy" (Morgan, 1987:301). Others,to be sure, would stronglydisagree withsuch a gloomyreading (Holsti, 1985a:4). They would counterthat the livelychorus of contendingtheoretical voices in the fieldof internationalrelations constitutes a "dialogue"or a "debate" withthe powerto transformthe international relations discipline. Yet even among thisgroup thereis conspicuouslylittle agreement about who is debatingwhom, along whatlines of contention,and withwhat prospectsof success. For in sharp contrastwith both previous debates, the residual confusionover the source, nature,direction, and potentialconsequences of the currentintellectual transition remains extensive. It reaches far beyond technicaldisagreements over nomenclatureor head countsof would-beparadigmatic combatants (Holsti, 1985a:5).4 At firstsight it is thereforedifficult to avoid the conclusionthat international relationstheory has recentlyup-graded its profileas "a fundamentallycontested domain"(Biersteker, forthcoming). This perhapspartially explains the reluctance to bringthe currentexchange into focusas an intelligible"debate." But, preciselyin view of this reluctance,it is imperativeto highlightsome notable commonalities among those who do acknowledgea coherentand consequentialpattern in the currentintellectual cacophony in the internationalrelations field. For at a minimum one finds,for example, a shared recognitionthat the thirddebate marksa clear end to the positivistepistemological consensus that was hardlyshaken in thecourse of the "historyversus science" controversy.Whereas the second debate was preoccupied with quarrels over methodologynarrowly defined, the third debate is typically expected to facilitatetrailblazing ideas about the natureand progressionof knowl-

4 The natureof the thirddebate may varyconsiderably along ontological,epistemological, and axiological lines. Its scope may fluctuatewidely depending on whetherone opts for a restrictivedescription of the debate-as a focused exchange between realism and neorealism versus all comers and challengers (Keohane, 1986)-or for a far broader characterization which specifies the emergence of a genuinely multiparadigmaticinternational relationsdiscipline as the outstanding noveltyof the currentintellectual transition (Alker and Biersteker,1984; Holsti, 1985a). And finally,moving along the plane of knowledgeversus power, the significanceof the debate may varydepending on whetherone sees it as a battlebetween "good" and "bad" ideas in an insuLlatedscienitific arenia or as a series of "intenselypolitical happenings" (Ashley, 1989) occur-ringbetween vested cuLltuLral,economic, and politicalinterests (Biersteker, forthcoming).

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edge in the internationalrelations field. One also findsa shared appreciationthat theoryin thisfield is "in the processof being restructured,"a restructuringwhich is recognizedmoreover as being"linked directly to a similarset of debatesoccurring in contemporarysocial and politicaltheory" (Hoffman, 1988:91). The followinganalysis makes no attempt to deny or expunge the possibly irreducibleambiguities of the currentintellectual transition in the discipline.Its purpose is simplyto referto certainthemes in the new philosophyand sociologyof science in order to clarifythe etiologyof the currentdebate and its promisesand limitations.

The Third Debate: A Post-PositivistProfile Especiallywhen compared withthe simplisticcoherence of the positivistphilosophi- cal movement,post-positivism is not a unitaryphilosophical platform. It presents itselfas a ratherloosely patched-up umbrella for a confusingarray of onlyremotely related philosophicalarticulations. Hence, if one wishesto refermeaningfully to post-positivismas an alternativephilosophical position-perhaps usheringin a new era in internationalrelations theory-one firstmust identifysome areas of con- vergencein the general ideas presentedby this"new philosophyof science." A detailed analysis of such convergentpost-positivist views is, however,well beyond the scope of this paper.5 I will deliberatelyrestrict my attentionto three themeswhich seem to have been particularlyinfluential in determiningthe tone, agenda, and mood of the currentdebate in internationalrelations theory. These themes-the preoccupationwith meta-scientific units (paradigmatism), the concern withunderlying premises and assumptions(perspectivism), and the drifttowards methodologicalpluralism (relativism)-are, of course, interrelated.They will, however,be treatedseparately here to elucidatemore clearly their distinct impact on the currenttheoretical debate.

The Concernwith Meta-Scientific Units (Paradigmatism) Post-positivismhas wroughta notablechange in the understandingand choice of properunits of analysisin the studyof scientificdevelopment.6 In sharp contrastto the positivistchoice of the empiricallycorroborated law or generalizationas the fundamentalunit of scientificachievement, the new philosophy of scienceinsists that only relativelylong-lived, large-scale, and multi-tieredconstructs-such as "paradigms"(Kuhn, 1962), "research-programmes"(Lakatos, 1970), "research traditions" (Laudan, 1984), "super-theories"(Gutting, 1980), "global theories"(Hooker, 1987), and "weltanschauungen"(Wisdom, 1987)-should qualify as basic knowledge- producing,knowledge-accumulating, and knowledge-conservingunits. For theories do not come to us separately;hence theyshould not be handled as self-contained entities. Above all, the new philosophicalposture portrays scientific knowledge as a triadic complex consistingof 1) a "phenomenic"axis coveringthe empiricalcontent of scientifictheories; 2) an "analytic"axis covering hypotheses,explanations, and theoreticalmodels; and 3) a "thematic"axis coveringreality-defining assumptions, epistemologicalpremises, and other typesof distinctly"ideological" or "metaphys-

'There is now a voluminous body of literature which seeks to identifythe basic themes of the dramatic revolutions in our understanding of science. See Laudan et al. (1986:141-224), in particular,for a readable summaryof both convergentand divergentthemes in the "new philosophyof science."

6This change is known in the philosophical literatureas the problem of choosing a proper unit of epistemic appraisal (Bernstein, 1983:24; Pandit, 1983:19; Campbell, 1984:28-30; Laudan et al., 1986:154).

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 240 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra ical" ingredients.7The noveltyof thisunderlying post-positivist project-postulating an irreduciblythree-dimensional space for scientificknowledge-is the explicit negationof the cardinal positivistpremise which affirms the "eliminabilityof the human" (Margolis,1987:xxii) and places (or replaces)the scientist"at the centerof the social-intellectual-ethicalcomplex knownas science"(Hooker, 1987:10). Paradigmatismthus asserts that meta-scientific constructs come and go in complete packages. It followsthat only broader conjunctures of interrelatedtheories, including theirunstated premises and underlyingassumptions, can qualifyas properunits of developmentand appraisal in science. It follows,furthermore, that empirical evidence in the usual sense of registering"objectively" what one sees is of only limited utilityin scientificevaluative appraisal. For in sharp contrastwith the phenomenicaxis, the thematicaxis-although challengeableperhaps in some other way (Wisdom, 1987:160)-is not refutableby direct empiricalobservation. This partiallyexplains, as Holton pointsout, whyscience is not "one great totalitarian engine takingeveryone relentlessly to the same inevitablegoal" (quoted in Stent, 1988:37). At the same time it also raises the challengeof formulatingalternative, "rational"criteria of evaluativeappraisal whichacknowledge and confrontrather than denyor ignorethe non-empiricalnature of at leastone integralcomponent of all scientificknowledge (Wisdom, 1987:160). Returningto our principalconcern with international relations theory, I submit that"paradigmatism"-in the specificsense of an enhanced post-positivistconcern withmeta-scientific constructs which incorporate integral thematic components as a preconditionof scientificintelligibility-presents itself as one of the most notable characteristicsof the thirddebate. For even a cursoryglance at the literaturereveals thatstudies involving bivariate and multivariaterelations, which flourished through- out the 1960s and early1970s, now are held in generaldisrepute (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:580). The intellectualexchange is no longer betweenindividual scholars or isolated theories,but between"models" (McKinlayand Little,1986), "paradigms" (Banks, 1985; Holsti,1985a), "researchprograms" (Keohane, 1984; Kratochwiland Ruggie, 1986; Hermann and Peacock, 1987), "research traditions"(Biersteker, forthcoming),or "discourses"(Ashley, 1989). The chosenunit differs in accordance with respectivepreferences for Kuhnian, Lakatosian,Laudanian, or other more fashionally"post-modernist" constructs. But we find in each case a remarkable concurrencewith the underlyingtenet which postulates that significant theoretical modificationsand choices must always take into account the supportivemeta- scientificdomains in whichthey are holisticallyembedded. It is in thisgeneral context,I suggest,that one can best understandthe marked popularityof countlessefforts to recastthe fragmentedtheoretical turnout of the internationalrelations field in terms of contendingmeta-theoretical constructs (Banks, 1985; Holsti, 1985a; McKinleyand Little,1986; Viottiand Kauppi, 1987). There is also the relatedpropensity to go beyondsimple shopping lists of would-be paradigms or perspectivesby launching more ambitious projects of paradigm demolition(Vasquez, 1983), paradigmsynthesis (Maghroori and Ramberg,1982), or paradigmproliferation (Rosenau, 1980). And, arguably,such is the logic thatalso informs,for instance.Kratochwil and Ruggie's choice of the historicallyevolving "researchprogram" (international organization) over the isolated theory (regimes) as theirprime unit of evaluativeappraisal (1986). The common denominatorof these endeavors is the implicitbelief that the substitutionof new meta-theoreticalconstructs for more traditional units of scientific

7 In thisanalysis I followarguments presented by Holton (1987) and Wisdom (1987). Holton's triad consistsof phenomentc,analyttc, and themattcaxes (Stent, 1988:36-37). Wisdom's roughlysimilar construct consists of empirical content,embedded ontology, and weltanschauung(Wisdom, 1987:140).

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions YOSEF LAPID 241 appraisal is somehow essential to locating and stimulatinggenuine theoretical growth.Fortunately-as indicatedby the tendencyto up-gradetheoretical revisions to would-be"paradigm clashes" or putative"progressive" or "degenerativeproblem- shifts"-the impactof paradigmatismon currenttheoretical preoccupations in the internationalrelations field has startedpenetrating well beyond a technicalrecasting of its fragmentedtheoretical corpus into revampedand more fashionablyholistic blueprints.New questions are being raised about the dynamicsof emergence, persistance,and the decline of meta-theoreticalconstructs in the field(Biersteker, forthcoming).The extent to which contending paradigms are truly "incom- mensurable"-incompatibleand even incommunicablewith one another-is more seriouslyexamined (Krasner, 1985). And the potentialfor fruitful dialogue between or synthesesof contendingparadigmatic approaches is moresystematically explored (Keohane and Nye, 1987; S. Smith,1987:201). Most important,in thisprocess of expandingparadigmatism the thirddebate has progressivelytaken the formatof "a discourseabout the choice of analyticframe- works"(Banks, 1985:20). In thismore sophisticated sense paradigmatismfocuses on the difficulttask of formulatingand applying valid-as opposed to invalid- evaluativeprocedures at the paradigmaticlevel (McKinleyand Little,1986:269). Needless to say, for the timebeing these promisingdevelopments have expressed themselvesmainly in a fargreater sensitivity to, rather than the actual resolutionof, new and heretoignored sets of meta-theoreticalproblems. But giventhis, it is still possibleto summarizeby reiterating the remarkable role playedby the post-positivist reformulationof the unit of scientificappraisal in determiningthe specifically "inter-paradigmatic"profile of the currentdebate in internationalrelations theory. This I submitdifferentiates in a fundamentalrather than a faddishway the current controversyfrom its two predecessorsin the field.

Thefocus on Premisesand Assumptions:Perspectivism In additionto the reformulationof theunit of scientificachievement, post-positivism also invokes a deliberate shiftto the thematiclevel of underlyingontological, epistemological,and axiological premisesand assumptions.8Such a refocusingis considerednecessary in viewof theremarkable willingness of bothnatural and social scientiststo disregardempirical data that appear to contradicttheories that (for them)have reachedthematic status. Sometimes, therefore, impasses in thegrowth of knowledgemay be created and reproduced less by observationalmistakes (in the phenomenicaxis) or by narrowlydefined theoretical flaws (in the analyticaxis) than by generalizedcrises of basic presuppositions(the thematicaxis).9 Once a set of guidingassumptions is elevatedto thematicstatus, the perspectivist argumentsuggests, it becomeshighly resistant to bothevidence and logicalcriticism (Laudan et al., 1986:154). And occasionally,under the fiat of premisesthat endure in the face of all negative tests,the entire process of theorizingmay be forced to preceedalong unacceptablyrestrictive or misleadinglines. For instance,as indicated by the bizarre lack of interestmanifested by Marxismtowards nationalism, such malfunctionsmay result in an excessivepreoccupation with marginal problems while even criticallyimportant phenomena are ignored.

8 See, however,Dawson's (1985:373-80) criticaldistinction between "strong"and "weak" perspectivesand their implicationsfor the objectivityof the social sciences. For an interestingattempt to differentiatebetween paradigms and perspectives,see DeMey (1982:222-26).

9 Gadamer's "prejudgments,"Holton's "themata,"Schumpeter's "vision,"Polanyi's "tacitdimensioll," or Laka- tos's"hard core" are, in a sense, differentarticulations of the same post-positivistinsight which posits that, although it is oftenleft implicit, what is assumed by a given theorycan be far more significantthan what is explicitlystated.

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Highlightingassumptions as an importantsource of our scientificignorance is different,however, from submittingthat theyalways serve to distorttheoretical inquiry.To the contrary,similar sets of assumptionsinvariably serve as enabling sourcesof valid scientificknowledge.'0 Perspectivism submits, in short,that we are encapsulatedin sets of presuppositionswhich may hinder or facilitatetheoretical growth.And if guidingassumptions are the source of both our ignoranceand our knowledge,it followsthat "the focal point of challengein scienceshould become our weltanschauungen"(Wisdom, 1987:154). It should not be difficultto establishthat the currentdebate in international relationstheory also is characterizedby a shiftof attentiontoward the domain of thematicpremises and assumptions(Haas, 1986). This refocusingexpresses itself in a manifesteagerness of internationalrelations scholars, from even radicallyopposed theoreticalcamps, to leave the phenomenicand analyticplanes in order to devote more energeticattention to the "hidden" domain of key underlyingassumptions. Perspectivismis implicit,for instance,in insightsconcerning the "inescapabilityof theory"and in ensuingconcerns with becoming "the prisonerof unstatedassump- tions"(Keohane, 1986:4). It is manifestalso in a moreexplicit sensitivity to the need "to become clearlyaware of the perspectivewhich gives rise to theorizing"(Cox, 1981:128). As a result,editors and theoristsin thefield seem farmore willing now to concede thatreaders are "entitled"to an expositionof underlyingpresumptions in theoreticalanalyses (Rosenau, 1986:854). Notably,one even hears the echoes of perspectivismin the embattledbastion of internationalrelations empiricism, the "data movement,"with prospective customers now dutifullyadvised to check"which dataset is the most suitable in termsof the nature of its underlyingtheoretical assumptions"(Maoz, 1988:165). To be sure,the perspectivistaccent is mostaudible among a smallbut vocal group of "post-positivist,""post-structuralist," and "post-modernist"critics of mainstream internationalrelations theory. As indicatedby RichardAshley's recent work, these "rebels" utilize "deconstructive"and "genealogical"tools deliberatelydesigned to automatically"target" assumptive theoretical headquarters. These intellectualtech- nologies postulatethat meaningand understandingare not intrinsicto the world but,on thecontrary, are continuouslyconstructed, defended, and challenged.Their main purpose is to "problemize"answers, make "strange" what has become familiar, and reversethe processof constructionin order to reveal how problematicare the taken-for-grantedstructures ("anarchy" for instance)of our social and political world(Ashley, 1988, forthcoming;Alker, forthcoming). The growingfascination with the thematiccomponent of our currentknowledge of world politicsis by no means restrictedto an elite vanguardof post-modernist rebels. In a perfectexample of perspectivism,as that termis used in this essay, RobertJervis (a leading internationalrelations "modernist") has recentlydemon- stratedthat modernists can be quite effective-and,of course,far more accessible than their post-modernistcolleagues-in exposing major assumptivetraps in currenttheory (Jervis, 1988). To be sure,unlike the rebels, Jervis has no intentionto "deconstruct"the "anarchyframework." On the contrary,he is evidentlyimpressed withits supposedly proven capacity to stimulateand sustainvalid theoreticalgrowth (Jervis, 1988:319). But he is nonethelessdetermined to demonstratehow the simplificationsof the anarchy framework-especiallywhen amplifiedby game theorysimplifications-lead us to concentrateon questionsthat are notcentral, while at the same time,we marginalizemany important queries (Jervis,1988:349).

' As Wisdom points out, "What the Weltanschauungeffects is to promote what comes withinthe poinltof view and discourage what fallsoutside it: what is discovered in its name can be valid if satisfactorilytested; what is not investigatedis a loss. But whatts gained is notthereby invaltd or dstorted"(Wisdom, 1987:138; my emphasis).

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Althoughit is possible to argue thatthe preoccupationwith underlying assumptions is anythingbut new to internationalrelations theory, my point is that this preoccupationhas acquired new significancein the contextof the third debate. Perspectivism,as definedin thisstudy, denotes somethingmore fundamentalthan a ritualisticinsistence that "we must examine our assumptionsabout the behavior of the actors in internationalarenas more carefully"(Young, 1986:121). It refers more to "a rejectionof empiricismin favorof a theoreticalapproach thataccepts the place of data in a subordinateposition" (Halliday, 1985:412). On the basis of these briefillustrations, it seems reasonable to conclude that perspectivismin the sense of a strongpost-positivist focus on thematicpremises and assumptionshas been internalizedas a foremostcharacteristic of the thirddebate in international relationstheory.

TheDrift Toward Methodological Pluralism: Relativism "The currentfierce attack on science,objectivity, truth, and even rationalityand logic," says J.O. Wisdom, "may well be the fiercestever mounted in history (1987:159; also see Bernstein,1986). The new epistemologyassociated with Fleck, Polanyi,Kuhn, Feyerabend and othersis, indeed, often attacked as havingextremely relativisticimplications (Bunge, 1983:261). This new relativism,posits Robert D'Amico,is farmore radical than previous versions because itis "secondorder," that is, "it questionsnot individualassertions for theirlack of evidencebut the implied and embedded standards,criteria, norms and principlesthat make judgments possible and givethem privileged status" (D'Amico, 1986:139; myemphasis). By undermining objectivityand truth,this relativizationof philosophicalthinking has greatlycom- plicatedthe taskof providingeffective legitimation of knowledgeand has rendered problematicthe demarcationof sciencefrom non-science. The massivemove towardrelativism has had at least threenoteworthy ramifica- tions.First, all versionsof methodologicalmonism seeking to institutionalizestandard- ized, explicit,and unchangingcriteria for regulatingscientific domains-including the positivistconception of the scientificmethod (Tianji, 1985:415)-have been renderedsuspect by thisnew intellectualclimate. Far fromconsenting that epistemic criteriaare destinedto remainessentially unchanged over timeand place, the new epistemologyunapologetically suggests that it is itselfsocially mutable and histori- callycontingent. And, followingmethodologically from such epistemologicalrelativ- ism,"a vigorouspluralism is called for. When it comes to theoreticalideas 'let the hundredflowers bloom"' (Hooker, 1987:56). Second, the growingrecognition of a multitudeof potentiallyfruitful research strategiesalso has facilitateda betterunderstanding of scienceas a polymorphicas opposed to monolithicentity (Wisdom, 1987:140). As the end productof scientific activity,social knowledge is now more typicallyseen as a complex of equally privilegedbut only loosely integratableforms (Margolis, 1987). And since these distincttypes of knowledge are set apart by characteristicmodes of theoretical growth,it is essentialto differentiatethem accordingly (Wagner and Berger,1985). Finally,the post-positivistendorsement of epistemologicaland methodological diversityhas underminedthe classic fascination with scientific consensus, resulting in "a new-wave preoccupation with scientificdissensus" (Laudan, 1984:13)11 This intriguingeclipse of consensusas a primedesideratum in socialscience is of primary importance,for it signalsa collapse of the highlyinfluential Kuhnian equation of an

" This trend is fed partiallyby the post-modernistportrayal of consensus as "a horizon that is never reached" (Lyotard, 1984:61).

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 244 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra inabilityto achieve paradigmaticconsensus with an inabilityto achieve significant theoreticalgrowth.' Returningto our main focus of interest,we note that the post-positivistbent toward relativismand its ensuing methodologicalramifications have clearlyinflu- enced the toneand substanceof the thirddebate in internationalrelations theory. It is hardlyaccidental, for instance, that despite high emotional and intellectualstakes, thecurrent controversy has notbeen characterizedby the focused intransigence that markedthe twoprevious debates. In tunewith the post-positivist"plea fortolerance in matterstheoretical" (Ball, 1987:34), scholarshave resistedthe temptationto seize upon the currentintellectual transition as an opportunityto impose a new set of exclusiveepistemological principles and prescriptions. Reflectinga deepening suspicionof methodologicalmonism, even scholarswho are otherwisesympathetic to positivistorthodoxy now feel obliged to concede the dangersof "monolithicdogmatism" (J. Snyder,1988:190). The disciplineas a whole now seems favorablydisposed to consideralternative epistemologies "rather than replacementof one kindof scienceby another" (R. Snyder,1985:53 1). In tune with the new polymorphicimage of science,it is now possibleto positthat "both old and newwill be sciencesalthough the purposes and evaluationswill be differentfor each" (R. Snyder,1985:531). The growingacceptance of methodologicalpluralism also is manifest,in the endorsementof "pluralistrigor" as the mostpromising methodological posture for the fieldof internationalrelations (Jervis, 1985), in the insistenceon "openness to criticismat every turn" (Ashley, 1989:30), in the vision of thriving"multiple disciplinesof internationalrelations" (Alker and Biersteker,1984:123), or, even more explicitly,in promptingsto adopt the dictumof "let a thousand theoretical flowersbloom" (Beal, 1980:55). In summary,the presentposition is indeed "one of fermentand transition,marked by pluralismin values, methods,techniques and perspectives"(Dunn, 1987:79). Finally,it was perhaps inevitablethat the expandingacceptance of a polymorphic imageof scienceand the growingpopularity of methodologicalpluralism also would lead toa reexaminationof scientific dissensus and itsrelationship to scientific progress. As a result,the search for "un-Kuhnian" versions of progressis alreadywell underway in internationalrelations theory (Beal, 1980; Mansbachand Ferguson,1986). Irre- spectiveof otherdisagreements concerning the theoretical prospects of thefield, one now findsconsiderable consensus that "the wayforward for [international relations theory]that finds itself in difficultiesis notto pursue'normalcy' of the Kuhniankind but to worktowards a diversityof strongparadigms" (Halliday, 1985:412).

The Grounds for Post-PositivistOptimism Grantedthat some post-positivistmessages have been tricklingdown fromthe new philosophyof science,why should thesetenets translate into greater optimism about the prospectsof internationalrelations theory? On whatbasis and in whatsense can one positthat the thirddebate "providesstimulus, hope, and even excitementin the demandingbusiness of analyzinginternational relations"? (Banks, 1985:20). What are the new promises of internationalrelations theory from a post-positivist standpoint,and what is the post-positivistsubstitute for the embattledand rapidly fadingEl Dorado of positivistscience? In seekingan answerto thisquestion it willbe usefulto takea second look at the threepost-positivist themes that surfaced in our previousdiscussion. Closer scrutiny

12 Ball (1987:15-16) identifiesthree more or less distinctphases in Kuhn's receptionby politicalscientists, with the currentstage being one of "outrightrepudiation."

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suggeststhat, under certainconditions, each of themcan providefertile ground for rejuvenatedtheoretical optimism. To begin,the preoccupationwith meta-scientific constructsprovides an attractivesubstitute for the positivistchoice of theempirically corroboratedlaw or generalizationas the fundamentalunit of scientificachievement.'3For despitemany valiant efforts, scholars were ultimatelyforced to concede the manifestabsence of cumulativeprogress defined in the rigorousterms of the empiricist-positivistscientific blueprint (Rosenau, 1980:195-241; Hermann and Peacock, 1987:16). Providedthat one is willingto live withcharitable definitions of "paradigms"or "researchprograms," it is possibleto documenta ratherimpressive record of actual and forthcomingtheoretical growth in internationalrelations theory. The relentless effortsto produce currentinventories of internationalrelations paradigms have resultedin counts rangingfrom zero to a maximumof no less than twenty-four candidates (Holsti, 1985a:4-7). And if the popularityof Lakatos's methodology continuesto riseamong theorists,one maysafely anticipate that we willsoon have as many,if not more,correspondingly reconstructed "research programs" (Keohane, 1984; Kratochwiland Ruggie, 1986; Hermann and Peacock, 1987: 13-32). Surely thisprovides grounds for optimism,for now-at least in termsof looselydefined meta-theoreticalconstructs-the international relations discipline can consideritself on a par withmany other social and even naturalsciences. Turningbriefly to thepost-positivist interest in guidingpremises and assumptions, we encountera similarpicture. The portrayalof scientificfailures as thedirect result of assumptive malfunctionscertainly leaves ample room for the possibilityof vigoroustheoretical growth through available substitutionsor revisionsof "defec- tive"thematic premises. A look at theliterature strongly suggests that a considerable part of the currentsurge of theoreticaloptimism is derived fromprecisely such origins.Noting, for instance,the "anomalyof mutualassured boredom" (MAB)- which unjustifiablyseparates comparativeforeign policy (CFP) and international politicaleconomy (IPE)-Rosenau submitsthat "the anomaly would seem to be conceptual and not empirical so that its resolutioncan be achieved through reconceptualizationrather than research"(Rosenau, 1988:24). An additionalillus- trationis providedby Wendt'sforceful argument that both neorealismand world- systemtheory are incapacitatedby theirrespective assumptions about the relationship of systemstructure to human agents, a problem which in his view can be satisfactorilyresolved by the adoptionof a scientificrealist perspective on ontological and epistemologicalmatters (Wendt, 1987).'4 Andjust as in some cases assumptivemalfunctioning is blamedfor theoretical and empiricalfailures, so in othercases assumptivesagacity is invokedto compensatefor admittedtheoretical and empiricalpoverty. As formaltheorizing efforts, suggests Donald Puchala, integrationtheories could hardlyqualify for even a footnoteto the intellectualdevelopment of theinternational relations field. But at thethematic level, in theircapacity as philosophiesthat in the 1950s and 1960s nearlysingle-handedly sustaineda challengeto the increasinglyhegemonic realist weltanschauung, integra- tion studieshave presumablyhad a lastingimpact on the field(Puchala, 1988). To

13 Some scholars suggest, in fact,that it is "primarilythe association of paradigms withsuper-theories that has made Kuhn's account so attractiveto social scientists"(Gutting, 1980:12). 14 Further examples abound in recent evaluative appraisals of internationalregimes theories. Identifyinga varietyof would-be assumptive problems caused by uncriticalacceptance of politicalrealist (O'Meara, 1984) and positivist(Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) commitments,some scholarshave expressed optimismabout the prospects of furthertheoretical progress in this currentlyfashionable field of enquiry through revisions (R. K. Smith, 1987:278-81; Haggard and Simmons, 1987:515-17), additions (Kratochwiland Ruggie, 1986), or substitutions (O'Meara, 1984) of thematicsets of ontological,epistemological or axiological assumptions.

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 246 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra summarize,in both theirhindering and theirenabling capacity, thematic assump- tionscan inspireconsiderable optimism about the growthand prospectsof internationalrelations theory. The belief that social scientistsare invariablybetter equipped to cut through assumptiveas opposed to empirical impasses is perhaps overlyoptimistic.'5 By pointing,nonetheless, to the nonempiricalsphere of thematicpremises and presuppositions,perspectivism has facilitateda relative"liberation of theoryfrom observation"(Gergen, 1987:2). And thisliberation was destinedto be interpretedby at least some scholarsas a good reason for renewed hopefulness."Having passed through a phase in which facts have dominated theory,"one of them notes approvingly,"the logic of our scholarshipis carryingus intoa phase in whichtheory dominatesfacts" (Banks, 1986:9). This takes us directlyto perhaps the richestmine of optimismembedded in the post-positivistcredos of the thirddebate. Like other social scientists,international relationstheorists can deriverenewed confidence in theirscientific credentials from the post-positivistmove toward relativismand methodologicalpluralism. For the positivistscientific promise was arrogantand brutal in its simplicity:"This is the model of a scientificenterprise, take it or leave it" (Elias, 1987:xix). For too long thetragedy of internationalrelations scholars was, of course,that they proved incapable of either fruitfullyadopting or decisivelyrejecting the grail of positivistscience. Via positivismthe discipline became locked in a sterile and frustratingworshipful relationship to the naturalsciences. Presently emerging from thisself-imposed positivist trap, many scholars are favorablyimpressed by the new latitudeof maneuveroffered by a multitudeof post-positivistidioms of enquiry.And althoughnotably lacking the exclusiveluster of thepositivist "mantle of science,"the post-positivistcounterpart-or counterparts-are farmore accommodating in their acknowledgedposture of toleranceand humility. The endorsementof methodologicalpluralism, the emergenceof a polymorphic image of science, and the reassuring notion that in the social sciences even permanentdissensus is not a scientificdisaster have neutralizedthe once intimidat- ing bite of the positivist"anti-scientific" label. Small wonder thatcurrently issued verdictsof condemnationto "a lifeof intellectualpluralism" (Holsti, 1985b:695) no longer carrytheir traditional message of scientificdespair. Followinga necessary period of digestionof post-positivistideas, it is now more fashionableto posit that "'muchof the strengthof the disciplinecomes fromthe pluralityof its theoretical orientations"(Walker, 1987:8). Arguablyit is thisfeeling of an exceptional"opening up" of internationaltheory which above all sustains the hope that,by presentingunprecedented theoretical potentialities,the impact of the thirddebate mayexceed byfar the significance of the two previous ones. For some the main opportunityis to overcomeU.S.-inspired nationalisticparochialism and createa "genuinelyinternational theory applicable to all" (Holsti, 1985a; S. Smith,1987:204). Othersseem more concernedwith related problemsof paradigmaticsectarianism, identifying opportunities for new and more energeticsyntheses of realismand Liberalism(Nye, 1988) or realismand Marxism (Linklater,1986; Halliday, 1987b). Still others have identifiedopportunities for revampingthe empiricist-positivist orthodoxywith "holistic" (Snyder, 1988) or "interpretive"(Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986) correctives;grounding political realism and internationaltheory in the supposedly superior principles of a "realist philosophy of science" (Wendt,

15 In fact, as Wisdom points out, problems at the weltainschauungenlevel may prove far more difficultto overcome than problems at theoreticalor empirical levels (see Wisdom, 1987:153-54).

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1987:369); endorsingthe epistemologicalfoundations of criticaltheory as "the next stage in the developmentof InternationalRelations theory" (Hoffman, 1987; see also Ashley,1987); and adoptinga "post-structuralistdiscourse" which, we are told, "expands the agenda of social theory,posing questions that other discourses must refuseto ask" (Ashley,1989: 1). Other interpretationsof the precise nature of the post-positivistpromise are readilyavailable. What seems commonto manyof thesetheoretical projects is their strikingambition. In theircombined effect the themesof paradigmatism,perspectivism,and relativism-in conjunctionwith the post-positivistplea for tolerancein matterstheoretical-apparently have generateda reservoirof energywhich seems to be best released by theorizingon a grandiosescale. Indeed, as Rosenau remarks, "thisis not a timefor nit-picking, for finding fault with rogue definitions,imprecise formulationsand skeweddata" (1986:850).

The Limits of Post-positivistOptimism How durable and consequentialwill the currentseason of hope be in the internationalrelations discipline? Are we trulyon the vergeof a new era in international theoryor is itmore likely that the adrenaline rush of thethird debate, like others, will have only negligiblelong-term implications? A definitiveanswer to this question would be riskyand prematureat this point,for we must keep in mind that the currentsurge of optimismis admittedlyheuristic. It is,in otherwords, an enthusiasm of newlyinitiated departures rather than a sober celebrationof safe arrivals.Hence prudence and fairnessand the post-positivistspirit of toleranceitself demand a patientawaiting of further,more substantive,research findings. Having acknowledgedthis it is nonethelessappropriate to add some observations on the hazards of excessive post-positivistoptimism. In referringto possible problemsand difficulties,my purpose is not to deprecatethe revitalizingtheoretical energyreleased by the thirddebate. It is ratherto furtherdelimit its scope in the spiritof constructivecriticism. For clarityand consistencywe willreturn, for the last time, to the three post-positivisttrademarks of the third debate. Startingwith "paradigmatism,"one should notice in particularthe danger of misappropriating thisvaluable post-positivistcorrective for propaganda and polemicaluses. Philoso- phersof sciencehave long suspected,in fact,that one major reason social scientists turnto philosophyis to fabricatea more"respectable" anchor for the claim of beinga "progressivescience" (Rosenberg, 1986:340). There are reasonsto suspectthat such a line of reasoning may stand behind some currentattempts to reconstructthe corpus of internationaltheory in termsof "paradigms,""research programs," and othermeta-scientific units of analysis. Consider the fact that,as typicallyapplied to the internationalrelations field, Lakatos's methodologyof scientificappraisal has consistentlyresulted in rather optimisticreadings of bothits past theoretical growth and itsfuture prospects.'6 This mightbe a fortunatecoincidence, but one is alerted by Hermann and Peacock's candid confessionthat the main reason for theirdecision to move fromthe two "prevailing logics of inquiry" (the neo-positivistand Kuhnian methods) to a Lakatosianmethodology of scientificappraisal is thatthe firsttwo-but presumably not the third-lead invariablyto negativeassessments of the comparativestudy of foreignpolicy. The excessivelycavalier interpretation of Lakatos'smethodology is

16 Such is, indeed, the warrantfor the passportsof hope recentlyissued forneorealism (Keohane, 1984), regimes analysis (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986), and the comparative study of foreign policy (Hermann and Peacock, 1987:16-22).

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 248 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra particularlystriking in thiscase. For one looks in vain foreven gesturesto the key term of "progressiveor degenerativeproblem-shift." Yet in the absence of this conceptit is virtuallyimpossible to accomplishwhat these two scholars have explicitly set out to do, to refermeaningfully to Lakatos'smethod for purposes of theoretical appraisal (Hermann and Peacock, 1987:16-22).17 But the problemgoes far beyondcavalier invocations of would-bephilosophical authorities.With the consolidationof internationalrelations as a "dividingdiscipline," contendingsets of criteriafor judging scientificacceptability proliferate. Ironically,this opens up temptingopportunities for instant scientific redemption of vast bodies of theoreticalliterature by simple shiftsof epistemicstandards of appraisal. Would-be scientificcontributions such as Allison's"models" of foreign policydecision-making, which might be consideredunacceptable if judged by strict positivistcriteria, may appear more promisingif "interpretive"or "hermeneutical" standardsare invoked (Ball, 1987:104-09). Withoutquestioning the considerable meritsof multiplecriteria for evaluating claims, scholars in the fieldshould beware lest theycome to resemblethe proverbialarcher who shoots his arrow and then draws a bull's eye around it. . . . Especially if seen as a miracle drug, enthusiastic paradigmatismwhich makes lightof the criticaldistinction between promising and misleadinglines of inquiryat the meta-scientificlevel might lead us straightinto new but equally damagingtraps at the paradigmaticlevel. A moresober look at the truemerits of post-positivistperspectivism reveals at least three noteworthyrisks. First, the preprogrammingcapacity of assumptiveframe- worksis oftenvastly exaggerated or reified.Perspectivism can play a constructive role onlyin so faras it acknowledgesthe historicand dynamiccharacter of cognitive schemesand assumptiveframeworks. Otherwise, "we lock the subjectinto himself unable ever to see more than he knows"(DeMey, 1982:225). This reminderseems particularlypertinent in view of the still popular rehearsalsof rigid matrixesof underlyingassumptions which mechanisticallyincapacitate realist thinking about contemporaryworld affairs(O'Meara, 1984:250; Taylor, 1984:4). Seen in this simplisticmanner-but nototherwise-perspectivism as revealedin the debate over realismmay justifiably be dismissedas "a sourceof confusion"(Goldmann, 1988).18 This takesus to a second set of hazards,namely that of embeddingthe fixationon guidingassumptions in a superficialunderstanding of the ramificationsof whathas been popularized by Kuhn and by Feyerabendas the "incommensurability"thesis. This in turncan resultin equallydamaging denials or exaggerations of the problem of comparisonand communicationbetween sets of thematicassumptions. Rather thandefining the problem away by assuming automatic commensuration (portraying "models" as merely different"facets" of the same complex "reality"[Young, 1986:120] and instead of building up the problem to "suicidal" proportions(by insistingthat "genuine" paradigms "are definedby theirfundamental incommensu- rabilitieswith other interpretations" [Biersteker, forthcoming)], scholars interested

7 In fairness,these scholars do acknowledge that"It may be stretchingtoo far to call these various contributions a research program in the spiritof Lakatos" (Hermann and Peacock, 1987:30). But the factremains thatthey do invoke Lakatos's authority for what can be uncharitablyportrayed as propaganda purposes. For to take Lakatos's scheme seriously would involve among other things "that we distinguishbetween core and auxiliary assumptions,directing our defenses and/or criticismsaccordingly . . . that our criticismsbe retrospectiveand directed against adjustments in the protective belt of the program in question; and . . . that we judge the success-to-dateof a researchtradition and of thetheones composing it in termsof progressiveness or degenerationof successive adjustmentsand auemptsat problem-solving"(Ball, 1987:34-35, my emphasis).

18 Fortunatelyothers have acknowledged the fact that assumptionsdo not stay unmodifiedover time and have approached realism as "a knot of historicallyconstituted tensions and contradictions"which "might be re- constitutedin a more criticaland creativemanner" (Walker, 1987; see also Ashley,1984). As Musgrave points out (1981:378), it is necessarynot only to distinguishbetween different types of assumptionsbut also to rememberthe possibilityof a concealed change in the nature of a single assumptiondue to ongoing criticism.

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions YOSEF LAPID 249 in understandingthe implicationsof post-positivistperspectivism for international theory must pay considerably more attention to philosophical effortsto devise new roads to commensurability(Pearce, 1987; Rengger,1988a). A thirddanger which merits brief mention in thiscontext lurks in theoften-voiced concernthat the shiftof focustoward the loftydomain of guidingassumptions will come at the expense of empiricalor lower level theoreticalstudies. Should it drift into such parasiticdirections, the post-positivist"liberation of theoryfrom data" could indeed lead us "into the dead end of metatheory"(Skocpol, 1987:12). Finally,we willbriefly examine the notoriouspitfalls of post-positivistrelativism. To be sure, methodologicalpluralism richlybenefits from all the virtues of relativism.Unfortunately, it also suffersfrom some of itsworse vices (Gellner, 1985). If adopted uncriticallyor taken to its logical conclusion,methodological pluralism maydeteriorate into a conditionof epistemologicalanarchy under which almost any positioncan legitimatelyclaim equal hearing.And to theextent that such an equality between differenttypes of knowledge prevails, mere theoreticalproliferation becomes practicallyindistinguishable from genuine theoreticalgrowth. It is hardlya secret,of course, that the internationalrelations field is already seriouslyafflicted by some of the hazards of unreflectivemethodological pluralism. Withincertain limits, the fieldseems well advised to distanceitself from economics and followin the footstepsof sociologyin reinterpretingits own "lackof definition" and "theoreticalcacophony" as "selectiveadvantages" (Hirsch et al., 1987:333). For, like sociology,the fieldof internationalrelations must typically deal with"multiple realities" (Holsti, 1986). Hence it must resolutelyresist the seductive lure of economicswith "its self-imposedincapacity to see more thana singledimension of mostphenomena" (Hirsch et al., 1987:333). Havingsaid that,one mustadd thatthe "Newton syndrome"and the seeminglyuniversal desire to engage in grandiose theorizinghave already resulted in an excessive fragmentationof the field. To borrow an apt metaphor,the field of internationalrelations indeed "resembles nothingas much as the Learnean Hydra; each timeone conceptualhead is lopped off,another two appear in itsplace" (Rengger,1988b:81). If the relativisticexcesses of methodologicalpluralism and fickleallegiances lead to hopeless theoretical incoherence,the optimisticmessage of post-positivistpluralism ironically may result in a backlashof some new dogmaticversion of methodologicalmonism."

In Lieu of Conclusion: A "Pianissimo" Bravo? Much more could be said on the promises and hazards of post-positivismin internationalrelations theory. It is certainlyuseful to note that the thirddebate offersas many dead ends as it opens promisingpaths for futureresearch. But acknowledgingsuch hazardsis not to deny thattheoretical creativity may be greater todaythan at any time since the emergenceof internationalrelations as a distinct discipline.For we mustkeep in mind Isaiah Berlin'sbrilliant insight concerning the propensityof all great liberatingideas to turn into "suffocatingstraitjackets" (1979:159). When all angles are carefullyconsidered, the hazards are not sufficient to seriouslychallenge the conclusionthat the thirddebate has indeed generated some unparalleledtheoretical potentialities. Indeed, "the next decade could be an excitingtime for scholarship"(Keohane and Nye, 1987:753). Whetherthese theoreticalpotentialities will bear fruitin the foreseeablefuture remains to be seen, but one thing seems reasonablyclear. For many years the internationalrelations discipline has had thedubious honor of beingamong the least

'9 To appreciate how compellingthe fearof disciplinaryparalysis through excessive pluralism and relativismcan become, consider Peter Rossi's 1980 presidentialaddress before the AmericanSociological Associationin whichhe argues for a dominant model even if such a model were to exclude his own work (cited in Crane, 1986:443-44).

This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 250 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra self-reflexiveof the Westernsocial sciences(Frost, 1986:11). In the words of one critic,the field has alloweditself to deteriorateto thelevel of "a welcomingrepository forphilosophical and theoreticalcaricature" (Walker, 1988:84). The thirddebate is the beginningof a slow but progressiveloss of patience with this posture of intellectualhibernation. The debate has stimulatedtheoretical and epistemological fermentin internationalrelations theory,forging links with other disciplines undergoinga similarprocess. It has called attentionto new notionsof scientific objectivity,forcing a reconsiderationof therole of theinternational relations theorist in the scientificprocess. It has called into questionreceived criteria for evaluating theoreticalconstructs (such as empirical validity,prediction, and explanation), allowing theories to be reexamined in terms of their historicalcontext, their ideologicalunderpinnings, the formsof societywhich they foster or sustain,and the metaphorsand literarytropes that inform their construction. Although the controversyfueled by post-positivistideas in some ways has aggravatedthe dangersof epistemologicalanarchism, it also has alertedscholars to the problemof understanding"the notion of criticismwhere knownmethods of refutationare inapplicable"(Wisdom, 1987:136). Althoughwe may be unable to disprove a "themata"or a "weltanschauung"with traditional empirical or logical methods,we may findthem to be overlyrestrictive or impossibleto workwith, as shownby Jervis's critique of the"anarchy/game theory" framework or by Kratochwil and Ruggie'srebuff of positivismin thecontext of regimeanalysis (1986:766).2 One would thinkthat analyses such as Jervis's(1988) wouldreduce the very real threatof the internationalrelations field being "seduced" by economics. And although positivismis stillvery much alive in thefield (Alker and Biersteker,1984), it has been retreatingto ever thinnerand more tolerantversions, as indicatedby Jack Snyder's (1988) advocacyof "hybridmethods." In the space cleared by the weakeningof deeply rooted urges for firmfounda- tions,invariant truths, and unitiesof knowledge,an optimistichope is now being planted-as hintedby the demand to makeroom for new "problematiques"(Ashley, 1988:189) and "to open up the fieldto criticalapproaches which have hithertobeen marginalised,neglected, or dismissedby the discipline"(Der Derian, 1988:189)- that,as in other social disciplines,knowledge in the fieldof internationalrelations may be cumulative "not in possessing ever-more-refinedanswers about fixed questionsbut in possessingan ever-richrepertoire of questions"(Cronbach, 1986:4). In thisprocess, the discipline's level of reflexivityand itsmeans for sustaining critical and self-consciousdirection have been vitallyenriched. And as Der Derian saysin a differentcontext, "Taking into account the complexityand the breadth of the subject,one is inclinedto be intellectuallyover-rather than under-equipped for the task"(Der Derian, 1987:5). "The task,"as highlightedby the thirddebate, is neitherthe discoveryof some ahistoricaland universalscientific method nor the attainmentof some objectively validatedtruth about world politics. It is rathera matterof promotinga morereflexive intellectualenvironment in whichdebate, criticism, and noveltycan freelycirculate. The internationalrelations scholarly community-like all communitiesof inquiry-is communicativelyconstituted, and its successis partiallyconditioned by its abilityto sustainand enhance the qualityof argumentin the contextof deeply entrenched paradigmaticdiversity.2' The proper attitudefor such situations,suggests Terence Ball, "is less one of live and let live than of talkingand listening"(1987:4).

20 Wisdom calls this"the cenablinigcr-iterion." It asks whethera weltanschauting"cani do itsjob or gets in the wvay of its own goal" (Wisdomii,1987:161). 21 Reflexivityis buiilt,above all, on a "dialogical niotioniof scientificr-ationality" (Colapictro, 1987:283). Fol all attemptto go beyond dialogical reflexivityin the directionof praxis, see Jackson anid Willmott(1987).

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The internationalrelations discipline must locate and eliminateRosenau-type "MABS" (relatedresearch areas separatedby redundantwalls of "mutuallyassured boredom"). Those who labor hard to integratedeconstruction into the normal business of internationalrelations scholarship must be on alert not to give the impressionthat to show a subject to be a "construction"is to render its de- constructionimperative (Connolly, 1984:164). Should thathappen, Rosenau's more familiar"MAB-type" mines could be accidentallyreplaced by "MAD-type"booby traps (paradigmsor discourseslocked in a deadly embrace of "mutuallyassured deconstruction"). As it delightsin the lightof its newlyfound "reflexivity," the fieldmust take care not to burn up in the heat of "hyper-reflexivity"(Rose, 1979). To an unprecedented degree, however,international relations scholars now seem ready to concede that theymust come to understandwhat they cannot or willnot embrace (Geertz, 1986). Arguably,there is some cause for optimismin the realizationthat the current intellectualtransition "portends a new pluralismas the cutting-ratherthan the polemical-edge of internationaltheory" (Der Derian, 1988:190). On thataccount alone we can agree, I hope, thatthe "exclusive and chloroformingworld of the 1950s . . . is one to which few friends of International Relations or social science more generallywould wantto return"(Halliday, 1987a:216). And on thisminimal basis I for one am prepared to add a pianissimo"bravo" to the cheers of those already celebratingthe would-be splendors of post-positivismin internationalrelations theory.

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