DOCSLIB.ORG

The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era Author(S): Yosef Lapid Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era Author(S): Yosef Lapid Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era Author(s): Yosef Lapid Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), pp. 235-254 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600457 . Accessed: 02/05/2014 02:59 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions InternationalStudies Quarterly (1989) 33, 235-254 The Third Debate: On the Prospects of InternationalTheory in a Post-PositivistEra YOSEF LAPID CarletonUniversity The demiseof the empiricist-positivistpromise for a cumulativebehavioral sciencerecently has forcedscholars from nearly all the social disciplinesto reexaminethe ontological,epistemological, and axiologicalfoundations of theirscientific endeavors. The "thirddebate" in the fieldof international relationsparallels this intellectual ferment and constitutesa stillmaturing disciplinaryeffort to reconsidertheoretical options in a "post-positivist"era. This essay explores the etiologyof this debate and criticallyassesses its implicationsfor currentand futuretheoretical practices. Although the debate has triggeredmany different responses, the analysis focuses on only one of them-the optimisticresponse-which both affirmsand celebrates the unparalleledtheoretical potentialities presumably created by the pre- sent intellectualtransition. While acknowledging the considerablepromise of the thirddebate, the essay notes that post-positivismoffers nearly as manydead ends as itopens promisingpaths for future research. The essay issues some warningsconcerning hazards of misplaced or extravagant theoreticalhopes, and it singles out enhanced reflexivityin the scholarly communityof internationalrelations as the notablecontribution to date of the currenttheoretical restructuring. "The searchfor a bettertheory formsthe third debate . [It] is potentiallythe richest, most promisingand excitingthat we have everhad in internationalrelations." MichaelBanks (1986:17) "Our enterpriseshows important signsof maturation." Kal Holsti(1984:361) Excursions into metatheory are notoriously controversial in the social sciences. One finds, on the one hand, the conviction that such concerns "are too important to be taken for granted and too much a part of our ongoing research enterprises to be left to philosophers to think about" (Fiske and Shweder, 1986:3). Furthermore, as Mario Bunge notes, "Those who tryto ignore philosophy only succeed in reinventing Author'sNote: For their support in the preparation of this article, I thank the Leonard Davies Institutefor InternationalRelations at the Hebrew Universityof Jerusalemand the Departmentof PoliticalScience at Carleton Universityin Ottawa. I am gratefulto Meir Stieglitz,two anonymous referees,and the Editors of ISQ. ? 1989 InternationalStudies Association This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 236 Prospectsof International Theory in a Post-PositivistEra it" (Bunge, 1983:270). One finds,on the other hand, a prescriptionfor a rigorous philosophy-avoidancestrategy for the practicingsocial scientist.Especially in the earlystages of theorizing,so thisargument goes, misplacedpursuits of epistemology and philosophyof scienceare bound to be inconclusiveand are likelyto come at the expense of actual research(Rosenberg, 1986). Be thatas it may,it is hardlydisputable that the demise of theempiricist-positivist promisefor a cumulativebehavioral science recently has forcedscholars from nearly all thesocial disciplines to reexaminethe ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundationsof their scientificendeavors. As a result, the human sciences are currentlyundergoing an acute bout of self-doubtand heightenedmetatheoretical ferment.Indeed, some of the most highlyprized premisesof Westernacademic discourse concerningthe nature of our social knowledge,its acquisition,and its utility-includingshibboleths such as "truth,""rationality," "objectivity, reality," and "consensus,"-have come under renewedcritical reflection (Fay, 1985). AnthonyGiddens (1979:238) has identifiedfour typicalresponses to this re- awakening of metatheoreticalimpulses followingthe collapse of the positivist orthodoxy:the "despairing,"the "dogmatic,"the "celebratory,"and his own,the call for a "systematicreconstruction" of social theory.Alarmed by the conspicuous absence of a single shared convictionabout the nature and destinationof social theory,the despairingresponse articulates an instinctivedesire not to be disturbed by foundational,or "meta"-scientific,problems. Noting that experts in metascience rarelyagree among themselves,this response clings to pre-Kuhnianverities about objectivity,testability, and falsificationand encouragessocial scientiststo go on with some "useful" or practical work. Unfortunately,this retreatistpattern neither addresses nor settlesthe issues raised by the currentintellectual transfiguration. Worsestill, the creative potential of thecrisis is lostin "thehaste of wantingto know." The dogmaticresponse suffers from similar limitations. In the face of expanding confusionand as a resultof a foundationalistcraving to restoreintellectual security, thisresponse appeals to an "authoritative"figure such as Karl Marx or Max Weber. As Giddens indicates,however, this reversionto dogmatismavoids rather than confrontsthe core problem. Certaintyis perhaps artificiallyrestored, but at an excessive scientific price. In sharp contrastto the firsttwo responses,the thirdaffirms and celebratesthe supposedly"liberating" potential of the Babel of theoreticalvoices currently sound- ing over the ruins of the positivistproject. It casts a new lighton the endemic diversityof theoriesby questioningthe assumptionthat convergenceof belief is necessaryfor maturityin science. It seriouslyexamines instead the possibilitythat, within limits,diversity of viewpointsmight be fully compatible with scientific rationalityand objectivity.This is an optimisticresponse, and thus Giddens cau- tiouslyapproves. He insists,however, that simply embracing-or compounding- this conditionof theoreticalpluralism may inadvertentlyaggravate the crisis.His fourthresponse, systematic reconstruction, addresses this problem by trying to order and transcend diversitywithout substituting a new orthodoxyfor the old one (Giddens, 1979:240). As we shall see shortly,this far-reaching and stillevolving intellectual transition in the philosophicaland social disciplineshas leftits markon internationalrelations scholarship.Following the "idealismversus realism" schism of the 1920s and 1930s, and transcendingthe more recent"history versus science" exchange of the 1950s and 1960s, in the late 1980s the disciplinestands in the midstof a thirddiscipline- definingdebate (Maghrooriand Ramberg,1982; Holsti, 1985a; Banks, 1986). It is noteworthythat in termsof methodologicaland theoreticalinnovations the fieldof internationalrelations was and stillis "an absorberand importer,not a producerin its own right"(Halliday, 1985:408). Hence, primafacie, thereare reasons to suspect thatjust as the "second debate"-the "historyversus science" controversy-was This content downloaded from 194.69.13.215 on Fri, 2 May 2014 02:59:37 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions YOSEF LAPID 237 wedded to the ascendance of positivismin Westernsocial science,so is the "third debate" linked, historicallyand intellectually,to the confluenceof diverse anti- positivisticphilosophical and sociologicaltrends. Submittingthat the third debate in internationalrelations theory parallels the intellectualferment that other social sciencesare presentlyundergoing and thatthis debateconstitutes a diffuseand stillmaturing disciplinary effort to reassess theoretical optionsin a "post-positivist"era, thisessay explores the debate's etiology and assesses itsimplications for current and futureprospects for theoretical growth. Although all fourresponses enumerated by Giddens are embryonicallypresent in the contextof the thirddebate, this study singles out one of them-the celebratorypattern-as its main focus.' This optimisticreaction has been chosen for threeprincipal reasons. First,it is a salientand provocativeresponse which merits special consideration in view of a lingeringsuspicion that somethingis stillradically wrong withinternational theory.2What, one mightask, is the natureand the originof thisapparent surge of optimism?Are we trulyon theverge of a newera in theoryor are we simplywitnessing an internationalrelations version of the "obsessivediscoverer's complex"?3 Second, froma more practicalpoint of view,the celebratorypattern is intriguing because of itsexplicit focus on some putativemoments of specialproductivity which are presumablyimplicit in the currentintellectual transition.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Sociological Functionalist Theory That Shapes the Filipino Social Consciousness in the Philippines
    Title: The Missing Sociological Imagination: Sociological Functionalist Theory That Shapes the Filipino Social Consciousness in the Philippines Author: Prof. Kathy Westman, Waubonsee Community College, Sugar Grove, IL Summary: This lesson explores the links on the development of sociology in the Philippines and the sociological consciousness in the country. The assumption is that limited growth of sociological theory is due to the parallel limited growth of social modernity in the Philippines. Therefore, the study of sociology in the Philippines takes on a functionalist orientation limiting development of sociological consciousness on social inequalities. Sociology has not fully emerged from a modernity tool in transforming Philippine society to a conceptual tool that unites Filipino social consciousness on equality. Objectives: 1. Study history of sociology in the Philippines. 2. Assess the application of sociology in context to the Philippine social consciousness. 3. Explore ways in which function over conflict contributes to maintenance of Filipino social order. 4. Apply and analyze the links between the current state of Philippine sociology and the threats on thought and freedoms. 5. Create how sociology in the Philippines can benefit collective social consciousness and of change toward social movements of equality. Content: Social settings shape human consciousness and realities. Sociology developed in western society in which the constructions of thought were unable to explain the late nineteenth century systemic and human conditions. Sociology evolved out of the need for production of thought as a natural product of the social consciousness. Sociology came to the Philippines in a non-organic way. Instead, sociology and the social sciences were brought to the country with the post Spanish American War colonization by the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Climate Change: How Do We Know We're Not Wrong? Naomi Oreskes
    Changing Planet: Past, Present, Future Lecture 4 – Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong? Naomi Oreskes, PhD 1. Start of Lecture Four (0:16) [ANNOUNCER:] From the Howard Hughes Medical Institute...The 2012 Holiday Lectures on Science. This year's lectures: "Changing Planet: Past, Present, Future," will be given by Dr. Andrew Knoll, Professor of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University; Dr. Naomi Oreskes, Professor of History and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego; and Dr. Daniel Schrag, Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Harvard University. The fourth lecture is titled: Climate Change: How Do We Know We're Not Wrong? And now, a brief video to introduce our lecturer Dr. Naomi Oreskes. 2. Profile of Dr. Naomi Oreskes (1:14) [DR. ORESKES:] One thing that's really important for all people to understand is that the whole notion of certainty is mistaken, and it's something that climate skeptics and deniers and the opponents of evolution really exploit. Many of us think that scientific knowledge is certain, so therefore if someone comes along and points out the uncertainties in a certain scientific body of knowledge, we think that undermines the science, we think that means that there's a problem in the science, and so part of my message is to say that that view of science is incorrect, that the reality of science is that it's always uncertain because if we're actually doing research, it means that we're asking questions, and if we're asking questions, then by definition we're asking questions about things we don't already know about, so uncertainty is part of the lifeblood of science, it's something we need to embrace and realize it's a good thing, not a bad thing.
    [Show full text]
  • “Hard-Won” Consensus Brent Ranalli
    Ranalli • Climate SCienCe, ChaRaCteR, and the “haRd-Won” ConSenSuS Brent Ranalli Climate Science, Character, and the “Hard-Won” Consensus ABSTRACT: What makes a consensus among scientists credible and convincing? This paper introduces the notion of a “hard-won” consensus and uses examples from recent debates over climate change science to show that this heuristic stan- dard for evaluating the quality of a consensus is widely shared. The extent to which a consensus is “hard won” can be understood to depend on the personal qualities of the participating experts; the article demonstrates the continuing util- ity of the norms of modern science introduced by Robert K. Merton by showing that individuals on both sides of the climate science debate rely intuitively on Mertonian ideas—interpreted in terms of character—to frame their arguments. INTRodUCTIoN he late Michael Crichton, science fiction writer and climate con- trarian, once remarked: “Whenever you hear the consensus of Tscientists agrees on something or other, reach for your wallet, because you’re being had. In science consensus is irrelevant. What is relevant is reproducible results” (Crichton 2003). Reproducibility of results and other methodological criteria are indeed the proper basis for scientific judgments. But Crichton is wrong to say that consensus is irrel- evant. Consensus among scientists serves to certify facts for the lay public.1 Those on the periphery of the scientific enterprise (i.e., policy makers and the public), who don’t have the time or the expertise or the equipment to check results for themselves, necessarily rely on the testimony of those at the center.
    [Show full text]
  • Ois Laruelle
    Frans;ois Laruelle --- and collaborators --- Dictio nary of Non-Philosophy -- translated by Taylor Adkins I Univocal -- Fran\:ois Laruelle ------ and collaborators -----­ To ny Brachet. Gilbert Kieffer, Laurent Leroy, Da niel Nicolet, Anne-Fran�oise Schmid, Serge Valdinoci Dictio nary of Non-Philosophy translated by Taylor Adkins I Univocal ---- DJCT!ONNAIREDE LA NON-PHILOSOPH!Eby Fran�ois Laruelle ©Editions Kime, 1998 Translated by Taylor Adkins as Dictionary ofNon-Philosophy First Edition Minneapolis©2013, Univocal Publishing Published by Univocal 123 North 3rd Street, #202 Minneapolis, MN 55401 No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including phorocopying, recording or any other information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Thanks to John David Ebert and Ben Woodard Designed & Printed by Jason Wagner Distributed by the University of Minnesota Press ISBN 9781937561130 Library of Congress Control Number 2013939530 TA BLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introduction .......................................... .....................9 Preface to the English Language Edition...................... ................. 15 Preface .........................................................................................19 Theory of the Non-Philosophical Dictionary....................... .......23 Auto-position .......................... .....................................................39 Being-in-One (Being-according-to-the-One)...............................
    [Show full text]
  • The Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming Matters
    BSTXXX10.1177/0270467617707079Bulletin of Science, Technology & SocietyPowell 707079research-article2017 Article Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 2016, Vol. 36(3) 157 –163 The Consensus on Anthropogenic © The Author(s) 2017 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Global Warming Matters DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/0270467617707079 10.1177/0270467617707079 journals.sagepub.com/home/bst James Lawrence Powell1 Abstract Skuce et al., responding to Powell, title their article, “Does It Matter if the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming Is 97% or 99.99%?” I argue that the extent of the consensus does matter, most of all because scholars have shown that the stronger the public believe the consensus to be, the more they support the action on global warming that human society so desperately needs. Moreover, anyone who knows that scientists once thought that the continents are fixed in place, or that the craters of the Moon are volcanic, or that the Earth cannot be more than 100 million years old, understands that a small minority has sometimes turned out to be right. But it is hard to think of a case in the modern era in which scientists have been virtually unanimous and wrong. Moreover, as I show, the consensus among publishing scientists is demonstrably not 97%. Instead, five surveys of the peer-reviewed literature from 1991 to 2015 combine to 54,195 articles with an average consensus of 99.94%. Keywords global warming, climate change, consensus, peer review, history of science Introduction Consensus Skuce et al. (2016, henceforth S16), responding to Powell What does consensus in science mean and how can it best be (2016), ask, “Does it matter if the consensus on anthropo- measured? The Oxford English Dictionary (2016) defines genic global warming is 97% or 99.99%?” consensus as “Agreement in opinion; the collective unani- Of course it matters.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceptions of Science in America
    PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE IN AMERICA A REPORT FROM THE PUBLIC FACE OF SCIENCE INITIATIVE THE PUBLIC FACE OF SCIENCE PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE IN AMERICA american academy of arts & sciences Cambridge, Massachusetts © 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences All rights reserved. isbn: 0-87724-120-1 This publication is available online at http://www.publicfaceofscience.org. The views expressed in this publication are those held by the contributors and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Please direct inquiries to: American Academy of Arts & Sciences 136 Irving Street Cambridge ma 02138-1996 Telephone: 617-576-5000 Fax: 617-576-5050 Email: [email protected] Web: www.amacad.org CONTENTS Preface v Top Three Takeaways vii Introduction 1 SECTION 1: General Perceptions of Science 4 Confidence in Scientific Leaders Remains Relatively Stable 4 A Majority of Americans Views Scientific Research as Beneficial . 6 . But Many are Concerned about the Pace of Change 7 Americans Express Strong Support for Public Investment in Research 8 Americans Support an Active Role for Science and Scientists in Public Life 10 Scientists Should Play a Major Role in Shaping Public Policy 11 Discussion and Research Considerations 12 SECTION 2: Demographic Influences on General Views of Science 14 Confidence in Scientific Leaders Varies Based on Demographics and Other Factors 14 Higher Educational Attainment Correlates with Positive Perceptions of Science 16 Trust in Scientists Varies Based on Education and Politics 18 Discussion and Research Considerations 20 SECTION 3: Case Studies of Perceptions on Specific Science Topics 22 There is No Single Anti-Science Population .
    [Show full text]
  • Centennial Bibliography on the History of American Sociology
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Sociology Department, Faculty Publications Sociology, Department of 2005 Centennial Bibliography On The iH story Of American Sociology Michael R. Hill [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons Hill, Michael R., "Centennial Bibliography On The iH story Of American Sociology" (2005). Sociology Department, Faculty Publications. 348. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub/348 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Department, Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Hill, Michael R., (Compiler). 2005. Centennial Bibliography of the History of American Sociology. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association. CENTENNIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY Compiled by MICHAEL R. HILL Editor, Sociological Origins In consultation with the Centennial Bibliography Committee of the American Sociological Association Section on the History of Sociology: Brian P. Conway, Michael R. Hill (co-chair), Susan Hoecker-Drysdale (ex-officio), Jack Nusan Porter (co-chair), Pamela A. Roby, Kathleen Slobin, and Roberta Spalter-Roth. © 2005 American Sociological Association Washington, DC TABLE OF CONTENTS Note: Each part is separately paginated, with the number of pages in each part as indicated below in square brackets. The total page count for the entire file is 224 pages. To navigate within the document, please use navigation arrows and the Bookmark feature provided by Adobe Acrobat Reader.® Users may search this document by utilizing the “Find” command (typically located under the “Edit” tab on the Adobe Acrobat toolbar).
    [Show full text]
  • TIMELINES Newsletter of the ASA History of Sociology Section July 2013, No
    HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY SECTION, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION JULY 2013, NO. 21 TIMELINES Newsletter of the ASA History of Sociology Section July 2013, No. 21 , Richard Swedberg INSIDE Message from the Chair History of Sociology as a Working Memory (Part 2) ESSAYS Message from the Chair 1 In the last issue of this news- study of good quality. Wilner Figures 3 letter I suggested that one way of My suggestion is that members of looking at the history of sociology is HOS may want to devote attention to to see it as the working memory of both of these tasks. While having EVENTS AT ASA sociology. In this brief follow-up ar- access to a high quality history of HoS Events at ASA 4-5 ticle I want to continue with this ar- sociology is important and valuable New Symposium 6 gument and spell out some of its im- to all sociologists (Task 1), it may Doctoral Students & plications. not engage their direct interest and Early Career Sociologists The history of sociology, I argue, more than, say, historians of sociolo- has two main functions. One is to gy are directly concerned with what NEWS produce the history of sociology in a is going on in one and every subfield Report: Award Panel 12 narrow sense, a bit like the task of of sociology. What immediately con- Recent publications 14 historians is to carefully write and cerns all sociologists, however, is the Book Spotlight 15 Announcement 16 analyze the history of the past. This kind of knowledge of the past that Section Awards 19 is a task that typically only experts in they need to have in order to carry Awards and Honors 19 the history of sociology will engage out their own research in a compe- in.
    [Show full text]
  • Empiricism, Stances, and the Problem of Voluntarism
    Swarthmore College Works Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy 1-1-2011 Empiricism, Stances, And The Problem Of Voluntarism Peter Baumann Swarthmore College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy Part of the Philosophy Commons Let us know how access to these works benefits ouy Recommended Citation Peter Baumann. (2011). "Empiricism, Stances, And The Problem Of Voluntarism". Synthese. Volume 178, Issue 1. 27-36. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9519-7 https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/13 This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Empiricism, Stances and the Problem of Voluntarism Peter Baumann Synthese 178, 2011, 207-224 Empiricism can be very roughly characterized as the view that our knowledge about the world is based on sensory experience. Our knowledge about the world is "based" on sensory experience in the sense that we could not know what we know without relying on sense experience. This leaves open the possibility that sense experience is only necessary but not sufficient for the knowledge based upon it1-as long as the non-empirical elements are not themselves sufficient for the relevant piece of knowledge.2 The basing relation is not just a genetic one but also a justificatory one: Sense experience does not only lead to beliefs which happen to count as knowledge but also qualifies them as knowledge. In his important book The Empirical Stance Bas van Fraassen characterizes traditional empiricism at one point in a more negative way-as involving the rejection of "metaphysical" explanations which proceed by postulating the existence of something not 1 "But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience." (Kant, CpR, B1).
    [Show full text]
  • Reply by Jean Bricmont and Alan Sokal
    Reply to Turnbull Krips Dusek and Fuller For Metascience Jean Bricmont Institut de Physique Theorique Universite Catholique de Louvain chemin du Cyclotron B LouvainlaNeuve BELGIUM Internet BRICMONTFYMAUCLACBE Telephone Fax Alan Sokal Department of Physics New York University Washington Place New York NY USA Internet SOKALNYUEDU Telephone Fax February Biographical Note Jean Bricmont is professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain Belgium Alan Sokal is professor of physics at New York University Introduction 1 In the preface to the second edition of Intel lectual Impostures we wrote that the criticisms of our b o ok can b e divided roughly into four types A very few reviewers discuss what we wrote and try to refute it Other commentators raise ob jections often p erfectly valid ones to ideas that are not in fact ours and that we may have expressly rejected in the b o ok while attributing them to us implicitly or explicitly Yet a third group of critics pretend to discuss our b o ok while actually doing something completely dierent for example attacking our p ersonalities our alleged motivations for writing the b o ok or the failings of scientists in general And nally some reviewers agree with us but think that we do not go far enough I I p xv The comments by Turnbull and Dusek fall squarely into the second and third cat egories apart from o ccasional brief excursions into category while Krips and Fuller oer a mixture of the rst and second categories It would b e a hop eless task to address al l the issues
    [Show full text]
  • Scientific Consensus in Policy and the Media
    An Exercise in Scientific Integrity: Scientific Consensus in Policy and the Media I. The Importance of Scientific Consensus Science is a collaborative effort; over time, the ideas of many scientists are synthesized, modified, clarified, and sometimes discarded altogether as our understanding improves. Thus, science can be viewed as a method of reaching a consensus about the ways in which the world works. 1. From what you know about the scientific method, the peer review process, and the development of scientific theories, what does it mean when a scientific consensus emerges in a given field? 2. When science can have an impact on issues such as public health, environmental sustainability, and areas in which people have ethical or religious concerns (e.g., evolution, cloning), how should the existence of a scientific consensus affect the development of policy? 3. How should policy makers react to a scientific consensus that is politically or economically inconvenient? II. Skepticism Toward Scientific Consensus There are two unfortunate obstacles to an accurate public understanding of scientific consensus and its importance. First is a tendency to exaggerate the number of times scientific consensus has been overturned. This comes, in part, from the excitement of scientists, the public, and the media to new and untested ideas. When these attention- grabbing ideas prove mistaken or exaggerated during subsequent scientific review, this can give the impression that science has “failed.” There are certainly times when scientific consensus has been overturned, but such instances are rare. 4. How should policy makers react to cutting-edge science? Are there situations where policy decisions should be made before a scientific consensus has been reached, or should governments wait until the science is very clear? 5.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding and Trusting Science
    Understanding and Trusting Science MATTHEW H. SLATER, JOANNA K. HUXSTER, JULIA E. BRESTICKER (forthcoming in the Journal for the General Philosophy of Science) Science communication via testimony requires a certain level of trust. But in the context of ideologically-entangled scientific issues, trust is in short supply — particularly when the issues are politically “entangled”. In such cases, cultural values are better predictors than scientific literacy for whether agents trust the publicly-directed claims of the scientific community. In this paper, we argue that a common way of thinking about scientific literacy — as knowledge of particular scientific facts or concepts — ought to give way to a second-order understanding of science as a process as a more important notion for the public’s trust of science. 1. Introduction The state of scientific literacy in America and in other developed nations has been an issue of concern for many decades now (Miller 1983, 2004; Bodmer 1985; OECD 2007). More recently, a palpable anti-science sentiment has become more prominent (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Kahan 2015). This is reflected, in part, by the fact that large portions of the public remain intransigent with respect to their dismissal of policy-relevant science, such as that concerning the risks of anthropogenic climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2016). Given the amount of attention that scientific education and communication have received in the intervening decades, these facts may seem a little surprising. Why have we failed to bring about better outcomes? A number of plausible explanations could be cited, from the persistence of problematic models of science communication to the increasing prominence of well-funded anti-science groups (Dunlap and McCright 2010, 2011; Brulle 2014).
    [Show full text]